Hircocervi & Other Metaphysical Wonders: Essays in Honor of John P. Doyle 0874627214, 9780874627213

Table of contents :
Hircocervi & Other Metaphysical Wonders cover
Half Title
Title Page
Series Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
Epigrams
Acknowledgments
Editor's Foreword
Chapter 1
Chapter 2
Chapter 3
Chapter 4
Chapter 5
Chapter 6
Chapter 7
Chapter 8
Chapter 9
Chapter 10
Chapter 11
Chapter 12
Post Scriptum
About the Contributors
Index of Names
Index of Terms

Citation preview

HIRCOCERVI & OTHER METAPHYSICAL W:ONDERS

Hircocervi & Other Metaphysical Wonders

Hircocervi & Other Metaphysical Wonders Essays in Honor of

John P. Doyle

Edited by

Victor M. Salas

Marquette studies in philosophy No. 84 Andrew Tallon, Series Editor Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hircocervi & other metaphysical wonders : essays in honor of John P. Doyle / edited by Victor M. Salas. — first [edition].        pages cm. —  (Marquette studies in philosophy ; No. 84)   Includes bibliographical references and index.   ISBN 978-0-87462-721-3 (hardcover : alk. paper) — ISBN 0-87462-721-4 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1.  Philosophy, Medieval.  I. Salas, Victor M., editor of compilation. II. Doyle, John P., 1930- III. Title: Hircocervi and other metaphysical wonders. B720.H57 2013 189—dc23      2012049690

© 2013 Marquette University Press Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201-3141 All rights reserved. www.marquette.edu/mupress/

Printed at Thomson-Shore, Dexter, Michigan, USA Cover portrait, “Jack Doyle.” Oil on canvas, 11 x 17 in. ©2013 Curt Crain. http://crainpainting.com/gallery.html

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences— Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1992.

table of contents Editor’s Foreword ~ 9 Chapter 1: The Eternity of the World According to Peter of Candia Stephen Brown ~ 31 Chapter 2: Suárez & Medieval Transcendental Thought Rolf Darge ~ 65 Chapter 3: John Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Marsilius of Inghen on Chimerae, & Impossible Objects Thomas Dewender ~ 95 Chapter 4: “Ut ex etymologia nominis patet?” John Punch on the Nature & the Object of Metaphysics Marco Forlivesi ~ 121 Chapter 5: Actions Speak Louder Then Words: What Aquinas Learned from Maimonides Jennifer Hart-Weed ~ 157 Chapter 6: Abstraction, Intentionality, & Moderate Realism: Suárez & Poinsot. Daniel Heider ~ 177 Chapter 7: John Duns Scotus’s Approach to Metaphysics Ludger Honnefelder ~ 213 Chapter 8: Thomistic Ornithology: A Brief Note Jack Marler ~ 229 Chapter 9: Twenty Years after Suárez: Francisco de Araújo on the Nature, Existence, & Causes of Entia rationis Daniel Novotný ~ 241 Chapter 10: Man’s Ability to Understand His Own Understanding: Aquinas, Kant, & Modern Physics Michael Renemann ~ 269

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Chapter 11: Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, & Edith Stein on Essential Being Victor Salas ~ 285 Chapter 12: Augustinian Abstraction & Henry of Ghent’s Metaphysical Argument Roland Teske, S.J. ~ 309 Post Scriptum: Hircocervi & Other Metaphysical Wonders John Patrick Doyle ~ 329 About the Contributors ~ 369 Index of Names ~ 373 Index of Terms ~ 377

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idetur enim aliqua negativa omnino nihil ponere, et tamen esse vera: ergo verum non universaliter causatur ab ente, nec convertitur cum ente. Verbi gratia, si dicam sic, Caesar non est homo: haec enim (ut dicunt quidam) nihil ponit. Et si dubitatur de illa, pono istam, tragelaphus non est fligax, vel chimaera non est hircocervus, quae nec secundum extrema, nec secundum compositionem, videtur supponere aliquod ens: ergo videtur, quod nec hoc sit verum universaliter, quod verum cum ente convertitur: nec hoc, quod sicut unumquodque se habet ad esse, ita se habet ad verum: nec hoc, quod in eo quod res est, vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa est.

A

—Albertus Magnus, Super Sententiarum I, d. 46, a. 13 (ed. Borgnet, vol. 26, 449a)

trusty servant’s picture would you see/ This figure well survey, who’ever you be./ The porker’s snout not nice in diet shows;/ The padlock shut, no secret he’ll disclose;/ Patient, to angry lords the ass gives ear;/ Swiftness on errand, the stag’s feet declare;/ Laden his left hand, apt to labour saith;/ The coat his neatness; the open hand his faith;/ Girt with his sword, his shield upon his arm,/ Himself and master he’ll protect from harm.

I

—An inscription describing a wall painting (hanging in Winchester College, Hampshire, England) called “The Trusty Servant” (1597) in which is depicted a Hircocervus

don’t think there is any such thing as less than nothing. Nothing is absolutely the limit of nothingness. It’s the lowest you can go. It’s the end of the line. How can something be less than nothing? If there were something less than nothing, then nothing would not be nothing, it would be something: even though it’s just a very little bit of something. But if nothing is nothing, then nothing has nothing that is less than it is.”

—Wilbur the Pig, Charlotte’s Web by E.B. White

Acknowledgments

I

wish to thank all the contributors to this volume for their very fine scholarship and kind patience throughout the various steps of publication. I owe a debt of gratitude to the financial support of Mr. and Mrs. William Dick, whose love for learning and generous patronage of intellectual and artistic endaevors will be of benefit for generations to come. Mr. Darren Hogan was an invaluable resource in helping with the more practical affairs of bringing this volume to publication. Finally, I am grateful for the support of the Very Rev. Msgr. Todd Lajiness, Rector-President of Sacred Heart Major Seminary, whose generosity likewise helped this volume find its way to publication.

Editor’s Foreword

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he twelve essays contained in this volume are a tribute to the career and scholarship of John Patrick Doyle offered by his former students, colleagues, and friends. Chapter 1, an edition of Peter of Candia’s Commentarium in II librum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. l, a. 3, which pertains to the question of the eternity of the world, is Stephen Brown’s contribution to this volume. In chapter 2 Rolf Darge discusses Suárez’s understanding of the transcendental character of being and takes pains to distinguish it from Scotus’s conceptus entis simpliciter simplex. In chapter 3 Thomas Dewender offers an examination of a subject near and dear to Doyle, impossible objects, according to the logical and semantic analyses of John Buridan and his followers, Albert of Saxony and Marsilius of Ingham. Marco Forlivesi’s contribution, chapter 4, considers the role epistemology plays for John Punch in determining the proper object of metaphysics. Chapter 5 offers Jennifer Hart-Weed’s consideration of how Moses Maimonides’s account of divine actions informs much of Thomas Aquinas’s analogical theory of religious language. Chapter 6 is Daniel Heider’s contribution, wherein it is argued that Suárez’s ontological theory of universals, even when compared to John Poinsot’s theory of universals, proves to be an equivalent—if not stronger—form of moderate realism than that of the Thomists. Ludger Honnefelder’s essay, chapter 7, identifies the nature, scope, and peculiar features of Duns Scotus’s metaphysics, identifying it as a truly transcendental science. Jack Marler’s contribution, chapter 8, on the De ente et essentia’s ‘phoenix example’ argues that Thomas’s intention is to show how even (created) individuals that are one of a kind, like the phoenix, are such that their essence too is really distinct from their esse. In chapter 9 Daniel Novotný places Francisco de Araújo’s theory of entia rationis into opposition with that of Suárez and argues that, while the former is not exactly the philosophical equal of the latter, nonetheless, Araújo improves upon and ultimately holds a more consistent theory than Suárez. Chapter 10, Michael Renemann’s contribution, argues that self-consciousness according to Thomas Aquinas is not nerely as

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anemic as those sympathetic to Kant might consider it to be is but a truth-revealing power that has significant implications in contemporary experimental science. My own contribution, chapter 11, examines the notion of ‘essential being’ as a point of convergence between the medieval metaphysics of Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus, on the one hand, and, on the other, the phenomenology of Edith Stein. Finally, in chapter 12 Roland Teske, S.J., discusses Henry of Ghent’s metaphysical argument for God’s existence and finds it problematic because of a faltering effort to synthesize a fundamentally Platonic Augustinian abstraction theory with an Aristotelian analogy of being. The volume concludes with a post scriptum featuring a reprint of one of Doyle’s own articles on imaginary beings. In this essay Doyle, the consummate historian of philosophy, traces the lineage of beings of reason from a cast off of the Aristotelian metaphysics (i.e., being as true) to the vexing centerpiece of late Scholastic metaphysics. Questions pertaining to the metaphysical status of such “shadowy” beings eventually give rise to that topic which would eventually preoccupy much of Doyle’s scholarship, namely, supertranscendental being.

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Students of late Scholastic philosophy, in general, and especially of Francisco Suárez, in particular, are no doubt familiar with the work of John Doyle. A 1966-graduate from the University of Toronto, Doyle studied under some of the twentieth century’s most notable and preeminent Thomists, including: Étienne Gilson, Armand Maurer, Gerald B. Phelan, and Joseph Owens, to name only a few. As is well known, the Thomism emerging from Toronto during those years, characterized as it was by its strong emphasis on Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine of esse, earned the sobriquet “Existential Thomism.” Crucial to their interpretation of Thomas was the Dominican’s understanding of esse as the actualitas omnium actuum and perfectissimum inter omnia,1 which understanding, as they saw it, was a watershed moment in the history of metaphysics that propelled the Angelic Doctor well beyond the essentialist metaphysics of both his contemporaries and late Scholastic successors. More often than not, at least as Gilson tells us

1  Cf. Thomas Aquinas, De potentia Dei, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9.

 Editor’s Foreword

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in his Being and Some Philosophers2 and again in his L’être et l’essence,3 what the “essentialist metaphysics” had in common is a metaphysical point de départ located in an Avicennian-based account of essence broadly speaking. Avicenna had explained that essence is subject to a threefold consideration: it can be taken as existing in an individual (and thus as a particular), as existing in the mind (and thus as a universal), and, perhaps most significantly, at least for the purpose of conducting a scientific metaphysics, as taken just in itself or considered per se.4 With respect to this last sense of essence, Avicenna exclaims, “Equinitas est tantum equinitas,”5 and, as Gilson put it, this horse “was destined to become a battle horse later to be ridden by no less a rider than Duns Scotus….”6 Not only Scotus, but his disciples and critics alike took turns astride the metaphysical steed. One of the most significant philosophical figures to take his turn upon this metaphysical “battle horse” was the Jesuit Scholastic Francisco Suárez. With one foot in Scholasticism and another in modernity,7 Suárez literally straddled the transformation of medieval thought into early modern philosophy. What is more and as Doyle has argued, not only did Suárez form a juncture in the history of philosophy, in many ways it was Suárez himself who set the process in motion whereby high medieval Scholasticism irrevocably transformed into modern philosophy. Certainly there are indications of Suárez’s pivotal role within modern philosophy. For example, even only a cursory glance through 2  Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd edition (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952). 3  L’être et l’essence (Paris: J. Vrin, 1962). 4 Avicenna, Logica I in Avicennae perhypatetici philosophi: ac medicorum facile primi opera (Venice, 1508): “Essentie vero rerum aut sunt in ipsis rebus: aut sunt in intellectu: unde habent tres respectus: unus respectus essentiae est secundum quod ipsa est non relata ad aliquod tertium esse: nec ad id quod sequitur eam secundum quod ipsa est sic. Alius respectus est secundum quod est in his singularibus. Et alius secundum quod est in intellectu” (fol. 2rB). 5 Avicenna Latinus, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, ed. S. van Riet (Leiden: Brill, 1980), V.1, 228. 6  Being and Some Philosophers, 77. 7  For a lengthy discussion of Suárez’s status as a transitional figure see José Pereira’s Suárez: Between Scholasticism and Modernity (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2007).

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Christian Wolff ’s Philosophia prima sive ontologia, that great hallmark of modern philosophy and quintessential metaphysical textbook if ever there were such a thing,8 reveals not only the pervasive influence of Suárez but also the great esteem that Wolff held for his Jesuit predecessor, who, Wolff says, “among all the Scholastics has meditated more profoundly upon metaphysical things….”9 It is not unreasonable, then, for Gilson to maintain that Suárez “begot Wolff,”10 and, through Wolff, Immanuel Kant. Thus, Armand Maurer could rightly claim that Suárez served as “the main channel by which scholasticism came to be known by modern classical philosophers.”11 The role that Suárez played in the history of western metaphysics did not go unnoticed among the Toronto Thomists, and when, in several of his initial studies on the Jesuit thinker, Doyle likewise offered his own criticism of the Suárezian metaphysics, the dots were not difficult to connect, so to speak, between the project(s) that had been undertaken by his mentors and the scholarly course upon which Doyle himself embarked. Doyle maintained together with the Existential Thomists that each of the Avicennian-inspired metaphysicians, such as Suárez, sought within essence, in some fashion or another, an answer to the question of being. Yet, as “esse,” as well as oneness, universality, individuality, etc., is incidental to an essence considered as such, 8  The esteem with which Kant held Wolff as the metaphysician par excellence is beyond dispute. In the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant writes: “… the famous Wolff, the greatest among all dogmatic philosophers, … gave us the first example (an example by which he became the author of a spirit of well-groundedness in Germany that is still not extinguished) of the way in which the secure course of a science is to be taken, through the regular ascertainment of the principles, the clear determination of concepts, the attempt at strictness of proof and the prevention of audacious leaps in inference…” (B xxxvi-xxxvii; trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood, Cambridge University Press, 1998). It is not too much of an exaggeration, I think, to view Christian Wolff and metaphysics as nearly synonymous for Kant. 9  Christian Wolff, Philosophia prima sive ontologia, pars I, sect. 2, c. 3, n. 169, ed. Jean Ecole (Hildesheim: George Olms, 1962, reprint): “Sane Franciscus Suarez e Societate Jesu, quem inter Scholasticos res metaphysicas profundius meditatum ….” 10  Being and Some Philosophers, 112. 11  Armand Maurer, Medieval Philosophy (New York, NY: Random House, 1962), 356.

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each essentialist metaphysics established itself as “existentially neutral.” This is not to say that ‘existence’ was rejected or dismissed a priori;12 Gilson himself was aware of this, and so, concerning Aristotle, noted that “to be means to exist, and this, probably, was what it meant to Aristotle himself when, in everyday life, he forgot to philosophize.”13 So too was it the case with Avicenna, who, well before Hamlet, recognized the urgency of the question “to be or not to be?” No, existence was not banished from metaphysical thinking, but the question for these thinkers, as indeed it is for all philosophers, was what to do with it? For Avicenna, it seemed that there was only one place to turn. Not in essences themselves, for as the Persian maintained, considered simply in themselves essences have neither existence (esse) nor even unity. Rather, existence, as the actualization of some possible essence, must be sought in the relationship between that essence and the divine being, necesse esse, who is understood as simply existence itself so much so that it does not even have a quiddity or essence: “Primus igitur non habet quidditatem, sed super habentia quidditates fluit esse ab eo.”14 Here, then, transposed to an Avicennian framework, the question of existence is recast in terms of the modal interplay between necessity 12  It is interesting to note, however, that in one of his Heideggerian-inspired moments, Doyle actually describes Suárez as a” metaphysical nihilist” for the reason that the Jesuit, in prescinding from esse as is required by his scientific metaphysics, deliberately leaves out a consideration of existence and thus is truly subject to the charge of Seinsvergessenheit as Heidegger had maintained. Cf. Doyle, “Heidegger and Scholastic Metaphysics,” The Modern Schoolman 49 (1972): 201-220; for more on this issue see what follows. 13  Being and Some Philosophers, 45. In his own way Joseph Owens, Gilson’s star pupil and Doyle’s Doktor Vater, also noted Aristotle’s philosophical blindness to existence in his The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics: A Study in the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978). See, e.g.: “From the viewpoint of the much later distinction between essence and the act of existing, this treatment [i.e., of the question of ‘being’] must mean that Aristotle is leaving the act of existence [i.e., esse or the actus essendi] entirely outside the scope of his philosophy. The act of existing must be wholly escaping his scientific consideration” (309, emphasis his). Cf. this quote with Gilson’s claim that, for Aristotle, “Inasmuch as it is an abstractly objective interpretation of reality, philosophy is not interested in actual existence…” (51). 14 Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima, VIII.4, 402.

14 Hircocervi & Other Metaphysical Wonders (necesse esse) and possibility, which latter essences enjoy of themselves on account of their own metaphysical constitution.15 Doyle’s early work on Suárez and the possibles shows that, for Christian theologians of the Middle Ages and late Scholastic period, the difficulties engendered by a metaphysics of essence become all the more acute insofar as the Christian God, much more so than Avicenna’s necesse esse, must be the ultimate point of resolution for all being, not just actual being but also possible being. It is insufficient for the Christian theologian—for whom God is taken to be a creator ex nihilo—to appeal simply to a (creaturely) essence in order to account for its possibility, for, in order to preserve a creation-metaphysics, even the possibility of a creaturely essence must be understood as extrinsic to that essence and ultimately dependent upon God’s creative causality.16 It is within this creationist framework that one is led to Henry of Ghent’s theory of the esse essentiae, Scotus’s doctrine of esse intelligibile, Suárez’s metaphysics of being taken as a noun (which not only considers actual being but also possible being inasmuch as the latter is apt to exist17), and even more remotely to Christian Wolff ’s metaphysics of possiblity.18 The question that concerned Doyle here is whether these metaphysical theories of essence can accommodate the exigencies of their proponents’ commitment to a doctrine of creation ex nihilo. At least with respect to Suárez, Doyle’s outlook is not so sanguine. The budding Gilsonian Thomist concluded his early analysis of the Suárezian doctrine of possibles with the following remark: “Apart 15  See Gerard Smith, “Avicenna and the Possibles,” The New Scholasticism 17 (1943): 340-357. 16  Cf. John Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines on the Reality of Nonexisting Possibles,” in Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas, ed. J. Wippel (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1984), 163-190; for Scotus see Tobias Hoffman, “Duns Scotus on the Origin of Possibles in the Divine Intellect,” in Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century, eds. Stephen Brown, Thomas Dewender, and Theo Kobusch (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2009), 359-379. 17  Cf. Suárez, Disputationes metaphysicae [hereafter DM] 2.4.3 (ed. Vivès, Paris, 1861; vol. 25, 88): “Ens ergo … sumitur ut nomen significans de formali essentiam ejus rei, quae habet vel potest habere esse, non ut exercitum actu, sed in potentia vel apitudine….” All subsequent citations will be taken from the Vivès edition. 18  Cf., e.g., Wolff, Philosophia prima sive ontologia, § 135: “Quoniam illud existere potest, quod possibile est; quod possibile, ens est.”

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from the fantastic character of its ramifications … to say that the common denominator of being, the only intrinsic reality of a merely possible thing and the object of metaphysics, is simple non-repugnance or non-self-contradiction, comes close to reducing metaphysics itself to a kind of logomachy.”19 Later Doyle would trace the implications of this “logomachy” within the context of Heidegger’s charge of Seinsvergessenheit in which the Suárezian metaphysics is regarded not only as a kind of logomachy but it is, according to Doyle, a veritable form of metaphysical nihilism. Doyle’s reason for this claim follows from a number of the initial decisions Suárez makes in setting up his metaphysical project. For Suárez, metaphysics has as its adequate object being insofar as it is real being (ens in quantum ens reale).20 Furthermore, as Doyle notes,21 central to the Suárezian conception of real being is existence (esse), for ‘being’ (ens) inasmuch as it is being, says Suárez, is so called because it is from existence (ab esse) and, through esse or through its relation to esse, has the character of being (ens).22 Yet, Doyle then points out that, paradoxically, it is precisely from existence (esse) that the Suárezian metaphysics (construed as a science) deliberately prescinds or abstracts23 in order to consider all beings—both actual and possible [i.e., those beings (entia) that do not enjoy esse]—as they fall under the common concept of being.24 As Doyle sees it, with respect to being, Suárez “has forgotten its root in being (actus essendi) in favor of pursuing beings (entia) through the transcendental and categorical determinations of being as a noun (ens

19 Doyle, “Suarez on the Reality of the Possibles,” The Modern Schoolman 45 (1967): 29-48, quote on 47. 20 Suárez, DM 1.1.26 (vol. 25, 11): “Dicendum est ergo, ens in quantum ens reale esse objectum adaequatum hujus scientiae.” 21  Cf. Doyle, “Heidegger and Scholastic Metaphysics,” 205-207. 22 Suárez, DM 31.1.1 (vol. 26, 224): “… ens, inquantum ens, ab esse dictum est, et per esse, vel per ordinem ad esse habet rationem entis….” 23  Ibid., 1.5.40 (vol. 25, 49): “… scientia vero abstrahit ab existentia….” 24  Cf. ibid., 2.2.8 (vol. 25, 72): “Dico ergo primo, conceptui formali entis respondere unum conceptum objectivum adaquatum, et immediatum, qui expresse non dicit substantiam, neque accidens, neque Deum, nec creaturam, sed haec omnia per modum unius, scilicet quatenus sunt inter se aliquo modo similia, et conveniunt in essendo.”

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ut nomen).”25 Then, his Existential Thomism shining through, Doyle celebrates the existential triumph of Thomas Aquinas and exonerates the Dominican thinker from all charges of Seinsvergessenheit through appeal to a doctrine of being that is resolved not in terms of essence— and thus avoiding the logomachy that dares to exhaust reality of its ontological richness within the confines of a static concept—but in the actus essendi. Thus, whereas Suárez neglects esse and succumbs to the Heideggerian critique of Western metaphysics, Thomas resists Heidegger’s efforts at a Destruktion and places esse—that primordial existential act—at the very heart of his understanding of being, which act is not attained through a simple conceptualization but originally through judgment,26 for judgment—itself a dynamic synthesizing activity27—alone can respect the dynamism of esse. Doyle argues, for Thomas, “[creatures] point to a God Who, most centrally, lacks that composition of essence and esse which is mirrored by the complexity of an existential judgment. But since in themselves the core of being is the actus essendi, the indicated ‘reduction’ of essence and esse to perfect unity in God is from essence to esse, rather than vice versa.”28 In short, Doyle’s early work reveals a philosophical orientation largely formed by the Existential or Gilsonian Thomism of 1960s Toronto. This is not to suggest that in his later years Doyle eventually moved away from this Thomistic outlook, which, as Doyle himself admits, he retains to this very day.29 Nevertheless, the harsh and ready-to-pounce stance of his early work on Suárez evolved into a deep sympathy and more patient hearing of the Baroque Scholastic. This evolution may be due to a subtlety and complexity within Suárez’s work that can only 25 Doyle, “Heidegger and Scholastic Metaphysics,” 209. 26  As is well known, Thomas is deliberate about his decision to identify the apprehension of esse with judgment. The initial drafts of his Commentary on Boethius’ De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 3, where Thomas examines the role of judgment vis-à-vis esse, manifest Aquinas’s gradual movement toward judgment as the power whereby esse is apprehended. See Armand Maurer, Thomas Aquinas: The Divisions and Methods of the Sciences (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1986), xxv-xxvii. 27  Cf. Gerald B. Phelan, “Verum Sequitur Esse Rerum,” Mediaeval Studies 1 (1939): 11-22. 28 Doyle, “Heidegger and Scholastic Metaphysics,” 216. 29  See Doyle’s Collected Studies on Francisco Suárez, S.J. (1548-1617), ed. Victor Salas (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010), xv.

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be appreciated with prolonged familiarity and study; or perhaps the partisanship of a youthful scholar eventually matured into mellow, fragrant array of rich and complex notes. Or perhaps there were other reasons. Whatever the reason, the shift seems to have centered around Suárez’s doctrine of entia rationis. Doyle’s research into this “shadowy” realm of entia rationis led to a number of articles and an English translation of the fifty-fourth disputation of Suárez’s Disputationes metaphysicae.30 In that final disputation Suárez manages to preserve a realist metaphysics while opening the door for metaphysics’s eventual late Scholastic and Early Modern metastasization into a science centered upon the thinkable and, to that extent, upon the “ideal.” Just how this “metastasization” occurs is a story Doyle has told often in his work, but its basic outline can be considered briefly. Doyle has found an ancient distinction that Aristotle had made in his own coming to terms with the question of being lying behind Scholasticism’s shift to modern ontology. The distinction at hand is that between ‘being in the categories’ (i.e., real being, tÕ ×n Î Ôn) and ‘being as true’ (tÕ Ôn æj ¢lhqšj).31 Aristotle excludes the latter from the study of metaphysics and restricts ‘first philosophy’ to the study of real being. This distinction is repeated throughout the metaphysical tradition to which Suárez is heir.32 In the opening passages of his Disputationes metaphysicae the Jesuit metaphysician is clear: metaphysics, as has already been noted,33 has as its adequate object real being and excludes entia rationis—which Suárez, following Averroes, identifies with ‘being as true’—from its consideration.34 What is more, as entia rationis have only the name ‘being’ in common with real beings (vere entia), entia rationis, Suárez explains, do not fall under the same concept as real being (i.e., the conceptus entis), which concept is the 30  See bibliography appended to this foreword. 31  Metaphysics 6.2.1026a33–1026b2; ibid., 6.4.1027b34–1028a3. 32  One such example is that of Thomas Aquinas, who notes in the first chapter of his De ente et essentia that being (ens) is taken in two senses: (1) as that which is located in the categories and (2) as the truth of a proposition. Taken in the latter sense, ‘blindness’ can be considered being for it is in the eye, Thomas says, yet it has no essence and is thus not that with which his metaphysical treatise is concerned. Cf. Thomas, De ente et essentia, c. 1, ed. Leonine, 1976, vol. 43, 369, lines 2-18. 33  Cf. n. 20 supra. 34  Cf. Suárez, DM 1.1.4-6.

18 Hircocervi & Other Metaphysical Wonders proper object of metaphysics. As it turns out, entia rationis are called ‘being’ only by an imperfect analogy of proportionality in relation to real being.35 Even so, in the last disputation of his vast metaphysical oeuvre, Suárez does concern himself with these forbidden beings and subjects entia rationis to a lengthy quasi-metaphysical scrutiny. Of course, there he notes all the same caveats noted at the beginning of the Disputationes metaphysicae regarding entia rationis.36 Nevertheless, according to Suárez, entia rationis are of concern to the metaphysician insofar as they perform a pedagogical role and are needed for “human instruction.”37 While the metaphysician remains concerned with real being, he can also consider entia rationis, not directly or per se, but obliquely in their relation to ens reale and in terms of the objective being (esse objectivum) that entia rationis receive from their being thought. Here, again, Suárez follows Averroes’ lead,38 who, as noted, understood entia rationis in terms of Aristotle’s τὸ ὂν ὡς ἀλεθές and attributes the being they have to the intellect.39 Similarly, Suárez, though acknowledging that entia rationis have no real being, refuses to regard them as altogether nothing for they do have a sort of being (i.e., objective being) even if only in the intellect. A being of reason, says Suárez, is, “that which has objective being [esse objective] only in the 35 Cf. DM 1.1.5 (vol. 25, 3): “… quia talia [entia rationis] neque vere sunt entia, sed fere nomine tantum, neque cum entibus realibus conveniunt in eodem conceptu entis, sed solum per quamdam imperfectam analogiam proportionalitatis….” 36  Cf. ibid., 54.prol.1 (vol. 26, 1014-1015): “Quanquam in prima disputatione hujus operis dixerimus, ens rationis non comprehendi sub proprio et directo objecto metaphysicae… nihilominus ad complementum hujus doctrinae, et ad metaphysicum munus pertinere existimo, ea, quae communia et generalia sunt entibus rationis tradere.” Ibid., 54.1.9 (vol. 26, 1017): “… ens rationis, quamvis aliquo modo participet nomen entis, et non mere aequivoce et casu… non tamen posse participare aut convenire cum entibus realibus in conceptu ejus.” 37 Cf. DM 54.prol.1 (vol. 26, 1015): “Est enim eorum cognitio et scientia ad humanas doctrinas necessaria; vix enim sine illis loquimur, vel in metaphysica ipsa, vel etiam in philosophia, nedum in logica; et (quod magis est) etiam in Theologia.” 38  DM 54.1.6. 39 Doyle, “Another God, Chimerae, Goat-Stags, and Man-Lions: A Seventeenth-Century Debate about Impossible Objects,” The Review of Metaphysics 48 (1995): 775-776.

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intellect… which is thought of by reason as a being, yet in itself [it] has no entity.”40 Though they are mere products of the intellect, the metaphysician can conceive of and treat entia rationis as though they were positive realities.41 What is clear at the end of his discussion of entia rationis is that, despite his “step toward mentalism,” to borrow and adapt to the current discussion a phrase from Jorge Gracia,42 for Suárez, thought remains subordinate to being, and thus, as had been the case with so many thinkers before him, the Jesuit metaphysician remains faithful to a realist metaphysics and thus to the Aristotelian distinction between ‘being in the categories’ and ‘being as true.’ The subsequent history of Scholasticism, however, tells a different story, one that Doyle has carefully chronicled throughout his scholarly career. This story suggests that in his fifty-fourth disputation Suárez, even if unwittingly, opened a door through which a radically transformed metaphysics would emerge, one that extended itself beyond real so as to include beings of reason (i.e., ‘being as true’). According to Doyle, signs of this transformation, beyond what one finds in Suárez, are in place as early as the Calvinist Scholastic, Clemens Timpler (1567–1624), who, apparently taking his cue form Suárez, develops an ontology that embraces both real being and beings of reason in what might be called a ‘supertranscendental’ concept of being. For Timpler, ens in quantum ens reale is no longer adequate for the purposes of metaphysics, and so he turns instead to the broader omne intelligibile or πᾶν νοητόν, which includes real being, of course, but also entia rationis. Unlike Suárez, however, Timpler maintains more than a mere nominal community between real being and thought objects and posits an analogical 40 Cf. DM 54.1.6 (vol. 26, 1016): “Et ideo recte definiri solet, ens rationis esse illud, quod habet esse objective tantum in intellectu, seu esse id, quod a ratione cogitatur ut ens, cum tamen in se entitatem non habeat” (emphases in original). 41  Ibid., 54.3.4. 42  Jorge E. Gracia, “Suárez’s Conception of Metaphysics: A Step in the Direction of Mentalism?” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 65 (1991): 287-309. Cf. also Norman Wells, “Esse cognitum and Suárez Revisited,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 67 (1993): 249258; J.E. Gracia, “Suárez and Metaphysical Mentalism: The Last Visit,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 67 (1993): 349-354.

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conceptual community.43 Working along these same lines is Johannes Clauberg (1622–1665), yet another Protestant Scholastic who, after distinguishing among various meanings of being, settles upon being in the sense of ‘intelligible’ or ‘thinkable’ (cogitabile) as the proper subject of metaphysics.44 On the Catholic side of Scholasticism, several Jesuits, for example, Andreas Semery (1630-1717) and Maximilian Wietrowski (1660-1737), followed a similar route and not only maintained a conceptual community between ens reale and entia rationis, they also unified that community to the point of a univocity more radical, one might say, than even Scotus had ever dreamed.45 Despite the significant differences that exist among various Scholastic thinkers, differences that Doyle charted throughout his works, the basic thrust of their thinking converges upon a similar juncture and ultimately involves the subordination of being to thought in such a manner that thought is quite literally transformed into being. Accordingly, even impossible objects, such as the Greek ‘τραγέλαφος’ or Latin ‘hircocervus,’ though they involve a contradiction within their very core, are not entirely nothing. The reason for this claim stems from the fact that impossible objects are thinkable and to that extent are even in some sense ‘intelligible’—even if that intelligibility is entirely extrinsic—in the way that nonsense words such as ‘blituri’ and ‘scindapsos,’46 Doyle observes, are not. For the late Scholastics, bridging the divide between real being and purely imaginary being is “supertranscendental being,” that, according to Doyle, has its roots in Stoic “tinology.”47 For the Stoics, ‘something’ (ti) was wide enough to embrace even contradictions or impossible objects. Wearing the mantle of the ‘intelligible,’ 43 Cf. Doyle, “‘Extrinsic Cognoscibility:’ A Seventeenth-Century Supertranscendental Notion,” The Modern Schoolman 68 (1990): 58-59. 44  Ibid., 59. 45 Doyle, “Between Transcendental and Transcendental: The Missing Link?,” The Review of Metaphysics 50 (1997): 806-811. 46 Doyle, “Another God, Chimerae, Goat-Stags, and Man-Lions: A Seventeenth-Century Debate about Impossible Objects,” 772-773. 47  See Doyle, On the Borders of Being and Knowing: Some Late Scholastic Thoughts on Supertranscendental Being, ed. Victor Salas (Leuven University Press, 2012), ch. 1. Complementing Doyle’s work with respect to the evolution of τι into Scholasticism’s ‘supertranscendental being’ is Jean-François Courtine. Cf. his Suarez et la système de la métaphysique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990), ch. 4.

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this ‘tinology’ is resurrected at the dawn of modernity with Clauberg’s “omne quod cogitari potest,”48 Timpler’s “omne intelligibile,”49 Leibniz’s “nihil aliud est realitas quam cogitabilitas,”50 and eventually Berkeley’s famous “esse est percipi,” etc. What modern ontology witnesses, then, is the gradual transformation of nothing into something. That is, insofar as impossible objects—entia rationis included—can be thought, they are ‘intelligible;’ insofar as they are ‘intelligible,’ they are ‘something;’ and, finally, insofar as they are ‘something,’ they are not nothing, that is, they are! As Doyle’s career has shown, the metaphysical “battle horse” to which Gilson alluded in his Being and Some Philosophers evolved into a rather bizarre creature, a metaphysical hircocervus for which an entirely new category of being—supertranscendental being—would be required.

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Now an octogenarian—and a spry one at that—Doyle remains committed to an active program of teaching and research that would put to shame any newly minted assistant professor eagerly aspiring to tenure. Recently, Doyle has published a collection of his essays on Suárez, another volume devoted to supertranscendental being, a book-length translation of a portion of John of St. Thomas’s Cursus theologicus, and remains hard at work on several other projects. Though he fully retired from Saint Louis University, Doyle returned to the classroom and at the behest of then-Archbishop Raymond Burke (now Cardinal Prefect of the Apostolic Signatura) took up a position as Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Kenrick-Glennon Seminary (Shrewsbury, MO). As remarkable as his contribution to the “academy” are, Doyle’s greatest achievements are his personal ones. He has been happily married to his dear wife, Mary Gale, now for half a century. Together they raised seven children and are now loving grandparents of twelve. Those who know Doyle will testify to his cheerful and generous spirit. I myself was a direct beneficiary of his generosity as he directed my 48  Johannes Clauberg, Metaphysica de ente, quae rectius Ontosophia I, n. 4, 3rd ed., Amsterdam,1664. 49  See Doyle, “Extrinsic Cognoscibility,” 58. 50  G.W. Leibniz, Die Philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, ed. Carl Gerhard (Berlin, 1875), 272.

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graduate work and dissertation—I had the great honor and privilege of being his last dissertation student—even though he was moving through phased retirement and seeking relief from his responsibilities as a faculty member. Being the dissertation student of a mature scholar does not come without its own peculiar set of pressures. Urging me to complete my work in a timely fashion, Doyle would often threaten me with what he took to be his impending demise, “I no longer buy green bananas,” and, “I’ve got one foot in the grave and another on a banana peel.” I am grateful beyond words that John Doyle has very steady feet and pray that they will remain so for many, many more years to come. Finally, I might say that, as a graduate student at Saint Louis University, I knew that Doyle’s work was respected and enjoyed an international following. (More than a few scholars, after all, made their way from various parts of the globe to St. Louis to collaborate and study with Doyle; some are now contributors to this volume.) Yet, as “no prophet is accepted in his own country,” to borrow a saying from Luke, so likewise oftentimes an academic, at least in Doyle’s case, is not fully appreciated in his own institution; his 2008 full retirement from Saint Louis University, for example, lacked adequate recognition. It was not until 2007, when I participated in a conference in Prague devoted to Suárez’s Disputationes metaphysicae that I appreciated just how far-reaching Doyle’s scholarly influence is. After a harrowing taxi ride with a bewildered driver from Ruzyně Airport to the villa where the conference was being hosted, and still uncertain that I was at the correct place, I made my way into a room adorned with tapestries and frescos. (If not the proper location, then at least I would be stranded in style.) Taking up the center of the room was a long and imposing mahogany table, around which sat a group of strangers except for one who stood and addressed the gathered in German. (I would later learn that this person was Rolf Darge.) I quickly scanned the room looking for signs that I was at the Suárez conference, perhaps I might recognize the gathered as a group of Suárez scholars (though what I expected such a group to look like I have no idea). Suddenly, the lecturer, whose discourse had faded into a humming drone, captured my attention when, in one and the same breath, he mentioned “supertranscendentals” and “Jack Doyle.” I had been in Prague for less than an hour and already the name of Jack Doyle was ringing in my ears. I knew that I was in the right place.

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Bibliography of John P. Doyle Books: 1. Francisco Suárez, S.J., On Beings of Reason (De Entibus Rationis), Metaphysical Disputation LIV. Translated from the Latin with an Introduction and Notes. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1995. 2. Francisco de Vitoria, O.P.: On Homicide and Commentary on Summa theologiae II-II Q. 64 (Thomas Aquinas). Translated from the Latin with an Introduction and Notes. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1997. 3. The Conimbricenses: Some Questions on Signs. Translated with an Introduction and Notes. Milwaukee, MI: Marquette University Press, 2001. 4. The Metaphysical Demonstration of the Existence of God: Metaphysical Disputations 28-29, Fransico Suárez. Translated and edited. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2004. 5. Francisco Suárez: A Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Index locupletissimus in Metaphysicam Aristotelis). Translated from Latin with an Introduction and Notes. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2004. 6. Francisco Suárez, S.J.: On Real Relation (Disputatio Metaphysica XLVII). A Translation from the Latin with Introduction and Notes. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2006. 7. A Treatise of Master Hervaeus Natalis (d. 1323), the Doctor Perspicacissimus, On Second Intentions, Volume One—An English Translation; Volume Two—A Latin Edition. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2008. 8. Collected Studies on Francisco Suárez, S.J. (1548-1617). Edited by Victor M. Salas. Leuven University Press, 2010. 9. On the Borders of Being and Knowing: Some Late Scholastic Thoughts on Supertranscendental Being. Edited by Victor M. Salas. Leuven University Press, 2012. 10. John of St. Thomas (Poinsot) on Sacred Science: A Translation of Cursus theologicus, Disputation 2. Translated by John P.

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Articles in Journals: 1. “Suarez on the Reality of the Possibles,” The Modern Schoolman 45 (1967), 29-47. 2. “Suarez on the Analogy of Being, Part 1,” The Modern Schoolman 46 (1969), 219-249. 3. “Suarez on the Analogy of Being, Part 2,” The Modern Schoolman 46 (1969), 323-341. 4. “A Suggested Modification of the Critical Text of the Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus,” Manuscripta 16 (1972), 30-32. 5. “Heidegger and Scholastic Metaphysics,” The Modern Schoolman 49 (1972), 201-220. 6. “Person: A Christian Contribution—Reflections,” Social Justice Review 65 (1972), 184-186. 7. “Ipsum Esse as God-Surrogate: The Point of Convergence of Faith and Reason for St. Thomas Aquinas,” The Modern Schoolman 50 (1973), 293-296. 8. “A Philosophical Curriculum for Seminaries,” Social Justice Review 65 (1973), 396-398 (co-authored with Thomas C. Anderson). 9. “Saint Bonaventure and the Ontological Argument,” The Modern Schoolman 52 (1974), 27-48. 10. “Prolegomena to a Study of Extrinsic Denomination in the Work of Francis Suarez, S.J.,” Vivarium 22 (1984), 121-160. 11. “The Conimbricenses on the Relations Involved in Signs,” Semiotics 1984 (New York, 1985), 567-576. 12. “Suarez on Truth and Mind-Dependent Beings: Implication for a Unified Semiotic,” Semiotics 1983 (New York, 1987), 121-133. 13. “Peter John Olivi on Right, Dominion, and Voluntary Signs,” Semiotics 1986 (New York, 1987), 419-429. 14. “Suarez on Beings of Reason and Truth, Part 1,” Vivariuim 25 (1987), 47-75. 15. “Suarez on Beings of Reason and Truth, Part 2,” Vivarium 26 (1988), 51-72.

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16. “Thomas Compton Carleton, S.J.: On Words Signifying More than their Speakers or Makers Know or Intend,” The Modern Schoolman 66 (1988), 1-28. 17. “‘Extrinsic Cognoscibility’: A Seventeenth-Century Supertranscendental Notion,” The Modern Schoolman 68 (1990), 57-80. 18. “Suárez on the Unity of a Scientific Habit,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 65 (1991), 309-331. 19. “Francisco Suárez: On Preaching the Gospel to People like the American Indians,” Fordham International Law Journal 15 (1992), 879-951. 20. “On the Self-Refuting Statement ‘There is no Truth’: A Medieval Treatment,” Vivarium 31 (1993), 241-266 (co-authored with William C. Charron). 21. “Poinsot on the Knowability of Beings of Reason,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 68 (1994), 337-362. 22. “Another God, Chimerae, Goat-Stags, and Man-Lions: A Seventeenth-Century Debate about Impossibile Objects,” The Review of Metaphysics 48 (1995), 771-808. 23. “Silvester Mauro, S.J. (1619-1687) on Four Degrees of Abstractions,” International Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1996), 461-474. 24. “Two Thomists on the Morality of a Jailbreak,” The Modern Schoolman 74 (1997), 95-115. 25. “Between Transcendental and Transcendental: The Missing Link?” The Review of Metaphysics 50 (1997), 783-815. 26. “Reflections on Persons in Petri Dishes,” The Linacre Quarterly 64 (1997), 62-76. 27. “The Conimbricenses on the Semiotic Character of Mirror Images,” The Modern Schoolman 76 (1998), 17-31. 28. “Supertranscendental Nothing: A Philosophical Finisterre,” Medioevo 24 (1998), 1-30. 29. “Suárez on the Truth of the Proposition, ‘This is My Body,’” The Modern Schoolman 77 (2000), 145-163. 30. “Koimbrski scholastiki o semioticheskom charaktere zerkalnich otrazhenij,” Verbum 5 (St. Petersburg Society of Philosophy, 2001), 93-109. 31. “On the Pure Intentionality of Pure Intentionality,” The Modern Schoolman 79 (2001), 57-78.

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Hircocervi & Other Metaphysical Wonders 32. “Hervaeus Natalis, O.P. (d. 1323) on Intentionality: Its Direction, Context, and Some Aftermath,” The Modern Schoolman 83 (2006), 85-123. 33. “Francisco Suárez, S.J. (1548-1617) on the Interpretation of Laws,” The Modern Schoolman 83 (2006), 197-222.

Articles in Books: 1. “The Suarezian Proof for God’s Existence,” in History of Philosophy in the Making: A Symposium of Essays to Honor Professor James D. Colling on His 65th Birthday, ed. Linus J. Thro. Washingon, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982, 105-117. 2. “The Unborn as Person,” in Restoring the Right to Life: The Human Life Amendment, ed. James Bopp, Jr. Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1984, 81-88, 218-221. 3. “Vitoria on Choosing to Replace a King,” in Hispanic Philosophy in the Age of Discovery, ed. Kevin White. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1997, 45-58. 4. “Supertranscendental Being: On the Verge of Modern Philosophy,” in Meeting of the Minds: The Relation Between Medieval and Classical Modern European Philosophy, ed. Stephen Brown. Turnhout: Brepols, 1998/9, 297-315. 5. “Francisco Suárez on the Law of Nations,” in Religion and International Law, eds. Mark W. Janis and Carolyn Evans. Lancaster, UK: Kluwer, 1999, 103-120. 6. “Francisco Suárez, S.J. on Human Rights,” in Menschenrechte: Rechte und Pflichten in Ost und West, Strukturen Der Macht: Studien Zum Politischen Denken Chinas, ed. Konrad Wegmann. Münster-Hamburg-Berlin-London: Lit Verlag, 2001, 105-132. 7. “Gedankendinge bei den Jesuiten des 17. Jh.,” in Imagination—Fiktion—Kreation: Das Kulturschaffende Vermögen Der Phantasie, eds. Thomas Dewende and Thomas Welt. München-Leipzig: K.G. Saur, 2003, 213-228. 8. “The Borders of Knowability: Thoughts from or Occasioned by Seventeenth-Century Jesuits,” in Die Logki Des Transzendentalen: Festschrift Für Jan A. Aertsen Zum 65. Geburtstag,

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10.

11.

12. 13.

14.

15.

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vol. 30: Miscenllanea Mediaevalia, ed. Martin Pickavé. Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2003, 643-658. “Wrestling with a Wraith: André Semery, S.J. (1630-1717) on Aristotle’s Goat-Stag and Knowing the Unknowable,” in The Impact of Aristotelianism on Modern Philosophy, vol. 39, Studies in Philsoophy and the History of Philosophy, ed. Riccardo Pozzo. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004, 84-112. “Two Sixteenth-Century Jesuits and a Plan to Conquer China: Alonso Sanchez and José de Acostoa: An Outrageous Proposal and its Rejection,” in Strukturen Der Macht: Studien Zum Politischen Denken Chinas, vol. 13, eds. Konrad Wegman and M. Kittlaus. Münster-Hamburg-Londen: Lit Verlag, 2005, 253-273. “Mastri and Some Jesuits on Possible and Impossible Objects of God’s Knowledge and Power,” in ‘Rem in seipsa cernere’ Saggi sul Pensiero Filosofico di Bartolomeo Mastri (1602-1673), ed. Marco Forlivesi. Padova: Il Poligrafo, 2006, 439-468. “Hispanic Scholastic Philsoophy,” in The Cambrdige Companion to Renassiance Philosophy, ed. James Hankins. Cambridge University Press, 2007, 250-269. “Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality: Its Direction and Some Aftermath,” in Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century, eds. Stephen Brown, Thomas Dewender, and Theo Kobusch. Leiden: Brill, 2009, 261-283. “Suárez and Some Precursors on Lex and Ius,” in Lex und Ius: Beiträge zur Begründung des Rechts in der Philosophie des Mittelalters und der Frühen Neuzeit; Lex and Ius: Essays on the Foundation of Law in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, eds. Alexander Fidora, Matthias-Lutz Bachmann, and Andreas Wagner. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Fromann Holzboog, 2010, 393-427. “St. Thomas Aquinas on Theological Truth,” in Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages: A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown, eds. Kent Emery, Russell L. Friedman, and Andreas Speer, assistaed by Maxime Mauriège. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2011, 571-589.

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Encyclopedia Entries 1. “Bacon, Francis,” Academic American Enyclopedia, vol. 3. Princeton, NJ: Aretê Publishing Co, 1980, 13-14. 2. “Bayle, Piere,” Academic American Enyclopedia, vol. 3. Princeton, NJ: Aretê Publishing Co, 1980, 113. 3. “Bondin, Jean,” Academic American Enyclopedia, vol. 3. Princeton, NJ: Aretê Publishing Co, 1980, 356. 4. “Bruno, Giordano,” Academic American Enyclopedia, vol. 3. Princeton, NJ: Aretê Publishing Co, 1980, 525. 5. “Cambridge Platonists,” Academic American Enyclopedia, vol. 4. Princeton, NJ: Aretê Publishing Co, 1980, 52. 6. “Descartes, René,” Academic American Enyclopedia, vol. 6. Princeton, NJ: Aretê Publishing Co, 1980, 125-126. 7. “Ficino, Marsilio,” Academic American Enyclopedia, vol. 8. Princeton, NJ: Aretê Publishing Co, 1980, 70. 8. “Hobbes, Thomas,” Academic American Enyclopedia, vol. 10. Princeton, NJ: Aretê Publishing Co, 1980, 192. 9. “Innate Ideas,” Academic American Enyclopedia, vol. 11. Princeton, NJ: Aretê Publishing Co, 1980, 178. 10. “Malebranche, Nicholas,” Academic American Enyclopedia, vol. 13. Princeton, NJ: Aretê Publishing Co, 1980, 87. 11. “Occasionalism,” Academic American Enyclopedia, vol. 14. Princeton, NJ: Aretê Publishing Co, 1980, 320. 12. “Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni,” Academic American Enyclopedia, vol. 15. Princeton, NJ: Aretê Publishing Co, 1980, 294. 13. “Ramus, Petrus,” Academic American Enyclopedia, vol. 16. Princeton, NJ: Aretê Publishing Co, 1980, 82. 14. “Rationalism,” Academic American Enyclopedia, vol. 16. Princeton, NJ: Aretê Publishing Co, 1980, 92-93. 15. “Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of,” Academic American Enyclopedia, vol. 17. Princeton, NJ: Aretê Publishing Co, 1980, 234. 16. “Spinoza, Baruch,” Academic American Enyclopedia, vol. 18. Princeton, NJ: Aretê Publishing Co, 1980, 187-188. 17. “Suarez, Francisco,” Academic American Enyclopedia, vol. 18. Princeton, NJ: Aretê Publishing Co, 1980, 312.

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18. “Telesio, Bernardino,” Academic American Enyclopedia, vol. 19. Princeton, NJ: Aretê Publishing Co, 1980, 83. 19. “William of Ockham,” Academic American Enyclopedia, vol. 20. Princeton, NJ: Aretê Publishing Co, 1980, 154-155. 20. “Collegium Conimbricense,” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 2. London-New York: Routledge, 1998, 406-408. 21. “Fonseca, Pedro da (1528-99),” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 3. London-New York: Routledge, 1998, 688690. 22. “John of St. Thomas (1589-1644),” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 5. London-New York: Routledge, 1998, 117-120. 23. “Soto, Domingo de (1494-1560),” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 9. London-New York: Routledge, 1998, 37-40. 24. “Suárez, Francisco (1548-1617),” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 9. London-New York: Routledge, 1998, 189-196. 25. “Toletus, Franciscus (1533-96),” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 9. London-New York: Routledge, 1998, 433435. 26. “Supertranszendent,” Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 10, 1999, cols. 643-649. 27. “Suárez, Francisco,” New Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 2, Supplement, 2010, 1043-1047. 28. “Hervaeus Natalis,” Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy, part 8. Berlin-New York: Springer Verlag, 2011, 472-473.

chapter 1 The Eternity of the World According to Peter of Candia Stephen Brown

P

I. Introduction

eter of Candia’s discussion of the possibility of an eternally created world is one element within the framework of his treatment of God’s power in relation to creatures. It is part of the opening question in his Commentary on Book II of Peter Lombard’s Sentences. The question has three articles that raise challenges to God’s omnipotence. 1) How can God be omnipotent if He cannot create another being distinct from Himself who is infinite? 2) How can God be omnipotent if He cannot separate an accident, such as motion, from its substance, i.e., the body that has motion? 3) How can God’s power be infinite if He cannot produce something distinct from Himself that is co-eternal? Peter of Candia splits this third discussion into two parts: the first part deals with the views of Aristotle and other philosophers concerning the eternity of the world; the second part presents the views of the theologians.1

1  A more extensive discussion of the context of the philosophical discussion of the eternity of the world according to Peter of Candia can be found in a previous article entitled “Aristotle’s View on the Eternity of the World according to Peter of Candia” in Divine Creation in Ancient, Medieval, and Early Modern Thought. Essays Presented to Rev’d Dr. Robert D. Crouse (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 371-404.

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II. The Philosophical Discussion of the Eternity of the World Although Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Plato have their say, in Peter of Candia’s portrait of the discussion concerning the eternity of the world Aristotle has the main voice for the philosophers.2 In fact, Aristotle has many voices, since he has many interpreters. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Al-Farabi and their followers contend that Aristotle demonstrated that the world is eternal. Moses Maimonides points out that Aristotle in the Topics admitted that his position is not formally a demonstration: “As for the matters concerning which we have no argument or that are too great in our opinion, it is difficult for us to say: Why is this so? For instance, when we say: ‘Is the world eternal or not?’” Maimonides thus refuted the demonstrative character that Alexander and Al-Farabi gave to Aristotle’s arguments. Furthermore, as a Jewish believer, he accepted the account of Genesis, that the world de facto was created in time. No matter what the philosophical arguments might be to the contrary, Maimonides held that they had certain points through which they could be invalidated. He accepted the temporal origin of creation due to the Law, “which explains things to which it is not in the power of speculation to accede.” Maimonides was very much aware that the Mutakallimum thought that they, in opposition to Al-Farabi, have even more firmly demonstrated that the creation of the world took place in time. Maimonides, however, strongly criticizes them: “If a man claims that he set out to demonstrate a certain point by means of sophistical arguments, he does not, in my opinion, strengthen assent to the point he intends to prove, but rather weakens it and opens the way for attacks against it.” For Maimonides, neither the eternal nor the temporal character of creation is demonstrable; temporal creation “should be accepted without proof because of prophecy.”3 More than a century before Peter of Candia’s Commentary, many Latin Scholastics had variously presented and evaluated proofs for the eternal and temporal creation of the world. They represented Aristotle 2  For the summary concerning these authors, see “Aristotle’s View on the Eternity of the World according to Peter of Candia,” 3.11 (385). 3  Ibid., 373-74. Cf. MosesMaimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, 2.15-16, trans. S.Pines (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 289-94.

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in different ways. As early as Robert Grosseteste, we find indications of some (probably Philip the Chancellor and Alexander of Hales) who “tell us that Aristotle did not hold that the world lacked a beginning in time, but say that on this issue the Philosopher held, in a way consistent with Catholic teaching, that there was a beginning of the world and of time.” Grosseteste somewhat excuses them by saying that their interpretation of Aristotle was based on “a corrupt Latin translation” instead of “the original uncorrupted Greek text.”4 Shortly after Philip and Alexander, however, we find authors who, in a more sophisticated way, also argue that Aristotle denies that the world is eternal. We can find many such arguments in Distinction 1 of St. Bonaventure’s Commentary on Book II of the Sentences and in many of Thomas Aquinas’s works (Commentary on the Sentences, Summa contra Gentiles, De potentia, Summa theologiae and Quodlibet XII).5 Peter of Candia’s arguments on behalf of those who defended the “Catholic” interpretation of Aristotle’s position claim that Aristotle would violate a number of his basic principles if he held that the world was eternal. This position would mean that an infinite number of things has occurred, that an infinite number of things actually exists, that one infinite be greater than another, that an infinite be added to, or that a part be equal to its whole. Such a strong philosopher as Aristotle would never hold conclusions that would contradict his basic principles.6 Peter of Candia considers such arguments to be weak and forced. “I do not consider it a healthy approach or one that is suitable to the truth of the faith. Certainly I wish that Aristotle had been a Christian, but

4  Ibid., 375-77. Cf. Robertus Grossetesta, Hexaëmeron 1.8, n. 4, eds. R.C. Dales and S. Gieben, Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi 6 (Londone, 1982), 58: “…Mira cecitate et presumpcione putantes se limpidius intelligere et verius interpretari Aristotelem ex litera latina corrupta quam philosophos, tam gentiles quam catholicos, qui eius literam incorruptam originalem grecam plenissime noverunt.” 5  Ibid., 378-79. Cf. Bonaventura, Commentaria in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, II, dist. l, p. 1, a. l, q. 2, Opera omnia, vol. 2 (Quaracchi, 18821902), 20-22 and Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, II, dist. l, q. 1, a. 5; Summa contra Gentiles 2.38, De potentia, q. 3, a. 14; Summa theologiae I, q. 46, a. 2; Quodl. XII, q. 6, a. 1. 6  Ibid., 377-79.

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his words themselves make clear to all who read him what he teaches.”7 Averroes, in his Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘De coelo et mundo,’ tells us that Aristotle was the first to speak of the heavens as eternal. Boethius points out that Aristotle thought of time as he did about the world, that neither of them had a beginning, nor will they have an end. Peter Lombard simply declares that for Aristotle the world always is and has been eternal.8 Going beyond these authorities and turning to the texts of Aristotle himself, Peter, like Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas, contends that the three arguments in chapter 1 of Book VIII of the Physics, are not demonstrations. Peter argues, however, that they are sure indicators that Aristotle’s position was that the world is eternal.9

III. The Theological Discussion of the Eternity of the World In the first, philosophical, part of his treatment of the eternity of the world Peter provides Aristotle’s account of the eternity of the world and the history of its ancient and medieval interpretations. It is effectively a prologue to the theological discussion that takes place in the second part of the same article. Toward the end of this prologue he tells us that, although he knows from Biblical revelation that Aristotle’s arguments in favor of the eternity of the world are false, he still accepts the responsibility to consider them carefully and to argue against them. He even adds other arguments supporting the eternity of the world and considers them. “I will bring forth more arguments from the philosophers that claim to prove the eternity of the world so that, by responding to them, the faithful profession of the Catholic faith may shine forth with more clarity.”10 In responding to these arguments he clarifies matters by making helpful distinctions about the different kinds of necessity and possibility, explaining the meaning of 7  Ibid., 3.273 (392): “Quod non reputo consonum nec conveniens fidei puritati. Bene vellem quod Aristoteles fuisset Christicola, sed loquela sua ipsum reddit cunctis legentibus manifestum.” 8  Ibid., 379-80. For the texts and references to these authorities, cf. ibid., 3, 281-283 (392-93). 9  Ibid., 3, 284 (393). 10  Ibid., 381. Cf. Candia’s text itself : 3, 411 (395): “Ulterius adduco aliqua philosophorum motiva mundi aeternitatem probare praetendentia, ut, ipsis solutis, clareat evidentius fidelis professio Christianae religionis.”

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“out of nothing,” clarifying the difference between God’s will and the execution of His will, nuancing the meanings of ‘eternity,’ ‘sempternity,’ and ‘time’ as measures of the divine, the angelic, and the earthly.11 In the second part of his article Peter turns to the arguments of the theologians. They are arguments representing both eternal and temporal creation, but they are not arguments about creation de facto; they are arguments about the possibility of eternal creation. Eternal creation as an actuality is opposed to Christian belief, and like Grosseteste and many after him, Peter of Candia chides those who try to make Aristotle a Christian by denying that he held the de facto eternal existence of the world. Peter would also chide anyone who would deny the de facto temporal character of creation. Peter, however, claimed in the first part of his article on the eternity of the world, as we mentioned above, that there is a legitimate purpose in considering the arguments in favor of eternal creation: so that “the faithful profession of the Catholic faith may shine forth with more clarity.”12 Here in the second part he extends his study beyond the de facto created world to the possibility or impossibility of eternal creation, so that the faithful profession of the Catholic faith may shine forth with even greater clarity. With this perspective regarding both positions, Peter launches into a detailed study of twelve arguments which argued for the impossibility of eternal creation. He informs us that many of the great doctors were moved to hold that a creature could not be produced eternally by a finite being, and not even by God. In his response to each the twelve arguments he introduces clear distinctions, e.g., beween necessary and free production,13 about the different ways of understanding “made from nothing,”14 the way we must understand the expression that “a creature on its own part tends toward non-being,”15 the manner in which something is produced by a production that precedes its coming to exist and a making that is by a simple emanation,16 and so on. 11  Ibid., 381. For Candia’s text in regard to these clarifications, see 3.5113.59 (399-404). 12  Supra, n. 10. 13  Candia’s text, infra, 3.71. 14  Ibid., 3.72. 15  Ibid., 3.73. 16  Ibid., 3.74.

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Each of his counter-arguments against the “impossibility” arguments is not aimed at establishing the truth of the “possibility” thesis. Peter’s aim is essentially to bring greater light to the discussion, so that we can see that the arguments of even the great doctors are not demonstrations for the impossibility of an eternal creation. Since the impossibility of an eternal creation is not demonstrated, then someone, if he wished to do so, could with probability hold that some possible thing essentially distinct from God could have been produced eternally.17 When Peter turns to this position and the arguments its supporters use to try to establish the possibility of an eternal creation, his focus is even much more concentrated. Since the present discussion of the possibility of an eternal creation takes place within the context of God’s omnipotence, Peter prefaces his evaluation of the theological arguments representing this position with clarifications concerning what he considers the fundamental key for understanding the arguments sustaining this approach: the meaning of ‘power’ (potentia). Peter tells us that for a proper understanding of the theologians’ arguments in favor of the possibility of an eternal creation one must realize that ‘power’ can be understood in three ways. In one sense, ‘power’(potentia) in one of these supporting arguments might be pointing to an active power as we conceive of it in God, i.e., God’s power. In dealing with ‘power’ in this sense it is important to realize that God’s power can be considered in its relation to His wisdom or according to the greatness of His immensity. In the first context, we call it “God’s ordained power”; it is God’s power as carried out according to the order He has wisely chosen to establish ad extra. God’s absolute power 17  Ibid., 3.821: “Ex quarum rationum solutione manifeste apparet quod qui vellet posset probabiliter sustinere quod absolute exsistit possibile aliquid a Deo essentialiter distinctum Deum producere aeternaliter potuisse. Pro cuius opinionis probabilitate aliquas rationes adducam, et cum hoc declarabitur positionis imaginatio radicalis.” See also ibid., 3.832: “Ex quibus apparet quod contradictionem non implicat quidditatem distinctam a Deo aeternaliter exstitisse, et sic secundum istam viam apparet quod cum non sit repugnantia ex parte Dei absolute, nec ex parte creaturae, nec ex rationibus quidditatum aeternitatis, videlicet, et dependentis naturae, quod absolute possibile est Deum potuisse creaturam aeternaliter produxisse non per viam productionis connotantis non-esse creaturae durative praecessisse suum esse sed per viam simplicis emanationis, ut nunc intelligimus Verbi productionem per plenitudinem memorativae fecunditatis. Sic igitur apparet modus istius positionis multum solide declaratus.”

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is also active, but in the sense of the immensity of all the things that are possible for Him to bring forth, not limited to the things He has actually chosen to bring about. In a second sense, ‘power’ (potentia) can have a passive sense. In this case, it could better be translated as ‘potency.’ This potency can also be of two kinds: one is ‘natural,’ the other is ‘obediential.’ A natural passive potency is one which is able by its own proper nature to be brought into existence by the dependent agent that is able to accomplish the effect. An obediential passive potency is more receptive or a capacity to receive fulfillment; its fulfillment can only be accomplished by a higher agent, by an agent that does not depend on anything above it. In a third instance, ‘power’ (potentia) can have a relational sense. It might better be translated as ‘a possible type of relation.’ This could be expressed better in the contrast presented by its two forms: some things can have a necessary relation or connection; others can have a contingent relation. A creature, for example, cannot be a being that exists necessarily, since it depends on its Creator for its existence. On the other hand, it is possible that a creature can receive in a contingent way whatever is not repugnant to a limited substance.18 Understanding the terms used by those arguing for the possibility of an eternal creation, in accord with the above account of ‘power,’ generates six basic conclusions, of which three would be affirmative and three would be negative. The fundamental conclusions which they hold, according to Peter, are: l) the co-eternity of an effect is not inconsistent with God’s absolute power; 2) according to God’s ordained 18  Ibid., 3.830: “Radix et imaginatio istius positionis potest in hoc consistere: potentia tripliciter potest intelligi: aut pro potentia activa aut pro passiva aut pro convenientia praedicati ad subiectum. Potentia vero activa prout ipsam concipimus in Deo dupliciter a nobis exprimitur: aut secundum ordinem et dispositionem ad suam sapientiam aut secundum magnitudinem suae immensitatis. Primo modo ipsam vocamus potentiam ordinatam. Secundo modo vero ipsam dicimus potentiam absolutam. Ulterius potentia passiva quae intelligitur in limitata exsistentia sine dependente dupliciter intelligitur: quaedam dicitur naturalis et quaedam oboedientialis. Illa dicitur naturalis passiva potentia quae ex natura propria habet quod possit per agens dependens ad esse deduci. Alia vero oboedientialis quae solum per actionem independentem potest in actum deduci. Ulterius potentia tertio modo sumpta potest intelligi duobus modis secundum duplicem convenientiam praedicati ad subiectum, videlicet, necessariam et contingentem. Et secundum hoc quaedam est possibilitas contingentiae et quaedam necessitatis.”

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power, that is, according to the order and disposition that God has given to created things, the co-eternity of creatures with God is inconsistent; 3) eternity in the sense of existing before its creation by God is opposed to the natural potency of a creature; 4) eternity in the same sense is not repugnant to the obediential potency of a creature; 5) the possibility of a creature being produced necessarily is repugnant to its essential dependence; 6) the possibility of a creature being produced in a contingent way is not opposed to a substance that is a limited substance.19 These conclusions are the necessary supports for holding the position that contends that an eternal creation could have taken place. In effect, they are a summary of the conclusions arrived at by the arguments of those supporting this possibility. Peter judges that in fact that they are not arguments which would convince those who wish to hold the opposite position,20 for they are not demonstrations. He sees his task as providing help to those who hold the counter thesis obtain a clearer grasp of their own position by challenging the arguments supporting these six conclusions, as they might be attending to his criticisms of their own position and its arguments. The edition of both the philosophical and theological parts of Peter of Candia’s treatment of the eternity of the world provides a rich source for considering one of the key questions debated by medieval university faculty and students. Our summary introductions to these editions aim to identify some of the main issues involved. We hope they also serve as an invitation for deeper detailed study. *** 19  Ibid., 3.831: “Ad propositum: igitur ista via haberet sex fundamentales conclusiones: tres affirmativas et tres negativas. Prima est haec: potentiae Dei absolute consideratae non repugnat coaeternitas sui effectus. Secunda est: potentiae Dei ordinatae, hoc est secundum ordinem et dispositionem quam indidit rebus, repugnat coaeteritas creaturae. Tertia: naturali potentiae creaturae repugnat aeternitas a parte ante. Quarta propositio: suae oboedientiali potentiae aeternitas huiusmodi non repugnant. Quinta propositio: creaturae repugnat necessitatis possibilitas propter dependentiam requisitam. Sexta: contingentiae possibilitas pro quacumque mensura limitatae substantiae non repugnat.” 20  Ibid., 3.841: “Sed quia in rei veritate rationes adductae non convincunt oppositum sustinere volentem, ideo ad ipsas per ordinem respondeo ut satisfaciam cuilibet postulanti.”

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This unpublished text is based on the dependable manuscript located in the Vatican Library, cod. Vat. Lat. 1081 (V). In this codex, the present text is found on ff. 176rb-181rb. When we had a doubt, we compared it to the Milan manuscript, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, cod. A 123 sup. (M). In this Milan manuscript, the present text is found on ff. 110ra-113rb. This is part two of the third article of question 1 of Book II. The paragraph numbering continues the numbering in the printed edition of the first part of the third article, published as an appendix to “Aristotle’s View of the Eternity of the World according to Peter of Candia” in Divine Creation in Ancient, Medieval, and Early Modern Thought: Essays Presented to the Rev’d Dr Robert D. Crouse (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 371-404.

[3.70] Habito secundum opinionem philosophorum iudicio quid sit de mundi aeternitate censendum, et ipsorum rationibus aliquantulum dissolutis, appareat quod de facto nihil aliud a Deo fuerit aeternum. Nunc consequenter investigandum est de ipsius possibilitate, an, videlicet, Deus creaturam potuerit producere ab aeterno. Circa quam quaestionem contradictoria videntur sentire doctores. Quidam21 tenent quod mundum posse exsistere aeternaliter est impossibile per quamcumque potentiam finitam vel infinitam. Alii vero oppositum istius tenent. Primo igitur declarabo primae opinionis modum per multiplicia argumenta ad quae per ordinem respondebo. Et consimiliter faciam de alia, ut quilibet sibi placibiliorem eligat partem. [3.701] Adducam igitur pro primae opinionis declaratione duodecim rationes quibus multi magni doctores fuerunt moti ad tenendum quod creatura non potuit a Deo aeternaliter produci. Et primo faciam octo et consequenter solvam, et sic de aliis quattuor faciam cum subsequenti solutione, ne nimia arguendi prolixitas taedium audientibus inferat sine responsione. 21 Quidam]namque add. M

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[3.71] Arguo igitur primo sic: impossibile est Deum aliquid ad extra necessario produxisse. Sed dato quod Deus aliud a se aeternaliter produxisset, sequitur Ipsum illud necessario produxisse; ergo propositum. Consequentia et maior patent. Sed probo minorem, quoniam si ponatur quod Deus aeternaliter mundum produxit, aut ergo potuit ipsum non produxisse aut non. Si non, habetur propositum: quod necessario ipsum produxit. Si sic, contra: aut in instanti aeternitatis potuit ipsum non produxisse, aut ante instans aeternitatis, aut post. Non in instanti aeternitatis, quia tunc impossibile erat simul contradictoria poni. Nec ante, quia nihil est vel22 potuit esse ante instans aeternitatis. (M=110rb) Nec postquam facta est creatura aeternaliter potuit ipsam non fecisse aeternaliter, quia iam transiit in praeteritum; et per consequens necessarium est ipsam aeternaliter fuisse productam. Unde et Aristoteles, VI Ethicorum,23 commendans sententiam Agathonis philosophi, dicit: “Propter quod et Agathon recte24 ait: ‘Hoc etenim et solo Deus privatur: ingenita facere quae utique sunt facta’”; quare propositum. [3.72] Praeterea, sicut se habet creatura ad non-entitatem subsequentem ita ad non-entitatem praecedentem. Sed contradictionem implicat creaturam in aeternum post hoc fore et tamen in nihilum redigi. Ergo contradictionem includit creaturam aeternaliter fuisse et tamen ex nihilo fuisse productam. Consequentia patet. Et tunc ultra: cum igitur de ratione creationis sit productio de nihilo, sequitur quod contradictionem implicat creaturam aeternaliter fuisse, quia eo quod creatura ex nihilo producta et (V=176va) eo quod25 aeternaliter producta non est ex nihilo producta; ergo propositum. [3.73] Praeterea, impossibile est imaginari creaturam quin mox occurrat intellectui non-esse ipsius praecessisse suum esse. Si ergo creatura ponitur aeternaliter fuisse, sequitur quod suum non-esse praecessit suum esse: vel ergo tempore vel natura. Non tempore, cum suum esse aeternaliter fuerit. Si ergo natura, contra: quaecumque sunt solum prius natura possunt esse simul tempore sine repugnantia. Si ergo non-esse creaturae et esse aeternaliter productae sunt prius secundum naturam, nulla videtur repugnantia ipsa simul posse esse tempore. Si 22  vel]nec M 23 Aristot., Ethica Nicom., VI, c. 3 (1139b 9-11). 24  Agathon recte sic V, Agathonis ratio M 25 quod sic M, quo V

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autem non-esse talis creaturae nullo modo est imaginabile tempore vel natura praecessisse suum esse, sequitur quod tam necessario esse talis creaturae est quam esse Dei, et per consequens Deus non posset destruere talem creaturam, et ita necessario produxit eam, sicut prima ratio deducebat; quare propositum. [3.74] Praeterea, si creatura aeternaliter fuit facta, sequitur quod ipsa est terminus factionis. Aut ergo est terminus factionis quae est motus successivus aut quae est mutatio subita. Non primo modo, quia sic non-esse duratione praecessisset esse talis creaturae, et per consequens talis creatura non fuisset aeterna. Si vero factionis quae est mutatio subita sit terminus talis creatura aeternaliter producta; sequitur quod cum cuilibet mutationi sit aliqua mensura, quod istius erit aliqua mensura. Et tunc illa signata quae sit a et instans praesens quae sit b: sequitur quod inter a et b est infinita distantia temporalis, et per consequens inter duos terminos finitos est distantia infinita; quod videtur absurdum; quare propositum. Nec valet si dicatur quod talis mensura semper durat, quia tunc talis creatura esset in continuo fieri et in facto esse, quoniam si instans in quo Sortes producitur continue esset, continue Sortes fieret et esset factus, quod non videtur verum in permanentibus; quare propositum. [3.75] Praeterea, et redit in idem, non citius Deus potuit creaturam ex nihilo producere quam potuit ipsam ex prima materia produxisse. Sed si fecisset creaturam ex materia prima, impossibile esset ipsam aeternaliter produxisse; ergo propositum. Consequentia et maior patent; et minor probatur, quoniam si Deus aeternaliter creaturam fecisset ex prima materia, aut ergo per motum aut mutationem. Non primo modo, quia sic non-esse praecessisset esse talis creaturae duratione, et sic non esset aeterna. Si ergo mutatione subita, cum illa, ut prius dictum est, habeat mensuram, sequitur quod ipsa signata inter ipsam et quamcumque posteriorem signatam esset infinita distantia, quod videtur a ratione totaliter alienum; quare propositum. [3.76] Praeterea, quandocumque aliquae duae distantiae sunt aequales, non videtur maior ratio quare unum mobile motum versus unum extremum illius distantiae possit pertransire (V=176vb) illam distantiam quam e converso. Verbi gratia, signata a distantia cuius sint duo termini, b videlicet et c, si26 d mobile potest ire a b usque ad c, non videtur ratio quare non possit d mobile vel unum aliud moveri a c usque ad b, ut si possum ire usque ad Nostram Dominam possum a Nostra 26  si]sed V, sic M

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Domina huc reverti. Sed posito quod Deus produxisset aliquam creaturam27 ab aeterno, illa necessario duravit per tempus infinitum. Signo igitur aliquod28 instans post aeternitatem quod sit a; tunc arguo sic: et sit illa creatura b. Tunc sic: b pertransivit29 totam (M=110va) istam distantiam; ergo imaginabile est b vel aliud retrocedere unde b processit. Vel ergo inveniet terminum vel non. Si sic, ergo talis distantia non fuit infinita, et per consequens b non aeternaliter fuit; quod est contra positum. Si non inveniet, ergo cum aequalis sit distantia ab illo nunc signato usque in aeternum sicut ab aeterno usque ad istud nunc, sequitur quod quam incipiens ab isto nunc versus aeternum non potest pervenire ad illud, tam et creatura data non poterit pervenire ad istud nunc; quod est contra casum; quare propositum. [3.77] Praeterea, dato quod mundus potuisset fuisse aeternaliter, sequitur quod divisio continui posset evacuari. Consequens est impossibile; ergo et antecedens. Et per consequens positio vera. Sed consequentia probatur, quoniam si mundus fuit aeternaliter, infiniti dies fuerunt; sed in qualibet die potuit evacuari una divisio continui, et non sunt plures divisiones in continuo quam sint dies; sequitur propositum et falsitas sui. Impossibilitas consequentis patet, quoniam si Deus posset dividere continuum in omnes partes suas ita quod divisio continui evacuaretur, aut ergo staret divisio in partes divisibiles aut indivisibiles. Non est dicendum secundum, quia sic continuum esset compositum ex indivisibilibus. Nec primum, quia tunc divisio continui non esset evacuata, cum tales partes sint divisibiles. [3.78] Praeterea, si Deus potuisset produxisse mundum aeternaliter, Deus potuisset se facere nullipotentem. Consequens est impossibile; ergo et antecedens. Consequentia probatur, nam ponatur quod Deus produxisset mundum aeternaliter, et tunc arguo sic: destruat mundum citius quo potest ipsum destruere. Vel ergo destruet ipsum in instanti aeternitatis vel non. Si non, ergo necessario expectabit per tempus infinitum antequam possit ipsum destruere. Et si sic, non est omnipotens, quoniam potentia quae non potest se applicare ad suam actionem infra horam est aliquantae tarditatis, et quae non potest infra duas est maioris tarditatis; ergo potentia quae non potest (V=177ra) ante infinitum tempus ponere suum effectum in executione est infinitae 27  creaturam]per tempus infinitum vel add. M 28 aliquod]aliud add. M 29  pertransivit] per add. V, sic M

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tarditatis, et per consequens non est omnipotens. Et prima consequentia probatur, quoniam inter quodlibet instans post instans aeternitatis et ipsum instans aeternitatis est infinita distantia; quare propositum. Si vero dicatur quod ipsum destrueret in instanti aeternitatis sequuntur multa inconvenientia. Primum, videlicet, quod in eodem instanti contradictoria sunt simul vera. Secundum, quod aeternitas non est mensura impartibilis sed successiva, quorum quodlibet est impossibile manifeste; quare propositum.

[3.711] Ad istas rationes per ordinem respondeo. Ad primam: cum dicitur quod si Deus aliquid aeternaliter produxisset quod necessario illud produxisset, quia quaeritur: quando potuisset non produxisse? — aut in instanti in quo produxit, aut ante, aut post. Non ante, quia nihil potest esse ante instans aeternitatis. Nec post, quia iam praeteriit productio mundi, et per consequens necessarium est ipsum produxisse. Nec in instanti in quo ipsum produxit, quia non est possibile in eodem instanti duo contradictoria simul poni; quare propositum. Hic dico breviter duo: primo, quod ratio non valet. Secundo, dicam ad materiam argumenti. Verbi gratia, quantum ad primum, quaero ab istis theologis: vel Deus necessario praedestinavit antichristum fore vel contingenter? Non est dicendum quod necessario: hoc enim nititur vitare quilibet theologus. Si ergo contingenter: vel ergo potest ipsum non produxisse ante instans aeternitatis, et hoc non; vel in instanti aeternitatis, et hoc non, per similem rationem, sicut prius30 allegatum est; vel post, et hoc est impertinens proposito. Igitur si ratio ipsorum valet, per similem modum arguendi oporteret ipsos concedere Deum necessario praedestinassse antichristum fore. Dico igitur ad materiam quod in casu quo poneretur Deum aeternaliter produxisse aliud a se, quod tunc concedendum est quod in instanti aeternitatis in quo produxit potuit non produxisse. Et ratio est, quia adhuc non naturae necessitate produxisset sed libere et contingenter. Et ideo licet sit impossibile32 ista duo poni in esse — ‘producit’ et ‘non 30  Viz., “quia non est possibile in eodem instant duo contradictoria simul poni.” 31 argumenti sic M, om. V 32  sit impossibile rep. V

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producit’ — tamen ista stant simul:‘in a instanti producit’ et ‘in eodem contingenter producit;’ et per consequens, potest non producere; quare propositum. [3.712] Ad secundum, cum dicitur quod non stant simul quod creatura duret in aeternum a parte post et tamen in nihilum reducatur; ergo pariformiter non stant simul quod creatura33 fuit34 aeternaliter et sit de nihilo; (M=110vb) quare propositum.35 Hic dico quod creaturam fore36 de nihilo ad praesens potest duobus modis intelligi: uno modo, quod quandoque fuerit verum talem creaturam non esse et postmodum fuerit verum ipsam esse, et hoc secundum se et quodlibet sui. Et sic absque dubio contradictionem implicat creaturam aeternaliter fuisse. Alio modo potest intelligi ut quocumque a Deo (V=177 rb) distincto signato sic habet suum esse quod ratione sui, subducta Dei manutenentia, tendit in non-esse. Dico igitur quod si Deus aeternaliter aliquam creaturam produxisset, non fuisset de nihilo primo modo sed secundo modo. Et isto etiam modo stat creaturam in aeternum durare et tamen quantum est ex parte sua tendit in non-esse. Et tunc ulterius cum dicitur quod de ratione creationis est quod de nihilo producatur, hic dico quod non est de ratione rei a Deo distinctae quod formaliter non possit esse nisi per viam creationis. Immo, nunc in casu isto processisset per modum simplicis emanationis, sicut nunc dicimus Verbum aeternaliter a Patre productum, et hoc per modum simplicis emanationis, ita et ibi, hoc uno excepto, quod huiusmodi productio non ponit in termino producto distinctionem essentialem a producente, et ibi sic, quia talis creatura non esset Dei substantia; quare propositum. [3.7131] Ad tertium,37 cuius radix in hoc consistit,38 quod quae sunt prius natura sunt vel possunt esse simul tempore, sed dato quod creatura aeternaliter fuisset, adhuc non-esse ipsius39 natura praecessisset suum esse; ergo talia possunt esse simul tempore. Sed hoc est impossibile; ergo impossibile est quod solum natura non-esse creaturae 33 duret…creatura om. (hom.) M 34  fuit]sit M 35  quare propositum om. M 36  fore]fieri M 37  tertium] secundum V, sic M 38 cuius…consistit om. M 39 ipsius]prae add. V

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praecedat suum esse, et per consequens oportet quod tempore, et ita creatura non poterit fuisse aeterna. Hic dico pro materia argumenti primo quod non-esse creaturae talis non potest aliter intelligi nisi quod quantum est ex parte sua tendit in non-esse, ut supra40 declaratum est. Et ex hoc non sequitur quod argumentum imaginatur sicut aer quantum est ex parte sua semper tendit in obscuritatem sed ab alio illuminatur, et tamen ista stant simul quod aer de se sit obscurus et tamen est illuminatus ab alio, ita in proposito semper ista starent simul, quod creatura talis est aeterna et tamen ex parte sua tendit in non-esse, et per istum modum intelligitur talis creaturae non-esse, aliter non in casu isto. [3.7132] Ulterius tamen dico duas propositiones. Prima, quod non oportet quod quaelibet quae se habent secundum prius et posterius natura41 possint esse simul tempore sicut prius natura est informitas materiae quam sua formatio, et tamen non possunt simul esse tempore quod materia sit informis et cum hoc formata. Secunda propositio est quod quae sunt prius natura et ad invicem non repugnant possunt simul esse, sed quae simul repugnant non oportet, ut, verbi gratia, homo—animal, quae sunt prius natura nec ad invicem repugnant, possunt simul esse. Veniendo igitur ad rationem, dico quod propositio assumpta falsa est, quia dato quod concederetur quod non-esse talis creaturae et esse se habent secundum prius et posterius natura, tamen non oportet illa esse simul tempore, quia ad invicem repugnant. Et ideo ratio non habet magnum colorem; tamen prima responsio realior est, quia dato quod Deus produceret aliquam creaturam aeternaliter, non oporteret ibi imaginari praecessionem non-esse respectu esse nisi (V= 177va) modo superius declarato, videlicet, protendentia in nonesse quae proprie nullam dicit praecessionem sed potius concomitantiam, sicut apparet, quia quam primo creatura est tam primo vanitati subiecta est; quare propositum. [3.714] Ad quartum: cum dicitur quod si creatura aeternaliter fuit facta, quod ipsa est terminus factionis, concedo. Et cum quaeritur: vel ergo est terminus factionis quae est motus successivus vel factionis quae est mutatio, dico breviter quod nec sic nec sic. Unde argumentum praetendit quod talis creatura aeternaliter producta, si poneretur de possibili, produceretur per actionem praecedentem suum esse; quod 40  Supra, n. 3,712, scilicet,“subducta Dei manutenentia, tendit in non-esse.” 41 natura]quod add, (rep,) V

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falsum est in isto casu, quia, ut praedictum est,42 talis creatura fuisset in esse producta per simplicem emanationem sicut nunc dicimus de Verbo divino; quare propositum.43 [3.715] Et per hoc apparet quid est dicendum ad quintum cum dicitur quod non citius Deus potuit creaturam ex nihilo producere quam ex materia. Si intelligatur per simplicem emanationem concedo, quia si Deus aeternaliter (M=111ra) produxisset materiam et totum compositum, tunc materia praecessisset,44 non compositum, sed non tempore. Et ex hoc apparet quod non valet ulterius instantia de factione cum dicitur “vel est subita vel successiva,” quia talis materia et compositum, cuius est pars talis materia, non fuissent producta per factionem praecedentem suum esse sed solum per simplicem emanationem; quare propositum. [3.716] Ad sextum: cum dicitur quod capta aliqua distantia habente duos terminos, si aliquod mobile potest ire ab uno termino ad alium, potest etiam econverso, sicut in exemplo posito de loco isto ad Nostram Dominam, et econtra. Si ergo detur distantia, data mundi aeternitate usque nunc, constat quod mundus pervenit usque ad istud nunc. Si ergo aliquis procederet versa vice, vel deveniret ad finem vel non. Si non, tunc nec aliud, videlicet mundus, debeberet devenire. Si ergo deveniet, sequitur quod talis processus non est infinitus, et per consequens nec talis creatura fuit aeterna. Hic dicitur pro materia argumenti quod capto per imaginationem tempore praeterito nullum habet principium quod est pars sui, et hoc in casu quo mundus fuisset aeternus, sed solum habet principium per modum conservantis, utpote ipsum mundum qui in tali casu esset subiectum talis temporis. Nunc vero ex parte nostra bene habet principium ad quod potest aliquid realiter pervenire, quia praesens nunc; sed ex parte illa nullum est principium. Et ideo exemplum non est ad propositum, quia de loco isto ad Nostram Dominam signantur duo principia, et ideo non est mirum si sic procedendo possit pervenire ad quemlibet illorum terminorum, quod in proposito minime reperitur. Et ideo similitudo videtur non modicum claudicare: verbi gratia, in divisione continui divisio potest incipere a certo continuo dato, sed in nullo terminatur. Tunc consimiliter (V=177vb> imaginetur ista partibilis distantia, et quaeritur si sic 42  Cf. supra, n. 3.712. 43  quare propositum om. M 44 praecessisset]non add. V, sic M

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procedendo possetis verire ad finem? Certum est quod non, et tamen quacumque alia divisione signata, veniendo versus alterum extremum deveniretur ad primam divisionem. Sic igitur apparet quod si argumentum deberet valere, oporteret addere quod in tali distantia sint ex qualibet sui parte principia quae sint eius partes; quare propositum. [3.717] Ad septimum: cum dicitur quod iam divisio continui esset evacuata, posita mundi aeternitate, hoc negatur. Et ad probationem, cum dicitur quod infiniti dies fuerunt, et in qualibet die potuit evacuari una divisio continui, cum igitur non sint plures divisiones in continuo quam sint dies, sequitur propositum. Hic dicitur quod casus ponit incompossibilia, videlicet, quod continuum aeternaliter producatur, et tamen aeternaliter dividatur. Et ratio est quia ex divisione continui sequitur ipsum non-esse. Nunc autem, si ipsum fuisset aeternaliter, et cum hoc divisum, sequitur quod ipsum aeternaliter fuisset et non fuisset, quod est impossibile. Verumtamen adhuc si posset imaginari divisio, oporteret imaginari aliquod principium in tempore versus istud nunc in quo fuisset facta prima divisio. Unde divisio continui se habet per modum infiniti ex una parte, et ex alia finiti. Verbi gratia, cuiuscumque continui potest assignari prima divisio sed non est possibilis ultima, quia est processus in infinitum. Ita est in talibus infinitis in quibus datur principium ab una parte sed ab alia non est status. Nunc autem infinitas divisionis in continuo non debite applicatur infinitati dierum in tempore, quia ab aeterno procedendo versus nunc non potest assignari aliqua pars temporis quae sit ipsius principium, sed econverso sic. Sed in divisione continui datur prima divisio sed non ultima. Et ideo divisio, si deberet tempori debito modo applicari, oporteret quod applicaretur ex illa parte ex qua tale tempus habet principium quod est pars sui; aliter numquam posset fieri prima divisio continui nisi in aliquo tempore. Quo dato, non esset principium temporis; immo, ab illo usque aeternum esset processus in infinitum; quare propositum. [3.718] Ad octavum: cum dicitur quod si Deus produxisset mundum aeternaliter, quod fecisset se nullipotentem, pro eo quod dato quod vellet mundum destruere, oportuisset ipsum expectasse per infinitum tempus et per consequens infinitae tarditatis esset in applicando se ad destructionem talis mundi; et sic per consequens non esset omnipotens. Hic dico quod (M=111rb) ad destruendum mundum taliter productum non oportet quod expectet per tempus infinitum, quia in instanti aeternitatis potuit produxisse, et immediate post illud

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instans potuit destruxisse. Unde cum ponitur (V=178ra) casus quod destruat citius quo potest sic in nomine Domini, tunc dico quod non est dandum primum instans destructionis sed ultimum, sic, videlicet, signato instanti aeternitatis quod iam est et immediate post hoc non erit, et sic, quocumque instanti in tempore signato, ante illud destruxit Deus mundum. Et ita non expectavit per tempus infinitum, sicut, verbi gratia, signato aliquo instanti in aliquo tempore, verum est dicere de ipso ‘hoc iam est et immediate post hoc non erit,’ et sic non est dandum primum esse destructum istius instantis. Nunc dato quocumque instanti post illud, ante illud tale instans fuit destructum, et sic esset in proposito imaginandum. Si vero fortificetur casus positive, sic videlicet quod Deus non posset producere unam aliam creaturam quin per tempus infinitum expectaret, quoniam dato instanti in quo est verum dicere ‘haec creatura nunc primo est et immediate ante hoc non fuit,’ et signato instanti aeternitatis, inter illa est infinitum tempus intermedium. Hic dico quod iste casus non plus probat nisi quod Deus non potest producere creaturam post instans aeternitatis cui est dare primum sui esse nisi transeat tempus infinitum. Hoc utique verum est, sed ex hoc non sequitur quod non possit creaturam producere nisi transeat tempus infinitum, quia potest pro instanti aeternitatis creaturam non producere et immediate post illud producere, et sic quocumque tempore dato, ante illud produxit pro eo quod non est dandum primum in tempore in quo talis creatura fuerit producta. Et ex hoc apparet quod ista consequentia non valet, quocumque tempore dato, ante illud a creatura fuit producta, ergo a creatura fuit aeternaliter producta, apparet manifeste oppositum in casu praelibato. Et sic apparet quid est ad illas octo rationes dicendum.

[3.81] Ulterius adduco quattuor breves instantias. Et primo arguo sic: creatura taliter producta non habet esse ex se sed ab alio; vel ergo habet idem esse cum Deo vel aliud. Non est dicendum quod idem, quia tunc essent duo dii, nam talis creatura esset a Deo essentialiter distincta. Si vero habet aliud a se, ergo per prius est esse Dei quam sit esse talis creaturae, et per consequens non-esse talis creaturae ea prioritate praecederet suum esse, et per consequens talis creatura haberet esse novum. Et prima consequentia patet, nam pro quacumque mensura est imaginabilis positio alicuius rei et pro eadem non est positio

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alterius rei imaginabilis, ibi non-esse rei praecedit suum esse; quare propositum. [3.82] Praeterea, si mundus fuit possibilis aeternaliter produci, eadem ratione et angelus producaretur; ergo ista. Tunc sic: intellectus angelicus vidit infinitas revolutiones (V= 178rb) orbium; sed in eo non cadit oblivio; ergo iam de facto haberet infinitam notitiam, quia aut esset idem habitus respectu infinitorum obiectorum, aut cuilibet obiecto corresponderet propria cognitio in mente angeli, et sic essent infinitae cognitiones actualiter in mente angeli. Et per consequens, ex omnibus illis resultat cognitio infinita, et sic quocumque dato, habetur propositum. [3.83] Praeterea, si Deus potuit produxisse mundum ab aeterno potuit etiam produxisse duos homines disparis sexus aeternaliter, utputa, unum virum et unam mulierem. Quo facto, sequitur ista conclusio: quod isti non possent filium generare nisi expectarent per tempus infinitum, et sic vellet nollet adhuc servarent castitatem per tempus infinitum. Et consequentia probatur, quoniam quicumque generaretur post hoc in aliquo instanti temporis generaretur. Sed a quocumque instanti temporis signato versus aeternitatem est distantia infinita; ergo propositum. [3.84] Praeterea, et ultimo, arguitur sic: si Deus potuisset produxisse creaturam ab aeterno sequitur quod potuit fecisse ab aeterno hominem infinitae perfectionis, et lapidem, et sic de aliis. Consequens videtur impossibile, cum tales species habeant intrinsecam limitationem. Et consequentia probatur: sit enim quod Deus produxisset Sortem aeternaliter; tunc arguo sic: potentia cuius virtus durativa se extendit ad unum diem est aliquantae perfectionis, et quae se extendit, caeteris paribus, ad duos est duplae perfectionis, et sic in infinitum. Ergo potentia cuius virtus durativa se extendit (M=111va) ad infinitum tempus est iam de facto potentia infinita. Sed quodlibet aeternum est id cuius potentia se extendit ad tempus infinitum; ergo propositum.

[3.811] Ad istas rationes respondeo. Ad primam: cum dicitur “creatura aeternaliter producta non habet esse ex se sed ab alio,” concedo. Et cum quaeritur: “vel habet idem esse cum Deo vel non,” dico quod non. Et cum infertur quod tunc suum non-esse praecessit suum esse,

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nego consequentiam: sicut non sequitur ratio filiationis45 non est ratio paternitatis, et ipsa est a Patre, ergo non-esse suum praecessit suum esse. Ista argumenta generaliter non valent nisi ubi productum est in esse positum per actionem praecedentem et non per simplicem emanationem; quare propositum. [3.812] Ad secundum de angelo qui haberet nunc infinitam cognitionem: hic dicitur quod infinita cognoscere in habitu non videtur impossibile creaturae, licet in actu sit. Sed ulterius: istud argumentum modicum valet contra ponentes Deum posse producere infinitum ad extra secundum omnem denominationem perfectionis simpliciter quidditativam, qui pro nullo inconvenienti haberent quod aliqua creatura cognosceret actualiter infinita. [3.813] Ad tertium: cum dicitur quod “producat tunc Deus aeternaliter hominem et mulierem,” admittitur. (V=178va) Tunc, cum dicitur quod “non possent generare nisi expectarent per tempus infinitum,” hic dicitur quod dato quod Deus posset46 producere hominem aeternaliter, non tamen posset facere quod aeternaliter generaret, quia generatio hominis necessario includit successionem quae repugnat aeternitati nisi forsan dicatur quod produceret per simplicem emanationem, quod creaturae non potest convenire pro eo quod talis modus producendi exigit potentiam immensam et simpliciter independentem. Concederetur ergo conclusio inducta quod inter filium ab eis productum et ipsos esset distantia infinita, nec hoc in casu huiusmodi aliquam impossibilitatem inducit. [3.814] Ad ultimum: cum dicitur quod “tunc creatura quaelibet sic aeternaliter producta esset infinita intensive,” nego consequentiam, quia infinitas durativa non arguit in eodem infinitatem intensivam. Unde albedo unius diei non est minus perfecta albedine unius anni. Et ideo cum dicitur quod “durare per diem est aliquantae perfectionis et per duos est maioris,” istud negatur, quia, ut iam dictum est, talis duratio non arguit maiorem perfectionem intensivam: sic enim materia prima esset perfectior sua forma, quod falsum est; quare propositum.

45 filiationis corr. ex finalis V 46 posset corr. ex poni V

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[3.821] Ex quarum rationum solutione manifeste apparet quod qui vellet posset probabiliter sustinere quod absolute exsistit possibile aliquid a Deo essentialiter distinctum Deum producere aeternaliter potuisse. Pro cuius opinionis probabilitate aliquas rationes adducam, et cum hoc declarabitur positionis imaginatio radicalis. Arguo igitur primo sic: si aliquis effectus non potest esse coaevus suae causae, aut hoc provenit ex insufficientia causae secundum se et absolute, aut ex defectu actionis in comparatione ad patiens, vel provenit ex parte effectus in comparatione ad suam causam. Primum non potest dari in proposito, quia Deus est sufficientissima causa quam47 impossibile est deficere. Secundum similiter dari non potest, quia actio Dei non est successiva sed instantanea, et per consequens in eodem instanti potest esse effectus productus cum sua causa. Tertium non impedit, quia creatura ex hoc non excederet limites creationis; quod sic probatur: quoniam adhuc haberet conditiones creaturam necessario consequentes, videlicet, dependentiam et naturalem tendentiam ad non-esse. Nec etiam in aliquo coaequaretur Creatori, quia aeternitas formaliter non dicit perfectionem simpliciter, tum etiam si diceret hoc, videretur in habente ipsam a se necessario et independenter, cuiusmodi non est in proposito. Et ita per consequens, cum nulla videatur impossibilitas, sequitur quod hoc est possibile absolute. [3.822] Praeterea, si ista impossibilitas (V=178vb) proveniret ex parte (M=111vb) effectus, sequitur quod impossibile esset Deum qualitercumque agentem ipsum aeternaliter produxisse, sicut quia hoc est impossibile secundum se quod humanitas sit asineitas, qualitercumque Deus ageret, non minus talis esset impossibilis absolute. Sed hoc est falsum, quoniam si Deus naturaliter produceret quodlibet quod producit quilibet suus effectus fuisset sibi coaeternus; ergo quod effectus sit aeternus non habet repugnantiam ex parte sua sed potius est indifferens ad hoc vel eius oppositum. Et ita cum Deus ratione sui et propriae actionis sit aeque sufficiens agendo libere sicut si ageret naturaliter non videtur aliquod impossibile quin aliquid a se distinctum essentialiter potuerit aeternaliter produxisse. [3.823] Praeterea, si aliqua duo sic se habent quod unum est perfectius alio, non videtur aliquod impossibile si id quod est imperfectius sit aeternum quin etiam illud quod est perfectius potuerit fuisse ab aeterno. Sed negatio creaturae, hoc est, non-esse ipsius et eius affirmatio, quae est esse, imaginarie sic se habent quod esse perfectius est 47 quam corr. ex qua V

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non-esse. Ergo, si non-esse creaturae aeternaliter praecessit suum esse non videtur impossibile quare hoc non potuit fuisse econverso, quod esse ipsius aeternaliter praecessisset suum non-esse. Et confirmatur, nam ista duo contradictoria sunt contingentia: “creatura est,” “nulla creatura est.” Ergo pro quacumque mensura unum erat verum, pro eadem alterum poterat esse verum. Si ergo nullam creaturam esse pro aeternitate erat verum, sequitur quod et suum contradictorium, videlicet, creaturam esse pro aeternitate fuit possibile, et per consequens habetur propositum, quia si pro aeternitate ista fuisset impossibilis “creatura est,” sequitur quod pro tunc necesse erat nullam creaturam esse; quod videtur falsum, quia tunc ista non essent contradictoria contingentia. Immo sequitur quod creatura numquam in posterum potuisset fuisse, quoniam quod est necessarium aeternaliter est etiam necessarium temporaliter. Si ergo non-esse creaturae esset necessarium aeternaliter, sequitur quod et modo; quod falsum est. [3.824] Praeterea, si aliquis effectus potest absolvi ab eo a quo magis dependet, a fortiori potest absolvi ab eo a quo minus dependet. Sed effectus quilibet magis dependet a subiecto sive materiali principio quam a termino a quo; ergo si per Dei omnipotentiam effectus absolvitur a dependentia materiali et subiectiva, ut tenet fides de mundi creatione, sequitur quod et similiter potest absolvi a conditione termini a quo quae est inceptio exsistentiae realis effectus; et per consequens potest esse aeternus. Consequentia ista patet, et omnes propositiones assumptae, minore excepta, quae sic probatur, (V=179ra) quoniam effectus dependens a duobus magis dependet ab eo a quo sumit maiorem influxum. Sed effectus praesupponens materiale principium et suum non-esse maiorem influxum suscipit a materiali principio quam a non-esse propriae exsistentiae. Immo, ut verius loquar, ab uno suscipit influxum, videlicet, a materiali principio, et ab alio non, quia a non-ente non potest influxus aliquis provenire; ergo magis dependet a materiali principio quam a non-esse proprio. Et per consequens, sicut prius deducebatur quam potest absolvi ab uno tam a reliquo, et ita creaturae aeternitas non repugnat; quod est propositum. [3.825] Praeterea, si alicui formali principio producendi non praeexigenti materiale principium ad agendum non repugnat suum principiatum certum signabile esse coaeternum, sequitur quod nec aliquod eiusdem principii principiatum eidem repugnabit esse coaeternum. Verbi gratia, si calori qui est principium formale in igne producendi calorem correspondent a et b effectus, eidem non repugnat coaevitas

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a, nec repugnare videtur coaevitas b. Sic igitur patet illa propositio assumpta. Sed nunc de facto ita est quod voluntas in Deo est principium formale producendi Spiritum Sanctum, et eadem est principium formale producendi creaturam. Ergo cum Spiritum Sanctum non repugnet illi voluntati esse coaeternum, sequitur quod nec eidem principio repugnabit creaturam fore coaeternam. Nec valet si dicatur quod ibi inter formale principium et terminum productum non est realis distinctio, cuiusmodi est inter tale principium et creaturam; sed hoc non obviat, quia si sol fuisset aeternaliter, adhuc ipsius splendor sibi fuisset coaeternus, et tamen splendor ipsius essentialiter (M=112ra) distinguitur ab eo. Similiter apparet in quolibet corpore quod quam primo est tam primo radiat suam speciem causando, et tamen ibi est essentialis distinctio. Ergo instantia praemissa non impedit; quare propositum. [3.826] Praeterea, non minoris perfectionis est volitiva divina in sua activitate libera quam si esset mere naturaliter activa. Sed si divina voluntas esset potentia mere naturaliter activa effectum sibi potuisset producere coaevum. Ergo et nunc de facto per principium liberum potuit sibi effectum coaevum producere. Consequentia patet, et maior ex hoc, quoniam volitivae divinae prout est potentia libera independens correspondet infinita activitas; sed si esset potentia naturalis, sibi maior activitas correspondere non posset; ergo propositum. (V=179rb) Et minor apparet, quoniam potentia naturalis nullatenus impedibilis quam primo est tam primo ponit suum effectum, sicut apparet fide et experientia: fide, de productione Verbi quae procedit per actum memorativae fecunditatis quae quia mere naturalis et non impedibilis est, mox sequitur productio Verbi sive notitiae adaequatae. Experientia similiter docet in corporis luminosi praesentia ex cuius positione statim sequitur diffusio luminis instantanea per spatium valde magnum. [3.827] Praeterea, signo totum tempus imaginarium exclusive ad instans aeternitatis terminatum, et quaero: numquid sit finitum vel infinitum? Non est dicendum quod finitum, quia tunc esset signabile maximum tempus possibile ita quod maius imaginari non posset; quod falsum videtur pro eo quod ubicumque est processus in infinitum ibi nullum datur maximum versus illud extremum. Si ergo sit infinitum, cum igitur Deus videat id quod immediate terminatur ad instans aeternitatis, sequitur quod cum illud videat sicut mensuram alicuius, sequitur quod in eodem poterit producere creaturam. Sed illa

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ab instanti praesenti imaginarie per infinitum tempus distaret et non magis ipse Deus. Ergo quam Deus esset aeternus tam et creatura huiusmodi esset aeterna; quod est propositum. [3.828] Praeterea, et ultimo, arguitur sic: si mundo vel creaturae repugnaret aeternitas, aut hoc esset quia creatura ex ratione propria est durative posterior suo principio productivo aut quia talis creatura suum non-esse necessario praesupponit durative. Primum non potest dari, quia quod effectus ponatur plus nunc quam alio tempore non est ex ratione effectus sed potius ex ratione causae, et per consequens si causa sit sufficiens et infinita, omnem mensuram temporalem potest excludere, quoniam causa quae in una hora potest producere certum effectum est aliquantae perfectionis et quae in minori maioris perfectionis est. Ergo quae sine tempore est infinita, talis est prima causa; ergo propositum. Nec secundum potest dari, quia si effectui non repugnat coexsistere suae causae primae pro quacumque mensura, ut iam dictum est, sequitur quod ipsa non necessario praesupponit suum non-esse, et etiam aliunde apparet, quoniam creaturae non-esse et suum esse videntur simul coniungi, nam creatura a se habet non-esse sed a Deo capit esse; ergo quod semper sit a Deo et ex se tendat in non-esse nulla videtur praesuppositio secundum exigentiam prioritatis; quare propositum.

[3.830] Radix et imaginatio istius positionis potest in hoc (V=179va) consistere: potentia tripliciter potest intelligi: aut pro potentia activa aut pro passiva aut pro convenientia praedicati ad subiectum. Potentia vero activa prout ipsam concipimus in Deo dupliciter a nobis exprimitur: aut secundum ordinem et dispositionem ad suam sapientiam aut secundum magnitudinem suae immensitatis. Primo modo ipsam vocamus potentiam ordinatam. Secundo modo vero ipsam dicimus potentiam absolutam. Ulterius potentia passiva quae intelligitur in limitata exsistentia sive dependente dupliciter intelligitur: quaedam dicitur naturalis et quaedam obiectivalis.48 Illa dicitur naturalis passiva potentia quae ex natura propria habet quod possit per agens dependens ad esse deduci. Alia vero obiectivalis49 quae solum 48  oboedientialis]obiectivalis V 49  oboedientialis]obiectiavlis V

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per actionem independentem potest in actum deduci. Ulterius potentia tertio modo sumpta potest intelligi duobus modis secundum duplicem convenientiam praedicati ad subiectum, videlicet, necessariam et contingentem. Et secundum hoc quaedam est possibilitas contingentiae et quaedam necessitatis. [3. 831] Ad propositum: igitur ista via haberet sex fundamentales conclusiones: tres affirmativas et tres negativas. Prima est haec: potentiae Dei absolute consideratae non repugnat coaeternitas sui effectus. Secunda est: (M=112rb) potentiae Dei ordinatae, hoc est secundum ordinem et dispositionem quam indidit rebus, repugnant coaeternitas creaturae. Tertia: naturali potentiae creaturae repugnant aeternitas a parte ante. Quarta propositio: suae oboedientiali50 potentiae aeternitas huiusmodi non repugnat. Quinta propositio: creaturae repugnat necessitatis possibilitas propter dependentiam requisitam. Sexta: contingentiae possibilitas pro quacumque mensura limitatae substantiae non repugnat. [3.832] Ex quibus apparet quod contradictionem non implicat quidditatem distinctam a Deo aeternaliter51 exstitisse, et sic secundum istam viam apparet quod cum non sit repugnantia ex parte Dei absolute, nec ex parte creaturae, nec ex rationibus quidditatum aeternitatis, videlicet, et dependentis naturae, quod absolute possible est Deum potuisse creaturam aeternaliter produxisse non per viam productionis connotantis non-esse creaturae durative praecessisse suum esse sed per viam simplicis emanationis, ut nunc intelligimus Verbi productionem per plenitudinem memorativae fecunditatis. Sic igitur apparet modus istius positionis multum solide declaratus.

[3.841] Sed quia in rei veritate rationes adductae non convincunt oppositum sustinere volentem, ideo ad ipsas per ordinem respondeo ut satisfaciam cuilibet postulanti. Ad primam igitur (V=179vb) rationem cum dicitur: “unde provenit quod effectus non possit esse coaevus suae causae? Aut ex insufficientia causae, aut ex modo agendi causae, aut ex parte effectus.” Non primis duobus modis, nec tertio; ergo concedo propositionem assumptam. Et concedo similiter quod hoc non 50  oboedientiali]obiectivali V 51 aeternaliter corr. ex essentialiter V

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provenit ex aliqua insufficientia primae causae vel etiam suae actionis; sed hoc provenit ex parte effectus. Et ad probationem, cum dicitur quod non, quia aeternitas non ponit creaturam extra limites creationis, quia talis denominatio perfectio simpliciter non est, et etiam quia adhuc creatura esset dependens et tendens in non-esse ex parte sua, hic diceretur quod ratio aeternitatis est conditio quae ex sua ratione formali repugnat dependenti naturae, et ideo creatura non potest esse aeterna. Cuius ratio est quia omnis conditio potens creaturae correspondere est simpliciter vel secundum quid limitata. Et ideo cum ratio aeternitatis sit formaliter infinita permanentia, creaturae non potest correspondere. Licet igitur possit sibi correspondere perpetuitas, non tamen aeternitas. Unde proprie aeternitas dicit carentiam principii et finis; sed perpetuitas dicit tantummodo carentiam finis. De ratione igitur formali aeternitatis est non posse non-esse, quae ratio non potest competere creaturae. Et cum dicitur tunc quod “posita creatura aeterna, adhuc posset non esse,” verum est, quia ex tali propositione sequuntur duo contradictoria, videlicet, quod non potest non esse et quod potest non esse, nam eo quod creatura potest non esse eo vero quod aeterna non potest non esse; sed per hoc non probatur possibilitas antecedentis. Et cum dicitur quod “ratio aeternitatis non dicit perfectionem simpliciter,” hic dico quod quamvis formaliter non dicit perfectionem, exprimit tamen modum perfectionis, sicut infinitas et necessitas quae etiam creaturae nullatenus possunt convenire; quare propositum. [3.842] Ad secundam: cum arguitur quod “si impossibilitas haec provenit ex parte effectus, sequitur quod qualitercumque effectus huiusmodi produceretur quod adhuc impossibile esset ipsum fore aeternum, et per consequens, si Deus ad extra naturaliter produceret, adhuc non staret effectum esse aeternum; quod falsum est,” hic dico concedendo quod dato quod creatura ponatur a Deo naturaliter produci, quod sequuntur duo contradictoria, videlicet, quod creatura non est aeterna et tamen est aeterna, nam eo quod creatura rationi aeternitatis repugnat eo quod naturaliter a Deo producta est aeterna, et ideo illa propositio includit contradictionem, videlicet, quod Deus necessario producit creaturam. Sicut, verbi gratia, si ponatur quod homo naturaliter producat asinum, sequitur quod homo est asinus et homo non est asinus, nam eo quod est asinus non est homo, sumendo terminos absolute, et eo quod ab homine naturaliter productus est homo. Per (V=180ra) istum igitur modum numquam probaretur possibilitas

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huius, quod homo est asinus; sic nec in proposito. (M=112va) Ad venandum igitur istam impossibilitatem non sufficit modus iste arguendi, sed requiritur investigatio convenientiae vel disconvenientiae terminorum qui a posteriori indicant impossibilitatem vel possibilitatem extremorum. Et ideo argumentum ab insufficienti procedit. Et sic apparet quod illa secunda ratio non demonstrat. [3.843] Ad tertium, cuius radix est quod si minus perfectum est aeternum, non videtur52 quin maius perfectum possit esse aeternum. Cum igitur non-esse non sit perfectionis et esse sit, non apparet quare magis non-esse creaturae sit aeternum quam e converso possit esse. Hic dico primo quod fundamentum rationis physicae leviter negaretur, quoniam materia prima est aeterna, et tamen forma quae est perfectior ipsa materia est generabilis et corruptibilis. Sic igitur apud eos modicum concluderet rationis fundamentum, tamen dato quod illud concederetur, propter hoc non haberetur intentum: non enim imaginamur non-esse creaturae fuisse aeternum per modum cuiusdam positionis sed53 isto modo: quod creatura non fuit aeternaliter. Sed ex hoc nihil concluderetur contra oppositum opinantem. Et si dicatur: unde hoc quod per prius est creaturam non esse quam ipsam esse? Causa iam dicta est ex propriae quidditatis limitatione quae non potest capere plenissime unam perfectionem simpliciter nec modum perfectionis; et hoc non est aliud nisi quia hoc est hoc. Sic igitur apparet quid est ad illam rationem dicendum. [3.844] Ad quartum, cuius radix in hoc consistit, quod potest absolvi ab eo a quo magis dependet potest etiam absolvi ab eo a quo minus dependet. Sed magis effectus dependet a principio materiali quam a termino a quo, quod est non-esse. Ergo cum per Dei omnipotentiam effectus absolvitur a dependentia materiali, sequitur quod etiam potest absolvi a conditione inceptionis, et per consequens potest esse aeternus. Hic dico quod ratio ista multipliciter peccat. Primo, in hoc quod praesupponit quod cuiuslibet rei productio praesupponit principium materiale; quod falsum est de materia prima quae ponitur in esse per creationem, et similiter de formis simplicibus intellectualis naturae, de caritate et multis aliis. Secundo, deficit in hoc quod imaginatur quod effectus dependeat a suo non-esse sicut a materiali principio; quod falsum est: non enim est imaginandum effectum dependere a suo 52  non videtur om. V, sic M 53  sed]propter hoc non haberetur intentum sed rep. (va-cat) V

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non-esse. Sed positio effectus est talis naturae quod ad eius positionem sequitur naturali consequentia ipsum non aeternaliter exstitisse, sicut ad positionem hominis sequitur ipsum non esse asinum. Ita ad positionem creaturae (V= 180rb) sequitur ipsam non esse aeternam pro eo quod creatura et aeternitas ex suis formalibus rationibus opponuntur. Et ideo licet possit absolvi a conditione materialis principii, non tamen potest a praesuppositione sui non-esse, quia hoc sequitur ex positione talis effectus. Illa autem materialis conditio est extrinseca tali rei, utpote formae. Si enim intelligeret de composito, falsum esset, quia Deus non potest facere compositum tale sine materia, quia cadit in sua ratione, sicut non potest facere hominem sine anima intellectiva pro eo quod cadit in sua ratione constitutiva. Et sic apparet quid est ad illud argumentum dicendum. [3.845] Ad quintum, cum dicitur in radice quod formale principium Spiritus Sancti est voluntas divina et similiter formale principium creaturae est ipsa divina voluntas, unde ergo est quod unum principiatum potest esse coaeternum suo principio et aliud non? Hic dico pro materia istius argumenti tres propositiones, quarum prima est haec: ratio activae productionis non est ratio formalis excludendi a principiato proprio coaevitatem cum suo principio productivo. Ista patet de Verbi productione, et Spiritus Sancti, et consimiliter de effectibus multarum creaturarum qui non praesupponunt tempore exsistentiam proprii principii productivi. Secunda propositio est haec: essentialis distinctio non est formalis ratio excludendi ab effectu coaevitatem cum suo principio productivo. Ista patet per exempla beati Augustini de sole et splendore, qui si fuisset aeternaliter consimiliter et splendor eius fuisset aeternaliter et tamen esset ab eo essentialiter distinctus. Et patet etiam de vestigio et multis aliis. Tertia propositio est haec: sola effectus intrinseca conditio habentis causam infrustrabilem excludit ab ipso coaevitatem cum suo principio productivo. Ista patet, quoniam ubi causa est sufficiens ex parte sua, et sua actio consimiliter, ad communicandum effectui a denominationem, et impossibile est a (M=112vb) denominationem tali effectui correspondere, oportet quod hoc proveniat ex intrinseca conditione effectus. Ad propositum igitur applicando, dico quod licet ista diversitas non sit ratione principii productivi nec ratione distinctionis essentialis, ut tangit argumentum; provenit tamen ex instrinseca conditione effectus, ut iam declaratum est. Et ideo stat quod voluntas sit principium formale in spiratione Spiritus Sancti et in creatione creaturae, et tamen in uno sit coaevitas

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et non in alio. Posset tamen dici, et alio modo, quod voluntas, ut in Patre et Filio est formale principium spirando Spiritum Sanctum, sed non sic ut est principium productivum creaturae, quoniam voluntas ut est in tribus suppositis est formale principium (V=180va) producendi creaturam, et ut sic non est formale principium in spiratione Spiritus Sancti: sic enim Spiritus Sanctus seipsum produceret. Et per istum modum etiam posset assignari diversitas ex parte principii formalis inter processionem Spiritus Sancti et creaturae productionem; quare propositum. [3.846] Ad sextum, cum dicitur “non minoris perfectionis est volitiva divina nunc quam si esset mere naturaliter activa; sed si esset mere naturaliter activa, potuisset produxisse effectum sibi coaevum; ergo et nunc est ita quod potuit.” Hic dico quod iste modus arguendi universaliter peccat. Verbi gratia, non minoris perfectionis esset asinus si esset homo quam sit nunc de facto; sed si esset homo, posset producere hominem; ergo nunc de facto asinus potest producere hominem. Constat quod consequens est falsum, et tamen propositiones assumptae sunt verae pro eo quod sunt conditionales quarum consequentia sequuntur ex suis antecedentibus, licet ipsorum antecedentia sint impossibilia. Et ita modus iste arguendi fundatur per locum a conditionali ad alteram partem, qui nihil valet, sicut non sequitur: “Si homo est, animal est; ergo animal est,” quia antecedens est necessarium et consequens contingens; ita in proposito. Unde ergo provenit quod si volitiva divina ageret mere naturaliter, produceret effectum sibi coaevum non ex hoc quod sic esset ex parte rei, quia adhuc tali effectui repugnaret aeternaliter produci, sed propter positionem propositionis includentis contradictionem ex qua sequitur utraque pars contradictionis, et ideo non est mirum. Sic igitur apparet qualiter est dicendum ad hoc argumentum. [3.847] Ad septimum, cum dicitur quod signetur totum tempus imaginarium exclusive ad instans aeternitatis terminatum in nomine Domini, tunc cum quaeritur: vel est finitum vel infinitum, dico breviter quod loquendo imaginarie de infinito cuius quantitatem accipientibus semper restat aliquid accipiendum, quod tale quid est infinitum versus aeternum. Et cum dicitur quod in quacumque mensura quam Deus videt potest effectum suum producere, et ita cum videt illud quod immediate terminatur ad ipsum, sequitur quod in illa mensura posset Deus aliquem effectum producere. Et ita cum illa mensura per tempus infinitum distat ab isto nunc, sequitur quod productum in tali

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mensura esset aeternum. Hic dicitur dupliciter: primo, quod quacumque mensura data quae sit temporanea, ante illam Deus potuit producere aliquem effectum, et nulla est talis quae immediate terminatur ad Deum. Et per consequens, nullam talem videt Deus sicut nunc dicimus de partibus continui. Et sic ratio falsum imaginatur, quod sit certa portio temporis quae immediate terminetur ad ipsum Deum. Sicut nunc, verbi gratia, signato puncto terminante istam lineam non propter hoc dabitur aliqua pars proportionalis quae (V=180vb) immediate terminetur ad istum punctum, quia quacumque data, illa est divisibilis, et sic per consequens illa non fuit huic puncto immediata. Secundo posset dici quod dato quod daretur tale tempus Deo immediatum, adhuc non haberetur intentum; et ratio est quia adhuc talis effectus esset productus in tempore. Et cum dicitur quod “distaret per tempus infinitum ab isto nunc, ergo esset aeternum,” negatur consequentia, sicut nunc de intelligentia quam quidam imaginantur de possibili infinitam non sequitur infinite distat a non-esse simpliciter; ergo est independens. Sic in proposito, et ratio est quia aeternitas ultra huiusmodi distantiam infinitam imaginarie dicit infinitam permanentiam excludentem tendentiam in non-esse quae creaturae nullatenus potest convenire; quare propositum. [3.848] Ad octavum et ultimum: (M=113ra) cum dicitur “si creaturae repugnat aeternitas, aut hoc est quia creatura ex ratione propria est durative posterior suo principio productivo aut quia praesupponit necessario suum non-esse,” hic dico, ut saepe dictum est,54 quod hoc provenit ex intrinseca limitatione creaturae quae necessario infert posterioritatem sui respectu suae causae, et per consequens praesuppositionem sui non-esse ad suum esse. Et cum dicitur quod “hoc est potius ex parte causae quam effectus,” istud negatur. Unde posset esse fundamentalis responsio pro isto modo dicendi quod quam Deo repugnant mensurari tempore tam et creaturae mensurari aeternitate, et ideo non potest quovis modo concedi creaturam posse fuisse aeternam, quoniam aeternitas nihil aliud videtur quam primi entis permanentia inpartibilis, supersimplex et prima, quae conditiones, si quis bene prospicit, creaturae nullatenus possunt convenire. Et sic apparet quod licet positio istarum rationum posset sustineri, non tamen per has rationes sufficienter et convincenter probatur.

54  Cf., e.g., supra, n. 3.845.

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[3.90] Dico igitur pro complemento huius articuli quod quaelibet istarum positionum potest probabiliter sustineri, nulla tamen potest in hac via, supposita influentia generali, per rationem convincentem probari. Et sic per consequens propositio de possibilitate aeternitatis mundi remanet propositio ad utrumlibet, licet propositio de sua existentia, videlicet, quod non fuerit aeternus sit firmiter profitenda cum ad hoc nos instruat exordium sacrae Scripturae. Et sic patet qualiter est ad illum tertium articulum respondendum, et per consequens ad totam quaestionem.

[3.91] Ad rationes igitur factas in principio quaestionis. Ad primam:55 cum dicitur quod “Deus non potest ad extra producere infinitum, et hoc potest limitata intellectualis substantia capere cognitive,” patet quod secundum diversas vias tactas in primo articulo ad illud antecedens est respondendum: tenentes (V=181ra) Deum posse 55  Appendix to “Aristotle’s View of the Eternity of the World according to Peter of Candia,” op. cit., 382-383: “[1.1] Et arguo quod non tribus mediis, et primo sic: immensitas divinae potentiae non potest ad extra producere aliquid simpliciter infinitum, et limitata intellectualis substantia hoc potest capere cognitive; ergo quaestio falsa. Consequentia patet; et antecedens pro qualibet sui parte probatur. Et primo pro prima parte sic: Nihil aliud a Deo potest esse Deo aequale. Sed quodlibet infinutum simpliciter, si quidem poneretur, esset Deo aequale. Ergo nullum infinitum a Deo distinctum potest in esse produci. Consequentia patet. Maior est communiter theologorum. Sed probo minorem: sicut se habet infinitum extensive ad aliud infinitum extensive, si talia duo essent, ita conformiter se haberent duo infinita intensive, si essent. Sed duo infinita extensive, si essent, essent simpliciter aequalia. Ergo et similiter duo infinita intensive; quod est propositum. Probatur: aequalitas duorum infinitorum extensive, ut si per immaginationem a centro terrae protenderetur una linea in infinitum versus polum Articum, et alia ab eodem centro protenderetur versus polum Antarticum in infinitum, constat quod quot pedalia essent in uno illorum essent et in alio. Et sic, quocumque alio infinito signato, adhuc si iret versus quamcumquem differentiam in infinitum, tot pedalia essent in uno illorum quot et in alio, ut patet manifeste. Quare, illa duo essent simpliciter aequalia; quod est propositum. Et secunda pars antecedentis apparet;, nam intellectus de nullo disputat cuius notitiam aliqualem non habeat. Sed de hoc intellectus disputat; ergo propositum.”

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producere intelligentiam infinitam, negarent antecedens. Et ad probationem, cum dicitur quod tunc Deus ad extra posset sibi aliquid aequale producere, negatur consequentia, quia licet tali creaturae corresponderet quaelibet denominatio perfectionis simpliciter quidditativa, non tamen quaelibet distinctiva, vel etiam quilibet modus perfectionis, ut aeternitas, necessitas et independentia, quae potius dicunt modos perfectionum quam perfectiones. Et ex hoc apparet quod adhuc talis creatura non esset Deo aequalis. Et consequenter secundum istam viam concederetur quod unum infinitum esset perfectius alio. Sed secundum alias duas vias quae ponunt quod Deus non potest ad extra producere aliquod infinitum, diceretur quod “intellectum hoc posse capere cognitive” potest intelligi dupliciter: aut secundum rationem evidentem aut per modum phantasticum. Primo modo non potest intellectus aliquid capere cognitive ad extra respectu alicuius quin illud Deus possit facere. Secundo modo nullum est inconveniens, quoniam intellectus phantasticus frequenter sibi format propositiones quae sunt impossibiles respectu quarum nulla potentia se extendit ratione impossibilitatis et repugnantiae terminorum, non tamen ratione alicuius defectus ex parte potentiae. Posset etiam dici per istum modum quod intelligibile quoddam est per se et quoddam per accidens. Verbi gratia, ex hoc quod intelligo Deum esse, intelligo quod Deum non esse est impossibile, et sic per accidens intelligo Deum non esse, sed Deum esse per se. Diceretur ergo quod quidquid56 intellectus potest intelligere quod sit per se intelligibile Deus potest facere, et hoc ad extra. Quod addo, quia intellectus creatus potest intelligere Deum qui est obiectum per se intelligibile et tamen Deus non potest facere Deum, licet possit generare. Non tamen potest facere quidquid intellectus potest per accidens intelligere, quia tunc posset impossibile facere possible: multa enim impossibilia per accidens intelliguntur; quare etc. [3.92] Ad secundum:57 cum dicitur quod “immensitas divinae potentiae non potest quodlibet accidens a suo subiecto separare, et 56  quod quidquid]quicquid quod quid V, sic M 57  “[1.2] Praeterea, immensitas divinae potentiae non potest quodlibet accidens a suo subiecto separare, et hoc limitata intellectualis substantia potest capere cognitive; ergo, quaestio falsa. Consequentia patet. Et antecedens pro secunda parte patet per rationem nunc immediate superius assignatam. Sed pro prima parta probatur: Deus non potest facere relationem sine fundamento et termino, nec tempus sine motu, nec motum

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hoc potest quilibet intellectus capere cognitive, ergo ad propositum”; hic dicendum est secundum unam viam tactam in secundo articulo negando primam partem antecedentis pro eo quod omne accidens potest Deus a subiecto proprio separare. Et ad probationem: cum dicitur “Deus non potest facere relationem sine fundamento,” diceretur hic quod relatio non est distincta a suo fundamento, et ideo si intelligatur (M=113rb) propositio ratione significati, verum est. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod non possit facere quodlibet accidens sine subiecto: licet enim possit facere quod talis denominatio relativa non competat certae rei, non tamen propter hoc oportet ponere ibi distinctionem realem inter (V=181rb) significatum per terminum absolutum et per terminum connotativum sive respectivum, et hoc quoad principale significatum. Unde paternitatem Deus potest facere sine paternitate, et impossibile est Deum facere paternitatem sine paternitate, et hoc totum provenit ex varia terminorum connotatione. Secunda via quae ponit accidentia successiva negaret quod possible est intellectum capere relationem sine fundamento et successivum sine permanente, et sic per consequens non potest intelligere quodlibet accidens sine subiecto, et tota ratio est quia in ratione relationis cadit fundamentum et successivum permanens. [3.93] Ad tertiam:58 cum dicitur quod “immensitas divinae potentiae non potest aliquid distinctum essentialiter a se producere sibi sine mobili, et ista sunt accidentia; ergo propositum. Probo assumptum, nam contradictionem includit aliquem esse patrem sine paternitate, et similiter similem sine similitudine, mensuirari secundum prius et posterius sine motu, vel pertransire spatium sine motu. Ergo hoc Deus non potest facere, aliter faceret contradictoria simul vera, quod est destructivum primi principii. Et per consequens prima pars illius antecedentis est vera.” 58  “[1.3] Praeterea, immensitas divinae potentiae non potest producere aliquid a se distinctum sibi coaeternum, et hoc intellectualis substantia potest capere cognitive; ergo quaestio falsa. Consequentia patet, et antecedens pro secunda parte patet per rationem iam bis superius assignatam. Sed pro prima parte probatur, quia si Deus posset ad extra aliquid sibi coaeternum producere, aut causando aut generando; sed nec sic nec; ergo propositum. Probatur minor, quod non causando, quia qualibet quod per creationem producitur sic se habet quod per prius est suum non-esse quam suum esse, cum creatio sit de nihilo alicuius productio, ut patet per Magistrum, libro II, distinctione prima. Sed nullius aeterni non-esse praecedit suum esse; ergo nullum tale potest creative produci. Nec etiam potest tale producere generando, quoniam Deus mere contingenter agit ad

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coaeternum,” apparet secundum ultimam viam tertii articuli quod est negandum. Et cum dicitur “generando vel creando,” dicitur breviter quod nec sic nec sic sed libere producendo productione simplicis emanationis. Secunda vero via diceret quod repugnantia est in intellectu capere creaturam aeternam, et ideo illud non est ab intellectu intelligibile nisi per accidens. Et sic patet ad ista argumenta responsio secundum varias imaginandi vias. Et in hoc ista circa secundum prima quaestio terminatur. Gratias Deo omnipotenti.

extra. Sed generatio est rei naturalis productio; ergo non potest aliquid a se distinctum sibi coaeternum producere generando. Et per consequens, cum egressus rerum sit vel per viam naturalis productionis vel per viam creationis, et nulla istarum viarum, ut probatum est, Deus potest aliquid a se distinctum aeternaliter producere, sequitur minoris propositionis veritas evidenter.”

Chapter 2 Suárez and Medieval Transcendental Thought Rolf Darge

K

I. Introduction

ant’s transcendental philosophy faces—as Kant himself knows—a long tradition of transcendental thought, which goes back to the Middle Ages. In this tradition transcendental philosophy is not—or not primarily—understood as a reflexion on the inner a priori conditions of knowledge, but as a scientific investigation of reality, namely, of being in general.1 The transcensus (surpassing, going beyond) is not—as it is in Kant—related to empirical knowledge but to the Aristotelian categories: “transcendens”—since the sixteenth century the term“transcendentalis” is commonly used in the same sense2—means a trait of being, which is not

1  Within a famous passage of his Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1787) Kant points to the “transcendental philosophy of the ancients” and quotes a common Scholastic proposition: “quodlibet ens est unum, verum, bonum.” Cf. I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, §12, B 113-114 (Sämtliche Werke, Ed. K. Voränder, 1922, Bd. 1, pp. 135-136). The interrelationship between the Kantian and the Scholasic mode of transcendental thought has recently been studied by F. Tommasi, Philosophia Transcendentalis. La questione antepredicativa e l’ analogia tra la Scolastica e Kant. Le corrispondenze letterarie, scientifiche ed erudite dal Rinascimento all ‘età moderna, Subsidia 10 (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 2008), esp. 1-60. 2  Cf. for instance F. Suárez, Disputationes metaphysicae [hereafter DM] 1.5.4 (Opera omnia 25, ed. Vivès, 40b): “transcendentalia praedicata.” Ibid., 1.5.23 (43b): “transcendentia praedicata.” See J. Aertsen, “Transcendens— Transcendentalis: The Genealogy of a Philosophical Term,” in ed., J.

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restricted to a certain category. Metaphysics is a transcendental science (scientia transcendentalis) because it deals with the transcategorial traits of being.3 This conception of metaphysics persists till the eighteenth century. As Norbert Hinske has shown, even Kant, in an early state of development of his terminology, equates “metaphysica” and “philosophia transcendentalis.”4 What forms and traditional lines of transcendental thought may be discerned—which of them prevails within the development of modern metaphysics? Is it possible to reconstruct a traditional line that interlinks Kant’s transcendental philosophy and the Scholastic scientia transcendens? These questions have recently generated much scholarly activity—and continue to be the subject of international research; John Doyle‘s excellent studies on the Scholastic concepts and use of transcendental and “supertranscendental” notions belong to the pioneering works that set the standard within this wide and new field of investigation in the history of philosophy.5 Through these recent Hamesse, L’élaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au Moyen Âge: Actes du Colloque international de Lovain-la-Neuve et Leuven 12-14 septembre 1998 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000), 243-255. 3  Thereon see the research reports by J. Aertsen, “The Medieval Doctrine of the Transcendentals: The Current State of Research,” in Bulletin de Philosophie médiévale 33 (1991), 130-147; idem, “The Medieval Doctrine of the Transcendentals: New Literature,” in Bulletin de Philosophie médiévale 41 (1999): 107-121. Idem, art. “Transzendental” (II. Die Anfänge bis Meister Eckhart), in eds., J. Ritter and K. Gründer, Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Bd. 10, Darmstadt 1998, Sp. 1360-1465; and L. Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens. Die formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit (Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1990). 4  N. Hinske, “Verschiedenheit und Einheit der Transzendentalen Philosophien,” Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 14 (1970): 41-68; idem, Kants Weg zur Transzendentalphilosophie. Der dreißigjährige Kant, (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1970), esp. 40-77; idem, “Die historischen Vorlagen der Kantischen Transzendentalphilosophie,” Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 12 (1968): 86-113. 5 See, for instance, these contributions: J.P. Doyle, “‘Extrinsic Cognoscibility’: A Seventeenth-Century Supertranscendental Notion,” The Modern Schoolman 68 (1990): 57-79; idem, “Between Transcendental and Transcendental: The missing Link?,” The Review of Metaphysics 50 (1997): 783-815; idem, art. “Supertranscendent,” in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie Bd. 10, Darmstadt 1998, col. 644-649; idem,

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investigations the philosophical and historical importance of the transcendental theory found in Suárez’s Disputationes metaphysicae (1597) became more and more obvious; according to the prevailing view, this transcendental theory actually plays a decisive role in the transition from medieval to modern thought.6 Also within the Disputationes7 transcendental considerations occupy a central place. This work in its first and fundamental part contains a comprehensive doctrine of the transcendentals “being,” “one, ” “true,” and “good” because these are—as Suárez supposes in accordance with the Scholastic tradition—the most general contents (rationes) of real being, and as they are included in every understanding of real beings, they are always conceived at least implicitly from the beginning of our intellecual activity.8 This transcendental doctrine also affects the philosophical knowledge of God at which metaphysics, according to Suárez, is ultimately aimed since, besides finite or created being, infinite being also falls under the extension of the transcendentals. “Supertranscendental Nothing: A Philosophical Finisterre,” Medioevo 24 (1998): 1-30. 6  See O. Boulnois, Être et représentation. Une généalogie de la métaphysique moderne à l’époque de Duns Scot (XIIIe-XIVe siècle) (Paris : Press Universitaires de France, 1999); F. Volpi, “Suárez et le problème de la métaphysique,” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 3 (1993) : 395-411, 410: “La thèse qui peut être considerée comme acquise est qu’ avec Suárez la métaphysique opère un tournant décisif en direction de l’ontologie moderne;” J.-F. Courtine, Suárez et le système de la métaphysique, Paris 1990, esp. 325-457; L Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens, cf. n. 3, esp. 200-213; J. Gracia, “The Ontological Status of the Transcendental Attributes of Being in Scholasticism and Modernity: Suárez and Kant,” in, eds., J. Aertsen and A. Speer, Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der S.I.E.P.M. 25-30 August 1997 in Erfurt, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 26 (Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1998), 213-225. 7  In the following the Disputationes metaphysicae (DM) will be cited in the usual way from the Vivès Edition of the Opera omnia, vols. 25 and 26. 8  DM 1.2.27: “rationes universales, quas metaphysica considerat transcendantales sunt, ita ut in propriis rationibus entium imbibantur;”DM 1.4.20: “rationes […] transcendentales, sine quarum cognitione et adminiculo non potest aliqua ratio seu quidditas cuiuscunque rei in particulari explicari.” See thereon R. Darge, Suárez’ transzendentale Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition ( Leiden-Boston: E.J. Brill, 2004).

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Therefore any philosophical theory of God is also constructed on the basis, and within the framework, of the doctrine of the transcendentals. By determining the ontological perfection which the divine has in common with any other real being, the doctrine of the transcendentals opens a horizon within which the singular mode of being of the divine may be philosophically explored.9 After an explanation of the nature of first philosophy and an identification of its proper subject-matter, being insofar as it is real being (Disputation 1),10 Suárez begins his investigation of the transcendentals in the second disputation with a treatment of the concept of being as such. Disputation three and onward explore the nature of being as such by means of a demonstration of its transcendental attributes (passiones entis); this exploration involves considerations of the characteristic, number, and order of these attributes (disp. 3) as well as special reflections on transcendental unity (disp. 4-7), truth (disp. 8-9), and goodness (disp. 10-11). In the Berton edition the explanation extends to around 370 pages in close type. No other exposition of metaphysics contains a doctrine of the transcendentals comparatively extensive and reflected by the author himself with respect to its inner systematic coherence and its philosophical implications. In the seventeenth century Suárez’s transcendental doctrine exerted great influence on the development of first philosophy not only at Catholic universities but also at Lutheran and Reformist universities.11 Even Christian Wolff in 9  DM 1.4.34: “ut traditur lib. 10 Ethicor. haec felicitas in contemplatione Dei et substantiarum separatarum posita est; haec autem contemplatio proprius actus est, et praecipuus finis huius scientiae”; DM 1.3.10: “Deus et intelligentiae […] prout in nostram considerationem cadunt, non possunt a consideratione transcendentium attributorum sejungi.” 10  DM 1.1.26: “Dicendum est ergo, ens in quantum ens reale esse objectum adaequatum huius scientiae.” For the present discussion about Suárez’s conception of the proper object of metaphysics see R. Darge, “‘Diese Lehre ist von allen die gewisseste.’ Die Radikalisierung der aristotelischen Seinslehre in der Hochschulmetaphysik der frühen Neuzeit,” in eds., G. Frank and A. Speer, Der Aristotelismus in der Frühen Neuzeit - Kontinuität oder Wiederaneignung?, Wolfenbütteler Forschungen 115 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz in Kommission, 2007), 17-42. 11  See Charles Lohr,“Metaphysics,” in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1988), ch. X, 537-638, esp. 611638 and the former studies by K. Eschweiler, “Die Philosophie der spanischen Spätscholastik auf den deutschen Universitäten des siebzehnten

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his Ontologia (1728) still uses this transcendental doctrine as a starting point for his project, namely, the emendation of the Scholastic science of being. Wolff maintained that what in the Scholastic doctrine of being was thought clearly but indistinct by application of a method of proof orientated to mathematics should finally be brought to distinct determination. Although unaware of the multiplicity and diversity of Scholastic theories regarding the transcendentals, Wolff considers Suárez’s exposition of metaphysics as the epitome of the Scholastic doctrine of being.12 The great variety of the Scholastic doctrines of transcendentals has been commemorated in recent years.13 So the question arises, which tradition does Suárez take up and convey to “Modern School” metaphysics? This question has already been discussed and resolutely answered by É. Gilson in his famous acount on the history of the question

Jahrhunderts,” in eds., K. Beyerle, H. Finke, and G. Schreiber, Spanische Forschungen der Görresgesellschaft, Bd. 1, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kulturgeschichte Spaniens, Erste Reihe (Münster, 1928), 251-325; E. Lewalter, Spanisch-jesuitische und deutsch-lutherische Metaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der iberisch-deutschen Kulturbeziehungen und zur Vorgeschichte des deutschen Idealismus (Darmstadt:Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1967); M. Wundt, Die deutsche Schulmetaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts (Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr, 1939). 12  Within the explication of the concept of being in general and the discussion of the attributes of being as such, Wolff in his Ontologia systematically takes up parts of the tradional doctrine of the trencendentals and interprets them on the basis of Suárez’s Disputaiones metaphysicae. See R. Darge, “Von Durandus zu Christian Wolff: Eine Entwicklungslinie der Theorie des Guten in der mittelalterlichen und neuzeitlichen Universitätsmetaphysik,” in ed., D. Fonfara, Metaphysik als Wissenschaft. Festschrift für Klaus Düsing zum 65. Geburtstag (Freiburg-München: K. Alber, corp., 2006), 153-172. 13  See the studies mentionned in n. 3 and in addition: M. Pickavé, ed., Die Logik des Transzendentalen: Festschrift für Jan A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburtstag (Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2003); J. Uscatescu, “La teoría del bien transcendental en Pedro Auréolo en el contexto de su filosfía,” Faventia 26 (2004), 53-76; R. Darge, “Omne ens est conveniens. Ursprung und Entwicklung eines spätmittelalterlichen Neuansatzes der Theorie des ontischen Gutseins,” Salzburger Jahrbuch für Philosophie 50 (2005), 9-27.

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of being.14 He excluded Suárez from the Thomistic tradition and placed the Jesuit in a line of thought stretching from Avicenna to Duns Scotus, from Scotus via Suárez to the German school philosophy of the seventeenth century, and from there to Wolff and finally to Kant. According to Gilson, characteristic in this line of thought is its reduction of beings to their essence—that is, to the ontological status of a possibile—and whereby beings’ actuality, their act of being (actus essendi), is lost from sight.15 According to such an approach, metaphysics eventually degenerates into “essentialism” and to the mere speculation about possibles. This view—independently from the evaluation Gilson connected with it—stimulated and inspired further research on Suárez’s metaphysics. As a consequence, the Disputationes were analysed for the structure of the Scotistic scientia transcendens.16 Under this respect two elements of Suárez’s doctrine of the transcendentals were of special interest: first (1), the concept of being in general—which is explained in the second disputation—and, second (2), the general theory of the passiones entis developed in the third disputation. (1) Just like Scotus, Suárez interprets the concept of being, which is relevant to metaphysics (i.e., “ens” taken in the sense of the noun 14  É. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), 2nd revised ed. Toronto, 1952; cf. (newly revised and extended version) L’être et l’essence (Paris: J. Vrin, 1962); 2nd revised and extended ed. Paris 1972. 15  É. Gilson, L’être et l’essence, see n. 14, 151: “Pour Suárez, la notion d’essence est adéquate à la notion d’être, si bien qu’on peut exprimer tout ce qu’est l’être en termes d’essence, avec la certitude qu’il ne s’en perdra rien. Une telle proposition semblera d’ailleurs aller de soi pour tote mentalité essentialiste. […] Pour une telle ontologie [essentialiste] […] l’essence épuise toute la richesse de l’être.” É. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, see n. 14 (supra), 106: “And all this owing to Avicenna, who begot Scotus, who begot Suárez, who begot Kleutgen”; ibid., 112: “And then Suárez begot Wolff ”; ibid., 120: “Wolff has been to Kant what Suárez had been to Wolff himself.” 16  W. Hoeres, “Francis Suárez and the Teaching of John Duns Scotus on ‘univocatio entis,” in eds., B. M. Bonansea and J. K. Ryan, John Duns Scotus, 1265 – 1965 (Washington: Catholic University of America, 1965), 263290; L. Honnefelder, see n. 3 (supra), esp. 200-294; J.-F. Courtine, Suárez et le système de la métaphysique, see n. 6 (supra), esp. 137-321; O. Boulnois, Être et représentation, see n. 6 (supra).

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and not in the sense of the participle from the verb “esse”), as an absolutely simple concept. It prescinds from any special mode of being and therefore can be predicated in the same sense with respect to God and creature, substance and accident. The concept of being indicates formally—just as “res”—only the real essence taken in a conrete way: something, a quid in the manner of a subject, which by itself is ordained to existence independent from thought.17 Therefore it can be predicated in an essential way and respect (quidditative) of any real being;18 because (whereas actual being in general does not belong to the essence of a being) it is essential for any being to have an essence that is capable of existing independently from thought—in the words of Scotus: “to which being [outside of the intellect] does not oppose [cui non repugnat esse].”19 So Suárez’s exposition of metaphysics in view of its basic approach appears as a continuation of the Scotistic scientia transcendens; Ludger Honnefelder sums up: “for both authors [i.e., Scotus and Suárez] metaphysics is transcendental science and nothing else.”20 17  DM 2.4.5: “si ens sumatur, prout est significatum huius vocis in vi nominis sumptae, eius ratio consistit in hoc, quod sit habens essentiam realem, id est non fictam, nec chymericam, sed veram et aptam ad realiter existendum”; DM 2.4.15: “Unde obiter colligo, ens, in vi nominis sumptum, et rem, idem omnino esse seu significare, solumque differre in etymologia nominum; nam res dicitur a quidditate, quatenus est aliquid firmum et ratum, id est non fictum, qua ratione dicitur quidditas realis; ens vero in praedicta significatione dicit id, quod habet essentiam realem. Eamdem ergo omnino rem seu rationem realem important”; DM 2.4.14: “quod vero essentia aut quidditas realis sit, intelligi non potest sine ordine ad esse et realem entitatem actualem; non enim aliter concipimus essentiam aliquam, quae actu non existit, esse realem, nisi quia talis est, ut ei non repugnet esse entitatem actualem, quod habet per actualem existentiam; quamvis ergo actu esse non sit de essentia creaturae, tamen ordo ad esse, vel aptitudo essendi est de intrinseco et essentiali conceptu eius.” 18  DM 2.4.13: “hinc obiter colligitur, rationem entis communissimam, quae significatur per eam vocem in vi nominis sumptam, esse essentialem, et praedicari quidditative de suis inferioribus.” 19  Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 43, q. un, n. 7 (ed. Vat. VI, 354); Ord. IV, d. 1, q. 1, n. 8, (ed. Vivès XVI, 109); Ord. IV, d. 8, q. 1, n. 2 (ed. Vivès XVII, 7); in this sense: Ord. I, d. 3, p. 2, q. un., n. 314 (ed. Vat. III, 191); Ord. I, d. 36, q. un., n. 50 u. 52 (ed. Vat. VI, 291 sq.). 20  L. Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens, see n. 3 (supra), 209.

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(2) Beyond that, some commentators trace Suárez’s basic understanding of the transcendental attributes back to Scotus. According to Jean-François Courtine, Suárez adopts the Scotistic doctrine of the passiones entis 21 and, following Scotus, reintroduces the doctrine of the disjunctive transcendentals.22 Courtine’s interpretation is mainly based on Suárez’s consideration of the classification of being (divisio entis) in the beginning of the second part of the Disputationes (Disp. 28, sect. 1). All in all, the received view according to which Suárez practices a form of Thomistic eclecticism23 is nullified. Recent studies replace it with the image of Suárez as a subtle analyst who traces the Scotistic scientia transcendens back to its basic principles and conceptual roots, reconstructs it from the bottom up in a new systematic way, and—thereby—pioneers modern ontology. This new view seems onesided to me. In the following I show that even if Suárez explains the meaning of “ens” in accordance with Scotus, he does not adopt the Scotistic model of transcendental science but rather looks for a suitable alternative to it. To this end, he reverts to a pre-Scotistic tradition of transcendental thought and seeks to develop it further on the basis of a new notion of being. The characteristic design of a transcendental theory of being is not only due to the notion of being it employs, which this theory takes as a basis, but also to the underlying idea of the transcendental task which it has to perform. So it substantially depends also on the underlying concept of transcendentality. Therefore to confirm my thesis in the 21  J.-F. Courtine, Suarez et le système de la métaphysique, see n. 6 (supra), esp. 355-377; 376: “C’est en fait à cette doctrine scotiste [des passiones entis] que se range finalement Suárez. ” 22  Ibid., 396: “C’est l’évidence d’une telle latitudo entis qui permet à Suárez d’élaborer son étude des transcendantaux disjonctifs”; ibid., 417: “[…] Suárez réintroduisait l’étude des transcendantaux disjonctifs.” 23  M. Grabmann, “Die Disputationes metaphysicae des Franz Suárez in ihrer methodischen Eigenart und Fortwirkung,” in Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik (München: Max Hueber, 1926), 525-560, 559: “Der von […] Suárez und, wir dürfen sagen auch von Thomas vertretene Eklektizismus, das große methodische Fundamentalprinzip der philosophia perennis, sieht gerade darin die volle Lebenskraft des metaphysischen Wahrheitsorganismus, daß dieser unbeschadet seiner Eigenart neue Stoffe sich assimilieren und sich so noch mehr ausgestalten und festigen kann.”

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following I shall, first (I), analyse Suárez’s concept of transcendentality with respect to its historical background. In the light of this analysis, I shall then (II) reconstruct the basic line of Suárez’s critical examination of Scotus’s project of transcendental science. From these considerations there will finally (III) be drawn a conclusion as to the placement of Suárez’s program of a transcendental explication of being in the history of metaphysics.

II. Suárez’s Concept of Transcendentality The Scholastic concept of transcendentality involves the conceptual surpassing (transcensus) of the Aristotelian categories—each of which, notwithstanding its character as a genus generalissimum, expresses a specific mode of being—that cannot be attributed to every being (substantial being, quantitative being, qualitative being, etc). Since the fourteenth century, two conceptions of this transcensus compete in the field of transcendental theory. According to the first one, the categories are surpassed in the direction of what is common to all things. Hence the transcendentals extend to all things and therefore, unlike the categories, may be predicated of every being in each category. Since they have the same extension—are identical secundum rem—the transcendentals may be predicated of each other. They are interchangeable (convertibiles) with each other as subject and predicate in a proposition without giving rise to tautologies, for even if they are identical in re, they differ conceptually from each other. From the historical perspective this conception prevails originally in the thirteenth century. In a systematic form it appears for the first time in the Summa de bono composed by Philip the Chancellor around 1225. Thenceforward it serves as a common ground for the following elaborations of the doctrine of the transcendentals up to Henry of Ghent. Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine of the transcendentals also stands within this tradition.24 24  To this see J. Aertsen, ‘Transzendentalien,’ in, eds., N. Angermann et al., Lexikon des Mittelalters, Bd. 8 (München : Lexma-Verlag, 1997), col. 953955; S. H. Pouillon, “Le premier traité des propriétés transcendentales. La ‘Summa de bono’ du Chancelier Philippe,” Revue néoscolastique de philosophie 42 (1939): 40-77; J. Aertsen, “The Beginning of the Doctrine of the Transcendentals in Philip The Chancellor,” Mediaevalia, Textos e Estudos, 7-8 (1995): 269-286; Ders., “Transcendental Thought in Henry of Ghent,” in, Henry of Ghent. Studies in Commemoration of the 700th Anniversary of his Death (1293) (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996), 1-18.

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According to the other position, the transcensus is limited to the negative moment of categorial indetermination: the transcendentals surpass the categories just insofar as they are not restricted to one of the highest genera. This conception appears for the first time in the writings of Duns Scotus.25 According to Scotus, what is crucial for the transcendentality of a form is that, apart from the concept of being— which has no generic character—no other superordinate predicate may be predicated of it. It is irrelevant to its transcendentality whether it is common to a plurality of things.26 This conception enables Scotus to extend the area of transcendentality beyond the traditional group of the transcendentals (‘unum,’ ‘verum,’ ‘bonum’), which are convertible with ‘ens,’ to those transcendental attributes that inhere only in some beings or even only in one single being, namely, God; for God is apart from any genus. The Scotistic doctrine of disjunctive transcendentals, according to which not only the whole disjunctum (‘finitum-infinitum,’ ‘actus-potentia’) but also each member of the opposite pair is in itself transcendental, is based on this new conception of transcendentality—as well as Scotus’s conception of transcendental science. It is on the base of the Scotistic interpretation of transcendentality as categorial indefiniteness that metaphysics constitutes itself for the first time to be altogether and exclusively scientia transcendens. Suárez, however, does not adopt this concept of transcendentality. In fact, following the pre-Scotistic tradition of transcendental thought, the Jesuit understands the transcensus as a surpassing in the direction of the most common, which extends to all catgories. The determinations of being, which are the most universal, “are called transcendentals […] because they do not belong to any paricular category but run through all of them.”27 So “transcendentality,” for him, means 25  Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, n. 113 (ed. Vat. IV, 206): “quaecumque conveniunt enti ut indifferens ad finitum et infinitum, vel ut est proprium enti infinito, conveniunt sibi non ut determinatur ad genus sed ut prius, et per consequens ut est transcendens et est extra omne genus.” 26  Ibid., n. 114: “de ratione transcendentis est non habere praedicatum supraveniens nisi ens, sed quod ipsum sit commune ad multa inferiora, hoc accidit”; ibid., n. 115: “Non oportet autem transcendens ut transcendens dici de quocumque ente nisi sit convertibile cum primo transcendente, scilicet ente.” 27  DM 47.3.10: “[T]ranscendentales dicuntur […] quia ad certum aliquod praedicamentum non pertinent, sed per omnia vagantur.”

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a commonness of predication, which extends to everything that is— and therefore entails the convertibility of the transcendentals. “The transcendentals are equal among each other [i.e., they have the same scope] and are converted with being.”28 Accordingly, Suárez rejects explicitly the Scotistic conception of disjunctive transcendentals.29 The second part of the Disputationes, which is concerned in particular with diverse forms of being, uses Scotistic themes; nevertheless it is not designed as a theory of the transcendentals—and especially not as a doctrine of the disjunctive transcendentals. This may be underlined with respect to the above-mentioned interpretation of J.-F. Courtine.

III. The Transcendental Explication of Being These observations relate to more than just terminological questions, for the difference between these two conceptions of transcendentality corresponds to a difference in the basic understanding of the explication of being which First Philosophy has to provide. Every concept, which qualifies things, expresses something more than just ‘being’— that is, it adds something conceptually to the content of being, which is not yet expressed by the concept of being as such: a mode or a difference, whereby a thing is not only being, but such and such a being, this or that being. Consequently, the question arises, whether or not this additum essentially includes the meaning/content (ratio) of ‘being’? Is the meaning of ‘being’ included essentially in the instrinsic modes and ultimate differences of being—and is it essentially included in the attributes of being as such (passiones entis), so that we can speak of an “inner explication of being as being”? In their responses to these 28  DM 4.8.12: “transcendentia omnia aequalia sint inter se et cum ente convertantur.” 29  DM 3.2.11: “De illis autem disiunctis, finitum vel infinitum, etc., dicendum est […] proprie non esse passiones entis in communi, sed potius esse divisiones eius […]”; DM 4.8.2: “haec praedicata complexa seu disiuncta revera non sunt proprietates entis in quantum ens, quia essentialiter dividunt ipsum ens.” Admittedly, the Scotistic doctrine of the disjunctive transcendentals, according to Suárez, can be made useful for the analysis of the specific forms of being within the framework of the special metaphysical investigation. Concerning the use he makes of it in the second part of the Disputationes metaphysicae see J.-F. Courtine, Suarez et le système de la métaphysique, see n. 6 (supra), 381-401, 416-417.

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questions, which pertain to the core of the classical doctrine of being, Scotus and Suárez differ fundamentally from each other. The respective models of thought upon which their argumentation is based are completely different.

III.1 Duns Scotus According to Scotus, the additum to being as such cannot include the meaning of ‘being’ intrinsically and essentially. Concerning the ultimate differences and inner modes of being (as, for example, finite-infinite, created-increated, actual-potential) his explanation is based on a model of conceptual composition. Regarding the passiones entis his argumentation is based on the model of the accident which arises immediately and necessarily from the essence of its subject (proprium, proprietas). Both models of thought originate from Aristotle, who uses them for the logical and ontological analysis of categorial forms. (a) According to Scotus, the complex concept of the essence of a being is structurally similar to a composed thing. Just as the thing is composed of potency and act, the quidditative concept is composed of conceptual parts which relate to each other as matter and form, as the determinable component to the determining component.30 Each of these components can then once again be composed in a similar way, so that the analysis may proceed in the direction of components each of which is even simpler. But it is impossible to perpetuate this decomposition without end. It finally ends in components, which are absolutely simple: in an element which is purely determinable and in another one, which is purely determining. In any case of conceptual analysis the endpoint of the decomposition on the side of the determinable is the concept of being—the endpoint on the opposite side is an ultimate difference as, for example, the individuating difference or haecceitas. As an ultimate distinguishing feature this difference is predicated from a being not under any essential aspect but in a purely qualifying sense.31 On the other hand, the purely determinable element is 30  Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 133 (ed. Vat. III, 82 f.): “… sicut ens compositum componitur ex actu et potentia in re, ita conceptus compositus per se unus componitur ex conceptu potentiali et actuali, sive ex conceptu determinabili et determinante.” 31  For more information about the ‘ultimate difference’ and its mode of predication see A. Wolter, The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute,

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predicated from a being under an essential aspect or “in quid.” To predicate in quid means, for Scotus, to predicate either the entire essence (species) or at least the determinable part of the essence (genus), whereas to predicate in quale means to predicate a further determination or qualification of the essence, for example, the specific difference or the ultimate, individuating difference. The concept of being is an irreducibly simple concept which forms the endpoint of the analysis in the line of the determinable concepts,32 each of which expresses a common essential structure and is therefore predicated in quid. Consequently, the concept of being is included in any subordinate concept which is predicable in quid.33 It cannot be predicated in quid from the ultimate differences and inner modes of being because these differences and modes—insofar as they are pure qualifications—do not fall under a quidditative concept.34 So there are some purely qualifying determinations of things which do not include the meaning of ‘being’ intrinsically and essentially. According to Scotus, the difference between these purely qualifying determinations and the ultimate concept, which can be predicated in quid from things, must be ontologically foundational. Scotus therefore assumes that the meaning of ‘being’ is not only conceptually but also in re antecedent to the intellect—in the manner of a real modal distinction—distinct from any ultimate differences and inner modes.35 Only according to such a fashion can ‘being,’ Scotus insists, be understood and legitimated as an unequivocal transcategorial concept. 1946), esp. 82-87 and L. Honnefelder, Ens in quantum ens. Der Begriff des Seienden als solchen als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus (Münster: Aschendorff, 1979), esp. 315-319. 32  Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 2, n. 71 (ed. Vat. III, 49): “conceptus ‘simpliciter simplex’ est qui non est resolubilis in plures conceptus, ut conceptus entis vel ultimae differentiae.” 33  Ibid., n. 80 (ed. Vat. III, 54): “ens includitur in omibus conceptibus inferioribus quiditativis.” 34  Ibid., q. 3, n. 131, (ed. Vat. III, 81): “Ens non est univocum dictum in ‘quid’ de omnibus per se intelligibilibus, quia non de differentiis ultimis.” 35  Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, n. 139 (ed. Vat. IV, 222 sq.): “non ut distinctio realitatis et realitatis, sed ut distinctio realitatis et modi proprii et intrinseci eiusdem.” See thereto L. Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens, see n. 31, esp. 365-390; A. Wolter, “The formal Distinction,” in, eds., J. K. Ryan and B. M. Bonansea, John Duns Scotus 1265-1965, 45-60.

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(b) Scotus explains the relationship between being as such and its passions in a similar way. His explanation is shaped on the bases of the Aristotelian doctrine of the essential attributes (kath’ autà symbebekóta, per se accidentia) or properties (ídia, propria, proprietates); according to the Aristotelian doctrine of science, these attributes are, what in a demonstrative science is investigated with regard to some determinate subject, that which forms the proper object or subject-matter of the respective science.36 According to Aristotle, these essential attributes are predicated by means of concepts that express no intrinsic feature whatsoever of the subject-concept and on their part do not include the relevant concept of the subject. Although their subject is mentionned explicitly in their definition, it is mentionned there only “by addition” (ek prosthéseos) and not as an intrinsic moment of the definiendum.37 Habitually, the Scholastic commentars illustrate and exemplify this interrelationship referring to Porphyry’s example (Isagoge c. 6 and 15) of the laughing faculty; risibilitas is considered as a proprium of man, deriving necessarily from the essence of its subject, the human being. The passiones entis relate to being in a similar way, according to Scotus. This means that they are not essentially inherent in being as their quasi-subject nor do they on their part intrinsicly and essentially contain the content of ‘being,’ the ratio entis; ‘being’ appears in their definition only ut additum—as something added to the defined attribute. 38 Accordingly, the difference between being and its passiones must somehow be more than only a conceptual one because the distinctive concept of being as such and the concepts of its passiones are real concepts; by means of these concepts the intellect refers to the res given independently of it. But to a difference of real concepts, neither 36 Aristotle, Metaphysics III, c. 2, 997a19-22: “… every demonstrative science investigates with regard to some subject (hypokeímenon) its essential attributes (tà kath autà symbebekóta), starting from the common beliefs” (transl. W. D. Ross eBooks@Adelaide, 2007); cf. also Anal. Post. I, c. 10, 76b11-16; ibid. I, c. 4, 73a33-73b5; Top. I, c. 4, 101b17-29, 102a18-29. 37 Cf. Anal. Post. I, cap. 4, 73a34-73b5; Metaph. VII, cap. 5, 1031a2-5. 38  Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 134-136 (ed. Vat. III, 83-85): “passio ‘per se secundo modo’ praedicatur de subiecto, I Posteriorum,—ergo subiectum ponitur in definitione passionis sicut additum, ex eodem I, et VII Metaphysicae. Ens ergo in ratione suae passionis cadit ut additum. Habet enim passiones proprias, ut patet per Philosophum IV Metaphysicae cap. 3.”

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of which includes the other—unless as an additional part—there must correspond a real non-identity on the side of the thing; that is, on the side of the thing, there must at least correspond a real non-identity between factual determinations, formalities (formalitates),39 or real contents (realitates) of the thing to which these concepts refer.40 In this way—in the manner of a real-formal non-identity—the passiones entis differ from each other and from being as such. Even though this difference is “real”—i.e., not caused by the intellect—as to its ontological status it is somehow less than a real difference between distinct things (res); therefore Scotus qualifies it as a differentia realis minor.41 Only this interpretation of the interrelationship between the passiones entis and being as such, Scotus argues, allows one to justify the claim that metaphysics is a real science; his view presupposes the Aristotelian doctrine of science according to which a demonstrative science has to prove the necessary attributes of its proper object or “subiectum.”42

III.2 Suárez In opposition to the interpretation of J.-F. Courtine and others cited above, I would like to point out that Suárez doesn’t consider Scotus’s transcendental theory as a guideline—even though he shares with 39  A. Wolter, The Transcendentals, see n. 31 (supra), 22: “The formality is not a distinct physical thing, but a positive something that is somehow less than a thing. It is the ratio objectiva of a distinct formal concept.” 40  Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 2, p. 2, q. 1-4, n. 404-406 (ed. Vat. II, 357): “Melius est uti ista negative ‘hoc non est formaliter idem,’ quam, hoc est sic et sic ‘distinctum’”; ibid., n. 409 (ed. Vat. II, 359): “Ista distinctio sive non-identitas formalis.” Cf. M. J. Grajewski, The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1944); A. Wolter, “The Formal Distinction” (1965), in ed. M. McCord-Adams, The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990), 27-53. 41  Duns Scotus, QQ. Metaph. (ed. St. Bonaventure) IV, q. 2, n. 143: “… alietate, inquam, non causata ab intellectu, nec tamen tanta quantam intelligimus cum dicimus ‘diversae res’; sed differentia reali minori, si vocetur differentia realis omnis non causata ab intellectu.” 42  Duns Scotus, Ord. II, d. 16, q. unica, n. 17 (ed. Vivès XIII, 43 a): “[…] aliter Metaphysica concludens tales passiones de ente, et illas considerans, non esset scientia realis.”

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Scotus the assumption that ‘being’ is an irreducibly simple concept that is predicated in quid of any real being. Rather, on the common ground of the quidditative concept of being, he considers Scotus’s theory to be the most important competing position. It challenges him to a critical examination since it contains a fundamental difficulty which arises from the explanatory models that Scotus takes as a basis for his explanation. This difficulty, according to Suárez, lies in the fact that Scotus loses sight of the radical inner transcendentality of ‘being’: “‘being’ inwardly transcends all [i.e., every determinate nature]”43; outside of being there is nothing. ‘Being’ is transcendental insofar as it “transcends inwardly” everything that exists or can exist independently from thought; that means, that the ratio entis is included “in the whole beingness as a whole” and therefore is also included in the same way, namely, intrinsically and essentially, in any inner mode and any real difference of being and in any passio entis.44 Based on this conception of the transcendentality of ‘being’ Suárez subjects Scotus’s draft of a scientia transcendens to an extensive critical review. It begins in the second Disputation with a critique of the Scotistic model of transcendental analysis. Section 2.3 raises the question “whether the meaning (ratio) or concept of ‘being’ is in the thing itself (in re ipsa) and before (ante) the intellect somehow separated from the inferior forms.”45 In response, Suárez rejects the Scotistic doctrine of the real modal distinction and replaces it with a conception according to which ‘being’ in fact or in reality (in re) also includes 43  DM 2.4.14: “ens […] non dicit determinatam naturam, sed intime transcendit omnia.” 44  DM 2.6.10: “continentia in qua fundatur eius [entis] conceptus, aeque est in tota entitate secundum se totam.” 45  DM 2.3: “Utrum ratio seu conceptus entis in re ipsa et ante intellectum sit aliquo modo praecisus ab inferioribus.” To the intellect’s formal concept of a real thing corresponds an objective structure in the thing, which Suárez, true to the late Scholastic tradition, calls “conceptus objetivus.” Cf. DM 2.1.1: “conceptus obiectivus dicitur res illa vel ratio quae proprie et immediate per conceptum formalem cognoscitur vel repraesentatur.” See Rolf Darge, “Grundthese und ontologische Bedeutung der Lehre von der Analogie des Seienden nach Suárez” Philosophisches Jahrbuch 106 (1999): 312-333, esp. 320-323; J. Gracia, “Suárez’s Conception of Metaphysics: A Step in the Direction of Mentalism?” The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 65 (1991): 287-309; idem,“Suárez and Metaphysical Mentalism,” ibid., 67 (1993), 349-354.

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all real modes, insofar as it is in re nothing else than the multiplicity of beings, each with its particular determinateness.46 His argument is based on the assumption that the ratio entis is contained intrinsically and essentially in every real mode and in every real determination by which things differ from each other. This basic assumption is explained and established in the two following sections: 2.4 and in particular 2.5. After explaining the ratio entis in section 2.4, in section 2.5 Suárez explicitly poses the central question “whether the ratio entis transcends all the rationes and differences of the inferior beings, so that it is intrinsically and essentially included in them.”47 This question is immediately motivated by the Scotistic doctrine of the ultimate differences and inner modes. Suárez explicitly cites the relevant passages from the Ordinatio.48 He rejects this doctrine and, through detailed reasoning, shows why the ultimate difference and any inner mode of being itself are also something real and thereby essentially being. This conclusion is implied by the foregoing explication of the central metaphyical concept of being (section 2.4). According to this explanation, “it is not included therein [i.e., determined within the content of this concept] whether that essence [which is formally expressed by the concept of being] is imperfect or perfect, complete or only fragmented; it is only included, that it is real; but this is necessary to be included in all things (res) and [their real] modes or real differences.”49 Consequently, Suárez rejects the Scotistic transcendental analysis, a procedure that is based on the Aristotelian patterns of the 46  DM 2.3.7: “dicendum est, conceptum entis obiectivum prout in re ipsa existit non esse aliquid ex natura rei distinctum ac praecisum ab inferioribus in quibus existit”; DM 2.3.13: “non recte infertur, quod etiam in re ipsa ratio entis prout est in singulis entibus non includat proprias rationes seu modos eorum […] est enim [ratio entis in re quae mente concipitur] eadem realiter.” 47  DM 2.4: “Utrum ratio entis transcendat omnes rationes et differentias inferiorum entium, ita ut in eis intime et essentialiter includatur.” 48 Cf. DM 2.5.2. 49  DM 2.5.17: “… in quo non includitur, quod illa essentia sit perfecta vel imperfecta, integra vel partialis, sed solum quod realis sit; hoc autem necesse est includi in omnibus rebus et modis, seu differentiis realibus”; DM 2.5.16: “Dicendum est ergo, ens inquantum ens intrinsece includi in omni ente, et in omni conceptu positivae differentiae, aut modi entis realis.”

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composition of potency and act or of matter and form makes sense for an analysis of categorial concepts by which the complex specific terms are resolved to supreme generic terms. In fact, the specific term may be interpreted as a compound which consists of two composits: a determinable “material” composite, the generic term, and a determining formal composite, the specific difference; the generic term does not include the specific difference, nor does this latter include the generic term. But this pattern of thought appears to be inadequate with regard to an analysis which transcends the area of the categorial forms in direction of being as such, because every real determination essentially is being. The Scotistic analysis misses the mark insofar as it attempts to explain transcendental structures by means of categorial patterns of thought.50 Suárez therefore replaces the Scotistic analysis with another transcendental procedure. According to this new interpretation of the transcendental analysis, the concept of being as such results from an abstraction by a melting down (confusio), as it were, of the concept (section 2.6). In this procedure the categorial concept that serves as a starting point for the analysis—for example, “substance”—is not decomposed into two concepts, neither of which does includes the other. Rather, the notion is reduced to a more indeterminate (i.e., more “confused”) notion of the same thing by means of a holistic conceptual prescinding and viewing. The concepts that are separated in this way do not relate to each other as form and matter, determinant and determined. They relate to each other as that which represents the thing in a distinctive manner—with its particular mode of being—to that which represents the same whole thing in an indistinctive, “confused” manner (confuse) so that the thing is represented just in that structure by which it coincides with everything else insofar as it is a being. 50  DM 2.5.18: “…  tenet [proportio inter compositionem metaphysicam et physicam] in hoc quod nec genus differentiam, nec differentiam genus includit, sicut nec materia formam, nec formam materiam; si autem resolvendo metaphysicam compositionem pervenitur ad simplices conceptus non compositos ex genere et differentia, iam in illis respectu praedicatorum superiorum transcendentium non oportet servari praedictam proportionem, quia in eis iam non reperitur ille determinationis modus.” See R. Darge, “‘Ens intime transcendit omnia’ Suárez’ Modell der transzendentalen Analyse und die mittelalterlichen Transzendentalienlehren,” Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie (47) 2000, 150-172, esp. 159-167.

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Suárezian transcendental analysis thus begins with the highest genera of ‘being’ and ends with an entirely simple concept.51 Reciprocally proportional, the concept of being in general is not determinated and specified to its subordinated concepts by means of composition—so that something would be added from outside to the initial concept of being as such in the way of an “additio quasi partis ad partem” (2.6.7)—but by means of an interior conceptual unfolding, that is to say, by means of a holistic and more distinct, more explicit apprehension of the same thing.52 In any moment of this conceptual unfolding the meaning of ‘being’ (ens) is internally and essentially present. In this view, Suárez refers to the pre-Scotistic medieval tradition of the doctrine of the transcendentals. This tradition in an exemplary way is represented by a passage of the first question of Thomas Aquinas’s Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, where Aquinas explains his understanding of the transcendental approach. In order to confirm his own view of the transcendental analysis and of the reverse procedure of the inner transcendental explication, Suárez quotes this passage completely: That which the intellect first conceives, as best known, and into which it resolves all its conceptions, is being (ens) […]; consequently all other conceptions of the intellect must be gained by an addition to being. Nothing, however, can be added to being as if it were extrinsic to it, in the manner in which a difference is added to a genus […], because every nature is essentially being[…]. Therefore 51  DM 2.6.10: “possit […] abstrahi conceptus entis per solam praecisionem intellectus, quae non consistat quasi in separatione unius ab alio, scilicet formalis a materiali, vel materialis a formali, ut fit in abstractione generis a differentiis; sed quae consistat in cognitione aliquo modo confusa, qua consideratur objectum non distincte et determinate prout est in re, sed secundum aliquam similitudinem vel convenientiam quam cum aliis habet, quae convenientia in ordine ad conceptum entis est in rebus secundum totas entitates et modos reales earum, et ideo confusio seu praecisio talis conceptus non est per separationem praecisivam unius gradus ab alio, sed solum per cognitionem praecisivam conceptus confusi a distincto et determinato.” 52  DM 2.6.7: “hanc contractionem [...] non esse intelligendam per modum compositionis, sed solum per modum expressioris conceptionis alicuius entis contenti sub ente”; ibid.: “differunt […] [conceptus formales] solum quia per unum expressius concipitur res, prout est in se quam per alium, quo solum confuse concipitur.”

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Suárez in his own interpretation of the transcendentals takes up a pre-Scotistic model of an inner modal unfolding of the conception of being. Against this background, he finally discusses in the third disputatio Scotus’s general theory of the passiones entis. The first section of this disputatio discusses the ontological status of these transcendental attributes in that it raises the question “whether being as being has any attributes (passiones)—and (if so) what are their characteristics?”54 Straightaway, Suárez places the question of the explanatory model in the foreground. The introductory dubitative considerations (3.1.1) recall the paradigm of the per-se-accident or real property (proprium, proprietas), which guides the Scotistic theory of the passiones entis, and point to the fundamental deficiency of this explanatory model: (1) in contrast to any real attribute, the passiones entis are not really distinct from their subject; (2) it is not only “by addition” (ek prosthéseos) that the subject of the passiones entis is mentioned in their definitions; rather the passiones entis in their definitions include the ratio of their subject—being as being—internally and essentially.55 If the passiones entis cannot be considered as real attributes, however, then the question arises whether they are merely beings of reason (entia rationis); in this case the science of being as being would have 53  DM 2.6.8: “Talem modum explicandi hanc rem indicavit D. Thomas, quaest. 1 de Verit, art. 1 dicens: Quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum , et in quo omnes conceptiones resolvit, est ens, unde oportet quod omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad ens; sed enti nihil potest addi quasi extranea natura per modum quo differentia additur generi, quia quaelibet natura essentialiter est ens; sed secundum hoc aliqua dicuntur addere supra ens, in quantum exprimunt ipsius modum, qui nomine ipsius entis non exprimitur;….” 54  DM 3.1: “Utrum ens in quantum ens habeat aliquas passiones, et quales illae sint.” 55  DM 3.1.1: “Repugnat ergo esse proprietatem realem entis realis ut sic, quia si est proprietas realis, ergo ens est de essentia eius; si autem ipsa est proprietas entis, ens non potest esse de essentia eius, quia, ut dicebamus, subiectum non potest esse de essentia passionis. Rursus id, quod est essentialiter ens, non potest ex natura rei distingui ab ente, ut supra generaliter probatum est; ergo nec potest esse passio entis….”

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to abandon its traditional claim to be a science of reality, for such a science has to identify and demonstrate the real attributes of its proper subject. In order to cope with this task Scotus had interpreted the passiones entis according to the paradigm of the categorial proprium. Consequently, Suárez in his own solution proceeds according to the transcendental approach that he had established in the second disputation. With reference to Thomas Aquinas he first draws an immediate conclusion from the radical inner transcendence of being: “being as such cannot have true and entirely real attributes, which are really (ex natura rei) distinct from it,” because any real attribute internally and essentially is being.56 Therewith the Scotistic explanatory model tumbles down. Then Suárez looks for a way to overcome the alternative posed by Scotus. This alternative is: either the passiones entis are thought of as positive real determinations of things which are really (formally) distinct from each other and from being as such—or they have to be regarded as mere products of thought, so that metaphysics cannot belong to the sciences of reality. In order to overcome this alternative Suárez separates two questions from each other, which for Scotus are integrally connected: (1) the question whether the passiones entis are real beings or mere beings of reason—and (2) the question whether the passiones entis are not only conceptually but also really distinct from each other and from being.57 The distinction of these questions is a consequence of the criticism that Suárez raised in section 2.3 regarding the ontological and epistemological foundation of Scotus’s transcendental analysis. As for Scotus, these two questions are inseparably connected since a difference between simple distinct conceptions in any case refers to a real difference between the respective contents within the real thing (noetic-noematic parallelism). Accordingly, an attribute, which is conceived in a distinct way, cannot be real if it doesn’t differ from that which is apprehended in other distinct concepts at least in the way of a formal non-identity. But now, according to the Scotistic analysis of predication, the concept of being as such and the concepts of the 56  DM 3.1.8: “Dico primo ens ut ens non posse habere veras et omnino reales passiones positivas ex natura rei ab ipso distinctas.” 57  DM 3.1.6: “… observandum est, in huiusmodi attributis formaliter sumptis aliud esse, quod ipsa sint entia realia, vel rationis; aliud quod distinguantur re vel ratione.”

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passiones entis are distinct concepts none of which is included in another one of these concepts. Therefore if metaphysics is supposed to be a science of reality, the real (formal) distinctness of the passiones entis from being as such has to be admitted.58 Suárez neither agrees with Scotus’s onto-epistemological basic assumption of a noetic-noematical parallelism nor does he approve of Scotus’s conceptual analysis in which the passiones entis do not essentially include the ratio entis. Consequently, Suárez also rejects the Scotistic assertion that they are really (formally) distinct from being as such. It then becomes thinkable—and according to Suárez it is the case—that the passiones entis are real attributes, even though they differ only conceptually and not really from being as such. In the second preliminary note of section 3.1 Suárez shows that this view is consistent and supportable with good arguments.59 The assumption, that an attribute is only conceptually distinct from its real subject does not only exclude the reality of this attribute, but even implies it: (1) that which in no way is real, either is nothing or is a mere being of reason—and the difference between these and real being is not constituted by the intellect but found by it; this difference therefore is not merely a conceptual difference, but a real one.60 Later, in the context of a taxonomy of distinctions, which is unfolded in section 7.1, Suárez classifies it as a subspecies of the distinctio realis realis (sic!) negativa.61 (2) Even if and when the passiones entis are only conceptually distinct from being as such, they may be considered as real attributes, because in this case the conceptual distinction is not due to a mere fiction; it is based rather on an abstraction of the intellect, in which the real thing is conceived in an inadaequate way. But being (ens) is by and in 58  Duns Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 16, q. un., n. 17 (ed. Vivès XIII, 43 a-b): “… distinguuntur tamen [passiones entis] ab invicem formaliter et quidditative, et etiam ab ente, formalitate dico reali et quidditativa; aliter Metaphysica concludens tales passiones de ente et illas considerans, non esset scientia realis.” 59  DM 3.1.6: “… optime […] fieri potest ut sint realia, quamvis non re, sed ratione distinguantur [...].” 60  Cf. ibid.: “… ut attributum sit sola ratione distinctum a reali subiecto, oportet quod sit attributum reale et non rationis tantum vel privativum; alioqui […] plus quam ratione distingueretur, scilicet ut non ens ab ente, vel ut ab ente vero ens fictum.” 61 Cf. DM 7.1.7.

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its own “beingness”—independently of our intellect—in an ontological sense ‘one’ (unum), ‘true’ (verum), and ‘good’ (bonum): “Even though the mind doesn’t think anything about the things, gold is true gold and is one [undivided] determinate thing, which is distinct from other things [i.e., unum in the ontological sense of transcendental unity] and similarly God is one and good etc.” 62 Thus also on the basis of the assumption, namely, that the passiones entis are only conceptually distinct from being as such,63 the status of metaphysics as a science of reality is saved. But then how do the passiones entis differ from being as such—what do they convey in addition to the meaning of ‘being’ which they all include essentially? And finally what is their philosophical relevance? In Suárez’s answers to these questions the historical background of his transcendental theory becomes manifest. From what has been said, it is clear that the feature which a passio entis adds to being cannot be a mere fiction. What is more, it cannot be a positive reality of the thing; since such a reality in turn would include the meaning of being essentially, so that there would result an infinite regress. Now there are two—and only two—classes of real predicates, which do not express a positive reality of the thing in itself: negative determinations and extrinsic denominations (denominationes extrinsecae). The latter denominate a subject with regard to something else, which relates to this subject without originating an inherent being (esse) of it; so for instance God is called “creator” with reference to the creatures—or a wall is called “seen” or “visible” in respect to something else, which relates to it or can relate to it by visual perception.64 The transcendental attributes in that part of their content that is added to ‘being’ form determinations of this kind: in their additum they either express a negative determination—as, for instance, unum, which formally signifies the indivision of being—or a denomination with regard 62  DM 3.1.10: “… quamvis enim mens nihil de rebus cogitet, aurum est verum aurum, et est una determinata res distincta ab aliis; et similiter Deus est unus et bonus etc.” 63  DM 3.1.12: “… sola ratione ab ipso ente distinguerentur.” 64 Cf. DM 3.1.7: “… huiusmodi autem praedicata seu attributa videntur posse ad duo capita revocari. Unum est eorum, quae in negatione vel privatione consistunt … aliud est eorum quae consistunt in denominationibus extrinsecis sumptis ex rebus ipsis, quomodo dicitur Deus creator ex tempore, vel paries visus, etc.”

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to something else—as, for example, verum et bonum.65 The negation or extrinsic denomination, which they add to being expresses a merely conceptually distinguishable aspect of being, pertains to any and every being but is not yet expressed by the term ‘being’ itself. This conception intentionally and deliberately departs from the Scotistic position and aligns itself much more with the pre-Scotistic tradition of transcendental thought. This is shown by the explanatory model that serves as its foundation. Suárez points to a famous statement in Metaphysics IV, cap. 2 concerning the per se attribute of being: “the one;” medieval authors regularly used it as a point of departure in their general explanations of the relationship between the transcendentals: “Being and the one are the same and one single nature (phýsis) in the sense that they follow upon each other […] but not in the sense that they are determined by one concept (lógos).”66 According to Aristotle, the relation between being and the one is characterized by two features: real identity and conceptual difference. In the pre-Scotistic tradition of transcendental thought these two features were interrelated by the idea of a conceptual explication of being by the one without real difference. Representatively for this tradition stands the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas to which Suárez refers in this context explicitly.67 For this doctrine, the one adds to being not a real but only a conceptual moment: the negation of division.68 Even though a negation is a mere ens rationis, the one as such is not an ens rationis, for it not only expresses the indivision but also signifies ‘being.’ ‘One’ just signifies ‘undivided being’ or ‘being insofar as it is undivided.’69 The other transcendental attributes relate to being in a similar way. Each of 65  Ibid.: “… nihil aliud dicere possunt, nisi aut negationem, aut privationem, vel aliquam habitudinem seu denominationem extrinsecam.” 66 Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, cap. 2, 1003b22-24; cf. J. Aertsen, “Die Lehre von den Transzendentalien und die Metaphysik,” Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 35 (1988): 304-307. 67  DM 3.1.11: “… ita videtur rem hanc plane exponere D. Thomas….” 68  Thomas Aquinas, In IV Metaph., lect. 2, n. 560 (ed. Marietti): “[…] superaddens indivisionis rationem, quae cum sit negatio vel privatio, non ponit aliquam naturam enti additum.” Cf. J. Aertsen, “Die Lehre von den Transzendentalien und die Metaphysik,” 307ff. 69  Ibid.: “… unum […] ipsum ens designat, superaddens indivisionis rationem;” ibid., n. 553: “… est enim unum ens indivisum.”

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them, according to Thomas Aquinas, signifies being itself in this way: that it expresses in addition to ‘being’ a determinate conceptually distinguishable aspect of being in general which is not yet expressed by the simple term ‘being.’70 Thus every passio entis immediately—by itself—accomplishes a sort of explication of the nature of being as such. In fact, Aquinas does not employ the term “explicatio entis” or “explicatio naturae entis.” This term appears in the corresponding text where Suárez interprets the Aristotelian assertion quoted from Metaphysics IV, cap. 2.71 In the subsequent explanation of the transcendental ‘one’ (section 4.1) Suárez distinguishes this way of understanding Aristotle explicitly from the Scotistic interpretation. As Scotus sees it, the one indeed expresses a negation—it signifies the internal indivision of the respective being and its division from any other being—but thereby it signifies a real perfection that differs not only conceptually but also really from being as such; it really adds a perfection to being.72 Given this interpretation, the transcendental attributes cannot be said to explain immediately—by themselves—the nature of being as such. Suárez makes no attempt to integrate this position in his own view of transcendental thought; it is, as he laconically remarks, “sufficiently refuted” by the preceeding explanations in section 3.1 that we just considered.73 70  Ibid., n. 553: “[…] significant omnino idem, sed secundum diversas rationes.” 71  DM 3.1.11: “Hanc conclusionem indicasse mihi videtur Arist., 4 Metaph., cap. 2, simul dicens, ens et unum eamdem dicere naturam, et nihilominus non idem formaliter significare; quia nimirum unum de formali addit negationem, quam non dicit ens; per eam vero nihil aliud explicatur, quam ipsamet natura entis.” 72  Duns Scotus, QQ. Metaph. IV, q. 2, n. 80 (ed. St. Bonaventure 1997, 339): “privatio nullam perfectionem ponit; unitas ponit”; ibid., n. 143, 355: “… non tamen realiter differens [ab ente] quod sit alia natura, sed [...] differentia reali minori, si vocetur differentia realis omnis non causata ab intellectu.” Cf. J. Aertsen, “Being and One: The Doctrine of the Convertible Transcendentals in Duns Scotus,” Franciscan Studies 56 (1998): 47-64. 73  DM 4.1.1: “[…] Scotus […] qui docet unum addere supra ens aliquid positivum ex natura rei distinctum ab ente. Sed haec sententia quantum ad distinctionem ex natura rei inter ens et id, quod unum addit supra ens rejecta sufficienter est praecedente disputatione et plane repugnat Aristoteli, 4 Metaph., cap. 2.”

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Like Aquinas, Suárez considers the relation of the one to being as significant also for the true and the good. However, the conceptual aspects added by the true and the good to being are not negations but positive relations to something else: ‘true’ signifies being in relation to the intellect, which cognizes it as that what is—‘good’ signifies being in relation to the will; it means being, insofar it constitutes by itself a perfection by virtue of which it is desirable and loved.74 These explanations hearken back to the received doctrine of the “relational” transcendentals, which doctrine, in present research, is regarded as an original and innovative contribution of Thomas Aquinas.75 According to this doctrine, which Thomas expounds most extensively in De veritate q. 1, a. 1 and q. 21, a. 1, “true” and “good” each signify a universal mode of being, which regards being in its positive relation to something else—according to its conformity to one of the rational cognitive and appetitive faculties of the human soul which extend to everything. The notion of “true” expresses the conformity of being to the intellect; the notion of “good” expresses the conformity of being to the corresponding appetitive faculty: the will.76 Suárez does not adopt every detail of this doctrine. He relates the ontic base of the true and the good in the thing itself not especially to the human soul; nor does his position coincide with the Thomistic doctrine regarding the manner in which this ontic base is itself conceived. According to Aquinas, this base is the act of being (actus essendi); just by its act of being a thing is knowable—i.e., “true” in the ontological sense—and ontically perfect, so that it is appetible—i.e., “good” in the ontological sense.77 In contrast, Suárez considers the real essence with its capability to exist independently from thought to be this base. These differences with regard to some special explanatory statements, however, do not hide the fact that the core of the explanatory model used by Aquinas and Suárez is identical. Suárez himself 74  DM 3.1.11: “… significant […] ens sub quadam habitudine ad aliud, scilicet quatenus in se habet unde ametur aut vere cognoscatur.” 75  To this see J. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals. The Case of Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: Brill), 1996, esp. 102-105, 243-334. 76  Thomas Aquinas, De veritate q. 1, a. 1: “… convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit hoc nomen bonum...convenientiam vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen verum.” 77  See J. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy, see n. 75, 262-269, 299-306.

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refers explicitly to Thomas Aquinas and sees his own theory as an explication of Thomas.78 Against this background, Suárez finally conceives and explains the philosophical significance of this transcendental-conceptual addition to ‘being:’ by means of this addition the real perfection, which necessarily inheres in being as such by itself—in its nature or “beingness”— is explained.79 Thereby the explication is not made with respect to something real, which would be added to being as such, but “according to the very form or essential content (ratio) of being.”80 This means the nature of being as such, which is thought of as perfection, is the immediate subject-matter of the transcendental explication—and its inner starting point and point of origin, which remains perpetually present within the process of explication. This immediate and internal relation of the explicans to the explicatum is characteristic of the transcendental explication of being. Therein it differs from another kind of explication of being, according to which the perfection of a determinate being is explained indirectly by means of its real quality characteristics, essential accidents or properties (propria, proprietates). In this manner that which is known first is the mentionned quality or property—and only thereby, indirectly, the underlying nature, insofar as it appears via these accidents. Such a method of explication seems expedient in the area of categorial forms—but not with respect to the nature of being as such, for there isn’t anything, which is not internally and essentially being. From this, Suárez explains, the relevance of the transcendental attributes for metaphysics becomes evident. Totally simple forms—and the nature of being as such or the ratio of the real essence in a certain way is a totally simple form—aren’t completely by themselves and in themselves accessible to our intellect. In order to get insight in them, we need an investigation that elucidates their nature by means of negation or with respect to its relation to something else.81 In this way, the 78  DM 3.1.4: “Haec est sententia D. Thomae, dict. q. 1 de Verit., art. 1 et q. 21, art. 1 […] et in rigore est vera, indiget tamen explicatione.”  79  DM 3.1.11: “… per ea […] explicatur realis positiva perfectio entis, non secundum aliquid reale superadditum ipsi enti, sed secundum ipsammet formam seu essentialem rationem entis.” 80  Ibid.: “… secundum ipsammet formam seu essentialem rationem entis.” 81  DM 3.1.11: “… quia nos simplicia non perfecte cognoscimus prout in se sunt, partim negationibus, partim comparationibus ad res alias utimur

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science of being as such elucidates its subject-matter by means of the transcendental attributes. Any meaning (ratio) that these attributes add to being as such serves our rational insight into the nature or essential perfection of being as being. In this function the transcendental attributes are of eminent importance for metaphysics.82

IV. Conclusion As a result of our analysis, it appears that the view established by recent research, according to which Suárez follows the outlines of the Scotistic scientia transcendens and conveys them to modern ontology, needs further clarification. Suárez indeed adopts the Scotistic concept of being. Nevertheless in the further development of the transcendental themes he does not appropriate the Scotistic doctrine. His notion of the transcendentality of being, his conception of the transcendental proceeding from the conceptual analysis and determination of being, and finally his explanation of the transcendental attributes and their ontological function differ fundamentally from the Scotistic view. Suárez himself is aware of this difference. In a critical examination of the underlying principles and basic models of Scotistic transcendental thought he continuously and systematically develops the outlines of a new transcendental approach to being. As a counterpart of Scotus’ scientia transcendens, it includes the programm of a transcategorial inner conceptual explication of the nature of being as such. From a Scotistic point of view this kind of transcendental approach is incomprehensible, because it requires one to overcome the basic patterns and models of thought underlying the Scotistic project of a scientia transcendens: the model of composition in the transcendental analysis leading to the entirely simple notion of being as such—and the model of the real property (proprium, per-se-accidens) that guides the understanding of the structure of transcendental attributes; both models of thought are taken from the area of categorial thinking, therefore they inhibit the central idea of the transcendental explication of being—the idea, that the ratio entis is internally and essentially included in the explicans. ad ea distincte explicanda.” 82  Ibid.: “… omnis haec attributorum ratio eo tendit, ut perfectius a nobis cognoscatur et explicatur entis natura; alioqui frustra esset et impertinens ad scientiam entis.”

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Suárez’s account of being, which is accomplished immediately by the passiones entis themselves, finds a happy medium: on the one hand, it corresponds to a way of thinking in which—contrary to Scotus— the inner transcendence and indefiniteness of being can be thought of radically even with respect to these attributes of being as such; on the other hand, it allows one to appreciate and sustain the received conception of metaphysics as a science of reality. By means of explaining and demontrating the transcendental determinations, which differ only conceptually from each other and from ‘being,’ metaphysics renders a truthful explication of the nature of being as such. In a similar way, the pre-Scotistic tradition of transcendental thought—which in Suárez’s explanation is mainly represented by Thomas Aquinas—determined the philosophical task of the transcendental explication of being. Apparently, Suárez deliberately takes up this tradition. Thus it seems that he aims at offering a competitive alternative to the Scotistic scientia transcendens, which—on the ground of the assumption of the supreme simplicity and the quidditative character of the ratio entis—harkens back to pre-Scotistic doctrine of the transcendentals and tries to continue and develop it in a form that is adapted to the new notion of being shared with Scotus. In this regard Suárez’s project may be inscribed in the history of the impact of the Scotistic scientia transcendens as well as in the history of influence of the pre-Scotistic—especially Thomistic—transcendental thought.

Chapter 3 John Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Marsilius of Inghen on Chimerae, and Impossible Objects Thomas Dewender

A

I. Introduction

t the beginning of his Peri Hermeneias (16a16 sqq.), Aristotle drew attention to the fact that there are names that refer to non-existing, even impossible, objects and that nevertheless are not just meaningless words, but do have some kind of meaning—Aristotle’s example is the “goatstag” (tragelaphos).1 Thereby, the Greek philosopher initiated a discussion about these imaginary objects that can be traced through the subsequent history of philosophy down to the twentieth century, when, for instance, the Austrian philosopher, Alexius Meinong, used the example of the “round square” to discuss the ontological and semantic problems connected with impossible objects. Although Aristotle himself did not pursue the problem any further, his commentators from late antiquity onwards were quite explicit about the issue: a goat-stag is an imaginary being that does not and cannot exist in extramental reality 1  Aristotelian commentators in late antiquity use ‘blithyri’ and ‘skindapsos’ as examples of linguistic expressions devoid of any meaning whatsoever, see S. Meier-Oeser and W. Schröder: “Skindapsos,” in eds. J. Ritter and K. Gründer, Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 9, Basel 1995, 974-976.

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as it would have to be, at the same time, a goat and a stag, which is obviously a contradiction. Thus there arises the notion of an impossible object.2 In later times, the chimera, an imaginary being composed of incompossible parts, usually of a lion in front, a goat in the middle, and a serpent in the rear, became the standard example for such an impossible object and occupied the place of Aristotle’s goatstag in medieval and early modern discussions.3 We have to thank John P. Doyle for his pioneering studies on the early modern debates concerning the ontological status of impossible objects, in which he meticulously traces this debate in the writings of the Jesuit philosopher Francisco Suárez and others in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, who dealt with chimerae mainly in the context of beings of reason (entia rationis), and where he convincingly demonstrated the importance of this hitherto rather neglected issue for the history of early modern metaphysics in general.4 In my paper, I shall have a look at chimerae and, generally, at non-existent and impossible objects from the point of view of late medieval logic and semantics. Probably the most fruitful and interesting discussions of this issue in the Middle Ages can be found in fourteenth-century philosophy in the wake of William of Ockham, who is commonly regarded as the inaugurator of late medieval nominalism.5 A major characteristic of fourteenth-century nominalism is its logical-semantic 2  See Giovanna Sillitti, Tragelaphos. Storia di una metaphora e di un problema (Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1980), for the background of this topic in ancient Greek philosophy. 3  The exact description of the composition a chimera does in fact vary with different authors, see S. Ebbesen: “The Chimera’s Diary,” in eds., S. Knuuttila and J. Hintikka, The Logic of Being (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986), 115-143. 4  See, e.g., John P. Doyle, “Another God, Chimerae, Goat-Stags, and Man-Lions: a Seventeenth-Century Debate about Impossible Objects,” The Review of Metaphysics 48 (1995): 771-808; J.P. Doyle: “Gedankendinge und Imagination bei den Jesuiten des 17. Jahrhunderts,” in eds., T. Dewender and T. Welt, Imagination–Fiktion–Kreation. Das kulturschaffende Vermögen der Phantasie (München-Leipzig: K.G. Saur, 2003), 213-228. 5  The use of the term “nominalism” to characterize Ockham’s philosophy is not unproblematic, however. As I am not dealing here with the problem of universals, where “conceptualism” seems a more appropriate label for Ockham’s position, I use “nominalism” here in the larger sense to refer to a certain logical-semantical approach to philosophical problems; on this notion of nominalism, see, e.g., the entry by J.P. Beckmann: “Nominalismus,”

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approach to philosophical problems through its focus on the semantic analysis of language and its extensive use of analytical tools such as the theory of supposition and other properties of terms, viz., signification and appellation. One of Ockham’s basic ideas was that science is about concepts which supposit for things in extramental reality, hence the main concern of nominalist logic was to investigate which words or concepts in the mind have reference and supposition. In this way, philosophical problems become issues concerning the reference and meaning of terms. This approach seems particularly suited to deal with words and concepts signifying imaginary objects.6 In fact, the investigation of linguistic and logical terms that signify these non-existent objects leads straight to the core questions of semantics, namely, to the problems of the reference and meaning of terms, as Joel Biard aptly pointed out: “La possibilité de signifier des objets imaginaires est un élément qui me paraît de la première importance dans l’évolution de la sémantique médiévale vers une théorie générale de la référence.”7 In the following, I shall focus on John Buridan and two of his followers, Albert of Saxony and Marsilius of Inghen, who were the probably the most important and certainly the most influential representatives of nominalism at the University of Paris in the mid-fourteenth century. These members of the “Buridan School” have been known mainly for their contributions to natural philosophy, where, for example, Buridan’s theory of impetus comes to mind.8 It was only in recent in Lexikon des Mittelalters, 10 vols., Stuttgart 1977-1999, vol. 6, cols. 1222-1227. 6  See E.J. Ashworth: “Chimeras and Imaginary Objects: A Study in the Post-Medieval Theory of Signification,” Vivarium 15 (1977): 57-79, and the beautiful paper by Sten Ebbesen referred to above, which offers an historical overview of the history of our problem up to and including Ockham and Buridan. On Ockham, whose approach cannot be dealt with here, see my: “William of Ockham and Walter Burley on Signification and Imaginary Objects,” in eds., K. Emery, Jr., R.L. Friedman, and A. Speer, Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages: A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2011), 437-450. 7  Joël Biard, “La signification d’objets imaginaires dans quelques textes anglais du XIVe siècle (Guillaume Heytesbury, Henry Hopton),” in ed., P. Osmund Lewry O.P., The Rise of British Logic (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1985), 265-283, at 265. 8  This group also includes Nicole Oresme and some minor figures. One should, however, be cautious to see these schoolmen as forming a

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decades that their logical writings have grown in popularity among scholars of medieval philosophy so that many of the relevant texts have now become available in critical editions and their significance for the history of logic in the later Middle Ages is gradually emerging.

II. John Buridan on Chimerae John Buridan, the leading figure of this group of Scholastics, was active at the University of Paris from the 1320s until his death around the year 1360. Buridan was an extremely prolific writer and one of the most productive Aristotelian commentators of all times.9 His most important logical text and masterpiece is the Summulae de dialectica, a comprehensive logical textbook comprising eight treatises dealing with (I) propositions, (II) predicables, (III) categories, (IV) suppositions, (V) syllogisms, (VI) topics, (VII) fallacies, and (VIII) definitions, divisions and demonstrations.10 Another source for his views on logic is doctrinally coherent group; on this see J.M.M.H. Thijssen: “The Buridan School Reassessed: John Buridan and Albert of Saxony,” Vivarium 42 (2004): 18-42. Although Ockham’s overall influence on these thinkers is obvious, there are nevertheless many issues where Buridan in particular deviates from Ockham’s views, as will also become apparent in the following. 9  See the monographs by J. Zupko, John Buridan: Portrait of a 14th-Century Arts Master (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), and G. Klima, John Buridan (Oxford , 2009), for a general overview of Buridan’s life and works; cf. also J. Zupko: “John Buridan,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . 10  Almost all of them are now available in critical editions: (I) Summulae de propositionibus, ed. R. van der Lecq (Turnhout: Brepols, 2005); (II) Summulae de praedicabilibus, ed., L.M. De Rijk (Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers, 1995); (III) Summulae in Praedicamenta, ed. E.P. Bos (Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers, 1995); (IV) Summmulae de suppositionibus, ed. R. van der Lecq (Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers, 1998); (V) Summulae de syllogismis, ed. J. Spruyt (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010); (VIII) Summulae de demonstrationibus, ed. L.M. De Rijk (Groningen-Haren: Ingenium Publishers, 2001). There is now a complete translation into English, John Buridan: Summulae de Dialectica. An annotated translation, with a philosophical introduction by Gyula Klima (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), which I have used throughout. In the following, the Summulae will be cited by treatise number and chapters so that the

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his Sophismata, which Buridan himself at one time regarded as treatise IX of the Summulae.11 In addition, we have Buridan’s commentaries on Aristotle’s Organon, where in particular his questions on the Peri Hermeneias and on the Sophistical Refutations contain some passages on chimerae.12 Finally, in his commentaries on the De anima and on the Metaphysics Buridan discusses chimerae in the context of non-being in general, as, for example, in the question “Whether non-being is intelligible.”13

references can easily be found both in the Latin editions and in Klima’s translation. 11  Johannes Buridan, Summulae de Practica Sophismatum. Introduction, critical edition and indexes by Fabienne Pironet (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004). An English translation is included in Klima’s translation of the Summulae, 821-997. 12  Johannes Buridanus, Quaestiones longae super librum Perihermeneias, ed. R. van der Lecq (Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers, 1983), in particular qu. 2: “Utrum omne nomen significat aliquid,” 7-14; Johannes Buridanus, Quaestiones elenchorum, ed. R. van der Lecq and H.A.G. Braakhuis (Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers, 1994), qu. 17: “Utrum chimaera sit intelligibilis,” 84-86. 13  The question “Utrum non ens potest intelligi” is contained in two versions of Book III of Buridan’s Quaestiones de anima: cf. qu. 13 in: John A. Zupko, John Buridan’s Philosophy of Mind: An Edition and Translation of Book III of his ‘Quaestiones on Aristotle’s De anima’ (Third Redaction), with Commentary and Critical and Interpretative Essays. Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 1989, 141-151, and qu. 15 in Jean Buridan: Quaestiones de anima (Prima Lectura), ed., B. Patar (Louvain-la-Neuve: Longueil, 1991), 483-487; cf. Buridan’s commentary on the Metaphysics, book IV, qu. 10: “Utrum negationes sint entia,” and qu. 14: “Utrum non ens potest intelligi,” in Johannes Buridanus: In Metaphysicen Aristotelis Quaestiones argutissime (Paris: 1588 [recte: 1518], repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1964), fol. 20ra-vb and fol. 23rb-24ra. The texts from the Metaphysics- commentary have been analysed in detail by J. Spruyt, “John Buridan on Negation and the Understanding of Non-Being,” in John Buridan: A Master of Arts. Acts of the Second Symposium Organized by the Dutch Society for Medieval Philosophy ‘Medium Aevum‘ on the Occasion of its 15th Anniversary LeidenAmsterdam [Vrije Universiteit], 20-21 June 1991, ed., E.P. Bos and H. A. Krop (Nijmegen, 1993), 23-39.

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II. 1. An Outline of Buridan’s Semantics Before looking at what Buridan has to say about chimerae in particular, it may be in order to give a short outline of his semantic theory and its basic concepts insofar as they are necessary for an understanding of his treatment of impossible objects. The starting-point for Buridan’s semantics is Aristotle’s remarks at the beginning of the Peri Hermeneias, a text that was transmitted to the medievals through Boethius’ translation and commentary.14 The semantic model outlined in Aristotle’s text contains four basic elements and certain relations obtaining among them, the two most important of which were, according to the fourteenth-century logicians, the signification and the supposition of a term. The four basic semantic elements are extramental things (res), concepts in the mind, spoken words, and written words. Whereas things and concepts exist naturally (secundum naturam) and are universal, that is, they are the same for all human beings, the written and spoken words are due to convention and thus not universal, just as Latin and Greek are different languages with a different vocabulary. Among these four basic semantic elements there is a genetic and natural order, namely: first, we have things themselves, then, concepts, then, spoken words and, finally, written words. Furthermore, there is an order of signification which is exactly the reverse of the first one, namely: written words signify spoken words, spoken words signify concepts, and concepts signify things themselves. Within this order, written and the spoken words stand in a twofold relation: they are related to concepts in the intellect, which they—directly or indirectly—signify, and they are related to things, which are signified by the concepts. The basic task, then, for any semantic theory is to determine the precise nature of this twofold relationship: what exactly do (spoken or written) words signify; do they signify the concepts or the things themselves? According to Ockham, spoken words, written words, and concepts signify the same, namely, the things themselves, but in different ways: concepts signify 14  For the following, see the detailed exposition in S. Meier-Oeser, Die Spur des Zeichens. Das Zeichen und seine Funktion in der Philosophie des Mittelalters und der frühen Neuzeit (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 35 ff; for a shorter version in English, cf. idem: “Medieval Semiotics,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta, ed., URL = .

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things naturally and primarily, whereas spoken and written words signify things by convention and secondarily, that is, they are subordinated to the corresponding concept in the mind.15 In contrast to this, Buridan argues for a transitivity of signification: written words immediately signify written ones, spoken words, “voces,” in turn, immediately signify concepts, which are thus their “significatum immediatum,” but by means of these concepts the words signify things themselves, which thus are their “significatum ultimum.” That is, words signify things only through the medium of concepts, “mediantibus conceptibus.”16 The notion of transitivity involved in this context captures the underlying idea that meaning is transmitted here in analogy to a causal relation. The written word reminds me of the spoken word, the spoken word in turn reminds me of the concept, and the concept of the thing itself. In addition to these four basic elements of semantics, there are certain relations obtaining among those elements. The most important of these “properties of terms” (proprietates terminorum) are signification, supposition, and, to a lesser degree, appellation. Buridan’s definition 15  See William of Ockham, Summa totius Logicae I, c. 1, ed. S. Brown et al., St. Bonaventure, NY, 1974 (Opera Philosophica I), 7: “Dico autem voces esse signa subordinata conceptibus seu intentionibus animae, non quia, proprie accipiendo hoc vocabulum ‘signa’, ipsae voces semper significent ipsos conceptus animae primo et proprie, sed quia voces imponuntur ad significandum illa eadem, quae per conceptus mentis significantur ita, quod conceptus primo naturaliter significat aliquid et secundario vox significat illud idem, in tantum quod voce instituta ad significandum aliquid significatum per conceptum mentis, si conceptus ille mutaret significatum suum, eo ipso ipsa vox sine nova institutione suum significatum permutaret.” 16 See Sophismata, c. 1; ed. Pironet, 18, 13 ff.: “Et est prima conclusio quod litterae scriptae significant voces prolatas vel proferendas, et non significant aliquas res extra animam, puta asinos aut lapides, nisi mediante significatione vocum”; ibid., 19,8 ff.: “Secunda conclusio est quod voces significativae significant passiones, id est conceptus animae, et non alias res nisi mediante significatione conceptuum”; cap. 2, 37, 20 ff.: “Ego suppono, secundum dicta prius, quod voces habent duplices significationes: unam apud mentem, quia immediate significant conceptus sibi correspondentes a quibus vel sibi similibus imponebantur ad significandum. Aliam habent quia, mediantibus dictis conceptibus, significant res quae illis conceptibus concipiuntur, et quia multotiens illae res conceptae sunt extra animam, ut lapis et asinus. Ideo ad placitum ego vocabo primam significationem ‘apud mentem’ et secundam vocabo significationem ‘ad extra.’” See also Summulae 1. 1. 6., ed. van der Lecq, 15-18.

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of “significatio” is basically the traditional one already used in the thirteenth-century textbooks of logic and which ultimately goes back to Aristotle and to Augustine’s theory of signs. According to this view taken up by Buridan, “significare” means to establish an understanding of the thing signified, an “intellectum rei constituere.”17 Signification is the most fundamental property of a term in semantics on which the other properties such as supposition or appellation are based. A term has a signification even if it does not occur in the context of a proposition, whereas it can have a supposition only if it functions as the subject or the object of a proposition.18 The supposition of a term describes, roughly speaking, its reference, its standing-for-something-else, a property which presupposes a propositional context in which the term occurs. Buridan defines supposition as “the taking [acceptation] of a term in a proposition for something or things, so that when they are pointed out [demonstrates] by the pronouns ‘this’ or ‘these,’ or equivalent ones, the term is truly affirmed of the pronoun by means of the copula of the proposition.”19 Buridan uses an example to illustrate what is meant here: “In the proposition ‘A horse runs’ the term ‘horse’ supposits for every horse that exists, for whichever is pointed out it would be true to say: ‘This is a horse.’”20 Like Ockham before him, Buridan develops a theory of truth-conditions for affirmative categorical propositions on the basis of the theory of supposition. An affirmative proposition is true if and only if the subject and the predicate term supposit for, that is refer to, the same thing.21 Buridan then goes on to differentiate between two kinds of suppositions following from the fact that the term in a supposition may stand for different things. A term can have a personal or a material supposition, depending on whether it stands for what it signifies—as “horse” in “This horse runs”—or whether it supposits for the language sign, as “asinus” appears in material supposition in “‘asinus’ is trisyllabic.”22 At this point, Buridan deviates from Ockham’s 17 See Sophismata, c. 1, ed. Pironet, 15, 22 f. 18  Sophismata, c. 3, ed. Pironet, 53, 4 f. 19  Sophismata, c. 3, ed. Pironet, 53, 6 f.; Klima, 866. 20 Ibid. 21  Sophismata, c. 2, concl. 10, ed. Pironet, 42, 20ff. 22  Sophismata, c. 3, ed. Pironet, 54, 4 f.

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theory, as the latter recognizes simple supposition as an additional, third kind of supposition.23 Another basic concept in Buridan’s semantics is appellation. His notion of appellation is different from that found in other authors and, in particular, in William of Ockham. For Buridan, the property of appellation refers to what a term signifies implicitly, but not explicitly. More precisely, a certain term appellates if it connotes something, that is, if it signifies something in addition to what it supposits for in a proposition.24 Buridan’s notion of appellation seems to be equivalent to Ockham’s notion of a “connotatio” of a term.25 In chapter IV of his Sophismata, Buridan offers the following definition: “A term that is apt to supposit for something should appellate everything that it signifies or consignifies besides what it supposits for.”26 In the Summulae this definition is put in slightly different words: “Every term that supposits for something and signifies something else for which it does not supposit appellates everything it signifies other than that for which it supposits [as pertaining to that for which it supposits].”27 To see more clearly what Buridan means by this definition, one may consider the proposition “Every father is a man.” Here the term “father” supposits for the things it ultimately signifies, its “ultima significata,” namely, all the fathers. At the same time, it appellates their children. To take another example: the term “rich” (dives) supposits for certain human 23  On Ockham’s theory of supposition, see, e.g., M. McCord-Adams, William Ockham. 2 vols. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 327-351. 24  See L.M. DeRijk, “On Buridan’s Doctrine of Connotation,” in ed., J. Pinborg, The Logic of John Buridan. Acts of the 3rd European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Copenhagen 16.-21. November 1975 (Copenhagen ,1976), 91-100, and A. Maierù, “Significatio et Connotatio chez Buridan,” in ibid., 101-114. 25  See DeRijk, op. cit., 93. 26  Sophismata, c. 4, ed. Pironet, 66, 10: “terminus innatus supponere pro aliquo debet appellare omne illud quod ipse significat vel consignificat praeter illud pro quod supponit”; Klima, 879. 27  Summulae 4.1.4, ed. van der Lecq, 12, 25 f.: “Terminus enim omnis pro aliquo supponens et significans aliud pro quo non supponit, appellat omne illud quod significat aliud ab eo pro quo supponit per modum adiacentis ei pro quo supponit”; Klima, 226.

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beings—this is its “matter”—and appellates their riches like houses, land, money and so on—the “form” of this term.28 The exact relationship between supposition and appellation will be discussed in detail below when discussing Buridan’s analysis of the semantical properties of the term “chimaera.”

II. 2. Buridan’s Analysis of the Semantics of “Chimaera” Before looking at how Buridan applies these tools of semantic analysis to terms like “chimaera,” a remark on terminology may be in order here. Like many other fourteenth-century philosophers, Buridan usually refers to two examples of non-existent, impossible objects: the chimera and the vacuum.29 Whereas the reason for the non-existence of a chimera is just the incompossibility of its parts and thus ultimately a logical contradiction, the impossibility of a void in nature is a basic doctrine of Aristotelian natural philosophy, because its existence would contradict the principles of Aristotle’s philosophy, as Aristotle himself amply demonstrated in book IV of his Physics. Medieval philosophers generally accepted this doctrine, and Buridan endorses it explicitly in his commentary on the Physics in a lengthy discussion of the possibility of a void in nature. He reaches the conclusion that a vacuum is not possible, at least as far as natural causes and forces are involved.30 The impossibility of a void, therefore, is not due to a strictly logical contradiction, but to its incompossibility with the contingent principles of natural philosophy. In fact, Buridan admits that we cannot exclude 28  Sophismata, c. 4, ed. Pironet, 66, 17-26. 29 Buridan has essentially two definitions of “chimaera”, a material one and a formal one. The first one may be found, for example, in his Quaestiones Elenchorum, qu. 17, eds. van der Lecq and Braakhuis, 85, 61 ff.: “Hic terminus ‘chymera’ significat caudam draconis, similiter ventrem virginis et collum gruis et caput bovis”; the latter in his Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, book VI, qu. 6, ed. cit., fol. 37vb: “Idem significat […] chimaera quod compositum ex impossibilibus componi.” The issue of defining “chimaera” and “vacuum” is also dealt with in the section on nominal definitions in the Summulae, 8.2.3., ed. De Rijk, 33f. 30  Johannes Buridanus, Subtilissimae Quaestiones super octo Physicorum libros Aristotelis (Paris 1509, repr. Frankfurt am Main 1964); see book IV, qu. 7: “Utrum possibile est vacuum esse,” fol. 72vb-73vb, at 73rb: “Ergo dicendum est quod nec est vacuum […] nec potest esse naturaliter.”

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the possibility, granted by the articles of faith, that the omnipotent God could create a void in nature, thus making it a case possible by supernatural means (casus supernaturaliter possibilis).31 Though Buridan does not make the distinction himself when dealing with impossible objects, one may nevertheless distinguish between at least two kinds of impossible objects: the chimera providing the standard example of a logically impossible object and the vacuum being the example of an object that is impossible due to the principles of natural philosophy. As the most detailed discussion of the issue of chimerae in Buridan’s writings is contained in the first chapter of the Sophismata, the following exposition of Buridan’s views will be based mainly on this text, drawing on other passages from Buridan’s work if necessary. The first chapter of Buridan’s Sophismata, which deals with the signification of terms and propositions, consists of three parts, starting by presenting a couple of sophisms, that is, of seemingly paradoxical propositions, for which two sets of arguments can be advanced, one of them to show them to be true and the other arguing for their falsity. The attempt at a solution of these sophisms allows Buridan to display the whole range of his logico-semantic tools. After having stated these sophismata together with the two sets of arguments Buridan proposes a series of theorems that he calls conclusions and which contain the basic ideas of his semantic theory, sometimes just repeating what has been said earlier, but sometimes going more into detail and being more precise. In the third and final part of the chapter, Buridan draws on these conclusions to present his final solutions of the sophisms stated at the beginning. 32 Buridan begins this first chapter of the Sophismata, whose topic is the signification of terms and propositions, by presenting a couple 31  Ibid., qu. 8: “Utrum possibile est vacuum esse per aliquam potentiam,” fol. 73vb-74rb, at 74ra: “Et possibile est […] vacuum esse per potentiam divinam. Et hoc est mihi creditum et non ratione naturali probatum.” For the role of “casus supernaturalis possibilis” in Buridan, see M.E. Reina: “L’ipotesi del ‘casus supernaturalis possibilis’ in Giovanni Buridano,” in ed., B. Nardi, La filosofia della natura nel medioevo. Atti del terzo congresso internazionale di filosofia medioevale (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1966), 683-690. 32  For the following, see Sophismata, c. 1; ed. Pironet, 14-16. Here and in the following I have gratefully used Klima’s translation, here 826-828. There is also a translation of the Sophismata into French with useful annotations, Jean Buridan: Sophismes. Texte traduit, introduit et anoté par Joel Biard (Paris: J. Vrin, 1993).

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of six sophisms whose discussion and solution is intended to bring about a clarification of the notions of signification and supposition. Chimerae are introduced already in the fourth sophism, namely: “The name ‘chimera’ signifies nothing” (“Hoc nomen ‘chimaera’ nihil significat”). Then several arguments are put forth which purport to prove the correctness of this proposition followed by others arguing for its falsity. Thus one may argue in favor of the truth of this proposition that the name “chimaera” does not signify something other than a chimera, just as the name “man” does not signify anything but a man and “whiteness” (albedo) nothing else but whiteness or being white, etc. But as there are no such things as chimerae, the name “chimaera” cannot signify anything. Another argument follows: if the name “chimaera” signified something, it should supposit for it just as the word “stone” supposits for a real stone; but the term “chimaera” does not supposit for anything, therefore it does not signify anything. On the other hand, one might argue that if the word “chimaera” signified nothing, it would be an utterance as meaningless as “bu” or “ba,” which cannot be conceded. Furthermore, every name, and the name ‘chimera’ is no exception here, is a conventionally significative utterance, which has been imposed (impositum est) to signify; as everything that is imposed to signify is imposed to signify something, therefore also the name “chimaera” must signify something. Now there are some people, Buridan continues, who try to circumvent this difficulty by assuming that the name “chimaera” does indeed signify, but that it does not signify anything (“bene significat, sed tamen non significat aliquid”). To this Buridan has a twofold answer. First, “to signify” was defined as “to establish an understanding of the thing” (intellectum rei constituere) such that an utterance is said to signify the thing whose understanding it establishes for us. But “thing” and “something” are convertible, thus “to signify” a thing means the same as to signify something. Second, “to signify” means “to be a sign.” But the sign (signum) and that which is signified (signatum) are correlatives; therefore the name “chimaera” can only be a sign if it is a sign of something, that is, if there is a “signatum” which is signified by it. The same is also true for every relative term; there is no father if there are no children. After these preliminary comments on the fourth sophism and after stating two other sophisms which are not relevant in our context, Buridan presents his solution to the sophism in a series of eleven

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conclusions which serve to elucidate the notion of signification of terms.33 Buridan’s first conclusion simply calls to the reader’s mind the basic rules that describe the order of signification: written words signify spoken words, “but they do not signify other things outside the soul, such as donkeys or stones, except by the meditation of the signification of utterances” (“nisi mediante significatione vocum”). This is proved by pointing to the fact that a person is able to understand a sentence uttered in his mother tongue; if this same person, however, is illiterate and cannot read, he will not be able to understand the same sentence when it is written down, as he does not know which sounds correspond to the written letters. In a similar manner—and this is the second conclusion—the spoken words signify the concepts in the soul, but they signify extramental things only mediately through the signification of concepts. Buridan’s strongest argument for this thesis points to the fact that in our language we have different, but synonymous words (ens, unum, idem, etc.) that signify different concepts and yet supposit for the same thing. Buridan’s third conclusion deals with concepts, namely, by every concept something is conceived, and this may be one thing or several things together. “For it would be absurd to say that someone understands, and yet he understands nothing (“intelligit, et tamen nihil intelligit”); or that he sees, and yet he sees nothing.” This is evident from looking at the rules of grammar, as a transitive verb that describes an action requires an accusative, a direct object, since it “signifies in the manner of an act passing over to another term,” hence it would include a contradiction to say things such as: “I see and I see nothing.” The same is true for all spoken words that have a signification, as Buridan makes explicit in the fourth conclusion. The application of these results to the special cases of terms like “chimaera” and “vacuum” is the subject of the following conclusions. The first result is stated in the fifth conclusion: “The name ‘chimera’ does not signify a chimera” and “the name ‘vacuum’ does not signify a vacuum.” The reason is that neither a chimera nor a vacuum can exist in reality. Accordingly, the names “chimaera” and “vacuum” do not supposit for anything, as there is nothing one could point to and of which one could correctly say: “This is a chimera” or “This is a vacuum” as required by supposition theory. Furthermore, as there is a general rule of supposition that all affirmative propositions whose subject or 33  Pironet, 18-28; Klima, 831-840.

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predicate does not supposit for anything are false, all propositions of the kind: “A chimera is intelligible” or “a chimera is opinable” (opinabilis) are false. As, however, every concept and every spoken word and even words such as “chimaera” and “vacuum” do signify something, the question arises: what exactly do these terms signify given that the name “chimaera” does not signify a chimera and “vacuum” does not signify a void? To answer this question, Buridan first makes a distinction between simple and complex concepts and then deals with each of these cases separately, discussing the signification and the supposition of simple terms first and then turning to complex terms, namely, those composed of simple ones either with a copula—a “complexio distans” such as “asinus non est rationalis”—or without copula, that is, a “complexio indistans” such as “animal rationale.”34 This leads to the sixth conclusion: “A simple concept, if it becomes the subject or predicate of a mental proposition, supposits for the thing itself that is thereby conceived (concipitur).” In this case Buridan does allow for exceptions: if, for example, the thing signified does not exist presently but will exist at some time in the future, as this is the case with the Antichrist, then a mental proposition such as “The Antichrist exists” supposits for nothing, as the present tense implied in the copula “prevents supposition for non-present things.” This touches 34  On the distinction between “complexio distans” and “complexio indistans” see Buridan’s Questions on the Metaphysics VI, qu. 6, ed. cit., fol. 37vb: “Deinde venio ad complexionem, quae debet distingui duplex: una vocatur indistans, alia distans. Indistans est prout determinatio complectitur cum suo determinabili sine copula verbali mediante, ut si dico ‘animal rationale,’ ‘homo albus.’ Et hoc potest fieri componendo vel dividendo. Et vocatur haec compositio, si fit modo affirmativo, scilicet sine negatione interveniente, ut ‘homo albus’; et vocatur divisio, si fit modo negativo, scilicet negatione interveniente, ut si dico ‘homo non albus.’ Modo ergo compositio indistans dicitur habere convenientem correspondentiam, si res significata per determinationem sit eadem cum re, pro qua determinabile supponit vel si ei adiaceat, et tunc illa compositio diceretur vera, sed si non esset ita, diceretur falsa vel ficta. Verbi gratia, iste conceptus diceretur falsus vel fictus ‘asinus rationalis,’ ‘mons aureus.’ Et e converso esset dicendum de divisione indistante. Unde ille conceptus esset verus ‘asinus non est rationalis’ et ille falsus ‘homo non est animal.’ Et isto modo isti termini vocales ‘chimaera,’ ‘vacuum’ designant conceptus falsos sive fictos. Designant enim conceptus complexos, quia idem significat ‘vacuum’ quod ‘locus non repletus corpore’ et idem ‘chimaera’ quod ‘compositum ex impossibilibus componi.’”

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upon another, though closely related issue, namely, entities which do not exist at present, but which may exist at another time, e.g., a rose.35 More important for our issue is the case of complex concepts. In this case the situation is different from the one before, as “not every complex concept that is the subject or the predicate of a mental proposition supposits for everything that it signifies,” as Buridan remarks in conclusion seven. This is obvious when considering expressions such as “white man” (“homo albus”) that may occur as the subject in the mental proposition “a white man runs” (“homo albus currit”). Though the concept “man” includes every man without exception, it does not supposit here for all men but only for white men, as its supposition, the range of objects it stands for, is restricted by the adjacent concept “white.” Similarly, the concept “white” does not supposit for every white thing but only for white men. Taken together, the complex concept that corresponds to the spoken words “white man” does not supposit, as a simple concept does, for everything conceived by it. One must even admit—and this is Buridan’s eighth conclusion— that there are complex concepts that occur as the subject or the predicate of a mental proposition and which supposit for nothing, even though many things are conceived by them. Buridan’s example here is the proposition: “A donkey that is capable of laughing runs” (“asinus risibilis currit”) which we may utter as a spoken proposition so that also a corresponding mental proposition exists. By the complex concept “asinus risibilis” or “donkey capable of laughing” we grasp a lot of things, namely, by the concept “asinus” we conceive of all donkeys and by the concept “risibilis” of everything that is capable of laughing. However, there is nothing the complex concept of a “donkey capable of laughing” supposits for, as the intersection of the set of all donkeys and of the set of everything capable of laughing is empty, because being capable of laughing is a property exclusively pertaining to human beings. Summing up the results that have been reached so far concerning the supposition and the signification of simple and of complex concepts, we arrive at the following three theses, stated by Buridan as his ninth conclusion: 35  On this, see R. van der Lecq, “The Problem of Reference to Nonexisting Things,” in the introduction to her edition of Buridan’s Quaestiones longae super librum Perihermeneias (cited in note 12), xxi-xxvii, in particular xxiv ff.

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(1) A spoken or a written word that is subordinated to a simple concept taken significately (i.e., which does not supposit materially) supposits for the things it ultimately (ultime) signifies, that is to say, for the things conceived by that concept, with the exception of some special cases mentioned above. (2) In the case of complex terms, however, it is not the case that every spoken or written complex term which is the subject of a proposition supposits for all the things it ultimately signifies, as the examples of “white man” or “a white man runs” show. (3) There are even spoken or written terms serving as the subject of a proposition that do not supposit for anything at all, as in the case of the donkey that is capable of laughing. From these propositions Buridan gets as a corollary that if a determination is added to a term—as, for example, “risibilis” to “asinus”— the signification of that term is not restricted, but its supposition is narrowed or, as we have seen, it is even completely eliminated. Returning now to the problem of impossible objects, what about names like “chimaera” and “vacuum” in this context? Buridan first of all remarks in the tenth conclusion that to the spoken term “chimaera” there does not correspond a simple concept. This is obvious, because if this were the case, the spoken term “chimaera” would have to supposit for the thing (res) conceived of by the mental concept “chimaera,” but this is impossible, as there are no chimerae in extramental reality. Thus, there is only one possibility left, namely, that a complex concept corresponds to the spoken word “chimaera,” which it primarily signifies and in terms of which it was imposed to signify. But how is this possible? As our spoken language is based on convention and the meaning of spoken or written terms is dependent on human will (ad placitum nostrum), we are not only able to impose a simple word to signify a simple concept, but we may also impose a simple utterance upon a complex concept immediately signifying particularly this compound concept and everything that is conceived by it (Conclusion 11). Buridan mentions three examples to illustrate this:36 (1) Some poet conceived by means of a huge complex concept the story of Troy, more specifically, of how Paris abducted Helen and of how the Greek King invaded the Trojans, et cetera. And then the poet wrote a huge book according to that complex concept containing everything that is conceived by this complex concept. Finally, the poet 36  Pironet, 25, 24ff.; Klima, 838ff.

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imposed the simple name Iliad to signify everything that is signified by this huge book. (2) To the expression “place not filled with body” there corresponds a complex concept by which we signify a place, a body and the filling. To signify this complex concept including everything signified by it, we impose the name “vacuum.” The term “vacuum” has a nominal definition—“a place not filled with body”—which does not really say what a vacuum is (it does not tell us its essence), but it informs us what and how the name “vacuum” signifies something, namely, place, body, and filling. And, yet, neither the spoken term “vacuum” nor the corresponding complex concept nor its nominal definition supposit for anything, because in this case there is no concept which supposits both for “place” and for “not filled with body,” as, according to the laws of Aristotelian physics, there can be no place whatsoever which would not be filled with a body. (3) Finally, the case of “chimaera” is a similar one. For to the spoken word “chimaera” there is a corresponding complex concept, “an animal composed from members from which nothing can be composed”— Buridan prefers to use the formal definition of “chimaera” here. This concept signifies everything that is also signified by the terms “animal,” “member,” and “composed,” but again there is no supposition here, as the determination “from which nothing can be composed” eliminated the first part of the nominal definition, namely, the “an animal composed from members,” and thus eliminates the definition as a whole. The same is obviously true if one uses the other available nominal definition of “chimaera” which uses the terms “lion,” “goat,” and “serpent.” Thus Buridan arrives at the following result. To the spoken word “chimaera” there exists a corresponding complex concept that signifies all the things that are mentioned in the nominal definition of “chimaera,” but which does not have a supposition. This enables Buridan to solve the fourth sophisma (“The name ‘chimera’ signifies nothing”), which now appears to be false as the name “chimaera,” though it does not signify a chimera itself, in fact signifies a lot of things that are no chimerae, but which are consignified by the complex concept “chimaera.”37 To complete the analysis of impossible objects the property of appellation has to be applied to the concept of “chimaera.” This is done in the fourth treatise of the Summulae where Buridan discusses the 37  Pironet, 31, 1ff.; Klima, 843.

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difference between the appellation and the signification of terms.38 As far as the relation between supposition and appellation is concerned, three cases may occur: (1) There are terms which have a supposition and which do not appellate, e.g., “animal,” “plant,” or “gold,” and generally all terms in the nominative case that signify substances. These terms do not signify anything beyond the substance they supposit for, and they do not connote some extrinsic (aliena) disposition along with the substance they signify. This is also true for many abstract terms belonging to the category of quality like “whiteness” (albedo), “hotness” (caliditas), and “humidity” (humiditas). (2) Then there are terms which appellate, but which do not have a supposition. This is true in the case of “chimaera,” “vacuum,” and “a man able to neigh” (homo hinnibilis). We have already seen that these terms do not supposit for anything, as there is nothing one could point to and truly say “this is a chimera,” “this is a vacuum,” or “this is a man that is able to neigh”. As far as their appellation is concerned, in the proposition “a man able to neigh runs” the expression “able to neigh” (hinnibilis) “appellates the capability to neigh, not as belonging to that for which the whole subject supposits, but as belonging to that for which the other part, namely, ‘man’ or ‘homo’ would supposit,” as Buridan says. But as the predicate “hinnibilis” cannot pertain to man, the supposition of the term “man” is completely eliminated. The same is true for the term “vacuum” drawing on its nominal definition as “a place not filled with body.” The term “place” taken for itself does indeed supposit for something, but this supposition is eliminated because of the appellation of the determination “not filled with body.” Finally, the same is obviously true for the term “chimaera” and its nominal definition. (3) Finally, there are terms that both appellate and supposit, as in the case of the terms “father” or “white” (album), which supposits for a substance, namely some white thing, and appellates the color inhering in that substance. Putting together what Buridan has to say about the semantic properties of terms like “chimaera” or “vacuum” in the “Sophismata” and in his other writings, which present more or less the same views,39 one arrives at the following scheme: 38  Summulae 4.1.4, ed. van der Lecq, 12-14; Klima, 226-228. 39  See the texts mentioned in notes 12 and 13 above.

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- Terms like “chimaera” and “vacuum” do not have a supposition, as there in nothing in extramental reality they could supposit for; - these terms have a signification, as they signify a complex concept, a “conceptus complexus,” which has a nominal definition and whose parts have a signification; - these terms have an appellation insofar as they connote something. In the light of these results of Buridan’s semantic analysis, what is left of a chimera? The result, so it seems, is quite disappointing for the chimera. To use Ebbesen’s conclusion put in the mouth of a chimera: “So this is what is left of me: a word and a corresponding complex concept. But not a trace of old-fashioned being.”40 Fortunately, however, this is not the final word on chimerae in fourteenth-century nominalism, as Buridan’s analyses were not universally accepted, not even among his followers. Indeed, as we shall see, at least Marsilius of Inghen was willing to accord an ontologically more elevated position to the chimera.

III. Albert of Saxony & Marsilius of Inghen on Chimerae Albert of Saxony (died 1390) studied at Paris in the mid fourteenth-century and became the first rector of the University of Vienna in 1365.41 He is traditionally regarded as a pupil and a close follower of John Buridan, whose ideas on natural philosophy in particular became known in central Europe and Italy due to their transmission through Albert’s writings. In recent scholarship, however, Albert’s dependence on Buridan was convincingly questioned and the influence of Ockham’s ideas and of thinkers such as William Heytesbury, Walter Burley, and others on Albert was emphasized.42 Albert was the author of several logical writings, of which especially his textbook 40  S. Ebbesen: “The Chimera’s Diary,” 139. 41  On Albert’s life and works, see Harald Berger: “Albert von Sachsen,” in eds., B. Wachinger et. al., Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters. Verfasserlexikon, 2. Aufl., Bd. 11 (Berlin-New York, 2000), 39-56, and Joël Biard: “Albert of Saxony,” in ed. Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2004 Edition): . 42  On this latter point see Thijssen, “The Buridan School Reassessed” (cited in n. 7 supra), who focuses on natural philosophy.

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on logic, the Perutilis Logica (A Very Useful Logic) became quite popular.43 In addition, we have his Sophismata, several commentaries on Aristotle’s logical texts and a collection of 25 logical questions, the Quaestiones logicales.44 Although Albert’s overall approach to logic is, like Buridan’s, based on the analysis of language by means of the exploration of the properties of terms, in particular of the theory of supposition, his opinions on logical issues diverge from Buridan’s in several respects, the most relevant for our purpose are the following.45 Albert returns to Ockham’s semiotic approach to linguistic analysis, as for him, as for Ockham before, spoken, written, and mental terms are regarded as signs.46 He also sides with Ockham in regarding signification and the relation of spoken to mental signs as a relation of subordination and not as one of a transitivity of signification, as Buridan held.47 Finally, 43  There is a recent critical edition, Albert von Sachsen: Logik. LateinischDeutsch. Übersetzt, mit einer Einleitung und Anmerkungen, ed., Harald Berger (Hamburg: Meiner, 2010). 44 Albert’s Sophismata, a collection of 254 sophisms, were printed in Paris in 1502 (repr. 1975). His Quaestiones in artem veterem, viz., on the Isagoge, the Categories and the Perihermeneias, have been edited by A. Muñoz Garcia, Alberti de Saxonia Quaestiones in Artem Veterem. Edición Crítica. Maracaibo (Universidad del Zulia, 1988). Albert’s Questiones super libros Posteriorum Aristotelis appeared in print in Venice in 1497 (repr. Frankfurt am Main 1986). The Logical Quaestiones were edited by M. Fitzgerald, Albert of Saxony’s Twenty-five Disputed Questions on Logic. A critical edition of his ‘Quaestiones circa logicam’ (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 79) (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2002). 45  Cf. Biard, “Albert of Saxony,” ch. 2, for a succint characterisation of Albert’s approach to logic compared to Ockham’s and Buridan’s. 46  See Albert’s remarks at the beginning of his Quaestiones in Artem Veterem, Proemium, §1: “Cum logica solum sit de signis qui sunt termini, aut igitur est de signis qui sunt termini incomplexi, aut est de signis qui sunt termini complexi,” ed. Muñoz Garcia, 142, and Perutilis logica, tr. 1, ch. 1, ed. Berger, 4-6. Cf. J. Biard, Logique et Théorie du Signe au XIVe Siècle (Paris: J. Vrin, 1989), 205 ff. 47 See Perutilis logica, tr. 1, ch. 2, ed. Berger, 8: “Et iste terminus [scil. vocalis vel scriptus], qui hoc significat ad placitum, quod unus terminus mentalis significat naturaliter, dicitur illi termino mentali esse subordinatus in significando. Non quod significet illum terminum mentalem, sed quia significat hoc ex impositione, quod ille terminus mentalis significat naturaliter.” On this issue, cf. Ch. Kann, Die Eigenschaften der Termini. Eine

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Albert follows Ockham’s tripartite division of supposition into simple, personal and material thereby rejecting Buridan’s dismissal of the “suppositio simplex.”48 Albert deals with chimerae at several places in his logical writings, as, for example, in his Sophismata, where the chimera and the vacuum usually serve as the common examples of non-existing things. Taken together, however, Albert’s treatment of chimerae is by no means as extensive as Buridan’s, and he usually follows the Parisian master’s views on this issue quite closely. Albert’s short remarks on the semantics of “chimaera” may be put together and summarized as follows: Terms like “chimaera” and “vacuum” do have a signification. Thus, “chimaera” signifies —depending on the exact definition of “chimaera” one chooses—“a lion’s tail, a woman’s stomach and a virgin’s face etc.” or “a donkey’s ass, a lion’s head and a woman’s stomach” or “a fish’s tail, a woman’s stomach and a virgin’s head”—in any case we have a composition of parts of real beings which, however, cannot be put together in reality.49 Thus we get a complex concept which does not include a copula (“conceptum complexum complexione indistanti”) to which the spoken and written term “chimaera” is subordinated and which in itself is neither true nor false, in contrast to a complex concept which includes a copula and thus may have a truth value.50 It is obvious that both the Untersuchung zur Perutilis Logica Alberts von Sachsen (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 37) (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994 ), 32 ff. 48  Perutilis logica, tr. 1, ch. 1-3. On Albert’s theory of supposition, cf. Berger’s introduction to his edition of the Perutilis logica, xxxix ff., and Kann, Die Eigenschaften der Termini, esp. 43-87. 49 Cf. Quaestiones circa logicam, q. 5, §95, ed. Fitzgerald, 114: “Dico de isto termino: chymaera, quod significat aliquid, quia significat taliter: caudam leonis, et ventrem mulieris, faciem virginis etc. Modo haec sunt aliqua, sed verum est quod ista significat taliter quod impossibile sit ea ad invicem componi”; ibid., q. 12, §228.2.1, ed. Fitzgerald, 195: “Hic terminus: chymaera, significat culum asini, et caput leonis, et ventrem mulieris”; Quaestiones in Librum De interpretatione, §786, ed. Garcia, 508: “Secunda conclusio: similiter hoc nomen ‘chimaera’ non solum aliquid significat, verum etiam aliquid quod est. Patet hoc, quia significat caudam piscis et ventrem mulieris et caput virginis”. 50  Quaestiones in Librum De interpretatione, §792, ed. Garcia, 510: “Tunc dico quod conceptum complexum complexione indistanti non oportet esse verum nec falsum, qualis est conceptus cui subordinatur hoc nomen ‘chimaera’, vel hoc nomen ‘vacuum’ vel talis oratio ‘homo albus’; nihilominus

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term “chimaera” and the term “vacuum” do not have a supposition (“pro nullo supponit”) such that a proposition like “A chimera is a chimera” is false, as its subject term does not supposit for anything, whereas the negation “A chimera is not a chimera” is true. This is a consequence of the well-known truth-condition for propositions, viz., that an affirmative proposition is true if and only if the subject-term and the predicate-term supposit for the same thing; and if the subject-term supposits for nothing, and as nothing obviously cannot have any properties, nothing can truly be predicated of it. In the negative proposition, on the other hand, the subject-term and the predicate-term do not supposit for the same thing, because terms that supposit for nothing do not supposit for the same thing, hence the truth-condition for negative propositions holds and the proposition is true.51 Finally, as a chimera may be imagined or conceived of, a proposition such as “One may have an opinion about ‘chimera’” (“Chimaera est opiniabilis”) is true if one concedes that “opinabilis” may ampliate the subject-term so that it does not only stand for things that exist but also for those that existed, will exist or may be imagined or conceived of.”52 conceptum complexum complexione distanti bene oportet esse verum vel falsum; sed talis non est conceptus cui subordinatur hoc nomen ‘chimaera’ vel ‘vacuum.’” 51 See Quaestiones circa logicam, q. 9, § 170.2, ed. Fitzgerald, 168: “Secundo, infero quod omnis propositio affirmativa, cuius subiectum pro nullo supponit est falsa. Propter hoc haec est falsa: Chymaera est chymaera. Et propositio negativa cuius subiectum pro nullo supponit est vera. Et propter hoc, haec est vera: Chymaera non est chymaera”; Quaestiones in Librum De interpretatione, §870-871, ed. Garcia, 544: “Ulterius sequitur omnem affirmativam cuius subiectum pro nullo supponit esse falsam, sicut est ista ‘chimaera est chimaera’; nam ex hoc quod verbum ‘est’ non negatur, significat idem pro quo supponit subiectum esse illud pro quo etiam supponit praedicatum. Modo sic non est cum subiectum pro nullo supponit.—Ulterius sequitur omnem propositionem negativam esse veram cuius subiectum pro nullo supponit. Patet hoc, nam ex quo in tali propositione hoc verbum ‘est’ negatur, illud significat non esse idem pro quo supponit subiectum et praedicatum; et sic est, cum subiectum pro nullo supponit, ergo”; also see Perutilis logica, tr. 6. ch. 6, ed. Berger, 52 ff. On this issue, cf. Biard, Logique et théorie du signe, 221. 52  Quaestiones circa logicam, q. 13, § 246.2.1, ed Fitzgerald, 206ff.: “Si concedis istum terminum ‘opinabilis’ posse ampliare terminum ad standum pro eo, quod est vel fuit, vel erit vel potest esse, vel potest intelligi vel imaginari, vel concipi, haec est concedenda: Chymaera est opinabilis”.

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This latter point becames important in Marsilius of Inghen’s treatment of chimerae. Marsilius (ca. 1340-1396), a master of arts in Paris from 1362 onward, was a prolific writer and an influential teacher both in Paris and, since 1386, in Heidelberg, where he was one of the founders and several times rector of the university.53 Among his numerous writings there are several commentaries and questions on the Old and the New Logic, which, however, are not yet available in modern editions; besides, we have his “Treatises on the Properties of Termes” (Suppositiones, Ampliationes, Appellationes, Restrictiones and Alienationes), his only logical texts that was edited in modern times.54 Belonging to the tradition of fourteenth-century Parisian nominalism, Marsilius’ philosophical approach generally seems to be closer to Buridan than to Ockham. For example, he follows the Parisian master in rejecting simple supposition.55 Marsilius’ discussion of chimerae and imaginary objects, however, shows some originality and adds a new aspect to the debate.56 Marsilius makes a clear distinction between two available definitions of “chimaera,” one of them may be called a formal or logical one and the other a material one: “Some define it as follows: a chimera is a being made up of incompatible parts. Other logicians define it as follows: a chimera is an animal with the head of a lion, the belly of a goat, and the tail of a dragon and so on, with other parts of different animals.”57 53  On Marsilius’ life and works see M. Hoenen: “Marsilius of Inghen” in ed., Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition): URL = and the references given there. 54 Marsilius of Inghen, Treatises on the Properties of Terms, ed. E.P. Bos (Synthese Historical Library 22). (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1983). 55  On this and on Marsilius’ logic in general, see Biard, Logique et théorie du signe, 222 ff. 56  See the important paper by G. Roncaglia: “Utrum impossibile sit significabile: Buridano, Marsilio di Inghen e la chimera,” Filosofia e teologia nel trecento. Studi in ricordo di Eugenio Randi. A cura di Luca Bianchi (LouvainLa-Neuve: Fédération internationale des instituts d’études médiévales, 1994), 259-282, and Biard, Logique et théorie du signe, 228-231. 57  “Quidam enim dicunt sic, quod chymera est ens compositum ex incompossibilibus componi. Alii diffiniunt sic: chymera est animal compositum ex capite leonis, ventre capre, caude draconis et sic de aliis partibus

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These definitions already appear in Buridan, as we have seen, but Buridan obviously uses them interchangeably.58 For Marsilius, however, the two definitions are not at all logically equivalent. A chimera as it is defined in the first, the formal way cannot be imagined, as contradictories cannot be imagined. In the second case, however, a chimera defined materially can be imagined and even has a signification in itself (per se), as it signifies a “res imaginata.”59 This means that even imaginary objects can have a signification by themselves and not only, as Buridan thought, insofar as they signify the real parts of the complex concept to which they are subordinated. Furthermore, Marsilius goes on to extend the domains or tenses of logic so that logic does not only deal with the past, the present, and the future, but also with the possible and even the imaginable as a fifth domain.60 “This was a considerable step in the direction of developing a theory of the language of fiction.”61 In fact, the difference in opinion between Buridan and Marsilius did not go unnoticed in the later Middle Ages and beyond,

animalis”: Marsilius’ Questions on Aristotle’s De interpretatione, in: MS Erfurt, Ampl. Q 246, fol. 95ra, cited in: E.P. Bos, ed., Marsilius of Inghen. Treatises on the Properties of Terms, 192. 58  This difference between the two definitions is also made explicit in John Dorp’s commentary to Buridan’s “Compendium totius logicae,” Tr. VIII, cited by Roncaglia, op. cit., 271. In this passage and possibly under the influence of Marsilius, Johannes Dorp regards the impossibility of a chimera when defined formally as a logical impossibility, whereas for the second case he sees a natural impossibility. 59  Bos, op. cit., 193, who gives a summary of a passage in a manuscript of Marsilius’ still unedited “Questions on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione.” 60  Marsilius of Inghen: Ampliationes, ed. Bos, 102: “Secundo […] est notandum quod tres sunt differentie temporum, scilicet presens, preteritum et futurum. […] Et possunt addi duo, scilicet ‘posse’ et ‘imaginari esse’, que, licet non sint proprie differentie temporum, tamen in proposito sunt differentie temporum, nam respectu eorum termini supponunt in propositionibus pro diversis temporibus.” 61  S. Ebbesen, “Language, Medieval Theories of,” in ed., E. Craig, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London -New York: Routledge, 1998), vol. 5, 389-404, here on 399. J. Biard, “La signification d’objets imaginaires dans quelques textes anglais du XIVe siècle,” points to an Oxford background of this idea.

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as several testimonies make clear.62 Extending the universe of discourse and including imaginary objects in it does, however, create considerable problems concerning the ontological status of these objects and the notion of possibility that is at stake here, which opened a vast field for philosophical debate in the centuries to come.63

62  See the text cited by Roncaglia, op. cit., 262 f., from an anonymous commentary on Peter of Spain’s Tractatus: “Utrum impossibile sit significabile. Et de isto sunt due famose opiniones autorum Biridani et Marsilii. Et tenet Biridanus quod non […] Alia opinio est Marsilii et suorum quod impossibile est significabile quia res que non potest esse bene potest significari per aliquem terminum ….” Another testimony is found in a SophistriaDisputation edited by E. P. Bos, Logica Modernorum in Prague about 1400. The ‘Sophistria’ Disputation ‘Quoniam Quatuor’ (MS Cracow, Jagiellonian Library 686, ff. 1ra-79rb), with a partial reconstruction of Thomas of Cleve’s Logica (Leiden: Brill, 2004), at 263, 19-26: “Nota M et Hesbri [Heytesbury] tenent oppositum Byridano […] secundum B dicitur quod nomen significat aliquid per se vel mediantibus partibus sue descriptionis, representat aliquid quod est, fuit vel erit vel potest esse, et sic ly ‘chymera’ mediante ly ‘compositum’ significat omnia composite.” 63  On this, see the paper by Ashworth, “Chimeras and Imaginary Objects,” referred to in note 6 above.

Chapter 4 “Ut ex etymologia nominis patet?” The Nature & the Object of Metaphysics according to John Punch Marco Forlivesi I. Life and Works of John Punch

J

I.1 Life

ohn Punch (also known as‘Ponce’) was born in the county of Cork, Ireland, in 1599 or 1603. At an early age he went to Belgium, where he entered the Franciscan Observant order in the novitiate of the Irish convent of St. Anthony of Padua in Leuven. After the year of novitiate, he was sent to study philosophy in Köln, from where he went back to Leuven to study theology under Hugh Ward and John Colgan. Before he completed his theological studies, he was noticed by Luke Wadding, who supported his transfer to Rome in the new Irish Franciscan college at Sant’Isidoro. Formally established in 1625, in the same year the new college received Punch as one of its first three students. There, he finished his theological studies under Anthony Hickey and Patrick Fleming and taught philosophy, first, and subsequently theology. In 1630 he was charged with the office of rector of the Ludovisian College, a college for Irish secular priests fostered by

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Wadding and founded thanks to donations from Cardinal Ludovico Ludovisi. From 1633 he assisted Wadding in the task of preparing the first complete edition of the works of John Duns Scotus. In 1642-1643 he published the first edition of his Integer philosophiae cursus ad mentem Scoti. This work—which had a second edition in 1649 and was reprinted in 1659 and 1672—provoked a two decade-long clash, of no mere doctrinal nature, between Punch and the Conventual Scotist, Bartolomeo Mastri. In 1648 Punch left Rome for France, where he taught for a year in Lyon, moving afterward to Paris. In 1652 he published his Integer theologiae cursus ad mentem Scoti, which was reprinted in 1671, and in 1661 his six-tome Commentarii theologici on Scotus’s Commentary on the Sentences. During his stays in Rome and Paris, Punch actively supported the cause of the Irish Confederate Catholics, opposed the alliance with the English Royalists, and supported papal nuncio Giovanni Battista Rinuccini’s political action. From the end of the 1640s, Punch quarrelled also with the Irish Jansenist John Callaghan: a Rinuccini’s opponent who had found asylum in the Paris house of Port-Royal. In 1657 Punch was given jurisdiction over the Irish Franciscans in Paris in order to investigate accusations brought against them, and in 1658 he sent a communication in their defence to the General Minister of his order. He died in Paris on 26 May 1661.

I.2 Works A) Supplementa ad Commentaria Francisci Lycheti in Quaestiones Joannis Duns Scoti super libros Sententiarum Ioannes Poncius, Supplementum ad Commentaria Francisci Lycheti, in Ioannes Duns Scotus, Opera omnia, vol. 5/1-2: Quaestiones in librum primum Sententiarum, Lugduni: Sumptibus Laurentii Durand, 1639. Ioannes Poncius, Supplementum ad Commentaria Francisci Lycheti, in Ioannes Duns Scotus , Opera omnia, vol. 5/1-2: Quaestiones in librum secundum Sententiarum, Lugduni: Sumptibus Laurentii Durand, 1639.

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Ioannes Poncius, Supplementum ad Commentaria Francisci Lycheti, in Ioannes Duns Scotus , Opera omnia, vol. 7/1-2: Quaestiones in librum tertium Sententiarum, Lugduni: Sumptibus Laurentii Durand, 1639. B) Integer Philosophiae Cursus ad mentem Scoti First edition Ioannes Poncius, Integer philosophiae cursus ad mentem Scoti, 3 vols. Vol. 1: Logica, Romae: Sumptibus Hermanni Scheus - Typis Ludovici Grignani, 1642. Vol. 2: Physica et libri de Caelo, Romae: Sumptibus Hermanni Scheus - Apud Dominicum Marcianum, 1642. Vol. 3: Libri de Generatione et corruptione, Meteoris, Anima, Parvis naturalibus, et Metaphysica, Romae: Sumptibus Hermanni Scheus Typis Ludovici Grignani, 1643. Dedicatory letter, preface (i.e., ad lectorem) and approbations are present only in the first tome. The work bears no dedication. The approbations are dated 10 December 1641 and 3 June 1642.1 Second edition Ioannes Poncius, Integer philosophiae cursus ad mentem Scoti, primum editus in Collegio Romano fratrum minorum Hibernorum. Nunc vero ab authore, in conventu magno Parisiensi recognitus, mendis quibus scatebat, expurgatus; Moralis insuper Philosophia, varijsque additionibus locupletatus, Parisiis: Sumptibus Antonii Bertier 1649.2 The work is dedicated to Claude de Mesmes, count of Avaux. The approbations are dated 10 December 1641, 3 January 1648, 12 October 1648, and 28 November 1648. In f. (not numbered) 1r of the second gathering (with signature ‘ē’) of the preliminary pages of the volume, one can read: “Peracta est haec impressio die i. Decemb. 1648.” 1  Through the courtesy of Jacob Schmutz. 2  M. Grajewski, “John Ponce, Franciscan Scotist of the Seventeenth Century,” Franciscan Studies 6 (1946): 65-66, dates this edition at 1648 and writes: “… this edition we have at hand and its full title is as follows: Integer […] MDCXLVIII.” I do not know of copies dated 1648 and there are reasons for doubting that the printing of this edition was already finished in 1648; however, I cannot exclude that some copies bear this date on the title page.

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Reprints of the second edition Ioannes Poncius, Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti cursus integer, Lugduni: Sumptibus Ioannis Antonii Huguetan et Marci Antonii Ravaud, 1659. Ioannes Poncius, Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti cursus integer, Lugduni: Sumptibus (simultaneous issue) Laurentij Anisson / Laurenti Arnaud et Petri Borde, 1672. C) Integer theologiae cursus ad mentem Scoti First edition Ioannes Poncius, Integer theologiae cursus ad mentem Scoti, Parisiis: Sumptibus Antonii Bertier, 1652. The work is dedicated to François de L’Hospital, count of Rosnay. The approbations are dated 8, 13, 14, and 15 December 1651. At the foot of the f. (not numbered) 6v of the first gathering (with signature ‘a’) of the preliminary pages of the volume, one can read: “Peracta est haec impressio die i. Februarii 1652.” Reprint of the first edition Ioannes Poncius, Theologiae cursus integer ad mentem Scoti, Lugduni: Sumptibus (simultaneous issue) Ioannis-Antonii Huguetan et Guillelmi Barbier / Iacobi Canier et Floridi Martin / Laurentii Anisson / Laurentii Arnaud et Petri Borde, Lugduni 1671. The work bears no dedication. The approbations are dated 8, 13, and 15 December 1651, and 18 March 1670. D) Commentarii theologici quibus Ioannis Duns Scoti quaestiones in libros sententiarum elucidantur et illustrantur Ioannes Poncius, Commentarii theologici quibus Ioannis Duns Scoti quaestiones in libros sententiarum, elucidantur, et illustrantur, 4 vols in 6 tomes, Parisiis: Sumptibus (simultaneous issue) Dionysii Bechet et Ludovicus Billaine / Sebastiani Cramoisy / Simeonis Piget, 1661. Vol. 1/1: Commentaria in primam distinctionem libri primi Sententiarum, ad duodecimam exclusive. Vol. 1/2: Commentaria in duodecimam distinctionem libri primi Sententiarum, ad quadragesimam-octavam inclusive.

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Vol. 2/1: Commentaria in primam distinctionem libri secundii Sententiarum, ad decimam exclusive. Vol. 2/2: Commentaria in decimam distinctionem libri secundi Sententiarum, ad quadragesimam-quartam inclusive. Vol. 3: Commentaria in primam distinctionem libri tertij Sententiarum, ad vigesimam-quintam exclusive. Vol. 4: Commentaria in vigesimam-quintam libri tertij Sententiarum, usque ad finem. Dedicatory letter and approbations are present only in vol. 1/1. The work is dedicated to Nicolas Fouquet, viscount of Melun and Vaux. The approbations are dated 1 April 1647, 14 July 1658, 20 December 1659, 1 February, 1 April, 12 May, 16 June, and 3 August 1660. In the middle of the f. (not numbered) 4v of the second gathering (with signature ‘e’) of the preliminary pages of the volume, one can read: “Peracta est haec prima impressio die 30. Augusti 1660.” The work contains the first three books of Scotus’s Ordinatio, in accordance with the Wadding edition, as well as Punch’s commentaries on them. In some cases, the text of these commentaries echoes, in the typographical aspect too, the text of Punch’s aforementioned commentaries published in the Wadding edition. However, most of the commentaries published in this work are new. Actually, they replace the commentaries by Licheto published in the Wadding edition. The vol. 1/1 contains also the work Scotus Hiberniae restitutus, whose pages are autonomously numbered 1-39 and whose gatherings are autonomously signed A4-E4. E) Other printed works Ioannes Poncius, Appendix apologetica ad Cursum Philosophicum eiusdem. In qua non solum a novis quibus impetitur impugnationibuis in secunda editione Physicae RR.PP.MM. Bartholomaei Mastrij, et Bonaventurae Belluti Ord. Min. Conv. Vindicatur; sed et plurimae Philosophicae difficultates, ac loca Scoti as non mediocrem Sectatorum eius utilitatem, ac profectum examinantur, et exponuntur, Romae: Ex typographia Andreae Phaei - Sumptibus Ioannis Baptista Smeraldus, 1645.3 3  As far as I know, only two copies of this volume are extant. One is held by Sant’Isidoro’s Library in Rome, whose librarian, Louis Brennan, I wish to thank for his commitment to recover the volume, which seemed lost. Another one is held by the University of St. Bonaventure’s Library. About the staff of this institution I complain that they never aswered to the many

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The work is dedicated to card. Francesco Peretti di Montalto.4 The approbations are dated 12 and 18 December 1644, and 28 April 1645.5 Joannes Poncius, D. Richardi Bellingi Vindiciae eversae […]. Ea occasione exponitur, quibus potissimum viis Hibernia a parlamentariis subacta est. Alia etiam eiusdem D. Bellingi Epistola refellitur. Et denique Doctoris Callaghani correctoratus Corisopitanus contra duas ipsius Gallicas epistolas, et authorem libri Gallici “l’Innocence et Verité defenduës” confirmatur, Parisiis: Apud Franciscum Piot, in Conventu majori Fratrum Minorum, 1653. The work bears neither dedication6 nor approbations. Joannes Poncius, Scotus Hiberniae restitutus, Parisiis: Sumptibus (simultaneous issue) Simeonis Piget / Dyonisii Bechet et Ludovici Billaine, 1660. The work is dedicated to Philippe Le Roy (“Ordinis Minorum, Provinciae Turoniae, Almae Facultatis Parisiensis Doctori Theologo, necnon Christianissimae Reginae a Confessionibus et Consiliis”). The approbations are dated 8 August 1659.7 The work was reprinted in Commentarii theologici quibus Ioannis Duns Scoti quaestiones in libros sententiarum elucidantur et illustrantur, vol. 1/1; cf. supra. F) Manuscripts John Punch, letter to Hugh Burke, 2 July 1644 (Roma, Collegio di Sant’Isidoro, Archivio, Sectio W, 15. 1).

requests of providing a reproduction of this book that were sent to them for many months. 4  The dedication is signed by Giovanni Battista Smeraldi, bibliopola. 5  Through the courtesy of Louis Brennan. 6  Broadly speaking, the work is dedicated to the Irish archbishops, bishops, prelates, and clergy. However, the volume bears no dedication to a patron. 7  Through the courtesy of Jacob Schmutz.

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II The Framework of Punch’s Theory Concerning the Subject/Object of Metaphysics II.1 The Aristotelian Roots of the Debate and Its Late-Antique and Medieval Shaping8 The doctrines formulated by seventeenth-century thinkers on the nature of metaphysics and the subject/object of this science are rooted in a debate that in the first half of the seventeenth century was already nearly two thousands years old. Some statements contained in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and Metaphysics constitute the roots of this debate. In the former work, the Stagirite provides a definition of scientific knowledge and incorporates knowledge through demonstration into it. There are three things involved in demonstrations—writes Aristotle—: what is demonstrated, i.e., the conclusion, which expresses the fact that an attribute belongs per se to a genus; the axioms; and the subject genus (ghénos hypokeímenon), whose per se attributes are revealed by the demonstration. Each science, with respect to its own demonstrations, possesses the genus that is proper to it, and to which both principles and conclusions of the demonstrations of that specific science belong. Despite the fact that in the Metaphysics Aristotle sometimes uses ‘genus’ to refer to what a science is concerned with, he neither properly says that metaphysics is concerned with a genus, nor does he explain what the genus possibly studied by metaphysics is. Nonetheless, he provides at least four different descriptions of what metaphysics deals with. In the first book of the Metaphysics, we read that all men suppose what is called wisdom to deal with the search for the first causes and the principles of things. In the fourth book we read that there is a science that considers being as being and the attributes belonging to it in virtue of its own nature. In the sixth book our author develops the following argument: if there is something that is eternal, immovable, 8  This part of my essay summarises what I have written in M. Forlivesi, “Approaching the Debate on the Subject of Metaphysics from the Later Middle Ages to the Early Modern Age: The Ancient and Medieval Antecedents,” Medioevo 34 (2009): 9-59. The reader will allow me to refer to this article for any substantiation of my theses.

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and separate, then the knowledge of it belongs to a science that is distinct from physics and from mathematics; but if the divine exists, it exists in things of this sort; hence, the science that deals with them is called theology. Finally, in the seventh book he writes that the question concerning ‘what being is’ is equivalent to the question concerning ‘what substance is.’ This does not mean that the Metaphysics contains no suggestions useful to understand metaphysics as a unitary science, but these very suggestions give rise to further questions. According to a passage of the first book, we could think that the unity of metaphysics rests on the fact that this science deals with the first causes of all things. This doctrine can be combined with the theory expressed in the fourth book so that it is possibile to conceive of a single science dealing both with principles and with the attributes of being. However, in the first chapter of the sixth book Aristotle seems to propose a different criterion for grounding the coherence of this science. There, he writes that physics deals with non-separate and non-immovable realities; mathematics (or at least some parts of mathematics) with immovable but non-separate realities; first philosophy with realities which are both separate and immovable. Consequently, the different degrees of “involvement” with matter and motion and of “detachement” from them appear to be the roots both of the distinction between the different theoretical sciences and of their intrinsic unity. The problems that arise from reading these texts by Aristotle were not transmitted to Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages in the form of a historiographical debate; rather, they spread in the form of a theoretical reflection that thrived in late ancient, Arabic, and late medieval intellectual speculation, giving rise to several doctrines concerning the nature of the subject/object of a science and, in particular, concerning the question of the subject/object of metaphysics. Actually, there is a component of the debate that remains essentially unchanged through the centuries: it is the question concerning whether and how metaphysics deals with real beings, substances, accidents, spiritual substances, material substances, and beings of reason. By contrast, other components of the problem undergo changes and developments. Since Alexander of Aphrodisias, the subject genus of the Posterior Analytics becomes a subject, i.e., an epistemological genus

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as distinct from the metaphysical genus.9 Arabic and late medieval thought modifies and interprets the very epistemological role of this subject in a plurality of ways, so that from the last quarter of the thirteenth century the notion of ‘subject of a science’ is frequently coupled with the notion of ‘object of a science,’ becoming variously interlaced with it. Therefore, in spite of the fact that, after the reception of Arabic philosophy among Latin authors, most academic thinkers identify the subject/object of metaphysics with being as being, nonetheless the different writers give different meanings to the syntagma ‘being as being.’ Synthetically, we might say that, along the Middle Ages, at least five issues contributed to determine the nature of metaphysics and of its subject/object: i) the epistemological role of the subject/object of science; ii) the degree of insight of metaphysics into that which it considers; iii) the role assigned to God and separate substances within metaphysics, i.e., the role assigned to the existence of God and separate substances in the establishment of metaphysics as a science distinct from physics; iv) the relationship between metaphysics, or rational theology, and “revealed” theology; v) the different conceptions that authors maintained of the notion (or rather: the notions) of being. In order to shed light on the meaning of these issues and on their connections, at present suffice it to highlight some of the questions that can guide historiographical research through medieval, renaissance, and early-modern authors and texts. First, one might wonder whether—according to the different authors—the ratio of being is already fully given from the outset of metaphysical research or whether what is known of it depends on pieces of knowledge acquired throughout this research. In particular, one might wonder whether —according to the authors— knowing the existence (or, at least, the possible existence) of spiritual beings “enriches” the notion of being and, consequently, modifies this notion. Second, one might wonder whether the different authors consider the ratio of being as identical with the ratio of being qua being, i.e., the ratio which is subject/object of metaphysics, or as different from it. More specifically, one might wonder whether—again, according to the authors—studying being as being, metaphysics studies all determinations of all beings, or rather it 9  Now and subsequently I use the word ‘epistemology’ as bearing a different meaning from ‘gnosiology.’ Accordingly, here ‘epistemology’ means ‘theory of scientific knowledge’ and ‘epistemological’ means ‘concerning a theory of scientific knowledge.’

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deals only with some of them; and, in the latter case, one might wonder which determinations it deals with, and why it deals with them and not with others.

II.2 The positions of Thomas, Scotus, Buridan, & Suárez Not even a brief review of the various positions of the Medieval and Renaissance authors can be presented here. For the purposes of the present essay, however, it will suffice to summarise some theses provided by the authors who most influenced our seventeenth-century Scotist: Thomas Aquinas and the Thomistic tradition, John Duns Scotus, the nominalist tradition (and especially John Buridan), and Francisco Suárez. As far as I can understand Aquinas’s position, it seems to me that he does not consider ens commune, taken as the subject of metaphysics, as conceptually identical with transcendental being. For him, transcendental being includes all its inferiors; by contrast, common being includes some inferiors of being (general rationes; rationes of immaterial substances as far as the latter are taken as principles of being), but not all of them (it does not include the particular rationes of material beings and the rationes of immaterial substances that are different from those characterizing these substances when the latter are taken as principles of being). Thus, in Aquinas’s view, transcendental being is an ontological/metaphysical notion; common being is an epistemological notion. In reality, they are identical, but before the mind they are not completely identical. Nevertheless, the fact that in reality they are identical allows Thomas to maintain that God is both cause of the subject of metaphysics and part of it. In fact, the reason for this latter thesis appears to be the following. According to Thomas, on the one hand, transcendental being is common both to material substances and to spiritual substances and, on the other, it is in a way posterior to the latter substances, since it depends on them (or, at least, it depends on God); but the ens commune, i.e., the subject of metaphysics, as far as it is considered as it is in reality, is identical with transcendental being; thus, common being too is in a way both common to material and spiritual substances and posterior to spiritual substances.10 10  About Thomas’s position, let me refer to Forlivesi, “Approaching,” in particular 23-28.

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Thomas Aquinas’s proposal concerning the nature of metaphysics and of the subiectum of this science aroused several problematic issues among his interpreters. One of these problems concerns the nature of the object of any science. Aquinas holds that the proper object of a science is what is knowable (scibile), that the knowable is like a genus distinguished by its rationes formales and that the unity of a science requires the unity in the genus of the knowable. These rationes formales are constituted by the principles by virtue of which a thing is known, i.e., by the different ways of knowing and defining. Considering all this, one may ask what founds the diversity of these ways. It might be the thing that is known; but it might also be the knowing intellect. This question was intensely dealt with by Aquinas’s followers.11 Scotus’s position appears even more complex. According to the mature Scotus, metaphysics is possible as a science distinct both from physics and from revealed theology thanks to a capability and a limitation. The capability is expressed by Scotus in two ways. Firstly, the ratio of being that is included in everything can be abstracted from it; in particular, this ratio can be abstracted from sensible things. Secondly, in actual fact, metaphysics is a “transcendentology.” The ratio of being somehow includes both absolute transcendentals and disjunctive transcendentals; consequently, metaphysics has to deal both with absolute transcendentals (first of all with the ratio of being) and with disjunctive transcendentals, and, moreover, in doing so it has to consider separately each of the two parts composing them. In particular, metaphysics has to deal with the proper characteristics of the two parts of the disjunctive transcendental ‘infinite being/finite being.’ The limitation posed by Scotus is twofold. First of all, in the present state, the human intellect (and therefore human metaphysics) cannot grasp the proper characteristics of the infinite being. Secondly, in any case the pair ‘immobile being/mobile being’ is not a disjunctive transcendental, so that metaphysics cannot study the proper characteristics of immobile being. Thanks to these tenets, Scotus advocates a conception of metaphysics as a unitary science dealing both with rationes generalissimae and—to some extent—with spiritual substances; nevertheless he binds together these two parts of that science in a way 11  Cf. P.P. Ruffinengo, “L’oggetto della metafisica nella scuola tomista tra tardo medioevo ed età moderna,” Medioevo 34 (2009): 141-219; V. Rodriguez, “El ser que es objeto de la metafisica segun la interpretacion tomista clasica,” Estudios filosóficos 14 (1965): 283-312 and 461-492.

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that is intrinsically complex and (due to the fact that one of his works, the De cognitione Dei, failed to circulate) not even fully known by all of his followers.12 Besides knowing the theses of Thomas, Scotus, and their respective followers, Punch was also acquainted with the doctrines of some nominalist authors on the nature of science. Actually, the Irish Franciscan mentions the positions of the nominales, simply designating them collectively. It is even possible that he had not personally read the works of these authors and that he knew their doctrines about the nature, unity, and distinction of the sciences from sources like Domingo de Soto, Diego Mas, Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza, and the Complutenses; sources that he explicitly mentions. What is clear is that he adhered to these doctrines. Secunda sententia est tot esse specie distinctas scientias, quot sunt obiecta materialia specie distincta, quae per scientias arguuntur. Haec a Soto et Masio tribuitur nominalibus, et manifeste falsa asseritur a Complutensibus […]. […] revera haec sententia mihi verissima videtur, praesertim si in qualibet conclusione sit difficultas distincta, aut si praemissae, ex quibus infertur sint diversae rationis.13

It is not possible to present here the positions of the various nominalist authors.14 However, due to the deep influence of their theses 12  About Scotus’s, position, let me refer to M. Forlivesi, “‘Quae in hac quaestione tradit Doctor videntur humanum ingenium superare:’ Scotus, Andrés, Bonet, Zerbi, and Trombetta Confronting the Nature of Metaphysics,” Quaestio 8 (2008): 219-277. 13  Ioannes Poncius, Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti cursus integer, [Logica], disp. 22: De scientia, q. ultima [i.e., 6]: De unitate et distinctione scientiarum, n. 78, Lugduni: Sumptibus Ioannis Antonii Huguetan et Marci Antonii Ravaud, 1659, 303a. 14  The reader might examine Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum ordinatio, prol., , 4 vols, (Opera philosophica et theologica, Opera theologica 1-4) (St. Bonaventure, NY: Ex officina Collegi S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1967-1979), vol. 1, eds. G. Gál and S. Brown, 205-225; Gregorius Arimnensis, Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum, In lib. 1, prol., qq. 2-4, ed. A.D. Trapp - V. Marcolino, 7 vols, (Spätmittelalter und Reformation. Texte und Untersuchungen 6-11), Berlin - New York: De Gruyter, 1979-1987, vol. 1, 57-147; Gabriel Biel, Collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum, , q. 8, eds. W. Werbeck and U. Hofman, 4 vols, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1973-1977, vol. 1, 52-56. Cf. L. Honnefelder ,“Wilhelm von Ockham.

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on Punch’s thought and in order to compare those theses with the position of the latter, in the next pages I will review some doctrines developed by a representative of that current: the French philosopher, John Buridan. By the name ‘science’—writes Buridan in his commentary on the fourth book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics15—we may designate two Die Möglichkeit der Metaphysik,” in Theo Kobusch, ed., Philosophen des Mittelalters. Eine Einführung (Darmstadt: Primus Verlag - Wissenschafliche Buchgesellschaft, 2000), 250-268; Z. Kaluza, “Les sciences et leur langage. Note sur le statut du 29 dècembre 1340 et le prétendu statu perdue contre Ockham,” in ed., L. Bianchi, Filosofia e teologia nel Trecento. Studi in ricordo di Eugenio Randi (Louvain-la-Neuve: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Études Mediévales, 1994), 197-258, in particular 243-245; E.P. Bos, “Marsilius of Inghen on the Subject of a Science,” in eds., M. Asztalso, S. Ebbesen, D. Føllesdal, S. Knuuttila, A. Inkeri Lehtinen, J.E. Murdoch, I. Ninluoto, R. Työrinoja, Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy, vol. 2 (Helsinki: [s.e.], 1990), 12-24; L. Miccoli, “L’oggetto della conoscenza scientifica nel prologo del Commento alle Sentenze di Gregorio da Rimini,” Journal Philosophique. Bulletin du Centre de Recherche Philosophique saint Thomas d’Aquin 13 (1987): 86-109; St. J. Livesey, “William of Ockham, the Subalternate Sciences, and Aristotle’s Theory of Metabasis” The British Journal for the History of Science 18 (1985): 127-145; O. Grassi, “La questione della teologia come scienza in Gregorio da Rimini,” Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica 68 (1976): 610-644; G. Leff, William of Ockham. The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse (Manchester - Totowa: Manchester University Press - Rowman and Littlefield, 1975), 320-335; A. Maurer, The Unity of a Science: St. Thomas and the Nominalists, in St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974. Commemorative Studies, 2 vols. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), vol. 2, 269-291. 15  Iohannes Buridanus, In Metaphysicen Aristotelis quaestiones argutissimae, Parisiis: Impensis I. Badii Ascensii, 1518 (repr. ed. Johannes Buridanus, Kommentar zur Aristotelischen Metaphysik, Frankfurt a.M.: Minerva, 1964). On this topic in general, cf. J. Biard, “L’organisation des sciences spéculatives selon Jean Buridan,” in Chr. Grellard, ed., Méthodes et statut des sciences à la fin du Moyen Âge (Villeneuve d’Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2004), 27-40, in particular 28-32; J.M.M.H. Thijssen and J. Zupko, eds., The Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan (Leiden-Boston-Köln: E.J. Brill, 2001); J.M.M.H. Thijssen, Johannes Buridanus over het oneindige. Een onderzoek naar zijn theorie over het oneindige in het kader van zijn wetenschaps- en natuurfilosofie, 2 vols. (Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers, 1988), vol. 1, 90-122; P. King, “Jean Buridan’s Philosophy of Science,” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 18

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things: either the cognitive habitus regarding a single proved conclusion or a complex of conclusions. If it is said of a single conclusion, this name supposes differently in the case of a quia science and in the case of a propter quid science: in the first case it supposes for the assent to the conclusion; in the second it supposes for the assent to both the principles and the conclusion. In both cases, the unity of the science (i.e., of the science that is the single conclusion) is very strong. And indeed, for each conclusion (in the case of a quia science) as well as for each complex of principles and conclusion (in the case of a propter quid science) there exists a sole assent.16 Now, the science of the single conclusion is precisely the habitus of the assent to the latter; thus, the name ‘science,’ if it is said of the single conclusion, denotes a sole habitus.17 If ‘science’ is taken according to this meaning, concludes Buridan, it is “una secundum numerum, sicut quodlibet animal est unum animal in numero.”18 The same does not apply to science understood as a certain complex of conclusions and processes. First of all, its delimitation cannot derive from things as they are outside the soul: this is due to the fact that both the physicist and the metaphysician study everything. It cannot derive from the conclusions themselves either: for the same conclusion may belong to different sciences, nor is it possible to reduce the many conclusions of a science to a sole final conclusion. Lastly, it cannot derive from the complex principles: each science possesses many of them; but they are all unprovable; thus, they are irreducible one to the other.19 This does not prevent this type of science from possessing unity. First of all, it has the unity of a universal whole that can be predicated of the single conclusions of this science as of its species. Let us (1987): 109-132; A. Ghisalberti, Giovanni Buridano dalla metafisica alla fisica (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1975), in particular 17-32. 16  Iohannes Buridanus, In Metaphysicen, IV, q. 2: Utrum scientie demonstrative habeant unitatem vel distinctionem a conclusionibus an a principijs, ad oppositum arguitur, f. 13va-b. 17  Iohannes Buridanus, In Metaphysicen, IV, q. 3: Utrum metaphysica considerans de omnibus entibus sit una scientia, modo igitur, f. 14va. 18  Iohannes Buridanus, In Metaphysicen, IV, q. 3, et tunc, f. 14vb. 19  Iohannes Buridanus, In Metaphysicen, VI, q. 2: Utrum philosophia speculativa bene dividatur in physicam, mathematicam et metaphysicam, oppositum tamen, f. 33va-b.

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consider, writes Buridan, four mathematical conclusions: a, b, c, and d. Now, the propositions ‘a is mathematics,’ ‘b is mathematics,’ etc., are true; then the term ‘mathematics’ is a real generic name; hence, it possesses the unity of a genus. This applies to the names ‘metaphysics’ and ‘physics’ too. Therefore, they also have the unity of a genus containing as its own species the names of the single conclusions—or of the inferior aggregates of conclusions—that are beneath it. Secondly, the type of science examined here has the unity of an integral whole, i.e., one formed by the totality of its species. Indeed, a mathematician—argues Buridan—is not he who knows just two or three mathematical conclusions, but he who knows many of them. The same applies to the metaphysician and the physicist. In relation to both of these two totalities, i.e., the universal one and the integral one, the French philosopher makes use of the syntagma ‘total science.’ ‘Total science’ is the name that designates the aggregate of the totality of a science’s conclusions and that is predicable of each of them as being their genus. By contrast, ‘partial science’ is the name that designates both the single conclusion and the inferior aggregates of conclusions included in the total science.20 In particular, the total metaphysics is that which is one “per aggregationem continens integraliter omnes processus et conclusiones contentas in libris metaphysicalibus.”21 If we ask what ultimately grounds the unity possessed by any total science, Buridan’s answer is that it has a unity “secundum connexionem multorum vel ordinem multorum attributorum ad unum.” Its unity is thus like that of an army, which is one with respect to one and only commander: “ab unitate ducis.”22 In particular, metaphysics is one because “accidentia […] primitus reducuntur ad substantias, quia esse habent per illas; et substantie separabiles reducuntur ad separatas, quia etiam habent esse per illas; et tandem omnes separate reducuntur ad ipsum Deum a quo etiam et propter quem habent esse.”23 20  Iohannes Buridanus, In Metaphysicen, IV, q. 3, oppositum tamen, f. 14rb. 21  Iohannes Buridanus, In Metaphysicen, IV, q. 4: Utrum metaphysice sit assignandum unum subiectum proprium adequatum, f. 14vb. 22  Iohannes Buridanus, In Metaphysicen, IV, q. 3, modo igitur, f. 14rb-va and Ibi, VI, q. 2, oppositum tamen, f. 34ra. On the Ockhamistic source of this doctrine, see Ghisalberti, Giovanni Buridano, 21, note 10. 23  Iohannes Buridanus, In Metaphysicen, IV, q. 3, et tunc, f. 14va-b.

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According to our author, this way of conceiving and grounding the unity of the aggregates of conclusions applies not only to the case of total sciences in relation to partial sciences, but also to the name ‘theoretical science’ in relation to the names ‘metaphysics,’ ‘mathematics,’ and ‘physics:’ indeed, in this case too, what comes into being is a generic name which is divided into its species.24 We may conclude that Buridan conceives of the complex of sciences as a cascade of terms ranging from the more generic (i.e., ‘science’) to the more specific (i.e., the names—so to speak—of the single proved conclusions) through a series of intermediate stages. ‘Theoretical science’ contains as its species ‘metaphysics,’ ‘mathematics,’ and ‘physics;’ ‘metaphysics’ contains as its species ‘science of accidents’ and ‘science of substances;’ the latter —if I interpret Buridan’s text correctly—contains ‘science of material substances’ and ‘science of separate substances.’25 In Buridan’s view, however, this does not mean that the steps and partitions of this sequence are arbitrary.26 One of the objections the French philosopher raises against his own thesis is that the reductio ad unum he invokes implies the unification of all sciences in a unique science capable of dealing with everything in detail.27 Buridan answers that it is not true that “reducuntur ad unum omnes; immo diverse ad diversa.” What differs in the different total sciences, explains our author, is the way in which they consider beings. The metaphysician “considerat de omnibus quomodo sunt et propter quas causas sunt, et quid sunt;” and Buridan clarifies: it is for this reason that in the eyes of the metaphysician “omnia reducuntur ad primum ens a quo omnia sunt.” The physicist considers “de omnibus entibus […] quomodo movent vel quomodo moventur.” The mathematician considers beings with respect to the way in which—as well as the reason why—they are measured. Hence, 24  Iohannes Buridanus, In Metaphysicen, VI, q. 2, ad rationes, f. 34rb. 25  Iohannes Buridanus, In Metaphysicen, IV, q. 3, modo igitur, f. 14va. 26  This is the only point on which I slightly disagree with Biard’s interpretation of the thought of Buridan. It seems to me that Biard attributes to Buridan the view according to which the unity and distinction of the theoretical sciences is worked out merely by the mind; on the contrary, I think that Buridan persistently tries to ground his semiological conception of these sciences in the extra-mental states of affairs. 27  Iohannes Buridanus, In Metaphysicen, IV, q. 3, arguitur primo quod non, f. 14ra.

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concludes Buridan, in these three cases everything is “reduced” to the ratio essendi, the ratio movendi, and the ratio mensurae, respectively.28 It seems to me that the meaning of Buridan’s doctrines we saw above may be summarised in the two following points. On the one hand, the French philosopher establishes a sharp distinction between the unity of the science of the single conclusion and the unity of a science understood as an aggregate of conclusions. The latter is not really a being, nor is it an individual or a specific unity; rather, it is a multiplicity, an aggregation, so that it can be defined as one just from a certain point of view (secundum quid). On the other hand, Buridan wishes to exclude the possibility that the unity of the conclusions composing a total science is purely accidental, or even arbitrary. A total science possesses the unity of a genus, and although this unity is merely generic, it is a real unity. Actually, also an army is really one insofar as its members can refer to a leading member. So far I have discussed what seems to be clear in the doctrines of the French thinker. However, what he writes presents at least one problematic aspect. The texts we have seen above offer two possible explanations as regards the unity of a science: the first rests on the ordo multorum ad unum; the second rests on the fact that each total science considers a particular way of being (a quomodo) of all beings. In the first case the reductio appears to relate to a quite definite being, or to a quite definite property of certain beings; in the second case the reductio relates to a ratio. No explicit mediation is placed between the two statements. This problematic aspect also appears in the context of the question of the nature of the adequate proper subject (subiectum proprium adaequatum) of any total science and, specifically, in the context of the question of the nature of the subject of metaphysics. In the fourth quaestio of the commentary on the fourth book of the Metaphysics, Buridan approaches this question asking in what sense we speak of adequate subject of a science. The term subiectum—he explains—has three meanings: that in which a substantial or an accidental form inheres; the term of the proposition of which another term is predicated; the absolute term in relation to the connotative term, i.e., to the property (passio). The first meaning does not concern science. As regards the second: in the case of the simple science (simplex), i.e., the science of the single conclusion, we may say that this 28  Iohannes Buridanus, In Metaphysicen, IV, q. 3, et tunc, f. 14vb.

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science has a sole subject in the sense that it has a sole grammatical subject. On the contrary, in the case of the total science we may not say it has a sole grammatical subject: for different conclusions have different grammatical subjects. Thus, we may ask the question whether the total science has a sole subject only if we take the term ‘subject’ in the third of the aforementioned meanings.29 Buridan answers by posing two conclusiones. First of all, he maintains that neither in total metaphysics nor in any other total science does there exist a unique subject of which all the properties (passiones) considered in that science are demonstrated.30 Secondly, he explains in what consists the attribution to a unique subject: in total metaphysics—and generally in every science that is one due to aggregation— there is a proper and adequate subject in the sense that each thing considered by that science can be referred to that subject (i.e., to the subject that is the proper and adequate one) “vel sicut pars eius, vel sicut principium, vel sicut passio eius, aut passio alicuius partis eius, vel est passio passionis, aut quia est contrarium vel oppositum illi subiecto aut alicui parti eius vel passioni, et sic de aliis diversis attributionibus.” Proof of this, states Buridan, is that otherwise there would be no reason to claim that the different conclusions of that science belong to that science and not to another.31 We may conclude that in these pages our author identifies the subiectum proprium adaequatum of a total science with the primum in respect to which the terms of the conclusions of a total science are ordered. Nevertheless, the thesis he proposes in the next quaestio (like that already proposed in some places of the third quaestio) appears quite different from the one we have just seen. At the beginning of this quaestio—the fifth of the commentary on the fourth book—he writes that all that the metaphysician considers is referred (reducitur) to God, but a few lines below he writes that the metaphysician refers (reducit) beings to the ratio essendi. The point is, he explains, that the proper and adequate subject (subiectum proprium et adaequatum) of 29  Iohannes Buridanus, In Metaphysicen, IV, q. 4, oppositum tamen habetur, f. 15ra-b. 30  Iohannes Buridanus, In Metaphysicen, IV, q. 4, et tunc ponuntur duae conclusiones, prima, f. 15rb. 31  Iohannes Buridanus, In Metaphysicen, IV, q. 4, et tunc ponuntur duae conclusiones, secunda, f. 15rb.

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metaphysics is being, or rather, the term ‘being.’ Buridan argues as follows: the adequate and proper subject of a science is the one satisfying the condition of being the most generic term among those which do not exceed—in their extension—what that science deals with; but the term ‘being’ satisfies precisely that condition; ergo.32 No explicit mediation is interposed between the three statements; no elucidation is provided about the relations that should connect God, the term ‘being’ and the ratio essendi. On the grounds of what is written in the third quaestio, I would put forward the hypothesis that Buridan subordinates the reductio to a specific primum to a previous delimitation of the field taken into consideration by a science; a delimitation which, on its turn, is based on taking into consideration some characteristics of beings and not some others. In the case of metaphysics, the examined characteristic of beings is precisely the fact that they are beings. I would equally hypothesize that our author conceived of the ratio essendi as the capacity—proper to all that is considered by metaphysics—of connoting the first being. In sum, we could say that Buridan introduces a thesis about the unity of a science that pivots on a “term/target;” this term is at least obliquely recalled by the mind every time it considers something in the context of a specific science. Actually, this thesis can be understood as a nominalist reinterpretation of the doctrine grounding the unity of science on the fact that all particular objects a science considers include a common ratio; a reinterpretation by virtue of which the ratio at issue is no longer conceived of as a property of these objects (no matter whether they are considered a parte rei or a parte scibilis), but as a capacity they all have of connoting a certain being (the first being, in the case of metaphysics).33 The historical importance of Buridan’s doctrines lies at least in the fact that they focus on some aspects of the matter that were neglected by authors living between the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries. The French philosopher does not approach the problem of the nature of a science starting from the existence of its subject; rather, he develops his speculation relying on the existence of the science itself. He considers a science as something drawing our attention in the form of a complex of propositions: “in ista questione intenditur de metaphysica 32  Iohannes Buridanus, In Metaphysicen, IV, q. 5: Utrum metaphysice proprium subiectum sit ens, oppositum videtur, f. 16ra. 33  It seems to me that this view is shared also by Marsilius of Inghen: cf. Bos, “Marsilius of Inghen.”

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que est una per aggregationem continens integraliter omnes processus et conclusiones contentas in libris metaphysicalibus.”34 The immediate and lasting effect of this outlook on the problem—as well as its primary vehicle for diffusion—is represented by the names designating the different “types” of science: totalis, partialis, simplex. Let us finally turn our attention to the Disputationes metaphysicae of Francisco Suárez. At least two features of this work make it historically significant. First, its structure: not a commentary, as usual previously, but a systematic treatise.35 Second, the concept of metaphysics which is advocated in it: not an instantiation of a conception of metaphysics as ontology, but a firm rejection to such a view. Against any conception of metaphysics as “pure ontology,” Suárez constantly and intentionally tried to develop a concept of metaphysics as a unified science consisting of two parts: a science of the supreme rationes and a science of spiritual substances. His “anti-ontological” conception of metaphysics is composed of two fundamental theses and two complementary ones. The first fundamental thesis: as concerns the depth of the investigation conducted by metaphysics into spiritual substances and material substances, this science proceeds asymmetrically; i.e., the degree of analyticity by which metaphysics studies the spiritual being is, at least to some extent, greater than the degree of analyticity by which this science studies the material being. This thesis is connected to the following one: metaphysics is not a science concerned only with transcendental rationes; in fact, it provides a knowledge deeper than that constituted by the attribution of transcendental rationes to a certain number of subjects. The second fundamental thesis: comprehending the subject of metaphysics involves 34  Iohannes Buridanus, In Metaphysicen, IV, q. 4, f. 14vb. 35  About this aspect of Suárez’s work, let me refer to M. Forlivesi, “A Man, an Age, a Book,” in idem, ed., “Rem in seipsa cernere.” Saggi sul pensiero filosofico di Bartolomeo Mastri (1602-1673 ) (Padova: Il Poligrafo, 2006), 23144, in particular 78-83, and idem, “Francisco Suárez and the ‘rationes studiorum’ of the Society of Jesus,” in ed., M. Sgarbi, Francisco Suárez and His Heritage (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 2010), 75-88. The reader may notice that I do not mean the term ‘systematic’ in the sense of a work in which the whole field it deals with is deduced from a handful of primary principles. What I mean is a work in which the disposition of the arguments tackled in it is justified not by the order of the themes presented in an earlier text, but by the will of its author to reveal to the reader the nature of the objects examined in it and of the ties that connect them.

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the acknowledgement of the existence of spiritual beings. This thesis is connected to the following one: metaphysics, to some extent, demonstrates the existence of its object. To this, it can be added that, in Suárez’s view, the object of metaphysics—just like the object of any science—has the role of summarizing and expressing the relationships and binding links that found the parts constituting it. Suárez expressed this thesis by writing that the adequate object of metaphysics is being as real being: not a pure conceptual content, nor the transcendental being taken without qualifications, but the transcendental being taken in its condition of being abstracted from matter secundum esse et considerationem and, therefore, taken as including some inferiors and not some others.36

III. The Doctrine of John Punch Punch’s doctrine about the nature and the object of metaphysics is mainly expounded, from partly different perspectives, in two places of his Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti cursus integer: , disp. 22: De scientia, in particular q. ultima [i.e., 6]: De unitate et distinctione scientiarum, and Tractatus in metaphysicam, disp. 1: Proœmialis in Metaphysicam.37

36  About Suárez’s position on the nature of metaphysics, let me refer to M. Forlivesi, “In Search of the Roots of Suárez’s Conception of Metaphysics: Aquinas, Bonino, Nédellec, Orvaux, Trombetta,” in ed., L. Novák, Disputationes metaphysicae in Their Systematic and Historical Context (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming); M. Forlivesi, “Impure Ontology. The Nature of Metaphysics and Its Object in Francisco Suárez’s Texts,” Quaestio 5 (2005): 559-586; idem, “Ontologia impura. La natura della metafisica secondo Francisco Suárez,” [http:// web.tiscali.it/ marcoforlivesi/ mf2004oi.pdf ], 2004 (previous printed edition in Francisco Suárez. “Der ist der Mann:” Homenaje al prof. Salvador Castellote [Valencia: Facultad de Teología ‘San Vicente Ferrer,’ 2004], 161-207). 37  Due to the accessibility of the text, I use the first reprint of the second edition of this work: Ioannes Poncius, Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti cursus integer, Lugduni: Sumptibus Ioannis Antonii Huguetan et Marci Antonii Ravaud, 1659. The two disputationes appear respectively on 287a-306b and 875a-879a of the volume. I shall abbreviate the title of the work as ‘Poncius, Phil.,’ the (Punch gives no explicit title to this section of his work) as ‘Log.’, and the Tractatus in metaphysicam as ‘Met.’

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III.1 The nature of science and the division of the theoretical sciences In Log, disp. 22, q. 2, Punch distinguishes between two senses of ‘science.’ Taken in a strict sense, science is knowledge of things achieved through the knowledge of their causes; taken in a broad sense, it is a discursive, certain, and evident knowledge, through which a specific proposition becomes known thanks to the connection (no matter of what kind) between the truth of this proposition and the truth of other propositions. Now, Punch informs us that he will ordinarily speak of science taken in the broad sense.38 Once this is clarified, in q. 6 our author introduces two pairs of types of science: the pair ‘total (or integral) science/partial science’ and the pair ‘actual science/habitual science.’ The total science is that which concerns a plurality of conclusions and medium terms; the partial science is that which concerns only a specific conclusion, in addition to the medium terms and the principles this conclusion depends upon.39 The actual science is the science taken as act—or as an assemblage of acts—of knowledge; the habitual science is the science taken as habitus, or as an assemblage of habitus.40 Regarding these two pairs of types of science, Punch raises and approaches some groups of problems. It seems to me that the most significant among them are the following ones, which, moreover, are closely related. As regards the total actual sciences, we might wonder why the partial sciences composing the total ones form the latter rather than a single absolutely total science, i.e., one science comprising all scientific knowledge.41 Further, we might wonder why the partial actual sciences 38 Poncius, Phil., Log, disp. 22, q. 2: De obiecto scientiae, n. 10, p. 291a. 39 Poncius, Phil., Log., disp. 22, q. 6 [nn.], n. 76, 302b. Strictly speaking, here Punch does not explicitely and clearly define the nature of the partial science. What I have written above expresses my personal interpretation of this author’s argumentation as a whole. 40 Poncius, Phil., Log., disp. 22, q. 6 [nn.], n. 76, 302b. In this case too the reader should consider that in the examined pages Punch formulates no explicit definitions of these two types of science. 41 Poncius, Phil., Log., disp. 22, q. 6 [nn.], n. 76, 302b. See also ibid., n. 95, 306a.

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composing the different total actual sciences have to be gathered into the latter rather than into other clusters of a different kind.42 As regards the total habitual sciences, first of all two hypotheses about their nature can be formulated. We might think that they are simple qualities, or that they are aggregates of partial habitual sciences. Assuming the first hypothesis, we might wonder whether the partial sciences merging (conflare) into the total science differ from each other by species.43 Assuming the second hypothesis, we might wonder what is the reason why the partial sciences composing a science form that science rather than a single all-embracing total science. […] cur plures habitus metaphysici v.g. faciant unam scientiam totalem potius, quam omnes habitus scientifici, tam metaphysici et mathematici faciant unam scientiam totalem aggregatam ex omnibus.44

Furthermore, we might wonder why the partial habitual sciences composing the different total habitual sciences give rise to the latter rather than to other clusters of a different kind. […] cur plures scientiae distinctae rationis dicantur integrare unicam scientiam totalem, v.g. metaphysicam, potius quam aliae scientiae.45

Punch’s answer to the problems seen above is structured into three points. First, he establishes a strict correspondence between the total actual science and the total habitual science. This enables him to discuss many difficulties relative to these two types of science jointly and to address most aspects of the question concerning the relationship between partial sciences and total sciences without introducing any other specifications. Second, he clarifies a few points concerning the nature of the total sciences. 42 Poncius, Phil., Log., disp. 22, q. 6 [nn.], n. 78, 303a. Actually, Punch here speaks of total science in general, namely, without distinctions between actual science and habitual science. 43 Poncius, Phil., Log., disp. 22, q. 6 [n.n.], n. 76, 302b-303a. 44 Poncius, Phil., Log., disp. 22, q. 6 [n.n.], n. 76, 302b-303a. See also ibid., n. 95, 306a. 45 Poncius, Phil., Log., disp. 22, q. 6 [n.n.], n. 78, 303a. It is the same text I refer to in note 42.

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According to our author, nothing prevents the partial sciences either from being gathered into a single cluster embracing them all, or from being gathered into several distinct clusters. In the first case, the partial sciences would produce a single total science comprising all partial sciences;46 in the second case, they would produce several total sciences.47 Punch does not give grounds for these statements. On the contrary, according to the Irish Franciscan, it is impossible that in the intellect there exists one simple habitus tending toward all the knowables, individually taken, and making their knowledge easier. He also denies that in the intellect there may exist several simple habitus, each concerning one specific cluster of knowables and making the knowledge of the knowables comprised in that cluster easier. In this case, Punch gives reasons for his own statements. It seems to me that the argument he proposes can be expressed in the following way. If there existed a single absolutely total habitus (or at least one habitus for each distinct integral science, i.e., ut ita dicam, for each subtotal science), then the knowledge of any knowable (or at least of any knowable comprised in a certain integral science) should be equally easy or difficult to us; it is however clear that we know some knowables easily, while some others with difficulty; therefore, this type of habitus does not exist.48 As the third stage of his argumentative process, Punch addresses the only point still left unsettled: the reason why some aggregates of partial sciences exist while others do not. On this issue our author proceeds in two phases: first, he criticizes the theory generally proposed by the Thomists, and more specifically by the Complutenses; subsequently, he develops and argues for his thesis. According to the Complutenses, writes Punch, the single cognitions composing a certain total science (and consequently the habitus related to these cognitions) are unified by a sole definite ratio sub qua.49 This 46 Poncius, Phil., Log., disp. 22, q. 6 [n.n.], n. 77, 303a; ibid., n. 96, 306a. Poncius, Phil., Met., disp. 1, q. 2, n. 18 [w.n. 17], 878b-879a. 47 Poncius, Phil., Log., disp. 22, q. 6 [nn.], n. 78, 303a; ibid., n. 96, 306a-b. 48 Poncius, Phil., Log., disp. 22, q. 6 [nn.], n. 77, 303a; ibid., n. 78, 303b; ibid., n. 88, 305a. 49 Poncius, Phil., Log., disp. 22, q. 6 [nn.], n. 80, 303b: “ quod in obiecto formali scientiae, hoc est in illo obiecto, quod per se attingitur a scientia, duae rationes sunt considerandae, ratio nimirum formalis quae, quae vocatur obiectum formale quod, et ratio formalis sub

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ratio sub qua is different for each single total science and is such as to provide the single cognitions comprised in that total science with the identity of a species. Now, Punch holds that the Complutenses’ doctrine contains two false statements: the first asserts that the ratio sub qua is the only specifying principle of the partial sciences composing a total science; the second, ensuing from the first, asserts that these partial sciences are all of the same species. The point is, argues our author, that the rationes quae of the conclusions that a total science deals with—or the medium terms of the single argumentations—as well as the rationes sub quibus, are partial specifying principles of the single partial sciences composing the total sciences. This is because, argues Punch, the species to which each knowable object belongs—also in the case it is taken precisely as knowable—depends also on the ratio quae characterizing it.50 But the qua, quae vocatur obiectum formale quo: ex his autem scientia specificatur a ratione formali sub qua, et non a ratione formali quae v.g. visus versatur circa colorem, et tendit in colorem, unde ratio caloris [sic; lege ‘coloris’] est ratio formalis quae; lux vero, aut idem modus immutandi potentiam erit ratio formalis sub qua, a qua specificatur visus” (his italics). 50  In Poncius, Phil., Log., disp. 22, q. 6 [nn.], nn. 83-84, 304a-b, ibid., n. 90, 305a-b and Poncius, Phil., Met., disp. 1, q. 2, n. 18 [w.n. 17], 879a, our author gives a few examples of conclusions belonging to physics and conclusions belonging to metaphysics that cannot belong to respective unique species. As regards the objects of metaphysics, in Poncius, Phil., Log., disp. 22, q. 6 [nn.], n. 90, 305a-b, he focuses the attention on the fact that God and the angel, or God and any creature, sharply differ both in the degree of abstraction from potentiality and in the degree of abstraction from matter. If the degree of abstraction from matter were sufficient ground to distinguish sciences belonging to different species, then God and any creature should belong to specifically different sciences. Moreover, the degree of abstraction from potentiality should also be, and even for better reasons, a sufficient ground to distinguish sciences belonging to different species. Hence, God and the angel, or God and any creature, should be, within metaphysics, objects of sciences belonging to different species. But this, concludes Punch, conflicts with the view held by the Thomists, according to which the partial sciences composing metaphysics belong to the same species. Well, in front of this argument, we should remember that also Suárez had acknowledged that a difference exists—as to the type of abstraction from matter—between God, angels and rationes generalissime, and yet had maintained that the connexio of these objects and the relative

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rationes quae of these objects are specifically different. Hence, the single partial sciences composing the total sciences do not belong to the same species.51 All this, clarifies Punch, does not imply that a number of partial sciences cannot combine into a total science, nor that this can happen without a reason. It is a fact, writes our author, that there are partial sciences having among them a cohesion (convenientia, similitudo) greater than what they have with other sciences; hence, these sciences can be gathered and separated into several classes (classis), which may be called integral sciences (scientia integralis). Now, both the unity of these classes and the distinction of each class from the others can be derived from the ratio in which every object belonging to a specific class can be gathered. In other words, the belonging of a partial science to a specific class, i.e., to a certain total science, is determined by the fact that it has a reference or it has no reference (ordo, connexio) to that ratio to which all conclusions belonging to that total science refer. This ratio, concludes Punch, can also be defined ratio formalis sub qua, with the warning that it does not supply the objects or conclusions that may be referred to it with the identity of a species.52 The solution seen above is applied by the Irish Franciscan to the question of the nature, unity, distinction, and number of the theoretical sciences as well. In Punch’s view, each of the three canonical theoretical sciences has a precise justification. The partial sciences that compose metaphysics sciences caused the latter to belong all to the same species (cf. Franciscus Suarez, Disputationes metaphysicae, disp. 1, sect. 3, nn. 2, 8 and 10-11). Therefore, the above seen criticism elaborated by Punch hits Suárez’s position too. Let us just observe that the Irish Observant never approaches, at least directly, that part of Suárez’s argument that rests on the connexio, perhaps because he thinks that this connexio is sufficient at most to found an identity of a generic type. 51 Poncius, Phil., Log., disp. 22, q. 6 [n.n.], nn. 83-91, 304a-305b. See also Poncius, Phil., Met., disp. 1, q. 2, n. 18 [w.n. 17], 879a. Punch raises several arguments against the Thomistic thesis. The above presented line of reasoning is what I perceive as the framework common to all arguments formulated by the Irish thinker. 52 Poncius, Phil., Log., disp. 22, q. 6 [nn.], n. 96, 306a-b.

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are related by the fact that they consider something that is not corporeal; which, continues our author, accounts for the fact that metaphysics is not only concerned with being, but also with some—but solely some—of its species.53 The partial sciences that compose physics are related by the fact that they consider something having a reference to bodies.54 The partial sciences that compose mathematics are related by the fact that they consider a plurality of things not with respect to the intrinsic nature of these things, but with respect to the proportion the latter have to each other or to other things.55 Punch adds to these statements, however, a few specifications which make perfectly clear that—against the Thomists—not only does he deny that the ratio sub qua is a principle sufficient to provide a unity of species to all the partial sciences of an integral science, but he also denies that the criterion of the three degrees of abstraction from matter is a reason enough to render the distinction among the three theoretical sciences the only admissible one. First of all, he explicitly states that there is no impediment to the fact that the partial sciences may be gathered so as to form classes that are different from the three canonical classes. Quod si aliquis vellet alio modo dividere scientias in alias et alias classes, non esset ipsi difficile: posset enim in unicam classem ponere scientias de naturis substantiarum spiritualium, in aliam, scientias de substantiis corporalibus cœelestibus, in aliam, eas quae essent de substantiis sublunaribus; in aliam, scientias, quae de accidentibus spiritualibus; in aliam, quae de corporalibus, in aliam, quae de numero, in aliam denique quae essent de proportionibus, etc. nec in hoc est aliqua realis difficultas.56

In particular, in Met., disp. 1, our author clarifies that the division of the theoretical (or real) science into metaphysics, physics, and 53 Poncius, Phil., Log., disp. 22, q. 6 [nn.], n. 97, 306b. 54 Poncius, Phil., Log., disp. 22, q. 6 [nn.], n. 98, 306b. 55 Poncius, Phil., Log., disp. 22, q. 6 [nn.], n. 98, 306b. 56 Poncius, Phil., Log., disp. 22, q. 6 [nn.], n. 99, 306b. This thesis is repeated in Poncius, Phil., Met., disp. 1, q. 2, n. 18 [w.n. 17], 879a: “quemadmodum ens finitum bene dividitur in decem praedicamenta, quamvis posset dividi in plura vel pauciora etiam cum fundamento in re, ita bene dividi potest scientia totalis ut sic in illas tres scientias [i.e., metaphysics, physics and mathematics]; quantumvis posset dividi in plura vel pauciora membra.”

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mathematics is appropriate when speaking about the science that comprises the accidental being per accidens and concerns objects considered according to their proper natures. But if we wished to develop a science dealing with accidental being per se, or concerning objects considered in relation to other objects, then it would be necessary to introduce other theoretical sciences, so that the division here at issue would no longer be adequate. per se consideratio ipsius [i.e., of accidental being] ad illam scientiam, a qua potest per se cognosci. Et si quaeras, quaenam illa sit. Respondeo vocari posse scientiam de ente per accidens (si de illo datur scientia, ut supponit obiectio) cui scientiae nondum est impositum nomen aliquod unum particulare, quia nemo adhuc tractavit de illo ente, nisi, in tractationibus de aliis obiectis. Dices, ergo scientia realis non est adequate divisa in metaphysicam, physicam, et mathematicam. Respondeo, distinguendo sequaelam, quantum ad hoc quod possit dari aliqua cognitio realis etiam de obiecto reali, quae per se non spectet ad illas, concedo ita ut nulla sit scientia realis, quae vel per se, vel per accidens non spectet ad illas nego antecedens.57 […] quando dividitur scientia speculativa ut sic in tria illa membra adaequate, hoc debet intelligi de scientia quae habetur de obiectis secundum se consideratis, et naturas suas intrinsecas, non vero de scientia quae habetur de obiecto aliquo ut comparato ad aliud obiectum, secundum quod scilicet distinguitur ab alio obiecto, aut

57 Poncius, Phil., Met., disp. 1, q. 1, n. 7 [nn.], 876b. About the distinction between per se treatment and per accidens treatment, see Poncius, Phil., Met., disp. 1, q. 1, nn. 4-5, 876a. Here the author specifies that each total science deals with several things whose analysis, if those things were taken as for themselves, would not belong to that science. This happens because, in order to make the treatment clearer, it may be useful that a certain science also accounts for some elements belonging to another science. Nevertheless, warns Punch, one thing is what a total science deals with per se, another thing is what it deals with per accidens. Cf. also ibid., n. 7 [nn.], 876b, where it is written that any object falls properly within the competence of the total science that considers it per se. As regards the possibility of developing a scientific knowledge of accidental being (ens per accidens), and the fact that such knowledge already exists, cf. Poncius, Phil., Log., disp. 22, q. 2, n. 14, 291b.

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est maioris vel minoris perfectionis quam illud: quod valde advertendum est.58

Furthermore, Punch denies that mathematics abstracts from sensible matter but not from intelligible matter, i.e., (this is how he understands intelligible matter) from the first matter. It is true that quantity is actually joined to the first matter, explains our author, but it is equally true that mathematics deals with quantity apart from the fact that quantity is joined to the first matter. In addition, he continues, numbers hold also in the case of angels; therefore, numbers are independent from intelligible matter; it follows that what mathematics (or at least arithmetic) considers is independent from the first matter too.59 Finally, the Irish Franciscan maintains that, strictly speaking, the types of abstraction from matter are more than three. Color, for example, insofar as it determines the vision, abstracts from singular matter as well as from intelligible matter, but not from sensible matter. It ensues, concludes our author, that if the sciences were distinguished by the degree of abstraction from matter, then we should concede the existence of a fourth theoretical science.60 A possibility, it should be noted, that he does not reject.

III.2 The Object and Extension of Metaphysics In disp. 22 De scientia, Punch does not address the question of the adequate object of a science (i.e., of a total science).61 By contrast, the first quaestio of the first disputatio of the Tractatus in metaphysicam, which is devoted to the issue Quodnam sit obiectum metaphysicae, focuses precisely on the problem of the nature of the adequate object of a science and on the relationships between that object and all the other objects that science deals with. 58 Poncius, Phil., Met., disp. 1, q. 2, n. 16, 878b. 59 Poncius, Phil., Log., disp. 22, q. 6 [nn.], n. 93, 305b-306a. 60 Poncius, Phil., Log., disp. 22, q. 6 [nn.], n. 94, 306a. 61  In fact, in that text he merely introduces a distinction between the types of objects of a particular science: complex and non-complex. Complex object, he writes, is the objective proposition (propositio obiectiva) that becomes known thanks to a particular science; non-complex object is the subject of that proposition (Poncius, Phil., Log., disp. 22, q. 2, n. 10, 291a). The author of this doctrine is Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, but Punch does not name him.

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Punch explains that the adequate (or most common) object of a total science is either that object which is univocally common to all things considered by that science, or an object which is such that any other thing considered by that science can be referred to it in one of the following ways: as essential part of the adequate object, as integral part of it, as property of it, as accident of it, as genus of it, as species of it, as individual of it, as cause of it (according to any of the different types of causes), as property or accident of one of its species.62 Our author does not justify his thesis; he merely invokes the “communi authorum sensu, qui assignant aliquod unum pro obiecto adaequato, aut communissimo scientiae totalis.”63 To some extent, however, he infers from this the thesis according to which the adequate object of a science must be identified—among the objects a science deals with—with a more common object rather than with a lesser common object. This is especially true, clarifies Punch, if the more common object includes something which cannot be related to any of the lesser common objects that science deals with.64 In order to clarify what is the adequate object of metaphysics, the Irish Observant at first establishes what it is not. First of all, being as comprising the real being and the being of reason is not the adequate object of metaphysics. On the one hand, observes Punch, there is no concept of being embracing both the real being and the being of reason, about which there can exist a science that is distinct from those sciences concerning the real being and the being of reason and that is additional in relation to these sciences. On the other hand, the being of reason cannot be referred to the real being in any of the ways according to which something considered by a specific science can refer to the adequate object of that science; and conversely neither.65 Secondly, being as comprising per se being and per accidens being is not the adequate object of metaphysics either. On the one hand, observes Punch, there is no concept of being abstractable by both, of which something can be known per se. On the other hand, per accidens 62 Poncius, Phil., Met., disp. 1, q. 1, n. 2, 875b; ibid., n. 5, 876a; ibid., n. 7 [nn.], 876b. 63 Poncius, Phil., Met., disp. 1, q. 1, n. 2, 875b. 64 Poncius, Phil., Met., disp. 1, q. 1, n. 8, 876b. 65 Poncius, Phil., Met., disp. 1, q. 1, n. 2, 875b.

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being cannot be referred to per se being in any of the ways according to which something considered by a specific science can refer to the adequate object of that science; and conversely neither.66 Further, neither God, nor the immaterial substance as comprising only God and the angels, nor immaterial substance as comprising every immaterial substance, nor is finite being (namely, being as comprising the ten predicaments) the adequate object of metaphysics. God is not because—writes our author—the created substance cannot be related to him as a part of him, nor as a property of him, nor as an accident of him.67 Substance is not because of the following reason. Accidents can be univocally gathered in the ratio entis together with the substance, namely, they can be regarded as beings in themselves; now, if the substance were the adequate object of metaphysics, then metaphysics would deal with the accidents only insofar as they are accidents of the substance; hence, there would be an aspect of accidents that no science would consider.68 Finally, finite being is not the adequate object of metaphysics because, if it were, God might be studied within metaphysics only insofar as he can be related to finite being; but God cannot be related to finite being; the science dealing with him must therefore have as its object real being in its full extent.69 Once Punch has excluded all the hypotheses seen above, he asserts that the adequate object of metaphysics is being as such (ens ut sic) qua comprising the immaterial real beings insofar as they can be naturally known. This is because, writes our author, among the objects considered by metaphysics, being is the most common object and it contains things that cannot be related to any other lesser common object, among those metaphysics deals with.70 The thesis presented above contains at least two elements that, according to Punch himself, need to be elucidated and justified. 66 Poncius, Phil., Met., disp. 1, q. 1, n. 7 [nn.], 876b. 67 Poncius, Phil., Met., disp. 1, q. 1, n. 9, 876b. 68 Poncius, Phil., Met., disp. 1, q. 1, n. 9, 876b-877a. 69  This is how I interpret the following brief passage in Poncius, Phil., Met., disp. 1, q. 1, n. 9, 877a: “Deus non potest reduci ad ens finitum in ratione obiecti quod solum considerari deberet gratia entis finiti in hac scientia.” 70 Poncius, Phil., Met., disp. 1, q. 1, n. 8, 876b.

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The first element consists in the fact that this thesis does not consider the existence of a distinction between a material object and a formal object of metaphysics. Our author justifies this aspect of his view in the following way. The distinction between a formal object and a material object of a science, he writes, is justified only if the two following conditions take place: i) more than one formality (formalitas) is present in the object; ii) that science deals solely with one among these formalities. Now, it is not possible to distinguish—within being— between a formal ratio and a material ratio; hence, what metaphysics studies of being belongs to the latter as for all that the latter is (secundum rationem entis). It follows that it is not possible to distinguish between a formal object and a material object of metaphysics.71 The second element of Punch’s thesis needing further clarification, as remarked by the author himself, constitutes the theme of the whole second quaestio of Met., disp. 1: Utrum metaphysica versetur circa rerum omnium quidditates in particulari. The Irish Franciscan answers the question that gives the title to this quaestio in two phases. First of all, he writes, metaphysics deals with all beings—according to all their predicates, both generic and specific—which do not include the first matter. Evidence for this is the fact that no other science deals with these predicates; but there must be a science that deals with them; dealing with them is therefore the task of metaphysics. Secondly, metaphysics does not deal per se with any being according to any predicate that includes the matter or a reference to the matter. Evidence for this is the fact that, assuming that metaphysics is distinct from physics and mathematics, then it does not, and must not, deal with these predicates.72 Punch gives no further justification of this aspect of his view. Yet, he puts forth an interesting objection: assuming that being is the adequate object of metaphysics, it follows that this science must be concerned with all, and not merely some, species of being, or at least that it cannot be concerned with one species more than with another.73 71 Poncius, Phil., Met., disp. 1, q. 1, n. 12, 877a-b. 72 Poncius, Phil., Met., disp. 1, q. 2, n. 14, 877b. 73 Poncius, Phil., Met., disp. 1, q. 2, n. 17, 878b. A difficulty similar to that we have just considered appears in Poncius, Phil., Log., disp. 22, q. 6 [nn.], n. 79, 303b: “si dicatur, unicum habitum simplicem posse sufficere ad omnes conclusiones metaphysicas, quia omnia obiecta istarum conclusionum continentur sub uno obiecto adaequato, nimirum ente, ad quod illa

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The answer given by our author is laconic: this would be true if the adequate object of metaphysics were being as such, but it would be false if the adequate object of metaphysics were being as such taken both for itself and for all its species that abstract from matter. […] respondeo distinguendo sequelam: si ens ut sic secundum omnem latitudinem suam esset obiectum adaequatum eius, concedo: si ens ut sic secundum se et omnes suas species abstrahentes a materia, esset obiectum adaequatum eius, nego sequelam.74

Unless we propose emendations to the text, the only possible correct reading of this passage implies that the preposition ‘secundum’ governs the entire expression ‘se et omnes suas species abstrahentes a materia.’ This means that here Punch distinguishes between two types of ens ut sic: the first, namely, ens ut sic secundum omnem latitudinem suam, including all its own species; the second, namely, ens ut sic secundum se et omnes suas species abstrahentes a materia, including only some of the species comprised in the first type of ens. Now, our author appears to hold that the adequate object of metaphysics is not the first type of ens ut sic, but rather the second type. Nonetheless, on this issue he adopts no explicit position.

IV. A Hypothesis of Historical Interpretation: Punch’s Doctrine as a Loosened Form of Nominalism Punch’s doctrine about the nature of metaphysics and the adequate object of this science certainly contains elements that are present in Scotus’s position too: among them, the attribution to physics of a merely generic unity.75 Nevertheless, it clearly appears that the view omnia attribuuntur, maned adhuc difficultas, cur non possit idem habitus extendere se ad conclusiones physicas, quandoquidem corpus naturale, quod est obiectum adaequatum physicae, contineatur sub ente, tanquam species eius, et possit consequenter ad ipsum attribui non minus quam substantiae spirituales, quae continentur sub ipso, attribuuntur ipsi.” In this case, however, Punch raises the difficulty in order to contest a thesis he opposes: the thesis according to which the conclusions of metaphysics can be the object of a unique habitus. 74 Poncius, Phil., Met., disp. 1, q. 2, n. 17, 878b. 75  But cf. also the way according to which Scotus considers science in Joannes Duns Scotus, Quaest. super Met., I, q. 1, §[32], n. 103.

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of the nominalists is what mainly permeates the thought of our Franciscan author. Actually, the relation theorised by Punch between the contents of single cognitions and their organisation by the mind seems looser than that theorised, for instance, by Buridan. According to the French philosopher, the unity of metaphysics is based on the causal relation connecting the different types of substances. In the theory put forward by the Irish Observant in Log., disp. 22, q. 6 and in Met., disp. 1, q. 1, the unity of metaphysics is based a parte conoscibilis simply on the fact that various objects are referred to being according to one of the many admissible modalities. Moreover, the very fundamentum in re of the various sciences he mentions appears to play the role of a mere conditio sine qua non. Indeed, the real foundation of the unity of the various sciences appears to lie in the decision of establishing and organising the sciences in one way and not in another. To summarise: according to Punch’s perspective, the contribution given by reality (or by mental contents) to the organisation of our cognitions only consists in offering some hints; choosing which suggestions are to be followed and which are to be ignored is entirely a concern of the mind. Even looser appears the unity of metaphysics in the pages of Met., disp. 1, q. 2. Here, as we saw, Punch searches for the reason of the fact that metaphysics deals not only with being, but also with all its immaterial species (and solely with these species of it). Well, the only reason for this fact actually put forward by our author consists in the decision of dealing with being and with its immaterial species. No doubt that also in this case this decision is only justified insofar as reality allows it, and yet Punch does not indicate in which way reality allows it. Our author’s entire argumentation is made of a game of references from the level of etymology (i.e., of the decision made by the community of scholars and crystallized in the name ‘metaphysics’) to the level of the decision itself, and conversely: metaphysics, i.e., the science named ‘trans-physics’ deals with being in general and with spiritual beings because—and precisely because—it is a trans-physics; and it is a trans-physics because it deals with being in general and with spiritual beings. By contrast, Punch does not explain if being taken for itself is immaterial, nor if it enjoys a stronger relation with its immaterial species than with its material species. For these reasons, I think that defining Punch as a Scotist requires—at least concerning his doctrine about the nature and the

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object of metaphysics—much caution. Rather, it seems to me that his position on this topic may be qualified as a loose form of nominalist epistemology.

Chapter 5 Actions Speak Louder than Words: What Aquinas Learned from Maimonides Jennifer Hart-Weed

I

I. Introduction

n Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 2, St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) describes and rejects Rabbi Moses ben Maimon’s (1135-1204) approach to naming God, which is articulated in his work, The Guide of the Perplexed (Moreh Nevukhim). Aquinas then turns his attention to outlining and defending an alternative approach, the way of analogy. In recent years, much attention has been given to the differences between these two methods of naming God. Many of these studies imply that the methods are so different, that there is no continuity between them. I take a different view in this paper. When one focuses on the similarities between Maimonides and Aquinas, a rather different picture of the relationship between these two thinkers emerges. In this paper, I describe Maimonides’s treatment of the divine actions, and I show that divine actions play a crucial rule in Aquinas’s theory of analogy. I also explore Maimonides’s discussion of relations between God and creatures in order to highlight an important text that could have influenced Aquinas’s own account of relations. In so doing, I argue that the similarities between Aquinas and Maimonides suggest the possibility that Aquinas learned a great deal from Maimonides despite their well-documented differences.

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II. Maimonides and Aquinas: Divine Simplicity One of the key similarities between Maimonides and Aquinas is their commitment to the doctrine of divine simplicity, which denies any composition in God.1 Thus, they agree that God is not composed of substance and accidents, or of genus and differentia. In contemporary terms, one could say that God is not composed of intrinsic accidental properties.2 Given the doctrine of divine simplicity, it looks as though one could not speak about God at all. Statements such as “God is P,” in which P is an intrinsic accidental property, would be completely ruled out by divine simplicity. For example, the proposition, “Mary is good” means that some property goodness is a property of Mary. When I say “God is good” I am saying some property—goodness—is a property of God. Owing to the doctrine of simplicity, it is impossible that God have the property goodness. Rather, God is goodness. That is, God’s essence includes goodness and God is identical with his essence. Consequently, whenever a human being applies an affirmative attribute to God, she is speaking falsely, for God does not have properties in the same way that creatures have properties. This is the so-called problem of naming God or the problem of religious language and it is a problem faced by both Aquinas and Maimonides because of their commitment to divine simplicity. 1  Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), vol. 1, I.50 and St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, (New York: Benziger Bros., 1948), I, q. 3, a. 7. All English citations of the Summa will be taken from this translation. The Latin text of the Summa theologiae will be cited, except where indicated, from Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia (Roma: Editio Leoninus Manualis, 1882). 2  Intrinsic properties are distinguished from Cambridge properties such that the acquisition or loss of a Cambridge property by a subject does not entail a change in that subject, while the acquisition or loss of an intrinsic property by a subject entails a change in that subject. Moreover, accidental properties are distinguished from essential properties such that if a subject were to acquire or lose an accidental property, then the subject would still be a member of its species.

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III. Divine Actions In this section, I outline briefly Maimonides’s approach to naming God and his focus on divine actions in that context. Maimonides begins by focusing his attention on the attributes that can be predicated of a substance.3 This five-fold division is unique to Maimonides and it includes the following attributes: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5)

Definition—e.g., the essence of a thing Part of a definition—e.g., part of the essence Quality—e.g., quality of an essence Relation Action4

Next, Maimonides addresses each of the five attributes, asking whether or not such an attribute can be said of God correctly. Since God is the first cause, Maimonides reasons that there is nothing prior to God that could cause him and through which he could be defined.5 Moreover, God cannot be subsumed under a genus or a species. Therefore, it is impossible to offer a definition or even a part of a definition of God. Consequently, one should deny these two attributes of God.6 With respect to qualities, Maimonides argues that they cannot be attributed to God because qualities inhere in a substance, thus generating a kind of composition.7 Since God is simple, he cannot be a composite of substance and quality. Therefore, one should deny this attribute of God. Maimonides rules out the attribution of relations to God on the basis of a similar argument.8 Of particular interest to him is the relation he identifies as “correlation,” which is a relation between two things that are dependent on one another, such as the relation of father to 3 Maimonides, Guide, I.52. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6  This is so because Maimonides has in mind the medieval understanding of a definition as the genus of a thing plus its differentia. 7  Guide, I.52. 8 Ibid.

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son.9 According to Maimonides, one should be able to invert the statement that holds between two relata while preserving their correlative relation.10 For example, the father is related to the son by virtue of being the son’s father, and the son is related to the father by virtue of being the father’s son. In this example, the relation is symmetrical. The relata are dependent on one another in order for the relation to hold between the two.11 Maimonides argues that God cannot be dependent in any way on a contingent being.12 If a correlation is attributed to God, then the existence of another entity would be implied.13 Thus, some property of God, the correlation, would depend upon the existence of a contingent thing. Yet, it seems problematic to think of a feature of God’s nature as somehow dependent on a contingent being, since Maimonides believes that God is a necessary being. Furthermore, correlations (relations) are accidents, and therefore ruled out on the basis of divine simplicity. So correlations are to be denied of God. As I shall make clear in a subsequent section, the fact that Maimonides rejects the applicability of this kind of relation to God marks a significant divergence from Aquinas, who argues that the relation of cause and effect between God and creatures is the foundation of the analogy between them. Rather than focusing on relations as a foundation for religious language, Maimonides shifts his attention to divine actions. Maimonides chooses to focus on the divine actions because he thinks that actions, in the sense in which he uses the term, are verbs. As Seymour Feldman comments, according to Maimonides, actions 9  Ibid. See also Harry Austryn Wolfson, “The Aristotelian Predicables and Maimonides’ Division of Attributes,” in Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion, ed. Isadore Twersky and George H. Williams (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), vol. II, 184. 10  Guide, I.52. 11  Neil A. Stubbens, “Maimonides and Aquinas,” Thomist 54.2 (1990): 229-267. Stubbens uses this example and refers the reader to Aristotle’s Metaphysics 5.15.1020b26-1021b12. 12  Seymour Feldman, “A Scholastic Misinterpretation of Maimonides’ Doctrine of Divine Attributes,” in Maimonides: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Joseph A. Buijs (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 267-283. 13  Ibid., 270.

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are “unique deeds or events, not qualities, habits or traits.”14 Since actions are verbs, they do not imply the existence of a habit or a disposition in the agent who is performing the action.15 Thus, Maimonides conceives of the attribute of action as different from the Aristotelian accident of action, which would be a property that inheres in a substance. Whereas a quality would refer to some property of God, actions refer to an event. Events do not indicate features of the agent in question, apart from the fact that the agent performed the action. Therefore, actions can be predicated of a subject without implying composition in the subject. Accordingly, actions can be predicated of God because they do not compromise his simplicity. Maimonides addresses the problem of religious language by naming God’s actions in the affirmative, and by negating those attributes that imply composition in God. The distinction that Maimonides makes between actions and the other four kinds of attributes is based on a logical distinction between so-called “binary” and “trinary” propositions.16 Binary propositions have a verb as their predicate, which may or may not be “accompanied by other words.”17 These propositions can be affirmative or negative and they do not require another element such as a copula to connect the subject with the predicate. For example, “Zayd stood,” or, “Zayd did not stand,” would both be binary propositions.18 Thus, propositions containing actions are binary propositions in which the action is the verb and the verb does not inhere in the subject.19 Trinary propositions are propositions whose predicate is a noun and they include a term or copula that connects predicate and subject, e.g., “Zayd is now standing.” The copulas indicate that the predicate inheres in the subject at a particular time. So such propositions as “Zayd is now standing,” include the predication of something added to the essence of the subject, in this case, “standing.” Harry Wolfson explains the distinction between binary and trinary propositions in the following way: 14  Ibid., 271. 15 Wolfson, “Aristotelian Predicables,” 190-191. 16  Guide, III. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Feldman, “A Scholastic Misinterpretation,” 271.

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In a [trinary] proposition [e.g., ‘Zayd is a carpenter’] … the predicate will always be a participle which, having the meaning of an adjective or nomen agentis, may imply the existence of a habit or disposition or natural power in the subject to which the action is attributed. In a [binary] proposition … however, [e.g., ‘Zayd made this’] where the predicate is a verb, the action attributed to the subject is to be taken as a pure action without any implication of habit or disposition or natural power.20

Someone might dismiss Maimonides’s claim as a linguistic sleight of hand and maintain that binary propositions are easily converted into trinary propositions, thus nullifying the distinction. Moreover, one could claim that, of course, actions imply composition in their subject. For example, in the proposition, “Zayd stood,” the fact that Zayd stands shows that Zayd has the property “the ability to stand.” So for every divine action, God will have a separate power or ability in himself. This objection occurs to Maimonides, as well, and so he addresses it in the following passage: Though an agent is one, diverse actions may proceed from him, even if he does not possess will and all the more if he acts through will. An instance of this is fire: it melts some things, makes others hard, cooks, and burns, bleaches and blackens. Thus, if some men would predicate of fire that it is that which bleaches and blackens, which burns and cooks, which makes hard and which melts, he would say the truth. Accordingly he who does not know the nature of fire thinks that there subsist in it six diverse notions … all of these actions being opposed to one another, for the meaning of any one of them is different from that of any other. However, he who knows the nature of fire, knows that it performs all these actions by virtue of one active quality, namely, heat.21

In this example, fire produces at least six different kinds of actions, bleaching, blackening, burning, cooking, etc. One might think that these six different kinds of actions require six different powers in the agent, fire. But upon closer inspection of fire, one can see that all of these actions are performed by virtue of one thing, the fire’s heat. Thus, one should not assume that a multiplicity of actions entails a 20 Wolfson, “Aristotelian Predicables,” 191. On page 190, Wolfson points out that in Arabic and Hebrew, but not in Latin, it is impossible to have a proposition of the second adjacent in the present tense. 21  Guide, I.53.

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multiplicity of powers in the agent. The fire example shows this inference to be false. Maimonides argues that an agent who acts by virtue of his or her will acts in a similar fashion. Thus, God performs many acts by virtue of his essence and not by “differing notions” out of which he is composed:22 I shall illustrate this by the example of the rational faculty subsisting in man. It is one faculty with regard to which no multiplicity is posited. Through it he acquires science and the arts … . Those very different actions, however, proceed from one simple faculty in which no multiplicity is posited. … It accordingly should not be regarded as inadmissible in reference to God … that the diverse actions proceed from one simple essence in which no multiplicity is

posited .and to which no notion is superadded.23

Owing to divine simplicity, God’s will is identical with God’s essence, just as God’s existence is identical with his essence. Following the “Zayd” example, one can infer from the divine actions that God has the power to do those actions. But by itself, this does not imply composition in God. God’s will is the seat of power to perform those actions and God’s will does not entail composition in God just as God’s existence does not entail composition in him. Similarly, diverse actions do not imply diverse notions in an agent, as was shown above by the “fire” example. Therefore, the predication of an action in itself does not imply composition in an agent. On the basis of this distinction, Maimonides argues that actions can be affirmed of God, while definition, part of a definition, quality and relation are all to be denied of him.24

IV. Divine Actions and Naming God Having established that the predication of divine actions does not compromise divine simplicity, Maimonides argues that God can be named in the affirmative by naming his actions. He then argues that accidental attributes and body parts that are predicated of God in 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid.

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the Torah and the prophets should be interpreted as attributes of action.25 For example, the term “eye” when it is applied to God in the Torah should be interpreted figuratively in order to indicate that God performs the act of apprehension. The act of apprehension does not imply composition in God, insofar as it is an attribute of action, so it can be attributed to God without compromising divine simplicity. But “eye” would be equivocal as it is applied to God and as it is applied to creatures. God does not have an “eye” since he is incorporeal and therefore lacks a visual apparatus. A similar procedure is to be followed for all of the qualities that are predicated of God in the Torah. For example, God could be called “merciful” on the basis of the fact that he performs an act that is similar to an act that is performed by a merciful human being. But God does not possess the quality, “merciful,” because God is absolutely simple. So “merciful” is predicated of God equivocally. However, human beings can apprehend a divine action, and then apply a name from that action to God.26 And since the relation of similarity is alleged to hold only between a human action and a divine action, which is “remote from the divine essence,” the assertion that divine and human actions are similar does not violate Maimonides’ prohibition against the predication of relations to God, nor does it compromise divine simplicity. By way of comparison, it is interesting to note that Aquinas echoes what Maimonides wrote about the ascription of body parts to God in the sacred writings: Corporeal parts are attributed to God in Scripture by reason of his actions, according to some similarity. Just as the action of the eye is to see; so the eye said of God signifies his power of seeing by the intelligible mode, not the sensible mode, and the same is said of the other parts.27 25  Arthur Hyman, “Maimonides on Religious Language,” in Perspectives on Maimonides, ed., Joel L. Kraemer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 175-191. 26  Guide, I.54. 27 Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 3, a. 1, ad 3: “Partes corporeae attribuuntur Deo in Scripturis ratione suorum actuum, secundum quandam similitudinem. Sicut actus oculi est videre: unde oculus de Deo dictus, significat virtutem eius ad videndum modo intelligibili, non sensibili. Et simile est de aliis partibus.”

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Although Aquinas addresses the problem of naming God through his theory of analogy, he uses the Maimonidean strategy of interpreting body parts in Scripture that are predicated of God as being indicative of divine actions. Aquinas even uses the same example as Maimonides, the term “eye,” which is interpreted as indicating divine apprehension, which is the same interpretation that Maimonides makes. However, there is an obvious problem with Maimonides’s view that does not escape Aquinas’s notice. If God is assumed to be the first cause, then this implies a relation to all his effects. That is, divine causality entails a relation between God as cause and creatures as effects and this relation is more than just a relation between two sets of actions; it is a relation between two substances. Maimonides addresses this problem in the following passage, but he also links divine causality, relations and analogy. To my knowledge, this passage has never been cited in any comparative treatments between Maimonides and Aquinas: This ultimate form for all that exists is God … our saying of Him … that He is the ultimate form of the world does not denote that there is an analogy between Him and the form endowed with matter in its being a form to that particular matter, so that He … would be a form to a body. … One should rather consider that just as every existent thing endowed with a form is what it is in virtue of its form—in fact its being passes away and is abolished when its form passes away—there subsists the very same relation between the deity and the totality of the remote principles of existence. For the universe exists in virtue of the existence of the Creator, and the latter continually endows it with permanence in virtue of the thing that is spoken of as overflow. … Accordingly if the nonexistence of the Creator were supposed, all that exists would likewise be nonexistent; and the essence of its remote causes, of its ultimate effects, and of that which is between these, would be abolished. God has therefore, with reference to the world, the status of a form with regard to a thing possessing a form, in virtue of which it is that which it is: a thing the true reality and essence of which are established by that form. Such is the relation of the deity to the world. In this respect it is said of Him that He is the ultimate form and the form of forms; that is, he is that upon which the existence and stability of every form in the world ultimately reposes and by which they are

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constituted, just as the things endowed with forms are constituted by their forms.28

This passage is interesting for many reasons. First, Maimonides rejects explicitly an analogy between creatures and God, arguing that God is not the form of the world like a form that configures matter. This implies that Maimonides thinks that the term “form” is equivocal as between God as form and the forms in created substances. Second, Maimonides appears to reverse what he says in the discussion of the five-fold attributes by claiming that a relation subsists between God and the world and that this relation is founded on the fact that God creates and continually sustains the universe. Without God’s sustaining power, the universe would not exist. Thus, all that exists in the universe depends on God for its existence and this dependence is a relation. This passage does not demonstrate that Maimonides was the one who inspired Aquinas’s treatment of analogy on the basis of a relation between God and creatures. Maimonides rejects analogy and he rejects the relations between creatures. But the way in which Maimonides links divine actions, relations and analogy is very similar to the process described by Aquinas. Since Maimonides rejects analogy, it is not surprising that Aquinas quotes sources that are more positive about analogy, such as (pseudo)Dionysius the Areopagite. However, it is clear that Maimonides is a source for Aquinas on the topic of naming God and that his defence of analogy in the Summa is placed after a consideration of Maimonides’s view. Moreover, Maimonides was a source that was cited by Aquinas in his earliest writings. His first major work was his Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, which was composed between 1252 and 1256 AD, while he was in Paris.29 In Sent., I, prol., q. 1, a. 2, ad 2, Aquinas discusses his theory of analogy for the first time. Although Aquinas does not cite Maimonides in connection with that discussion, Maimonides is mentioned twenty-nine times in the Commentary, six of which occur in book I.30 Thus, at the time he penned his first discus28  Guide, I.69. Emphasis added. 29  Mercedes Rubio, Aquinas and Maimonides on the Possibility of the Knowledge of God (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 16. 30  Index Thomisticus, Robert J. Busa, S.J. et al., electronic version accessed at http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/it/index.age.

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sion of analogy, Aquinas was already very familiar with Maimonides and he cited him extensively. Interestingly, Aquinas doesn’t cite any source in connection with his first reference to analogy; he simply offers an explanation of analogy, without argument.31 Even if Aquinas first encountered the idea that divine actions, relations and analogy could be connected in Maimonides’s writings, he may have failed to mention this since Maimonides was best known for his via negativa, and not for any illuminating remarks on analogy. Thus, it is possible that Aquinas had Maimonides’s remarks in the Guide I.69 in mind when he was developing his account of analogy, amongst other sources, and that he thought that Maimonides dismissed analogy too quickly. It is also possible that Aquinas discovered the insight that the relation between God and creatures forms a foundation for analogy in the Guide. But once again, Aquinas does not credit Maimonides as his source and so I cannot say so for sure. It is clear, however, that by focusing on the similarities between these two thinkers some possible connections emerge that had been previously overlooked. By way of comparison, here is Aquinas’s short, initial description of analogy in the Commentary on the Sentences: It should be said that the Creature and the creature are reduced to one, not by community of univocation but by community of analogy. Such a community can exist in two senses. Either because some things share some one thing according to one being primary and the other being secondary, as potency and act both share the meaning of being, and likewise substance and accident; or because one thing receives existence and meaning from the other, and such is the analogy of creature to the Creator: the creature does not have existence except to the extent that it has come down from the first being; hence the creature is not called a being except insofar as it imitates the first being; and it is the same concerning wisdom and all the other things that are said of the creature.32 31 See Scriptum super libros Sententiarum I, prol., q. 1, a. 2, ad 2. 32  Ibid., trans. Hugh MacDonald, unpublished translation available as an e-text, accessed at http://www.vaxxine.com/hyoomik/aquinas/sent1.html “Creator et creatura reducuntur in unum, non communitate univocationis sed analogiae. Talis autem communitas potest esse dupliciter. Aut ex eo quod aliqua participant aliquid unum secundum prius et posterius, sicut potential et actus rationem entis, et similiter substantia et accidens; aut ex eo quod unum esse et rationem ab altero recipit, et talis est analogia

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In this passage, Aquinas grounds analogy in the divine action of creation, through which God gives existence to the creature. The only reason why creatures exist is because God gave them existence. The action of creation, then, entails a relation of resemblance between creature and God. Even in this early description, there are similarities between Aquinas’s claims and Maimonides’s claims with respect to creation but with a significant difference; Maimonides denies any resemblance between God and creatures.

V. Maimonides and Aquinas on Relations Returning to Maimonides, it is not clear how one should understand his claim in the Guide I.69, namely, that since God is the form of the world, that this expresses the relation of God to the world. This claim seems to contradict what Maimonides said in reference to the attribute of correlation. Perhaps Maimonides views the relation of God to the world as something other than a correlation. It is possible that there is some other kind of relation that Maimonides does not identify and negate in his discussion of the divine attributes and it is this kind of relation Maimonides is referring to in the passage on divine causality. In his discussion of the five-fold attributes, Maimonides writes: However, relation is an attribute with regard to which it is more appropriate than with regard to the others that indulgence should be exercised if it is predicated of God. For it does not entail the positing of a multiplicity of eternal things or the positing of alteration taking place in his essence … as a consequence of an alteration of the thing related to Him.33

It seems that Maimonides recognizes that if God is the cause of the universe, then this entails some kind of relation between God and creatures and so he admits this in the Guide I.69. Nevertheless, based upon the text I have just quoted, Maimonides would approach such a relation with indulgence and not use it as the foundation for naming God or as the ground of some kind of analogy between forms in creatures and God as the form of the universe. Once again, it is tempting creaturae ad creatorem: creatura enim non habet esse nisi secundum quod a primo ente descendit: unde nec nominator ens nisi inquantum ens primum imitatur; et similiter est de sapientia et de omnibus aliis quae de creatura dicuntur.” 33  Guide, I.52.

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to view Aquinas’s emphasis on an analogy between creatures and God as having its roots in Maimonides’s own reflections because it is precisely the relation between God and creatures as it emerges out of a divine action that constitutes the foundation of analogy. Yet, Aquinas accommodates Maimonides’s worry about the implication that God is dependent on creatures by arguing in favour of relations of reason. Thus, he is able to give an account of relations between God and the world that goes beyond indulgence, without violating Maimonides’s prohibition against correlations. According to Aquinas, creatures are really related to God by virtue of their dependence on God for their existence, but God is related to creatures only through a relation of reason.34 Aquinas writes: Now God does not work by an intermediary action to be regarded as issuing from God and terminating in the creature: but his action is his substance and is wholly outside the genus of created being whereby the creature is related to him. Nor again does any good accrue to the creator from the production of the creature: wherefore his action is supremely liberal as Avicenna says [Metaphysics viii, 7]. It is also evident that he is not moved to act, and that without any change in himself he makes all changeable things. It follows then that there is no real relation in him to creatures.35

Notice that Aquinas identifies the divine activity as identical with the divine substance, thus preserving divine simplicity, as Maimonides does. Further, Aquinas maintains that it is the divine activity in 34  Mark G. Henninger, S. J. Relations: Mediaeval Theories, (1250-1325) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 37. See also Summa theologiae I, q. 28, a. 1. 35  St. Thomas Aquinas, On the Power of God, trans. by the English Dominican Fathers (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2003), q. 7, a. 10. All English translations of this text will be taken from this edition. All Latin citations of this text will be taken from Quaestiones disputatae De potentia Dei, ed. Raymund Spiazzi (Taurini: Domus Editorialis Marietti, 1953). “Deus autem non agit per actionem mediam, quae intelligatur a Deo procedens, et in creaturam terminata: sed sua actio est sua substantia, et quidquid in ea est, est omnino extra genus esse creati, per quod creatura refertur ad Deum. Nec iterum aliquod bonum accresit creatori ex creaturae productione, unde sua actio est maxime liberalis, ut Avicenna dicit. Patet etiam quod non movetur ad hoc quod agat, sed absque omni sua mutatione mutabilia facit. Unde relinquitur quod in eo non est aliqua relatione realis ad creaturam.”

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creation that forms the basis of a real relation of creatures to God. However, on God’s part there isn’t a similar foundation, since God has an entirely different kind of existence than his creatures. God is outside the “genus of created being” entirely while created things exist as part of the genus of created being.36 Although God imparts existence to creatures, he is not diminished by this nor is he magnified in some respect because his necessary existence does not admit of degrees. He doesn’t accrue goodness by creating creatures nor does he change. God is not dependent on creatures in anyway, and thus he is related to creatures only by a relation of reason. Maimonides doesn’t advocate this view. But if he were to introduce relations of reason into his predications of God, then he could deny correlations of God and maintain that God is related to creation as its creator, without contradiction. Certainly Maimonides recognizes that God and creatures have completely different modes of existence, a point that Aquinas uses as a justification for the denial of a correlation between God and creatures.

VI. Aquinas on Naming God: Divine Actions, Relations and Analogy In this section, I describe briefly Aquinas’s theory of analogy and how he uses analogy to address the problem of naming God, taking account of the ways in which his view is both similar to and different from that of Maimonides. In his more detailed defence of analogy in the Summa, Aquinas outlines the following points: 1) Human beings name things as they know them (Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 1); 2) Human beings know God from creatures; 3) God causes the existence of creatures (Summa theologiae I, q. 12, a. 8). 4) Creatures resemble God just as an effect resembles its agent cause.37 36 Henninger, Relations, 36. See also Aquinas, De potentia, q. 7, a. 10. 37  For a more detailed discussion of this, see my article “Creation as a Foundation of Analogy in Aquinas,” in Divine Transcendence and Immanence in the Work of Thomas Aquinas, eds., Harm Goris, Herwi Rikhof, and Henk J. M. Schoot (Leuven: Peeters Press, 2009).

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On the basis of the resemblance between creatures and God, human beings can infer that certain perfections of created things are present in God and they can name these perfections. Thus, the foundation for an analogy of names between creatures and God is the causal relationship that holds between God and creatures. But as I mentioned previously in connection with the Sentences passage, Aquinas goes even further and argues that a relation of resemblance emerges out of God’s causal activity, which Maimonides explicitly denies.38 Aquinas writes: Now we must needs admit a relation between a principle and the things which proceed from it; and not only a relation of origin inasmuch as a result springs from its source, but also a relation of distinction, seeing that an effect must needs be distinct from its cause, for nothing is its own cause. Accordingly from God’s supreme simplicity there results an infinite number of respects or relations exist between creatures and him, inasmuch as he produced creatures distinct from himself and yet somewhat likened to him.39

Aquinas recognizes that there are similarities between creatures and God, but there are differences as well. Since God does not share a species with anything and since he transcends all genera, Aquinas argues that God is not a univocal agent.40 Instead, God is a kind of analogical agent: If there is an agent not contained in any ‘genus,’ its effect will still more distantly reproduce the form of the agent, not that is, so as to participate in the likeness of the agent’s form according to the same specific or generic formality, but only according to some sort of analogy; as existence is common to all. In this way all created 38  St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, trans. By Richard J. Blackwell, Richard J. Spath, and W. Edmund Thirlkel (Notre Dame: Dumb Ox Books, 1999), Lib. iii, l. 1, n. 6. 39  De potentia, q. 7, a. 8 : “Oportet autem intellegi aliquam relationem inter principium et ea quae a principio sunt, non solum quidem relationem originis, secundum quod principiata oriuntur a principio, sed etiam relationem diversitatis: quia oportet effectum a causa distingui, cum nihil sit causa sui ipsius. Et ideo ad summam Dei simplicitatem consequitur quod infinitae habitudines sive relationes existant inter creaturas et ipsum, secundum quod ipse creaturas producit a se ipso diversas, aliqualiter tamen sibi assimilatas.” 40  Summa theologiae I, q. 25, a. 2, ad 2. For Aquinas’s arguments in favour of this view see ibid., I, q. 3, a. 5 and I, q. 4, a. 3.

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things, so far as they are beings, are like God as the first and universal principle of all being.41

The similarity between the divine cause and its effects cannot be one in which they share a genus or a species. To use Maimonides’s language, God is not the form of the universe in the same way that a form configures matter in a creature. However, the similarity between creatures and God could be according to an analogy of being in which the forms are related to one another.42 With respect to naming God, Aquinas is interested primarily in the perfections that are shared by both creatures and God. For Aquinas, as for Maimonides, perfections are associated with form since perfections are associated with what confers essential properties on a substance. Since God is an analogical first cause, Aquinas argues that all of the perfections that exist in creatures must pre-exist in God in a more perfect way: We have said that all the perfections found in other things are attributed to God in the same way as effects are found in their equivocal causes. These effects are in their causes virtually, as heat is in the sun […]. So, too, the perfections of all things, which belong to the rest of things through diverse forms, must be attributed to God through one and the same power in Him. This power is nothing other than His essence, since, as we have proved, there can be no accident in God. Thus, therefore, God is called wise not only in so far as He produces wisdom, but also because, in so far as we are wise, we imitate to some extent the power by which He makes us wise.43 41  Ibid., I, q. 4, a. 3: “Si autem agens non sit contentum in eadem specie, erit similitudo, sed non secundum eandem rationem speciei, sicut ea quae generantur ex virtute solis, accedunt quidem ad aliquam similitudinem solis, non tamen ut recipiant formam solis secundum similitudinem speciei, sed secundum similitudinem generis.” 42  Note that Aquinas rejects any suggestion that God is similar to creatures in Summa theologiae I, q. 4, a. 3, ad 4. 43  St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, trans. by Anton C. Pegis, F.R.S.C. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), I, c. 31, n. 2. All English citations of this text will be from the Pegis translation. All Latin citations of this text will be taken from the Leonine edition. “Sic enim omnes perfectiones in rebus aliis inventas Deo attribui diximus sicut effectus in suis causis aequivocis inveniuntur. Qui quidem effectus in suis causis sunt virtute, ut calor in sole […] Ita et omnium perfectiones, quae rebus aliis secundum diversas formas conveniunt, Deo secundum unam eius virtutem attribui est necesse. Quae item virtus non est aliud a sua

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Although in this passage, Aquinas cites a similarity between divine causation and equivocal causation, it is clear from the passages I cited previously that he differentiates between the two. Equivocal causes can share a genus with their effects, but since the divine agent cause transcends all genera, he never has this possibility. Divine causation also carries with it an intellectual component that is not present in ‘natural’ equivocal causation, such as the sun producing heat.44 Divine causation involves an act of will rather than a necessary act.45 Indeed, this point is made clear by Maimonides when he argues that the predication of divine actions does not compromise divine simplicity since God acts through his one and simple will. Once again, the topic of forms emerges but not in a univocal sense. Like Maimonides, Aquinas denies that God’s form and the forms of human beings are univocal. However, Aquinas argues that we can name all creaturely perfections that pre-exist in God on the basis of the analogy between forms, despite the fact that God is simple: For just as diverse things are likened through their diverse forms to the one simple reality that God is, so our intellect through its diverse conceptions is to some extent likened to God in so far as it is led through the diverse perfections of creatures to know Him. Therefore, in forming many conceptions of one thing, our intellect is neither false nor futile, because the simple being of God, as we have shown, is such that things can be likened to it according to the multiplicity of their forms. But in accord with its diverse conceptions our intellect devises diverse names that it attributes to God.46 essentia: cum ei nihil accidere possit, ut probatum est. Sic igitur sapiens Deus dicitur non solum secundum hoc quod sapientiam efficit, sed quia secundum quod sapientes sumus, virtutem eius, qua sapientes nos facit, aliquatenus imitamur.” 44  Summa theologiae I, q. 15, a. 1. 45  Ibid., I, q. 19, a. 4. 46  Summa contra Gentiles, I, c. 35, n. 2: “Nam sicut diversae res uni simplici rei quae Deus est similantur per formas diversas, ita intellectus noster per diversas conceptiones ei aliqualiter similatur, inquantum per diversas perfectiones creaturarum in ipsum cognoscendum perducitur. Et ideo de uno, intellectus noster multa concipiens non est falsus neque vanus: quia illud simplex esse divinum huiusmodi est ut ei secundum formas multiplices aliqua similari possint, ut supra ostensum est. Secundum autem diversas conceptiones diversa nomina intellectus adinvenit quae Deo attribuit.”

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Although God is absolutely simple, he can be imitated in many different ways, as evidenced by the multiplicity of forms that exist in creatures. So divine simplicity doesn’t entail that God would have only one effect. Furthermore, human beings can develop their concept of God through understanding the various perfections that must pre-exist in God, even though in God all of those perfections exist as God’s essence. In this way, Aquinas focuses on God as the form of the world, just as Maimonides does, but with a different understanding of what that means. For Maimonides, God is the form of the world in an equivocal sense. For Aquinas, God is the form of the world in an analogical sense. In order to affirm the naming of God by analogy along with the doctrine of simplicity, Aquinas makes a distinction between the mode of signification of a name (modus significandi) and the thing signified by a name (res significata). This distinction is not made by Maimonides and so he is unable to use it in his attempt to provide a solution to the problem of religious language. Owing to divine simplicity, the divine names will be different in mode than the same names as applied to creatures. For example, when “good” is applied to a creature it will signify that the property “goodness” inheres in the creature. However, when “good” is applied to God it will signify that “goodness” is somehow included in God’s essence, but not as a property. The mode of signification of human language is inherently defective with respect to God since human language always picks out predicates as accidental properties, and God doesn’t have accidental properties. In contrast, the thing signified by names such as “good” belongs properly to God and more so to God than to creatures, since any goodness that could be found in a creature is derived from God as the creator. So one could say “Mary is good” and one could say “God is good,” where “good” is included in God’s essence in a higher mode and to a greater degree than the property “goodness” inheres in Mary. Here is how Aquinas describes his method: These names [of perfections] are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially. For the words, ‘God is good,’ or ‘wise,’ signify not only that He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name signifies (res significata), these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures; but as regards the imposition of the names,

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they are primarily applied by us to creatures which we know first. Hence they have a mode of signification (modus significandi) which belongs to creatures.47

In his theory of analogy, Aquinas both agrees and disagrees with Maimonides. Aquinas agrees that there are relations of difference between God and creatures. Nevertheless, Aquinas affirms that a relation of resemblance holds between creatures and God, but claims that it is asymmetrical. A relation of reason holds from God to creatures, and a real relation holds from creatures to God. Thus, creatures are dependent on God for their existence, but God is not dependent on creatures for their existence. This explanation would satisfy Maimonides’s requirement that correlations be denied of God, because they imply that God is dependent on a creature for some aspect of his existence.

VII. Conclusion: What Aquinas Learned from Maimonides It is clear from Aquinas’s writings that he was familiar with Maimonides’s solution to the problem of religious language, even at the beginning of his career. Moreover, he outlines and describes Maimonides’ solution in the Summa theologiae before he offers his own solution. This progression suggests a process in Aquinas’s own thought from a consideration of Maimonides’s solution to the theory of analogy. By focusing on the similarities between their assumptions and commitments, continuity emerges. This continuity is perhaps best seen in their respective discussions of divine actions. Recall that Aquinas echoes what Maimonides wrote about God’s actions and the ascription of body parts to God in the Bible, and he also uses the “eye” example and interprets “eye” in exactly the same way that Maimonides 47  Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 6: “Huiusmodi nomina non solum dicuntur de Deo causaliter, sed etiam essentialiter. Cum dicitur Deus est bonus, vel sapiens, non solum significatur quod ipse sit causa sapientiae vel bonitatis, sed quod haec in eo eminentius praeexistunt. Unde, secundum hoc, dicendum est quod quantum ad rem significatam per nomen, per prius dicuntur de Deo quam de creaturis, quia a Deo huiusmodi perfectiones in creaturas manant. Sed quantum ad impositionem nominis, per prius a nobis imponuntur creaturis, quas prius cognoscimus. Unde et modum significandi habent qui competit creaturis.”

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does.48 Since God is absolutely simple, he cannot be corporeal. So Aquinas, like Maimonides, argues that God’s actions are what are being named in passages that suggest God’s corporeality. Like Maimonides, Aquinas claims that the divine will is compatible with divine simplicity. However, Aquinas believes that God’s act of willing implies a relation to something else. Once again, the relation that emerges as a result of divine actions forms the basis of Aquinas’s account of analogy. Although Maimonides thinks that divine actions can be named in themselves, he resists any resemblance between God and creatures. Nevertheless, this strategy becomes the foundation of Aquinas’s own method, and the way in which he describes this strategy echoes Maimonides’s own description of analogy and the connection between it and divine actions, and the relation of God to creatures. The similarity between Maimonides’s claim that God is the form of the world and Aquinas’s claim that one can name the perfections of God on the basis of an analogy between forms is striking. Maimonides argues that one should name all references to God in the Torah as actions. Aquinas names God’s perfections as a result of God’s creative act, although he, like Maimonides, recognizes the importance of negation with respect to God. Indeed, both Maimonides and Aquinas view divine simplicity as a negative doctrine in which composition of any kind is denied in God. And it is only after explaining divine simplicity, that Maimonides and Aquinas turn their attention to the problem of naming God. In both of their solutions to this problem, divine actions play a crucial role, which suggests that Aquinas could have learned part of his solution from Maimonides. In this respect, Aquinas’s theory of analogy echoes and reiterates Maimonides’s own view that actions speak louder than words.49 48  Summa theologiae I, q. 3, a. 1, ad 3: “Partes corporeae attribuuntur Deo in Scripturis ratione suorum actuum, secundum quandam similitudinem. Sicut actus oculi est videre: unde oculus de Deo dictus, significat virtutem eius ad videndum modo intelligibili, non sensibili. Et simile est de aliis partibus.” 49  A previous version of this paper was delivered as the Aquinas Lecture at Emory University in 2008. I would like to thank the students and faculty of the Department of Philosophy at Emory University for their very helpful comments and especially to Professor Jack Zupko for his generous invitation.

Chapter 6 Abstraction, Intentionality, & Moderate Realism The Ontology & Epistemology of Universals in Francisco Suárez & John Poinsot1

Daniel Heider

I

I. Introduction

t is well known that the metaphysics of Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) is considerably different from that of John Poinsot (1589–1644).2 At the same time, it is accepted (not by all, though) that their ontological theories of universals are both to be evaluated as instances of moderate realism. However, taking into account Suárez’s enormous emphasis on individuality, both on the ontological and epistemological level, it could be said that such identification is the evidence that the label “moderate realism” is of no real 1  The paper has been elaborated with the support of the Grant Project no. P401/10/0080 “Univerzálie v  raně novověké univerzitní filosofii,” Czech Science Foundation (GAČR). Its modified version was delivered at the Summer Aristotle Conference in July 2010 at Marquette University. 2  As is it well known, Poinsot did not write a separate treatise on metaphysics in his Thomistic Philosophical Course. Poinsot’s metaphysics is to be sought in his Material Logic and Natural Philosophy.

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significance. Nonetheless, seen from the point of view of the so-called objective precision (praecisio obiectiva)—the conceptual separation of two objective formalities found in an extramental thing itself—it would be fairly disorientating to consider the designation as fully irrelevant and misleading.3 It has been abundantly shown that the main epistemological difference between the authors lies in the issue of the intellectual knowledge of material singulars, underscored by the authors’ different theories of individuation (the material principle in Poinsot, the whole entity in Suárez).4 Provided that Poinsot’s theory represents the classical example of moderate realism (as Neo-Thomists claim), which cannot be “deconstructed” (at least not as readily as Suárez’s teaching5), the important question is: what makes the Jesuit’s ontology the doctrine .

3  “Nulla celebrior hodie, quam de Praecisionibus, in scholis quaestio; nulla, maiore vel argumentorum, vel animorum contentione disputata, quasi ut ille nodus, Phrygiae, ita hic Philosophiae fatum foret” (R.P. Tuoma Comptone Carleton, Universa Philosophia, Disputatio XXIV: “Dentur nec Praecisiones Obiectivae” [Antverpiae (Antwerp), apud Iacobum Meursium, 1664], 97). 4  See the authors mentioned in the following note. 5  For this deconstruction, see the following works: León Mahieu, François Suarez, sa philosophie et les rapports qu’elle a avec sa théologie (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1921), especially 522-523; Carlo Giacón, Guglielmo di Occam. Saggio storico-critico sulla formazione e sulla decadenza della Scolastica (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1941), especially 679-689; Carlo Giacón, Suarez, “La Scuola” Editrice—Brescia, 1945, especially 29-46; Francisco L. Peccorini, “Suárez’s Struggle with the Problem of the One and the Many,” The Thomist 36 (1972): 433-471; Francisco L. Peccorini, “Knowledge of the Singular: Aquinas, Suárez and Recent Interpreters,” The Thomist 38 (1974): 605-655; Gallus M. Manser, “Die Universalienlehre im Lichte von Akt und Potenz,” Divus Thomas 1 (März 1934): 385-407; Wilhelm Kolter, Die Universalienlehre des Franz Suarez, Inaugural Dissertation, Freiburg, 1941; Alfred J. Freddoso, “Review of Suarez on lndividuation, Metaphysical Disputation V: Individual Unity and its Principle. Translation, Introduction, and Glossary by Jorge J.E. Gracia (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1982), 229”: http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/papers/gracia.htm; Donald W. Mertz, “The Nature and Necessity of Composite Simples,” http://www.metaphysica.de/texte/mp2004_1-Mertz.pdf, 89-133, especially 30; James F. Ross, “Suarez on Universals,” The Journal of Philosophy 59.23 (1962): 736-748, especially, 747-748; Erik Åkerlund, “Suárez on Forms, Universals and Understanding,” Studia Neoaristotelica 2 (2009), 159-182, especially 181.

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of moderate realism, or what, in fact, are the impediments for others to accept such an evaluation? In my paper I intend to “kill two birds (one ontological, the second epistemological) with one stone”: (1) I would like to put forth the thesis that Suárez’s ontological theory of universals is not to be considered as conceptualism, whether moderate, diminished, or realistic, especially when compared with the doctrine of Poinsot. I show that Suárez’s tenet, from a certain point of view, is not only equivalent to the Thomist’s theory in the degree of realism, but, moreover, that it can be regarded as the stronger type of moderate realism. (2) I shall claim that the doctrine of direct intellectual knowledge of material singulars does not necessitate empiricism or conceptualism, let alone idealism for Suárez, but that, along with the doctrine of intentionality, it complements and underpins his ontological moderate realism of universals. Both objectives are to be reached on the basis of relevant comparisons with Poinsot’s epistemology and ontology of universals. The choice of Poinsot, having in this paper only the instrumental comparative position to Suárez, is far from being incidental. There are two reasons, at least, for selecting Poinsot’s theory as the useful Thomistic comparative counterpart of Suárez. (1) As regards the issue of the epistemology and ontology of universals, Suárez, next to Aquinas and his followers, is (with Scotus) one of the authors most quoted by Poinsot. Correspondingly, Poinsot’s knowledge of Suárez’s epistemology and ontology is, no doubt, in-depth and complex. (2) In contrast to the theories of the other (older) Thomists (Cajetan, Capreolus), Poinsot’s position in the complex of universals comes comparatively close to Suárez. Suárez is not always the target of Poinsot’s critique, however—quite often he is taken as the source of inspiration. Thus holding Poinsot to be, so to speak, the exponent of pro-Suárezian Thomism, the detection of the doctrinal differences can be taken as the guarantee of unveiling the essential ideological differences between Thomism and Suárezianism as two singular philosophical systems. I shall proceed in six steps. (1) The symptomatic disagreements, already well known in the recent literature, in the issue of the agent and passive intellect will be presented. (2) I focus on the authors’ conceptions of the ontological status of various types of universals (mainly the physical and metaphysical universal). (3) As the expansion of the first part, I present Suárez’s and Poinsot’s antagonistic theories of the expressed species (species expressa) and intentionality. (4) I shall argue

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that Suárez’s theory of intentionality and the claim about the identical conceptual content in the sensibles and intelligibles represent two “pillars” of the Jesuit’s moderately realistic stance. (5) As a brief corollary, I show what doctrinal consequence Suárez’s theory of intentionality can have for the controversial issue of the objective concept (conceptus obiectivus). (6) Lastly, I briefly summarize the main points of the paper.

II. The Agent and Passive Intellect in Poinsot and Suárez II.1 As with differences in general, the doctrinal differences in the issue of the agent and passive intellect between Suárez and Poinsot also assume important doctrinal agreements. Leaving aside the superficial similarity in the claim that the soul is the substantial form of the organic body and the primary principle of all operations, Suárez and Poinsot employ the same range of conceptual (cognitive) tools, viz., the cognitive powers, the habitus, the cognitive act, the impressed intelligible species (species impressa), the expressed intelligible species and the “res cognita.”6 Though having different lay-outs, both Poinsot and Suárez coincide in the basic preconditions. The cognitive powers of finite beings must be really (realiter) different both from the soul and among themselves as well.7 Against Durandus and Ockham they both endorse intentional species as the inevitable intermediary between intellect and “res cognita.”8 The cognitive act is seen by both as the categorical quality really distinct from the cognitive powers. The agent intellect is neither God (Alexander of Aphrodisias), nor the separate substance (Avicenna), nor the power of a man common to the whole of mankind (Averroes), but the part of the intellectual power 6  Johannes Poinsot, Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Pars IV: De ente mobile animato, ed. Beatus Reiser O.S.B., Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim, Zürich, New York, 2008, 345 (henceforth: Poinsot, CPT, IV, 345). 7  Francisco Suárez, De anima 3 (disputation).1 (question).7 (paragraph). I quote from the critical edition of Salvador Castellote Cubells (http://www.salvadorcastellote.com/investigacion.htm). Further I shall quote only Suárez, DA 3, 1, 7. Poinsot CPT, III, 226. 8 Suárez, DA 5.1.3.

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of an individual.9 Both share the same anthropological claim that the intellectual soul is provably immaterial and immortal.10 The intellective cognition is properly realized not by (and in) the agent intellect but by (and in) the passive intellect. Even for Poinsot, to put it simply (simpliciter loquendo), the passive intellect, as the cognitive faculty, is more perfect than the agent intellect.11 Having pointed out the cognitive and representative nature of the passive and the agent intellect, it must be said that the given agreement is significantly trumped by important distinctions. In compliance with the overall project of ontological parsimony, Suárez, at least in the De anima, rejects the real distinction between the agent and passive intellect. He holds as probable the opinion of Augustino Nifo for whom there is either a formal or only conceptual distinction between the intellects.12 Three reasons can support Suárez’s functionalistic approach, according to how one and the same thing can be seen from different viewpoints.13 (1) “The nivelization of both intellects”: there cannot be a real distinction because the passive intellect is not actually passive. Correspondingly, the agent intellect is not purely active.14 The emphasis on the vital feature of the (passive) intellect constitutes one of the most idiosyncratic features of Suárez’s cognitive psychology. On that account, Suárez denies all possible pronouncements positing the principle of cognition outside the soul, viz., in the impressed species, or in the impressed species combined with the cognitive power.15 In 9 Poinsot, CPT IV, 106 and 301; Suárez, DA 2.4. 10 Poinsot CPT IV, IX, 279-288; Suárez, DA 4, 3. 11 Poinsot CPT IV, X, 1, 295-304; CPT I, IV, 343-347; Suárez, DA 9, 8, 15. 12 Suárez, DA 9.8.18; also DA 9.10.8. Cf also J.B. South, “Francisco Suárez on Imagination,” Vivarium 39.1 (2001): 119-158, especially 150. 13  Whereas the intellect is called “agent” when seen from the viewpoint of the production of the intelligible species, it is called “passive” when it is from the viewpoint of the cognitive outcome. 14  Lorenz Fuetscher, Akt und Potenz, Eine kritisch-systematische Auseinandersetzung mit dem neuren Thomismus (Druck und Verlag von Felizian Rauch, Innsbruck, 1933), especially 271. 15 “… si sola species esset tota ratio agendi, ageret ut naturale agens, et posita specie in potentia, statim naturaliter sequeretur actio. Consequens est contra experientiam, quia licet recipiam species in oculo non video, si non attendo” (Suárez, DA 5, 4, 5).

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the sensory cognition the selective attention (of the soul) plays the important role as the last trigger of the sensory act.16 Without the present-minded soul no cognitive act can, in fact, be elicited. The Aristotelian analogy of the passive intellect with the prime matter is to be taken only narrowly, viz., in the sense of the intellect’s being deprived of intelligible species. The passive intellect is not the cognitive screen upon which the intelligible species are to be projected, but the active source from which the intentional species spontaneously emanate.17 (2) “The inefficiency of the agent intellect in the after-life”: if the agent intellect were to be taken as a separate power, it would be inactive while being part of the intellect of the separated soul. When there is no need to convert the sensibles to the intelligibles in the after-life, the function of agent intellect seems to be at most ornamental.18 (3) “The refusal of the non-reified act-potency scheme,” what is considered by Thomists as the central philosophical principle, i.e., the act-potency scheme assuming the real distinction, is, euphemistically speaking, modified by Suárez. As a Thomist, Poinsot takes the same recourse to the act-potency scheme. The given distinction is for him the primary distinction in the genus of being. That is why he endorses that the mover (the active principle) and what is moved (the passive principle) cannot be really the same. Suárez’s philosophy broadly invades that axiom. Taking the real distinction as the distinction between two “res” (quod), never two principles (quo), the Jesuit comes to eliminate a great deal of the “real distinctions” of Thomism. One of them is the real distinction between two intellects. When it holds that the real distinction is the distinction of two, at least supernaturally, 16  Cf, e.g., Cees Leijenhorst, “Cajetan and Suarez on Agent Sense: Metaphysics and Epistemology in Late Aristotelian Thought,” in Henrik Lagerlund, ed., Forming the Mind. Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightment (Springer, 2007), 337-362. On the item of attention, there is more in the third part, “Intentionality in Suárez and Poinsot.” 17  “Intellectus autem noster et ex natura sua speciebus caret, in quo et a perfectione angeli declinat, habet tamen convenientiam aliquam cum illo, scilicet quod statim ac anima nostra cognoscit per phantasiam rem aliquam, dimanat ab ipso intellectu species repraesentans rem illam” (DA 9.8.18). 18 Ibid.

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separable extremes, what could, hypothetically, be the function of the single passive or single active intellect?19 Poinsot’s replies to Suárez indicate how sharply his doctrine differs from that of the Jesuit. Poinsot markedly represses the cognitive vitality of the passive intellect by refusing the claim that the intelligible species emanate from the passive intellect. As the purely cognitive power the passive intellect cannot take part in the production of the intelligible species at all. It must be the agent intellect alone, causally concurrent with the material images in the interior senses, that produces the intelligible species. As the purely productive agent, the agent intellect is to be really distinguished from the entirely cognitive power of the passive intellect. The cognitive power is basically what is moved, and as such it cannot be reduced by itself to the act. If it were to be (per impossibile) reduced to the act by itself, the axiom of “whatever is moved is moved from the other” would be violated.20 It has been said that Suárez levels the operations of the agent and passive intellect by providing the passive intellect with the productive function. At the same time the contrary effect must be brought in. The emanation of species from the passive intellect seems to have to hold back the causal concurrence of the sensory data. As is well known, Suárez refuses the strict causal explanation of the concurrence between the material—whether exterior or interior senses—with the immaterial intellect. The causal encapsulation of particular cognitive powers, underscored by the ontological gap between the particular powers, seems to lead him to the claim about the indirect or, as some say non-causal, mediation of the sensory and intellect cognition.21 Correspondingly, sensory cognition can provide the intellect’s 19  For the application of that criterion to the issue of the distinction between essential and existential being, cf. Metaphysical Disputation 31, “On the essence of finite being as such, on the existence of that essence and their distinction” (henceforth DM). As for the English translation cf. Francis Suárez, On the Essence of Finite Being As Such, On the Existence of That Essence and Their Distinction, translated from the Latin with an Introduction by Norman J. Wells (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1983). 20 Poinsot, CPT IV, 302-304. 21  As for the term “a-causal” see Joseph Ludwig, Das akausale Zusammenwirken (sympathia) der Seelenvermgen in der Erkenntnislehre des Suarez (Munich: Karl Ludwig-Verlag, 1929).

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formation of intelligible species at most with “occasion.” Sensory powers give the intellect only the quasi-example (materia circa quam), which is to be emulated by the (depicting) intellect. That emulation is in fact possible only because the intellect and sensory powers are rooted in the common and unique soul.22 Poinsot is well aware of the urgent problem of duality of powers too. That is also why he, similarly to Suárez, rejects some solutions of his confreres. Next to the denial of the claim that “phantasmata” are illuminated by the agent intellect’s so-called formal (subjective) illumination, he also rejects the opinion of Cajetan that the illumination is objective (the agent intellect serves only as the extrinsic assistant making the intelligible object in images visible).23 Consistent with Suárez, Poinsot affirms that the given extrinsic assistance is inconceivable without the assumption of the real inherence (termination) in the images. He also impugns the exposition, ascribed to Sylvester of Ferrara, that images are illuminated “radically” (radicaliter). According to Ferrara, who nevertheless comes close to Suárez, the images are rendered capable of being (habilis) that from which the agent intellect abstracts the intelligible species just because the images spring from the same soul as the agent intellect.24 It is no surprise that Poinsot also dismisses Suárez’s conception, according to which the images can concur only materially as quasi-examples. On the one hand, Suárez’s explanation is only metaphorical, non-scientific. One is after the real causal concurrence, not the behavior “after the fashion of ” (ad instar, quasi). On the other hand, it may be said that Suárez’s doctrine stands half-way to Poinsot’s claim. Both agree that material images are to be taken as the necessary objective determinants of the indifferent intellect. Yet the claim about the origination of all powers in the common soul cannot be taken as the sufficient “explanans” of the given concurrence. If it were to be, all interior senses would become useless. The given sensual excitement

22  “Haec determinatio non fit per efficientiam aliquam ipsius phantasmatis, sed per hoc solum quod materiam praebet et quasi exemplar intellectui agenti, idque propter unionem quam habet in eadem anima” (DA 5.2.12). 23  Analogously the sunshine makes visible the colors of material objects without inhering in them. It inheres only in the medium, viz., in the air. Cf. Poinsot, CPT, IV, 307. 24 Poinsot, CPT, IV, 305.

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could be already enacted on the plane of exterior senses. The exterior senses, after all, spring from the same soul as well.25 Standing half-way to Poinsot, how does Poinsot complement Suárez? Poinsot espouses the causal explanation that the material image is the instrumental cause of the principal cause, viz., of the agent intellect. To be the instrumental cause, however, it must be ontologically elevated. In contrast to Suárez, Poinsot feels free to count on such elevation of the inferior by the superior. The anthropological claim about the natural substantial unity and dependence and subordination of the body to the soul, based, among other things, on non-reified hylemorphic principles, cannot entail that the body is to be taken as the epistemological and anthropological obstacle to the soul. On the contrary, the body must be viewed as being completely in the service of the intellect.26 The subordination of body to spirit takes on various forms for Poinsot. Leaving aside the theological examples of the elevation of sacraments, the analogy with an artistic tool is a lucid illustration. In order that a painter’s paintbrush can be a suitable instrument it must be properly deployed by a painter herself/ himself. It must be washed, cleaned and have a sufficient amount of bristles. Likewise images, to generate the instrumental causality within the process of the causal effectuation of intelligible species, have to be correctly prepared, viz. they have to be ontologically elevated by 25  “Quod postea declarat Suarez n. 12. dicendo, quod se habet aut ad instar materiae excitantis animam aut vero ad instar exemplaris. Sed totum hoc, quod est dicere ‘ad instar’, relinquit rem obscuram et inexplicatam, quia in presenti inquirimus, quem concursum vere et proprie habeat phantasma, non ad cuius instar se habeat … Nec sufficiat esse radicatam untramque potentiam, phantasia et intellectum, in eadem anima” (Poinsot, CPT, IV, 308). 26  As for Suárez’s dualizing tendencies, see the following: “Dico ergo primo rationibus posteriori loco factis sufficienter convinci materiam esse posse et de facto aliquando esse proprium subiectum cui soli quantitas inhaeret…” (Suárez, DM 14.3.36). “… potentiae spirituales, ut sunt intellectus et voluntas, subiectantur immediate in anima, atque adeo quod anima habet causalitatem materialem respectu illarum … D Thomas respondet esse totum coniunctum; et consequenter loquitur, quia ipse tenet nulla accidentia esse in materia prima … Non tamen ita dicendum est esse in composito, ut utrique parti illius inhaereant, nam cum sint accidentia corporalia inhaerent media quantitate, atque adeo in subiecto quantitatis, quod est materia” (DA 3.3.4).

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the agent intellect. The given elevation cannot be understood as the ultimate rendering “in actu” intelligible, though. What Poinsot wants to suggest is that the spiritual force of the principal cause (the agent intellect) accesses images only transitively (per modum transeuntis). It provides them with the so-called viatic entity (ens viale), being nothing more than the momentum to immateriality (virtus ad incorporeum). The body, as the obedient potency, receives that “viaticum,” which is actually the physical premotion (praemotio physica). It is this physical premotion that makes images capable of being the instrumental cause of the agent intellect.27 It is well known that just the notion of the physical premotion, having made its career on the plane of the Divine physical premotion in the famous Baroque controversy “De auxiliis,” is the doctrine, which Suárez stubbornly refused.28

II.2 The indirect mediation of the sensory and intellectual knowledge by means of the rooting of the powers in the common soul leads Suárez to the claim about the direct and immediate knowledge of material singulars by means of their proper intelligible species, which is taken by interpreters as the key to Suárez’s epistemology.29 That doctrine is the “entrance hall” to the issue of Suárez’s psychogenesis of universals. When singular objects are perceived by the exterior senses, the interior senses and intellect immediately grasp the identical object. What the agent intellect does is the mere spiritualization of material singular species, the spiritual elevation. The dematerialization of species is far from being the de-individualization of them. The only transformation taking place in the abstraction of the agent intellect is the entitative modification (the sensible species is material, the intelligible 27 Poinsot, CPT, IV, 308-309. 28  As for the refusal of the Divine premotion, see, e.g., Friedrich Stegmüller, Zur Gnadenlehre des jungen Suarez (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder & co., 1933). Cf. also William L. Craig, The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez (Leiden– New York–Kobenhavn–Köln: E.J. Brill, 1988), 207-233. 29 “El singular directamente conocido, es el eje de la gnoseologa suareciana …” ( José M. Alejandro, La gnoseología del Doctor Eximio y la acusación nominalista [Santander: Publicaciones anejas a “Miscelanea Comillas,” 1948], 358).

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is spiritual), not the representative.30 That is why it must also be said that the functioning of the agent intellect is not as active as is the case according to Poinsot. It comes to know what affects the senses and subsequently the intellect in the strongest way, which is the material individual. It must be accepted that angels dispose of singular intelligible species, so that kind of species is not repugnant. Given the cognitive affinity between the human and the angelic intellect, which is much more apparent in Suárez than in Poinsot,31 then the same must be said about the human intelligible species, with the remark that the given production is occasioned by the senses.32 Poinsot safeguards the “middle” position of the human intellect differently. The spiritual position of the human cognition between the sensory cognition of animals and the intellective of angels is guaranteed by him by the claim that the embodied intellect forms the singular species on occasion of the sensory perception, but that it gets to know the “quiddity” of material substances. Everything else is and can be cognized only “sub ratione quidditatis.” Material singulars thus can be conceived only indirectly, reflectively, and connotatively by means of conversion to the material images from which the given universal nature has been abstracted.33 30 Suárez, DA 9.3. 31  According to Sebastian Lalla, we have to approach Suárez’s psychology from his angeology. Cf. Sebastian Lalla, “Die Interpretation von “De anima” bei Francisco Suárez,” in Rolf Darge, Bauer, J. Emmanuel, Frank, Günter, eds., Der Aristotelismus an den europäischen Universitäten der frühen Neuzeit (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 2010), 235-246. 32 Suárez, DA 9.3.5: “Intellectus noster cognoscit singulare materiale per propriam speciem illius … nihil repugnat dari speciem impressam repraesentativam rei singularis ut sic; ergo talis species potest fieri ab intellectu agente; in possibili ergo cognoscitur singulare per propriam speciem … in angelis dantur species spirituales repraesentantes propria singularia materialia ut sic; ergo non repugnat singulare materiale repraesentari per propriam speciem.” 33  “Species impressa intelligibilis, quae pro hoc statu abstrahitur a sensibus, non potest repraesentare directe sub exercitio et modificatione singularitatis, bene tamen ipsam singularitatem potest attingere per modum quidditatis” (Poinsot, CPT, IV, 324). As for the idiosyncratic position of Poinsot’s theory given by the positive evaluation of individuality in the issue of intellective knowledge in the frame of Thomistic tradition see Camille Berubé, La Connaissance de l´individuel au Moyen Age (Canada-Paris: Université

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III. Threefold Universal in Poinsot and Suárez III.1 Having seen the profound doctrinal disagreements between Poinsot and Suárez, it must come as a surprise to register a whole range of non-trivial agreements on the issue of the ontology and epistemology of universal concepts. It is all the more striking when one takes into account also the difference in the ontological assumptions of both thinkers. In contrast to Poinsot, considering the “Platonic” forms as the very bearers, though particularized, of universality in things, Suárez sharply rejects that sort of “Platonism” with the claim that the principle of individuation is the whole entity. It is in fact Suárez’s emphasis on singularity that has become the main reason for the recent and contemporary Thomists to object to Suárez’s doctrine of universals. If the dematerialization of the agent intellect is not the de-individualization, one loses the epistemological tool for any moderately realistic stance. One is not able to safeguard the in-being of forms in the intellect. If the singularity becomes independent of materiality, the only remaining way of generalization is the empirical induction. If singularity is what is first presented to the intellect (primum cognitum), the only remaining precision must be the so-called subjective precision (praecisio subjectiva), i.e., the abstraction progressing by the confusion and inclusion of the individual differences of things. If the subjective precision becomes the only way of acquiring universals, nothing more than the resemblance of nominalism can become the plausible solution. Moreover, taking into account Suárez’s innatism of species, similar to that of Descartes, one is fully right to accuse Suárez of idealism, i.e., of opening the chasm between intramental and extramental orders of being, which can necessitate also the sort of undesirable idealism in Suárez. In other terms and seen from a different viewpoint, the loss of the necessary parallelism between “lex entis” and “lex mentis,” the clear consequence of the denial of the Platonic “forms” in re, makes Suárez the immediate ancestor of British empiricism. All those deeply ill-fated steps by Suárez are, first of all, the consequences of the fact that de Montréal, Institut d’Études Médiévales, Presses de l’université de Montréal, Presses Universitaires de France, 1964), 236-239.

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Suárez, according to his critics, such as León Mahieu, Carlo Giacon, Gallus M. Manser, Francisco Peccorini, and Joseph Maréchal, misinterprets the Aristotelian cognitive mechanism of the agent intellect and abstraction.34 It must be asserted that the above-mentioned imputations do not cohere with the texts of De anima and Disputationes metaphysicae. To answer them, one must pay attention to Suárez’s differentiated theory of various kinds of universals.35 Generally speaking, Suárez and Poinsot present both ontological and epistemological theories of universals in the frame, broadly accepted in early modern Scholasticism,36 of three kinds of universal, namely, material (physical), metaphysical (direct), and logical (relational). First of all, contrary to nominalists, they consider that there is an extramental nature denominated as universal. According to both, the extramental universality is not the formal universality, but only the subject or substrate of the intellect’s denomination.37 Thus they deny that the universal cognition fixes its 34  For references, see note 5. 35  For the exposition of Suárez’s psychogenesis of universals and the right, but only partial, answer to the accusation of conceptualism, see James B. South, “Singular and Universal in Suárez’s Account of Cognition,” The Review of Metaphysics 55.4 (2002): 785-823. What I consider to be missing in South’s paper is the role of the expressed species. My thesis is that if one takes into account Suárez’s theory of the expressed species, the case for the moderately realistic position in Suárez can be made stronger. 36  Bartholomew Mastrius and Bonaventure Belluto say: “Praeterea distingui solet apud omnes universale in physicum, metaphysicum, & logicum, per universale physicum intelligunt naturam in singularibus existentem cum sua unitate formali, quae est minor numerali, per metaphysicum intelligunt naturam, cum per opus intellectus abstrahitur, & exuitur differentiis, & induitur unitate praecisionis; denique per universale logicum intelligunt eandem naturam affectam secunda intentione universalitatis, per quam ad inferiora refertur in ratione superioris, & praedicabilis” (RR. PP. Bartholomaei Mastrii de Meldula et Bonaventurae Belluti, Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti Cursus Integer, Venetiis, 1728, Editio Novissima a mendis expurgata, Tomus quintus: continens disputationes ad mentem Scoti in duodecim Aristotelis Stagiritae Libros Metaphysicorum. Pars Posterior, 130). 37  “Vocibus et conceptibus universalium vere et simpliciter correspondet pro obiecto aliqua entitas seu natura, quae universalis denominatur; non quidem que existat a parte rei sub illo statu universalitatis et abstractionis, sed quae per ipsam abstractionem intellectus ita attingat in obiecto naturam, ut non attingat singularitatem …” (Poinsot, CPT, I, 316). “Principio

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terms (by means of extension of a concept) in all singulars of the given kind in so far as they are similar. They disagree outright upon the claim that the intension (meaning) of concepts is to be explained by their extension. They do not differ in the assumption that “material” or “physical” nature is not accompanied by the less than numerical unity but by the formal unity, however, defined only as nature’s indivision in the essential or formal predicates.38 Thus they can speak about nature’s essential similarity, the type of similarity, which is different from the extrinsic resemblance based on the similarity of accidents (tropes). It is not incidental that both expose Scotus’s doctrine of the less than numerical distinction as the fully-fledged real distinction. By that they are able to put the Scotistic formal unity “upon the stretch” of the extramental fully-fledged universal unity. Seen in that unfavorable light, it is not difficult to trace the absurd states of affairs consequent upon the claim that the common nature is formally distinct from individual difference.39 As a result of that it can be said that they embrace the virtual distinction (distinctio virtualis)—the extramental foundation of the distinctio rationis ratiocinatae—as the type of intrinsic (not extrinsic, realized by means of connotations or effects of a thing) distinction

statuendum est naturas illas quas nos universales et communes denominamus, reales esse et in rebus ipsis vere existere; non enim eas mente fingimus, sed apprehendimus potius … ” (Suárez, DM 6.2.1). 38  “… in praesenti distinguimus in eadem re unitatem formalem et individualem et universalem ... solum distinguimus varios respectus negandi divisionem ... non fit divisio penes formalia principia ... dicitur unitas formalis” (Poinsot, CPT I, 321). “… dari in rebus unitatem formalem per se convenientem unicuique essentiae seu naturae” (Suárez, DM 6.1.8). 39  “Naturae secundum se non convenit aliqua unitas, quae positive et absolute unitas sit minor numerali, et quae a parte rei inveniatur coniuncta cum unitate numerica, sed solum convenit unitas formalis negativa, id est negatio divisionis per principia formalia … haec est unitas non simpliciter et positive, sed quantum ad negationem divisionis per principia formalia …” (Poinsot, CPT, I, 322-323). “… hae unitates non distinguuntur a parte rei, seu ex natura rei”, “… hae unitates non distinguuntur a parte rei, seu ex natura rei”; “… unitatem formalem, prout existit in rebus ante omnem operationem intellectus, non esse communem multis individuis, sed tot multiplicari unitates formales, quot sunt individua” (Suárez, DM 6.1.10-11).

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between the distinguishable metaphysical grades (e.g., animality and rationality).40 A closer look at the property of the formal unity of the physical universal betrays the important difference, though. When defining nature as what is indifferent (non-repugnant) to many (unum in multis) Suárez discriminates two meanings of non-repugnance. According to the first, “this non-repugnance belongs of itself to the nature by virtue of its formal unity.”41 Suárez regards that exposition as false. If it were true, it “would be inseparable from the nature, and consequently the nature as it exists in reality would have this non-repugnance, which is obviously false.” One can understand the indeterminacy purely negatively. According to that sense “the nature by virtue of its formal unity, taken in isolation, does not have a repugnance to being in many things.”42 The non-repugnance is based on “the formal unity, which of itself is not individual, and in this way the nature can be said, even existing in things, to have this non-repugnance, for even in a thing itself it [the nature] is not incommunicable by force of its formal unity, but by force of its individual unity? [emphasis mine].”43 It may come as a surprise that Suárez speaks in this context about the nature “taken in isolation” (praecise sumptae), which is a term markedly similar to that of “natura absolute considerata” of Aquinas in the treatise De ente et essentia, which is one of three ontological statutes which can accrue to nature as such (that what is divided according to those three “conditions”).44 It holds that thanks to this “precisely taken nature,” ac40  “Distinctio rationis ratiocinatae est, quae relinquit ex parte obiecti identitatem materialem, sed non formalem seu virtualem” (Poinsot, CPT I, 295-296). “Unde fundamentum, quod dicitur esse in re ad hanc distinctionem, non est vera et actualis distinctio inter eas res quae sic distingui dicuntur; alias non fundamentum distinctionis sed distinctio ipsa antecederet; sed esse debet vel eminentia ipsius rei quam sic mens distinguit, quae a multis appellari solet virtualis distinctio … ” (Suárez, DM 7.1.4). 41 Suárez, DM 6.4.10. Francis Suarez, On formal and universal unity (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1964), 66. Wherever available, I use (the official) English translation. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. 44  “Natura autem vel essentia sic accepta potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo, secundum rationem propriam, et haec est absoluta consideratio ipsius. Et hoc modo nihil est verum de ea nisi quod convenit sibi secundum

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companied by the formal unity, Peter is not Peter, but a man. I do not think that it is far-fetched to call this Suárez’s formal unity “the negative unity,” and the given community “the negative community,” to use the terms employed by Poinsot himself. Consequently, Suárez’s view of the ontological status of the physical universal can be summarized as follows. The nature with negative unity and community can and must be, according to Suárez, as occurrent not only on “the essential,” but, which is important for the comparison of the paper, also on the existential (extramental) plane. Poinsot’s evaluation seems to be different. Poinsot, of course, also distinguishes nature as such (that what is divided according to three ontological “conditions”) and nature existentially modified; i.e., inclusive of absolutely and solitarily. However, the real distinction between essence and existence leads him to the following classification: “Although it is true that the nature considered in itself is negatively common and that the negation of formal division belonging to it is, likewise, negatively common, that is, nonsingular, this unity, neither positively nor negatively common, can never be found absolutely and factually in the real and outside the intellect” [emphasis is mine].45 The difference from Suárez is striking. It is the nature taken in (essential) isolation, not as existent extramentally (sic!), which possesses the negative community. When existential singularity is posited, not only the positive, but also the negative community becomes lost. What one obtains on the existential level is the full particularization of the essence. That, it seems to me, is not the case in Suárez. Every deep-rooted enemy of the real distinction between the essence and existence can use this as the tailwind to consider Poinsot’s doctrine as the outright instance of, at most, realistic conceptualism. quod huiusmodi. Unde quicquid aliorum attribuatur sibi, falsa est attributio. Verbi gratia, homini in eo quod est homo convenit rationale et animal et alia, quae in diffinitione eius cadunt ... Alio modo consideratur secundum esse quod habet in hoc vel in illo ... Haec autem natura duplex habet esse, unum in singularibus et aliud in anima, et secundum utrumque consequuntur dictam naturam accidentia” (Sancti Thomae de Aquino, De ente et essentia, cap. 2 [http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/oee.html]). 45  The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas, Basic Treatises, trans. Yves R. Simon, John J. Glanville, G. Donald Hollenhorst, with a preface by Jacques Maritain (Chicago, Il: The University of Chicago Press, 1955), 107. Wherever possible, I shall use that translation in the quotations.

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III.2 Though both expose the abstraction of universals differently—for Poinsot the universal species stems automatically from the agent intellect, while according to Suárez it is the (conscious) product of the precisive act (the formal abstraction) of the passive intellect—both agree that the metaphysical universal is acquired by the absolute (non-reflexive) and objectively precisive act that separates nature from singularity. Both agree that the metaphysical universal cannot be identified with the nature absolutely considered because it represents the nature already under the unity of precision (unitas praecisionis). Nor can it be the fully-blown universal (universale logicum), which is the logical universal. Whereas the physical universal constitutes the remote, the metaphysical universal represents the proximate foundation of the logical universal. They are also not at odds in the affirmation that the metaphysical universal can be built on a single example. Both state that the metaphysical universal is absolute because it is related to the inferiors only as to the terms “a quo,” i.e., as to something from which it has been taken. The respective universal tends to its inferiors not as to the terms, from which it has been taken, but rather as to the terms “ad quem,” i.e., as to the terms to which it, as the second intention built upon the first intention, is actually related. They liken the metaphysical universal to the Platonic universal “ante rem,” which for both, however, exists only intellectually.46 46  “… [the metaphysical universal] non representat solum naturam secundum se …” (Poinsot, CPT I, 344); “Et hoc vocamus universale metaphysicum, quod in hoc distinguitur a logico, quod utrumque respicit singularia, sed metaphysicum respicit illa ut terminum a quo, quia abstrahit ab illis, logicum autem, ut terminum ad quem, quia respicit illa, ut dicatur de illis” (Poinsot, CPT I, 345); “Universale metaphysicum fit per actum absolutum abstrahentem naturam ab inferioribus tam abstractione negativa quam positiva. Itaque utraque abstractio est actus absolutus et non deservit ad universale logicum formaliter constituendum, quod in relatione consistit” (Poinsot, CPT I, 348); “Unitas et aptitudo, quae sunt fundamentum proximum universalitatis, ex isto actu praecisionis convenire dicuntur etiam ante universale logicum … ante actum comparativum denominatur natura universalis metaphysice, non logice, seu fundamentaliter proxime, non formaliter” (Poinsot, CPT I, 349-350); “Unde si daretur a parte rei universale eo modo, quo posuit Plato, esset universale metaphysicum, quod in unitate praecisa consisteret…” (Poinsot, CPT I, 352). “… universale dupliciter posse a nobis concipi vel denominari. Primo, ut quid absolutum secundum

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Both, as it has been hinted, explicitly endorse the distinction between the nature or essence as such on the one hand and its conditions on the other. According to Suárez, “In the abstracted nature two things can be considered. The first is the essence of the very nature; the second the mode, which it has in the intellect, namely, to be abstracted.”47 Poinsot echoes: “As Cajetan rightly points out … there are in the nature (a) the thing which is predicated, and (b) the condition or state which makes predication possible. The thing which is predicated is the nature considered in itself, for its quiddity is communicated to its inferiors. The condition or state which renders it communicable is its superiority, and this does not belong to the nature considered in itself.”48 Despite the differences in the issue of the distinction between essence and existence, they both seem to infer the same consequence for the ontological status of the metaphysical universal. In answer to the—according to Poinsot—false nominalist dilemma that the objective concept of universal (intentio prima obiectiva) must be either one (then it is the being of reason), or multiple (then it signifies only the plurality of individual, which is what the nominalist is after), Poinsot affirms: “The objective concept is one, not according to a real unity, but according to a unity of reason and abstraction. In answer to the proof, let it be said that what is described as one is something real if it is understood materially as subject of unity; but it is not something real if it is understood formally as the very unity of abstraction ….”49 Suárez in his De anima assents to it: “Universale, secundo modo [universale metaphysicum], communiter etiam dici solet ‘ens rationis,’ quia universalitas illa etiam fit ab intellectu et nihil ponit in re abstracta, tamen vere non est esse, quod potest relationem aliquam fundare … Primo modo intelligeretur substantia universalis, si esset homo a parte rei subsistens separatus ab omni contractione, iuxta platonicam opinionem; neque esset universalis propter relationem realem secundum esse ad inferiora, sed propter unitatem suam cum intrinseca et substantiali aptitudine ad existendum in multis …” (Suárez, DM 6.6.8); “… et nunc est intellectualiter universalis, ut sic dicam. Tandem in natura sic concepta est nova unitas rationis quia habet unum conceptum obiectivum indivisibilem in plures similes; habet etiam communitatem seu aptitudinem ut insit multis et de iis praedicetur” (Suárez, DM 6.6.9). 47 Suárez, DA 9.3.20. 48 Poinsot, The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas, 108. 49 Poinsot, The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas, 101.

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relatio rationis, sed ipsa natura realis ut subsistens sub directa intentione intellectus et ut denominata ab illa … Universale, secundo modo, est quid reale extrinsece denominans rem.”50 However, that is only half the story that can be told about the given comparison of the ontological status of the metaphysical universal. According to the modified reading, it can be said that Poinsot brings an ontological evaluation, which is in the degree of realism weaker than that of Suárez. In consonance with his theory of beings of reason, Suárez unambiguously asserts that the extrinsic denomination—in fact the direct act by which the universale metaphysicum is produced—does not entail beings of reason.51 Without delving too deeply into the complex issue of the theory of beings of reason, it can be said that Poinsot, at least, oscillates in his evaluative analysis of the ontological impact of extrinsic denomination. Contrary to Gabriel Vásquez (1551–1604), who claimed that the extrinsic denomination is the mere imposition of a name and as such the being of reason, Poinsot states that as far as the really denominating acts (forms) are concerned the extrinsic denomination entails the real being, but seen from the point of view of its non-inherence in a subject it must result in the being of reason. Like Suárez, Poinsot seems to affirm that the direct and absolute act denominating a real nature does not make that nature the being of reason.52 Much like Suárez, Poinsot says that the being of reason originates only when the intellect denominates what is not a real being or what is not a real relation as if it were the real

50 Suárez, DA 9.3.27. 51  “… quando autem natura abstracta primo concipitur nullum ens rationis ab intellectu cognoscitur” (Suárez, DA 9.3.20); “… sic enim naturam esse abstractam seu universaliter conceptam non addit naturae nisi esse quoddam conveniens illi per extrinsecam denominationem; quod esse obiectivum appellatur” (DA 6.6.10). 52  “… intentiones [secundae] supponunt pro fundamento esse cognitum, sicut genus supponit rem esse abstractam ab inferioribus et ratione abstractionis ei convenit. Ergo supponit denominationem extrinsecam cogniti et abstracti …” (Poinsot, CPT I, 292). As for the presentation of Poinsot’s theory of being of reason cf. John P. Doyle, “Poinsot on the Knowability of Beings of Reason,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 68.3 (1994): 337-362. For Suárez’s critique of Vásquez’s opinion, see DM 54.2.10.

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being or as if it were the real relation.53 Applied to the instance of the metaphysical and logical universal, both affirm that only after the intellect takes the form denominated by the intellect, namely, the form of the commonality and aptitude to be the many, as if it really existed in the denominated thing and as if it were really related to the inferior natures (or after the fashion of a real relation), does the being of reason originate.54 That is why they both assent to the claim that the logical universal is acquired only by the comparative act (notitia

53  “Cognitio formans ens rationis non est reflexa respiciens ipsum tamquam rem cognitam ut quod, sed illa cognitio directa, quae ipsum non ens reale vel quod realiter relativum non est, denominat cognitum ad instar entis vel relationis realis, dicitur formare vel ex illa resultare ens rationis” (Poinsot, CPT I, 304). “Dicendum est ergo, ens rationis proprie fieri per illum actum intellectus, quo per modum entis concipitur id, quod in re non habet entitatem” (Suárez, DM 54.2.15). 54  “Cum ergo in natura abstracte cognita duo sint, scilicet natura et abstractio naturae, intellectus directa operatione cognoscit naturam ipsam, tamen quia virtutem habet reflectendi, non sistit in cognitione naturae, sed ulterius transit et considerat modum quem illa natura habet, et ab ipso intellectu est cognita, et invenit illam denudatam ab omni contractione, et illam denudationem quasi formam quamdam in illa natura considerat, ratione cuius respicit illa natura plura inferiora a quibus est abstracta. Et haec vocatur notitia comparativa,seu secunda intentio formalis; natura vero, ut sic cognita, vocatur secunda intentio obiectiva. Est enim haec vis intellectus nostri, quod quando invenit rem aliquam denominatam ab aliquo extrinseco, ad perfecte comprehendendam denominationem illam, ita eam fingit ac si in re denominata esset forma aliqua illam denominans” (Suárez, DA 9.3.21); “Vel quatenus per eam consideratur habitudo naturae communis ad particularia in quibus existit. Postquam enim intellectus apprehendit Petrum et Paulum esse similes in esse hominis, rursus considerat hoc praedicatum homo habere se ad Petrum et Paulum ut quid commune ad particularia; et in hac comparatione videtur consummari ratio universalis, etiam respectivi; per eam enim consurgit in mente, vel potius in re menti obiecta, habitudo rationis unius rei communis ad plura” (Suárez, DM 6.6.12). “… omnis tamen secunda intentio formaliter sumpta, est relatio rationis …” (Poinsot, CPT I, 291). “Universale logicum sive pro secunda intentione non conisistit in comparatione atributionis sive praedicationis, sed simplicis relationis seu ordinis sine inclusione actuali in inferioribus. Itaque ipsa aptitudo ad praedicandum de multis ut positive respiciens inferiora universale logicum est” (Poinsot, CPT I, 304).

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comparativa).55 That “as if it were the real being” (ac si) or “after the fashion of real being” (ad instar) is for both the key device which is necessary for the production of beings of reason. Nevertheless, from Suárez’s viewpoint, rather confusingly, Poinsot does not avoid (generalizing) formulation such as “… the proximate foundation of the universality [of the logical universal] is certainly the being of reason ….”56 By such a claim Poinsot exempts the metaphysical universal entirely from the realm of real beings. I offer the following hypothesis for Poinsot’s claim: the fluctuation in Poinsot’s designation of the ontological status of the metaphysical universal is given by the basic assumption of a rather robust (non-reflexive) dimension of objective being or being cognized (esse cognitum). That is the consequence of his concept of “in-being” intentionality, according to which the cognitive intentions are not the attentive directedness (tendere in obiectum) to things, as it is in Suárez, but the immaterial reception of forms resulting in the intimate, more than it is the substantial unity of form and matter, unity of a cognitive faculty and “forma cognita.”57 That hypothesis brings us directly to the issue of intentionality, connected with Poinsot’s doctrine of the expressed species (concept) as that “in which” (id, in quo) things are being contemplated.58

55  For the logical universal in Suárez and Poinsot, see more in Blanes F. Guil, “Las raices de la doctrina de Juan de santo Tomas acerca del universal lógico,” Estudios filosoficos 5 (1956): 215-232. 56 Poinsot, CPT I, 346. 57  For the two distinct metaphors of intentionality present in the hypothesis see, e.g., Tuomo Aho, “Suárez on cognitive intention,” in Paul J.J.M. Bakker & Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen, Mind, Cognition and Representation. The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate Studies in Medieval Philosophy, 2007), 179-203, especially 203. 58  On the distinction between (intramental) objects and extramental things in Poinsot, cf. John Deely, Postmodernity in Philosophy, A Poinsot Trilogy, Vol. 2: Descartes & Poinsot (Scranton, Philadelphia & London: University of Scranton Press, 2008), especially 47-67.

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IV. Intentionality in Suárez and Poinsot IV.1 It has already claimed that it is the theory of intentionality, which is to be taken into consideration if the case for the moderately realistic position is to be made stronger. My thesis is that it is the theory of intentionality, which, jointly with the above-mentioned ontological foundation, makes fairly intelligibile the authors’ above-mentioned different ontological evaluations on the metaphysical universal. Generally speaking, for Suárez and Poinsot, as for almost all Scholastics, cognition is processed in two acts. Whereas the first-act cognition pertains to the domain of principles of cognition, the second-act cognition amounts to the elicitation of the cognitive act (actus intelligendi). One is not amiss in assuming a certain structural correlation between the two stages. It might be said that the more the principles of cognition are, so to speak, imprinted from the side of extramental reality, the less the cognitive act seems to be active or less directed to the extramental reality. In contrast to Suárez, Poinsot seems to work with the more “flowery” nature of the species. Moreover, Poinsot counts on the universal species as the “primum cognitum” in “the statu isto.” Consequently, it can be said that as far as the universal knowledge in the first act goes, Suárez lags behind Poinsot. Contrary to Poinsot, as it has been mentioned, Suárez denies that the result of assimilation between the cognitive power and species results in the identification, which is tighter than is the (substantial) unity between form and matter. Whereas the second leads to the constitution of something third, viz., the material composite, it is not the case with the first one. Suárez affirms that there is only accidental unity. The intelligible species is for Suárez first of all the accident of quality, strictly speaking the disposition, which as the natural sign enables one to know the extramental beings. It is impossible for Suárez to distinguish the entitative and representative feature of the intentional species. Each (entitative) species is essentially intentional.59 Taking into account the deficiency of the intelligible 59  “Quod unio inter potentiam et speciem intentionalem est accidentalis, qualis esse solet inter accidens et subiectum, neque ibi ulla maior unio realis excogitari potest” (DA 5.2.4); “… quomodo intelligi potest quod intellectus fit ipsa essentia? Nullo modo, nisi forte metaphorice nimium” (DA 5.2.4); “… infra probabimus quod species concurrit effective ad actum; ergo

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species taken as seed in relation to the universal species, Suárez, if he intends to uphold moderate realism in the issue of universals, is logically obliged to lay the far greater emphasis, comparatively to Poinsot, on the cognitive activism of the intellect. Thus he is supposed to reinterpret accordingly the theory of intentionality.

IV.2 In the fifth question, “Utrum per actum potentiae cognoscitivae aliquis terminus producatur, et de verbo mentis” of the fifth disputation in De anima, Suárez presents four conclusions in which he introduces his anti-Thomistic opinion. (1) The essentially productive nature of the cognitive act, which is the categorical quality, is given by the claim that the intrinsic term, namely, the mental word or the expressed species or the formal concept (all are taken as synonyms by Suárez), is produced in all cognitive acts, inclusive of the act of exterior senses and the “visio beatifica” of the blessed. No matter whether one considers the intuitive non est causa formalis illius” (DA 5.2.6); “ergo debet esse in aliqua specie qualitatis, et maxime in specie dispositionis, nam disponit ad operari” (DA 5.2.23); “Unde illa similitudo speciei … est similitudo quaedam naturalis conveniens intrinsece illi qualitati, quae est species ex natura sua” (DA 5.2.23); “… divisio illa communis, qua species intentionalis distingui solet in esse qualitatis, et in esse repraesentatio, non est propria …” (DA 5.2.2). “Et in hoc differt exemplum vulgare de semine, quod ita est virtus generantis in esse naturali, quod nullo modo participat esse ipsius geniti, sed solum est virtus ad illud. At vero species impressa ita est virtus obiecti ad eliciendam cognitionem et formandum verbum, quod tamen formaliter in se habet esse intentionale, in quo convenit cum obiecto representative, sed non entitative ... speciem esse similem obiecto non entiative sicut duo individua ejusdem speciei, sed intentionaliter sicut imago et idea respectu sui repraesentati” (Poinsot, CPT III, 184); “… speciem informare dupliciter potentiam, scilicet entitative seu inhaerendo, intentionaliter autem et vice obiecti perficiendo seu potius transformando potentiam in obiectum … nam forma intentionalis entitative considerata dependet in suo esse a subiecto sicut reliquae formae … At vero obiectum repraesentatum in species non accipit aliquod esse a subiecto nec constituit cum illo aliquam naturam, sed ita praesentatur potentiae, quod determinat et actuat illa intelligibiliter sine hoc, quod realiter alteret illam et transmutet aut componat aliquod tertium cum illa … alia unio seu actuatio aut determinatio debet intercedere inter obiectum repraesentatum et potentiam, et haec dicitur unio intelligibilis seu intentionalis, inter entitatem vero speciei et potentiam est unio accidentalis, id est inhaerentiae”(Poinsot, CTP III, 185).

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or abstractive acts—Suárez takes those two concepts traditionally, i.e., the first acts assume the presence of objects, the second does not—the productive force of the cognitive act is not the result of the insufficiency (indigentia) of the known objects (given by their materiality or absence), but the expression of the essentially active and productive nature of human cognition. (2) The term differs from the cognitive act only formally, never really. Though it is not entirely clear what Suárez really means by the formal distinction in De anima, it is important to note that he denies outright the real distinction between the cognitive act (intelligere) and its term. In reference to his unpublished logical treatises, Suárez affirms that there is no real distinction between “qualitas in facto esse” and “qualitas in fieri.”60 (3) Nothing else than the given formally distinct term is produced. By that claim Suárez bolsters his rebuttal of the claim that the term of the given act must be a really (realiter) distinct object and functioning as the intramental vicarious object or substitute of an extramental thing. If the term as the really distinct quality assisted the cognitive power as the substitute of the extramental thing, one would have to know firstly the image or the given substitute of the extramental things. However, that would destroy the direct realism of human cognition, so valuable to Suárez. (4) The mental word produced by each cognitive act is both formally and really identical with the cognitive act qua quality (“ratio qualitatis productae”). By the claim of the real identity between “ratio qualitatis productae” and “ratio productionis,” Suárez opposes the theory according to which the formal concept is taken as “that, in which” (id, in quo), as if in a mirror, extramental things were contemplated. Suárez adopts the position that the mental word is nothing else than “that, by which” (id quo) we come to know things. By emphasis on the direct realism of the cognitive acts, Suárez also eliminates “id, in quo,” which he regards as the undesirable intermediaries, being present in each representational conception.61 60  The destiny of the majority of Suárez’s commentaries to Aristotle’s Organon, Physics and Nicomachean Ethics” still remains a mystery. Cf. R. de Scorraille, Francois Suarez de la Compagnie de Jesus. 2. sv. (Paris, P. Lethielleux, Libraire-Éditeur 1911), 416. 61  “Prima conclusio: Per omnem actionem cognoscitivam producitur aliquis terminus illi intrinsecus” (Suárez, DA 5.5.4); “Secunda conclusio: Talis terminus formaliter tantum distinguitur ab actione cognoscendi,” (Suárez, DA 5.5.5); “Tertia conclusio: Praeter terminum hunc non

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What are Poinsot’s contrapuntal theses? (1) Poinsot claims that there are overall four factors necessary for the explanation of the intellection, viz., the cognitive power, the intelligible species, the intellective act and the expressed species. All the elements are really distinct, even though not separable outright. To be really distinct, it suffices when they are related as to cause and effect. Though the intellection and its “verbum” are not separable, according to Poinsot, they still have to be considered as really distinct because they are related as an act and its object.62 (2) Analogous to Suárez, the intellection does not pertain to the category of action, but only to the category of quality. As the immanent action, the cognitive act cannot be an act because if it were, it would have to be productive of a distinct effect, to which it would ultimately have to be subordinated. The finality of the cognitive act is not the production of the effect in a passive subject, but the advancement of a cognizant by means of the contemplation of truth in the mental word or image. In contrast to Suárez, Poinsot remarks that the intellection by no means goes beyond a cognizant, nor is it the act, which comes out from the agent and is directed to things.63 (3) Still analogous to Suárez, Poinsot denies that “dicere” is really distinct from producitur aliquid per actum cognoscendi, neque formaliter, neque realiter ab illo distinctum. Patet etiam ex dictis in dicta quaestione 2, et in Physicis, tract de proprietatibus entis naturalis, nam qualitas in facto esse et fieri qualitatis formaliter distinguitur, non realiter,” (Suárez, DA 5.5.6); “Quarta conclusio: Per omnem actionem cognoscendi producitur verbum, vel aliquid illi proportionale, quod realiter et formaliter non est aliud quam ipse actus cognoscendi, ut est qualitas, tamen distinguitur modaliter ab illo, ut est productio. Quare verbum non ponitur ex indigentia obiecti, sed ex vi et natura cognitionis” (Suárez, DA 5.5.9). 62  “… quatuor sunt ponenda in intellectu nostro ad intelligendum requisita, scilicet potentia seu virtus … species intelligibilis, actus intelligendi et verbum seu conceptus aut species expressa … ista quator ita se habent, quod vel possunt separari, vel unum est causa alterius, ergo distinguuntur” (Poinsot, CTP, IV, 345-346). 63  “Intellectio etiam ut distinguitur a conceptu producto, non est actio de praedicamento actionis, sed de genere qualitatis … intelligere non significat actionem ut ab agente exeuntem, ubi excludit illa a praedicamenti actionis. Non enim solum dixit non esse actionem exeuntem ab agente, quod est negare rationem viae et causalitatis praecise ordinatae ad terminum” (Poinsot, CTP, IV, 346).

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“intelligere.”64 However, a closer look unveils the doctrinal distinction. Poinsot says that “intelligere,” being related to an object qua known object, is virtually the productive action (“dicere”) being related to an object qua produced object. Nonetheless, the claim about that virtual containment does leave the room for their variation, which is refused above by Suárez’s first thesis.65 (4) In the first part of the following thesis Poinsot recaptures the alternating nature of “dicere” by claiming that “intelligere” and “dicere” differ as a thing and a mode. That means that “intelligere,” in consonance with Poinsot’s overall doctrine, can exist on its own (e.g., in the cognition of exterior senses) and need not always be accompanied by “dicere.” In the second part, Poinsot states that “intelligere” differs from the mental word as a thing from a thing (res et res). “Intelligere” is not the act, but the quality of a knower, and so is the mental word. As the expressed species, in comparison with the representation of the impressed species, it must represent more perfectly the extramental object. That is why the expressed image must be the really distinct quality—the image.66 (5) With the last pronouncement Poinsot comes back to the above-mentioned distinction between “intelligere” and “dicere” saying that whereas “intelligere” equals the operation related to an object by way of actuation, “dicere” is related by way of origin.67 64  It is one of the very few points in which Poinsot sides with Suárez against the Scotists. “… verbum mentale produci per actum dicendi, non autem intelligendi… verbum mentale produci debet aliqua actione a seipso distincta ... intellectio est actio de genere qualitatis non de genre actionis, ergo necessario alter actus constituendus est intellectui, qui sit productivus …” (RR. PP. Bartholomaei Mastrii de Meldula et Bonaventurae Belluti, Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti Cursus Integer, Venetiis, 1728, Editio Novissima a mendis expurgata, Tomus tertius: continens disputationes Ad mentem Scoti in Aristotelis Stagiritae Libros De Anima, De Generatione & Corruptione, De Coelo, & Metheoris, 147-148). 65  “Expressio productiva verbi seu dictio non est actio distincta ab ipso actu immanente intellectionis, sed ipsa intellectio est virtualiter actio productiva verbi; nec indiget intellectio alia actione, per quam producatur, quia procedit per emanationem, neque alia actione, qua producat, quia ipsa virtualiter est productio” (Poinsot, CTP, IV, 348). 66  “Intelligere et dicere differunt ut res et modus, intelligere autem et verbum differunt sicut res et res”(Poinsot, CTP, IV, 349). 67  “Intelligere formalissime consistit in operatione habente se per modum actus ultimi ipsius intelligentis in ordine ad obiectum, ideoque formalitas

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IV.3 What can be deduced from the above-mentioned comparison as regards the theory of intentionality? I think it reveals that Suárez’s intentionality of concepts takes a different direction from that of Poinsot. In the comprehensive passage that is his reply to the Thomistic objection, Suárez affirms: “… the termination of cognition in the object cannot be understood materially in the way in which one understands the termination of a line a point, but it must be taken intentionally or spiritually.”68 What does Suárez mean by the material exposition of intentionality? I suppose two aspects.69 (1) The reduction of intentionality to the more basic metaphysical or naturalistic concepts and principles (identity in form), which ultimately ground it. (2) The cognitive act must primarily terminate in some really distinct intrinsic object, analogous to a line terminating at a point. If it did not, one could not explain the cognition of the absent things, etc. Suárez proceeds from the point that the intentionality of cognitive acts can be explained only if their representation is taken spiritually. I read that claim broadly, namely, as the manifestation of Suárez’s project, which is the non-reductive interpretation of the intentionality (labeled by Miguel Cruz Hernández as “the gnoseological intentionality”).70 The intentionality or the person’s ability to be related to an extramental object is the primitive state of affairs, which can be successfully performed without the assumption of intramental vicarious illius, ut distinguitur a dicere, magis consistit in actuatione quam in origine” (Poinsot, CTP, IV, 350). 68  “Terminatio cognitionis ad obiectum non est materialiter intelligenda eo modo quo intelligitur terminatio lineae ad punctum, sed est sumenda intentionali seu spirituali modo” (Suárez, DA 5.5.23). 69  See also Miguel Cruz Hernández, “La intencionalidad en la Filosofía de Franciso Suárez,” in Congreso International de filosofia Barcelona 1948, Actas Madrid, 1949, 315-337. 70  Provided that Suárez aspired to harmonize his conception with Aquinas, it is interesting that quite recently Jeffrey E. Brower and Susan Brower-Toland have embraced the strikingly similar non-reductive interpretation of the intentionality of concepts in Aquinas. Their exposition can be taken as evidence that Suárez´s liberal interpretation of Aquinas need not always be foreign to Aquinas himself. Cf. Jeffrey E. Brower and Susan Brower-Toland, “Aquinas on Mental Representation: Concepts and Intentionality,” Philosophical Review 117.2 (2008): 193-243.

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objects. Suárez says: “That is why the termination of the cognition in a thing is nothing else than the thing being cognized, which can be realized even if the given thing is absent. It is not necessary for it to be objectively represented in the image. In the same way love tends to a beloved thing as it can be in itself, even though it does not actually exist. The knowledge of rose terminates at the very same rose, even though the given rose does not exist.”71

IV.4 Suárez’s concept of intentionality cannot be understood without the item of the substantial attention of soul.72 As Walter Hoeres says, Suárez’s doctrine is similar to the theory of the Franciscan John Peter Olivi (1248–1298).73 What is the main thesis of Hoeres’s assimilation of Suárez to Olivi? Hoeres is convinced that it would be incorrect to leave aside the tenet of the substantial attention (attentio substantialis) present in Suárez’s theory of the sympathy of potencies (sympathia potentiarum). He comes with the interpretation, according to which the given interpenetration of powers in the common soul is to be explained, first of all, intentionally, not physically. It means that only because of the soul’s substantial attention, consciousness, deeply inherent in our (not only cognitive) powers and operations, can we direct ourselves to extramental objects. The substantial attention of the soul thus constitutes the proximate ground for the sympathy of powers: “… the vital actions come intimately from the first principle of life, which is the soul; from that it happens that though sight has

71  “Unde cognitionem terminari ad rem non est, nisi rem illam cognosci, quod potest fieri etiam si sit absens. Neque est necesse quod in imagine obiective repraesentetur, sicut etiam amor terminatur ad rem amatam, prout in se esse potest, quamvis actu non existat. Scientia etiam rosae ad ipsam rosam terminari dicitur obiective, quamvis ipsa rosa non existat” (Suárez, DA 5.5.23). 72  See also Tuomo Aho, “Suárez on cognitive intentions,” op. cit., 199-203. 73  Walter Hoeres, “Bewusstsein und Erkenntnisbild bei Suárez,” Scholastik 36 (1961): 192-216. As Hoeres shows, the similarities extend also to the ontology of universals. See Walter Hoeres, “Der Unterschied von Wesenheit und Individuation,” Scholastik 38 (1963): 54-61.

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the present image and from that it accepts the species, if the soul is not attentive, it does not see” [the translation is mine].74 Despite the differences in Suárez’s and Olivi’s theory of cognition— the most important is Olivi’s dismissal of the intentional species on the level of non-memory species—they share the following assumptions that divide them from Poinsot. (1) Both Suárez and Olivi take intentionality to be the primitive epistemological notion, not reducible to the causal relation between the cognitive power and its extramental object. Both rely on the central role of the soul’s consciousness, being taken as the basic assumption and the last trigger of the cognitive act. (2) The presence of an extramental thing is not and cannot be the cause of the intentional acts. At most it is the occasion, the effective determinant. The cooperation of the intellect and sensible objects must be based on the indirect sympathy of powers. (3) Both refuse the claim that the mental word is really distinct from the cognitive act. Both agree that if the expressed species were to be some really distinct entity, the cognitive realism would be jeopardized.75

V. Moderate Realism in Suárez In contrast to Hoeres’s exposition I do not think that the similarity of Suárez to Olivi can be absolute. As indicated, Olivi does not accept the intentional impressed species and thus the phenomenon of intentionality remains a sort of mystery for him. It cannot be said, as Hoeres does, that the intentional species are “Fremdkörper” in Suárez’s system. As mentioned, the intentional species are necessary for him because of the unification of the cognitive faculty with objects. Even though Suárez identifies the entitative and representational aspects of species, it still transmits the conceptual content from the extramental reality to the intelligible reality. According to Dominik Perler, the elimination of the impressed species is, among other things, the reason why Olivi is not able to explain the genesis of the universal knowledge. What Perler misses in Olivi is the diversiform nature of attention, which is 74 “ … hae actiones vitales tam intimo modo fiunt ut ab ipso primo principio vitae, quod est anima, actualiter procedere videantur; unde fit ut, licet oculus praesentem habeat imaginem et ab illa recipiat speciem, si anima non attendat, non videat” (Suárez, DM 18.5.2). 75  For Olivi, see Dominik Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002), 109-146.

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focused not only on singulars but also on the universal natures. I am sure that Suárez disposes of that multifarious “attentio.” Just the formal abstraction, which is effective in the detection of the metaphysical universal, is the manifestation of that attention. The missing principle of Hoeres’s otherwise challenging interpretation is what James South calls “the principle of containment.” According to that principle, highlighted by all moderate-realistic expositors of Suárez’s theory of universals (headed by José Alejandro),76 it holds, in contrast to Poinsot, that the sensory cognition must be taken as implicitly essential and universal. When the intellect generates the intelligible species of, e.g., Peter, it need not afterwards produce the further species of Peter’s specific nature. The universal humanity is known just by means of the firstly known singular intelligibile species of Peter.77 Though the generic universal can be acquired only by the comparison of specific concepts, the main ontological foundation of Suárez’s metaphysical universality is the fact there cannot be “this man” (Peter) without “man as such.”78 Moreover, it is Suárez’s notion of formal abstraction (fulfilling the cognitive role of “intelligere” as the “intus-legere”), which is significantly fortified by the component of special attention of the soul, by which the intellect is capable of the direct attainment and also discernment of the metaphysical components of individuality and sortality in the “bowels” of the extramental things themselves. I think that Suárez’s psychological doctrine of the spiritual intentionality taken as “attentio” and the metaphysico-epistemological teaching of potentiality of sensibles, as two complementary tenets, provide us with the argumentative background, which can be of help 76  José M. Alejandro, La gnoseologia del Doctro Eximio y la acusación nominalista, 1948, 344-365. 77  “Nihilominus tamen probabilius apparet quod cum primo intellectus cognoscit universale, id facit per speciem repraesentantem rem singularem” (Suárez, DA 9.3.13). 78  “Nihilominus tamen probabilius apparet quod cum primo intellectus cognoscit universale, id facit per speciem repraesentantem rem singularem. Probatur, nam supposito phantasmate Petri, v.g., intellectus agens facit speciem Petri ut sic in intellectu possibili, nam habet virtutem ad illam efficiendam et est naturale ac universale agens non impeditum; ergo non efficit speciem universalis abstracti, scilicet hominis ut sic. Probatur haec ultima consequentia: 1º, Quia illa species Petri non potest repraesentare hunc hominem quin repraesentet hominem; ergo per illam potest homo cognosci; ergo superflua est alia species” (Suárez, DA 9.3.13).

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in the rebuttal of the competing interpretations of Suárez’s doctrine of universals. (1) Though Suárez speaks about the emanation of the impressed species from the intellect, it would be fairly inappropriate to designate his doctrine of universals as a version of Platonism.79 Such an interpretation neglects the fact that Suárez’s partial innatist setting in the first-act cognition is significantly balanced by the direct conceptual realism fortified by the soul’s attention. (2) Suárez’s doctrine is not to be qualified as a variant of idealism and as conceptualism because Suárez does not stretch out the chasm between subject and object. Even though he puts back the formal causality between thing and mind by identifying entitative and representational aspects of species, Suárez is far from eliminating the intentionality of species transmitting the conceptual content from the cognitive process. (3) All interpretations regarding Suárez as the epicene Thomist cannot be right. They do not take into the consideration the very context of Suárez’s teaching. They do not do justice to Suárez’s own claims and assume that the universal knowledge must proceed only by means of the proper intelligibile universal species, which is the output of the dematerializing and de-individualizing abstraction.

VI. A Note on the Objective Concept in Suárez The notion of the metaphysical universal (prima intentio), as it has been suggested, is closely connected not only with the formal concept, as the prima intentio formalis, but also with the notion of the objective concept and objective being (prima intentio objectiva). On this occasion I cannot address all the nuances of the ramified issue of the objective concept (extensively discussed in the secondary literature80), which is fundamental not only for Suárez’s overall conception of metaphysics—the object of Suárez’s metaphysics is not being as such but the objective being as such—but also for all the authors of early modern not non-Scholastic philosophy (vide Descartes). What I would like to do is to present what I consider to be the epistemological confirmation 79  Salvador Castellote, Die Anthropologie des Suarez, Beitrge zur Spanischen Anthropologie des XVI. und XVII. Jahrhunderts (Freiburg, Munich: Verlag Karl Alber, 1962), 192-193. 80  The coryphaeuses of this discussion are, no doubt, Norman J. Wells and John P. Doyle.

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of the ontological reasoning, which was presented in the realistic interpretation of Suárez’s doctrine of the objective concept. I disagree with Tuomo Aho, who maintains that the issues of Suárez’s doctrine of the formal and objective concept “fall mainly outside the scope of De anima.”81 Quite the contrary, I think that De anima is important for a better understanding of Suárez’s claims about the formal and objective concept in the Disputationes metaphysicae. In the 1990s two contrasting expositions of the objective concept were developed. According to them, the objective concept of being can be expounded in two basic ways. Along the first opinion—held by Eleuterio Elorduy, Timothy Cronin, Jean-François Courtine, John P. Doyle, Norman Wells—Suárez’s metaphysics, when qualifying its object as the objective concept of being, substantially contributed to the process of mentalization of Aristotelian metaphysics that culiminated in Kant. Suárez’s metaphysics, simply speaking, must be seen as the “logomachy” or “tinology,” that is, as the science dealing with the “objects” transcending both real and rational beings. When treating the objective concept of being, Suárez’s metaphysics is primarily focused, as Timothy Cronin says, on the “third” type of being “existing neither in the intellect nor in things,” as “that state of essence which is within the intellect as the thing known ….”82 Accordingly, Suárez’s metaphysics loses the status of real science and enters the preserve of purely mental sciences.83 With the second opinion, Suárez’s doctrine of the objective concept, in fact, does not leave room for that claim about the Popperian World Three consisting of the body of human knowledge. On the other side, according to authors such as Jorge Gracia, James C. Doig and Theo Kobusch, the ontological status and the unity of the objective concept, in contrast to the formal concept, being always the real and positive form inhering in the intellect, is entirely dependant on the ontological status of the concrete objective concept in question. If presented with the objective concept of a chimera, the objective 81  Tuomo Aho, “Suárez on Cognitive Intentions,” 200, n. 79. 82  T.J. Cronin, S.J., Objective Being in Descartes and in Suarez (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1966), 83-84. 83  Jean-François Courtine, Suarez et le système de la métaphysique, Épiméthé (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990), 169-182; Norman J. Wells, “Esse cognitum and Suárez revisited,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 67 (1993): 339-348; John P. Doyle, “Suarez on the Reality of Possibles,” The Modern Schoolman 65 (1967): 29-48.

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concept is the being of reason. Having the objective concept of Peter and Peter’s nature, the first objective concept is singular, the second universal. According to these authors, the step of Suárez’s metaphysics must be sought elsewhere (e.g., in Suárez’s conception of possibles).84 I concur with what I consider to be the best defense of realistic exposition undertaken on the ontological basis (on the basis of DM), that by Jorge Gracia. According to him, to be cognized and to be objectively in the intellect does not entail in itself any kind of mental being, different both from the being proper to the cognized thing and to the formal concept. To be objectively in mind or to be cognized (esse cognitum) means nothing else than to become the focus of the formal concept. Surprisingly enough, though arguing for the realistic exposition of the objective concept only on the ontological basis, considered as the more appropriate approach to the issue of the ontological status of objective concepts,85 Gracia does not avoid referring to the notion of substantial attention or the focus of the formal concept, which (at least on the non-reflexive level) extrinsically denominates and also separates the metaphysical universal from the singularity. It must be said that Gracia, in his excellent paper, rather unwittingly also makes provision for the epistemological argument that I have employed in my paper.

VII. Conclusion (1) De anima, having been written in the early 1570s, represents the important and systematic background for Suárez’s later, more famous, metaphysics. I dare say that one cannot fully understand what Suárez’s Disputationes metaphysicae is about unless one is familiar with De anima. (2) Given the distinct ontologies of Suárez and Poinsot, it is difficult to make sense of the striking doctrinal resemblances in the issue 84  Jorge J.E. Gracia, “Suarez’s Conception of Metaphysics: A Step in the Direction of Mentalism?,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 65.3 (1991): 287-310; “Suárez and Metaphysical Mentalism: The Last Visit,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 67.3 (1993): 349-354; James C. Doig, “Suarez, Descartes and the Objective Reality of Ideas,” The New Scholasticism 51 (1977): 350-371; Theo Kobusch, Sein und Sprache. Historische Grundlegung einer Ontologie der Sprache (Köln: E.J. Brill, 1987), 204. 85  Jorge Gracia, “Suárez’s Conception of Metaphysics: A Step in the Direction of Mentalism?,” 297.

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of the ontological evaluation of various types of universal, all the more of Suárez’s even stronger moderate realism, without taking into account the broader epistemological contexts connected mainly with the theory of concept (expressed species). (3) I am not hesitant in labeling Suárez’s doctrine of universals, in contrast to Poinsot’s metaphysically grounded doctrine, the epistemological version of moderate realism. Not only does Suárez present the key statements about the ontological status of various kinds of universals in DM 6.6 (titled “Per quam operationem intellectus fiant res universales”), i.e., in the epistemological and psychological context, but, again, I dare say that one cannot fully understand his claims about the real nature of the metaphysical universal without assuming the theory of intentionality. The given label is to be taken also as the evidence that Suárez’s epistemological and metaphysical system cannot be taken only as the system which grew out of Thomism.86 (4) I have to say that the given label corresponds also with the overall tendency of Suárez’s metaphysics in general, which I call the “epistemologization” of metaphysics.87 The propensity can be detected at the very beginning of Suárez’s Disputationes metaphysicae (DM 1), where Suárez deals with the issue of the specific unity of metaphysics. Here, he affirms that there is a significant difference between two kinds of abstraction, namely, the abstraction from matter in the case of immaterial entities (the necessary abstraction), and in the case of transcendental properties (the permitted abstraction).88 However that distinction of those types “entities” does not imply the progressive scission of metaphysics into ontology and natural theology. Suárez is convinced that according to our knowledge and reasoning (prout in nostram considerationem cadunt), the abstraction concerning the transcendental properties cannot be distinguished from the sort

86  I have completely left aside the basic influence of Scotus, who can be regarded as the most important historical determinant of Suárez’s ontological and metaphysical doctrine of universals. Even though Suárez diminishes the Scotistic formal distinction by the conceptual distinction, the structural similarity of their doctrine is omnipresent. 87  Cf. Daniel Heider, “The nature of Suárez’s Metaphysics. Disputationes Metaphysicae and Their Main Systematic Strains,” Studia Neoaristotelica 6.1 ( 2009): 99-110. 88 Suárez, DM 1.3.2.

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of abstraction concerning the immaterial reality, which is enough to safeguard the specific unity of metaphysics.89

89  Cf. Daniel Heider, “The unity of Suárez’s metaphysics,” Medioevo XXXIV, a cura M. Forlivesi, 2009, 475-505. See also DM 1.3.10.

Chapter 7 John Duns Scotus’s Approach to Metaphysics Ludger Honnefelder

I

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n every era of philosophy there are philosophers who are important primarily because they introduced a new way of thinking. They owe their lasting significance more to the new horizons they opened than to the concrete solutions they developed in detail. Aristotle and Kant are without doubt philosophers of this kind, as might be Husserl and Frege in the twentieth century. In the middle ages, John Duns Scotus is the foremost philosopher of this kind. No single medieval author before him changed philosophical discourse to quite the same extent; none had such lasting influence.1 One could say that ‘after Scotus’ philosophers and theologians thought and spoke differently. One has only to read Ockham, Buridan and Gerson, or the Thomists of the fifteenth century, to recognize the difference in argumentation. The new standards of conceptual analysis and argumentation reach beyond the circle of Scotus’s immediate followers. In addition, the theoretical framework became radically altered. The philosophical discipline which exemplifies this most strikingly is metaphysics. What is it that made Scotus’s way of dealing with this discipline so important that its influence reaches well beyond the middle ages to Suárez, Wolff, and Kant? A closer analysis reveals that 1 Scotus’s far-reaching influence can be seen impressively in John Doyle’s numerous important contributions to the history of the first and second Scholasticism and to the history of philosophy in the following seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

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the reason for this influence lies in Scotus’s approach and method. The next question, then, is: how does Scotus develop his approach and method against a rich historical background? And what is the new aspect that exercises such lasting influence? My contention is that Scotus put the question ‘how is metaphysics possible’ at the heart of his discussion; his views on the potential of metaphysics and its limits were determined by his answer to this central question.2 What made the question ‘how is metaphysics possible’ so urgent for Scotus was a certain constellation of historical facts. In my paper I will deal first (I) with the historical background, then (II) with Scotus’s approach to metaphysics and (III) his method. Finally (IV), I will add a few remarks on Scotus’s influence.

II The essential elements of the historical background are well known. On the one hand, there are the soteriological considerations central to the Franciscan theological tradition: a new view on the history of salvation with its contingency and historicity and a deeper appreciation of individuality, freedom and matter—to mention only these keywords. On the other hand, there is the scientific rationality defined by Aristotle, whose highest ideal is metaphysics as the ‘first philosophy.’ Obviously, it is the Franciscan tradition that made Scotus aware of the problematic aspects of Aristotelian metaphysics and its Arabic interpretations and systematizations.3 Most problematic for Scotus were the questionable scientific status of metaphysics, its uncertain epistemological scope, and its close connection with a specific cosmological world view. ‘First philosophy,’ as described by Aristotle, is either totally dependent on physics or it assumes a status it cannot warrant because it

2  Cf. the former contribution: L. Honnefelder, “Wie ist Metaphysik möglich? Ansatz und Methode der Metaphysik bei Johannes Duns Scotus,” Via scoti. Methodologia ad mentem Ioannis Duns Scotis. Atti del Congresso Scotistico Internazionale, Roma 9-11 marzo 1993, ed. L. Sileo, Rome, 1995, 77-93. 3  Cf. in more detail, L. Honnefelder, “Franciscan Spirit and Aristotelian Rationality: John Duns Scotus’ Approach to Theology and Philosophy,” Franciscan Studies 66 (2008): 465-478.

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lacks an adequate understanding of the First.4 Regarding the scope of its understanding, metaphysics either attempts too much by claiming a knowledge of being that would render superfluous all other sciences, or it unduly restricts itself so that it deals only with the quiddity of the objects of sensory experience. It is the theology of revelation that makes Scotus aware of these unresolved questions because claims of theology and metaphysics are so deeply affected by metaphysical considerations. If metaphysics remains within the range of physics, all knowledge of motionless and immaterial being would be impossible, even by revelation. If metaphysics claims a comprehensive natural knowledge of ‘first things,’ then theology like the other sciences would become superfluous. Apart from these formal problems, Scotus was concerned about the problematic implications of Aristotelian metaphysics. Precisely, those elements which make metaphysics a science, namely, invariant universal natures and universal concepts, and the necessity of causal relations that enable us to reach logically compelling conclusions, are connected with assumptions that endanger theology, for certain elements of Aristotelian and Arabic concept of metaphysics fundamentally contradict Christian revelation. Where Aristotelian metaphysics assumes the primacy of universals and necessitarianism, the Christian faith presupposes contingency, divine freedom and the priority of the individual over the universal. How can metaphysics and the theology of revelation co-exist, if metaphysics assumes a cosmology that flatly contradicts the views on history, freedom, individuality and personhood demanded by the Christian faith? The formal and material inconsistencies between the traditional Aristotelian and Arabic conception of metaphysics and the Christian faith would have provided Scotus with adequate reasons for rejecting the claims of metaphysics on theological grounds or for subordinating the claims of metaphysics to those of revelation like Augustine and Bonaventure. Remarkably, that is not what happens. Scotus’s argument does not—as many interpreters in the past, É. Gilson regrettably 4  Cf. in more detail L. Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens. Der Begriff

des Seienden als solchen als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus, 2nd ed. (Münster: Aschendorff, 1989), esp. 1-143; idem, Johannes Duns Scotus (München: C.H. Beck, 2005), 27-73.

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too,5 suppose—aim at the subordination of metaphysics to theology, as a reading of the relevant texts in the critical edition proves. Instead, Scotus intends to save metaphysics for the sake of theology. To save metaphysics is indispensable for Scotus if he is to maintain, the unity of God as redeemer and creator, the right relation of nature and grace and the cognitive dimension of the act of faith proclaimed by revelation. Scotus explicitly states that revelation can be understood only if the meaning of the words of revelation are naturally familiar to us.6 Meaningful revealed sentences presuppose semantically significant terms; their truth claims require that the most crucial term, ‘God,’ be a term regarding which revealed divine attributes can be predicated without contradiction. Everything depends on having at our disposal a term that can meaningfully refer to an immaterial, motionless, and transcendent being, despite the fact that such beings are not part of our sense experience, and all knowledge originates with the senses. It must be possible to form a concept that can refer at least indirectly to a transcendent being. In short, it is the necessity and possibility of revelation that forces Scotus to tackle the question whether knowledge that transcends sense experience is possible, even necessary. The rediscovery of Aristotelian scientific rationality, with its claims to universal and necessary truth, made this an urgent problem. Since these claims are proper to our God-given reason, Scotus has no doubt that the truth claims of theology, like those of metaphysics, must be scientifically maintained. That is why Scotus cannot deal with the necessity and possibility of theology without discussing the possibility and necessity of revelation, just as he cannot establish the possibility of, and necessity for, metaphysics without discussing our capacity for and need of transcendental knowledge. What is more, Scotus discovered in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics not just the means for elucidating the relation between metaphysics and theology, but also a way to

5  Cf. É. Gilson, Johannes Duns Scotus. Einführung in die Grundgedanken seiner Lehre (Düsseldorf: L. Schwann, 1959), esp. 35f. Criticising Gilson, cf. C. Bérubé, “Interprétations virtualisantes de la thèse scotiste de 1’objet de l’intellect,” Laurentianum 86 (1967): 234-250, 380-401; L. Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens, 92. 6 Cf. Ord. prol., p. 3, q. 1-3, nn. 202-203, ed. Vat. I, 136f.; cf. also L. Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens, 29-39.

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establish the limits of metaphysics itself and to discriminate between its legitimate and illegitimate claims.7 In this endeavour Scotus’s most important predecessor was Avicenna, with whom Scotus first became acquainted in the teaching of Henry of Ghent.8 Avicenna used the scientific theory he found in the Posterior Analytics to separate the legitimate from the illegitimate claims of metaphysics, as well as to establish the subject of metaphysics. Scotus could not simply adopt the solutions proposed by Henry and Avicenna, because their critique was not sufficiently radical. Avicenna determined the scope of reason on the basis of revelation;9 Henry made unacceptable claims for knowledge by illumination.10

III If we keep in mind that the conflict between revelation and AristotelianArabic metaphysics was what prompted Scotus to apply the standards of Aristotelian scientific rationality to Aristotelian metaphysics, it will be clear why for Scotus the answer to the question how metaphysics is possible establishes the approach and methodology of metaphysics. Like Avicenna, Scotus establishes the unity and the scope of a science in terms of its subject (subiectum). For if science is to be more than the knowledge of specific facts, it must be unified, as Aristotle tells us. That unity must be established in terms of a single concept that as a sentence subject extends to all other sentences pertaining to that science. Such a subject is also the first in the order of adequacy and thus is the object that establishes the scope of that science.11 “Science” (episteme), i.e., the knowledge of such a sentential complex, Aristotle describes as a habitual quality of the rational soul. Consequently, the subject of such a science and the object of our faculties are connected. 7  Cf. in more detail L. Honnefelder, “Der zweite Anfang der Metaphysik. Voraussetzungen, Ansätze und Folgen der Wiederbegründung der Metaphysik im 13./14. Jahrhundert,” in eds., J.P. Beckmann , L. Honnefelder, G. Schrimpf, G. Wieland, Philosophie im Mittelalter. Entwicklungslinien und Paradigmen (Hamburg: Meiner, 1987), 165-186. 8  Cf. ibid., 169-172. 9 Cf. Ord. prol., p. 1, q. un., n.33, ed. Vat. I, 19f. 10 Cf. Ord. I, d. 3, p. 1, q. un., n. 125, ed. Vat. III, 78. 11 Cf. Met. VI, q. 1, n. 8, ed. Viv. VII, 308; Ord. prol., p. 3, q. 1-3, n. 142, ed. Vat. I, 96; Lect. prol., p. 2, q. 1-3, n. 71, ed. Vat. XVI, 28.

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And the converse is also true; the first most adequate object of a faculty determines the first subject of scientific knowledge, particularly of a first science. Of course, here we must distinguish between what is scientifically knowable in itself (ex ratione potentiae) by an unqualified faculty and the kind of science attainable by us in the conditions of our present life (in aliquo statu) or as Scotus says between scientia secundum se scibilis and scientia in nobis.12 We can see the significance of what has been established here in the prologue and third distinction of book one, both in the Lectura and in the Ordinatio.13 The answer to the question whether theology can be a science presupposes that metaphysics is possible, since only an appropriate metaphysics can supply a concept that can stand for the first subject of theology. The first subject of the sort of metaphysics possible for us is determined in turn by the first object of our reason. In a comprehensive fashion never before achieved, Scotus describes how the subjects of theology and metaphysics are determined by the scope and limits of our capacity for knowledge—in a certain sense, this is a critique of reason. The result of this critique14 is the claim that the primary object, adequate to the capacity of the human intellect is the common notion of “being,” not the excellent being of God or of substance, not any object at all whose virtual causality would permit us to know any being positively. The entire scope of the common concept of being (ens secundum totam indifferentiam ad omnia in quibus salvatur)15 is accessible only to the receptivity of the intellect. In its activity the intellect can grasp, at most, only what is abstractly intelligible on the basis of sense experience (ut est ‘quoddam unum intelligibile’).16 Even this concept cannot function as a first common predicate in the strict sense. For it can serve as a primum in the order of common predication only in a twofold 12 Cf. Ord. I, d. 3, p.1, q. 3, nn. 186-187, ed. Vat. III, 112-114; Ord. prol., p. 3, q. 1-3, n. 141, ed. Vat. I, 95f.; cf. L. Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens, 3-11, 55-98. 13 Cf. Ord. prol., p. 3, q. 1-3; ibid., I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3; Lect. prol., p. 2, q. 1-3; ibid., I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1-2; cf. L. Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens, 3-43, 5598, 144-168. 14  Cf. L. Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens, 55-98, esp. 94-98. 15  Ord. I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 127, ed. Vat. III, 79. 16  Ord. n. 124, ed. Vat. III, 76ff.

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complementary way, in quid vel in quale, and consequently it can only serve as a ‘substitute’ for the first object.17 According to Scotus, it is this concept of ‘being’ that takes the place of the first subject of the kind of metaphysics which is possible in our present state.18 Here Scotus’s determination regarding the subject of metaphysics was to have far-reaching consequences regarding a problem that was inherent in the Aristotelian corpus and greatly concerned his predecessors among the Latin authors of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.19 The central question is whether first philosophy is a science of being as being, because it deals with the excellent being of God or substance, i.e., with the paradigm instance of being. Or is metaphysics the science of being, because it is concerned with the general predicate ‘being,’ i.e., the concept of being? To put it another way: is metaphysics onto-theo-logy, i.e., the science of the first in a sequence of beings? Or should we consider metaphysics as ontology, i.e., as the science of being as a whole? Aristotle himself prefers the first approach because of the difficulties inherent in conceiving ‘being’ as a common predicate.20 But for Scotus even this first approach of metaphysics as ontological theology is bound to fail, because it presupposes an unwarranted claim to innate knowledge or knowledge by illumination regarding an excellent first being and therefore cannot fulfill its essential function as a foundation for theology or for the unity of our knowledge. For this reason, Scotus must re-examine and discuss further the solution rejected by Aristotle, namely, metaphysics as a science that deals with being as a common predicate. In this regard Avicenna’s similar discussion served as a model, though Scotus considered it incomplete and defective. The result was the first consistent 17 Cf. Ord. n. 137, ed. Vat. III, 85; Lect. I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1-2, n. 104, ed. Vat. XVI, 263f.; cf. L. Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens, 313-343. 18  Cf. L. Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens, 99-143. 19  Cf. A. Zimmermann, Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert. Texte und Untersuchungen, 2nd ed. (Leuven: Peeters, 1998); L. Honnefelder, “Der zweite Anfang.” 20  Cf. in more detail L. Honnefelder, “‘Einheit der Realität’ oder ‘Realität als Einheit’—Metaphysik als Frage nach der Welt im ganzen,” in ed., O. Marquard, Einheit und Vielheit. XVI. Deutscher Kongress f. Philosophie, 21.26-9-1987 (Hamburg, 1990), 72-85.

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study of metaphysics as ontology, that is, as a science of the concept of being.

IV The texts themselves reveal the extent to which Scotus’s scientific approach of determining the possibility of metaphysics via a critique of reason shapes the methodological form of metaphysics. The determination of the primary object of reason in Ordinatio and Lectura I d.321 is, by and large, a determination of the primary subject of metaphysics; it is already part of the execution of the metaphysical program itself, the part that could be called the formal analysis of the concept of being. This represents the analytical part of Scotus’s method. In detail, this part consists of an analysis of predication in which Scotus distinguishes between quidditative (in quid) and denominative (in quale) predication. The analysis further resolves the predicate concepts into simpler ones that are related like act and potency. This yields a concept of being that is (1) contained in all other quidditative concepts and (2) cannot be further resolved since its content is absolutely simple and hence primary and distinctly knowable. The analysis of concepts predicable in quale reveals that some of them can be broken down into quidditative and qualitative components, as in the case of specific differences; others are purely qualitative like those that pertain to last differences, to convertible transcendentals or pure perfections. In both cases, we encounter concepts that indicate not a quid but a pure quale and hence are called ‘being’ only denominatively, since we can grasp them only as determinations of something that itself can be called being in the quidditative sense. Scotus’s formal analysis of metaphysics is composed of several methodological elements; the conceptual resolution handed down by Aristotle and further developed by Avicenna, and the formal distinction that originated with Richard Rufus of Cornwall.22 Both elements are linked to the noetic-noematic parallelism which can be called the epistemological basis of Scotistic philosophy.23 Scotus contends that a concept that proves to be a conceptus simplex or even a conceptus 21 Cf. Ord. I, d. 3, p.1, q.1-3; Lect. I, d. 3, p.1, q.1-3. 22  Cf. G. Gál, “Opiniones Ricardi Rufi a censore reprobatae,” Franciscan Studies 35 (1975):136-193, 142-144. 23  Cf. L. Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens, 168-175.

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simpliciter simplex must correspond to a simple or absolutely simple content. And if a distinct concept (in the sense of a conceptus proprius) is always related to a definite formal content, then differences between distinct concepts always indicate a formal non-identity of objects, which non-identiy is logically prior to thought.24 In this way, Scotus can show that certain quidditative and qualitative contents are simple or absolutely simple and that some qualitative determinations, with regard to their formal contents, are perfections or determinations which are convertible with ‘being.’ In addition to conceptual resolution and formal distinction, there is a third methodological element, namely, the modal distinction. It is this element which makes it possible to conceive of being as a trans-categorially univocal concept without being entangled in the aporia that deterred Aristotle from an investigation of being as a whole. If ‘being’ were a proper concept (conceptus proprius), it would have contents distinct from all other objects. But ‘being’ cannot have such separate objects, since if it did, then all other objects would be non-beings. Here, the Scotistic distinctio modalis applies according to which it is possible to grasp a realitas as an intensio in abstraction from its intrinsic mode. Admittedly, such a concept of a reality without its mode is, as Scotus points out, an imperfect concept because it does not grasp the thing (res) in its positive intensity; nevertheless it is a real concept caused by the thing.25 If one conceives ‘being’ as such as an imperfect concept, then it is possible to grasp the element in it that belongs either “in quid” or “in quale” to any being whatsoever and leaves nothing outside its range except “not-being.” As Scotus points out in his new definition of univocal predication,26 the trans-categorially common element grasped with the concept of being is sufficient to yield a contradiction in the case of simultaneous affirmation and negation. Hence the determination which is grasped and stated with the concept of “being” is conceived of like a quiddity, though it is no longer a quiddity. In the same way in which Avicenna’s consideratio absoluta 24 Cf. Ord. I, d. 2, p. 2, q. 1-4, nn. 399-402, ed. Vat. II, 355f.; Lect. I, d. 2, p. 2, q.1-4, nn. 271-273. 25 Cf. Lect. I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, n. 129, ed. Vat. XVII, 46f.; cf. also L. Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens, 365-382. 26 Cf. Ord. I, d. 3, p.1, q. 1-2, n. 26, ed. Vat. III,18.

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grasps ad se the determination of a horse that it is a horse, i.e., without the connotation of a suppositum—Scotus also calls this an abstractio ultima27—, the determination, belonging to all beings, that they are is grasped ad se. However, ‘being’ is no longer a quidditative determination but a determination belonging to all quidditative determinations. In relation to all limiting determinations it is wholly undetermined and determinable, but compared to the determination “not-being” it is the most “determined determination.”28 Thus it is the analytical part of metaphysics in which Scotus proves the possibility of an—albeit qualified—knowledge of the primary object of the intellect and a corresponding knowledge of the first subject of metaphysics. And this analytical part consists methodologically in the connection of an analysis of predication, a conceptual analysis, and the modal distinction. The first type of analysis shows that ‘being’ has a trans-categorially univocal unity of meaning, the second that an absolutely simple concept is grasped with this concept of being. The modal distinction proves that a non-exclusive cognition of being is possible. Admittedly this ‘transcensus’ over the categorial predicates comprehends only a minimal, comparatively ‘empty’ element. But for Scotus the foundation not only for the unity of our knowledge of the world and the possibility of metaphysics as ontology, but also for the knowledge concerning God and the possibility of theology, depends on the success of this ‘transcensus.’ It is exactly this categorially ‘empty’ unity of meaning that makes it possible to predicate ‘being’ of substance and accident alike without abolishing the original real difference (primo diversa) between them.29 What the formal analysis reveals is the framework of understanding that allows one to conceive of the Christian God and renounce neither his ontological transcendence nor his immanence in the history of salvation. 27 Cf. Lect. I, d. 5, p. 1, q. un., nn. 21-23, ed. Vat. XVI, 417f.; Ord. I, d. 5, p. 1, q. un. nn., 18-22, ed. Vat. IV, 17-21; cf. also L. Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens, 212-218. 28  Thus with regard to Scotus, H. Blumenberg, Beiträge zum Problem der Ursprünglichkeit der mittelalterlich-scholastischen Ontologie, Phil. Diss., Kiel 1947, 41ff. 29 Cf. Ord. I d.3 p.1 q.3 n. 133, ed. Vat. III 82f.; Lect. I d. 3 p.1 q. 1-2 n. 68 and 101, ed.Vat. XVI 250 and 262; cf. also L. Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens, 152f., 310-313, 343-395.

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However, the analysis of predication, resolution of concepts, and formal as well as modal distinction represent only the first part of metaphysics. It has been proved that metaphysics as the science of being qua being is possible in the form of a science concerning the concept ‘being,’ yet its completeness is still unproved. We have reached the cognition of a transcendental concept, but not the cognition of transcendent beings, which is traditionally attributed to metaphysics. Even the concept of ‘being,’ though its knowability has been proven, remains empty in its positive meaning. For everything is conceived as ‘being,’ the analysis shows,30 but ‘being’ itself cannot be known and defined as something since it is a first, simply simple content. Metaphysics therefore needs a second, synthetic part, of which Scotus however has set out only certain elements, especially in the context of the proof for God’s existence. Methodologically, this synthetic part is carried out by contrasting ‘being’ with its opposite, through the demonstration of the convertible transcendental determinations of ‘being,’ and through the explication of its modes in the form of a demonstration of disjunctive transcendental determinations of ‘being.’ The first part is developed by Scotus in Quodl. q. 3 where he explains the absolutely simple ratio ‘being’ by contrasting it against its opposite ‘non-being.’31 Since that which cannot possibly be because it contains a contradiction, is simply nothing, ‘being’ in its minimal transcendental meaning can be described as that which is not nothing, or to put it positively, as that which can exist outside the mind since its contents are not in contradiction either to each other or to existence. In short, it is explicable as that “to which being is not repugnant” (hoc cui non repugnat esse).32 According to Scotus, it can be known “evidentissime” that certain properties (passiones) like “true” and “good” are coextensive with ‘being’

30 Cf.Ord.I,d.2,p.1,q.1-2,n.132,ed.Vat.II,207;De primo principio c.4 concl.9, ed. Kluxen l02. 31 Cf. Quodl., q. 3, n. 2, ed. Viv. XXV, 113f.; cf. in more detail L. Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens. Die formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realitat in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit (Duns Scotus - Suárez Wolff – Kant - Peirce) (Hamburg: Meiner, 1990), 6ff. 32 Cf. Ord. I, d. 43, q. un., n. 7, ed. Vat. VI, 354; ibid., IV, d. 1, q. 2, n. 8, ed. Viv. XVI, 108.

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qua being.33 Obviously Scotus relies here on a demonstratio propter quid, i.e., a demonstration from insight into the content of ‘being.’ Yet this deducibility propter quid does not apply to determinations like finite/infinite, contingent/necessary, etc., which are coextensive with being in a disjunctive form. The formal analysis shows that ‘being’ does not necessarily connote finitude, but it does not show that infinity can belong to being. For that purpose one has to rely on a demonstratio quia, which starts from the observation that the minor member, namely, contingent being, exists and ascends from the contingent being considered as effect to the necessary being considered as its cause. Characteristically this demonstration does not take place on the level of actual existence but on the level of the inherent and, as such, necessary possibility.34 In the proof for God’s existence, this means that his existence is demonstrated via the demonstration of the completeness of the disjunctive notion of ‘being.’ Thus Scotus manages to remain consistent with his determination of the subject of metaphysics. The subject of metaphysics is nothing but the concept ‘being;’ God is known only insofar as the complete disjunctive notion of ‘being’ is known. But the demonstratio quia of a first being is only the first part in the modal explication, as the proof of God’s existence in Ordinatio and Lectura I d. 2 and in De primo principio shows. A second part consists in the proof that the First being is conceivable only as a being that is infinite according to its inner intensive mode. In this context Scotus sets out the methodologically interesting argument that the connection of ‘being’ and ‘infinite’ represents a thought content that can not only be thought of without contradiction but allows the intellect to rest (quiescit) in the fullest sense, because it represents the content of its primary object “to the highest degree.”35 For if we have to take being as a non-categorial “magnitude of power” (quantitas virtutis) and 33 Cf. Lect. I, d. 2, p.1, q. 1-2, n. 84, ed. Vat. XVI, 141; ibid., I, d. 39, q. 1-5, n. 39, ed. Vat. XVI, 490f.; Ord. I, d. 2, p. l, q. 1-2, nn. 132-133, ed. Vat. II, 207. 34  Cf. The proof of the existence for God in Ord. I, d. 2, p. 1, q. 1-2; Lect. I, d. 2, p.1, q.1- 2; De primo principio, c. 3; cf. in more detail, L. Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens, 158-199. 35 Cf. Ord. I,d. 2, p. 1, q. 1-2, nn. 135-138, ed. Vat. II, 208-210; De primo principio, c. 4 concl. 9, n.79, ed. Kluxen 104f.; cf. also L. Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens, 186-199.

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“infinity” as its “inner mode,” then the concept composed of these two elements signifies a “simul totum” of being to the highest degree possible for us, i.e., one “which lacks no being in the way in which a single being is able to possess the totality of being.”36 Hence while the analytical part leads to the transcendental character of the meaning of the ratio entis, the synthetic part leads to the cognition of the content of its meaning via the cognition of an infinite being.37

V The significance of Scotus’s approach and method is not to the least extent revealed by its historical effects. With regard to this rich and varied, but to a large part still unwritten history of the influence of Scotus’s metaphysics I wish to point to four particularly significant aspects.38 1. The first aspect to be mentioned is Scotus’s formal point of view. I mean the method based on Avicenna’s consideratio absoluta and developed with the help of the theory of formal non-identity, which considers the formal contents of our concepts “as such.” It was particularly emphasized by Scotus’s pupils and adopted outside his own schools as well. But it is connected with a considerable shift of emphasis. The traditional orientation of metaphysics towards the concept of substance is replaced by an interest in formal structures. The attention of the metaphysician is no longer directed primarily towards the ad se of eidetic structures. The immediate starting point for this formal approach are the meanings of our words. Therefore, it is not surprising that the formal point of view is retained also without its noetic-noematic parallel—as in William of Ockham and his schools—and leads to what we can call in anticipation a universal formal semantics.39 What Charles S. Peirce refers to and develops further is this formal 36 Cf. Quodl., q. 5, n. 4, ed. Viv. XXV, 199f.; cf. also L. Honnefelder,” Metaphysik und Transzendenz. Überlegungen zu Johannes Duns Scotus im Blick auf Thomas von Aquin und Anselm von Canterbury,” in eds., L. Honnefelder and W. Schüßler, Transzendenz. Zu einem Grundwort der Metaphysik (FS K. Kremer) (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1992), 137-161. 37  Cf. ibid. 38  Cf. in more detail L. Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens Schluß; idem, Johannes Duns Scotus, 132-148. 39  Cf. L. Honnefelder, Der zweite Anfang, 182 ff.

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point of view and the understanding of the reality of the formal ad se, which, thought brought to light in our thinking, is nevertheless prior to our thinking.40 2. The formal point of view is linked to a second aspect relevant to the ensuing historical development, namely, the transcendental point of view. The question about the excellent first as the paradigm of being is transformed into the question about the first object of cognition, i.e., about the trans-categorially common concept of ‘being.’ The option of metaphysics in the form of onto-theo-logy is replaced by the option of metaphysics in the form of ontology. The investigation about being considered as a sequence is replaced by the investigation about being as a whole. The ‘transcensus’ of metaphysics becomes a ‘regress’ to the trans-categorial concepts through which the world as a whole, including beings that transcend experience, becomes an object of our thought. For the first time the momentous term “transcendental science” (scientia transcendens)41 is used to characterize metaphysics, and that in a twofold way. It investigates being insofar as it investigates the concept ‘being’ obtained through analysis which transcends the categories. It investigates only this concept ‘being’ and its coextensive or disjunctive properties. Thus once and for all a dividing line is drawn that separates metaphysics from physics and all other sciences. Metaphysics precedes them as “first philosophy,” insofar as it is about the “transcendentalia,” i.e., the trans-categorial concepts. So the theory of transcendentals, which in Thomas forms only a small part of metaphysics, becomes the sole and proper subject of this discipline. Thus for the first time metaphysics is studied as ontology, i.e., in form of a transcendental science, a concept originating with Aristotle but not carried out by him. It will have a decisive influence in the history of this discipline, not only with regard to the early and late Scotism and the Ockham school but also with regard to Spanish late Scholasticism; and via Suárez, the German Schulmetaphysik, Christian Wolff and Kant it will continue to exercise its influence.42 When Kant 40  Cf. L. Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens, 382-402. 41 Cf. Met. prol. n. 18, OPh III 9: “… necesse est esse aliquam scientiam universalem, quae per se consideret illa transcendentia. Et hanc scientiam vocamus metaphysicam, quae dicitur a ‘meta’, quod est trans, et ‘ycos’, ‘scientia’, quasi transcendens scientia, quia est de transcendentibus.” 42  Cf. in more detail, L. Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens, 200-381, 403-486.

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refers to the “transcendental philosophy of the old” in the Critique of Pure Reason43 as a structural ancestor, he means the concept of metaphysics originating with Scotus. 3. The third historically momentous aspect I wish to mention is the modal point of view, which is closely tied to the transcendental point of view inherent in this concept of metaphysics. The effect is not only that modalities like possible/impossible and finite/infinite are held to be the decisive aspects for the explication of ‘being,’ but also that these modalities themselves are conceived in a new way.44 This applies to the concept of the possible, which for the first time since Aristotle is understood as a modality independent of any reference to a faculty or potency.45 The concept of the contingent is freed of all the cosmological implications which it still retains in Aquinas. Finally, it applies to the concept of infinity, which is being related entirely to the inner mode of a non-categorial intensity. Only after Scotus can we speak of an ontological theory of modalities in the proper sense, and this theory exercises a formative influence not only on metaphysics, but on natural philosophy as well, like that of John Buridan, and via natural philosophy on the developing natural science.46 43  Critique of Pure Reason, B 114. Cf. L. Honnefelder,” Metaphysics as a Discipline: From the ‘Transcendental Philosophy of the Ancients’ to Kant’s Notion of Transcendental Philosophy,” in eds., R.L. Friedmann and L.O. Nielsen, The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400-1700 (Dordrecht-Boston-London: Reidel, 2003), 53-74. 44  Cf. in more detail L. Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens, 1-199. 45  Cf. also S. Knuuttila, Time and Modality in Scholasticism, in ed., S. Knuuttila, Reforging the Great Chain of Being. Studies in the History of Modal Theories (Boston-London: Dordrecht, 1981), 163-257; cf. also S. Knuuttila, Modalities in Medieval Philosophy (Routledge: London-New York 1993). 46  Cf. G. Krieger, “Motus est intrinsice aliter et aliter se habere. Die Zuständlichkeit der Natur als Konsequenz des ursprünglich praktischen Weltverhältnisses des Menschen,” in, ed., A. Zimmermann , Mensch und Natur im Mittelalter, Miscellania Mediaevalia XXI/l (Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991), 195-212; G. Krieger, “Natur im Verständnis des Spätmittelalters: Die Entdeckung des Primats der Methode in der Metaphysik des Johannes Buridanus,” in eds., E. Ströcker and L. Schäfer, Naturauffassungen in Philosophie, Wissenshaft, Technik (Freiburg-Munich: Verlag Alber, 1993).

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4. These three methodological elements together result in a fourth historically important aspect, namely, in a certain formal structure of metaphysics. It is the formal transcendental point of view that opens up and secures the possibility of metaphysics. And it is the modal point of view from which the realisation of this possibility is demonstrated, so that the analytic part of metaphysics is followed by a synthetic part. To what extent this formal, methodological structure, too, has its historical effect can be observed not only in the structure of Suárez’s and Wolff ’s metaphysics but also on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Kant adheres to this structure not only in the ordering of the analytic and synthetic parts but also in the systematic connection of the three concepts “transcendental object” (or “objective reality”), omnitudo realitatis, and ens realissimum. This can be read as the reformulation of the connection as seen by Scotus between the abstractive concept ‘being,’ ‘being’ as the primary object of our intellect according to the nature of its capacity, and ‘infinite being’ as the completion of being (simul totum) in a single being.47

47  Cf. in more detail L. Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens.

Chapter 8 Thomistic Ornithology: A Brief Note1 Jack Marler

I

n his treatise De ente et essentia, Thomas Aquinas remarked that “I can know what a man or a phoenix is and still be ignorant whether it has being in reality.”2 Regarding what is said in that treatise about the phoenix, Anthony Kenny maintained that Thomas was attempting to show a real distinction between essence (essentia) and existence (esse) on the basis of an essence understood as the definition of a word and not as the definition of an actual entity: I know that a phoenix is an Arabian bird of gorgeous plumage that has a life-span of six hundred years, after which it burns itself to ashes, and then emerges with renewed youth to live through another cycle. I can know this without knowing whether there is any such thing in existence as a phoenix. In fact, I have a pretty shrewd idea that there is no such thing, and I suspect St. Thomas did too; but there is nothing in the concept of phoenix that I have just enunciated to show whether there is or is not such a thing. If this is what is meant by the distinction between essence and existence, then 1  For his patience during my months of infirmity when I could write nothing at all, I am most grateful to Prof. Victor Salas. 2  “… possum enim intelligere quid est homo vel Phoenix et tamen ignorare an esse habeat in rerum natura.” Thomas d’Aquin, De ente et essentia, edited and treated by Marie-Dominique Roland-Gosselin, O.P. (Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1948), capitulum quartum, 34. For the translation into English, see Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence, translated by Armand Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1968), chapter 4, paragraph 5, 55.

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the thesis is quite unproblematic…. When he says, however, that I understand the essence of phoenix, he can only mean that I know what the word ‘phoenix’ means: he cannot mean that I have made a scientific study of phoenixes, as there aren’t any around for me to study. I know the essence of phoenix in the sense that I have a concept of phoenix, the concept that is exhibited in my mastery of the use of the word. In these terms, the doctrine of the real distinction may be expressed thus: I can grasp a concept without knowing whether the concept is instantiated.3

Kenny, in effect, was arguing that Thomas had supported his thesis concerning the real distinction between essence and existence in created beings by confusing the definition according to a name (what Aristotle called the κατὰ τoὔνομα λόγoς) with the definition of a being (what Aristotle called the λόγος τῆς οὐσιας).4 That the definition according to a name is not to be confused with the definition of a being was, of course, among the lessons of Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics: Since, therefore, to define is to prove either a thing’s essential nature or the meaning of its name, we may conclude that definition, if it in no sense proves essential nature, is a set of words signifying precisely what a name signifies. But that were a strange consequence; for (i) both what is not substance and what does not exist at all would be definable, since even non-existents can be signified by a name: (2) all sets of words or sentences would be definitions, since any kind of sentence could be given a name; so that we should all be talking in definitions, and even the Iliad would be a definition: (3) no demonstration can prove that any particular name means any particular thing: neither, therefore, do definitions, in addition to revealing the meaning of a name, also reveal that the name has this meaning.5 3  Anthony Kenny, Aquinas on Being (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 35-36. 4 Aristotle, Categories 1.1A1-15, in the first volume of Aristotelis organon graece, ed. Theodor Waitz (Leipzig: Hahn, 1844-46), 2 volumes. 5 “Εἰ ἄρα ὁ ὁριζόμενος δείκνυσιν ἢ τί ἐστιν ἢ τί σημαίνει τοὔνομα εἰ μὴ ἔστι μηδαμῶς τοῦ τί ἐστιν εἴη ἂν ὁ ὁρισμὸς λόγος ὀνόματι τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνων. ἀλλ’ ἄτοπον. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ καὶ μὴ οὐσιῶν ἂν εἴη καὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων· σημαίνειν γὰρ ἔστι καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα. ἔτι πάντες οἱ λόγοι ὁρισμοὶ ἂν εἶεν· εἴη γὰρ ἂν ὄνομα θέσθαι ὁποιῳοῦν λόγῳ ὥστε ὅρους ἂν διαλεγοίμεθα πάντες καὶ ἡ Ἰλιὰς ὁρισμὸς ἂν εἴη. ἔτι οὐδεμία ἀπόδειξις

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Philosophy, in other words, is not primarily the philosophy of language. Should the definitions of things in being not be distinguished from the definitions of things in speech, what is true of any nominal essence (what Cajetan was to call the quidditas nominis) must also be true of any real essence (what Cajetan was to call the quidditas rei).6 Thus Thomas, some years after his writing the De ente et essentia, commenting upon the Posterior Analytics: “It is obvious, however, that definitions are given in every science … it is obvious that [scientific] ἀποδείξειεν ἂν ὅτι τοῦτο τοὔνομα τουτὶ δηλοῖ· οὐδ› οἱ ὁρισμοὶ τοίνυν τοῦτο προσδηλοῦσιν” (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 92B26-34, in Analytica priora et posteriora, ed. William David Ross [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978]). For the translation of the Posterior Analytics into English by Geoffrey Reginald Gilchrist Mure, see the first volume of The Works of Aristotle Translated into English, ed. William David Ross (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1928). 6  “… sicut quid rei est quidditas rei ita quid nominis est quidditas nominis: nomen autem cum essentialiter sit nota earum quae sunt obiectiue in anima passionum (ex primo Perihermeneias) non habet aliam quidditatem nisi hanc quod est signum alicuius rei intellectae seu cogitatae: signum autem ut sic relatiuum est ad signatum: unde cognoscere quid nominis nihil est aliud quam cognoscere ad quid tale nomen habet relationem ut signum ad signatum. Talis autem cognitio potest acquiri per accidentalia illius signati per communia per essentialia per nutus et quibusuis aliis modis sicut a Graeco quaerentibus nobis (quid nominis anthropos) si digito ostendatur homo iam percipimus quid nominis: et similiter de aliis. Interrogantibus uero quid rei oportet assignare id quod conuenit rei significatae in primo modo perseitatis adaequate. Et haec est essentialis differentia inter quid nominis et quid rei scilicet quod quid nominis est relatio nominis ad signatum; quid rei uero est rei relatae seu significatae essential: et ex hac differentia sequuntur omnes aliae quae dici solent puta quod quid nominis sit non entium complexorum per accidentalia per communia per extranea: quid rei uero est entium incomplexorum per propria et essentialia: relatio enim uocis potest terminari ad non entia in rerum natura et complexa et declarari per accidentalia et huiusmodi: essentia autem rei non nisi per propria essentialia habetur de entibus incomplexis” (Tommaso De Vio, Cardinal Caetano, Super librum de ente et essentia Sancti Thomae, in Opuscula omnia [Turin: apud haeredes Nicolai Beuiliaquae (con los herederos de Niccolò Bevilacqua), 1582], 335-336). This volume was consulted at the Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Granada.

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definitions do not signify this, that is, a mere interpretation of a name.”7 From the “mere interpretation of a name” (sola nominis interpretatio), accordingly, no real distinction between essence and existence should be inferred. If, therefore, what Kenny believes concerning the use that Thomas made of the phoenix in the De ente et essentia is correct, then it seems (1) that the treatise does not furnish adequate grounds by which to acknowledge any real distinction between essence and existence in created beings and (2) that the understanding of essences displayed by the author of the treatise may not be quite the same as that expounded later by the commentator on the Posterior Analytics. Against the outlook of Kenny, Brian Davies argued that there is no reason by which to opine that, for Thomas, the phoenix is such as to exist only as a name to which nothing better than a set of statements may correspond as the nominal essence. The salient features of his argument are eight in number: First, there is nothing in the writings of Aquinas to suggest that he disbelieved in the phoenix. Second, there are no clear reasons for supposing that thirteenth century thinkers, even sophisticated ones, thought of the phoenix as purely mythological. Third, there were Christian authors (‘authorities,’ indeed) prior to Aquinas who speak of the phoenix as a real creature: examples include Clement of Rome, Tertullian, St. Ambrose of Milan, and Isidore of Seville. Fourth, in his De animalibus, Albert the Great, with whom Aquinas actually worked, talks about and describes the phoenix without expressing disbelief in its existence. Fifth, in his commentary on Aristotle’s De caelo, Aquinas argues that ‘there is nothing to prevent an individual alone in its species from being generated and corrupted, as they say of the phoenix’—a conclusion which does not show Aquinas to be thinking of the phoenix as positively fictional. Sixth, in De ente et essentia, Aquinas links ‘phoenix’ and ‘human being,’ which suggests that he is here taking the phoenix and people to be interchangeable examples. Seventh, in his commentary on the 7  “Manifestum est autem quod in qualibet scientia dantur aliquae definitiones. Manifestum est ergo quod definitiones non significant hoc, scilicet solam nominis interpretationem” (Thomas Aquinas, Expositio libri posteriorum, ed. René Antoine Gauthier, O.P. [Paris: J. Vrin, 1989], 2 volumes, lib. 2, l. 6, n. 9). And see the translation into English by Fabian Richard Larcher, O.P. in Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle (Albany, New York: Magi Books, 1970).

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Sentences Aquinas links ‘phoenix’ and ‘eclipse’ as interchangeable examples. Finally, Kenny’s reading of Aquinas at this point requires that Aquinas could make sense of the notion of unreal essences, which he cannot. For Aquinas, essences are not fictional or mythological things. They are what actually existing things (or things existing at various times) have (or are). In the case of created essences, at any rate, they are what sort real beings into one of the ten Aristotelian categories.8

In his view that, for Thomas, the phoenix, like the ivory-billed woodpecker (Campephilus principalis), is among the genuine subjects of ornithology, Davies may or may not be correct. What, however, is not explained by the cogency of his objections to the thesis of Kenny is exactly why Thomas believed it good to mention the phoenix and not some such species better known to Europeans as, for example, the peregrine falcon. The peregrine falcon, after all, was and is a winged creature the reality of which has never been open to doubt. Because Albert the Great, as Davies knows and says, was indeed the mentor of Thomas, his full report, in De animalibus, concerning the phoenix deserves scrutiny: The phoenix is said to be a bird of Arabia, in the regions of the East. So write those who examine theological and mystical matters rather than matters of natural science. They say that this bird, having no mixing of male and female, is alone in its species and that it comes in cycles of, and lives alone for, three hundred forty years. It is, so they say, the size of an eagle, with the crowned head of a peacock. It also has wattled jaws and around its neck is a purple color, but with a golden glow to it. It has a long tail of purple hue but with some rose-colored feathers mixed in, just as some circles shaped like eyes are mixed into the peacock’s tail. This variation is a wondrous beauty. When it senses it is weighed down with age, it builds a nest in a tall, hidden tree situated over a clear pool. It builds it out of frankincense, myrrh, cinnamon, and other precious fragrances. It rushes into the nest and puts itself into the blazing rays of the sun which the resplendence of its wings intensifies until a fire is started. It thus burns and reduces itself to ashes along with its nest. On the next day, so they say, a worm is born in the ashes which, having assumed wings on the third day, is changed within a few days into a bird with its former shapes, whereupon it flies off. 8  Brian Davies, “Kenny on Aquinas on Being,” The Modern Schoolman 82.2 (2005): 118.

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They also say that the following once happened in Heliopolis, a city of Egypt. They say this bird, carrying these fragrances over a pile of logs used for sacrifices, burned itself up. Within view of the priest and by the previously mentioned method, it was, through two acts of generation, formed into a worm and a bird and flew away. As Plato says, “those things which are reported as written in the books of the sacred temples should not be scorned by us.”9

It will not escape the scrupulous reader that Albert opens his account of the phoenix in a manner similar to that by which he begins his treatment, also in De animalibus, of the griffin:

9 “Fenicem auem esse Arabiae  in Orientis partibus scribunt hii qui magis theologyca mistica quam naturalia perscrutantur. Dicunt autem hanc auem sine masculi et sexus commixtione solam in sua esse specie et uenire in orbem et trecentis quadraginta annis uiuere solitariam. Est autem ut dicunt aquilinae magnitudinis caput habens coronatum ut pauo fauces etiam habet cristatos circa collum uero fulgore aureo purpureus est caudam habet longam purpurei coloris pennis quibusdam roseis interscriptam sicut interscribitur cauda pauonis quibusdam orbibus ad modum oculorum formatis: et haec uarietas miras pulchritudinis. Cumque sentit se aetate grauari construit nidum in alta et abdita super limpidum fontem sila arbore ex thure et mirra et cinamomo et aliis aromatibus pretiosis et ruit in nidum et se radiis feruentibus solis obicit et illos resplendentia pennarum multiplicat donec ignis elicitur et sic se cum nido incendit et incinerat: dieque altero dicunt uermem in cineribus nasci qui alis die tertio assumptis infra paucos dies in auem pristinae figurae commutatur: et tunc auolat. Referunt etiam hic iam semel in Helyopoli Egipti ciuitate accidisse quod super compositioneru lignorum sacrificiorum auis haec aromata comportans se incendit et ad uisum sacerdotis prius dicto modo duabus generationibus uermis et auis formata est et auolauit: et sicut dicit Plato non sunt nobis calumnianda quae libris sacrorum delubrorum conscripta referuntur” (Albertus Magnus, De animalibus libri xxvi nach der Cölner Urschrift, ed. Hermann Stadler [Münster in Westfalen: Aschendorff, 1916-20], 2 volumes, lib. 23, cap. 24, [42]). For the translation into English by Kenneth F. Kitchell, Jr. and Irven Michael Resnick, see Albertus Magnus, On Animals: A Medieval Summa zoologica (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 2 volumes. For a thorough survey of the ancient literature, in Greek, devoted to the phoenix, see D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson, A Glossary of Greek Birds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895).

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That griffins are birds is more a statement made by the histories than something asserted by the expert findings of philosophers or by proofs based on natural philosophy [rationes physicae].10

In his declaring that those by whom he is informed about the phoenix are “those who examine theological and mystical matters rather than matters of natural science,” it seems evident that Albert does not affirm the existence of the phoenix without reservation and without qualification. For grounds by which to lend credence to beliefs published about the phoenix by “those who examine theological and mystical matters rather than matters of natural science,” Albert does no better than to invoke the fallacy of argumentum ad verecundiam by means of a statement wrongly attributed to Plato. In outline, the topics through which Albert explains the phoenix are much the same as those provided by Clement of Rome in Epistola ad Corinthios I: Let us consider that wonderful sign [of the resurrection] which takes place in eastern lands, that is, in Arabia and the countries round about. There is a certain bird which is called a phoenix. This is the only one of its kind, and lives five hundred years. And when the time of its dissolution draws near that it must die, it builds itself a nest of frankincense, and myrrh, and other spices, into which, when the time is fulfilled, it enters and dies. But as the flesh decays a certain kind of worm is produced, which, being nourished by the juices of the dead bird, brings forth feathers. Then, when it has acquired strength, it takes up that nest in which are the bones of its parent, and bearing these it passes from the land of Arabia into Egypt, to the city called Heliopolis. And, in open day, flying in the sight of all men, it places them on the altar of the sun, and having done this, hastens back to its former abode. The priests then inspect the registers of the dates, and find that it has returned exactly as the five hundredth year was completed.11 10 “Grifes aues esse magis tradunt hystoriae quam experta philosophorum uel rationes physicae” (Albertus Magnus, De animalibus lib. 23, cap. 24, [46]). The translation is by Kitchell and Resnick. 11 “[Ἴδω]μεν τὸ παράδοξον σημεῖον τὸ [γι]νόμενον ἐν τοῖς ἀνατολικοῖς [τό]ποις, τουτέστιν τοῖς περὶ τὴν Ἀραβίαν. Ὄρνεον γάρ ἐστιν ὃ προσονομάζεται φοίνιξ· τοῦτο μονογενὲς ὑπάρχον ζῃ ἔτη πεντακόσια, γενόμενόν τε ἤδη πρὸς ἀπόλυσιν τοῦ ἀποθανεῖν αὐτὸ σηκὸν ἑαυτῷ ποιεῖ ἐκ λιβάνου καὶ σμύρνης καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀρωμάτων εἰς ὃν πληρωθέντος τοῦ

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What is mentioned both by Albert and by Clement, and what seems to have escaped the notice of Kenny and Davies, is that the phoenix, like each of the angelic substances that Thomas discussed in the fourth chapter of his De ente et essentia, is believed to be one of a kind. The fact that the phoenix, as Albert reports, is said to be “alone in its species” (sola in sua specie) is the reason why he thought it good to mention the fabulous Arabian bird and not some other such legendary creature as the griffin or some such discernible actual entity as the peregrine falcon. Neither the griffin nor the peregrine falcon could have been understood by Thomas, or by anyone else, as one of a kind.12 To anyone schooled in the logic of unique existential quantification, symbolized by “∃!” or by “∃=1”, any claim to the effect that something is one of a kind may bear existential import; but, for Thomas and for Aristotle, neither of whom was acquainted with the Boolean interpretation of categorical statements or with such developments in the theories of quantifiers as occurred after the career of George Boole, χρόνου εἰσέρχεται καὶ τελευτᾷ· σηπομένης δὲ τῆς σαρκὸς σκώληξ τις γεννᾶται ὃς ἐκ τῆς ἰκμάδος τοῦ τετελευτηκότος ζῴου ἀνατρεφόμενος πτεροφυεῖ· εἶτα γενναῖος γενόμενος αἴρει τὸν σηκὸν ἐκεῖνον ὅπου τὰ ὀστᾶ τοῦ προγεγονότος ἐστίν καὶ ταῦτα βαστάζων διανύει ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀραβικῆς χώρας ἕως τῆς Αἰγύπτου εἰς τὴν λεγομένην Ἡλιούπολιν· καὶ ἡμέρας βλεπόντων πάντων ἐπιπτὰς ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦ ἡλίου βωμὸν τίθησιν αὐτὰ καὶ οὕτως εἰς τοὐπίσω ἀφορμᾷ. Οἱ οὖν ἱερεῖς ἐπισκέπτονται τὰς ἀναγραφὰς τῶν χρόνων καὶ εὑρίσκουσιν αὐτὸν πεντακοσιοστοῦ ἔτους πεπληρωμένου ἐληλυθέναι” (Clement of Rome, Epistola ad Corinthios I, in S. Clementis Romani, S. Ignatii. S. Polycarpi, Patrum apostolicorum quae supersunt: Accedunt S. Ignatii et S. Polycarpi martyria, ed. William Jacobson [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1863], 2 volumes, cap. 25). See the translation of ad Corinthios I into English by John Keith for The Epistles of Clement, in The Ante-Nicene Fathers: Translations of the Writings of the Fathers Down to A. D. 325, Volume 10—Original Supplement to the American Edition of the AnteNicene Fathers (Buffalo, NY: The Christian Literature Company, 1896). 12  There is, however, much better evidence for the reality of griffins than there ever has been for the existence of the phoenix. About this, see Adrienne Mayor, The First Fossil Hunters: Paleontology in Greek and Roman Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). In the GraecoRoman Mediterranean, there was some awareness of extinct species. Among, however, species not extinct, Albert discussed the peregrine falcon at considerable length in De animalibus lib. 23, cap. 8.

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this was not so.13 Thus it was for Aristotle that the generality embodied in the formula of any essence never designates the individual that is one of a kind: … the impossibility of defining individuals escapes notice in the case of eternal things, especially those which are unique, like the sun or the moon. For people err not only by adding attributes whose removal the sun would survive, e.g. ‘going round the earth’ or ‘night-hidden’ (for from their view it follows that if it stands still or is visible, it will no longer be the sun; but it is strange if this is so; for ‘the sun’ means a certain substance); but also by the mention of attributes which can belong to another subject; e.g., if another thing with the stated attributes comes into existence, clearly it will be a sun; the formula therefore is general. But the sun was supposed to be an individual, like Cleon or Socrates….14

Addressing the question whether, in regard to material substances that are one of a kind, the essence of a primary substance must be identical to the primary substance of which it is indeed the essence, Thomas has much to say in his commentary on the Metaphysics, finished at a date subsequent to his treatment of the Posterior Analytics: 13  George Boole, An Investigation of the Laws of Thought (London: Walton and Maberly, 1854), 84-85. Theodore Hailperin, Boole’s Logic and Probability, second edition revised and enlarged (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1986). Also see Herbert Bruce Enderton (Schofield Barracks, Panalā’au o Hawai’i, 15 April 1936 – 20 October 2010, Santa Monica, California), “The Unique Existential Quantifier,” Archiv für mathematische Logik und Grundlagenforschung 13 (1970): 52-54. The death of Prof. Enderton, from leukemia, while at work on a monograph for publication, is much to be regretted. 14 “…  λανθάνει ὅτι ἀδύνατον ὁρίσασθαι ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις, μάλιστα δὲ ὅσα μοναχά, οἷον ἥλιος ἢ σελήνη. οὐ μόνον γὰρ διαμαρτάνουσι τῷ προστιθέναι τοιαῦτα ὧν ἀφαιρουμένων ἔτι ἔσται ἥλιος, ὥσπερ τὸ περὶ γῆν ἰὸν ἢ νυκτικρυφές (ἂν γὰρ στῇ ἢ φανῇ, οὐκέτι ἔσται ἥλιος: ἀλλ᾽ ἄτοπον εἰ μή: ὁ γὰρ ἥλιος οὐσίαν τινὰ σημαίνει): ἔτι ὅσα ἐπ᾽ ἄλλου ἐνδέχεται, οἷον ἐὰν ἕτερος γένηται τοιοῦτος, δῆλον ὅτι ἥλιος ἔσται: κοινὸς ἄρα ὁ λόγος: ἀλλ᾽ ἦν τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα ὁ ἥλιος, ὥσπερ Κλέων ἢ Σωκράτης  …” (Aristotle, Metaphysics, edited by William David Ross [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981], 2 volumes, Z.1040a271040b2). Also see the translation by Ross in volume eight of The Works of Aristotle Translated into English (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928).

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Now it should be noted that he [Aristotle] describes a universal as what is naturally disposed to exist in many, and not as what exists in many; because there are some universals which contain under themselves only one singular thing, for example, sun and moon. But this is not to be understood in the sense that the very nature of the species, considered in itself, is not naturally disposed to exist in many things; but there is something else which prevents this, as the fact that all the matter of the species is included in one individual, and the fact that it is not necessary that a species which can last forever in a single individual should be numerically many.15 … if a singular thing is defined, certain words must be given which are applicable to many things. Hence the definition must fit not only the singular thing whose definition is under investigation but also other things; and this is opposed to the notion of a true definition; for example, if someone intended to define you, and said that you are an animal capable of walking or a white animal or anything else that applies to you, this definition would not only fit you but other things as well. It is evident, then, that a singular thing lacks a definition not only because it is corruptible and material but also because it is singular. … The reason for this is the one which the Philosopher gives here: if the words taken to define a thing express the individual in terms of the things by which it is individuated, the words will be synonymous. But if they express the nature and common attributes without individuation, the definition will not be a proper definition of the thing defined, because all forms, accidental or substantial, which do not subsist of themselves, are, when considered in themselves, common to many. And if some are found in only one thing, as the form of the sun, this does not come from the form, inasmuch as it is of itself suited to be in many things, but from the matter; for the whole matter of the species is collected in 15  “Sciendum autem quod ideo dicit quod universale est quod natum est pluribus inesse, non autem quod pluribus inest; quia quaedam universalia sunt quae non continent sub se nisi unum singulare, sicut sol et luna. Sed hoc non est quin ipsa natura speciei quantum est de se sit nata esse in pluribus; sed est aliquid aliud prohibens, sicut quod tota materia speciei comprehendatur in uno individuo et quod non est necessarium multiplicari secundum numerum speciem quae in uno individuo potest esse perpetua” (Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, edited by M.-R. Cathala, O. P. and Raymundi M. Spiazzi, O.P. [Rome: Marietti, 1964], lib. 7, l. 13, n. 9). For the translation into English by John P. Rowan, see Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1961).

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one individual. Or this comes from its final cause, because one sun is sufficient for the perfection of the universe.16

In a word, as concerning the individual being of a material substance that is one of a kind, the essence is uninformative. There is, in the frequent appeal of Thomas, in his De ente et essentia, to the authority of Aristotle in the Metaphysics, no lack of agreement with the exposition de texte to which, some years later, he would subject the Metaphysics as an object of commentary in detail. Thomas, by his choosing to mention the phoenix in his treatise De ente et essentia, was neither attempting to prove anything on the basis of the “mere interpretation of a name” nor suggesting, contrary to good reason, that the distinction between a real essence and a nominal essence is itself no better than nominal. He, instead, was emphasizing that, even in regard to a thing that is one of a kind, knowledge of the essence is consistent with ignorance concerning its “being in reality.” The theory that Thomas advanced in the treatise De ente et essentia is that an essence, “absolutely considered, according to its proper meaning” (secundum rationem propriam, et hec est absoluta consideratio ipsius), whether or not inclusive of matter, is indifferent with regard to quantity: 16  “… si singulare definitur, in eius definitione poni aliqua nomina, quae multis conveniant. Ergo necesse erit, quod definitio non solum huic singulari conveniat, cuius definitio quaeritur, sed etiam aliis. Quod est contra rationem verae definitionis. Sicut si aliquis te definire intendat, et dicat quod tu es animal gressibile, aut animal album, vel quicquid aliud, non tibi soli convenit, sed etiam est in alio. Unde patet, quod singulare, non solum ex hoc quod est corruptibile et materiale, caret definitione, sed etiam ex hoc quod est singulare….  Cuius ratio est quam hic tangit philosophus: quia si nomina ad definiendum assumpta exprimunt individuum quantum ad ea ex quibus individuatur, erunt nomina synonyma. Si autem exprimunt naturam et accidentia communia absque individuatione, non erit definitio propria definitio: quia omnes formae, sive accidentales, sive substantiales, quae non sunt per se subsistentes, sunt, quantum est de se, communes multis. Et si aliqua inveniatur in uno solo, sicut forma solis, hoc non provenit ex parte formae, quin quantum est de se sit nata esse in pluribus; sed ex parte materiae. Nam tota materia speciei congregata est sub uno individuo. Vel magis ex parte finis; quia unus sol sufficit ad universi perfectionem” (Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, lib. 7, l. 15, nn. 12-13). The translation into English is from Rowan.

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… to man as man belong ‘rational,’ ‘animal,’ and everything else included in his definition; but ‘white’ or ‘black,’ or any similar attribute not included in the notion of humanity, does not belong to man as man. If someone should ask, then, whether a nature understood in this way can be called one or many, we should reply that it is neither, because both are outside the concept of humanity, and it can happen to be both. If plurality belonged to its concept, it could never be one, though it is one when present in Socrates. So, too, if oneness belonged to its concept, it could never be one, though it is one when present in Socrates. So, too, if oneness belonged to its concept, the nature of Socrates and of Plato would be identical, and it could not be multiplied in many individuals.17

Neither for Thomas nor for Aristotle is the essence of any substance determined in accordance with differences in being, however received in matter or not, a concrete universal (das konkret Allgemeine, for students of Germanistik) in which the individual being of the substance, however unique in its being or not, may be an object of cognition apart from any of its acts. And so it is, among all substances that are constituted under differences in being and that are also such as to be unique in their being, that Thomas does not acknowledge any exceptions whatsoever to the real distinction between essence and existence that, as he maintains in his treatise De ente et essentia, is fundamental to the being of every created being.18 It was surely not by pure reason that, in ancient Heliopolis, the flight of the phoenix obtained its priestly witness. 17  “… homini in eo quod est homo convenit rationale et animal et alia, quae in diffinitione eius cadunt. Album vero aut nigrum vel quicquid huiusmodi, quod non est de ratione humanitatis, non convenit homini in eo quod homo. Unde si quaeratur utrum ista natura sic considerata possit dici una vel plures, neutrum concedendum est, quia utrumque est extra intellectum humanitatis et utrumque potest sibi accidere. Si enim pluralitas esset de intellectu eius, nunquam posset esse una, cum tamen una sit secundum quod est in Socrate. Similiter si unitas esset de ratione eius, tunc esset una et eadem Socratis et Platonis nec posset in pluribus plurificari” (De ente et essentia, capitulum tertium, 24-25). The translation into English is from Maurer. 18  Thomas, in chapter five of the treatise De ente et essentia, denies that there is any human cognition of essential differences. His theory of essences, as a result, is somewhat problematic. This means, of course, that there is always the possibility of gaining more knowledge about things beyond what has already been acquired. Science, for Thomas, always has a future.

Chapter 9 Twenty Years after Suárez Francisco de Araújo on the Nature, Existence, & Causes of Entia rationis1

Daniel Novotný

I

I. Introduction

n 1597 the Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), the father of Baroque Scholasticism, published his monumental Disputationes metaphysicae. In this work he synthesized into a unified theory, among other things, previous medieval and Renaissance Scholastic discussions about beings of reason. Prima faciei, it would seem that the basic framework of the Suarezian synthesis became the standard point of departure for all post-Suarezian philosophers and theologians. As we know, Suárez’s Disputationes metaphysicae were published in numerous editions, read, and praised all over Europe and the Americas, not only in Catholic but also in 1  Portions of this paper were read under the title “How to Make a Being of Reason: Some Post-medieval Solutions” at the APA Easter Division meeting Philosophy of Mind in Historical Perspective in New York, NY, 29 December 2009. Sincere thanks to Prof. Paul Richard Blum for his kind iniviation to this meeting. The presentation of this paper was supported by the APA Committee on International Cooperation and by The Grant Agency of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic (Project no. IAA 908280801). The paper is dedicated to the gracious and indefatigable pioneer of research into Baroque Scholasticism in the English-speaking world.

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Protestant and Orthodox countries. The reference to Disputation 54, where Suárez deals with beings of reason, became an obligatory reference for all post-Suarezian authors. Nevertheless, when we look closer at the reception of Suárez’s synthesis, we see that it was often less enthusiastic than it appears. In this paper we shall take a closer look at the work of Francisco de Araújo, who explicitly criticized Suárez’s theory of beings of reason.2 To investigate the theory of Araújo seems a worthwhile project for at least three reasons. First, Aráujo is an original Thomistic thinker; this is clear, e.g., from the fact that in the bitter controversy over freedom and predestination he seems to have sided with the Jesuits.3 Secondly, to my knowledge, Araújo is the only thinker who explicitly, although respectfully, sets his theory of beings of reason against that of Suárez and hence we might test our interpretation of Suárez against that of Araújo. Thirdly, although quite unknown to Englishspeaking historians, Araújo has attracted attention of a few contemporary philosophers in Spanish-speaking countries, such as José Luis

2  For Suárez’s place in Baroque Scholasticism see Pereira, Suárez: Between Scholasticism and Modernity (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2007) and Novotný, “In Defense of Baroque Scholasticism,” Studia Neoaristotelica 2.6 (2009): 209–233; for an introduction into the Baroque discussions about beings of reason, see John P. Doyle, “Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth (First part),” Vivarium 25 (1987): 47-75; idem, “Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth (Second part),” Vivarium 26 (1988): 51-72; idem, On Beings of Reason. (De Entibus Rationis): Metaphysical Disputation LIV, trans., John P. Doyle (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1995), or Novotný, “Prolegomena to a Study of Beings of Reason in PostSuarezian Scholasticism, 1600-1650,” Studia Neoaristotelica 2.3 (2006): 117-141; for Araújo’s biography see Hernández Martín, “La actividad universitaria de Francisco de Araújo en los claustros salmantinos,” La ciencia tomista 92 (1965): 203–271. 3  Although this has been called into question by some, arguing that the passages from the Commentary on the Summa which reject the physical premotion, were included by the publisher and do not represent Araújo’s views; cf. Chrysostom O’Brien, “La enigma de Francisco de Araújo,” La ciencia Tomista 89 (1962): 221-234.

9  Francisco de Araújo: Nature, Existence, & Causes of Entia rationis 243 Fernández-Rodríguez,4 Mauricio Beuchot,5 and Antonio MillanPuelles.6 This testifies to Araújo’s philosophical abilities for this interest is not just purely historical but also systematic. Some of these Spanish philosophers even count Araújo, together with Suárez and John of St. Thomas, to be one of the three major seventeenth-century Scholastic philosophers. (I disagree with the claim that there were only three but I agree that Araújo is a major Baroque author.) Araújo was born in Verín, Spain, in 1580 (16 years before Descartes and 52 before Spinoza); he joined the Dominicans in Salamanca, where he also studied and taught philosophy and theology and died in Madrid in 1664 (i.e., the year after the publication of Spinoza’s Cogitata metaphysica appended to his Principia philosophiae cartesianae, where beings of reason are briefly dealt with). Araújo’s work includes two volumes of Commentariorum in Universam Aristottelis Metaphysicam [CUAM] (1617-1631), and six volumes of Commentary on Aquinas’s Summa (1635-1647). In the prologue to his CUAM, Araújo places himself into the Dominican tradition of commentaries on metaphysics, starting with Albert and Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Chrisostomus Iavellus, Dominic of Flandria, Mathias Aquarius (d. 1591), and Paul Soncinas.7 As he points out, the motivation for writing his commentary was to defend the true metaphysical doctrine against “neoterici.” 4  Cf. José Luis Fernández-Rodríguez, El ente de razón en Francisco de Araújo (Pamplona: Eunsa, 1972). 5  Cf. Mauricio Beuchot, Metafísica: La ontología Aristotélico-Tomista de Francisco de Araújo (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1987). 6  Cf. Antonio Millan-Puelles, The Theory of the Pure Object. [Spanish original: Teoría del objeto puro - Coleccíon Cuestiones Fundamentales. Madrid: Ediciones RIALP, 1990]. Translated and edited by Jorge GarcíaGómez. Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter. 7 Araújo was a contemporary of John of Saint Thomas ( João Poinsot, 1589-1644). Interestingly, Poinsot gives a different list of Thomistic disciples: “When there is doubt about what St. Thomas means, the true meaning, and therefore true discipleship, is found in the continuous succession of disciples who held firmly to his doctrine. Thus the line of succession includes: Hervaeus, Capreolus, Cajetanus, Ferrariensis, Victoria, Soto, and Flandria” (Quoted from Wade, Outlines of Formal Logic [Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1955]); Francis C. Wades gives a reference to Tractatus de approbatione et auctoritate doctrinae D. Thomae, but I was not able to locate this precise passage in the Vìves edition of the Tractatus). The difference between Poinsot and Araújo might be due to the fact that

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Araújo does not say so explicitly, but from the fact that he often argues against the positions of Pedro da Fonseca and Francisco Suárez, we may infer that it was they who were his main targets. Both Suárez’s and Araújo’s theories of beings of reason are versions of what I call a ‘classical theory.’ The classical theory contains the following propositions: 1. Beings of reasons cannot exist in actual reality (in the ordinary sense of ‘exist’). 2. There are beings of reason but in an analogical sense of ‘are.’ 3. Beings of reason are merely objectively in the intellect. 4. Beings of reason are thought in the manner of (real) being. 5. Beings of reason are totally dependent on actual mental acts. On the Classical Theory, beings of reason are “merely objectively in the intellect,” i.e., they are objects for the mind but they have no being apart from the mind. Hence the Classical Theory might be also called Objectualism. The reason I call this theory “Classical” is that only beings of reason as described by it to perform all the work, as it were, that they are traditionally supposed to do. First, they are needed for thinking about non-being: it was thought that if the proposition “Socrates is blind” were true, it is not true in virtue of Socrates and the absence of the accident of sight but in virtue of the made up accident of blindness.8 Second, they are needed as logical objects: it was thought that since the universal “man” is predicable of individual men, it is a relation; but since it cannot be a real relation, it is a made up relation of reason. Third, they are needed as self-contradictory objects, such as a square-circle, of which we sometimes think. From these examples we see that beings of reason were not just non-existent but necessarily non-existent objects. My paper provides a detailed comparison of Suárez’s and Araújo’s versions of Objectualism. The paper is divided into four sections. The first and the fourth section briefly report both Araújo’s views on the science of beings of reason as well as God’s knowledge of them. The second and the third sections treat the nature and causes of beings Poinsot speaks of the general Thomistic tradition, whereas Araújo of the Dominican tradition of Commentaries on Metaphysics. 8  See Aquinas’s Commentry on Metaphysics V c. 7, 1017°32ff, summarized by Suárez in DM 54.1.4.

9  Francisco de Araújo: Nature, Existence, & Causes of Entia rationis 245 of reason. I argue here that, although Araújo has not improved upon Suárez’s account of what beings of reason are, he has corrected Suárez’s views on the causes of beings of reason. The brief conclusion summarizes the results of this paper. Given the limitations set for this paper, I do not deal with Araújo’s views on the division of beings of reason and his important criticism of Suárez on this point.

II. The Science of Beings of Reason (Article 1) According to the prologue of Suárez’s fifty-fourth disputation, beings of reason are to be discussed in metaphysics and in no other science. In particular, Suárez points out (probably with a dry sense of humor) that it is a “dialectical error to treat beings of reason in dialectics.” Many other Baroque authors would agree with Suárez, perhaps with an apology that if they treat them in logic, it is because it is convenient to do so. Araújo disagrees with these views. His thesis is that beings of reason taken as a species (second intentions) are the primary objects of logic; taken in its whole range, they are the secondary objects of metaphysics. Hence, both sciences have the right to treat beings of reason, although in a different way and scope. This is the conclusion of the special article where Araújo deals with this question to a depth that goes beyond that of any other Baroque author. In Baroque Scholasticism, Araújo’s position is a manifestation of the moderate view, placed between, on the one hand, what might be called the “metaphysical maximalism” of Suárez, who would like to treat every important question in metaphysics, placing only little importance to logic and natural philosophy, and, on the other hand, the “metaphysical minimalism” of authors such as the Irish Franciscan John Punch, who left little room for metaphysics, discussing all important philosophical questions in logic and natural philosophy.

III. The Nature and Existence of Beings of Reason (Article 2) Araújo opens his discussion about the nature and existence of beings of reason by identifying three views on this question. This is exactly the same procedure that Suárez follows, which is likely to be accounted for by sharing a common pre-Suárezian tradition:

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View 1 (Eliminativism): Beings of reason are not possible. View 2 (Extreme Realism with respect to beings of reason): Beings of reason exist in the same sense as real beings. View 3 (Moderate Realism with respect to beings of reason): beings of reason “are given” (dari) but in an analogical sense of “are.” View 1 is attributed by Araújo to authors such as Francisco de Mayronis and Durand of St. Pourçain (on one interpretation)9 and View 2 to Durand (on another interpretation). The third, “moderate” view is held by the “entire Thomistic school” and by Suárez.10 Araújo then distinguishes three versions of the View 3, which have to do with the question of what sort of existence beings of reason are supposed to have (whether from the substance or sui generis and if the latter whether there is only one type of such sui generis existence or more than one). Araújo defends his own answer to this question.

III.1. There Are Beings of Reason—in an Analogical Sense of “Are” Before defending the “existence” of beings of reason, Araújo follows the standard procedure in defining them: 9  It does not occur to Araújo to mention Ockham as another eliminativist. (Suárez does not mention him in this context either.) Automatic repetions of the same references to ancient or medieval sources seem to be typical for Baroque authors. Once the standard references became established, they were rarely re-examined. Whereas with respect to theses and arguments, Baroque authors were often critical and creative with respect to exegeses of the works of earlier epochs they were not. 10  “Hoc supposito, triplex versatur sententia: [1] Prima asserit, entia rationis non esse possibilia. Quam secuti fuerunt Bernardinus Mirandulanus …. Maironis et huic sententiae affinis est sententia Durandi … asserens entia rationis esse duntaxat denominationes extrinsecas provenientes immediate ab aliquo actu rationis. [2] Secunda sententia asserit, entia rationis dari de facto, et adeo entibus realibus appropinquare, ut cum illis in unico conveniunt conceptu. [3] Tertia est veluti media, asserens dari entia rationis, adeo tamen esse diminutum habere, ut neque univoce, neque analogia unius conceptus conveniant cum entibus realibus. Ita docet tota schola Thomistrum, cui subscribit in hac parte Suarez disputatione quinquagesima quarta citata, sectione prima” (CUAM q1a2n11).

9  Francisco de Araújo: Nature, Existence, & Causes of Entia rationis 247 [A being of reason] is (a) that which has [objective] being only in the intellect, or (b) that which depends in its being from the intellect.11

This double definition is simply suggested and briefly explained, without any argument. This is what Suárez does as well, although Suárez’s explanation is more informative. Presumably Suárez and Araújo share the following common understanding of beings of reason: there are two basic ways in which an x can be related to the intellect. First, x is subjectively related to the intellect iff x inheres in it as an accident in its subject. X can be, for instance, the mental act whereby I think of something. This mental act is inhering in the intellect and hence within the Scholastic ontological framework, it is a real categorial being, namely, quality. Second, x is objectively related to the intellect iff the intellect is thinking of x, i.e., cognizes it.12 X can be, for instance, Socrates or his humanity.13 Now, there are two ways in which something can be objectively in the intellect. First, x has both real being in itself and at the same time it has also being as an object of the intellect. In our example, Socrates has real being in itself, but when cognized, he has also being as an object.14 Second, x can be also objectively in the intellect and have “no other being.” For example, the intellect cognizes a chi11  “Ante omnia operae pretium est diffinitionem entis rationis praesupponere, ne ignorantia illius per ignota procedamus. Ens igitur hoc ab omnibus communiter diffinitur sic: Est quod habet esse duntaxat in intellectu, vel quod dependet in suo esse ab intellectu: dicitur quod habet esse objective ad differentiam conceptus realis, qui habet esse in intellectu, eo quod in illo subiectatur, apponitur etiam dictio exclusiva, duntaxat, ad differentiam aliorum entium realium, quae etiam existunt objective in intellectu, quando ab illo cognoscuntur. Sed quia simul existunt a parte rei extra intellectum, non degenerant a natura entis realis: et eadem ratione salvatur secunda diffinitio” (CUAM q1a2n11). 12  Here the picture becomes a little more complicated because it is a controversial question whether and how the intellect can think about individuals; however, at least we may assume that it is capable of thinking about the universal aspects of individuals. 13 Suárez’s way of expressing the point is: x is objectively in the intellect, x has objective being in the intellect, x is an objective concept. The idea in the background is that for the intellect to cognize x, x must be somehow “in” it. And since x is a real physical thing, x cannot be in the intellect physically but only “objectively.” 14  Surprisingly, the same is claimed about possible entities too. Presumably, the reason is that, e.g., a unicorn, when cognized, is not just objectively in

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mera, that is, a self-contradictory creature. The chimera has no being whatsoever apart from the objective being in the intellect. It is only in this latter case that we speak of beings of reason in the proper sense. Having defined beings of reason, Araújo goes on to defend the following three theses: Araújo’s First Thesis: Beings of reason are possible and de facto exist. Araújo’s Second Thesis: Beings of reason and real beings are related not by an analogy of one concept but of two concepts. Araújo’s Third Thesis: Beings of reason exist only in (intra) the intellect and they are terms (terminations) of the cognitive act by which they are contemplated. The three theses are directed respectively against the three views distinguished above. Araújo’s First Thesis, asserting the possibility and de facto existence (giveness) of beings of reason, is defended as follows: [1] … a being of reason is directly and positively knowable by logic, which demonstrates about them many properties. [2] … the experience shows that many denominations come newly to their subjects and are removed from them, without their change; but nothing real begins or ceases to belong to them, hence we say that these denominations are of reason.15

Although both Suárez and Araújo argue for the existence of beings of reason based on their definition, their argumentation differs. Araújo’s first reason [1] would be eschewed by Suárez for, in his view, logic directs our mental acts and does not directly deal with beings reason. Neither would he agree that they are knowable (DM 54.prol.). The

somebody’s mind but it has also a real potential being in itself, derived from the creative potency of God. 15  “… ens rationis est scibile directe et positive a logica, quae de illo demonstrat quamplurimas passiones ... Secundo. Nam experientia constat, multas denominationes advenire subiectis de novo, et amoveri ab illis, absque ipsorum mutatione: sed nihil reale advenit, aut amovetur, absque sui subjecti mutatione: ergo dicendum est illas denominationes esse aliquid rationis” (CUAM q1a2n12).

9  Francisco de Araújo: Nature, Existence, & Causes of Entia rationis 249 second reason [2] would contradict Suárez’s firm and extensively argued thesis that some extrinsic denominations are real (DM 54.2).16 Araújo’s second thesis asserts that real beings and beings of reason are related not by an analogy of one concept but of two concepts.17 By the latter Araújo means what Suárez calls the analogy of proportionality (roughly: real being is to existence as being of reason is to thinking-about-it).18

III.2. The Mode of Existence of Beings of Reason Araújo discusses the third thesis most extensively. It is, in fact, a conjunction of two claims: Araújo’s Third Thesis (First Part): Beings of reason exist only in (intra) the intellect. Araújo’s Third Thesis (Second Part): Beings of reason are terms of the cognitive act by which they are thought.19 Araújo takes the first part as simply amounting to a moderate realism about beings of reason and follows, in his view, from the very definition of beings of reason.20 He proposes the second part against the 16 Araújo is aware that among Baroque authors, it is only the small minority of true Thomists who insist on the irreality of all extrinsic denominations; accordingly, he spends much effort defending their irreality. 17  “Dico secundo. Entia rationis non conveniunt univoce, aut analogia unius conceptus, sed duntaxat analogia duorum conceptuum cum ente reali” (CUAM q1a2n13). 18  “Tertia est veluti media, asserens dari entia rationis, adeo tamen esse diminutum habere, ut neque univoce, neque analogia unius conceptus conveniant cum entibus realibus. Ita docet tota schola Thomistrum, cui subscribit in hac parte Suarez disputatione quinquagesima quarta citata, sectione prima” (CUAM q1a2n11). 19  “Dico tertio: Entia rationis existunt duntaxat intra intellectu, per hoc quod terminant cognitionem, qua intellectus ipsa contemplatur” (CUAM q1a2n13). 20  This inference might follow given Araújo’s views about analogy (which I do not discuss here) but it is not cogent as it stands now. From the claim that beings of reason “are given” (dari) in some analogical sense, it does not

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three versions of moderate realism.21 Araújo’s defense of the second part is quite complex and extensive. It consists of one positive and one negative argument. Araújo’s positive argument is stated as follows: First, the [second part of the third] thesis is proved ostensively: [P1] the existence of a being of reason has to be its ultimate actuality through which it is suo modo reduced from potency to act: [P2] but this is the passive termination, hence.22

To put Araújo’s argument more explicitly: P1: The existence of a being of reason is its ultimate actuality. P2: The ultimate actuality of a being of reason is the passive termination [i.e., the term of the cognitive act by which it is thought about]. C: The existence of a being of reason [i.e., a being of reason] is the passive termination [i.e., the term of the cognitive act by which it is thought about]. P2 is further justified: The minor: because as long as a being of reason does not actually terminate the cognitive act [directed to it], it is not actually objectively in the intellect and it does not have its own ultimate actuality either; for similarly as an extra-mental thing does not have its existence unless it is actually outside of its causes (and is a term of the action that produces and conserves it), so intra-intellectual beings of reason do not have their objective being unless they are terms of the cognitive acts of the intellect, which is somehow their production and conservation.23 follow that this sense involves “intra-mentality” (for beings of reason might be analogical but still extramental). 21  “Prima pars conclusionis statuitur pro tertia sententia. Et probatur ex diffinitione assignata entis rationis. Secunda statuitur contra reliquos modos explicandi tertiam sentientiam” (CUAM q1a2n13). 22  “Et probatur primo ostensive. nam existentia entis rationis debet esse eius ultima actualitas, per quam suo modo reducitur de potentia ad actum: sed haec est illa passiva terminatio: ergo” (CUAM q1a2n11). 23  “Minor: quia quamdiu ens rationis non terminat actu cognitionem sui, non est actu objective in intellectu: neque habet suam ultimam actualitatem, quemadmodum enim extra intellectum res non habet suam existentiam, nisi quando actu est extra suas causas; terminatque actionem sui productivam et conservativam: ita intra intellectum entia rationis non habent

9  Francisco de Araújo: Nature, Existence, & Causes of Entia rationis 251 Araújo’s main point is simple: beings of reason need to be actualized and this can be done only via the intellect that produces and conserves them. But note that he does not seem to be aware of a difficulty implicit in his defense of P2. If the intellect is the cause of beings of reason and if causation (production) involves being “outside” of the cause, then beings of reason are extra-intellectual. This, however, contradicts the first part of the third thesis, namely, that beings of reason are intra-intellectual. Araújo’s negative argument for the second part of the third thesis consists in criticizing other versions of moderate realism. The versions that he rejects are differentiated according to what mode of existence beings of reason are claimed to have: [1] Some say that a being of reason exists through the existence of its subject or of its foundation, in the same way as accidents of a substance exist … [2] Others say that a being of reason exists through a proper and adjusted existence, communicated from the intellect; it is something objective in the intellect, terminating the [act of ] its cognition [directed to it]. If, however, you inquire from [the proponents of this view] what this objective existence in the intellect or the passive termination of the act of the intellect is, some of them say that it is some relation, called being known, and consequent upon the act of the intellect; others say that it is the passive termination by which a beings of reason, e.g., being-a-species, terminates the [act of ] the cognition, whereby it is cognized … [3] Suárez, however, [DM 54.1.8], says that beings of reason accept the existence from the intellect in three ways. First, through the cognition of its termination; in this way privations exist. Secondly, through the imperfect cognition of real entities in which the intellect compares or distinguishes those [things] among which there is no [real] relation or distinguishes those things that are not really distinguished. In this way relations of reason are made. Thirdly, when the intellect from its fecundity contrives fictitious beings from true beings; in this way chimeras or negations come to be in the intellect.24 esse objectivum, nisi quando terminant cognitionem intellectus, quae est ipsorum quodammodo productio et conservatio” (CUAM q1a2n11). 24  “[1] Quidam enim dicunt existere ens rationis per existentiam sui subjecti, aut sui fundamenti; sicut accidentia substantiae (juxta probabilem aliquorum opinionem, existunt per eandem existentiam substantiae). [2] Alii vero dicunt existere per sibi propriam et accommodatam existentiam,

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We see that Araújo distinguishes three views with respect to the mode of existence of beings of reason: [1] Existential Monism according to which their existence is derived from the real existence [2], Existential Dualism according to which their existence is sui generis, and [3] Existential Pluralism according to which they have various “sub-modes” of existence.25 Araújo openly rejects all three views but while criticizing the third view (Suárez’s) it becomes apparent that Araújo’s own view is a version of the Existential Dualism. Here is his argument against the first view, the Existential Monism: communicatam ab intellectu, per hoc quod objective in illo, terminando eius cognitionem. Si autem inquiratur ab illis, Quid sit haec objectiva existentia in intellectu, seu passiva terminatio actus intellectus? Respondent aliqui illorum, esse quandam relationem ex actu intellectus consecutam, quae diciur esse cognitum. Alii vero dicunt esse passivam illam terminationem, qua ens rationis, v.g. specieitas, quando cognoscitur ab intellectu, terminat illius cognitionem: quae terminatio est modus quidam specietatis, v. g. incompletus adhuc in ordine entis rationis, et entitative cum illa identificatus. [3] Suarez vero ubi sup. dicit, tripliciter ab intellectu accipere existentiam entia rationis, primo, per cognitionis sui terminationem, et hoc modo existere privationes: secundo, per cognitionem imperfectam entium realium, per quam intellectus comparat illa inter quae non est relatio; aut distinguit illa inter quae non est relatio, aut distinguit illa quae revera non distinguuntur; et hoc modo fiunt relationes rationis: tertio, quando intellectus, ex sua faecunditate, confingit entia ficitia ex veris entibus, et hoc modo fiunt et existunt chimerae, seu negationes in intellectu” (CUAM, q1a2n11). 25 Araújo’s way of expressing the point in terms of various sorts of existence (I say “modes of existence”), is conspicuous and it seems unique among Baroque authors. Suárez, for instance, in the passage interpreted here by Araújo (i.e., DM 54.1.8), does not speak in terms of existence. It would be a worthwhile project to investigate Araujo’s general views on existence. Would Araújo, as a Baroque Thomist, pass Gilson’s test of being a true (existential) Thomist? “Existence may mean either a state or an act. In the first sense, it means the state in which a thing is posited by the efficacy of an efficient or of a creative cause, and this is the meaning the word receives in practically all the Christian theologies outside Thomism, particularly those of Augustine, Boethius, Anselm, Scotus, and Suárez. In a second sense, existence (esse, to be) points out the interior act, included in the composition of substance, in virtue of which the essence is a ‘being,’ and this is the properly Thomistic meaning of the word” (Gilson, Elements of a Christian Philosophy [Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1960], 142).

9  Francisco de Araújo: Nature, Existence, & Causes of Entia rationis 253 The first view is flawed because [P1:] a being of reason cannot exist through the existence of a real being, unless such existence is both united and communicated [to it]; but [P2:] real existence cannot be united and communicated to it for that which is of reason, is incapable of receiving that which is real: hence. The minor [i.e., P2] is further explained: a being of reason cannot exist really; but this is the formal effect of the real existence; hence it cannot accept the formal effect of the real existence and hence such existence cannot be communicated to it.26

This argument needs no extensive commentary. [P1] If real existence is not communicated to some nature (essence), it cannot exist through real existence. [P2] But real existence cannot be communicated to beings of reason. Hence beings of reason cannot exist through real existence.27 The second view, i.e., Existential Dualism, is criticized by Araújo as follows: The second view, in so far as it asserts that the existence of a being of reason consists in the relation of being known, is flawed because [1] such relation is a complete relation in its genus: but the 26  “Secundo probatur labefactando caeteros dicendi modos. [1] Primus namque deficit, quia ens rationis nequit existere per existentiam entis realis, nisi talis existentia et uniatur, et communicetur: at existentia realis nequit ei uniri aut communicari, cum id quod est quid rationis, sit incapax recipiendi id quod est reale: ergo. Minor explicatur amplius: Ens rationis nequit existere realiter: et iste est effectus formalis existentiae realis: ergo nequit suscipere effectum formalem existentiae realis; et consequenter nequit talis existentia ei communicari. Confirmatur. Nulla existentia potest actuare alienam naturam, nisi sit infinita, ratione enim suae infinitatis potuit divini verbi existentia actuare in Christo Domino naturam humanam; sed existentia naturae creatae est finita: ergo nequit actuare alienam naturam, qualis est entis rationis” (CUAM q1a2n13). 27 Araújo seems to hold a stronger thesis, namely, that real existents cannot actualize even other real existents. Only God is an exception: “No existence can actualize another nature unless it is infinite (hence the infinite existence of the divine word could actualize human nature in the Lord Jesus); but the existence of the created nature is finite; hence it cannot actualize another nature such as that of a being of reason.” (“Nulla existentia potest actuare alienam naturam nisi sit infinita; ratione enim suae infinitatis potuit divini verbi existentia actuare in Christo Domino naturam humanam; sed existentia naturae creatae est finita: ergo nequit actuare alienam naturam, qualis est entis rationis” [CUAM q1a2n13]).

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existence of a being of reason must be an incomplete mode and not the complete nature…. Hence. The confirmation: [2] being known is a relation and a first intention … hence it cannot be the existence of the negation, privation, or the second intention. … [3] The second confirmation: the nature, e.g., blindness, terminates [the act of ] cognition [directed to it] before the relation of being known results in it; … similarly as the nature of Peter … is objectively in the intellect already before it is understood [as being known] … [so] before the advent of the relation of being known, the blindness is already known and hence its existence cannot consist in such a relation.28

In this passage Araújo criticizes those Existential Dualists who would explain the “proper and adjusted” existence of beings of reason in terms of the relation of being known. Araújo sees three difficulties with this view: [1] beings of reason are “incomplete” beings but the relation of being known is a “complete” being;29 [2] the relation of being known does not cover all kinds of beings of reason; [3] beings of reason are created already before we “discover” them by noticing that they are being known. (Note that even if Araújo’s criticisms are sound, he does not refute Existential Dualism as such but only one peculiar version of it.) Finally, we come to Araújo’s criticism of the third view, i.e., Suárez’s Existential Pluralism: The third view is flawed in several ways. For either one speaks about the formal existence … of a being of reason or about foundational existence only. [1] If one speaks about formal existence, it is false to 28  “Secundus, quantum ad id quod asserit entis rationis existentiam consistere in illa relatione cogniti, deficit, quia [1] illa est quaedam completa relatio in suo genere: sed existentia entis rationis debet esse modus incompletus, et non natura completa … ergo. Confirmatur: [2] nam illud esse cognitum est relatio et prima intentio …: ergo nequit esse existentia negationis, privationis, aut secundae intentionis. … Confirmatur secundo. [3] Nam prius natura terminat, caecitas, v.g. sui cognitionem, quam resultet illa relatio cogniti: sicut ... natura Petrus ... in illo priori iam intelligitur objective esse in intellectu: ergo ante adventum illius relationis cogniti existere intelligitur caecitas; et per consequens eius existentia nequit consistere in tali relatione” (CUAM q1a2n13). 29  This line of argumentation, however, seems to contradict Araújo’s view that extrinsic denominations are beings of reason. Since the relation of being known is an extrinsic denomination then, presumably, as a “complete nature,” it is a real being.

9  Francisco de Araújo: Nature, Existence, & Causes of Entia rationis 255 assert that beings of reason come to be in three ways, for every being of reason is and exists in one mode only, namely, through the act of cognition which terminates at it. [2] If one speaks about foundational existence, it is false to enumerate there the three modes … for a foundation of a being of reason can come to be in many other modes, besides those mentioned by the proponents of the third view…. [3] [For instance] … when the active or passive intellect abstracts a nature from the individuating conditions, it makes foundationally a universal; but this universal does not belong to any of the three modes [listed by Suárez and other proponents of the third view]—it is neither a cognition terminating at the universality itself, nor a cognition of negation, nor contriving of a chimera, nor a comparison of one to the other, hence.30

Taking avail of the distinction between the foundational and the formal being of reason, Araújo poses here a dilemma to Suárez. [1] If you speak about beings of reason in the formal sense, then you are wrong to say that they have more than one mode of existence; [2] if you speak about beings of reason in the foundational sense, then again you are wrong to say that there are only three types of foundation for them. Araújo also gives an example of the foundational being of reason (a universal) that would be presumably acceptable for Suárez but omitted by him [3]. It is clear from this criticism of Suárez that Araújo commits himself to the Existential Dualism with respect to the beings of reason in the proper formal sense [1], although in the foundational sense one could say that Araújo is an Existential Pluralist [2]. Since, however, the foundational sense in which one speaks about beings of reason is improper (the foundation of a being of reason is still a real being), it is more appropriate to consider Araújo as an Existential 30  “Tertius modus deficit in multi. Nam aut loquitur de formali existentia ... entis rationis aut de fundamentali tantum: [1] si de formali, falsum asserit tripliciter fieri: nam omne ens rationis unico duntaxat modo sit et existit, scilicet, per cognitionem ad ipsum terminatam; [2] si de fundamentali, falso inter illos tres modos annumerat. ... quia multis aliis modis ab illis recensitis, potest fieri fundamentum entis rationis. ... [3] quando intellectus agens, aut possibilis, abstrahit naturam a conditionibus singularibus, facit illam universalem fundamentaliter; et tamen sub nullo illorum trium modorum comprehenditur iste; quoniam neque est cognitio terminata ad ipsam universalitatem; neque cognitio negationis, aut confictio chimerae; neque est comparatio unius ad alterum: ergo” (CUAM q1a2n13).

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Dualist. (For more on the foundational/formal distinction, see below III.2).

IV. The Causes of Beings of Reason (Article 2) Surprisingly, Araújo does not have any article explicitly devoted to the question of (human) causes of beings of reason. But he does discuss causes at the end of Article 2 in the context of the first objection against his theory of the nature and existence of beings of reason. The objection might be called the Causality Argument against the Existence of Beings of Reason and it goes as follows: First: a being of reason has no causes of its being; hence it cannot be made, and hence it is impossible. The antecedent is obvious inductively. [P1:] A being of reason does not have an efficient cause; if, however, you remove the efficient cause, you also cancel the final, material, and formal cause. The major [P1] is proven: if something is an efficient cause [of a being of reason], it is certainly the intellect; but the efficiency of the intellect is real and consists in the real activity; it is thus incapable of [making up] a being of reason. Hence.31

The answer that Araújo gives to the Causality Argument is simple. Beings of reason have all four types of Aristotelian causes, but we must not understand the causality involved in their case to be the same as that involved in the case of real beings. Beings of reason have causes “in their own way” (suo modo). This simple answer, however, is wrapped up in the lengthy discussion of what types of causes beings of reason have and what mental powers cause them.

IV.1. What Types of Causes Beings of Reason Have? Araújo approaches the question of causes of beings of reason by way of criticizing Suárez. His views are summarized by Araújo in three points (in DM 54.2.1): 1. Beings of reason have a suo modo efficient cause, namely, the 31  “Primo: Ens rationis nullas habet causas sui esse: ergo non est factibile: et consequenter est impossibile. Antecedens patet inductive. Nam non habet causam efficientem: ablata autem efficienti, aufertur finalis, materialis, et formalis: ergo. Mai. probatur, quia si aliquod efficiens esset, maxime intellectus; sed intellectus efficientia est realis, in eius reali actione consistens, cuius non est capax ens rationis: ergo” (CUAM q1a2n13).

9  Francisco de Araújo: Nature, Existence, & Causes of Entia rationis 257 intellect (which in its act of intellection primarily produces the mental word, i.e., the formal concept, and secondarily, a being of reason). 2. Beings of reason have a suo modo material cause, if taken “concretely.” 3. Beings of reason have no final or formal cause.32 Araújo agrees with Suárez that beings of reason have suo modo efficient and material causes but he disagrees with the third point, namely, that they should lack formal and final causes. With respect to the formal cause he says: … being-a-species is a suo modo formal cause of a concrete species no less than human being is its material cause; hence if human being is a material cause, it is because it behaves as a subject, and thus being-a-species will be the formal cause, if it behaves as a form.

Strangely, Araújo seems to have misread Suárez here, for his argument against Suárez is in fact quite similar to Suárez’s argument: … if a thing denominated as a being of reason is considered in the manner of a subject, it could be called the ‘matter’ or the ‘quasi-matter’ … Hence … [beings of reason] could [also] be said to have a formal cause, namely, the being of reason itself taken abstractly. For example, when “man” is … a species … the matter is man and the form is the relation of species.33

We see that both Araújo and Suárez concur that beings of reason not only have a suo modo material but also a formal cause. 32  “Ad argumentum principale respondet Suarez d. citata sectione 2 quod [1] ens rationis habet causam efficientem suo modo, scilicet intellectum, qui per suam intellectionem primario producit verbum mentale, secundario autem, et per quandam resultantiam, producit ens rationis. [2] Subdit etiam, quod si sumatur ens rationis in concreto, habet causam materialem suo modo, ut species habet pro causa materiali substractum v.g. naturam humanam. [3] Dicit tertio, quod nullatenus habet causam finalem et formalem” (CUAM q1a2n13). 33   “… si res, qui ab ente rationis denominatur, consideretur per modum subiecti, possit dici materia vel quasi materia … Et consequenter… possit dici habere causam formalem, scilicet, ipsum ens rationis in abstracto sumptum; ut cum homo, verbi gratia, dicitur species… materia est homo, forma vero relatio speciei” (DM 54.2.1).

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With respect to the final cause, Suárez indeed seems to deny its existence, being aware, however, that this claim is counterintuitive. Nevertheless, Suárez leaves the claim as it stands with the remark that “if it is possible … to give some explanation in terms of the final cause … this final cause cancels the thought of the given human being, rather than the made-up object as such. …”34 In other words, only mental acts (i.e., real qualities) have final causes, not beings of reason. Araújo is understandably not satisfied with this maneuver: … it is contradictory [to say] that something has the efficient cause in some sense, unless, in the same sense, it also has the final cause: for the form itself is the cause of the end of its coming-to-be. [Furthermore and] more importantly, [to deny the final cause] is false because many times the intellect contrives and cognizes certain beings for the sake of some end, [as for] the cause of delight or of making various predications.35

Based on these arguments, Araújo concludes that beings of reason have not just suo modo efficient but also material, formal, and final causes.36 Many seventeenth-century authors, from the entire spectrum of Scholastic thought, beginning with the conservative Scotists, such as Mastri/Belluto, and ending with the liberal Jesuit Nominalists,

34  “Quod si ex parte hominis excogitantis … entia rationis finalis aliqua ratio reddi possit, illa magis est finalis ratio ipsius cogitationis hominis, quam ipsius obiecti facti et cogitati” (DM 54.2.1). 35  “[1]. Haec solutio, quoad primum dictum vera est, illamque tradit etiam Soncinas quarto Metaphysicorum, quaestione decima octava. [2]. quoad reliqua vero, mihi non placet. Quoad secundum ... et ... tertium displicet, quia specieitas etiam est causa formalis suo modo concreti speciei non minus, quam homo sit causa materialis; ergo si homo est causa materialis, quia ibi habet se ut subjectum, etiam specietas erit causa formalis, siquidem ibi se habet ut forma. [3]. Denique implicat, aliquid habere aliquo modo causam efficientem, quin habeat eodem modo causam finalem: cum forma ipsa causa sit finis suae generationis. Maxime, quia intellectus multoties confingit quaedam entia, et illa cognoscit propter aliquem finem, ut causa delectionis, et causa faciendi aliquas praedicationes.” 36  “Quapropter dicendum existimo, quod ens rationis sicut improprie habet suam causam efficientem ... eodem modo habet suam causam materialem et finalem, formalem” (CUAM q1a2n13).

9  Francisco de Araújo: Nature, Existence, & Causes of Entia rationis 259 such as Hurtado, held the same view, although not even this view was unanimously accepted.37

IV.2. Which Mental Powers Produce Beings of Reason? Araújo continues his discussion, occasioned by the Causality Argument, and considers whether other mental powers besides the intellect can make up beings of reason. Araújo identifies two views on this issue: View 1: Beings of reason can be produced not just by the intellect but also by other mental powers (such as the will and the imagination).38 View 2: Beings of reason can be produced by the intellect only in their formal being and by any potency in their foundational being. The first view is ascribed to Scotus, the second to Cajetan (Tommaso de Vio, 1469-1534) and endorsed by Araújo himself. Again, Araújo criticizes Suárez who holds a variation of the first view, in so far as Suárez takes not only the intellect but also the imagination as productive of beings of reason. (Suárez, however, does not want to go as 37  See Novotný, “Forty-Two Years after Suárez: Mastri and Belluto’s Development of the ‘Classical’ Theory of Entia Rationis,” Quaestio: The Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics 8 (2008). Doyle reports that Saenz de Aguirre and Oviedo are in agreement with Suárez that beings of reason have no final cause (Doyle, “On the pure intentionality of pure intentionality,” The Modern Schoolman 79 [2001]: 72, n. 58). John of St. Thomas in his Ars logicae (CPT-L IIq2a1–5) does raise this issue, but then again, the twentieth-century follower of John of St. Thomas, Joseph Gredt (without any arguments) claims that beings of reason have no efficient cause but only a formal one. “Causam efficientem non habet ens rationis … habet tamen fundamentum, quod est eius causa formalis” (Gredt, Elementa philosophiae aristotelico-thomisticae, ed. recognita et aucta ab Eucharius Zenzen. 2 vols. [Barcelona: Herder, 1899/1961], 103). 38  “Ad confirmationem duplex est modus dicendi. Primus asserentium, quod non a solo intellectu, sed ab aliis potentiis potest confici ens rationis. Quae autem sint istae potentiae, Scotus in primo d. 45. quaestione prima, dicit esse voluntatem, et cogitativam [here: imagination]” (CUAM, q1a2n13).

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far as Scotus who—reportedly—holds that even the will can make up beings of reason.39) In Araújo’s words, Suárez defends his views as follows: The justification [of Suárez’s view] is that for making up a being of reason the reflexive act which takes non-being in the manner of being is required; [and] only the intellect and the imagination on account of its conjunction with the intellect is capable of such reflection: [1] the intellect because, in conceiving [for instance] blindness, it first conceives sight by a direct act and [only] then the removal of sight by a reflexive act …. [2] The imagination because it first apprehends [for instance] mountain and gold and [only] then it makes up from these directly apprehended [items] golden mountain, as if reflexively …. [3] The will, indeed, cannot do this [reflexive act which takes non-being in the manner of being], because, although it can reflect upon its acts and be directed to the objects [as they are] universal, apprehended, beloved, and ordered, … it cannot apprehend these denominations under the aspect of being; it follows them under the aspect of good.40

Suárez’s overall argumentation is clear (except with respect to the imagination): if beings of reason can be made up only by the reflexive act that takes non-being in the manner of being, it is only the intellect that is capable of producing beings of reason [1]. The will is not capable since it reflects on something only in the manner of good [3]. Araújo, however, criticizes Suárez with contradicting himself when he suggests that the imagination also makes beings of reason [2]. For as 39  “Suarez vero sectione citata in hoc non subscribere vult Scoto: sed vult solam cogitativam [=imaginativam] ultra intellectum posse conficere ens rationis” (CUAM q1a2n15). 40  “Cuius fundamentum, quia ad conficiendum ens rationis requiritur actus reflexus, qui feratur in non ens ad modum entis; solus autem intellectus et cogitativa propter coniunctionem cum illo potest facere hanc reflexionem: [1] intellectus quidem, quia prius quam concipiat caecitatem, v.g. concipit actu directo visum, et postea actu veluti reflexo apprehendit remotionem visus, ad instar entis alicuius; [2] cogitativa vero, quia prius apprehendit montem et aurum; et postea ex illis directe apprehensis, veluti reflexe concipit montem aureum … : [3] voluntas vero id non potest, quia licet possit reflecti supra suos actus, et ferri in objecta universalia, apprehensa, amata, et praecepta; non tamen apprehendit reflexione ista has denominationes sub ratione entis; sed prosequitur illas sub ratione boni” (CUAM q1a2n15).

9  Francisco de Araújo: Nature, Existence, & Causes of Entia rationis 261 Suárez himself should know, the imagination is not capable of considering anything in the manner of being but only in the manner of sensible being.41 The second view is based on the distinction between the formal and the foundational being of reason. The distinction goes back to Cajetan’s Commentary on Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae I, Question 28, which deals with the question of relations in God.42 The distinction itself is not made by Aquinas himself—in Question 28 he only distinguishes real relations and relations of reason, without mentioning the foundational and formal sense in which one might speak of relations of reason (and hence of beings of reason in general).43 Suárez, of course, knew this passage and Cajetan’s commentary on it but he

41  “Quoad dictum Suarez … ipse vult actum factivum entis rationis esse reflexum et apprehensivum non entis ad modum entis, sub ratione entis: sed cogitativa non habet pro objecto ens sub ratione entis, sed sub ratione sensibilis. Ergo” (CUAM q1a2n16). 42  “… Distinguendum tamen est, quod relatio rationis potest considereari dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum suum esse: et sic non habet esse nisi in intelligi. Alio modo, secundum suam quasi proximam causam, seu fundamentum: et sic causatur et a voluntate et ab imaginativa. Imo etiam a visu exteriori: visus namque, attingendo colorem, causat in eo relationem visi ad videntem. Et similiter dextrum animalis causat relationem dexteritatis in columna. Et tamen hae relationes non sunt actu nisi cum intelliguntur.” (Emphasis mine, Commentary In ST I, 28, art.1; thanks to Jack Doyle for this passage). 43  “Respondeo dicendum quod relationes quaedam sunt in divinis realiter. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod solum in his quae dicuntur ad aliquid, inveniuntur aliqua secundum rationem tantum, et non secundum rem. Quod non est in aliis generibus, quia alia genera, ut quantitas et qualitas, secundum propriam rationem significant aliquid alicui inhaerens. Ea vero quae dicuntur ad aliquid, significant secundum propriam rationem solum respectum ad aliud. Qui quidem respectus aliquando est in ipsa natura rerum; utpote quando aliquae res secundum suam naturam ad invicem ordinatae sunt, et invicem inclinationem habent. Et huiusmodi relationes oportet esse reales. … Aliquando vero respectus significatus per ea quae dicuntur ad aliquid, est tantum in ipsa apprehensione rationis conferentis unum alteri, et tunc est relatio rationis tantum; sicut cum comparat ratio hominem animali, ut speciem ad genus.”

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mentions it only in a different context.44 Araújo paraphrases Cajetan as follows: The second—and true—view (modus dicendi) is held by Cajetan [In I, 28, art. 1] who asserts that with respect to the formal and actual being, a being of reason can be contrived only by the intellect, [but] with respect to its foundational being, it can made up by any potency. In order to understand this view I briefly summarize what Cajetan extensively, albeit eruditely, points out there. Namely: a being of reason can be considered in two ways. First in its actual and formal being; and in this way it does not have being (esse) other than its being-known, in the apprehension of the reason …. Second in its [being the] proximate cause … which is in relations its proximate foundation … [and] in this way a being of reason is caused by the will and the imagination, and even by the external sight.45

Cajetan’s point seems to be clear. We may speak of beings of reason in two senses. Strictly speaking (i.e., in their formal being), beings of reason are that which is actually thought about by the intellect. More loosely speaking (in their foundational being), beings of reason are any “material,” so to speak, that may eventually lead to the creation of the being of reason in the strict sense. Examples of such foundational beings of reason and the powers that make them include, for Cajetan and Araújo, the external sight, which “by seeing the color … causes the foundation of the relation of seen to the seer,” and the imagination 44  The context in which it is mentioned is the question of the special status of the category of relation, which is, according to Cajetan and the Thomistic tration, the only one among the categories that univocally includes both real relations and relations of reason (See DM 54.4.5 and ibid., 47.3.2). In DM 47.3.2, 5 Suárez dissagrees with Cajetan’s interpretation of Aquinas on this point. 45  “Secundus igitur modus dicendi, et verus, est Caietani prima parte, qu. vigesima octava, articulo primo, ad hoc, asserentis, ens rationis a solo posse confici intellectu, secundum esse formale et actuale, et a quavis potentia secundum esse fundamentale. Pro cuius intelligentia advertendum duxi breviter, quod ibi late, erudite tamen, advertit Caietanus [In I, 28, art. 1] Nempe, quod ens rationis potest dupliciter considerari. Uno modo secundum esse actuale et formale; et sic non habet esse, nisi in intelligi, seu in apprehensione rationis .... Alio modo secundum suam, quasi proximam causam ... quae in relationibus est proximum fundamentum; ... et hoc modo causatur ens rationis a voluntate, et ab imaginativa; imo etiam a visu exteriori” (CUAM q1a2n17).

9  Francisco de Araújo: Nature, Existence, & Causes of Entia rationis 263 which “by conceiving the golden mountain causes the ratio of a chimera.” Neither the external sight nor the imagination, however, is capable of making up a being of reason in the strict sense. Not even imagination can grasp the repugnancy and incompossiblity of the unity between gold and mountain and hence it cannot make a being of reason in its formal being.46 (Golden mountain is a stock example in Baroque discussions, although it is not apparent why golden mountains as such should be impossible—the observation occasionally made by Baroque authors themselves).47

V. Beings of Reason and God (Article 3) The third article deals with the question of whether only humans or also God make beings of reason. Araújo identifies three major theories. Let me just briefly describe the gist of Araujo’s view, without going into the details. View 1: Beings of reason can be contrived by whatever intellect, even Divine. View 2: Only the human intellect can contrive beings of reason. View 3: Created intellects (i.e., both human and angelic) can make them but not God. 46  “… imo etiam a visu exteriori qui videndo colorem causat fundamentum relationis visi ad videntem: et similiter dextera animalis causat dexteritatis relationem in columna secundum esse fundamentale et cogitativa etiam concipiendo montem aureum, causat rationem chimerae, quasi causaliter et materialiter: quia tamen non intelligit repugnantiam et incompossibilitatem illius unionis (in qua formaliter consistit chimera, seu negatio) ideo non efficit illam secundum suum esse formale.” Note that Araújo speaks not only of mental powers but even of simple physical presence as capable of creating a foundation for beings of reason: “Similarly, the right [side] of an animal causes the relation of right-ness in the column in its foundational being” (CUAM q1a2n17). 47 Araújo discusses two more issues in Article 2 but we leave them aside (one of them concerns Araújo’s agreement with Suárez on the analogy of proportionality). “Respondet Suarez ad hoc argumentum quod est analogia proportionalitatis inter ens reale et ens rationis: quae autem sit, an metaphorica, an potius propria, hoc non explicat: sed tamen existimo esse metaphoricam, quia ens rationis valde improprie participat rationem entis” (CUAM q1a2n17).

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The first view is ascribed to Scotus, Henry of Ghent, Molina, and others, the second to Suárez and Vázquez, the third to Capreolus, Cajetan, and perhaps Aquinas. 48 Araújo argues for still another view, apparently acknowledging that he departs from Aquinas’s opinion: God can make some but not all beings of reason while not others.49 God cannot make: [1] first or second intentions, [2] negations (by which Araújo means self-contradictory objects), and [3] distinctions of reason. To make these three types of beings of reason is only an imperfection and hence God can dispense with these.50 But, inter48  “[1] Prima asserit a quocumque intellectu etiam a Divino, posse confici entia rationis … Ita sentiunt Scotus… Argentina … Henricus … Durandus … Torres … Molina … Fonseca … [2] Secunda sententia, huic omnino opposita, asserit, nullum ens rationis posse confingi a Divino intellectu aut ab Angelico, quod per propriam speciem et quidditative cognoscit: sed solum ab humano. Hanc sententiam, quoad utrumque distinctum, docet Suárez sectione secunda citata et Vazquez … [3] Tertia sententia est media inter utraque, affirmatque, a quocumque creato intellectu posse fieri entia rationis; non tamen a divino. Ita videtur insuare Capreolus … Idem insinuat Caietanus … Huic etiam sententiae videtur favere Divus Thomas” (CUAM q1a3n19). 49  “Respondeo dicendum primo. Aliqua entia rationis sunt, quae a divino intellectu non possunt, alia vero, quae ab illo possunt confici” (CUAM q1a3n19). 50  “Nam divinus intellectus nequit confingere [1] relationem speciei, generis, aut praedicabilum, [2] nequit etiam conficere negationes, [3] neque rursus potest efficere distinctionem rationis inter illa, quae ex natura rei non distinguuntur. Ergo. Antecedens pro prima parte [1] patet, quia efficere illas relationes rationis provenit ex imperfectione intellectus concipientis gradum genericum sine differentiali et differentialem sine generico et utrumque sine condicionibus individuantibus. … Pro secunda parte patet [2], quia ad conficiendam negationem aliquam requiritur conceptus adunans res incompossibiles et repugnantes illam unionem representans ad instar entis possibilis, saltem ex parte concipientis. Haec autem etiam est imperfectio, derogas divino intellectui, qui neque res incompossibiles adunare potest, neque illarum unionem ad instar possibilis repraesentare, quin imo talis conceptio et repraesentatio esset actus otiosus et supervacaneus in divino intellectu. … Pro tertia parte [3] patet antecedens. Quoniam etiam fieri distinctionem rationis inter illa quae ex natura rei

9  Francisco de Araújo: Nature, Existence, & Causes of Entia rationis 265 estingly, God can make and cognize “ideal relations” (respectus ideales), i.e., relations in which his divine Essence is imitable by creatures, and privations, i.e., non-beings such as blindness or the lack of sight: The second part of the conclusion [i.e., that God makes some beings of reason] is proved: [P1] The ideal relations and privations are beings of reason … and [P2] they can be contrived by the divine intellect. Hence. The minor [P2], concerning the ideal relations, is approved by [Aquinas] … and it is obvious: for God … knows from eternity his essence as imitable in various ways by creatures; in this imitability, however, consists the ideal relation. Hence. With respect to the privations … it is [also] obvious. For God knows that a human being is blind and that his blindness consists in the lack of sight. Hence this lack has merely objective being in the Divine intellect.51

As far as I know, Araújo’s view that God can make some but not all beings of reason is quite original here. No other Baroque thinker seems to take this position. For the sake of completeness, let me make a brief report of Araújo’s remaining theses that he defends in the third article of his Question 1: Thesis 2: The angelic intellect cannot contrive those beings of reason that we have denied to the Divine intellect; it can, however, make those that we have conceded. Thesis 3: The angelic intellect does not make distinctions of reason with respect to the things that it can conceive as they are in themselves; it may do so, however, with respect to the things that it does not conceive as they are in themselves. non distinguuntur, oritur ex imperfectione intellectus, non valentis unico conceptu percipere rem sicut est in se. Haec autem imperfectio repugnat divino intellectui qui unico et simplici conceptu concipit omnia sicut sunt in se. Ergo” (CUAM q1a3n19). 51  “Secunda pars conclusionis [i.e., that God makes some beings of reason] probatur. [P1] Nam respectus ideales et privationes sunt entia rationis … et possint confici a divino intellectu. Ergo. [P2] Minor, quoad respectus ideales, est Doctoris sancti [ST I, q. 15, a. 2 et Contra gentiles I, c. 54] … et patet quia Deus … ab aeterno cognovit essentiam suam ut diversimode imitabile a creaturis: in illo autem respectu imitabilitatis consistit idealis relatio. Ergo. Quoad privationes … patet. Nam Deus cognoscit hominem caecum et eius caecitatem consistentem in carentia visus: ergo talis carentia habet esse obiectivum in Divino intellectu” (CUAM l3q1a3n21).

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Thesis 4: The human intellect makes all [sorts of ] beings of reason. Thesis 5: The angelic intellect and the intellect of the blessed can form plurality of concepts of God and hence distinctions of reason.52 The discussion of thesis 5 includes a long theological discussion about the beatific vision, which shows, among other things, that Araújo was less strict than Suárez as to the separation of theological and philosophical discourse.

VI. Conclusion To conclude, let me assess Araújo’s overall contribution with respect to a theory of beings of reason. The advantages of Araújo’s theory are the following: 1. Araújo offers more plausible and, at any rate, more extensively argued explanation of the place of beings of reason in logic and metaphysics. 2. Araújo pays greater attention to the question of what sort of analogy there is between beings of reason and real beings. 3. Araújo notices the question of whether beings of reason are immanent to the mental act that creates them or not— Suárez does not address this question at all. 4. Araújo improves upon Suárez in clarifying the role of the 52  “[2] Dico secundo: Angelicus intellectus nequit confingere illa rationis entia, quae divino intellectui denegavimus: bene tamen alia quae illi concessimus. Haec conclusio statuitur etiam contra auctores secundae sententiae, quoad secundam partem. … [3] Dico tertio: Angelicus intellectus circa res, quas intuetur sicut sunt in se, non format distinctionem rationis; bene autem circa res, quas non intuetur sicut sunt in se. … [CUAM l3q1a3n23] [4] Dico quarto. Humanus intellectus est factivus omnium entium rationis. Haec patet. Nam nullum ens rationis est quod ab aliquo intellectu confingi non possit: ergo si aliquod nequeat confingi a divino aut ab angelico intellectu, poterit et debebit confingi ab humano. Rursus, in humano intellectu est imperfectio et multiplicitas conceptuum: quae duo sufficiunt ad confingendum negationes, privationes, et relationes et distinctionem rationis. Ergo. … [CUAM l3q1a3n24] [5] Ultimo arguitur. Intellectus angeli et ciuscunque beati potest formare plures conceptos de Deo. Ergo et facere in Deo distinctionem rationis. …” (CUAM l3q1a3n24 n25).

9  Francisco de Araújo: Nature, Existence, & Causes of Entia rationis 267 intellect as the only cause of beings of reason in the strict, formal, sense of the word. 5. He also improves upon Suárez by acknowledging the fact that beings of reason have all four Aristotelian types of causes in some analogical sense. 6. Araújo takes up the question of the nobility of beings of reason that Suárez again does not seem to deal with explicitly. Finally, there is also an element of Araújo’s theory that I have not discussed in this paper but which is very important for it makes Suárez’s theory ultimately inconsistent (whereas Araújo avoids this inconsistency): 7. Araújo explicitly criticizes Suárez’s doctrine that negations and privations can be thought of and compared as they are in reality and as they are beings of reason.53 On the other hand, there are also some shortcomings, such as Araújo’s discussion of the definition and existence of beings of reason. For instance, he does not bother to explain in any detail the two ways in which one can speak of the dependency on reason (subjective and objective). This might be, however, done by Araújo in other parts of his monumental Commentary on Metaphysics, not considered here. My reading and analysis of Araújo’s treatise confirms Fernandez Rodriguez’s observation that the structure of Araújo’s text does not reach Suárez’s level of quality (and perhaps not even John of St. Thomas’s) but that Araújo is a “deeper thinker” in that he has improved upon several other respects of the classical theory of beings of reason.54 53  The critique of Suárez’s is developed in my PhD thesis Beings of Reason: A Study in Scholasticism of the Baroque Era, defended in December 2008 (electronically accesible through ProQuest/UMI Dissertation publishing). In Czech, see Novotný, “Suarezova teorie pomyslných jsoucen,” [Suárez’s Theory of Beings of Reason] Filozofia, Bratislava: SAV (forthcoming). 54  “Following Aristotle, St. Thomas took over a load of problems in a great number of texts. The speculation that followed [St. Thomas]—in almost all cases—aimed to be more precise in the double order of systematicity and of analysis. The Disputation 54 of Suarez and Ars Logica of John of St. Thomas ... are perhaps the most successful attempts at this. Overall, one

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Unlike most other Baroque authors, Araújo takes real hermeneutical effort to interpret and evaluate Suárez’s text. This is not a trivial observation. For as I have already pointed out in the introduction, Suárez’s role and significance for Baroque Scholasticism may be easily both overestimated and underestimated. It would be wrong to diminish his role in the transformation of Renaissance Scholasticism into Baroque Scholasticism. His leading role was recognized by all his, even non-Catholic, contemporaries and his works were distributed in all philosophically savvy areas. But, as we have seen in the case of Araújo and one can see in many other instances, it would be also wrong to exaggerate the actual dependency of post-Suárezian authors on Suárez’s thought and arguments. In the seventeenth century there was a thriving culture of philosophers and theologians who freely proposed theories quite at odds with those of Suárez, so that, eventually, in the latter part of the seventeenth century I do not think any major Scholastic author actually dealt with Suárez directly. He was seen as a venerable but obsolete author.

thing can be established, namely, that in the order of systematicity both texts are superior in their structure to that of Araújo. But it is to the same degree certain that Araújo shows greater depth in the order of analysis” (Fernandez Rodriguez, El ente de razón en Francisco de Araújo, 33-34).

Chapter 10 Man’s Ability to Understand His Own Understanding Aquinas, Kant, and Modern Physics

Michael Renemann

W

I. Introduction

hat is the purpose of exploring the nature of the human intellect? Thomas Aquinas says that by knowing the nature of the human intellect, we can also understand the relation (proportio) of our intellectual acts to the external things that are cognized by these acts, and thus make true judgments about those things. In fact, any claim to truth is based on the intellect’s self-knowledge (which can be more or less comprehensive). In other words, it is possible to know truth through the acquisition of self-knowledge, or through understanding the inner workings of the soul. The better my soul knows itself, the better it can understand from its perceptions and thoughts how external things truly are. In modern philosophy, it has often been doubted that man has the ability to reach the truth by understanding his own understanding. Thus, in his Meditations, Descartes doubts whether there is really something corresponding to the ideas of one’s mind. He only manages to soothe this doubt by proving that God exists and that God is veracious. But Descartes’ famous self-transparency of the mind is strictly

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limited to the mind itself and does not include the relation of the mind to the things. With Kant, the rupture with the old idea of self-reflection is even more radical. In order to avoid the doubt which torments Descartes, Kant recommends adhering to the phenomena—how things appear to us. Determining how our cognitive apparatus works is only possible through looking at the results of its workings, as delivered by the sciences. And it is precisely this restriction in the Kantian system that leads to the impossibility of understanding how things are in themselves. In this paper, I will analyze the truth-revealing power of self-cognition as presented by Thomas and as rejected by Kant. I hope that through this contrastive technique, some very important traits of the traditional account will become visible, and that the meaning of these old philosophical systems will become more apparent—a meaning which has often been obscured by contrasting them unfairly with modern systems, i.e., in ways dominated by modern criteria.

II. Kant The modesty of Kant’s epistemology was very appealing to his readers. But from the point of view of an historian of medieval philosophy, this modesty is also somewhat destructive. Hegel was among the first to notice this, and he summarized Kant’s philosophy with the following words: Theoretically the Kantian philosophy is the “Illumination” or Aufklärung reduced to method; it states that nothing true can be known, but only the phenomenal.1

Brentano, another critic, writes in On the Existence of God: Kant believes it is possible to assure only the knowledge of objects of experience. And he abandons all inferences to transcendental things.2 1  Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Medieval and Modern Philosophy, trans. E.S. Haldane (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 426 (= Hegel-Werke vol. 20, 333). 2  Franz Brentano, On the Existence of God: Lectures given at the Universities of Würzburg and Vienna (1868–1891), ed. and trans. Susan F. Krantz (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 63 (§ 69).

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And he goes on: This is exactly what must have established the belief that a proof of God’s existence is impossible, since the skeptic (scil. Hume) and his opponent (scil. Kant) were found to be agreed on this point.

So we already see where the destructive force is. Cognition, traditionally characterized by a triadic relation among the external thing, the act of the intellect, and the objective representation, is essentially reduced to that member which is ontologically weakest: the objective representation. What has happened to the other two members? The whole observer side of our cognitive processes is essentially hidden, and it reveals itself only through imprinting its structure upon our experience. The “representation of the I” is “in itself perfectly empty,” and: we cannot even say that it is a concept, but merely a consciousness that accompanies all concepts. By this I, or he, or it (the thing), which thinks, nothing is represented beyond a transcendental subject of thoughts = x, which is known only through the thoughts that are its predicates, and of which, apart from them, we can never have the slightest concept, so that we are really turning round it in a perpetual circle, having already to use its representation, before we can form any judgment about it. And this inconvenience is really inevitable, because consciousness in itself is not so much a representation, distinguishing a particular object, but really a form of representation in general, in so far as it is to be called knowledge, of which alone I can say that I think something by it.3

This representation of the “I,” or consciousness of self, does not imply any knowledge: “The consciousness of self is thus very far from being a knowledge of the self.4 That the information we can gain about our transcendent self is not knowledge is best illustrated by the fact that this information is not useful as an instrument to go beyond experience in the direction of the things in themselves—the other member of the cognitive relation which Kant effectively drops. At least traditionally, as we will see, knowledge of the nature of our intellect and of its relation to the given object will allow us to state how the thing is in itself. In other words, 3  Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A (= Riga, 1781) 345 sq. / B (= Riga, 1787) 403 sq. 4  Ibid., B 158.

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if we know about the workings of our cognitive apparatus, then we can see the world as it really is because we are able to understand our experience as experience of external things. Or again, in other words, the world as it really is only appears once we reflect upon the cognitive process; this reflection is the prerequisite for the dichotomy between the thing as it appears to us and the thing in itself. But as Kant neither allows this reflection, nor believes in it, the thing in itself remains hidden. But Kant’s philosophy is not only negative, “teaching us never to venture with speculative reason beyond the boundaries of experience.”5 As he explains in the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason: [A] critique that limits the use of speculative reason is, to be sure, to that extent negative, but because it simultaneously removes an obstacle that limits or even threatens to wipe out the practical use of reason, this critique is also in fact of positive and very important utility, as soon as we have convinced ourselves that there is an absolutely necessary practical use of pure reason (the moral use), in which reason unavoidably extends itself beyond the boundaries of sensibility, without needing any assistance from speculative reason, but in which it must also be made secure against counteraction from the latter, in order not to fall into contradiction with the latter.6

Thus, after having liberated the sphere of the “things in themselves” from the intrusion of speculative reason, we can explore it with practical reason. We cannot describe (speculatively, or by just observing) how things are in this sphere. Rather, we have to explore it with practical reason. Consequently, we have to be satisfied if this exploration leads us only to “object[s] in the idea, and not in reality,” or to “regulative principles,” as Kant explains with respect to a “Being which is the only and all-sufficient cause of all cosmological series”: If, thirdly, the question is asked, whether we may not at least conceive this Being, which is different from the world, in analogy with the objects of experience? our answer is, Certainly we may, but only as an object in the idea, and not in the reality, that is, in so far only as it remains a substratum, unknown to us, of the systematic unity,

5  Ibid., B XXIV. 6  Ibid., B XXV.

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order, and design of the world, which reason is obliged to adopt as a regulative principle in the investigation of nature.7

Thus, maintaining the idea of such a Being is mainly for the sake of “the systematical unity of all natural knowledge.”8 The Kantian system implies the accusation that the old systems present man with a certain order without explaining how the observer-theorist himself was able to understand or see this order. Now Kant denies that we are able to see any order which exceeds the empirical world, and claims that we do not have the powers to describe the framework in which this empirical world is embedded. And, after having thus liberated the space beyond the empirical world from the claims of speculative reason, Kant demonstrates that it is practical reason alone that can explore this space, and that everyone—by utilizing reason—has the chance to grasp the regulative principles dwelling there. The advantage is that through diminishing the demands (in terms of powers of observation) that can reasonably be put upon any knowledge, which exceed the phenomenal world, every person can achieve such knowledge. The illusion that there is a trick making it possible to see the framework around the phenomenal world is destroyed. This illusion had been used by some to gain power over others, who— feeling that they are not able to see the same things themselves—had no choice but to leave very important decisions in the fields of religion and morality to the authorities. But now, with the diminished demand, Kant claims that everyone can understand these regulative principles governing the realm of freedom.

III. Thomas Aquinas In fact, the order of the world plays an important role in Scholastic philosophy. Thomas interprets Genesis 1:31, “And God saw everything (cuncta) that he had made, and, behold, it was very good,” as follows: Of the singulars, it had been said that they are good. Because the singulars are in their nature good; but at the same time, everything 7  Ibid., A 696 sq. / B 724 sq. 8  Cf. ibid., A 674 / B 702.

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(omnia) is very good because of the order of the universe, which is the ultimate and noblest perfection in things.9

We have to note here the fine difference between ‘good’ (singulars) and ‘very good’ (order of the universe)—so the goodness of the order is greater than the goodness of the singulars. And there is a second premise, namely, that God’s perfection is better mirrored if the parts of the universe are not homogenous and similar, but diverse and heterogeneous. With these two premises, one could explain why evil does not necessarily reduce the perfection or beauty of the universe, but might also increase it.10 This explanation in the form Leibniz gave to it was famously ridiculed by Voltaire, who could not believe that we are living in the best of all possible worlds. And combined with both the increase in participation and transparency that the political systems have experienced since then through the Enlightenment, one tends to share Voltaire’s view that the old cosmological optimism was sometimes used by those who are in the key positions within the said order to justify existing conditions. We would like to claim that notwithstanding the political aims for that such theories have been used, one cannot generally say that theologians and philosophers presented such an order in a purely authoritative way. Rather, they explained how man can see himself as embedded in an overarching order through a more or less mysterious ability called reflection. They even thought that this ability played an essential role in man’s ability to understand things and to act freely. 9  Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles II, c. 45, n. 10: “Hinc est quod dicitur Gen. 1-31: vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona: cum de singulis dixisset quod sunt bona. Quia singula quidem sunt in suis naturis bona: simul autem omnia valde bona, propter ordinem universi, quae est ultima et nobilissima perfectio in rebus.” 10  For this topic, cf. Wolfgang Hübener, “‘Malum auget decorem in universo.’ Die kosmologische Integration des Bösen in der Hochscholastik,” in idem, Zum Geist der Prämoderne (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1985), 110-132. Hübener describes three different positions: Albert the Great says that the world would be better if there were no evil at all. Thomas Aquinas says that the world would be better if there were no evil of fault (malum culpae), but that the evil of punishment (malum poenae) and the evil of nature (malum naturae) increase the beauty of the universe. Another disciple of Albert the Great, Ulrich of Strasburg (Ulricus de Argentina), says that no kind of evil diminishes the perfection of the universe.

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It seems to us that one of the most intriguing consequences which man’s ability of reflection brings about is the fact that the realism of Scholastic philosophy (medieval and early modern) was not at all naive. Thomas explains in De veritate, q. 1 a. 9 co. that realism (i.e. knowledge of the truth) is founded in the claim that man can understand his own act of thought and the “proportion” of this act to the thing. It is through this ability to reflect (which pertains to the human intellect because its light is derived from divine truth) that access to the thing ‘as it truly is’ is secured: It has to be said that truth is in the intellect and in the senses, but not in the same way. In the intellect, it is in two ways: first as a consequence of the intellectual act, and second as cognized by the intellect: It follows the intellect’s operation, insofar as the intellect’s judgment is of the thing according to what it is (de re secundum quod est). But it is cognized by the intellect insofar as the intellect reflects upon its act, thereby not only cognizing its act, but cognizing also its act’s proportion to the thing (proportionem eius ad rem). Now the proportion cannot be cognized unless the nature of the act is cognized, and the nature of the act cannot be cognized unless the nature of the active principle is cognized, i.e. the nature of the intellect, which has the nature to conform to things. So the intellect cognizes the truth by reflecting upon itself.11

The question that Thomas wants to answer here is: how truth is in the intellect? He distinguishes two ways: in a sense, truth is already in the intellect when it cognizes a thing according to what it is (forming the quiddity of a thing). But truth can also be in the intellect as something known. And for this to happen, the intellect needs to reflect upon its operation, and it needs to understand the operation’s “proportion” to 11  Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 1 a. 9 co.: “Dicendum, quod veritas est in intellectu et in sensu, sed non eodem modo. In intellectu enim est sicut consequens actum intellectus, et sicut cognita per intellectum. Consequitur namque intellectus operationem, secundum quod iudicium intellectus est de re secundum quod est. Cognoscitur autem ab intellectu secundum quod intellectus reflectitur supra actum suum, non solum secundum quod cognoscit actum suum, sed secundum quod cognoscit proportionem eius ad rem: quae quidem cognosci non potest nisi cognita natura ipsius actus; quae cognosci non potest, nisi natura principii activi cognoscatur, quod est ipse intellectus, in cuius natura est ut rebus conformetur; unde secundum hoc cognoscit veritatem intellectus quod supra seipsum reflectitur.”

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the external thing. For this purpose, the operation’s nature and the nature of the operation’s active principle, i.e., the intellect, are required. So it is through the human intellect’s ability to reflect upon its acts that access to the thing ‘as it truly is’ is secured. If we now endeavor to find out how reflection works, it is not very helpful to emphasize the contrast between the Aristotelian conception of self-knowledge and the Platonic-Augustinian conception of self-knowledge by claiming, for example, that an Aristotelian conception like that of Thomas “excludes the consideration of the soul as an immediate object of cognition and, consequently, as a possible starting point for the cognition of the world.”12 Such a distinction tends to obscure the fact that there is a mutual dependence between our cognition of things and our cognition of the soul, and to overlook the foundational role which our knowledge of the soul has with respect to any kind of judgment due to the fact that this knowledge includes the “proportion” of the soul to the things (which the Cartesian self-transparency does not). It is true that the soul according to Thomas has no direct access to itself, and in this sense, he quotes—within a sed contra argument— Aristotle’s idea that the soul knows itself sicut et alia, “like any other thing.”13 Furthermore, cognition always starts with material things, and self-cognition has as its prerequisite the cognition of a material thing—because the intellect has no actuality (and therefore no intelligibility) before thinking some (other) thing. The starting point has to be something which is actually intelligible: As it is in the nature of our intellect, according to the state of present life, that it looks to material and sensible things, our intellect thinks itself insofar as it becomes actualized through the species which are being abstracted by the light of the agent intellect. This is the act of intelligible things, and

12  Cf. Theodor W. Köhler, “Philosophische Selbsterkenntnis im Mittelalter. Der Paradigmenwechsel im 13. Jahrhundert,” in eds., Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer, Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert (Miscellanea mediaevalia 27), (Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2000), 54-67, here 64. 13  Cf. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 87 a. 1 s.c.: “Sed contra est quod dicitur in III de anima, quod intellectus intelligit seipsum sicut et alia.”

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through them of the possible intellect. So our intellect cognizes itself not through its essence, but through its act.14

Thomas here adheres to the principle stated by Aristotle in book IX of the Metaphysics that things are only intelligible insofar as they are actual.15 Now the question is: is the intellect actual (i.e., actually thinking) by nature? An Aristotelian such as Thomas has no choice but to deny this, because it would make the soul’s connection to the body unnecessary and even obstructive, and it would make our sense-based occupation with the empirical world superfluous. Now, according to Thomas’s translation of the Platonic conception of understanding into Aristotle’s scheme of act and potency, the claim that the soul thinks through participation in Platonic ideas that are naturally implanted into it (naturaliter inditae16) would imply that the soul is by nature always actualized, even if it does not always think. Thomas explains this oddness with the example of something which is actually light (and thus should go up), but is hindered by a ceiling (as the soul is hindered from understanding by the distraction of the senses).17 So the actualization of the intellect is an absolutely necessary prerequisite for it to become intelligible, and thus for any self-knowledge of the intellect. The intellect is actualized through the abstraction of species from material things, for which the light of the agent intellect is the efficient cause. But the act that results from this process is nothing more than a prerequisite. It just opens the possibility that the intellect knows itself. How this self-knowledge is then gained is not trivial. The reason for this is that the intellect’s self-knowledge is neither merely a subjective certainty, concerning only the intellect’s inner events, nor completely exterior in the sense that the intellect has to use sensual 14 Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 87, a. 1 co.: “Sed quia connaturale est intellectui nostro, secundum statum praesentis vitae, quod ad materialia et sensibilia respiciat…; consequens est ut sic seipsum intelligat intellectus noster, secundum quod fit actu per species a sensibilibus abstractas per lumen intellectus agentis, quod est actus ipsorum intelligibilium, et eis mediantibus intellectus possibilis. Non ergo per essentiam suam, sed per actum suum se cognoscit intellectus noster.” 15  Cf. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 87, a. 1 co.: “Respondeo dicendum quod unumquodque cognoscibile est secundum quod est in actu, et non secundum quod est in potentia, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys.” 16  Cf. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 84, a. 3, arg. 3. 17  Cf. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 84, a. 3 co.

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perception to know itself (for example, by listening to the words which it has fashioned). Rather, it is in the middle, describing how my experience is brought about (what its active principle is, etc.) and how the experience relates to the thing as it is. This is why Thomas can say that “the intellect cognizes the truth by reflecting upon itself.”18 Selfknowledge, in this sense, guarantees neutrality or makes it possible. How exactly does this work? In the Summa theologiae, Thomas distinguishes two ways in which the intellect knows itself: particular self-cognition (by which an individual perceives that he or she has an intellect) and universal self-cognition (by which an individual understands the nature of the human mind in general): And this [i.e., that the intellect cognizes itself through its act] occurs in two ways: first, particularly, when Socrates or Plato perceive their having an intellective soul from the fact that they perceive themselves thinking; second, universally, when we explore the act of the intellect in order to understand the nature of the human mind. But it is true that the judgment and the efficacy of this cognition by which we cognize the nature of the soul pertains to us because the light of our intellect is derived from divine truth, in which the grounds (rationes) of all things are contained.19

The kind of self-cognition we are looking for—the kind that can ground the truth of our judgments—is universal self-cognition. It is only through knowing its nature that the intellect knows its act and its act’s relation to the thing.20 Thomas explains this kind of self-cognition in which the intellect can know its own nature with the fact that “the light of our intellect is derived from divine truth, in which the grounds (rationes) of all things are contained.” (This may be considered a Platonic-Augustinian element in Thomas’s philosophy.) 18  Cf. Thomas, De veritate, q. 1 a. 9 co: “…cognoscit veritatem intellectus quod supra seipsum reflectitur.” 19 Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 87, a. 1 co.: “Et hoc dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, particulariter, secundum quod Socrates vel Plato percipit se habere animam intellectivam, ex hoc quod percipit se intelligere. Alio modo, in universali, secundum quod naturam humanae mentis ex actu intellectus consideramus. Sed verum est quod iudicium et efficacia huius cognitionis per quam naturam animae cognoscimus, competit nobis secundum derivationem luminis intellectus nostri a veritate divina, in qua rationes omnium rerum continentur.” 20  Cf. Thomas, De veritate, q. 1, a. 9 co.

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How difficult it has become to grasp the point that man has this ability can be seen in the way many modern researchers treat this aspect of Thomas’s philosophy. An example is François-Xavier Putallaz, who, in his book Le sens de la réflexion chez Thomas d’Aquin, collects the most important passages in Thomas’s œuvre concerning self-cognition, but then writes: The reflection by which truth is known cannot be conceived as a super-act, exterior to myself, by which I would judge the thing in itself, my representation and the relation between this copy and its model. That would mean to demand that human intelligence goes beyond its concrete condition, and to allow that it judges itself, its own value. But said reflection is not an act of critical philosophy which would ground the objectivity of knowing. It is the concrete act by which I attain the object, but the object in its similitude, insofar as it is thought. The intellect returns upon itself when it grasps the extra-mental thing, and judges this thing insofar as it is conceptualized.21

Putallaz is right in stating that we do not have a bird’s-eye view of ourselves and the things we cognize. But he is wrong in saying that we do not judge the thing in itself. As our analysis has shown, Thomas grants humans the ability to assert the truth about things as they are in themselves. Otherwise, why would we need a reflexive act? The reflexive act combines the image provided by the direct act with knowledge about the nature of the direct act (based on knowledge of the nature of the intellect) to get to the thing in itself. This is a direct consequence of the intellect’s ability to understand itself. The intellect understands its own nature, or meaning, or function, within a complex, overarching order. And through this understanding, it can go beyond its own 21  François-Xavier Putallaz, Le sens de la réflexion chez Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: Vrin, 1991), 185: “La réflexion en effet, par laquelle la vérité est connue, ne peut pas être conçue comme un super-acte, extérieur à moi, par lequel je jugerais de la chose en soi, de ma représentation, et du rapport de cette copie à son modèle; ce serait demander à l’intelligence humaine de sortir de son conditionnement concret en lui permettant de juger d’elle-même, de sa valeur. Mais la présente réflexion n’est pas un acte de philosophie critique qui fonderait l’objectivité du connaître; elle est l’acte concret par lequel j’atteins l’objet, mais l’objet dans sa similitude, en tant qu’être intelligé. L’intellect fait retour sur lui-même quand il saisit la chose extra-mentale, et juge de cette chose en tant que celle-ci est conceptualisée.”

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condition and reach the things. Self-knowledge and knowledge of external things are deeply intertwined. There are two aspects of Thomas’s philosophy that have to be considered in this context. The first aspect is that man’s ability to understand himself determines his position in the order of the universe. In the hierarchy of essences, an essence is higher, the more interior its emanations are.22 Thus, intellectual beings take the highest positions due to their ability to reflect upon themselves: Therefore, the highest and most perfect grade of life is that which is according to the intellect: because the intellect reflects upon itself and is able to think itself. But there are different grades in intellectual life. Because the human intellect, even if it can understand itself, takes the first beginning of its understanding from outside, because there is no thinking without phantasm.23

This confirms the importance of man’s ability to reflect upon himself. The second aspect is that Thomas does not claim that every man knows the nature of the soul to the same extent. He explicitly denies this: Let us assume that the soul knows by itself what it is; but every man has a soul; thus, every man knows of his soul what it is. But this is false.24

In a passage where he explains the difference between cogitare, discernere, and intelligere in Augustine, he similarly states: 22  Cf. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles IV, c. 11, n. 1: “… secundum diversitatem naturarum diversus emanationis modus invenitur in rebus: et quanto aliqua natura est altior, tanto id quod ex ea emanat, magis ei est intimum.” Cf. François-Xavier Putallaz, Le sens de la réflexion chez Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: Vrin, 1991), 288: “Le Contra Gentiles IV, c. 11 et la Somme théologique I, 87, 1 rappellent différemment que tout esprit, quel qu’il soit, se caractérise par la connaissance (et l’amour) de soi.” 23 Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles IV, c. 11, n. 5: “Est igitur supremus et perfectus gradus vitae qui est secundum intellectum: nam intellectus in seipsum reflectitur, et seipsum intelligere potest. Sed et in intellectuali vita diversi gradus inveniuntur. Nam intellectus humanus, etsi seipsum cognoscere possit, tamen primum suae cognitionis initium ab extrinseco sumit: quia non est intelligere sine phantasmate.” 24 Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles III, c. 46, n. 3: “Si anima per seipsam cognoscit de se quid est; omnis autem homo animam habet: omnis igitur homo cognoscit de anima quid est. Quod patet esse falsum.”

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The soul does not always cogitate upon and discern God, nor itself, because if this were the case, everyone knew the whole nature of his soul, at which [knowledge] one hardly arrives even with great effort.25

This is important, because if every man knew the nature of the soul and if—as I have shown—this knowledge enables man to know how things really are, one would have to conclude that every man knows how things really are, which does not seem to be the case. So the qualification which Thomas makes is important to the whole argument about the relation between the intellect’s knowledge of itself and its knowledge of external things.

IV. Conclusion My main task was to analyze the truth-revealing power of self-cognition as presented by Thomas and as rejected by Kant. We have seen that, for Thomas, our access to truth is closely linked to the soul’s capacity for self-cognition. Man does have the possibility to understand how things truly are, but for this purpose he has to achieve clarity concerning the nature of his soul.26 So, where are we today? I have started to analyze the natural sciences with the suspicion in mind that, as they mature, these sciences will have to start looking at their own conditions, or at the conditions under which their observations occur. With respect to physics, which is arguably the maturest of the natural sciences, the question would be: is the knowledge that physics delivers sufficiently described as a knowledge about things, or does it much rather refer to our observations and the relation between our observations and the things observed? I suggest the following. Physics, as an experimental science, started as a science about celestial bodies and solid terrestrial objects, such as 25 Thomas, Super Sent., I, d. 3, q. 4, a. 5 co.: “… anima non semper cogitat et discernit de Deo, nec de se, quia sic quilibet sciret naturaliter totam naturam animae suae, ad quod vix magno studio pervenitur.” 26  This is just one solution to the problem of the knowability of the world. It is important to mention the Scotistic approach, which we might call the objective approach to knowability. The Scotists ensure that things can be known by endowing them with a special kind of being, called intelligible being (esse intelligibile). The Thomistic approach, in contrast, might be called the subjective approach to knowability, as it is based on the reflexive structure of the human intellect.

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apples. In this respect, physics knowledge is clearly about things, i.e., the laws of physics refer to the things primarily. But the theories that emerged around 1900, quantum mechanics and the special theory of relativity, provide knowledge about the relation between our observations and the things observed. And by providing this knowledge they make known to us the truth that lies in our observations. The special theory of relativity starts from the constancy of the speed of light and from there explains how “space and time change in a moving body, according to its speed, as seen by an outside observer. The body becomes shorter—that is, its length contracts—along its direction of motion. Time intervals become longer, meaning that time runs more slowly in a moving body; that is, time dilates.”27 Quantum mechanics explains that the state of a system cannot be defined in an observer-independent way.28 The state can only be expressed in the form of a wave function (von Neumann process 2) which indicates the probability for a certain outcome if a measurement is made. On the other hand, any measurement, or probing action (von Neumann process 1) will necessarily disturb the system, i.e., change the wave function. The smaller the measured system, the greater is the relative significance of the disturbance, and thus it is not surprising that quantum mechanics was discovered on the atomic and subatomic scale. But in principle it applies to any physical system. The best-known experiment which illustrates the core principles of quantum mechanics is the double-slit experiment. In the basic version of this experiment, light is sent upon a double-slit, and the result is an interference pattern. This means that light behaves as predicted by classical wave theory (which also applies to water etc.). But if one asks (measures) through which of the slits the particles of light (photons) are passing, then one destroys the interference pattern. So if one considers the situation at the particle level (photon), the situation at the macro level (interference pattern) is influenced. So on the one hand, both theories describe how the observer is involved in the process of measuring, or how he stands on the same plane with the system to be measured. This makes it difficult to speak 27  “Relativity.” Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 2011. 28  I follow here the description of Henry Stapp, Mindful Universe. Quantum Mechanics and the Participating Observer, 2nd ed. (Berlin-New York: Springer, 2011), chapter 3 (17-27) and chapter 10 (55-63).

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of a true observation in the classical modern sense (which implies a bird’s-eye perspective on things). But on the other hand, these theories provide the mathematics for describing with great precision what this involvement looks like, and thereby make apparent the truth that lies in an observation. They enable us to consider an observation as observation, i.e., insofar as it is detached from the sphere of objects, or insofar as it provides a true representation of the sphere of objects. The observation as observation is not causally connected with its object (like the deflection of a pointer); it is not on the same plane with its object, but rather belongs to a different plane. From this perspective, the special theory of relativity and quantum mechanics introduce a new dimension into physics, which we might call the vertical dimension, which is to say, they make known this new dimension. This is an important step because it shows that the physical world is not causally closed and thus cannot be described in a mechanistic or deterministic fashion. But this step is only possible (and understandable) because man is able to understand his own understanding, which includes that he understands the relation, or proportionality, of his observation to the object. So as a preliminary result, we can say that Thomas provides a better framework for understanding modern physics than Kant, whose system seems to be tailored to classical mechanics.

Chapter 11 Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and Edith Stein on Essential Being1 Victor M. Salas

T

I. Introduction

he interest in Scholastic philosophy, particularly that of Thomas Aquinas, that Edith Stein’s conversion to Catholicism generated is a well known feature of her philosophical development. In fact, the “Thomistic doctrine” of potency and act would eventually form the subject of her Habilitationsschrift, and later, in her Finite and Eternal Being, this same doctrine would facilitate her inquiry “into the meaning of being.”2 Yet, as has been pointed out,3 despite her frequent and approving appeal to Thomas, Stein’s account of “essential being” (Wesenhaftes Sein), among other things, makes clear that her position on being is fundamentally non-Thomistic.4 Essential being, Stein maintains,

1  This paper was originally published as “Edith Stein and Medieval Metaphysics,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2011): 323-340. 2  Edith Stein, Finite and Eternal Being: An Attempt at an Ascent to the Meaning of Being [hereafter FEB](Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 2002), xxviii. 3  See, e.g., Sarah Borden, “Edith Stein and Thomas Aquinas on Being and Essence,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 82.1 (2008): 87–103. 4 Stein, FEB, 62–106.

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stands in a timeless permanency over the diverse vicissitudes of finite actual being; it functions as the condition for finite being’s possibility; and it serves as the source of meaning for being.5 Thomas, in contrast, does not attribute any kind of entity to essence apart from its realization in the mind or in some concrete individual thing.6 Consequently, some have regarded Stein’s doctrine of essential being as evidencing a greater degree of alignment with John Duns Scotus (1266–1308), who similarly attributes being to essence or what he calls “common nature.”7 Despite the manifest similarities that obtain between Stein and Scotus, similarities that Stein herself notes,8 I argue that Stein’s understanding of being actually comes much closer to that of Henry of Ghent (1217–1293). More specifically, I show that Stein’s account of essential being is in many ways a faithful reproduction of Henry of Ghent’s distinctive doctrine of esse essentiae or ‘essential being.’ There is, of course, a consequence to this claim: to the degree that Stein’s teaching on essential being mirrors Henry’s understanding of esse essentiae, it is 5  Cf. Borden, Edith Stein Outstanding Christian Thinkers (London-New York: Continuum, 2003), 108–9. 6  See Thomas Aquinas, De ente et essentia, c. 3. In that text, Aquinas explains that ‘nature’ or ‘essence’ can be understood in two ways: (1) considered “absolutely” according to its own proper character (secundum rationem propriam) and (2) according to the being that it has in the singular thing or in the mind. Thomas’s account of essence “considered absolutely” bares a close resemblance to Avicenna’s own teaching on the same subject with one notable exception: Aquinas refuses to grant that essence being, whereas Avicenna does. Thomas writes, “Ergo patet quod natura … absolute considerata abstrahit a quolibet esse, ita tamen quod non fiat precisio alicuius eorum” (ed. Leonine, vol. 43, 374, ln. 68–70). For Avicenna see Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina V.I (ed. S. van Riet, Leiden, 1980; 233–34): “Poterit autem animal per se considerari, quamvis sit cum alio a se; essentia enim eius est cum alio a se; ergo essentia eius est ipsi per se; ipsum vero esse cum alio a se est quiddam quod accidit ei vel aliquid quod comitatur naturam suam, sicut haec animalitas et humanitas; igitur haec consideratio praecedit in esse et animal quod est individuum propter accidentia sua et universale quod est in his sensibilibus et intelligibile, sicut simplex praecedit compositum… ex hoc enim esse nec est genus nec species nec individuum nec unum nec multa, sed ex hoc esse est tantum animal et tantum homo.” 7 Borden, “Edith Stein and Thomas Aquinas on Being and Essence”; idem, Edith Stein, 109–10. 8 See FEB, 101.

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susceptible to the same criticisms that subsequent medieval thinkers would launch against Henry’s doctrine of esse essentiae.

II. Avicenna and Stein’s Trichotomous Accounts of Being and Essence To establish my claim concerning the crucial points of correspondence between Stein and Henry of Ghent, the link uniting the two must first be identified, namely, Avicenna (980–1037). For a significant number of medievals (e.g., William of Auvergne, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and much later even Francisco Suárez), Avicenna’s conception of being and essence would form, if not always their metaphysical point of departure, at least a common point of reference.9 This is especially true for Scotus, who not only sides with Avicenna against Averroes in identifying being inasmuch as it is being (ens inquantum ens) as the true subject of metaphysics,10 but who would also integrate Avicenna’s account of essences into his (Scotus’s) own teaching on common nature.11 Still, one must note that Avicenna plays an equally crucial role in Henry of Ghent’s understanding of the nature of metaphysics, his thesis of the intentional distinction between essence and existence, and also Henry’s argument for the impossibility of a plurality of gods.12 The similarity that Stein’s account of essential 9  Joseph Owens argues a similar point with respect to Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus in “Common Nature: A Point of Comparison between Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics,” Mediaeval Studies 19 (1957): 1–14. 10  To determine the subject of metaphysics Scotus weighs the contentions of Avicenna and Averroes against each other. Whereas Avicenna, no doubt taking his lead from Aristotle’s Metaphysics IV.2, maintains that being as such forms the proper subject matter of metaphysics, Averroes, coming down on the side of Metaphysics VI.1, criticizes Avicenna and argues instead that the separate substances (i.e., the gods) form the true subject matter of metaphysics. In considering the debate between the two Islamic thinkers, Scotus clearly affirms Avicenna against Averroes. Cf. Scotus, Reportatio I-A, prol., q. 3 (eds. Allan Wolter and Oleg Bychkov, 2004), 75: “Sed Avicenna bene dicit et Averroes valde male.” 11  Cf. Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 3, pars. 1, q. 1, nn. 30–34 (ed. Vatican, vol. 7, 402–404). 12  On these points see Roland Teske, “Some Aspects of Henry of Ghent’s Debt to Avicenna’s Metaphysics” The Modern Schoolman 85.1 (2007): 51–70.

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being bears to an Avicennian-inspired metaphysic will become clearer, but as Avicenna stands in the background of so many medieval metaphysical doctrines, one cannot facilely identify Stein’s account with that of Duns Scotus even if there are obvious similarities. Put another way, Stein’s doctrine of essential being may very well bear a strong family resemblance to Scotus but this is on account of an even more remote patrimony, one stemming from Avicenna. As it turns out, Avicenna’s teaching on essence generated a certain problematic that so many Christian theologians in the Middle Ages would have to address, each in his own unique way. This problematic, which I explain below, ultimately led to Henry of Ghent’s doctrine of the esse essentiae as well as Scotus’s account of common nature. Whether Stein had this Avicennian problematic explicitly in mind when articulating her doctrine of being is far from obvious and, given the paucity of references one finds in her work  to  the Arabic philosopher, I suspect she did not. Here, James Collins’s observations are entirely apposite, “Especially on the question of essence and existence, she could have profited from a reading of Avicenna and from a historically oriented introduction to Duns Scotus.”13 Accordingly, I think it safe to say that Stein was largely unaware of the difficulties that Avicenna’s conception of essence raises for the Christian theologian. This would later come to complicate her own task of developing a Christian philosophy in terms of essential being. To Avicenna’s way of thinking, essence is subject to a threefold consideration. First, essence can be considered as it is realized in particular or individual concrete beings, or, second, it can be considered from the perspective of its existence in the intellect, whereupon it attains the character of a universal, and, third, essence can be considered simply as it is in itself without regard to its realization in the mind or in an individual.14 Taken in this last sense, simply in itself (secun13  James Collins, Crossroads in Philosophy: Existentialism, Naturalism, Theistic Realism (Chicago, IL: Henry Regency Co., 1962), 103. I am grateful to Professor John P. Doyle for bringing this text to my attention. 14 Avicenna, Logica I in Avicennae perhypatetici philosophi: ac medicorum facile primi opera (ed. Venice, 1508): “Essentie vero rerum aut sunt in ipsis rebus: aut sunt in intellectu: unde habent tres respectus: unus respectus essentiae est secundum quod ipsa est non relata ad aliquod tertium esse: nec ad id quod sequitur eam secundum quod ipsa est sic. Alius respectus est secundum quod est in his singularibus. Et alius secundum quod est in

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dum se), essence enjoys a unique metaphysical position. Anything not strictly contained in the definition of essence is accidental to it. Thus for Avicenna, an essence taken simply in itself is neither particular nor universal. Particularity or universality is completely extraneous to the definition of an essence and accrues to the essence accidentally in its realization either in the individual thing or in the mind. Offering ‘equinity’ (equinitas) as an illustration of essence taken secundum se, Avicenna tells us, “Equinity [equinitas] itself is nothing except equinity only; for in itself it is neither many nor one, neither existing in sensible [things] nor in the mind, nor is it some of these [things] in potency or in act, so as they are included within the essence of equinity….”15 In short, as Avicenna famously exclaims, “equinitas est tantum equinitas!” What is more, though essences do not enjoy “actual” being, for, again, such being belongs to an essence only as it is realized in an individual thing (i.e., the particular) or in the mind (i.e., the universal), essence, on Avicenna’s view, does enjoy a kind of being of its own (esse proprium), in fact, a being that is “prior” to the being of the concrete individual.16 With Edith Stein, we find a similar trichotomous account of being in the third chapter of her Finite and Eternal Being. Though Stein speaks in terms of ‘being’ and the Latin Avicenna in terms of ‘essentia,’ the two accounts bear a striking resemblance, indicating a deeper intellecu” (fol. 2rB). Cf. Avicenna Latinus, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, V.1 (ed. S. Van Riet; Peeters-Leiden, 1980: 233–34); for the text see n. 5 supra. An almost identical division is found in Henry of Ghent, Quodlibetum 3, q. 9 (fol. 61r) and Duns Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1, nn. 30–34 (ed. Vatican, vol. 7, 402). 15  Avicenna Latinus, Liber de prima philosophia sive scientia divina, V.1 (ed. S. Van Riet; Peeters-Leiden, 1980: 228): “Unde ipsa equinitas non est aliquid nisi equinitas tantum; ipsa enim in se nec est multa nec unum, nec existens in his sensibilibus nec in anima, nec est aliquid horum potentia vel effectu, ita ut hoc contineatur intra essentiam equinitas, sed ex hoc quod est equinitas tantum.” 16  Ibid. The attribution of being to essences becomes a vexing issue for medieval Christian theologians, for whom the question would arise: how does essential being stand in relation to God, who, as creator, is the source of all being? If being is granted to essence apart from God, then in what manner can God be understood as the universal cause/creator of being? Moreover, would there be a way to articulate that relationship without doing violence to the notion of God as a creator ex nihilo?

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doctrinal congruence despite differences in vocabulary. Stein tells us that being can be located under one of three major divisions: (1) real or actual being, (2) being-in-the-mind or mental being, and (3) essential being.17 Here, one recognizes immediately the same division that Avicenna had anticipated much earlier. Prior to making explicit her trichotomous account of being, Stein’s efforts had been directed chiefly to a consideration of the being of the ego and the various “experiential units” that constitute the ego’s phenomenological life.18 Marian Maskulak helpfully fills out what Stein means by ‘experiential units:’ Phenomenology uses the term ‘experiential unit’ to describe the structural whole which occurs in the conscious life of the individual during a given span of life. At any specific time, only one of the parts of a current experiential unit steadily, but momentarily, becomes actual, and in this way, the whole unit ‘receives a share in being.’ Yet only that which takes place in the ‘now moment’ is ‘fully alive,’ with new life filling each new ‘now’.…19

Considered, then, against the backdrop of her divisions of being, Stein’s focus had been directed to the first of her divisions, “real being,” which in the third chapter of Finite and Eternal Being she develops in terms of temporality. As she explains, the diverse experiential units constituting the ego are experienced precisely as temporal—as “present” or “now”—to which a previous or past experience has given way in an unending succession of new experiences.20 Temporality is a feature not only of the ego but of all finite real being wherein one finds a composition of potency and act. The reason for this is that, in becoming “real,” a being must pass through a temporally prior state of potency into a subsequent state of actuality.21 For Stein, the temporal character of finite being means that it never possesses being as properly its own, as its birthright, but instead as a “gift.” (In contrast, Stein notes that eternal being does not receive its being but stands in the eternal possession of its own being as its master.)22 Stein has thus uncovered a 17  FEB, 101–2. 18  This is the approach she takes in her second chapter. 19  Marian Maskulak, Edith Stein and the Body-Soul-Spirit at the Center of Holistic Formation (New York, NY: Peter Lang Publishing, 2007), 49. 20  FEB, 43–7. 21  Ibid., 61: “Actual-potential being is thus temporal being.” 22  FEB, 61.

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feature of finitude itself, “We may accordingly call finite what does not possess its being but needs time in order to attain being.”23 Since her account of finite real being turns fundamentally upon the existential movements that go hand-in-hand with temporality, the question for Stein is: how does such an account—wherein being is constituted by an endless exchange between becoming and passing away—avoid degenerating into a chaotic morass of unintelligibility, a modern repetition, as it were, of Heraclitean flux dressed in phenomenological garb? Stein is pressed to discern a meaningful and stable source of intelligibility within finitude’s unending march toward real or actual being. Like Plato, who, over two millennia earlier, had used his theory of the Forms to overcome the challenges posed not only by Heraclitus but also the monistic logic of Parmenides, Stein has recourse to a transcendent reality—“essence”—to provide a constant structure of meaning that directs the ebb and flow of actual being’s realization. As she sees it, essence performs its governing task while standing timelessly outside the vicissitudes of actual or real being. And, again, like Plato, the permanent structures of intelligibility are put into relief by marking the distinction between the intelligible world and the visible world, the world of Being and the world of becoming.24 For her part, Stein insists, “It is necessary to make a distinction between the becoming and passing away and what becomes and passes away and which, after it has become, still is in a certain manner despite its being past.”25 And so, one can distinguish, on the one hand, between the peculiar and particular temporal features that pertain to diverse experiential units and, on the other, the abiding intelligible structure or content underlying those units. Stein offers as an illustration ‘joy.’ One can clearly distinguish, she says, between ‘this (my) joy’—which exists always under some temporal mode as ‘being present’ or ‘being past,’ which always has some particular intentional object, and which always varies in degree of intensity—and ‘joy’ itself.26 While the particular joys that I or others experience come into being and slip away, the essence of joy 23 Ibid. 24 Cf. Republic VI 504D–511E, the locus classicus for Plato’s discussion of this distinction. 25  FEB, 62. 26  Ibid., 73–4.

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as it is in itself—considered in terms of its intelligible structure on account of which joy can be distinguished from other phenomena such as, for instance, sorrow itself or fear itself—remains unperturbed in its timeless constancy. As such, the essence of joy, or any other essence for that matter, has a kind of priority over its corresponding instantiations in real being. In Stein’s words, “Nature quid such as the ‘joy of a child’ was in its essential being prior to all time, prior to the ‘existence’ of the world, prior to the existence of the children in the world, and prior to the existence of the joy of children.”27 More must be said concerning the kind of “priority” that essence enjoys over real being. Stein is clear; the priority is not a temporal one, for essential being is non-temporal. “The essence is not in time at all,”28 she writes and also, “Theirs [i.e., essential being] is a changeless and timeless being.”29 What is more, if the priority essential being possesses over real being is non-temporal, then essential being cannot be understood as merely a passive potency or prior potentiality from which the actuality of real being emerges.30 As Stein puts it, an essence is not some rudimentary phase through which real being passes in the accrual of its existential perfection.31 Rather, essence stands in an entirely different ontological order than real being and thus transcends the corresponding potency-act dyad proper to real being in its finite modalities. The priority that essence possesses must be understood, then, as a metaphysical or ontological one without which real being would not be possible let alone actualized.32 “Nothing temporal can exist without a timeless formal structure [Gestalt] which regulates the 27  Ibid., 95. Cf. Avicenna Latinus, Liber de prima philosophia sive scientia divina, V.1 (ed. S. Van Riet; Peeters-Leiden, 1980: 233–34); Henry, Quodlibetum 3, q. 9 (fol. 61r); Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1 (ed. Vatican, vol. 7, 402–3). 28  Ibid., 64. 29  Ibid., 67; cf. ibid., 93: “And it [essential being] is not as something which from moment to moment is wrested from nothingness; it is not in any temporal sense.” 30  Ibid., 83. 31 Ibid. 32 Cf. FEB, 80: “Essences are not actual, but if they were not, there would be neither actuality nor potentiality.”

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particular course of the temporal sequence of events [das Geschehen] and is thereby actualized in time.”33 Significantly, in her discussions of essence, Stein maintains that essence has a being of its own—“essential being.” Such being cannot simply be reduced to the experiential units of actual being that “flash up,” as it were, in the existential movement of finitude’s passage from potency to actuality. Indeed, the ontological status of essences, though “unreal,” cannot simply be nothing; for as Stein argues, “The possibility of real being has its ground in the being of the essence. For this reason its unreal being cannot be called nothing. Anything which is the condition of another’s being must itself possess being. Only what is nothing is not.”34 So, while essential being is not actually something—that is, it is not a real being since essential being “stands in opposition to actual being”35—it is not nothing that entirely lacks any ontological density since essential being is the very possibility of the act and potency that constitute real being. As I read her, then, essential being is simply the ‘being of possibility’ or, what is the same, ‘possible being,’ which is the condition for both real and mental being.

III. Stein and Henry of Ghent on Essential Being In attributing being to essence, Stein distances herself from Thomas Aquinas but moves much closer to thinkers like Avicenna, Henry of Ghent, and Scotus. One thus faces the question: is Stein’s position really a re-appropriation of Scotism, as some recent scholarship has maintained?36 Stein herself suggests as much when she acknowledges that: “It would seem that our own point of view is closest to that of Duns Scotus.” 37 Close, yes; but closest? Since the matter turns on essential being let us first consider the context in which Scotus attributes entity to essence or common nature. The context is Duns Scotus’s 33  FEB, 102. 34  Ibid., 68. 35  Ibid., 91: “[W]e have discovered in essential being… a type of being that is not a becoming and passing away and that stands in opposition to actual being.” 36  Cf. texts cited in nn. 3, 5 supra. 37  FEB, 101.

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grappling with the issue of individuation. He faces the question: what contracts a nature to this or that individual when the nature, of itself, is indifferent to any of them? In answering this question, Scotus notes first that nature itself is prior to the nature realized in “this” or “that” individual.38 Because of this “priority,” a common nature must enjoy a certain ‘unity’ unto itself, albeit a unity that is “less” than the numeric unity of the individual that instantiates that nature. Scotus writes: There is some real unity in a thing apart from any operation of the intellect, a less-than-numerical unity or the proper unity of a singular thing, and which “unity” is of the nature according to itself [secundum se]—and it is according to such “proper unity” of the nature as nature, that the nature is indifferent to the unity of singularity….39

To unfold his meaning, Scotus explains that this ‘less-than-numerical unity’ should be understood along the lines of what Avicenna argues with respect to essence taken just in itself; and, here, Scotus adverts to Avicenna’s familiar example of equinity. We recall for Avicenna, as Scotus himself points out, that equinity of itself is neither several, universal, nor particular. But, then, Scotus adds his own touch when he notes that the unity Avicenna denies of essence should be understood as ‘numerical unity’—the unity of the individual—and not some ‘prior unity’ that attends to the very essence itself.40 And so, Scotus concludes, though there is really nothing unless it is singular, universal, etc., of itself the common nature is prior to all of these determinations, including even the numerical unity of the individual.41 It is only after his extensive treatment of and argument for a less-than-numerical 38 Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 3, pars 1, qq. 5–6, n. 172 (ed. Vatican, vol. 7, 476): “… natura prius est naturaliter quam haec natura, et unitas propria— consequens natura ut natura—est prior naturaliter unitate eius ut haec natura….” 39  Ibid., q. 1, n. 30 (ed. Vatican, vol. 7, 402): “… aliqua est unitas in re realis absque omni operatione intellectus, minor unitate numerali sive unitate propria singularis, quae ‘unitas’ est naturae secundum se,—et secundum istam ‘unitatem propriam’ naturae ut natura, est, natura est indifferens ad unitatem singularitatis….” 40  Ibid., n. 31 (ed. Vatican, vol. 7, 402-3). 41  Cf. ibid., n. 32 (ed. Vatican, vol. 7, 403): “Licet enim numquam sit realiter sine aliquo istorum, de se tamen non est aliquod istorum, sed est prius naturaliter omnibus istis,—et secundum prioritatem naturalem est

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unity of common nature that Scotus, aware of the transcendental convertibility of ‘unity’ and ‘being,’ affirms entity of the common nature.42 Stein, in contrast to Scotus, begins not so much from a consideration of the unity that an essence enjoys as it is just in itself, but rather from the being that the essence must have if it is to function as a condition for real being.43 We find a similar approach with Henry of Ghent, who, following Avicenna’s lead, begins with a consideration of the reality that an essence enjoys in itself. Like Stein, Henry articulates a threefold account of essence and, once again, Avicenna’s own distinctions direct the discussion. Essence, Henry explains, can have being (esse) in extra-mental things, or it can have being in the mind, or, third, it can have a being unto itself, an esse essentiae. By way of example, Henry notes that ‘animal’ taken together with its various accidental properties in singular things is a “natural thing” (res naturalis), that is, an individual animal; taken with its accidents in the soul or mind, however, ‘animal’ is simply a thing of reason (res rationis) and attains to universality; further still, taken simply in itself (secundum se) it is a “thing of essence” (res essentiae) of which, much as Stein herself maintains, it is said that its being (esse) is prior or indifferent to both real and mental being.44 The being (esse) that ‘animal’ has considered just in itself as ‘animal,’ Henry says, is other than the being that ‘animal’ enjoys in the individual (i.e., ‘this’ or ‘that’ particular animal) or in the

‘quod quid est’ per se obiectum intellectus, est per se, ut sic, consideratur a metaphysico et exprimitur per definitionem….” 42  Ibid., qq. 5–6, n. 172 (ed. Vatican, vol. 7, 476): “In eodem igitur quod est unum numero, est aliqua entitas, quam consequitur minor unitas quam sit unitas numeralis, et est realis….” 43  Cf. Sarah Borden Sharkey, Thine Own Self, 91-92. 44 Henry, Quodlibetum 3, q. 9 (Paris, 1518; reprint Louvain, 1961): “Triplicem quidditate habet intellectum verum sicut et tres modos habet in esse. Unum enim habet esse naturae extra in rebus: alterum vero habet esse rationis: tertium vero habet esse essenitae. Animal enim acceptum cum accidentibus suis in singularibus, est res naturalis: acceptum vero cum accidentibus suis in anima, est res rationis: acceptum vero secundum se, est res essentiae de qua dicitur quod esse eius est prius quam esse eius naturae, vel rationis…” (fol. 61r). Cf. FEB, 64, 67; cf. Avicenna Latinus, Liber de prima philosophia, V.1 (ed. S. Van Riet; Peeters-Leiden, 1980: 233–34).

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universal (i.e., in the mind).45 In short, essence, on Henry’s view much as it was for Avicenna, is indifferent to all the conditions that befall it as it exists in the individual or in the mind; it is indifferent to particularity, universality, plurality, and, significantly, even unity, all of which are outside the intention or definition of the essence.46 Clearly, Henry’s doctrine of esse essentiae represents his effort at reconciling a fundamentally Avicennian-inspired metaphysics with an overarching Christian theo-logic. Still, that very Christian theo-logic marks the difference between Henry and Avicenna. For Avicenna, the possible being that an essence enjoys of itself depends upon necessary being (necesse esse) not for its possibility but only for its actualization.47 Such a thesis would obviously be unpalatable to a Christian thinker such as Henry since, understood as a creator-God, God is the ultimate source of all being, whether actual or possible. Thus Henry is forced to weave Avicenna’s teaching on essence into an overarching and governing Christian world-view, wherein Avicennian essence (i.e., possible being) is understood in terms of God’s own knowledge of creatures as possible imitations of His own nature. In other words, the ontological origin of esse essentiae is not independent of God, but stems directly from the divine being’s knowledge of Himself as imitable by diverse essences.48 This knowledge of imitability gives rise, Henry argues, to 45  Ibid.: “Alterum esse igitur habet consideratio scilicet animalis ex hoc quod est animal, ponitur in esse, et animal quod est individuum, et universale, et caetera huiusmodi…” (fol. 61r). 46  Ibid.: “… licet ex sua animalitate nec sit proprium nec communem: sed fit proprium vel commune per hoc quod accidit ei de conditionibus ut enim dicit [Avicenna] in eodem capitulo secundo, animal vel homo vel quoddam consideratum in seipso secundum hoc quod ipsum est, non accepto cum eo hoc quod est sibi admixtum scilicet sine conditione communis aut proprii, unius aut multi, in potentia vel in effectu, in anima vel in singularibus” (fol. 60v–61r). Again, see cf. Avicenna Latinus, Liber de prima philosophia, V.1 (ed. S. Van Riet; Peeters-Leiden, 1980: 233–34). 47  Cf. Gerard Smith, “Avicenna and the Possibles,” The New Scholasticism 17 (1943): 340–57. 48  Richard Cross rightly points out that the proper object of God’s knowledge is simply His own essence—an essence which is imitable—and not the diverse essences of creatures. See Cross, Duns Scotus on God (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005), 62: “[I]n principle there are two distinct claims here [with respect to Henry]: one that knowledge of God’s essence

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the plurality of divine ideas.49 What is at issue, then, is God’s exemplar causality. Henry’s position as stated thus far is not so different from some of his immediate predecessors such as Albert the Great50 and Thomas Aquinas,51 each of whom holds that God knows creatures by knowing how His essence can be imitated. Henry’s novelty, however, consists in his maintaining that God’s knowledge of creaturely essences as so many possible ways in which the divine essence can be imitated bestows a kind of objective being or esse cognitum upon those essences, which Henry develops in terms of esse essentiae.52 With respect to esse essentiae, Henry tells us, “This being belongs to it [i.e., essence] because, by reason of the exemplar that it has in God, in accord with which it is naturally able to be produced by God in actuality, it is in itself a certain nature and essence, which is naturally able to have being in the intellect and in the apprehension of it, even if it in no way has being in external reality.”53 In other words, in attributing being is necessary for God’s knowledge of creatures, and a second that the object of this knowledge requires the reality of non-existent essences.” 49  In fact, Henry insists that if God did not possess divine ideas, He would be incapable of knowing anything other than Himself. Cf. Henry, Quodlibetum 9, q. 2: “… si in deo divina essentia non haberet nisi rationem essentiae et absolute absque omni ratione respectus et imitabilis ad extra: nihil deus cognosceret nisi suam essentiam et seipsum: et illa quae intra se sunt ipsa essentia: et nihil eorum quae sunt extra…” (fol. 345r). 50  Cf. Albert, In I Sent., d. 35 , aa. 1, 10. 51  Cf. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 14, a. 5. 52  Cf. Tobias Hoffman, “Duns Scotus on the Origin of the Possibles,” in eds. Stephen Brown, Thomas Dewender, and Theo Kobusch, Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century (Leiden-Brill Press, 2009), 362: “God’s essence is the exemplary cause of ‘creatures as known,’ i.e. of the objective being of creatures. Henry identifies this ‘being known’ (esse cognitum) with the ‘being of essence’ (esse essentiae) of creatures. The ‘being of essence’ of a creature is equally eternal as is the divine knowledge.” 53 Henry, Summa quaestionem ordinariarum a. 21, q. 4, eds. Descorte and Teske (Peeters, 2005): “[Hoc esse] quod convenit ei ex hoc quod ratione exemplaris quod habet in Deo, secundum quam nata est a Deo produci in effectu, ipsa in se est natura et essentia quaedam quae nata est habere esse in intellectu et eius apprehensione, etsi nullo modo habeat esse in re extra.” Trans. Descorte and Teske, 76-7. Cf. also Summa quaestionem ordinariarum, a. 21, q. 4, eds. Descorte and Teske (Peeters, 2005): “Dicitur autem essentia et natura quaedam ex eo quod habet in divino esse rationem

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to essence, Henry is identifying those essences which are possible in themselves even if not actual. The reason for that possibility, unlike Avicenna, does not stem from the intrinsic nature of the essence considered in itself—what Avicenna describes as “certitudo” which simply pertains to the internal integrity of a nature making it to be what it is54—but from God’s knowledge of Himself as imitable. Henry’s account of esse essentiae thus stands in contrast to those fictions that have no corresponding exemplar in the divine mind because they imply a contradiction and thus have no esse unto themselves, that is, no esse essentiae.55 Thus, for Henry, the esse proprium that Avicenna attributes to essences or natures is recast in terms of the relationship that an essence has to its corresponding divine idea. Essential being (esse essentiae) is, as Henry puts it, ‘ratified being’ (ens ratum); it is “ratified” on account of the exemplar relation it enjoys to the divine ideas; indeed the very esse of esse essentiae stems precisely from that exemplar relationship.56 For our present purpose of locating Stein’s thought in closer proximity to Henry than Scotus, it is important to note that, according to Henry, though esse essentiae is constituted in its intentional relation to the divine ideas, it is not identical to those ideas or merely reducible to the divine being. Rather, esse essentiae is a term of that relation, and, exemplaris, secundum quam nata est produci in actuali esse, a quo convenit ei esse essentiae” (80-81). 54 See Avicenna Latinus, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina I.5 (ed. S. van Riet, Louvain-Leiden: 1977, 34-35): “Sed res et quicquid aequipollet ei, significat etiam aliquid aliud in omnibus linguis; unaquaeque enim res habet certitudinem qua est id quod est, sicut triangulus habet certitudinem qua est triangulus, et albedo habet certitudinem qua est albedo. Et hoc est quod fortasse appellamus esse proprium, nec intendimus per illud nisi intentionem esse affirmativi, quia verbum ens significat etiam multas intentiones, ex quibus est certitude qua est unaquaeque res, et est sicut esse proprium rei.” Cf. John Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines on the Reality of Nonexisting Possibles,” in Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1984), 175, n. 25. 55  Ibid.; cf. Quodlibetum 3, q. 9 (fol. 61v); cf. Quodlibetum 1, q. 9 (fol. 6v). 56  Cf. Henry, Summa quaestionem ordinariarum a. 21, q. 4; Quodlibetum 5, q. 2 (fol. 154r); Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines on the Reality of Nonexisting Possibles,” 178.

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as such, distinct from the opposing term, God.57 So on Henry’s view, in God’s very eternal act of knowing, He not only eternally knows His own essence as imitable by a creaturely essence but He also knows that essence as an object distinct from Himself.58 The esse essentiae, though dependent upon God, is nevertheless something other than God,59 albeit co-eternal with the divine being.60 Thus, essences, on Henry’s account, enjoy a real relation to the divine intellect—and that from eternity.61 In contrast, a creature’s existential being or esse existentiae is received from God at some specific time. While a creature has essential being (esse essentiae) insofar as it enjoys a formal relationship to an exemplar idea in God, the creature does not possess existential being (esse existentiae) in virtue of its own essence but on account of a 57  For an excellent account of Henry’s account of esse essentiae in relation to God see Mark Henninger, Relations: Medieval Theories 1250–1325 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 44-47. 58  See Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines on The Reality of Nonexisting Possibles,” 177. 59 Henninger, Relations, 44. 60  Cf. Hoffman, “Duns Scotus on the Origin of the Possibles,” 362. Godfrey of Fontaines, one of Henry’s earliest critics, likewise notes the co-eternal character that esse essentiae enjoys in Henry’s doctrine. Cf. In his Quodlibetum 3, q. 1 (Les Philosophes belges, ed., M. DeWulf and A. Pelzer, Louvain-Paris, 1904: 156) Godfrey first presents Henry’s doctrine as contrary to own: “… creature potest dici esse aliquod ens verum reale ratione suae essentiae sive quantum ad esse essentiae… quia relation realis non habet esse nisi in eo quod est ens verum reale, quia relation realis requirit fundamentum reale. Sed cum Deus se habet respectu creaturae in ratione causae efficientis et formalis… in ratione causae formalis se habet respectu creaturae in quantum creatura habet ab ipso esse essentiae,—ab aeterno autem se habet in ratione causae formalis exemplaris cum in ipso aeternaliter sint rationes idealis et exemplars omnium essentiarum creaturarum…” (emphasis mine). 61 Henry, Quodlibetum 9, q. 1 (fol. 341v): “Ex consideratione enim divini intellectus circa divinam essentiam ut est intellecta ab ipso: sunt in ipso rationes ideales secundum modum exponendum in sequente quaestione: quod sunt relationes ex hoc in deo secundum rationem ad ipsas essentias creaturarum: quae ex hoc sunt aliquid secundum essentiam quae respondent rationibus idealibus in deo existentibus: et ratione ipsius essentiae earum habent relationem realem ad deum.” Cf. Wippel, “The Reality of Nonexisting Possibles,” 177.

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relationship with the divine will through which it is brought into act by means of efficient causality.62 Does Stein maintain the same as Henry with respect to her understanding of essential being? I think she is forced to maintain a position that, while perhaps not identical to Henry’s account on every point, is strikingly similar and this because, as I read her, she draws a distinction between essential being and the divine ideas (i.e. the divine being). First, however, I should make clear that in distinguishing essential being from the divine ideas or essence, I do not mean to suggest that, on Stein’s view, the reality of essential being is something independent from God. Stein clearly rejects such a position, “[O] nly he who truly possesses being and who is thus the Lord of being can present such a gift.… [God] would not be the Lord of being if anything were exempt from his ontological might, if without him or independent of him there could be either being or not-being.”63 She thus insists that, “[T]he being of essences and whatnesses cannot be conceived as independent in relation to the eternal being.”64 If essential being is not independent in relation to God, this is precisely because, according to Stein, it is dependent as a term of otherness with respect to the divine intellect. Given her description of essential being as finite and of itself inefficacious, Stein cannot make the claim that essential being is identical to the divine ideas or divine essence. Speaking of “units of meaningful existence,” which function as one of the manifold senses of essential being for Stein, she writes that they, “[A]re finite inasmuch as they are ‘something, yet not everything.’ But they lack the possibility of

62  Cf. Henry, Quodlibetum 1, q. 9 (fol. 7r): “Et est hic distinguendum de esse secundum quod distinguit Avicenna in quinto in fine Metaphysica suae…. Primum esse habet essentiae creaturae essentialiter: secundum tantum participative: inquantum habet formale exemplar in deo…. Secundum esse non habet creatura ex sua essentia: sed a deo: inquantum est effectus voluntatis divinae iuxta exemplar eius in mente divina.” Cf. ibid, 9, q. 2 (fol. 345v): “Primo enim ab huiusmodi [Deus] scia habent esse id quod sunt per essentiam in cognitione interiori: ut a causa exemplari: et deinde per voluntatem per efficientiam: ut a causa efficiente in existentia exteriori….” 63  FEB, 106. 64 Ibid.

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beginning and ending in time.”65 Thus, while all temporal beings are finite, the relation is not biconditional; not all finite being is temporal. There would seem to be, then, at least some finite, that is, created, being that is, might one say, “eternal.” To be sure, Stein herself never explicitly describes essential being as ‘eternal,’ but it is difficult to understand what other conclusion one could draw from her claim that essential being is timeless, lacking all “beginning and ending in time.” Henry himself would seem to have anticipated Stein’s move since, as we saw above, he understands that esse essentiae enjoys a real relation to God from eternity.66 At any rate, what is clear is that if essential being is finite, as Stein suggests, it cannot be identified with the divine being who is infinite. Further still, within the context of Stein’s argument for the attribution of being to essence, she describes essential being as inefficacious and non-actual, “The being of the limited and separate essences is inefficacious and therefore also non-actual being.”67 So, as she explains, “An essence is not efficaciously active: The essence ‘joy’ does not vivify, the essence ‘light’ does not illuminate, the essence ‘sound’ does not emit any sound.”68 Now, one might argue that Stein would be safe in identifying essential being with the divine essence while denying the former’s lack of efficacy if she restricts her analysis to efficient causality, for the divine ideas can be understood as functioning with exemplar causality and the divine will, instead, with efficient causality. Henry, we recall, took a similar position, except he was able to do so only because he distinguished esse essentiae from the divine ideas. How could Stein maintain that essential being is, as she herself tells us, non-actual, in fact, opposed to actual being, if it is truly identical to God, who is pure act?69 If Stein is to remain self-consistent, I find it difficult to conclude 65  FEB, 105; cf. ibid., 62, 567, n. 107 where Stein describes finitude not as that which “has a beginning” but as that which “has limits.” 66  Cf. n. 61 supra. 67  FEB, 105. 68  Ibid., 93; cf. ibid., 67: “[I]f the individual semantic unit of the ideal essence is taken by itself in its delimited subsistence, it is not living being but appears rigid and dead.” 69  Ibid., 91: “But now we have discovered in essential being … a type of being that is not a becoming and passing away and that stands in opposition to actual being.”

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that she “ultimately identifies essences and essential being with the divine ideas.”70 For Stein, then, essential being must be other than God.

IV. The Medieval Reception of the esse essentiae: Implications for Stein? In developing her metaphysical account in terms of essential being as a source of meaning, Stein identifies a reality that, though timeless and changeless, is somehow derivatively dependent upon the divine being, which, as I have suggested, amounts to a sort of repetition of Henry of Ghent’s doctrine of esse essentiae. But to the degree that Stein adopts such a position, one wonders how she would handle the objections subsequent medievals raised against Henry, in particular, those of Godfrey of Fontaines (ca. 1250–ca. 1306/9) and also Duns Scotus. Here, I shall focus on Scotus’s critique of Henry. Scotus follows Godfrey’s earlier strategy against Henry and argues that attributing esse essentiae to creatures compromises the notion of a creation ex nihilo.71 In one text where Scotus addresses the question whether a creature, inasmuch as it is a term of relation to the divine mind, has true esse essentiae, he seems to have Henry’s position squarely in mind.72 Scotus first offers an argument for a positive response which virtually reproduces Henry’s own teaching. The argument maintains that no creature has “ratified being” of itself—that kind of being which would render an essence distinct from fictitious being (ens ficta)—but possesses ratified being only in relation to God. But that relationship to God is constituted not in terms of efficiency but exemplariety. On account of this exemplar relation to the divine cognition, 70 Borden, Stein, 108; idem, Thine Own Self, 102. 71  Cf. Godfrey, Quodlibetum 3, q. 2 (Les Philosophes belges, ed., M. DeWulf and A. Pelzer, Louvain-Paris, 1904, 177–79): “Si etiam [esse et essentia] different intentione, prius quam crearetur essentia quam esse, sicut prius fundamentum respectus ut album similitudine, sed ex hoc etiam sequerentur incovenientia supra dicta et cetera.” For a treatment of Godfrey’s critique of Henry’s account of esse essentiae see John Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines: A Study in Late ThirteenthCentury Philosophy (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1981), 130-45. 72 Scotus, Lectura I, d. 36, q. un., nn. 1, 2 (ed. Vatican, vol. 17, 461): “Utrum creatura, in quantum est fundamentum relationis idealis proximum, habeat verum esse essentiae.”

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creatures enjoy esse ratum, what Avicenna, we recall, terms “certitudo,”73 which is just another description of Henry’s esse essentiae.74 Against this argument, Scotus notes that if a thing, inasmuch as it eternally establishes a relationship between God and God’s cognition, has a true and essential being (esse essentiale) of itself, then creation would not be ex nihilo since that which has quidditative being is not simply nothing, but something. And thus the creature from eternity would enjoy essential being even if not actual or real being.75 Here, we recall Stein’s claim that whatever is the condition for something, namely, essential being, must itself be something and only what is not is nothing.76 One wonders, then, how Stein might react to Scotus’s argument when he writes: “If a thing has essential being from eternity and through creation does not acquire anything except existential being, which is said [to be] a certain relation, creation would be nothing other than making a new relation, and thus it seems less a matter of creation than alteration.”77 Scotus’s position is fairly straightforward: if any creature enjoys an “eternally prior” essential being, even if not an actual being, it is not true to say that the creature is not something 73  Cf. n. 54 supra. 74 Scotus, Lectura I, d. 36, q. un., n.1 (ed. Vatican, vol. 17, 461): “Humanitas de se non est ens ratum, quia nihil habet de se esse ratum nisi quod est suum esse (quod est Deus),—igitur humanitas habet esse ratum per respectum ad aliud; sed non per respectum ad aliud sub ratione qua efficiens est…. habet esse ratum per respectum ad exemplar. Sed iste respectus—qui est humanitatis—qui est ad exemplar, est respectus eius ad intellectionem divinam, in quantum potest considerari ab intellectu divino et sic fundare relations ideales.…” Cf. also ibid., nn. 4, 5. 75  Ibid., n. 13 (ed. Vatican, vol. 17, 464): “Si res, in quantum aeternaliter fundat relationem ad Deum et ad cognitionem Dei, sit res habens esse essentiale et verum esse reale extra animam, tunc creatio non erit entis de nihilo, sicut patet, quid quod habet esse quiddativum, non est simpliciter nihil—et creatura per positionem ab aeterno habuit esse essentiae.” 76  Cf. n. 34 supra. 77 Scotus, Lectura I, d. 36, q. un., n. 16 (ed. Vatican, vol. 17, 464-5): “… si res habuit esse essentiae ab aeterno et per creationem non acquirat nisi esse existentiae, quod dicit respectum quedam, ergo creare nihil aliud erit quam facere unum respectum, et sic minus est creare quam alterare.” For a brief but helpful exposition of Duns Scotus’s critique of Henry of Ghent see Antonie Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus (Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 274-79.

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before it is. In short, an eternal creation, Scotus insists, is no creation at all, or, at the very least, betrays the idea of a creation out of nothing (ex nihilo), for there is, as he says, “a contradiction included in something’s being created from eternity.”78 In contrast to thinkers, especially Henry of Ghent,79 who argue that God knows creatures insofar as He knows His own essence as imitable by creatures, Duns Scotus offers an entirely novel, one might even say radical, account of the manner in which God knows creaturely essences. I cannot do justice to the intricacies of Scotus’s theory here, however, and so I must content myself with offering only a sketch of that theory. Central to Scotus’s account is his understanding of esse intelligible (i.e., being knowable or intelligible being) as constitutive of the very manner in which God knows various creaturely essences, again, not in terms of imitation, but simply as so many and variously produced “thought-objects.” Unlike Henry’s esse essentiae, Scotus’s esse intelligible does not function as a kind of metaphysical mirror held up by the creative hand of God in which a reflection of the divine essence or nature is captured in an eternal gaze of self-beholding. Rather, esse intelligibile gushes forth from God’s superabundance and is the product of God’s supreme artistic genius that requires neither model nor archetype only the supreme actuality of the divine intellect.80 Still, as Scotus explains, the production of esse intelligibile does not in itself constitute an act of creation. The reason for this is that in producing 78  Cf. Ibid., n. 17 (ed. Vatican, vol. 17, 465): “Quaero igitur an lapis praecedit istam productionem secundum aliquod esse verum? Non potest hoc dici, quia tunc ante esse essentiae esset aliud esse verum extram animam; igitur omnino nihil ante illud esse. Igitur ista productio qua sic producitur lapis in esse essentiae, est alicuius et de pure nihilo, igitur est creatio; igitur ab aeterno fuit creatio, quia alicuius et de nihilo,—quod est contra eos et contra veritatem: dicunt quod contradictionem includit quod aliquid creetur ab aeterno….” 79  Cf. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibetum 9, q. 2 (folio 345r). 80 Cf. Ordinatio I, d. 35, q. un., n. 47 (ed. Vatican, vol. 6, 264): “… per hoc enim quod intellectus divinus est in actu per essentiam suam ut est ratio intelligendi, habet actum primum sufficientem ad producendum omne aliud in esse cognito, et producendo illud in esse cognito, producit ipsum habens dependentiam ad ipsummet ut intelligentiam… sicut in aliis dicetur quod causa sub ratione mere absoluta est actus primus a quo procedit effectus, et effectus productus habet relationem ad causam….”

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esse intelligibile something is not produced into being without qualification (simpliciter) but is brought into being only in a certain manner (secundum quid).81 The question then is how is intelligible being (esse intelligibile) produced and how does it evade a relation of imitation as so many prior medieval accounts held? Fortunately, Scotus offers a concise summary of the production of esse intelligible—here, for example, that of a stone—that warrants citing in full: In the first instant God understands His essence as merely absolute; in the second instant He produces a stone in esse intelligibile and understands the stone, and thus there is a relation in the understood stone to the divine intellection, but as yet there is no relation in the divine intellection to the stone, but the divine intellection terminates the relation of the ‘stone as understood’ to itself [i.e., the divine intellection]; in the third instant, perhaps, the divine intellect can compare its intellection to any intelligible to which we can compare ourselves, and thereupon by comparing itself to the understood stone, can cause in itself a relation of reason; and in the fourth instant it is able to reflect upon that relationship caused in the third instant, and then that relation of reason will be known. Therefore a relation of reason is not necessary to understand the stone….82 81 Cf. Ordinatio II, d. 1, q. 2, n. 84 (ed. Vatican, vol. 7, 44): “Potest aliquid produci (licet non creari) de simpliciter nihilo, id est non de aliquo secundum esse essentiae nec esse existentiae, nec secundum aliquod esse secundum quid,—quia creatura producitur in esse intelligibili non de aliquo esse, nec simpliciter nec secundum quid, nec possibili ex parte sui in isto esse; istud tamen ‘produci’ non est creari, quia non creatur aliquid in esse simpliciter, sed producitur ad esse secundum quid.” 82  Ordinatio I, d. 35, q. un., n. 32 (ed. Vatican, vol. 6, 258): “Deus in primo instanti intelligit essentiam suam sub ratione mere absoluta; in secundo instanti producit lapidem in esse intelligibili et intelligit lapidem, ita quod ibi est relatio in lapide intellecto ad intellectionem divinam, sed nulla adhuc in intellectione divina ad lapidem, sec intellectio divina terminat relationem ‘lapidis ut intellecti’ ad ipsam; in tertio instanti, forte, intellectus divinus potest comparare suam intellectionem ad quodcumque intelligible ad quod nos possumus comparare, et tunc comparando se ad lapidem intellectum, potest causare in se relationem rationis; et in quarto instanti potest quasi reflecti super istam relationem causatam in tertio instanti, et tunc illa relatio rationis erit cognita. Sic ergo non est relation rationis necessaria ad intelligendum lapidem….”

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Now, I should point out from the start that the “instants” with which Duns Scotus describes the production of esse intelligibile are not temporal instants of succession since such would imply that God is set on the stage of time. Scotus, however, is committed to the idea of an eternal or timeless God,83 and so these “instants” are better understood as logically distinct moments within an essentially ordered causal chain.84 The first of these “instants” makes clear that, as Scotus sees it, God first enjoys knowledge of His own essence in such way that knowledge of that essence is “absolute” and not in terms of it s being imitable or in terms of any relation whatsoever. God’s knowledge of his essence alone, Scotus here implies, is not sufficient for God’s knowledge of creatures, and so in the second “instant” God produces a “thought-object,” in the example offered in the passage cited, the concept of a stone. In the production of a stone in esse intelligibile there emerges a mixed-relation between the divine cognition and the esse intelligibile. That is, while the concept of the stone, its esse intelligible, is ‘really’ dependent upon God’s knowledge as an effect is dependent upon its cause, the reverse is not the case; God’s knowledge is not dependent upon the stone. Rather, God’s knowledge is only rationally related to the stone. What is crucial to recognize here is that, at this point, no rational relation of imitability between a creature’s essence and the divine essence is required for God’s knowledge of esse intelligibile, only the real relation in the object known (esse intelligible) is necessary.85 In fact, not only are the first two instants necessary for God’s cognition of created essences, they would also seem to be sufficient. The purpose of the third and fourth instants, as Richard Cross suggests, seem to be concerned with Scotus’s integrating his own account with that of his contemporaries, namely, Henry of Ghent.86 Do created essences imitate the divine essence? Yes, but this imitability is not the “first” or even “second” thing known but is known only after God, in the third instant, compares 83  Here, consider Scotus’s claim that God’s will does not have existence in time nor does it have to “wait” for its commands to be realized; cf. Ordinatio I, d. 8, q. 2, n. 294. 84  Cf. Cross, Duns Scotus on God, 64. Readers familiar with Cross’s text will note that my description of Scotus’s account of esse intelligibile is heavily informed by that work. 85  Ibid., 64. 86  Ibid., 64-65.

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His intellection, that is, compares Himself, to the thought-object produced in the second instant, which comparison gives rise to a rational relation between the divine cognition and the thought-object. Finally, in the fourth instant, God reflects on the rational relation produced in the third instant and knows the thought-object in relation to Himself, that is, God knows the relation as one of imitation. The particulars and nuances of Scotus’s position put aside, what is clear is that there is a marked difference between Henry of Ghent’s and Duns Scotus’s thinking on the manner in which God knows created essences. With Scotus’s doctrine of esse intelligible, he has no need of a distinct esse essentiae, as Henry had. But, this difference between Scotus and Henry on the issue of essential being (esse essentiae) simultaneously marks a difference between Scotus and Stein. The medieval context and problematic that determines Duns Scotus’s thinking allows him to frame a crucial question (viz., how it is that God knows creatures and possible beings) that affects not only his immediate contemporaries but also Stein’s account of essential being. Unfortunately, this may have been a context of which Stein was, most likely, unaware. Even so, Stein does begin her Finite and Eternal Being with the admission that: “The author is a novice in the field of scholastic philosophy, and as such can only seek to acquire little by little the knowledge she lacks.”87 Now, in the wake of the atrocity that cut down her life, one can only wonder how Stein would have carried further her project of arriving at a “synthesis of medieval thinking and vital present-day philosophy….”88

87  FEB, xxviii. 88 Ibid.

Chapter 12 Augustinian Abstraction and Henry of Ghent’s Metaphysical Argument Roland Teske, SJ

I

I. Introduction

n his so-called metaphysical argument for the existence of God, Henry of Ghent appeals to the kind of abstraction that Augustine had proposed in De trinitate 8, for coming to a vision of God. Scholarly literature on the sort of abstraction Augustine proposed is sparse, but Henry of Ghent’s use of it provides interesting insight into what Augustine may very well have had in mind and the Platonic presupposition that seems to be operative in the two thinkers. Hence, this paper begins with a look at the sort of abstraction that Augustine proposes in De trinitate and then turns to Henry’s appeal to such a form of abstraction in his metaphysical argument for the existence of God. It concludes with the Plotinian principle that seems to underlie such abstraction in both of them and argues that it is problematic in Henry’s use of it.

II. Augustinian Abstraction & the Vision of God In Summa quaestionum ordinarium (hereafter SQO) 22, 5 and 24, 6, Henry presents what many consider his metaphysical argument for

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the existence of God.1 In the first article he asks “whether a human being can know that God exists in another way than from creatures,”2 where he argues for the possibility of such an argument and indicates that such argument moves from the quiddity or essence of God to his existence, while in the second he asks “whether what God is can be known from creatures,”3 that is, he asks whether we can know the quiddity or essence of God, which is of course essential if one is to come to know the existence of God from knowing his quiddity or essence. In both questions Henry appeals to what Augustine said in his De trinitate 8, where the bishop of Hippo proposes to his readers several ways of coming to an intellectual vision of God.4 The passages in which Augustine does this are as difficult as they are beautiful. In the first passage Augustine says: Behold, see if you can, O soul weighed down by the corruptible body and burdened by many and various earthly thoughts. See if you can that God is truth. For it was written that God is light (1 Jn 1:5); see not as these eyes see, but see as the heart sees. When you hear: “He is the truth,” do not ask what truth is, for the fog of bodily images and the clouds of phantasms will immediately present themselves and disturb the clarity that shone forth for you at the first moment when I said “truth.” Behold, remain, if you can, in 1 In Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik als Erste Wissenschaft (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 344, Martin Pickavé admits that the majority of scholars follow this interpretation of the metaphysical argument, although he himself disagrees with this view. 2  SQO 22, 5; Badius, fol. 134rA: “Utrum Deum esse possit fieri notum homini alia via quam ex creaturis,” Since the new critical edition of this part of Henry’s Summa is not as yet complete, references are given to the Badius edition of 1520, reprinted St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1952. References include the article, question, folio, and paragraph in that edition. The English translations are taken from Henry of Ghent’s Summa: Questions on God’s Existence and Essence. Translated by Jos Decorte and Roland J. Teske, S.J.; Latin Text, Introduction, and Notes by Roland Teske, S.J., Dallas Medieval Texts and Translations 5 (Leuven: Peeters, 2005). 3  SQO 24, 6; Badius, fol. 141rK: “Utrum quid est Deus potest sciri ex creaturis.” 4  Parts of this paper draw upon previous articles of mine, namely, “An Augustinian Enigma,” in the Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 83 (2009): 19-24 and “Augustine’s Inversion of 1 John 4:8,” Augustinian Studies 39 (2008): 49-60.

12  Augustinian Abstraction & Henry of Ghent’s Metaphysical Argument 311 the first moment in which you were struck as if by lightning when “truth” is said. But you cannot. You will fall back into these familiar and earthly things.5

And in the second passage, again in language that is beautiful, almost mystical, and certainly no less easy to understand, Augustine says: When you hear “this good” and “that good,” which can be said to be not good in other respects, if you can, see without those good things that are good by participation the good itself, by participation in which they are good. For you understand it at the same time when you hear “this good” or “that good.” If you are able to set aside those good things and see the good by itself, you will have seen God.6

In both passages Augustine is telling his readers how they might come to some sort of vision of God as the truth itself or as the good itself. In the first text he gives no guidance about how to do this, but in the second he indicates to some extent how one might do so. In the second Augustine asks us, when we hear “this good” and “that good,” to see the good itself, by participation in which the good things are good, and in order to do this, he tells us to abstract or set aside the things that are good by participation and see the unparticipated good by which they are good. He assures us that, in doing so, we will see God. Scholarly literature on these passages is surprisingly sparse. In the Bibliothèque augustinienne edition of De trinitate, J. Moingt has a lengthy note on Augustinian “Mysticisme et théologie trinitaire,” 5 Augustine, De trinitate 8, 2, 3; PL 42: 949:“Ecce vide, si potes, o anima praegravata corpore quod corrumpitur, et onusta terrenis cogitationibus multis et variis; ecce vide, si potes: Deus Veritas est. Hoc enim scriptum est, ‘Quoniam Deus lux est.’ Non quomodo isti oculi vident, sed quomodo videt cor. Cum audis, Veritas est, noli quaerere quid sit veritas; statim enim se opponent caligines imaginum corporalium et nubilia phantasmatum, et perturbabunt serenitatem, quae primo ictu diluxit tibi, cum dicerem, Veritas. Ecce in ipso primo ictu quo velut coruscatione perstringeris, cum dicitur, Veritas, mane si potes: sed non potes; relaberis in ista solita atque terrena.” 6 Augustine, De trinitate 8, 3, 5; PL 42: 949: “Cum itaque audis bonum hoc et bonum illud, quae possunt alias dici etiam non bona, si potueris sine illa quae participatione boni bona sunt perspicere ipsum bonum cujus participatione bona sunt. Simul enim ipsum intelligis cum audis hoc aut illud bonum. Si ergo potueris illis detractis per seipsum perspicere bonum, perspexeris Deum.”

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which discusses the influence of Plotinus and the difference between Christian and Plotinian wisdom. He does not, however, offer any further commentary on the above passages.7 The two English translations also do not offer any significant help with the passages.8 Even the recent and massive study of De trinitate by Roland Kany does not comment on the passages or cite any study of them.9 In his book on De trinitate, Johannes Brachtendorf does, however, offer a fairly extensive commentary on the passages.10 He points out that in the course of the eighth book Augustine undertakes four attempts to bring the soul to a direct vision of the divine Trinity by the path of a vision of the Ideas, namely, by the way of the concepts of the truth, goodness, justice, love. The first three, however, necessarily fail to provide any vision of the Trinity, “denn die Begriffe ‘veritas’, ‘bonum’ und ‘iustitia’ repräsentieren ‘ad se’ Eigenschaften Gottes.”11 Although the concept of love affords some possibility of a grasp of relational properties, Augustine does not deal with it here, and it is not relevant to the two key passages with which we are concerned. Since the first three concepts provide no help toward a vision of the Trinity, they fall outside Brachtendorf ’s concern, and he says little more about them. Finally, Basil Studer’s introduction to the De trinitate does not discuss the passages at all.12 The sort of abstraction that Augustine proposes is odd for a number of reasons. To someone in the Aristotelian tradition, it would surely seem impossible since “good” is hardly a common characteristic like the common natures that one might abstract from two trees or two horses in order to get the concepts “tree” and “horse.” “Good” does not 7 See La Trinité, BA 16 (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1955), 574-78. 8 See The Trinity, introduction, translation, and notes by Edmund Hill (Brooklyn, NY: New City Press, 1990), and The Trinity, translated by Stephen McKenna (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1963). 9 Roland Kany, Augustins Trinitätsdenken: Bilanz, Kritik und Weiterführung der modernen Forschung zu “De trinitate” (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007). 10  Johannes Brachtendorf, Die Struktur des menschlichen Geister nach Augustinus: Selbstreflexion und Erkenntnis Gottes in “De Trinitate” (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2000). 11 Brachtendorf, Die Stuktur, 79. 12  See Basil Studer, Augustinus De Trinitate: Eine Einführung (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2005).

12  Augustinian Abstraction & Henry of Ghent’s Metaphysical Argument 313 fall under any particular genus, and for that reason it has been traditionally called a transcendental. Furthermore, the idea that one can begin with particular good things and can by setting aside their particular characteristics unveil the subsisting good that is God would seem to presuppose that the subsisting good that is God, is present in each particular good thing so that, by setting aside the thing’s particular characteristics, one can get at the good itself, which is the unparticipated good or God. But that seems to presuppose that God is present in every good thing and merely needs to be unveiled or unwrapped in order to be seen. In any case, such an intellectual vision of the good itself is surely a rare experience and one that most human beings never attain Having dismissed during many years of teaching graduate students about Augustine this movement to a vision of the Truth or of the Good itself as something mystical or at least beyond my powers, I was surprised to find that Henry of Ghent appealed to these passages in De trinitate as a step in his metaphysical argument for the existence of God, which is itself an interesting philosophical argument and one proposed by a philosopher who certainly knew his Aristotelianism, even if he was himself quite critical of some of the Aristotelian thought that he had encountered in thirteenth-century Paris.13 In his metaphysical argument Henry returns often to the whole of these passages from De trinitate or to snippets from them. Hence, it seems reasonable to see what Henry has to say about the sort of abstraction Augustine recommends in the second text.

III. Henry’s Use of Augustinian Abstraction In SQO 22, 5, Henry introduces what has been called his metaphysical argument for the existence of God.14 It was so called because, 13  See my “Henry of Ghent’s Criticism of the Aristotelian Arguments for God’s Existence,” The Modern Schoolman 82 (2005): 83-99. 14  The location of the metaphysical argument is debated by scholars. Stephen Dumont locates the metaphysical argument in SQO 22, 5, 24, 6, and 25, 3 in Henry of Ghent as a Source for John Duns Scotus’s Proof for the Existence of God, University of Toronto, diss., 1982. Pasquale Porro does much the same thing in Enrico di Gand. La via delle proposizioni universale, (Bari: Levante, 1990), although he excludes SQO 25, 3. I agreed with this view in my “Henry of Ghent’s Metaphysical Argument for the Existence of God,” The Modern Schoolman 83 (2005): 19-38. On the other hand,

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following Avicenna and in opposition of Averroes, Henry holds that the argument in SQO 22, 5 is an argument in first philosophy or metaphysics and is a more perfect argument than the demonstrative and dialectical arguments from sensible creatures that he had presented in SQO 22, 4.15 He states that the existence of God can be known by natural means in this life either through knowing his effects or through knowing his quiddity or essence. The metaphysical argument as distinct from the causal arguments of the previous article is an argument from the quiddity or essence of God to his existence. Henry says that “in this way God is known to exist when one knows his essence, inasmuch as his essence includes his being. For in him existence and essence do not differ….”16 Although Avicenna never developed in his Metaphysics the way of universal intelligible propositions that he promised,17 Henry says that he believed that “Avicenna understood Anton Pegis found the metaphysical argument in SQO 25, and Martin Pickavé favors Pegis’s position, but questions the existence of a metaphysical proof in Henry’s Summa in his Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik, 343-346. The bibliography on the metaphysical argument is extensive. For example, Jean Paulus, “Henri de Gand et l’argument ontologique,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 10 (1935-36): 265323; Raymond Macken, “The Metaphysical Proof for the Existence of God in the Philosophy of Henry of Ghent,” Franziskanische Studien 68 (1986): 247-260. Other studies on Henry’s metaphysical argument include: Anton Pegis, “Toward a New Way to God: Henry of Ghent,” Mediaeval Studies 30 (1968): 226-47; idem, “Toward a New Way to God: Henry of Ghent, II,” Mediaeval Studies 31 (1969): 93-116; idem, “Four Mediaeval Ways to God (St. Anselm of Canterbury, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent),” The Monist 54 (1970): 317-58; idem, “Henry of Ghent and the New Way to God, III,” Mediaeval Studies 33 (1971): 158-79; Stephen Dumont, “The quaestio si est and the Metaphysical Proof for the Existence of God According to Henry of Ghent and J. Duns Scotus,” Franziskanische Studien 66 (1984): 335-67. I have more recently argued for the similarity between Henry’s metaphysical argument and Anselm’s so-called ontological argument in “Henry of Ghent on Anselm’s Proslogion Argument,” Traditio 64 (2009): 213-228. 15  See below note 26. 16  SQO 22, 5; Badius, fol. 134vC: “per hunc modum Deus cognoscitur esse cognoscendo eius essentiam quoad hoc quod eius essentia includit ipsum esse. In ipso enim non differunt existentia et essentia….” 17  See M. Pickavé, Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik, pp. 326–328, where he points to Peter of Auvergne’s Quaestiones in Metaphysicam to

12  Augustinian Abstraction & Henry of Ghent’s Metaphysical Argument 315 this [that is, the argument from God’s quiddity or essence to his existence] when he said that a human being can know that God exists by way of universal intelligible propositions, not by way of the testimony of the senses.”18 Henry adds that “those universal propositions are about being, one, good, and the first intentions of things, which are first conceived by the intellect and in which a human being can perceive being without qualification and the good or the true without qualification.”19 That is, Avicenna’s universal intelligible propositions are about the sort of concepts that are found in De trinitate 8. Henry furthermore identifies this perception of these first intentions with that of something self-subsistent and not participated by something else and with the God that Augustine reaches in De trinitate 8. He says: Such being … is necessarily something subsisting in itself, not something in another by participation. And what is such is being itself, the good itself, the truth itself, God himself, in accord with what Augustine says in book eight of The Trinity.20

At this point Henry cites parts of both passages from De trinitate 8 on the vision of the truth and the good itself. In support of the Avicennian claim that “the concept of the good conceived in this way without qualification is the concept of the universal good and the first concept of the good, after which the others follow,”21 Henry quotes Augustine show that Peter identified the metaphysical argument for the existence of God with Avicenna’s argument from the nature of the possible, which is the only argument that Avicenna gives for the existence of God. 18  SQO 22, 5; Badius, fol. 134vC: “Hoc, ut credo, intellexit Avicenna cum dixit quod possit homo scire Deum esse ex via propositionum universalium intelligibilium, non ex via testificationis sensibilium.” 19  SQO 22, 5; Badius, fol. 134vD: “Sunt autem propositiones illae universales de ente, uno, et bono, et primis rerum intentionibus quae primo concipiuntur ab intellectu, in quibus potest homo percipere ens simpliciter, bonum, aut verum simpliciter.” 20  SQO 22, 5; Badius, fol. 134vD: “Tale autem est necessario subsistens quid in se, non in alio participatum. Et quod tale est, ipsum esse est, ipsum bonum est, ipsa veritas est, ipse Deus est, secundum quod dicit Augustinus octavo De trinitate….” 21  SQO 22, 5; Badius, fol. 134vD: “boni sic simpliciter concepti conceptus quidem boni universalis est et primus conceptus boni post quem sequuntur alii. …”

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who says: “We would not say that one thing is better than another when we judge correctly, unless the notion of the good were impressed on us. And there is nowhere for the mind to turn in order that it might become a good mind if … that good did not remain in itself.”22 Hence, Henry argues that “according to Avicenna and according to the truth of the matter, the more simple concepts are, the greater priority they have” and “according to Augustine, when one understands the being of every being and the good of every good without qualification, God is understood.”23 Henry is well aware that Averroes strongly criticized Avicenna for saying that the first philosopher or metaphysician ought to demonstrate the existence of the first principle. Furthermore, Henry admits that Averroes “really did very well to criticize him on this if he thought that the knowledge of those universal propositions is not obtained from sensible creatures. For, except from sensible things, we have no way to prove that he exists or to know his nature and essence.”24 Henry’s metaphysical argument for the existence of God is a priori in the sense that it moves from the knowledge of God’s nature or essence to his existence, but is not absolutely a priori in the sense that it is completely independent of sense experience.25 Henry is, nonetheless, 22  SQO 22, 5; Badius, fol. 134vD: “Non diceremus aliud alio melius cum vere iudicamus nisi nobis esset impressa notio ipsius boni, et non est quo se convertat animus ut fiat bonus animus, nisi maneret in se illud bonum.” Henry quotes Augustine, De trinitate 8, 3, 4; PL 42: 949-50. I have italicized the words of Augustine. The good that remains in itself is the divine subsistent good. See my “St. Augustine’s Use of ‘Manens in Se,’” Revue des études augustinienes 39 (1993): 291-307. 23  SQO 22, 5; Badius, fol. 134vD: “secundum Avicennam et secundum rei veritatem conceptus quanto sunt simpliciores, tanto sunt priores … secundum Augustinum intelligendo ens omnis entis et bonum simpliciter omnis boni, intelligitur Deus.” 24  SQO 22, 5; Badius, fol. 134vB: “Revera valde bene in hoc reprehendit eum si intellexit notitiam illarum propositionum universalium non haberi ex sensibilibus creaturis, quia non est nobis omnino via ad probandum ipsum esse nisi ex sensibilibus, neque ad cognoscendum ipsius naturam et essentiam….” 25  It would seem that Avicenna’s “floating man,” who could have the concepts of possible and necessary being independently of sense experience, could in theory come to the knowledge of the first principle or necessary being without any sensible experience. For Avicenna’s “floating man,” see

12  Augustinian Abstraction & Henry of Ghent’s Metaphysical Argument 317 convinced that “this way of knowing that God exists is much more perfect than [the way of knowing that God exists from his effects], although both are from creatures. For in the latter way God can be known to exist without knowing that the predicate belongs to the meaning of the subject, something that is necessarily known in this way.”26 Henry does not, however, spell out how one comes to such an understanding of the divine quiddity or essence in SQO 22, 5; rather he says that “we will look at this way of proving that God exists from universal propositions … later when we speak about the unity of God.”27 Hence, it would seem that the full presentation of the metaphysical argument is to be looked for in SQO 25, which contains the questions on the divine unity and simplicity.28 However, despite Henry’s apparently clear statement, the use of Augustinian abstraction coupled with the ways of eminence and remotion in SQO 24, 6 can also be taken as a discussion of divine unity and simplicity and the exposition of the metaphysical argument. Moreover, Pickavé has claimed that in SQO 25 Henry argues for the unity and the unicity of God and not for his Avicenna, Liber de anima, seu sextus de naturalibus, ed. S. van Riet; intr. G. Verbeke. 2 vols. (Louvain, Éditions orientalistes, 1968) I, ch. 1, 36-37 and II, ch. 7, 162-163. 26  SQO 22, 5; Badius, fol. 135rE: “Et est ista via sciendi Deum esse, multo perfectior quam secunda, licet ambae sint ex creaturis, quia in illa potest sciri Deus esse absque eo quod cognoscatur praedicatum esse de ratione subiecti, quod necessario scitur in ista.” 27  SQO 22, 5; Badius, fol. 135rE: “Istum autem modum probandi Deum esse ex propositionibus universalibus … videbimus infra loquendo de Dei unitate.” Pickavé comments on this passage, “Es hat kaum Sinn, ihn dort [in SQO 22, 5] zu suchen, denn Heinrich bemerkt selbst, dass ‘wir diese Art unde Weise aus dem allgemeinen Sätze zu beweisen, dass Gott ist, später sehen werden, wenn von der Einheit Gottes gesprochen wird’ (meine Hervorhebung)” (342–343). 28 Henry does, of course, discuss Anselm’s Proslogion argument in SQO 30, 2 and treats it quite favorably. Hence, one might see his discussion of the Proslogion argument as a further fleshing out of the metaphysical argument. If one distinguishes two arguments in the Proslogion, one that concludes that God necessarily exists and the other that it is impossible that God not exist, one might see the former in SQO 22, 5 and 24, 6 and the latter in SQO 30, 2.

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existence.29 I suggest that we might do well to pay more attention to what Henry does than to what he says on this point.30 In SQO 24, 6, Henry first of all states that, although we have natural knowledge of God only from corporeal and sensible creatures, this knowledge can be acquired from such creatures in two ways, namely, through natural philosophy or through metaphysics. In the first way, knowledge of whether God exists is gotten from created, sensible substances, that is, from the relation of effect to cause and of something moved to its mover. In this way, the proof that God exists pertains essentially to the physicist and natural philosopher and not to the metaphysician, except insofar the metaphysician wraps himself in the guise of the physicist by accepting the conclusions of the physicist.31

Henry here clearly refers to the arguments that he presented in SQO 22, 4. But in the second way knowledge of God: is achieved by the way of eminence through abstraction from creatures of intentions that belong to the creator and to creatures in 29  See Pickavé, Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik , 342-343: “ Aber auch dort sind wir keinem Existenzbeweis begegnen, sondern nur den avicennischen Argumenten für die Einzigheit and ‘Unmittelbarkeit’ des necesse esse, deren sich Heinrich bei dem Nachweis bedeint, dass es nur einem einizen Gott geben könne.” On the other hand, it is possible and quite plausible to see SQO 25, 3 as the completion of Henry’s metaphysical argument in the attainment of the necessary unicity of God, as Dumont argued: “The results of the a priori metaphysical proof of the divine existence, which attain the divine nature as necessary and incommunicable, are clearly assumed at article 25, question three, as the citation of Augustine’s De trinitate VIII shows. Thus, at article 25, question 3, Henry completes his metaphysical way to God by attaining the divine nature in its absolute necessary uniqueness” (Henry of Ghent as a Source, 230). 30  Years ago Henri de Lubac said something of this sort in speaking of Origen’s interpretation of scripture. “[I]l importe avant tout de voir Origène à l’oeuvre plutôt que de se tenir à quelque exposé méthodique abstrait …” (H. de Lubac, Histoire et esprit. L’intelligence de l’Ecriture d’apres Origène. Theologie 16 (Paris: Aubier, 1950), 34. 31  SQO 24, 6; Badius, fol. 141rN: “Primo modo ex substantiis sensibilibus creatis habetur cognitio de Deo quia sit, scilicet, ex collatione causati ad causam, mobilis ad moventem, et sic probatio quia Deus est per se pertinet ad physicum et naturalem philosophum et non ad metaphysicum, nisi in quantum induit formam physici, accipiendo probata a physico.”

12  Augustinian Abstraction & Henry of Ghent’s Metaphysical Argument 319 common by analogy. In that way the knowledge from creatures that God exists and what he is pertains essentially to the metaphysician.32

Here Henry seems to refer to the sort of argument that he sketched in SQO 22, 5. He states “that this question about what is the nature and substance of God cannot be brought to an end except by knowing whether he is with non-complex knowledge. In that way one knows what he is to the extent that one knows whether he is, and the converse….”33 That is, the knowledge of what God’s nature and substance is can only reach its goal in a concept of the divine quiddity or nature. Although it is not possible in this life to know the determinate nature of God as he is in himself, something only the blessed in heaven can do, Henry, nonetheless, claims: it is possible to know through creatures whether God is in non-complex knowledge, that is, by knowing from creatures the nature of some general attribute of his, either without qualification with respect to an indistinct knowledge about God or under such a concept by which the attribute cannot belong to any creature, and this with respect to a distinct knowledge of him.34

Henry explains how such knowledge of the divine quiddity can be attained in knowing God in his general attributes by appealing to two forms of abstraction. He says: the abstraction by the intellect of a form from an individual thing that partakes in this form is twofold: in one way as related to the individual things, in another way as completely abstracted from the individual things. Considered in the first way, abstraction is the abstraction of the universal from the particular, for example, of 32  SQO 24, 6; Badius, fol. 141vN: “fit via eminentiae per abstractionem a creaturis intentionum quae secundum analogiam communiter conveniunt creatori et creaturis. Et sic cognitio ex creaturis quia est et quid est Deus per se pertinet ad metaphysicum.” 33  SQO 24, 6; Badius, fol. 141vN: “quaestio ista quid est de natura et substantia Dei non potest terminari nisi cognoscendo de eo si est de incomplexo, ita quod quantum cognoscit de si est, tantum cognoscit de quid est, et e converso….” 34  SQO 24, 6; Badius, fol. 141vN: “per creaturas contingit cognoscere de Deo si est incomplexum, in cognoscendo, scilicet, ex creaturis naturam alicuius generalis attributi eius, vel simpliciter quoad cognitionem de Deo indistinctam, vel sub ratione tali, qua nulli creaturae natum est convenire, et hoc quoad cognitionem eius distinctam.”

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good from this or that good…. In the second way abstraction is the abstraction of a form considered completely separate from matter, that is, as subsisting in itself, for example, the good separate from anything participating in that good, which exists as a substance and as the self-subsistent good.35

This is, of course, the sort of abstraction that Augustine proposed in De trinitate 8, and Henry spells it out in more detail. We first come to know this sensible good by sensation; then “if by the intellect we abstract good from the particular good, we first consider good without qualification as it is a certain common and universal good, not as this or that particular good, but only as participated by and existing in many, that is, in this and that particular good.”36 There follows a second movement of abstraction. As Henry explains: if by the intellect we then abstract good from any other thing whatsoever and if we consider it as good without qualification, that is, not as this or that, nor as belonging to this or that, but as belonging to nothing at all, as the good which is the self-subsistent good of the creator alone, we come to know, secondarily, besides the participated good of the creature, the good through its essence of the creator himself, not so much by the way of excellence, as by the way of removal.37

35  SQO 24, 6; Badius, fol. 142vS: “duplex est abstractio formae per intellectum a supposito participante formam. Uno modo, ut relatae ad supposita; alio modo ut absolutae a suppositis. Considerata primo modo est abstractio universalis a particulari, ut boni ab hoc bono et ab illo…. Secundo modo est abstractio formae omnino a materia consideratae, scilicet, ut in se subsistentis, ut boni ab omni participante bonum, quod est substantialiter et in se subsistens bonum.” 36  SQO 24, 6; Badius, fol. 142vS: “abstrahendo per intellectum bonum ab hoc, consideramus bonum primo simpliciter, ut est commune quoddam et universale bonum, non ut hoc neque ut illud, sed tantum ut participatum et existens in multis, scilicet, in hoc et in illo….” 37  SQO 24, 6; Badius, fol. 142vS: “abstrahendo bonum per intellectum ab alio omnino et considerando ipsum ut bonum simpliciter, non ut hoc vel illud, neque ut huius vel illius, sed ut nullius omnino (quod est bonum in se subsistens solius creatoris), secundario iuxta bonum participatum creaturae, cognoscimus bonum per essentiam ipsius creatoris, non tam via exellentiae quam via remotionis.”

12  Augustinian Abstraction & Henry of Ghent’s Metaphysical Argument 321 In this way Henry explains we can come to know the quiddity of God through creatures in three degrees, namely, most generally, less generally, and generally. He begins with our knowledge of the divine quiddity in the most general and confused way when we understand something of excellence and worth in a creature. “And this way of knowing what the divine essence is is that of which Augustine speaks in book eight of The Trinity …,”38 where Henry quotes the passage from De trinitate 8, 3, 5. He then tells us: “See then from the words of Augustine that it is possible to understand the good in three ways, as this first way has three degrees in it. …”39 These three degrees are the particular good sensible thing, the common or universal good participated by many things, and the subsistent good completely abstracted from the good of the creature. As Dumont so well says: “The paradigm for this two-fold abstraction is the very text of De Trinitate quoted by Henry at article 22 question 5. Can there be any doubt that in article 24 question 6 we are on the metaphysical path to the existence of God?”40 With the three degrees at the level of most general knowledge of God we have come as far as Augustinian abstraction takes us. To arrive at the next level of knowledge, which is more general than general knowledge, but less general than most general knowledge, one has to use the ways of eminence and removal, ascribing to God perfections of creatures in a preeminent degree and removing any imperfection from them. Finally, to arrive at the level of general knowledge one has to remove all composition and diversity from God and unite all his perfections in the unity of divine simplicity. At this third degree of general knowledge of what God is, “it is known that diversity and composition must be completely removed from God and that the marks of nobility in creatures are in him in the highest unity and simplicity.”41 38  SQO 24, 6; Badius, fol. 142vT: “Et est iste modus cognoscendi divinam essentiam quid sit, ille de quo loquitur Augustinus octavo De trinitate….” 39  SQO 23, 6; Badius, fol. 142vV: “Vide ergo ex dictis Augustini, quod contingit bonum intelligere tripliciter, ut iste primus modus tres gradus in se habeat et quolibet illorum intelligere Deum.” 40  Stephen Dumont, Henry of Ghent as a Source, 166. There have been and are, of course, such doubts, as Pickavé has amply illustrated. 41  SQO 24, 6; Badius, fol. 143rZ: “Notum enim est quia a Deo removenda est omnino diversitas et compositio, et quod [illa quae sunt nobilitatis in creaturis] in ipso sunt per summam unitatem et simplicitatem.”

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But what holds for the movement from this good and that good to the subsistent good through abstraction holds equally well for each of the other first intentions or transcendental concepts, such as being, one, true, and beautiful. Hence, when all of these perfections are at the degree of general knowledge united through unity and simplicity in the divine quiddity or essence, one arrives at the divine quiddity or essence that includes or rather is identical with its being or existence. Thus at this point one arrives at a non-complex knowledge of God in which essence and existence are one. Such is, as I understand it, the metaphysical argument that Henry proposes in SQO 22, 5 and explains more fully in SQO 24, 6, and to which he puts the finishing touches in SQO 25, 3.42

IV. The Platonic Principle Underlying Augustinian Abstraction The sort of abstraction to which Augustine appealed in De trinitate 8 seems to presuppose, as I said, that the good itself or God is present in each good thing and merely needs to be unveiled or unwrapped in order to be seen by the intellect. I have argued that the same or a similar presupposition underlies Augustine’s inversion of 1 Jn 4:8 to “Love is God,” a topic on which T. J. Van Bavel, O.S.A., had written several articles.43 In examining that inversion, I found that Augustine clearly did invert the text of Saint John and that many of the Latin Fathers did so as well.44 In fact, Prosper of Aquitaine, one of Augustine’s most devoted students in the first generation after Augustine, inverted 1 John 4:8 twice in his De vocatione omnium gentium, the first patristic work on God’s universal salvific will, and also generalized it so that 42  Because none of the a posteriori proofs can attain the necessary unicity of God, the argument of SQO 25, 3 is needed to complete the metaphysical argument. See my “Henry of Ghent’s Criticism,” The Modern Schoolman 82 (2005): 83-99. 43  See T. J. van Bavel, “The Double Face of Love,” Louvain Studies 12 (1987): 116-130, as well as his “The Double Face of Love in Augustine,” Augustinian Studies 17 (1986): 169-181, “The Double Face of Love in St. Augustine. The Daring Inversion: Love is God,” Congresso Internazionale su S. Agostino nel XVI Centenario della Conversione, Roma, 15-20 settembre. Atti (Rome: 1987): 69–80. 44  See my “Augustine’s Inversion of 1 John 4:8.”

12  Augustinian Abstraction & Henry of Ghent’s Metaphysical Argument 323 the inversion applied to all the virtues or excellences. In the one text Prosper says of love: And so, since in this inexpressible gift of God there is the totality of all the gifts and a certain life of all the virtues, the others are conferred in order that the intention of a believing soul may have the means by which it can strive for perfect love. Because it [i.e., love] is not only from God, but is God, it makes stable, persevering, and unconquerable those whom it fills with the river of its pleasure.45

In another text Prosper says, “For wisdom is eternal, truth is eternal, goodness is eternal, justice is eternal, finally the light of all the virtues is eternal, and all that is virtue is God.”46 Here Prosper says that wisdom, truth, goodness, and justice are each God. That is, he generalizes Augustine’s claim about love and applies it to all the virtues or excellences. The texts from Augustine and the other Latin Fathers and especially Prosper’s generalization of the inversion are certainly puzzling and led me to wonder what these men could have meant. Given the context of 1 Jn 4:8, it seems clear that Augustine was saying that human love— presumably human love at its best—is God. Not all of Augustine’s translators have acknowledged the inversion in Augustine.47 The editors of the translation in the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers even accused Augustine of being ignorant of the fact that the article ὁ with θεός in the Greek precluded the possibility of inverting the Johannine text.48 45  Prosper of Aquitaine, De vocatione omnium gentium 2, 9; PL 51: 696697: “Cum itaque in hoc inenarrabili dono Dei, omnium summa donorum, et quaedam cunctarum sit vita virtutum, ad hoc caetera conferuntur, ut habeat animae fidelis intentio per quae ad perfectam charitatem possit eniti. Quae quoniam non solum ex Deo, sed etiam Deus est (1 Jn 4:8), stabiles et perseverantes atque insuperabiles facit, quos flumine suae voluptatis impleverit.” 46  Prosper of Aquitaine, De vocatione omnium gentium 1, 8; PL 51: 654– 655: “Aeterna est enim sapientia, aeterna veritas, aeterna bonitas, aeterna justitia, omnium denique virtutum lumen aeternum est, totumque quod virtus est. Deus est.” I have aided the emphasis in both translations of the texts from Prosper. 47  See my “Augustine’s Inversion of 1 John 4:8,” 49, note 2 for a list of translations that overlook the inversion. 48  See NPNF 7, translated by H. Browne with notes by J. H. Myers, 594.

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Given that few translators have acknowledged the inversion of the Johannine text, it is not surprising that few scholars have commented on it. Étienne Gilson avoided the problem by claiming that Augustine used love or charity in two senses either as human love or as God.49 Raymond Canning seems to attribute the inversion to Augustine’s enthusiasm for charity.50 Although van Bavel finds some similarity with a Platonic Idea or Form in Augustine’s identification of love with God, he emphasizes the difference between the God of Augustine and the Forms of Plato.51 However, if one bears in mind that for Plotinus the Platonic Forms are present whole wherever they are, that is, that they are “integrally omnipresent” in the words of Robert O’Connell, one can see that our participated love is not a sharing in a part of God, but our human love is rather God himself as participated by us. I have suggested that the key to understanding Augustine’s inversion lies in the integral omnipresence of the Forms or Ideas, at least of those of such excellence as being, one, good, and true.52 I have also suggested that such integral omnipresence of such perfections or excellences participated by creatures offers the key to understanding the sort of abstraction found in De trinitate 8, which of course would seem also to underlie the use of such abstraction in Henry’s metaphysical argument.53 In the case of Augustine, the integral omnipresence of the Ideas, at least of those such as being, one, true, good, and justice, accounts for how the sort of abstraction to which he appeals in De trinitate 8 can work. For by setting aside the particular characteristics of this good and that good, one can uncover or unwrap the good by participation in which they are good and see or understand the good itself, which is present whole and entire in anything that participates in the good. Henry clearly appeals to such Augustinian abstraction in his metaphysical argument for the existence of God, as we have seen. But can what works for Augustine work for Henry? 49  See É. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine (London: VictorGollancz, 1961), 313, n. 55. 50  R. Canning, The Unity of Love for God and Neighbor in St. Augustine (Heverlee-Leuven: Augustinian Historical Institute, 1993), 310. 51  T.J. Van Bavel, “The Double Face of Love,” 124. 52  See my “Augustine’s Inversion,” Augustinian Studies 39 (2008): 49-60. 53  See my “An Augustinian Enigma,” Proceeding of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 83 (2009): 19-24.

12  Augustinian Abstraction & Henry of Ghent’s Metaphysical Argument 325 The sort of abstraction that allows Augustine and many of the Western Fathers to identify the excellences of creatures with God seems to presuppose a real commonality between the participated perfection of a creature and the unparticipated perfection of God. The Platonism of Augustine and other Western Fathers may well have allowed them to move from the participated excellences of creatures to the unparticipated excellence of God. For, if each of the excellences, such as being, one, good, and true, is in creatures a participation in the Ideas or Forms and if such excellences are “integrally omnipresent” wherever they are, then the sort of abstraction that Augustine proposed in De trinitate 8 makes sense. However, the possibility of such abstraction presupposes a real commonality between the excellence of a creature and that excellence as it is in God. That sort of commonality is, however, precisely what Henry denies in SQO 21, 2 where he says that “in no way can being be something real and common to God and to a creature. And so, it must be said absolutely that being is not something real and common that God has in common with creatures.”54 Hence, being cannot be predicated of God and creatures in a univocal sense. But Henry also insists that it cannot be predicated of God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense. Hence, it is predicated in an analogous sense. The analogous concept of being or any of the transcendentals is, as we have seen, at the heart of the metaphysical argument. However, in speaking the analogous concept of being, Henry says that a human being cannot conceive a concept of being without qualification without “conceiving some concept of God or of a creature, that is, so that he conceives a single simple concept common to God and to a creature, that is, another concept besides the concept of God and of the creature. For there can be no such concept.”55 That is, one conceives either the being of God or the being of a creature, although it seems that one conceives under the term “being” something common. Henry, 54  SQO 21, 2; Badius, fol. 124rF: “Nullo modo ens potest aliquid commune reale Deo et creaturae. Et ideo absolute dicendum quod esse non est aliquid commune reale in quo Deus communicat creaturis.” 55  SQO 21, 2; Badius, fol. 124vO: “Numquam enim potest concipi aliquis intellectus entis simpliciter absque eo quod homo concipit aliquem intellectum Dei aut creaturae, ut concipiat aliquem unicum intellectum simplicem communem ad Deum et creaturam, alium praeter intellectum Dei aut creaturae, quia nullus potest esse talis.”

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however, attributes this analogous concept of being to a lack of determination in the concept. But that something common seems to be conceived by the term “being,” is due to the fact that, whether there is conceived something that is the divine reality or that is a creature, when being, nonetheless, is conceived without determinately and distinctly conceiving the being of God or of the creature, it is conceived only indeterminately, that is, without determining the concept to the being of God or of the creature.56

There are two sorts of determination of the concept of being, namely, negative and privative. When one conceives without qualification and indeterminately the being that is God, it is in that case negative indetermination, since the being of God is naturally able to be determined by nothing…. But when one conceives being indeterminately by the indetermination of privation, by removing those things by which it is naturally able to be determined, there is conceived the being that belongs to a creature, because the being of a creature is naturally able to be determined by the proper natures by which creatures differ from one another.57

Being conceived by negative determination or good conceived by negative determination is the being or good conceived by the sort of abstraction that Augustine spoke of in De trinitate 8, as Henry explicitly states: If, after you have understood this being and that being in creatures, you understand being without qualification by the denial that it belongs either to this determinate thing or to that one or to some 56  SQO 21, 2; Badius, fol. 124vOP: “Quod autem nomine entis videatur concipi aliquid commune, est quia sive concipiatur aliquid quod est res divina, sive quod est creatura, tamen cum concipitur esse absque eo quod determinate et distincte concipitur esse Dei vel creaturae, illud non concipitur nisi indeterminate, scilicet, non determinando intellectum ad esse Dei vel creaturae.” 57  SQO 21, 2; Badius, fol. 125rQ: “concipiendo esse simpliciter et indeterminate quod est Dei, tunc est indeterminatio negativa, quia esse Dei nullo est natum determinari …. Concipiendo autem ipsum esse indeterminate indeterminatione privationis illorum quibus natum est determinari, concipitur esse quod creaturae est, quia esse creaturae per proprias naturas quibus invicem differunt, natum est determinari.”

12  Augustinian Abstraction & Henry of Ghent’s Metaphysical Argument 327 other determinate thing, you are understanding the being of God, in accord with what Augustine says in book eight of The Trinity: You understand this good and that good. Understand good without qualification, and you will have understood God. Similarly, if you understand this being and that being and if you understand being without qualification, you understand God….58

Hence, the indeterminate perfection belongs to God by negation and to the creature by privation. But here lies the problem. Since the two sorts of indetermination are close to each other: those … unable to distinguish between such different things take being without qualification and indeterminate being for the same thing, in one way or in the other, whether as belonging to God or to a creature. For it is the nature of an intellect unable to distinguish things that are close to conceive them as one thing, though they do not, nonetheless, in the truth of the matter produce one concept. And so, there is error in its concept.59

The analogous concept then of being or of good that is needed for the metaphysical argument is the result of confusion by the intellect and is ultimately an error.60 As Dumont sums things up, “for Henry, every concept of being is in truth indeterminate either negatively or privatively…. Henry’s refusal to admit a concept of being apart from these 58  SQO 21, 2; Badius, fol. 125rQ: “si postquam intellexeris in creaturis hoc esse et illud esse, si intellexeris esse simpliciter per abnegationem quod sit neque huius determinati, neque illius vel alicuius alterius determinati, intelligis esse Dei, secundum quod dicit Augustinus octavo De trinitate. Intelligis bonum hoc, bonum illud; intellige bonum simpliciter et Deum intellexeris. Similiter, si intelligis hoc ens et illud ens, si intelligis ens simpliciter, Deum intelligis.” 59  SQO 21, 2; Badius, fol. 125rS: “non potentes distinguere inter huiusmodi diversa pro eodem concipiunt esse simpliciter et esse indeterminatum, sive uno modo sive altero, sive sit Dei, sive creaturae. Natura enim est intellectus non potentis distinguere ea quae propinqua sunt, concipere ipsa ut unum, quae tamen in rei veritate non faciunt unum conceptum. Et ideo est error in illius conceptu.” 60  As Dumont puts it, “In our analogously common concept we conceive as one what are in fact two different concepts of being. Henry himself advances the conclusion that will seem to Scotus very damaging. The source of our concept of being common to God and creature is an error in our concept of being…” (Henry of Ghent as a Source, 96).

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modifications of negation or privation is the chief target of Scotus’s first argument for univocity.”61 Why then is the sort of abstraction that Augustine presupposed in De trinitate 8 so problematic for Henry and, it would seem, destructive of this metaphysical argument, although Augustine and many of the other Latin Fathers found no problem with it or with the identification of the excellences of creatures with those of God? At this point I can offer only a hunch, but an educated hunch, I hope. Henry has worked to produce a synthesis of Aristotelian and Augustinian Platonic philosophy, bringing Aristotle and Platonism together in ways in which they were bound to jar. For instance, in his account of human knowing in SQO 1, 1 (Badius, fol. 7vL), Henry quoted favorably Augustine’s statement from Contra Academicos that “there were some very sharp and clever men who taught in their disputations that Aristotle and Plato were in agreement with each other in such a way that to the inexperienced and less attentive they seemed to disagree on many points of controversy.”62 Such a synthesis led to Henry’s juxtaposing a Platonic and an Aristotelian account of human knowing with two exemplars, that is, the intelligible species of Aristotle and the Form or Idea of Plato—a doctrine that borders on philosophical schizophrenia. On the present question there is a similar situation. For Augustinian abstraction presupposes a real commonality of excellences found in creatures with those found in God, but an Aristotelian analogy of being, at least as Henry interpreted it, rejects any such real commonality. Henry should, moreover, have seen the problem for in complaining of those people who are unable to distinguish the being of the creature and the being of God, he compares them to “Plato who also was unable, since he claimed that being is a genus, as if the term ‘being’ had some one common concept.”63 Henry’s metaphysical argument then tries to bring Augustinian abstraction and an Aristotelian analogy of being together in a way that really cannot be done, but that is a certainly fascinating step in the history of philosophy. 61 Dumont, Henry of Ghent as Source, 96. 62 Augustine, Contra Academicos 3, 19, 42; PL 32: 956-957: “non defuerunt acutissimi et solertissimi viri, qui docerent disputationibus suis Aristotelem ac Platonem ita sibi concinere, ut imperitis minusque attentis dissentire videantur….” 63  SQO 21, 2; Badius, fol. 124vO: “Nec potuit Plato ponens ens esse genus, tanquam sit nominis entis unum aliquid commune conceptum….”

Post Scriptum Hircocervi and Other Metaphysical Wonders1* John Patrick Doyle

A

I

s is well known, Aristotle in his Metaphysics distinguished being as found in the categories from ‘accidental being’ (τὸ ὂν κατα συμβεβηκός) and from ‘being as true’ (τὸ ὂν ὡς ἀληθές).2 The latter two ‘beings’ he then excluded from ‘being as being’ (τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν), the subject of metaphysics.3 Prima facie it seems easy to understand what he had in mind when he spoke of ‘accidental being’ and of ‘being as true.’ Accidental or incidental being, what the Latins would later call ens per accidens, was in fact a juxtaposition of two or more categorical beings.4 As such, it lacked a unified essence and thus it lacked genuine being. It was being ‘only in name.’5 ‘Being as true,’ he told us, was in the synthesis of the intellect, i.e., the intellect’s second operation of judgment. Apparently, it was the being of the copula “is” in a true judgment. Contrasted with 1 

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This essay was originally published as “Another God, Chimerae, Goat-Stags, and Man-Lions: A Seventeenth-Century Debate about Impossible Objects,” The Review of Metaphysics 48 (1995): 771-808. 2 Cf. Metaphysics 6.2.1026a33-1026b2. 3  See esp. Metaphysics 6.4.1027b34-1028a3; ibid., 11.8.1065a22-24. 4  Compare with this what Aristotle has said about τὸ ἓν κατὰ συμβεβηκός at Metaphysics 5.6.1015b17-34. 5  Cf. “ὥσπερ γὰρ ὄνoμά τι μόνoν τὸ συμβεβηκός ἑστιν” (ibid., 6.2.1026b13-14).

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this was being as false, or pseudo-being, which strictly is non-being, found in the copula of a false judgment.6 Later in the Aristotelian tradition a question arose as to whether ‘being as true’ was more than that of a copula in a true proposition. Specifically, could it include everything which has existence not in categories outside the mind—but in the mind or intellect alone? Even more specifically, could it include pure fictions, even impossible items, such as square circles, chimerae, and goatstags? This last, the goatstag (ὁ τραγέλαφoς), was first introduced to the literature of philosophy in Plato’s Republic (488A). However, with this first introduction Plato raised no question about the goatstag’s existence in the mind. Instead, with no apparent concern about its being or intelligibility, he simply gave it as an example of what a painter’s art might produce. With Aristotle, however, the plot thickened. He mentioned the goatstag in a number of places and tied it to questions of being, intelligibility, and truth. For example in the Prior Analytics,7 he says that the goatstag is knowable in the sense that it can be known not to exist.8 Again, in the Perihermeneias he uses the goatstag as an example of something which has meaning but no truth.9 Aristotle’s own meaning in this is that although the composition of a goat and a stag may be to some extent significant, it falls short of the synthesis which is the second operation of the intellect and the locus of ‘being as true.’ Indeed, in the Posterior Analytics he has gone so far as to speak of it as non-being and to say that, even though the formula or the name may be significant, the goatstag itself cannot possibly be known.10 It seems then that the goatstag is a perfect example of what in another place he has called “a false thing” (πρᾶγμα ψεῦδoς).11 In all of this there are further problems. Inasmuch as it is significant, the goatstag cannot be a matter of mere nonsense syllables. 6  Ibid. 6.4.1027b18-34. 7 1.38.49a24. 8  On this, cf. W.D Ross, Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 410. 9 Cf. Perihermeneias 1.16a16. 10 Cf. Posterior Analytics 2.7.92b5-8, esp.: “… τί δ/ ἔστι τραγέλαφoς ἀδύνατoν είδέναι.” 11 Cf. Metaphysics 5.29.1029b17-19.

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Later on, first among the Stoics and then in the Aristotelian tradition, a sharp distinction will be drawn between nonsense words like βλίτυρι (“blituri”) and σκινδαψός (“scindapsos”) and a word like τραγέλαφoς, the goatstag.12 Whereas the former signify nothing, if we take Aristotle at his word, the latter does signify something. But what is that something? Can it somehow be mind-independent? Not likely. Is it something then that is a fiction or a fabrication crafted by the mind? It would seem so. But if it is, can it then (that is, in the wake of such fabrication) exist outside the mind? Again, not likely—the reason being that in its makeup a goatstag, like a square circle, contains a contradiction. If following the mind’s fabrication it were to exist outside the mind, contradiction would ensue. It would be a goat which is not a stag and a goat which is a stag, or it would be a stag which is not a goat and at the same time a stag which is a goat. Can it therefore, as a result of the mind’s fabrication, have some shadow reality entirely within the mind as an object? This will be the common view by the end of the middle ages. But as already seen, Aristotle’s doctrine in the Posterior Analytics poses difficulty for this view. Still another question occurs when we consider the provenance of the goatstag through the mind’s operation. Exactly which operation will that be? And how precisely shall we understand it? Is it the first operation of simple apprehension? But then simple apprehension of what? Is it the second operation of judgment? It might seem that it is, inasmuch as a fanciful goatstag does involve a comparison with a real goat and a real stag and somehow a combining of the two. But again standing in the way of the goatstag’s arising in judgment is Aristotle in the Perihermeneias, even as he is accepting its significance, denying its truth for the reason that the combination which it involves is not that of a judgment. To make the matter even murkier, while the goatstag may be a non-being and while truth may be denied of it, in fact it is an object “existing” somehow and somewhere with enough density to be what seventeenth-century Scholastics will refer to as a “truthmaker” 12  The distinction between, say, a goatstag and blituri or scindapsos is found first among the Stoics. It is attributed to Chrysippus (cf. Galenus, De differentia pulsuum, III, 4, as cited by Joannes ab Arnim, in Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, II [Lipsiae: Teubner, 1903], n. 149, 45). In Latin it goes back at least to Boethius (cf. In librum de Interpretatione, ed. 2a, L. 1; Migne, Patrologia Latina 64, col. 420).

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(verificativum).13 That is to say, it is an object with enough density to be the completing correlate of true judgments. To see this, consider the fact that even though the goatstag may be “a false thing,” we can and do make true (as well as counterpart false) judgments about it. Thus we can apparently judge and say with truth that a goatstag is a goatstag, just as we can falsely judge and say that a goatstag is not a goatstag. Again, we can apparently judge and say with truth that a goatstag is a mythical beast, just as we can judge and say with falsity that a goatstag is a beast which we can find in the St. Louis Zoo. Such judgments and statements appear to be more than mere words and more than mere nonsense syllables.

II When we look among the Greek commentators on Aristotle, we find different approaches to the τραγέλαφoς or goatstag. It is certain that Aristotle excluded the goatstag from real being. But beyond that he remained silent regarding its status. Specifically, he did not classify it under such non-real beings as being per accidens and ‘being as true.’ Among his commentators, however, we do find such classifications. Some, for instance Asclepius, treat the goatstag as an example if not of ‘being as true,’ then of its counterpart ‘being as false.’14 This is so because the only existence it can have is as an object in the mind.15 That existence or 13  On this, cf., e.g.: “Verificativum in sensu positivo est objectum, quo dato actus est verus, quo non dato est falsus: et hujus tantum verificativi est capax actus affirmans. Verificativum in sensu negativo est, quo dato actus est falsus, quo non dato est verus: et hujus tantummodo capax est actus negans…” (Luis de Lossada, S.J. [1681-1748], Metaphysica, disp. IV, c, 3, n. 27 [ed. Barcinonae: Apud Vid. et Fil. J. Subirana, 1883 (originally: Salamanca, 1724)], X, 266). The term, “truthmaker,” was suggested to me from correspondence with Dr. Sven K. Knebel, Fellow of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. 14  Cf. “καλῶς δὲ εἶπε καὶ μὴ ὂν ὡς ψεῦδoς διὰ τὰ ἀνύπαρκτα, oἴoν τραγέλαφoς ἤ τι τoιoῦτoν …” (Asclepius, In Metaphys. E, 4, 1027b 18, ed. Michael Hayduck in Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, VI, 2 [Berlin: Reimer, 1888], 373, ll. 29-30). 15  Cf. Asclepius speaking of both the true and the false: “ἐν διάνoιᾳ γάρ εἰσι” (ibid., 374, ll. 6-7). Also cf. “τῶν ὄντων … … τά δὲ ἐξ ἁνάγκης oὐκ ἐστίν, ἄπερ καὶ ἁδύνατoν εἶναι λέγει, oἶoν τὰ μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς ἐν ὑπάρξει ὄντα πλὴν ἤ κατὰ ψιλὴν ἐπίνoιαν,

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that being (which a Latin version of Averroes will later refer to as “diminished” being [ens diminutum16]) is excluded from the categories and from the being qua being which is the subject of metaphysics. Other Greeks, while accepting this last exclusion, treat the τραγέλαφoς under being per accidens. In this way they exclude it from the real being, with which metaphysics is concerned, and from intelligibility itself, inasmuch as it lacks unity. It would thus not be one thing but at least two things accidentally juxtaposed. This is the doctrine found in Alexander of Aphrodisias17 and as such it represents a mainstream inheritance of the middle ages. oἶoν τραγέλαφoς…” ( Joannes Philoponus, In Aristotelis Libros de Generatione et Corruptione commmentaria, II, c. 9, ed. Hieronymus Vitelli, in Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, 14, 2 [Berlin: Reimer, 1897], 284, ll. 15-19); and Ammonius, In Porphyrii Isagogen sive V Voces, 1, 10, ed. Adolphus Busse, in Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, 4, 3 [Berlin, 1891], 39, l. 25-40, l. 8. This last text is particularly remarkable because in it Ammonius regards the goatstag and the hippocentaur as beings which exist only in thought and then only when we are actually thinking. Then, citing Antisthenes, he links these beings with second intentions such as genus and species, as well as pure abstractions such as horseness and manness, inasmuch as they too exist only in thought. With this we seem well on the road to the classification of entia rationis which Suárez will give us in Disputation 54 of his Disputationes metaphysicae (Salamanca, 1597). At the same time, it must be said that the matter is not all that simple for Ammonius. For in another place he has treated the goatstag as non-being, on a plane with βλίτυρι and σκινδαψός. Cf. Ammonius, In Analyt. Prior. I Prooemium, ed. Maximilianus Wallies in CAG, 4, 6 (Berlin, 1899), 3, ll. 20-21. Yet in a third place he has distinguished it from these as significative from non-significative; cf. In Lib. De Interpretatione, c. 2, ed. A. Busse, CAG, 4, 5 (Berlin, 1897), 29, ll. 8-11; and ibid., 30, ll. 18-19. For the same distinction attributed to Chrysippus, cf. Galenus, as referred to in note 11, above. 16  For this, see In Metaphys. VI, c. 2, t. 8, in Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libri XIIII. cum Averrois Cordubensis in eosdem commentariis (ed. Venetiis: apud Junctas, 1562), VIII, 152v. Also note that one of the Latin translations of the Metaphysics itself with which the editors have prefaced Averroes commentary says that being as true is “in genere diminuto generum entis;” cf. ibid. f. 152r B. Aristotle’s original phrase here is: “τὸ δ/ oὕτως ὂν ἕτερoν ὂν τῶν κυρίως …” (Metaphysics 6.4.1027b31). 17 Cf. “ὥπερ γὰρ ὄνoμά τι μόνoν τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ὲστιν. ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ τραγέλαφoς ὄνoμα μέν ἐστι, πρᾶγμα δὲ καὶ

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III Yet another equally mainstream legacy for the Latin medievals was bequeathed by Averroes. Indeed, for the Commentator the very core of ‘being as true’ was provided by something like a goatstag. Commenting on Aristotle, Averroes tells us that being is basically divided into real being outside the mind and being in the mind.18 Being in the mind is equivalent to Aristotle’s “being as true,”19 but with Averroes this is not restricted to the truth of a proposition. It occurs, he says, when “opposites are simultaneously in the intellect” (opposita insimul).20 The most obvious instance of such would be furnished by a goatstag, or in the Latin translations of Aristotle and Averroes a hircocervus. Once again, a goat is not a stag and a stag is not a goat. A goatstag then would be a φύσις τις καὶ ὅλως τι ὂν oὐδαμῶς ἐστιν, oὕτω καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὂν ὄνoμα μόνoν ἐστί” (In Metaph. VI, 2; ed. Hayduck, 448, ll. 36-39). 18  Cf. “… et intendebat per hunc sermonem declarare diversitatem duorum entium, scilicet entis, quod est in intellectu, et entis, quod est extra intellectum” (In Metaphys., L. VI, c. 1, t. 8 [f. 152r]). 19  Cf. “… et ideo nomen entis revertitur ad haec duo tantum, scilicet, ad verum et ad id quod est extra intellectum” (Epitome in Librum Metaphysicae Aristotelis, Tr. 1 [Venetiis: Apud Junctas, 1562], f. 357v K). Perhaps the main complaint that Averroes has against Avicenna is that in his Metaphysics Avicenna has confused real being with being as true. On this cf. “Il y a là, dans l’esprit d’Avicenne, une confusion entre l’être réel et l’être qui signifie le vrai. Lorsque nous concevons une essence quelconque sans nous préoccuper de savoir si elle existe, nous ne faisons rien de plus que de donner une signification à un mot: l’essence est alors une simple définition nominale. Mais si nous venons à la penser comme réelle, l’être que nous affirmons de l’essence, n’ajoute rien sinon que la pensée que nous formons de l’essence est vrai” (M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, O.P., Le ‘De Ente et Essentia’ de S. Thomas D’Aquin. Texte établie d’après les manuscrits parisiens. Introduction, notes et études historiques [Paris: Vrin, 1948], 15859). See also the texts cited by Roland-Gosselin; 159, n. 1. 20  “Quod enim est in anima, contingit ut recipiat duo opposita insimul, quod autem est extra animam, non. Et quasi dicat quoquomodo autem accidit quod anima intelligit duo opposita insimul, quod non potest esse extra animam, quia materia recipit contraria successive…. Deinde dicit in hoc causam, et dicit: Verum enim et falsum, etc., id est, et causa in hoc, quod intellectus comprehendit insimul duo opposita essent…” (In Metaphys., L. VI, c. 1, t. 8 [152r-v]).

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goat and not a goat—a stag and not a stag. Thus a goatstag would be self-contradictory and as such unable to exist. But for Averroes, even though it cannot exist in reality outside the mind, it can somehow be an object in the intellect.21 As such, it would be a perfect example of opposita insimul in intellectu.

IV Although I find Averroes so interpreted and followed generally in the seventeenth century, I have not found him cited in this context, much less followed, by the two most important and influential medieval doctors, St. Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus. While neither cites Alexander in this context, they both seem to follow him, and probably also Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics, in regarding self-contradictory items like the goatstag as not just impossible in the sense that they cannot exist outside the intellect. They regard it as also impossible that they be objects within the intellect. To my knowledge, St. Thomas does not explicitly contrast the views of Alexander and Averroes on the exclusion of ‘being as true’ from the subject of metaphysics. And most important for our present concern, in comment on Aristotle’s Metaphysics he says nothing for or against Averroes’ “simul opposita” or Alexander’s relegation of the goat-stag to the class of entia per accidens. But from other places, Aquinas’s view seems clear enough. Thus in at least three passages of which I am aware St. Thomas has rejected the fundamental intelligibility as well as the being of intrinsically impossible items. In the best known of these passages, he is explaining the angel Gabriel’s saying to Mary, that “no word will be impossible for God.”22 As St. Thomas reads this, “that which implies a

21  Cf., for example, his thoughts on “thing” as wider than “being:” “Haec dictio res, arabice alfciai, dicitur de omni eo, quod dicitur dictio entis. Et quandoque dicitur de communiori, scilicet, de omni re concepta in anima, sive ita se habeat extra animam, sive non, ut hircocervus, chimera. Et ideo dicimus dicere haec res vel est, vel non est. et ideo nomen rei transumitur ad falsas propositiones: quod tamen non facit nomen entis” (Epitome in lib. Metaphys., Tr. 1 [359v I-K]). While there is more here than fits our present concern, the basic thought is relevant enough. 22  Cf. Luke 1:37.

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contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can conceive it.”23 Commenting on the same passage in another place he writes: “a word is said to be not only what is spoken orally but also what is conceived by the mind. But that an affirmation and its negation be simultaneously true cannot be conceived by the mind as is proven in the fourth book of the Metaphysics. Consequently, neither can anything be conceived in which such simultaneous affirmation and negation are included.”24 Again, considering God’s will in relation to impossible items, Aquinas tells us that what is not within the scope of the intellect is not within that of the will. But things which are in themselves impossible do not fall within the scope of the intellect, ergo.25 On its face, this seems to rule out Aquinas accepting the core of Averroes’ doctrine with regard to ‘being as true.’26 As for Duns Scotus: there are beings of reason, in the sense of things which can exist only in the mind. These would be “impossible” in the

23  “Id enim quod contradictionem implicat, verbum esse non potest: quia nullus intellectus potest illud concipere” (Summa theologiae I, q. 25, a. 3). 24  “… dicendum quod verbum dicitur non solum quod ore profertur, sed quod mente concipitur. Hoc autem quod est affirmationem et negationem esse simul veram, non potest mente concipi, ut probatur IV Metaph. [comm. 9], et per consequens nec aliquid eorum in quibus hoc includitur” (De potentia, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1, ed. Paul M. Pession [Turin: Marietti, 1953], 15); cf. “Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cum verbum sit conceptus mentis, nihil quod contradictionem implicat, verbum dici potest, quia non cadit in conceptu mentis, ut probatur in IV Metaphys.” (Quaestiones Quodlibetales 5, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1, ed. Raymond Spiazzi [Turin: Marietti, 1956], 99); also see In Sent. I, d. 42, q. 2, a. 2, ad 6, ed. R.P. Mandonnet (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929), 993. For Aristotle here, cf. Metaphysics 4.3.1005b29-30. 25  “Illud igitur quod non cadit in intellectum, non potest cadere in voluntatem. Sed ea quae sunt secundum se impossibilia non cadunt in intellectum, cum sibi ipsis repugnent… In divinam igitur voluntatem non possunt cadere quae secundum se sunt impossibilia” (Summa contra gentiles I, c. 84). 26  This is so despite the fact that Thomas will cite Averroes distinguishing between being which signifies an essence and being as true. For this, see: De ente et essentia, c. 1; ed. Roland-Gosselin, 3; for Averroes (as cited by Roland-Gosselin), cf.: “Sed debes scire universaliter quod nomen ens, quod significat essentiam rei, est aliud ab ente quod significat verum” (In Metaphys. L. V, comm. 14 [55v-56]).

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sense of being incapable of existing outside the mind.27 They would not, however, be impossible in the sense of being self-contradictory. Self-contradictory items would also be incapable of extra-mental existence but in addition would lack all intelligibility and would be outside any conception of being.28

V Three centuries later, in 1597, the Jesuit Suárez devoted the last, that is the 54th, disputation of his famous Disputationes metaphysicae to beings of reason.29 Explicitly citing Averroes, Suárez viewed such beings as having no other reality beyond objective existence in the intellect.30 They were of three types: negations, privations, and relations.31 27  Cf. “… et tamen ista non possunt esse extra intellectum” (Quodlibeta 3, a. 1, n. 9, in Obras del Doctor Sutil Juan Duns Escoto: Cuestiones cuodlibetales, ed. Felix Alluntis [Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1968], 93-94). 28  “… nihil potest esse intelligibile, quod [non] includit rationem entis isto modo, quia, ut dictum est prius, includens contradictionem non est intelligibile” (ibid., 94 [the Latin text (but not the Spanish translation) of Alluntis is evidently lacking in its omission of the “non” which I have supplied here]); cf. also: “… in cuius cognitione vel cogitatione includitur contradictio, illud dicitur non cogitabile, …” (Ordinatio I, d. 2, p. 1, q. 2, in Joannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia, vol. 1 [Civitas Vaticana: Typis Vaticanis, 1950], 208, n. 137); and ibid., I, d. 43, qu. un., vol. 6 (1963), 360, n. 18. 29  Disputationes metaphysicae (hereafter referred to as DM and cited by disputation, section, and paragraph), d. 54: De Entibus Rationis, in Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1856-1866), vol. 26, 1014-41. For an English version, cf. Francisco Suárez, S.J.: On Beings of Reason (De Entibus Rationis), Metaphysical Disputation LIV, translated with introduction and notes by John P. Doyle (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1995). 30  Cf. “Et ideo recte definiri solet, ens rationis, esse illud, quod habet esse objective tantum in intellectu, seu esse id, quod a ratione cogitatur ut ens, cum tamen in se entitatem non habeat. Unde recte dixit Comment. 6 Metaphys., comment. 3, ens rationis solum posse habere esse objective in intellectu” (DM 54.1.6 [vol. 26, 1016]). Suárez’s citation (which stretches Averroes beyond the letter of his text) is actually incorrect. Corrected it should read: In Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, l. VI, c. 2, comm. 8 (ed. Venetiis, 1562), VIII, 152. 31  For the distinction and its lineage, cf. DM 54.3.1 (vol. 26, 1026); for Suárez’s own acceptance of it, see all of section 3, disputation 54 (1026-28).

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Within this division, a special place was occupied by impossible or self-contradictory items. These, which Francis of Mayronnes (d. ca. 1325) had earlier termed “prohibited beings,”32 would include things like chimerae and goatstags. Classified under negations,33 such impossible items would, most of all things, have their being “only in the intellect.”34 On at least one occasion, while reporting an opinion to which he did not subscribe, Suárez referred to such impossible items as “beings per accidens.”35 However, his more usual practice, and his own personal preference, was to treat such items under the heading of ‘being as true.’36 This can be coupled with his treatment of ens per se and ens per accidens as divisions of real being in contrast to ens rationis.37 Thus, 32  For this, cf. Francis of Mayronnes, Praeclarissima ac multum subtilia egregiaque scripta illuminati doc. F. Francisci de Mayronnis ordinis Minorum in quatuor libros Sententiarum. Ac quolibeta eiusdem …, Quodlibetti Questio VII (Venetijs: Imp. Heredum Dni. Octaviani Scoti, 1520), n. 7; f. 239v. 33  Cf. Suárez, DM 54.4.10 (vol. 26, 1031). Also: “… ratio entis ficti ut sic in negatione consistit: illud enim est proprie ens fictum quod ita mente apprehendi potest, ut in se involvat repugnantiam, et impossibilitatem, quae est negatio quaedam…” (DM 3.2.13 [vol. 25, 111]). 34  “… tantum in intellectu…” (DM 3.1.6 [vol. 25, 1016]). On this, see my article, “Suarez on Beings of Reason and Truth (1),” Vivarium 25 (1987): 69-75. 35 Cf. DM 54.4.2 (vol. 26, 1029). 36 Cf. DM 54.1.4 (vol. 26, 1016) where he is speaking about beings of reason in general; cf. DM 54.3.1 (vol. 26, 1026); and ibid., 54.5.16 (vol. 26, 1035), where he is immediately speaking about true statements regarding chimerae. Also cf. “Tandem esse potest quaestio, an entia rationis pertineant ad Metaphysicae considerationem. Quia ea ratione qua Aristot. excludit verum ens, excludit etiam omne ens rationis. Quod est verum loquendo de objecto directo et proprio, ut disp. 1. sect. 1. dixi. Hoc vero non obstat quo minus per occasionem et ad distinguendum illud ab ente reali, consideretur ens rationis in hac scientia, ut in disp. ult. huius operis annotamus, sic enim Arist. cum hic excluserit ens verum, aliquam de alio tractationem promittit, eamque tradit lib. 9. cap. Ult” (DM, Index locupletissimus, VI, c. 2, n. 6 [vol. 25, xxix]). 37  “… explicandum est, quid sit ens per se, et per accidens, sic enim etiam ens dividitur ab eodem Aristot. eodem lib. 5. cap. 7. quae divisio propria est entia realis: nam entia rationis, sicut aequivoce tantum sunt entia, ita non nisi aequivoce has denominationes recipiunt” (DM 4.3.5 [vol. 25, 127]).

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without his actually saying it, Suárez would be on the side of Averroes rather than Alexander. This accords with his mentioned citation of Averroes at that place in which he has given his own core description of a being of reason as that which has being only in the intellect.38

VI Among many seventeenth-century Jesuits after Suárez, we encounter the same basic doctrine. Being is divided into real being and being of reason. Being of reason, in turn, is divided into negations, privations, and relations. But more than this, impossible or self-contradictory items are the very paradigm of beings of reason. One of the best examples of this is in the work of Thomas Compton Carleton, S.J. (15911666), who devoted five quarto pages to such impossible objects as “another God,” “a chimera,” “a goatstag,” “a horsestag,” and “a manlion.”39 Other Jesuits with similar views in this period, or slightly after, include Sylvester Mauro (1619-1687),40 Andreas Semery (1630-1717),41 and Maximilian Wietrowski (1660-1737).42 38  Cf. notes 29 and 33, above. 39 Cf. Philosophia universa (Antwerpiae: Apud Jacobum Meursium, 1649), Logica, disp. 13, ss. 2-5 (66-70). On Carleton, cf. A. de Backer and C. Sommervogel, Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus (Bruxelles: O. Schepens, 1890-1900), vol. 2, cols. 1354-55. For Carleton on another topic, not entirely unrelated, see my article, “Thomas Compton Carleton, S.J.: On Words Signifying More than their Speakers or Makers Know or Intend,” The Modern Schoolman 66 (1988): 1-28. 40  For this, cf. Quaestiones philosophicae, ed. M. Liberatore (Parisii: Bloud et Barral, 1876 [first edition: Romae, 1658]), Quaest. prooemiales Logicae, q. 48 (I, 478-91). On Mauro, see de Backer-Sommervogel, Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus, vol. 5, cols. 765-69. 41 Cf. Triennium philosophicum, ed. 2a, Annus primus (Romae: Sumpt. Felicis Caesaretti, 1682), Logica, disp. 4, qu. 7: De impossibili, 531-55. On Semery, cf. de Backer-Sommervogel, Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus, vol. 7, cols. 1115-16. 42  Cf., e.g., “Ens rationis essentialiter seu in statu essentiae suae est ens impossibile, quatenus potest cognosci, et existere in cognitione” (Philosophia disputata, in qua comprehenduntur conclusiones ex universa philosophia Aristotelis [Pragae: Typis Univ. Car. Ferd., 1697], Logica, Concl. 14, cap. 2, n. 1 [276]). On Wietrowski, cf. de BackerSommervogel, Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus, vol. 8, cols. 1129-33.

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In the same period, still more Jesuits retained the Suarezian taxonomy of beings of reason but regarded impossible objects as ultimately each reducible to a complex of possible objects. This in effect reduced beings of reason to real beings, real that is at least in the sense of possible. An example here would be Richard Lynch (1610-1676), who, without mentioning Alexander of Aphrodisias, has, I believe, shown the Greek commentator’s influence when he tells us explicitly that an ens rationis, in the sense of an impossible being such as a goat-stag, is a “certain aggregate or an ens per accidens.”43 In the same vein as Lynch, John Morawski, S.J. (1633-1700) was in this an explicit opponent of Compton Carleton.44

VII As Carleton had stated his position,“it is necessary to admit impossible objects which are distinct from all possible ones.”45 This, he said, was 43 Cf. Universa Philosophia Scholastica (Lugduni: Sumpt. Borde, Arnaud, et Rigaud, 1654), Metaphys. IV, tr. 1, c. 1, n. 4 (III, 228): “Assero secundo: ens rationis, quamvis de eo affirmari possit non esse ens reale, tamen non est, alquid adaequate distinctum a complexione plurium entium realium, sed potius est aggregatum quoddam per accidens ex extremis realibus, et actu intellectus essentialiter falso: et applicante iis veram, ac realem identitatem, quae tamen inter eos reperiri nequit….” On Lynch, see de BackerSommervogel, Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus, vol. 5, cols. 218-19. 44  Joannes Morawski, S.J., Totius philosophiae principia per quaestiones de Ente in communi ex praelectionibus (Lugduni: Sumpt. A. Thomas, 1688), Disp. 1, qu. 2 (14-37). On Morawski, cf.: de Backer-Sommervogel, Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus, vol. 5, cols. 1286-90; Joseph Majkowski, “Morawski ( Jean),” Dictionnaire de spiritualité ascétique et mystique (Paris: Beauchesne, 1980), vol. 10, cols. 1719-20; and J. and W. Jadacki (“Morawski, Jan (16331700),” Encyclopédie philosophique universelle, III Les Oeuvres philosophiques, Dictionnaire, tom. 1 [Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990], 1355), who in connection with Morawski’s treatment of truths regarding impossible and possible objects have written: “Ce problème de l’éternité du vrai sera, deux cent cinquante ans plus tard, l’objet des discusssions dans l’Ecole lvovienne-varsovienne entre Kotarbiński et Leśniewski.” 45 “Admitti necessario debent objecta impossibilia ab omnibus possibilibus distincta” (Philosophia universa, Logica, disp. 13, sect. IV, [68]). For facets of Carleton’s doctrine beyond those treated here, cf. my article “‘Extrinsic Cognoscibility:’ A Seventeenth-Century Supertranscendental Notion,” The Modern Schoolman 68 (1990), esp. 60-61.

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also the view of his fellow Jesuits, Suárez, Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578-1651), Antonio Rubio (1548-1615), Francisco de Oviedo (1602-1651), and Roderigo de Arriaga (1592-1667). Without naming Averroes, Carleton says that this was “the explicit opinion of the ancients” who have thought of a being of reason as “being in the mind” as opposed to “real being outside the mind.”46 In this way, Carleton thinks, there are beings of reason in the most proper and rigorous sense. That is to say, there are beings which are simply fabricated by the intellect, beings in which there is nothing real, or at least in which there is something “plainly and fully” (plane et plene) distinct from all real or possible objects. These would be beings which have whatever entity they have entirely from a fabricating intellect, and whose whole being would thus be objectively in the mind.47 This he says is the opinion expressed by Aristotle in different places, for instance in the Metaphysics V, c. 7 “where he numbers being of reason among the divisions of being,” and Metaphysics VI, c. 2 “where in some sense he excludes being of reason from the object of metaphysics, because, he says, it does not share the true nature of being but it is by fabrication and its whole being is to be objectively in the intellect.”48 At the risk of understatement, let me just note here that by 46  Cf. “Hanc Conclusionem statuo cum auctoribus secundae sententiae sect. 2. relatae, …” (Philosophia universa, Logica, disp. 13, sect. IV, n. 1 [68]); and “… ita Suarez d. 54. metaph. s. 1. n. 4. Hurt. d. 19. Metaph. Ruvius in Log. trac. de Ente Rat. n. 1. Murcia d. 2. de Univer. q. 1. Arriaga d. 6. Metaph. s. 11. et alii. Est etiam expressa sententia antiquorum, qui Ens rationis ens in anima, seu ens cognitionis, ens vero reale ens extra animam vocabant, seu ens naturae” (ibid., sect. II, n. 9 [66]). The only non-Jesuit in this list is Francisco Murcia de Llano, who might be thought of as an “honorary Jesuit” inasmuch as he excised and edited “Disputationes metaphysicae” from the work of Gabriel Vázquez. 47  “… sicque Ens Rationis in sensu proprio et maxime rigoroso dari existimo, pure scilicet a intellectu confictum, in quo vel nihil involvatur reale, vel saltem aliquid reperiatur ab objectis omnibus realibus seu possibilibus plane ac plene distinctum, quod quidquid entitatis habet, ab intellectu mere fingente habet, sicque totum ejus esse, est esse objective in mente” (Phil. univ., Logica, disp. 13, sect. IV, n. 1 [68]). 48  “Haec est expresse sententia Aristotelis, tum alibi, tum l. 5. Metaph. c. 7. ubi inter Entis divisiones Ens rationis numerat. 6. etiam Metaphy. c. 2. Ens rationis ab objecto Metaphysicae aliquo sensu excludit, quia, inquit, veram

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1649 Carleton obviously has no qualms about identifying ens rationis with Aristotle’s τὸ ὂν ὡς ἀληθές. Carleton gives three main arguments to support his thesis. First, he says, it is evident often in daily experience that there are objects present to men’s minds which not only are not actual but which also cannot in anyway be or exist. The goatstag would be an example of such.49 Second, he says, whoever states or whoever hears someone stating propositions such as “a horse is the same as a stag,” or “there is identity between a horse and a stag,” conceives this identity which is stated to exist between these two, even though it is merely fictitious and such that it cannot in any way exist in reality.50 Third, he argues, this proposition is true, “By his own entity, God excludes another God.” But in this true proposition there is objectively represented “another God,” that is to say, one which is false and chimerical.51 Besides these three arguments, in the course of his treatment of impossible objects Carleton has given others as well, especially in answering objections to his position. Some of these other arguments will come out later in this paper, as objections to the opposite position of Carleton’s fellow Jesuit, John Morawski.

entis rationem non participat, sed fingendo sit et totum ejus esse, est esse objective in intellectu” (ibid.). 49  Cf. “Probatur primo, multa indies, ut quotidiana constat experientia, hominibus animo obversantur, quae non solum actu non sunt, sed nullo modo esse possunt, ut Hippocervus, Tragelaphus, Myrmicoleon, et similia, quae quisque fingit ac fabricat pro libitu, et fabricata facile dissolvit” (ibid., n. 2 [68]). 50  “Secundo probatur, in hac et similibus propositionibus equus identificatur cum cervo, vel intercedit identitas inter equum et cervum, quisquis vel has profert, vel proferentem audit, identitatem concipit inter illa duo intercedere, sed haec identitas est quid mere fictitium, quodque nec est nec esse a parte rei ullo modo potest, ergo” (ibid., n. 3). 51  “Tertio probatur Conclusio, haec propositio est vera Deus per suam entitatem excludit alium Deum, ergo hic ex parte objecti repraesentatur alius Deus, nempe falsus et chimaericus” (ibid., n. 9). Carleton does not spell it out, but from the wider context of seventeenth-century discussions clearly the burden of “chimaericus” here is that “alius Deus” would involve self-contradiction—for the reason that God is unique. Thus God is this God and another God would be at once both this God and not this God.

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VIII Morawski states his position starkly as follows: “All that is knowable is possible and there is no intellectual object which is distinct from all real being.”52 In agreement with this, he cites authorities, mostly fellow Jesuits who were at the Roman College53—whose work I have not yet seen. He correctly cites Richard Lynch,54 whose work I have seen and whose opinion I have already mentioned. But then he also follows Lynch incorrectly to cite Suárez and Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza as of the same opinion.55 Most importantly, he cites St. Thomas in effect saying in the three places I have cited that impossible items are inconceivable.56 52  “Omne cognoscibile esse possibile, nec dari ullum objectum intellectus distinctum ab omni ente reali” (Totius philosophiae, d. 1, qu. 2, I [17]). As will be evident from the Latin reproduced in my notes, from this point on I will be staying very close to the text of Morawski. This will be for two reasons: first, more carefully to follow the intricacies of the debate, and second, to give readers reliable access to a text which is not well known and not widely available. 53  Especially interesting here are his references to Antonio Pérez (15991649) and to Pérez’s pupil, Martín De Esparza (1606-1689), whom he calls “meus doctissimus in Theologia Professor” (ibid.). For the Roman College, see Riccardo G. Villoslada, S.J., Storia del Collegio Romano dal suo inizio (1551) alla soppressione della Compagnia di Gesù (1773) (Romae: Apud Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, 1954). 54  Cf. Morawski, Totius philosophiae, d. 1, qu. 2, I (17). 55  “Et pro hac sententia dicit stare Suarium, et Hurtad. dis. 19. Met. se. 1…” (ibid.). I know of no place where Suárez has stated his position so as to reply exactly to the question here. But it seems to me that his overall position on beings of reason is such that impossibles would be at its core and impossibles would not be reducible to possibles. As for Hurtado, I think his position is clearly opposite to that attributed to him by Lynch and Morawski; cf., e.g., Disputationes metaphysicae (Lugduni: Apud L. Prost et H. Roville, 1624), disp. 19, s. 3, n. 65 (952), and ibid., prooemium, disp. 1, s. 2, ss. 2, n. 58 (702). 56  Cf. “Sed quod caput rei est. idem videtur sensisse D. Thom. nam 1. p. q. 25. ar. 1. explicans dictum illud Archangeli ad B. Virginem: Non erit imposibile apud Deum omne verbum; ita dicit S. Doctor: Id quod contradictionem implicat, Verbum esse non potest, quia nullus intellectus potest illud concipere. Et 1. con. Gen. c. 84. Quae sunt impossibilia non cadunt in intellectu. Et qu. de poten. ar. 3. ad 1. Id quod est affirmationem

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Morawski goes on to support his position with reasoned arguments from which he will draw inferences. The first of these arguments is: just as the adequate object of sight is color or what is colored, in such way that color is the formal motive object and what is colored is the material and terminative object, so the adequate object of the intellect, encompassing all its acts, is the true or that which is true, in such way that truth is the formal motive object and that which is true is the material and terminative object.57 But the object (say, the goatstag) alleged by his adversaries as distinct from all real being is not true and it does not share in any truth. For it consists of two terms from whose mutual intentional destruction it results that both are intentionally destroyed, just as from the mutual physical destruction of two things there would result the physical destruction of both.58 Therefore, that which is distinct from all possible being cannot be the formal or a et negationem esse simul veram, non potest mente concipi, et per consequens, nec aliquid eorum in quibus hoc includitur, id est, nec objectum implicatorium, in quo utique includitur affirmationem et negationem simul esse veram” (Totius philosophiae, d. 1, qu. 2, I [17]). My guess is that Morawski has added this last point, “per consequens, …” in reply to Sylvester Mauro who earlier (1658) maintained that St. Thomas was not speaking about an impossible object such as a chimera but was rather denying the possibility of someone simultaneously affirming two contradictories to be true. For this cf. Mauro, Quaestiones philosophicae, Qu. 48, resp. (I, 485). For Morawski indicating that he has read Mauro in this context, see Totius philosophiae, d. 1, qu. 2 (21). 57  “Ratio prima assertionis est: quia sicut objectum adaequatum potentiae visivae, quod illam circumscribit, comprehenditque omnes ejus actus, et ultra quam non extenditur ullus actus potentiae visivae, etiam insincerus, est color, seu id quod participat rationem coloris: ita ut color sit objectum formale motivum, id vero quod est coloratum sit objectum materiale et terminativum; … ita objectum adaequatum intellectus, omnes actus ipsius etiam falsos circumscribens, est Verum, seu id quod participat rationem veri; ita ut objectum formale motivum, sit veritas, id vero quod participat rationem veri, sit objectum materiale et terminativum” (ibid., II [19-20]). 58  Cf. “Nempe cum objectum formale sit ratio ob quam ab aliqua potentia attingitur objectum materiale; debet aliquo modo includi objectum formale in materiali. Hoc posito principio, subsumo minorem: Atqui objectum, quod per Adversarios est distinctum ab omni ente reali, nec est verum, nec participat quidquam de veritate: constat enim ex terminis repugnantibus et mutuo se falsificantibus, ac destruentibus intentionaliter, scilicet ex esse et non esse, ex qua mutua destructione intentionali, uterque

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material object of the intellect. Hence, it cannot be known in any way, because all that is in any way knowable is either the formal object or a material object of the intellect.59 At this place, Morawski impugns a position of Sylvester Mauro to the effect that while an impossible item has no absolute truth, it does have truth on the supposition that it would exist.60 To this Morawski replies that, even on the supposition of their existence, being a goat and not being a goat would still mutually destroy and falsify one another. So even on that supposition neither contradictory extreme would remain definitely true. Likewise, the whole composed of them both would not be true. For if all its parts would be destroyed, necessarily the whole would be destroyed inasmuch as it is nothing besides its parts.61 Morawski’s second argument in support of his position is that since the self-contradictory objects of his adversaries do not exist prior to all knowing (otherwise they would be real beings) they either (1) result quasi-effectively from a knowing which fabricates them, or (2) they are constituted by that fabricating cognition as by an extrinsic form.62 terminus remanet intentionaliter destructus, sicut ex mutua physica duorum destructione, utrumque remanet physice destructum” (ibid.). 59  “Ergo id quod est distinctum ab omni ente possibili non potest esse objectum formale, aut etiam materiale intellectus; ideoque nullo modo cognosci potest, cum omne aliquo modo cognoscibile, adaequate dividatur in objectum formale aut materiale intellectus” (ibid.). 60  “Hinc impugnatur etiam responsio P. Sylvestri Mauri qu. 42. 1. dicentis, impossibile habere praedictam veritatem non absolute, sed ex suppositione si existeret” (ibid.). Morawski’s reference here is wrong; correctly, it should be: S. Mauro, S.J., Quaestiones philosophicae, qu. 48, ad 2 (I, 485). 61  “Impugnatur inquam, nam esse hircum et non esse hircum, etiam ex suppositione suae existentiae non amitterent suum virus sibi essentiale mutuo se interimendi et fasificandi, ac proinde etiam in tali suppositione neutrum extremum determinate sumptum remaneret verum: immo nec ipsum complexum ex utraque parte, remaneret verum, quia omnibus partibus destructis, necesse est Totum, quod nihil est praeter suas partes, pariter destrui” (Totius philosophiae, d. 1, qu. 2, II [21]). 62  “Illud objectum implicatorium Adversariorum cum non sit ante omnem cognitionem; (hoc ipso enim esset reale) vel resultat quasi effective ex cognitione fingente; vel constituitur per ipsam cognitionem fingentem tanquam per formam extrinsecam” (ibid.).

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The first is not the case, because to be an object or to be known is an extrinsic denomination from knowledge without any diminished being resulting from that knowledge, as the Jesuits (“nostri”) commonly teach against the Scotists.63 Expatiating on this, Morawski goes on to ask: if, indeed, confused knowledge, conditioned knowledge, or disjunctive knowledge effect or quasi-effect nothing on the part of their objects, but only extrinsically denominate an object as confusedly, conditionally or disjunctively known, why in the same way will not a knowledge which fabricates its object denominate it (only extrinsically) as fabricated?64 Assuming no reply to this (which is a large assumption by my reckoning) Morawski goes on to say that even if an object is extrinsically denominated as fabricated through a fabricating knowledge, a self-contradictory object is not only said to be fabricated but it is precisely said to be fabricated in a certain way, as this or that. For example, it is said to be the fabricated identity of God with a creature (in the case of a ‘created God’), or the fabricated otherness of God (in the case of ‘another God’). But now through a fabricating knowledge an object is not constituted as this identity or that otherness, even though it is known as such. For knowledge does not make its object such, but knowledge precisely only adds itself to such or such a terminating object, and in 63  “Non primum, quia esse objectum seu esse cognitum est denominatio extrinseca a cognitione, absque ullo ente diminuto resultante ex cognitione, ut communiter nostri docent contra Scotistas” (ibid., III [22]). For this common opinion, cf. Morawski’s opponent, Sylvester Mauro, Quaestiones philosophicae, Quaest. proem., qq. 46-49 (I, 461-503), esp. qu. 46, resp. (463). 64  “Profecto si cognitio confusa, aut conditionata, aut disjunctiva, nihil efficit vel quasi efficit ex parte sui objecti, sed solum seipsam addendo, objectum extrinsece denominat confusum, aut conditionatum, aut disjunctivum; cur etiam eodem modo cognitio fingens suum objectum non denominabit fictum?” (Totius philosophiae, d. 1, qu. 2, III [22]). One cannot help seeing the grammatical difference here (and wondering about its impact on Morawski’s argument) between the passive participles “confusa,” “conditionata,” and the more active “disjunctiva” as well as “fingens.” The difficulty is perhaps lessened if we think of a confusing knowledge resulting in a confused object or a conditional knowledge resulting in a conditioned object. But more than this, Morawski is not using “fingens” as fabricating in the sense of producing but rather in a sense close to manipulating what in some way already exists.

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this way it makes that terminating object (terminus), which is whatever it is from elsewhere, to be extrinsically known.65 Therefore, a fabricated object, apart from the knowledge or the intentional being by which it is denominated as fabricated, implies something completely distinct by which it is denominated this or that (for instance: identity or otherness in the cases mentioned). Accordingly, says Morawski, a fabricated object implies something real, because everything opposite to intentional is real.66 Therefore, rejecting one possible choice of his adversaries, namely, that their impossible objects could result quasi-effectively from cognition, Morawski turns to the other, that these objects would somehow be constituted by cognition as by an extrinsic form. In this instance, the object of a fabricating knowledge would neither have nor be able to have actual being besides that which it receives formally from that fabricating knowledge, and the denomination “fabricated” would entail only an extrinsic form and no subject of denomination which would actually or potentially have any being besides what it receives from that extrinsic form. But in this way, he says, the extrinsic form will denominate only itself and will be extrinsic to itself.67 Moreover, from this choice there will follow a further difficulty, that without any actual or possible difference supposed in subjects of denomination, the same extrinsic form, that is to say the same fabricating knowledge, will 65  “Si vero dicatur objectum per cognitionem fingentem extrinsece denominari fictum, contra est: quia objectum implicatorium, non solum dicitur fictum praecise sed etiam dictur tale fictum, v. g. dicitur: Identitas Dei cum creatura, Alteritas Dei ficta: atqui per cognitionem fingentem, objectum non constituitur tale, puta Identitas, vel alteritas licet cognoscatur ut tale; siquidem cognitio objectum non facit tale, sed solum termino tali superaddit seipsam praecise, et sic terminum aliunde talem, facit extrinsece cognitum” (Totius philosophiae, d. 1, qu. 2, III [22]). 66  “Ergo illud objectum fictum, praeter cognitionem fingentem a qua dicitur fictum, importat aliquid contradistinctum ab omni esse intentionali, a quo denominetur tale, puta Identitas vel Altereitas, adeoque importat aliquid reale, cum omne oppositum intentionali, sit reale” (ibid.). 67  “Et certe si objectum cognitionis fingentis, nec habet actu esse, nec habere potest, praeter illud quod recipit formaliter a cognitione fingente, jam denominatio ficti, solam dicet formam extrinsecam, et nullum dicet subjectum denominationis, quod habeat actu vel potentia aliquod esse, praeter id quod recipit a forma extrinseca: et sic forma extrinseca nihil denominabit nisi seipsam, sibique ipsi erit extrinseca” (ibid. [22-23]).

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denominate one subject the identity of God with a creature, another subject the negation of God, a third subject a goatstag, and so on for other chimerae—which anyone can see is absurd.68 Morawski’s third argument in support of his position is as follows. When the identity of a goat with a stag is conceived, either it is conceived as something objectively superadded to a real goat and a real stag, or as not so superadded.69 If you say the second, then objectively there is conceived only the real duality of the real goat and the real stag, which proves his point. But if you say the first, then there is no identity at all conceived between a goat and a stag. For identity cannot be conceived as some (third) thing added to the extremes of which it is said to be the identity.70 And this is true not only of real identity but also of chimerical identity. Therefore, just as a real identity is not conceived as some (third) thing objectively added to extremes identified with one another, in the same way chimerical identity is not added to its extremes which are distinct from one another. And the reason is that chimerical identity is conceived after the manner of real identity and through the intelligible species of this—with the single difference that it is conceived where it cannot be, namely between really distinct extremes.71 68  “Sequetur de inde illud etiam inconveniens, quod nulla supposita diversitate actuali vel possibili in subjectis, eadem forma extrinseca, id est eadem cognitio fingens, unum subjectum denominabit Identitatem Dei cum creatura; alterum vero, Negationem Dei, tertium, Hircocervum, et sic de reliquis chimeris; quod quis non videt esse absurdum; [sic]” (ibid. [23]). 69  “Dum concipitur Identitas hirci cum cervo; vel concipitur ut quid superadditum objective hirco et cervo realibus, vel ut non sic superadditum?” (ibid., IV [23]). 70  “Si hoc secundum dicis; Ergo objective solum concipitur dualitas realis hirci et cervi realium, quod mihi satis est. Si vero affirmas primum; Ergo tunc nulla inter hircum et cervum concipitur identitas. Nam de ratione Identitatis ut sic est ut, non concipiatur tanquam aliquid objective superadditum extremis, quorum dicitur esse identitas” (ibid.). 71  “Sicut ergo Identitas realis extremorum non concipitur ut quid objective superadditum respectu suorum extremorum identificatorum inter se; ita nec Identitas chimaerica respectu suorum inter se distinctorum et ratio est, quia Identitas chimaerica concipitur ad instar identitatis realis, et per huius species, cum hoc solo discrimine, quia ibi concipitur ubi ei locus esse nequit, nempe inter extrema realiter distincta” (ibid.).

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Morawski’s final argument, in support of his own position, is that contradictory propositions such as, “a man is a lion” and “a man is not a lion,” concern the same adequate terminating object. Otherwise, one would not deny precisely what the other affirms. But the second proposition, the true one, is about a real adequate terminating object— about a real man and a real lion. So also, therefore, is the first proposition, the fictionalizing one.72 Hence, the fictionalizing proposition does not extend to anything impossible on the side of its terminating object and it does not differ from a non-fictionalizing proposition by that terminating object.73 Rather, the two propositions differ by their ways of intending, insofar as one proceeds in a compositive way which is denoted by the word ‘is;’ whereas the other with respect to the same adequately terminating object proceeds in a divisive way which is denoted by the words ‘is not.’74 This is similar to the manner in which a copulative proposition and a disjunctive proposition, e.g., “Peter and Paul run,” and “Peter or Paul runs,” do not differ with respect to their object, but by their ways of intending that object, ways signified respectively by “and” and “or.”75 To this, he continues, it is no reply to say that the object of contradictory propositions is the same on the part of the subject and predicate but not on the part of the copula. For the copula ‘is’ does not signify an object but rather an intentional union, or an act of the intellect

72  “Propositiones contradictoriae v.g. hae: Homo est Leo: Homo non est Leo, sunt de eodem adaequate objecto terminativo; alias non idem, vel non de eodem una negaret, quod altera affirmat; quod est contra leges Dialecticae. Atqui secunda vera propositio est de objecto terminativo reali, nempe de homine et leone realibus: Ergo et prima fingens” (ibid.). 73  “Ergo propositio fingens non attingit quidquam impossibile ex parte objecti terminativi, consequenter propositio fingens a non fingente non differt objecto terminativo…” (ibid.). 74  ‘… sed ex modo tendendi, quatenus una procedit modo compositivo, denotato per particulam est; altera vero circa idem adaequate objectum terminativum procedit modo divisivo, denotato per particulam Non est: …” (ibid.). 75  “… eo modo, quo propositio copulativa et disjunctiva, v.g. hae: Petrus et Paulus currit: Petrus vel Paulus currit, non differunt objecto, sed modo tendendi, significato per To Et, et per To vel” (ibid.).

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composing extremes.76 The reason for this, he says, is that every proposition does nothing else but intentionally compose or divide among themselves the object signified on the side of the subject with or from the object signified on the side of the predicate. And besides these two there cannot be a third distinct object signified by the proposition.77 This last he further confirms. For if this proposition, “a man is not a lion,” extends to an objective negation of identity, which is signified by the ‘is not,’ does it affirm such objective negation or does it deny it?78 If the first, then the aforesaid proposition will be affirmative and consequently it will not be contradictory to this, “a man is a lion.” If the second, then the proposition is false; for it will deny the negation of identity between a man and a lion (which negation of identity or which distinction is in fact given) and therefore its contradictory, “a man is a lion,” will be true—which is false.79 At this point, Morawski tells us, “a being of reason, or a fictitious, chimerical, or impossible being taken materially, is nothing else than a real being or real beings insofar as they stand under a cognition which is necessarily false and unverifiable, that is: a cognition composing

76  “Et hinc est quod per Philosophum, verbum Est dicitur nota propositionis, id est affirmationis, communiterque vocatur Copula, id est unio intentionalis extremorum. Quapropter non subsistit illa responsio: propositionum contradictoriarum esse idem objectum ex parte subjecti et praedicati, non autem ex parte copulae: non subsistit inquam, quia ut modo dicebam, copula Est non significat objectum, sed unionem intentionalem, seu actum intellectus componentem extrema” (ibid. [25-26]). 77  “Et ratio hujus est, quia cum omnis propositio nihil aliud faciat, nisi componat aut dividat intentionaliter seipsa objectum significatum ex parte subjecti, cum, vel ab objecto ex parte praedicati significato; praeter haec duo objecta, nequit in propositione tertium objectum significari distinctum ab ipsa propositione” (ibid. [26]). 78  “Confirmatur hoc amplius: quia si haec propositio, Homo non est Leo, attingit objectivam negationem identitatis, per To Non est, significatam; quaero vel illam affirmat, vel negat?” (ibid.). 79  “Si primum? Ergo, praedicta propositio erit affirmativa, consequenter non erit contradictoria huic Homo est Leo. Si secundum? Ergo dicta propositio est falsa; negabit enim negationem identitatis inter hominem et Leonem, quae negatio identitatis seu distinctio revera datur, ac proinde haec contradictoria ipsius, Homo est Leo, erit vera, quod est falsum” (ibid.).

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things divided or dividing things which are identified.80 In this way, he says, a being of reason is an extrinsic denomination which content-wise and directly represents a real being or real beings. But formally and indirectly it entails a necessarily false cognition, as an extrinsic form from which what in itself is intrinsically and objectively real and possible is, inasmuch as it stands under that cognition, extrinsically denominated non-real, a being of reason, and materially impossible. For in the way in which it is expressed through that cognition it is not in reality nor can it be by the power of any agent, but it is given only in the intellect.”81 Accordingly, that “formidable monster,” the ‘goat-stag,’ is nothing more than a real goat and a real stag, insofar as they stand under a (false) judgment which affirms a goat of a stag.82 And ‘another God’ is some vaguely real otherness, which is found among creatures, insofar as it is applied to the true God by a false affirmation.83 And a ‘Holy Spirit which does not proceed from the Son’ is the true Holy Spirit insofar as by the false judgment of the Greeks it is in the intentional order divided from the true Third Person of the Trinity who does in 80  “Ob haec ergo dicendum est, Ens rationis seu Ens fictum, chimaericum, ac impossibile materialiter sumptum … nihil aliud esse, quam Ens reale vel entia realia, quatenus substantia cognitioni necessario falsa et inverificabili componenti scilicet divisa, vel dividenti identificata: …” (ibid., VI [26-27]). 81  “… ita ut Ens rationis sit denominatio extrinseca quae pro materiali et in recto dicat Ens reale vel entia realia; pro formali vero et in obliquo cognitionem necessario falsam, tanquam formam extrinseca, a qua id, quod secundum se, intrinsece ac objective est reale et possibile; ut substans illi cognitioni denominetur extrinsece non reale, ens rationis, et impossibile materialiter, quia scilicet tali modo quali enuntiatur per illam cognitionem falsam, nec datur a parte rei, nec dari potest ullius virtute Agentis, sed solum datur in intellectu” (ibid.). In passing, let me say that this is light years away from Suárez, who has opposed a reduction of beings of reason to extrinsic denominations (cf. DM 54.2.6-14 [vol. 26, 1019-21]) and who also would not think that the cognition which forms beings of reason would be necessarily false (ibid., 54.3.4 [vol. 26, 1027]). 82  “Itaque monstrum illud formidabile Hircocervus, nihil aliud est, quam hircus et cervus reales, quatenus substant alicui judicio affirmanti hircum de cervo” (Totius philosophiae, d. 1, qu. 2, VI [27]). 83  “Alter Deus, est aliqua vage alteritas realis reperta inter creaturas, quatenus per falsam affirmationem applicata vero Deo” (ibid.).

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fact proceed from the Son of God as well (as from the Father).84 And the same is to be said of other monsters.85 Moreover, declares Morawski, this seems to be what Aristotle is teaching when he says that the impossible is that which is necessarily false and whose opposite is necessarily true, and when he says that the simply impossible is that of which it is not true to say that it will be.86 That is: to say what is false or not true, since it is not in things, is nothing else than an extrinsic denomination falling on a real object from a false cognition.87 This is further confirmed and explained, he says, by a parity with a confused object. For just as this confused object, “an animal as such,” is nothing else but true and real beings, which are extrinsically said to be something confused from a confused cognition under which they stand, so equally this fictitious or false object, “a goatstag,” is nothing else except real beings as extrinsically denominated to be something fictitious and false from the fictionalizing and false cognition under which they stand.88 From this, Morawski tells us, a further inference is that a proposition is not false because its object is not given in reality, nor is it true because its object is given in reality. For the object of every proposition as such is given in reality either actually or possibly. But a proposition 84  “Spiritus Sanctus non procedens a Filio, est verus Spiritus sanctus, quatenus per falsum judicium Graecorum dividitur intentionaliter a vera tertia Persona Trinitatis, procedente etiam a Filio Dei” (ibid. [27-28]). 85  “Et sic discurrendum de omnibus aliis monstris” (ibid.). 86  “Atque hoc videtur docere Philosophus dum ait 5.(?) Met. tex. 17. Impossibile est id quod est necessario falsum et cujus contrarium necessario verum est. Et 1. de Caelo tex. III. Impossibile, inquit, simpliciter dicitur, quia non verum est dicere, quod factum erit” (ibid.). For Aristotle, cf. Metaphysics 5.12.1019b23-27 and De Coelo 1.11.280b13. 87  “Nempe Falsum seu non verum dicere, cum non sit in rebus, ut docet idem philosophus, et ex eo D. Thomas, nihil aliud est, nisi denominatio extrinseca cadens a cognitione falsa in objectum reale” (Totius philosophiae, d. 1, qu. 2, VI [27]). 88  “Quod ipsum ultra jam dicta confirmatur et declaratur paritate objecti confusi. Sicut enim hoc objectum confusum, Animal ut sic, nihil aliud est, nisi entia vera et realia, quae extrinsece dicuntur esse quid confusum a cognitione confusa, cui substant: ita pariter et hoc objectum fictum seu falsum, Hircocervus, nihil aliud est, nisi entia realia, quae extrinsece denominantur esse quid fictum et falsum, a cognitione fingente et falsa, cui substant” (ibid.).

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is false rather than true because its object is not given in reality in that precise way in which it is enunciated by that proposition, or because that proposition tends toward its object in an improper way and thus lacks conformity with it.89 Yet another inference is that a being of reason is produced by an act which tends in an improper way toward real objects, which act normally speaking is direct. But a being of reason is known always by a reflex act tending toward real objects taken in a second intentional way, or as denominated from some essentially false cognition.90 Hence it is that God does not produce any being of reason, for He does not have any improper way of tending toward an object. However, He does know beings of reason, because He knows real beings as they stand under actual and possible created fictions or fabrications.91 89  “Hinc ulterius infertur, non ideo aliquam propositionem esse falsam, quia ejus objectum non datur a parte rei, nec ideo veram, quia ejus objectum datur a parte rei; omnium enim propositionum objectum secundum se datur a parte rei actu vel possibiliter: sed potius ideo aliqua propositio est falsa quia ejus objectum non datur a parte rei tali modo, quali enuntiatur per ipsam, seu quia tendit modo indebito in suum objectum, estque illi difformis, secus autem vera” (ibid., VII [28-29]). 90  “Infertur rursus, Ens rationis fieri per actum indebito modo tendentem in objecta realia, qui actus regulariter loquendo, est directus; cognosci vero semper per actum reflexum tendentem in objecta realia secundo intentionaliter sumpta, seu ut denominata ab aliqua cognitione essentialiter falsa” (ibid., VIII). 91  “Hinc Deus non facit Ens rationis, quia non habet modum indebitum tendendi in objectum; cognoscit tamen Ens rationis, quia cognoscit entia realia ut substantia fictionibus creatis actualibus et possibilibus” (ibid.). By Morawski’s time there has been almost one hundred years of discussion and controversy on this matter among the Jesuits. The two main opinions were earlier staked out by Gabriel Vázquez (1549-1604) who denied that God can produce or know beings of reason and Francisco Suárez (15481617) who maintained that while God could not produce such beings He could know that as produced or producible by us. For Vázquez, cf. esp. Commentariorum ac disputationum in primam partem Summae Theologiae Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, Tomus II (Venetiis: Sumpt. Evangelistae Deuchini, 1608), In Qu. 28, art. 2, disp. 118 (52-6) and for Suárez, see DM 54.2.19-24 (vol. 26, 1024-6). For other seventeenth-century Jesuits, cf., e.g.: Antonio Rubio, S.J., Logica Mexicana (Lugduni: Sumpt. Antonii Pillehotte, 1620), Tractatus de natura entis rationis, dub. 4 (76-78); P. Hurtado de Mendoza, S.J., Disput. metaphy., disp. 19, sect. 6 (955-57);

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Furthermore, says Morawski, in this opinion (which he is espousing) God knowing beings of reason is liberated from every fiction even at the level of simple apprehension.92 For God in this opinion only knows our fictions about real objects in a reflex way, by dissenting from them. But in the opposite opinion, God by knowing our fictions comprehensively would have to also know the object of these insofar as it would be represented by them. But since, according to the adversaries, this object would be distinct from all real beings and yet would be apprehended in the manner of a real being, God also would have to apprehend it in this manner—which would entail Him having to fictionalize at the level of simple apprehension.93 One final inference here is to the effect that a being of reason which, says Morawski, is according to Aristotle necessarily false, is produced through the second operation of the intellect. For, absolutely speaking, falsity consists in an enunciation which says that its object is otherwise than it in fact is. Hence, a being of reason is produced only “occasionally and dispositively” through simple apprehension.94 Much less is it produced through sensation, for although sensation sometimes Diego Alarcon, S.J., Prima pars Theologiae Scholasticae (Lugduni: Sumpt. Jacobi Cardon, 1633), Tr. II, disp. 3, cap. 6 (124-26); R. de Arriaga, S.J., Cursus philosophicus (Parisii: Apud Jacobum Quenel, 1637), Metaphysica, disp. 6, qu. 4, nn. 38 ff. (788-89); Francisco de Oviedo, S.J., Integer Cursus philosophicus (Lugduni: Apud P. Prost, 1640), Metaphysica, cont. XII, punctum 7 (443-45); T. Compton Carleton, S.J., Philosophia universa, Logica, disp. 13, sect. 6 (79-80); Richard Lynch, S.J., Univ. Phil., Metaphy. IV, tr. 1, cc. 4-5 (III, 234-37). 92  Cf. “Caeterum Deus cognoscens Ens rationis, liberatur in nostra sententia ab omni fictione etiam apprehensiva; quae est aliquis defectus modi cognoscendi perfectioris, id est nequidem apprehensive fingentis” (Totius philosophiae, d. 1, qu. 2, VIII [29]). 93  “Nempe Deus, juxta nos, solum cognoscit reflexe nostras de objectis realibus fictiones, dissentiendo ipsis: at in sententia opposita, Deus cognoscendo comprehensive nostras fictiones, deberet etiam cognoscere objectum ipsarum quatenus ab ipsis repraesentatum: quod cum per Opppositos sit objectum distinctum ab omni ente reali, apprehensum per modum entis realis; deberet etiam Deus apprehendere illud simili modo; quod est fingere apprehensive” (ibid.). 94  “Infertur tandem, Ens rationis, quod per Philosophum (ut dixi) est necessario falsum, simpliciter loquendo fieri per secundam operationem intellectus, quia absolute loquendo falsitas consistit in enuntiatione, secus

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perceives an object otherwise than it is in fact, it does not perceive it other than it can be by the absolute power of God—and thus it does not conceive an object through an essentially false act.95 This is also true of the imagination, which only unites among themselves certain external shapes of distinct things, shapes that might be drawn by a pencil, but does not get to the essences of those things.96 And whether a being of reason can be made by the will is, Morawski says, only a question of name. It is commonly denied, inasmuch as the will, since it bears upon what is foreknown, presupposes a being of reason made by the intellect, when and if it bears upon the impossible.97 And from this it is clear, he tells us, what a being of reason is, and by what power and through what act it is made, and also by what power and act it is known.98

IX At this point, thanks to Morawski, we can play the two positions off against each other in a series of arguments and counter-arguments. Thanks to Morawski, that is, inasmuch as he has first summarized dicente esse objectum, quam sit a parte rei; unde solum occasionaliter et dispositive fit ens rationis per primam apprehensionem” (ibid., IX [30]). 95  “Multo vero minus fit per sensum, quia hic licet secus aliquando percipiat objectum, quam sit de facto, non tamen quam possit esse de potentia absoluta, et sic non concipit objectum per actum essentialiter falsum: …” (ibid.). 96  “… quod verum est etiam de Imaginatione, quae solum conjungit inter se quasdam figuras externas rerum distinctarum, etiam penicillo exprimibiles, nec pertingit ad essentias rerum” (ibid.). This view which departs from Suárez (cf. DM 54.2.18 [vol. 26, 1023-24]) is similar to that of most seventeenth-century Jesuits; cf. e.g.: A. Ruvio, S.J., Logica mexicana, Tract. de nat. entis rationis, dub. 4 (74-5); P. Hurtado de Mendoza, S.J., Disput. metaphys. d. 19, s. 5, n. 84 (955); and G. De Rhodes, S.J., Philosophia peripatetica (Lugduni: Sumpt. Huguetan et Barbier, 1671), II, d. 2, q. 1, s. 2, n. 2 (19). 97  “An vero Ens rationis fiat per voluntatem? quaestio est de nomine. Communiter negatur, quia voluntas cum feratur in praecognitum, supponit Ens rationis factum ab intellectu, si quando fertur in impossibile” (Totius philosophiae, d. 1, q. 2, IX [30]). 98  “Atque ex his patet quid sit Ens rationis, a qua potentia, et per qualem actum fiat, ac etiam per qualem cognoscatur” (ibid.).

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eight arguments of Carleton (cited nominatim), Mauro, Semery and others allied with them, and then, after giving his own position, has returned to answer them. First, says Morawski, they argue that items like a ‘goatstag,’ ‘another God,’ the ‘Divine Word as a creature,’ the ‘Holy Spirit not proceeding from the Son,’ the ‘negation of God,’ the ‘simultaneity of contradictories,’99 an ‘impossible thing,’ etc. are ‘conceived,’ if only for the reason that they must be understood by both parties to any dispute about them.100 But inasmuch as they are self-contradictory they cannot be real outside the mind. Accordingly, a ‘goatstag,’ say, as it is conceived and as it is self-contradictory will be distinct from and supplementary to all real beings.101 From what he has already said, Morawski answers, it is clear that all chimerical terms are second intentional and that what they signify is real beings standing under some essentially false judgment. These real beings as they stand under such a judgment are reflexly affirmed to be real by one party to the dispute and are reflexly denied by the other party, that is to say in the way in which they are expressed by that judgment.102 99  One might note here the language of Averroes and its inclusion on the side of those affirming impossible beings distinct from all those which are possible. 100  Cf. “… quia non potest explicari quodnam Ens reale concipiatur, dum concipiuntur hi termini: Hircocervus, Identitas hirci cum cervo, Alter Deus, Verbum esse creaturam, Spiritus Sanctus non procedens a Filio, Negatio Dei, Simultas contradictoriorum, Impossibile, aliique similes de quibus cum saepe disputetur; oportet eos ex utraque parte a disputantibus praecognosci” (Totius philosophiae, d. 1, qu. 2, n. 1 [14]). For this argument, cf. S. Mauro, Quaestiones, qu. 48, resp. (I, 483-84). 101  “Nec potest dici, Identitatem hirci cum cervo esse realem: nam identitas inter hircum et cervum et non unit sua extrema, ut omnes fatentur; et unit, quia est identitas hirci cum cervo, concepta a nobis ut quid connexum cum ipsis: adeoque est implicatoria, et distincta ab omni ente reali ac supranumeraria” (Totius philosophiae, d. 1, qu. 2, I [14]). 102  “Ergo constat ex dictis omnes terminos chimaericos … esse secundointentionales, et per eos semper significari aliqua Entia realis, ut substantia alicui judicio essentialiter falso, quae proinde entia realia, ut tali judicio substantia, ab altero disputantium per actum reflexum affirmantur, ab altero negantur dari a parte rei, tali modo, quali exprimuntur per illud judicium” (ibid., ad 1 [30-31]).

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A second argument of his adversaries, says Morawski, is that when an Arian says that the Divine Word is a creature, not only does he conceive the Word and a creature. But he also conceives some object which is signified by the “is,” an object which is in fact a chimerical identity. Therefore, he is conceiving some self-contradictory object.103 Were it otherwise, the proposition spoken by the Arian would not differ in its object from that which a Catholic would speak in contradiction to it.104 Morawski’s answer to this second argument is once again that contradictory propositions do not differ with respect to their terminating objects but rather with respect to their way of tending toward those objects.105 Thus, he says, according to Aristotle, for opposite acts (of judgment) there are opposite verifying objects, but not opposite terminating objects.106 In line with this, Morawski says, one need in no way concede that in affirmative propositions an ‘apprehended’ identity of the extremes moves toward and dictates ‘assent.’ For in many cases, even after that identity has been apprehended, what follows is ‘dissent.’ In all events, a fictitious identity, which does not and cannot exist, cannot exercise a motive force (for assent). For such a force, which causes the act, belongs only to a real being, since, as St. Thomas says, what is not is the cause of nothing.107 103  “Quando dicit Arrianus: Verbum est creatura, non solum concipit Verbum et creaturam, sed etiam aliquod objectum significatum per To est, quod objectum est utique identitas chimerica. Concipit ergo aliquid implicatorium ex parte objecti” (ibid., n. 2 [14]). 104  “… alioquin praefata propositio Arriana, non differret objecto ab hac contradictoria Catholica; Verbum non est creatura…” (ibid.). 105  “Dictum jam est et infra dicetur Disp. 2. qu. 2. ad 2. propositiones contradictorias, non differe objecto terminativo, sed modo tendendi” (ibid., ad 2 [32]). 106  “Philosophus etiam solum vult oppositorum actuum esse opposita objecta verificativa, non autem terminativa, …” (ibid.). 107  “Concedi vero nullatenus debet, determinativum et motivum ad assensum in propositionibus affirmativis, esse identitatem extremorum apprehensam; cum post illam apprehensam saepe sequatur dissensus, Certe identitas ficta, quae nec est, nec esse potest, non potest exercere vim motivam, cum haec sit vis causativa actus, soli enti reali conveniens: Quod autem non est nullius est causa, ut ait S. Thomas 3. cont. Gent. c. 10” (ibid.). For St. Thomas, cf. “Quod non est, nullius est causa. Omnem igitur causam oportet esse ens aliquod” (Summa contra gentiles III, c. 10). For

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Third, says Morawski, his adversaries argue that of these two contradictory propositions, (1) “An identity between God and a creature can be conceived,” and (2) “An identity between God and a creature cannot be conceived,” if indeed the first is false then the second is true.108 Necessarily, then, there cannot be in both propositions a real identity between God and a creature. Otherwise the first proposition (which sub-audits the affirmation of such identity) would be true, and the second proposition (which sub-audits the negation of such identity) would be false. Accordingly, their point is—apart from any real identity—a false or chimerical identity can be conceived.109 A similar argument can be formulated as follows. Of both these propositions, (1) “A created God is possible,” and (2) “A created God is not possible,” the subject is necessarily a chimerical God (distinct that is from any real or possible God). Otherwise the first proposition would be true and the second would be false. Therefore, they conclude, a chimerical God can be conceived.110 To this Morawski answers that the subject of both the first two contradictory propositions (“An identity between God and a creature can be conceived” and “An identity between God and a creature cannot be conceived”) is some indeterminate or confused real identity, not indeed as it is in itself, but as falsely applied in an intentional way to the true God and a real creature. And of an identity of this kind it is sixteenth and seventeenth-century Jesuits on the distinction here between apprehension and assent, cf. Leo W. Keeler, S.J., The Problem of Error from Plato to Kant (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1934), 121-40. 108  Cf. “Ex his contradictoriis propositionibus: Identitas inter Deum et creaturam potest concipi: Identitas inter Deum et creaturam non potest concipi; siquidem prior affirmativa dicitur esse falsa; jam secunda in negativa erit vera, juxta canones Logicos” (Totius philosophiae, d. 1, qu. 2, n. 3 [15]). 109  Cf. “Oportet ergo ut [in] utraque propositione non veniat ex parte subjecti Identitas realis: alioquin e contra, prior affirmativa erit vera, (verum enim est, quod Identitas realis possit concipi,) posterior autem negativa erit falsa, (falsum enim est quod Identitas realis non possit concipi)” (Totius philosophiae, d. 1, qu. 2, n. 3 [15]). 110  “Ex his propositionibus: Deus creatus est possibilis: Deus creatus non est possibilis; ut affirmativa sit fal[sa] … [et] negativa sit vera, oportet ut in utraque pro subjecto veniat Deus chimaericus, alioquin vera erit affirmativa, et falsa negativa…. Potest igitur concipi Deus chimaericus” (ibid. [15-16]).

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falsely affirmed, and truly denied, that it is knowable as a term of first intention, since it is rather known only reflexly as a term of second intention, for it is nothing else than a real being known in an improper way.111 Similarly, we must say of those other propositions (“A created God is possible” and “A created God is not possible”) that they proceed reflexly about a real God and a real creature, as intentionally joined together by some essentially false judgment, and so in their regard only the affirmative proposition is false.112 Morawski reports a fourth argument of his opponents thus: whoever denies something must know what he is denying. Therefore, he who denies that an impossible object is known must by that very fact know that object. But that falsifies his proposition. This argument, says Morawski, is thought by certain more recent authors to be a kind of “Achilles in support of chimerae.”113 In answer, Morawski says, this Achilles of his adversaries is slain with a simple distinction. If they mean that he who denies something knows that thing which he denies either ‘directly’ or ‘reflexly,’ he concedes their point. But if their argument means that someone who denies something always knows that thing ‘directly,’ Morawski 111  “Dicendum ex propositionibus illis contradictoriis, utriusque subjectum esse aliquam indeterminate seu confuse identitatem realem, non quidem secundum se, sed ut falso applicatam intentionaliter Deo vero et creaturae reali, atque de hujusmodi identitate falso affirmari, vere autem negari, quod sit cognoscibilis, scilicet tanquam Terminus primae intentionis, cum potius solum cognoscatur reflexe, ut Terminus secundae intentionis; siquidem nihil aliud est; quam ens reale indebito modo cognitum” (ibid., ad 3 [33]). Compare and contrast the last thought here with Suárez (DM 54.3.4 [vol. 26, 1027]) saying that a being of reason is known in an improper but not false way. 112  “Similiter de aliis illis propositionibus dicendum, eas reflexe procedere de Deo et creatura realibus, ut conjunctis intentionaliter per aliquod judicium essentialiter falsum, ideoque ex illis solam affirmativam propositionem esse falsam; …” (Totius philosophiae, d. 1, qu. 2, ad 3 [33]). 113  “Qui negat aliquid, debet cognoscere id quod negat. Ergo pariter negans cognosci ex parte objecti impossibile seu Ens rationis, debet illud eo ipso cognoscere ex parte objecti, et si falsificat suam propositionem. Et hoc argumentum a quibusdam RR. reputatur esse Achilles pro chimaeris” (ibid., n. 4 [16]). I have not yet found anyone claiming this argument to be an “Achilles.” However, the argument itself is common enough (cf. e.g. Carleton, Philosophia universa, Logica, d. 13, s. 5, n. 1 [69]) and goes back at least to Suárez (cf. DM 54.1.7 [vol. 26, 1017]).

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disagrees.114 For when someone denies that an (impossible) being of reason can be known on the side of the object, that person is ‘reflecting’ upon his opponents’ proposition, which intentionally separates possibility and reality from a knowable object. And he is ‘reflexly’ denying that the knowable and the possible are so separated, for the reason that every knowable (understand directly knowable) thing is possible and real.115 The fifth argument of Morawski’s adversaries is that the contradictory of any term can be conceived as distinct from it. Hence, the contradictory of real being as such may be conceived as distinct from it. Therefore, something distinct from real being as such, or something distinct from all real being can be conceived. But because the contradictory of real being as such is real non-being removing all real beings, even God Himself, which is impossible, it follows that there can be conceived something impossible which is distinct from all real being.116 In answer to this fifth argument, Morawski says that since contradictory terms must relate to the same object, a term which is contradictorily opposite to another term cannot be conceived as distinct from it on the side of the object but only on the side of the acts which that object terminates. This will be insofar as the same terminating object 114  Cf. “Quidquid dixeris, tuum Achillem sternis; sterno et ego hac unica distinctione. Qui aliquid negat, illud cognoscit vel directe vel reflexe, concedo quod dicitur: cognoscit semper directe, nego quod dicitur” (Totius philosophiae, d. 1, qu. 2, ad 4 [34]). 115  “Itaque dum quis negat posse ex parte objecti cognosci Ens rationis, reflectit se supra propositionem Adversariorum, separantem intentionaliter ab objecto cognoscibili possibilitatem et realitatem, negatque reflexe, cognoscibile et possibile tali modo se habere, quali modo repraesentantur per propositionem Adversariorum, quae dividit intentionaliter istos terminos, in re indivisos; cum omne cognoscibile sit possibile et reale, ut probatum est” (ibid.). 116  Cf. “Cujuscumque termini potest concipi contradictorium, tanquam distinctum ab ipso. Ergo etiam contradictorium entis realis ut sic, debet concipi tanquam distinctum ab ipso. Ergo ulterius aliquid distinctum ab ente reali ut sic, seu quod idem est, aliquid distinctum ab omni ente reali, potest concipi, nempe contradictorium entis realis ut sic. Et quia hoc contradictorium entis realis ut sic, est non ens reale, destruens omnia entia realia, etiam ipsum ens necessarium, nempe Deum, quod non ens est impossibile, ut patet; sequitur quod aliquod impossibile possit concipi ut distinctum ab omni ente reali” (ibid. n. 5 [15]).

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is apprehended relative to contradictory affirmative and negative judgments.117 Accordingly, a term which is contradictorily opposed to real being as such, that is: non-real being as such, or the non-being of all real beings, does not have to be known as something on the side of the terminating object distinct from real being as such, but only as something distinct on the side of the act which it connotes. That will be insofar as non-real being as such is all real being as it connotes a negative judgment which is disposed to all real being by way of aversion. At the same time, however, real being precisely as such connotes an opposite (affirmative) judgment.118 That is to say, even in simple apprehension, where the object of two opposite concepts is the same,119 that object is conceived relative to opposite judgments. Therefore, while the non-being of all real beings, even of God, contradictorily opposite to real being as such, is a chimera, this chimera need not be known as some object distinct from all real being.120 Added to this, Morawski says, it should be noted that a chimera contradictorily opposed to real being as such, is not ‘being and non-being’ (that is, something self-contradictorily ‘impossible’). For when one contradictory is removed the other is posited, but when all real beings are removed there would not be posited being and 117  Cf. “Quoniam termini contradictorii debent procedere de eodem objecto, juxta illud D. Thomae 1. p., q. 17, a. 1. Opposita sunt circa idem: ideo terminus alteri contradictorie oppositus, non potest cognosci ut distinctus ab ipso ex parte objecti terminativi ... sed tantum ex parte actus; quatenus scilicet in terminis contradictoriis apprehenditur idem objectum terminativum, relate ad judicia opposita, nempe ad affirmativum et negativum, tanquam ad sua connotata” (ibid., ad 5 [35]). 118  “Quapropter terminus contradictorie oppositus Enti reali ut sic, qui est Non ens reale ut sic, seu non esse omnium entium realium, non debet cognosci ut quid distinctum ex parte objecti terminativi … ab Ente reali ut sic, sed solum tanquam aliquid distinctum ex parte actus, quem connotat; quatenus scilicet Non ens reale ut sic, est omne ens reale, ut connotat judicium negativum, quod tendat in omne Ens reale per modum fugae; oppositum autem judicium connotat Ens reale ut sic; …” (ibid.). 119  “… tametsi utriusque conceptus oppositi idem sit objectum” (ibid.). 120  Cf. “Nempe hi termini, etiam in prima apprehensione, concipiuntur relate ad opposita judicia tanquam ad sua connotata. Quia vero idem Non esse omnium entium realium etiam Dei, contradictorie opppositum Enti reali ut sic, est chimaera, ideo neque haec chimaera debet cognosci ut quid distinctum ab omni Ente reali” (ibid. [35-36]).

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non-being. But rather there would be posited only the non-being of all beings. Therefore, a chimera contradictorily opposed to real being as such is precisely this non-being (rather than some impossible being or object).121 A sixth argument his opponents make, says Morawski, is to the effect that a man can erroneously wish to be at once a man and an angel, or desire simultaneously to love and to hate something. And in such cases he would be wishing what is self-contradictory. But because nothing is willed unless it is first known, he would first know something which is self-contradictory.122 Briefly in reply to this sixth objection Morawski says that when someone seeing pyrite desires it as gold, he in fact desires the pyrite which he sees and of which he for the moment falsely predicates that it is gold. In a similar way, when someone erroneously desires to be an angel, he is desirous of a real angelic nature, about which he falsely judges that it can be the nature of a man.123 His opponents’ seventh argument he reports as follows. If a being of reason is nothing other than real being or beings known in a certain way, it would follow that ‘another God,’ would be given in reality. For that which is such that all of its parts are real, is itself real since a whole is nothing beyond its parts. But on this supposition, ‘another God,’ would entail as its constitutive parts real created otherness, true

121  “Ex hac autem occasione notandum est, quod chimaera contradictorie opposita Enti reali ut sic, non sit Esse et Non esse; quia remoto uno contradictorio ponitur aliud, remotis autem omnibus entibus realibus, quae dicit Ens reale ut sic, non poneretur esse, et non esse, sed tantum poneretur non esse omnium entium: Ergo hoc praecise Non esse est chimaera contradictorie opposita Enti reali ut sic” (ibid. [36]). 122  “Potest homo ex errore velle esse Angelus, vel desiderare simultatem amoris cum odio: sed tunc vellet identitatem sui cum Angelo, vel simultatem amoris cum odio, quod implicat: Ergo praecognosceret id quod implicat: quia nihil volitum, quin praecognitum” (ibid. n. 6 [16]). 123  Cf. “Sicut cum quis videns aurichalcum, amat illud ut aurum, amat revera aurichalcum, quod videt, et de quo interim falso praedicat, quod sit aurum: ita cum quis per errorem appetit esse Angelus, appetit naturam Angelicam realem, de qua falso judicat, quod possit esse natura propria hominis. Idem dic de similibus exemplis” (ibid., ad 6 [36]).

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Divinity and a false cognition which would join them—all of which are given in reality.124 In answer to this seventh argument, Morawski says that a being of reason, taken “materially and objectively in itself,” is given either actually or potentially outside the intellect. However, taken “formally, or as denominated by an essentially false cognition,” it cannot be given precisely as it is proposed through that cognition. Therefore, taken in this way it is extrinsically denominated non-real, inasmuch as non-real equates with fictitious and false, although it can be called real insofar as the real prescinds from any intentional being, even that which is unverifiable. But to say this much of another God is no reason for anyone to worship Him.125 An eighth and final argument of his opponents, says Morawski, is that unless we could conceive something entirely distinct from possible things, it would follow that the commonly received definition of a being of reason, namely, that which has being only objectively in the intellect,126 would be false. The reason would be that both a goat and a stag have being not just in the intellect, but also in extra-mental reality, either in themselves or in the active power of some cause.127 124  “Si ens rationis nihil aliud esset quam ens reale, vel entia realia in debito modo cognita; sequeretur chimaeram, v.g. Alterum Deum, dari a parte rei: illud enim datur a parte rei, cujus omnes partes dantur a parte rei; cum totum nihil sit praeter suas partes: atqui admissa suppositione, Alter Deus, diceret tanquam partes sui constitutivas, Alteritatem realem creatam Divinitatem, veram, et cognitionem falsam conjungentem haec extrema; quae omnia dantur a parte rei: Ergo daretur Alter Deus a parte rei” (ibid., n. 7 [17]). 125  “Ens rationis materialiter et objective sumptum, secundum se, datur actu vel potentia extra intellectum a parte rei, caeterum formaliter sumptum, seu ut denominatum a cognitione essentialiter falsa, dari non potest, tali scilicet modo; quali enuntiatur per illam cognitionem, et ideo sic sumptum denominatur extrinsece non reale, quatenus reale opponitur ficto et falso, licet possit dici reale quatenus reale abstrahit ab esse intentionali qualicunque, etiam inverificabili. Hoc autem dicere etiam de altero Deo, non est cur sibi quisquam religioni ducat” (ibid., ad 7 [36-37]). 126  For this, cf. Suárez, DM 54.1.6, as cited in note 29 above. 127  “Rursus sequeretur, malam esse illam receptam communiter definitionem Entis rationis, quod sit, Id quod habet esse tantum objective in intellectu. Cujus sequelae ratio est: quia tam Hircus, quam Cervus, non tantum dantur objective in nostro intellectu, sed dantur etiam a parte rei, vel in se,

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To this final argument Morawski’s reply is brief. The common definition of a being of reason is not to be taken as if a being of reason is an object which in itself could not be given outside the intellect. Rather it should be taken to mean that a being of reason is an object which in that precise way in which it is expressed in a fictionalizing intellect cannot be given outside, but is given only within that fictionalizing intellect.128

X With this essay I have just scratched the surface of what remains a vast, deep, and untapped mine for historians of philosophy. While the title of my paper speaks of “seventeenth-century debate,” in that century I have restricted myself to Jesuits in the wake of Suárez and mainly to Morawski versus Carleton. This was for two reasons. First, I know Suárez and his Jesuit successors better than I know others in the seventeenth century. And, second, the text of Morawski is exact, it covers the main issues, and is not broadly available. For that reason I have followed it closely and have reproduced it in my notes. In truth, however, there is more in both Morawski and Carleton and much more in other Jesuit authors that I could have treated. In this connection, a thought about relations of reason with which Suárez has closed his fifty-fourth Disputation seems very applicable to impossible objects. “They can be multiplied almost to infinity by the fictions or the reflections of the intellect.”129 But in my own closing, let me pick up on the multiplication of impossible items and then two other things which in passing suggest a small part of what is in the mine to which I just referred. On the multiplication of impossibles, I direct you to Giovani Battista vel in potentia activa suae causae; …” (Totius philosophiae, d. 1, qu. 2, n. 8 [17]). 128  “Definitio communis Entis rationis, non ita est accipienda, quasi Ens rationis sit illud objectum, quod secundum se non possit dari extra intellectum, ut probatum est hactenus: sed ita, ut Ens rationis sit illud objectum quod tali modo, quali exprimitur in intellectu fingente, nequeat dari extra intellectum, sed tantum detur in intellectu fingente” (ibid., ad 8 [37]). 129  Cf. “… in infinitum fere multiplicari possunt per fictiones vel reflexiones intellectus” (DM 54.6.11 [vol. 26, 1041]).

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Tolemei, S.J. (1653-1725),130 who like Morawski refused to accept any impossible objects as such distinct from real or possible ones. Nevertheless, he thinks, there are many more ‘impossible terms’ than ‘possible terms.’ For the number of impossibles is a function of the possible combinations of possibles. Thus from two possible terms, say “man” and “horse,” there can result only one impossible, “manhorse.” From three possible terms, say “man,” “horse,” and “lion,” there can result four impossibles, “man-horse,” “man-lion,” “lion-horse,” and “man-lion-horse.” Similarly, from four terms there can result eleven impossibles, from five terms twenty-six impossibles, and so on “according to the rule of combinations.” Whence Tolemei declares: incomparably more impossibles than possibles can be at least spoken of, if not known.131 The second suggestion of the riches to be mined from this topic comes from Semery, whom I have identified as a proponent of impossible objects. Two centuries before Lewis Carroll and his Snark, Semery has briefly discussed the logic which would be involved in “hunting a goatstag.” His question is whether one can have practical knowledge of an impossible object.132 Despite his own espousal of such objects, Semery thinks not. For practical knowledge leads to the effecting of its object, which is obviously not going to happen in the 130  Cf. de Backer-Sommervogel, Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus, vol. 8, cols. 86-89. 131  Cf. “Impossibilia plura sunt, quam possibilia: e.g. per identitatem, quot dantur termini disparati, seu repugnantes tot dantur possibilia, e.g. homo, leo, equus etc. sed ex istis possunt fieri plures collectiones, adeoque etiam identitates, quam sint ipsae unitates seu termini, excepto solum binario. Nam ex duobus terminis possibilibus fit tantum unum impossibile v.g. homo equus: ex tribus vero quatuor impossibilia: e.g. ex homine, equo, leone fiunt ista: homo-equus, homo-leo, leo-equus, homo-equus-leo. Pariter ex quatuor terminis fiunt undecim impossibilia, ex quinque viginti-sex, et ita successive juxta regulam combinationum. Unde incomparabiliter plura impossibilia saltem nominari possunt, si non cognosci, quam possibilia” ( Joannes Baptista Ptolemaeus, S.J., Philosophia mentis, et sensuum secundum utramque Aristotelis Methodum Pertractata. metaphysice et empirice [Romae: Impens. Sangermani Corvi, 1702], Dissertatio XLII [De impossibili et ente rationis], Sect. I, n. IV [211]). 132  “… an dari possit cognitio practica de objecto impossibili” (Triennium phil., Annus primus, Logica, Disp. 1, qu. 5 [An Logica sit speculativa an practica], art. ult. [221]).

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case of an impossible object.133 But then there is a further question. If someone thinks the capture of a goatstag is possible, can he not logically take steps to that end? Can he not logically set up nets, array dogs in a circle, and do other things leading to that impossible object which is the capture of a goatstag?134 The response of Semery is to deny that such a man has a practical cognition leading to the impossible capture of a goatstag. Instead, what that man has is practical cognition leading to the placing of the nets, to the circling of the dogs, and other possible things of this nature. And just as these things are not means toward an impossible end so also the practical knowledge which is in the hunter is not a means leading to the capture of a goatstag.135 A third and final thing whose glint may catch the eye of an historical prospector comes from another proponent of impossible objects— Semery’s probable teacher, Sylvester Mauro. Mauro affirms that God knows impossible objects, for example, ‘another God.’ In fact, He has revealed “I am God and there is not another God besides Me.” But He could not have revealed this, unless He somehow knew another God.136 Mauro also thinks that God knows as many impossible objects as there can be incompossible predicates combined by our intellects. And because there can be many, and even many without end, 133  Cf. “Nam: nulla cognitio rei impossibilis est directiva ad effectionem objecti cogniti: Omnis cognitio practica est directiva ad effectionem objecti cogniti: ergo nulla cognitio practica est objecti impossibilis” (ibid.). 134  Cf. “Dices: putet aliquis capi posse Hircocervum, hoc posito ibit venatum; feret secum retia, ducet canes, et adhibebit media ad capiendum Hircocervum; ergo habebit cognitionem dirigentem ad capturam hircocervi: captura Hircocervi est aliquid impossibile: ergo habebit cognitionem dirigentem ad impossibile” (ibid. [222]). 135  Cf. “Resp. admissa hypothesi, negando, quod hic homo habeat cognitionem dirigentem ad capturam Hircocervi. Cognitio, quam habet, dirigit ad dispositionem retium, circumdictionem canum, et ad alia huiusmodi, quae sunt possibilia. Quemadmodum autem haec non sunt media ad capiendum Hircocervum, quia non datur medium ad impossibile, ita etiam cognitio, quae est in venatore, nec ita est medium ad capiendum Hircocervum” (ibid.). 136  “Ad sextum concedo quod Deus cognoscit impossibile ex. gr. alterum Deum. De facto enim revelavit, ego sum Deus, et non est alius Deus praeter me; sed non potuisset revelare, quod non datur alter Deus nisi cognosceret alterum Deum cognitione negativa ipsius; ergo etc.” (Quaestiones philosophicae, q. 48, ad 6 [I, 489]).

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therefore God knows many and even infinite impossibles.137 Again, Mauro thinks that God sees what everyone would do, even freely, if per impossibile he were identified with this or that other being—for example, what I would do if I were the angel Michael. For God sees that I would do what the angel Michael would do; and, supposing that I were the angel Michael, He sees that the angel Michael would do what I would do. And because we would often do opposite things He sees that, on this impossible supposition, in many instances we would do opposite things simultaneously—and for that very reason such a supposition cannot be posited in actual fact (even though we and God may think of it).138 Other things connected with impossible objects both in the seventeenth century and up to present time are myriad. Coming to mind are various overlapping angles on intentionality, meaning and reference, signs and their significates, truth and falsity, enunciation and assertion, identity and difference, negative facts, logical and literary fictions, the character and taxonomy of pure objects, as well as the ultimate limits of the real, the knowable, and the expressible. Such items have often been investigated in different philosophical and historical contexts. But, with few exceptions, their presence among lesser known seventeenth-century Scholastic philosophers has been overlooked. My hope is that this essay will work toward changing that.

137  “Concedo etiam, quod Deus tot impossibilia cognoscit, quot ab intellectu fieri possunt combinationes praedicatorum incompossibilium; et quia possunt fieri tales combinationes plures, et plures sine termino, ideo cognoscit impossibilia plura, et plura sine termino” (ibid.). 138  “Concedo etiam, quod videat quid unumquodque esset facturum, etiam libere, si per impossibile identificaretur cum hoc, vel illo ente, ex. gr. quid ego essem facturus, si essem Angelus Michael; videt enim quod essem facturus illud ipsum, quod est facturus Angelus Michael; et videt quod Angelus Michael esset facturus ex illa suppositione, quod ego sum facturus; et quia saepe essemus facturi contraria, videt quod in illa suppositione impossibili in multis casibus essemus facturi contraria simul, et propter hoc ipsum talis suppositio poni non potest” (ibid. [489]).

about the Contributors Stephen Brown (Ph.D., 1964, Université de Louvain) is Professor of Theology at Boston College. He previously taught at Siena College, St. Bonaventure University, the University of the South and has been at Boston College since 1979. He has been a Visiting Professor at SUNY-Buffalo, Yale University, and the Sorbonne. Presently, he is the director of the Institute of Medieval Philosophy and Theology. His primary research interests are in medieval philosophy and theology, especially 13th and 14th centuries, which has resulted in, among other things, an edition of William of Ockham’s opera. Rolf Darge (Ph.D., 1995, Habilitation, 2002, in Philosophy, University of Cologne) is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Salzburg. He specializes in the history of medieval and early modern philosophy; his recent publications include Der Aristotelismus an den europäischen Universitäten der frühen Neuzeit (2007) and “Suárez’ Disputationes metaphysicae (1597) und die mittelalterlichen Transzendentalienlehren” (2010). Thomas Dewender (Ph.D., 1999, University of Bochum) is Assistant in the Philosophy Department, University of Bonn, where he is teaching and doing research mainly on ancient and medieval philosophy. His current work focuses on 14th-century epistemology and natural philosophy. He is co-editor of Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century (2009). Marco Forlivesi (Faenza, Italy, 1967) is Tenured Researcher at Chieti University (Università degli Studi ‘Gabriele d’Annunzio’ di Chieti e Pescara). His studies span the period from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century, focusing on the History of University Philosophy, both in the context of public ‘studia’ and in the context of the ‘studia’ of religious orders. He has published two major books and many articles in Italian, English, and French. He is also the editor of

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five collective volumes and of two web sites. He is a member of several scholarly societies and research teams. Web page: http://unich.academia.edu/MarcoForlivesi. Jennifer-Hart Weed (Ph.D., Saint Louis University) is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the  University of New Brunswick.  Her teaching and research   specializations include medieval philosophy, the history of  philosophy, and metaphysics.  She also teaches in the areas of  contemporary metaphysics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of religion. Her publications focus primarily on the work of Aquinas and  Moses Maimonides. She delivered the 2008 Aquinas Lecture at Emory University and is a member of Alpha Sigma Nu. Daniel Heider (born 1973) is Assistant Professor at the University of South Bohemia (České Budějovice) and the research worker at the Academy of the Sciences of the Czech Republic (Prague). He is the author of two books on the philosophy and theology of Francisco Suárez and of more than thirty papers devoted especially to the philosophy of early modern Scholasticism (Suárez, Poinsot, Bartholomew Mastri/Bonaventure Belluto, Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza, Joannes Senftleben, etc.). Representative publications include: “Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza´s (Mis)interpretation of Aquinas,” in ed., Marco Sgarbi, Francisco Suárez and his legacy. The impact of Suárezian metaphysics and epistemology on modern philosophy (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 2010) 105-140; “Bartholomew Mastrius (1602-1673) and John Punch (1599 or 1603-1661 on the Common Nature and Universal Unity,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 2010, Philosophy and Language, Rollen Edward Houser (ed.) 84 (2011): 145-166. Ludger Honnefelder (Dr. phil., 1971, Universität Bonn; Habilitation, 1981, Universität Bonn) is an Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bonn in Germany. From 1972-1982 he was a professor in the Theological Faculty of Trier, then from 1982-1988 he was a professor at the Free University of Berlin. Since 1988 has was a professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Bonn where he retired in 2001. He also holds memberships in a variety of organizations, including the North Rhine-Westphalia Academy of Sciences, has been a member of the Deutschen Delegation im Lenkungsausschuss

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für Bioethik des Europarates (CDBI), was the director of both the Institut für Wissenschaft und Ethik, Bonn, 1993, and the Deutschen Referenzzentrums für Ethik in den Biowissenschaften, 1988. Jack Marler (Ph.D., 1988 , University of Toronto) is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Saint Louis University. His primary research interests are in late ancient and early medieval philosophy, ancient philosophy, medieval philosophy, modern logic, neoplatonism, medieval spirituality, and western and Byzantine manuscripts. Representative publications include: “The Dialectical Use of Authority in the Periphyseon” in ed., Bernard McGinn, Eriugena: East and West (Notre Dame University Press, 1994): 95-113; The Mirror of Simple Souls by Margaret Porette, trans., ed., and archivally treated in collaboration with Edmund Colledge and Judith Grant (Notre Dame University Press, 1999). Daniel Novotný (Ph.D., 2008, SUNY-Buffalo) is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Faculty of Theology, University of South Bohemia in Èes ké Budìjovice, Czech Republic. His interests include history of philosophy, metaphysics, philosophical anthropology, comparative philosophy, and teaching philosophy. His current research focuses on the history of the controversies about entia rationis in post-mediaeval Scholasticism. He is the Editor- in-Chief of Studia Neoaristotelica, A Journal of Analytical Scholasticism. Michael Renemann (Ph.D., 2008, Ruhr-Universität, Bochum) lives and works in Berlin, Germany. His publications include Gedanken als Wirkursachen. Francisco Suárez zur geistigen Hervorbringung (Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie 49), Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2010, and “The Mind’s Focus as an Efficient Cause. Francisco Suárez’s Re-interpretation of the Traditional Understanding of the Idea,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2010), 693– 710. Together with the dear laudatus, as well as Salvador Castellote (Valencia, Spain), and Jean-Paul Coujou (Toulouse, France), he digitized Suárez’s Disputationes Metaphysicae for the internet (2004/05) (http://homepage.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/Michael.Renemann/suarez). Victor Salas (Ph.D., 2008, Saint Louis University) is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Sacred Heart Major Seminary, where he

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conducts research on Medieval and Early Modern philosophy, as well as Postmodern Philosophies of Religion. He completed his dissertation on Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine of analogy under the supervision of John P. Doyle before the latter’s full retirement. Salas specializes in medieval and late Scholastic metaphysics and his publications have appeared in American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, International Philosophical Quarterly, Mediaeval Studies, The Modern Schoolman, The Thomist, et al. Roland Teske, S.J. (Ph.D., 1970, University of Toronto) is currently the Donald J. Schuenke Professor of Philosophy Emeritus from Marquette University in Milwaukee. He has published extensively on Saint Augustine, William of Auvergne, and Henry of Ghent. He edited the Aquinas Lecture from 1976 to 2005 and has edited Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation since 1988. He received the Aquinas Medal from the American Catholic Philosophical Association in 2009.

index of names A Aertsen 26, 65–67, 69, 73, 88–90, 276 Agathon 40 Albert of Saxony 5, 9, 95, 97–98, 113–115 Albertus Magnus 7, 232–236, 243, 274, 297 Alejandro, José 186, 206 Alexander of Aphrodisias 32, 128, 180, 333, 335, 339–340 Alexander of Hales 33 Al-Farabi 32 Ammonius 333 Anaxagoras 32 Antisthenes 333 Aquinas, Thomas 5, 9–10, 14, 16– 17, 23–24, 27, 33–34, 73, 83, 85, 88–91, 93, 130–131, 133, 141, 157–158, 160, 164–176, 178–179, 191, 203, 227, 229–233, 236– 240, 243–244, 261–262, 264–265, 269, 273–280, 285–287, 293, 297–299, 314, 335–336, 370, 372 Araújo, Francisco de 5, 9, 241–260, 262–268 Aristotle 13, 17–18, 23, 27, 31–35, 39–40, 61, 76, 78, 88–89, 95–96, 99–100, 102, 104, 114, 118, 127–128, 133, 160, 171, 177, 186, 197, 200, 213–214, 216–217, 219– 221, 226–227, 230–232, 236–240, 267, 276–277, 287, 328–336, 341–342, 352, 354, 357 Arriaga, Rodrigo de 341, 354

Ashworth, E.J. 97, 119 Augustine 23–24, 102, 215, 252, 280, 309–313, 315–316, 318, 320–328, 372 Averroes 17, 34, 180, 287, 314, 316, 333–337, 339, 341, 356 Avicenna 11, 13–14, 70, 169, 180, 182, 217, 219–221, 225, 286–289, 292–296, 298, 300, 303, 314–316, 334

B Berkeley, George 21 Beuchot, Mauricio 243 Biard, Joel 97, 105, 113–114, 116–118, 133, 136 Boethius 16, 34, 100, 252, 331 Bonaventure 24, 33, 76, 79, 89, 101, 125, 132, 189, 215, 310, 314, 369 Boole,George 236–237 Borden, Sarah 285–286, 295, 302 Brachtendorf, Johannes 312 Brown, Stephen 5, 14, 26–27, 31, 97, 101, 132, 297, 369 Buridan, John 5, 9, 95, 97–115, 117–118, 130, 133–139, 154, 213, 227 Burley, Walter 97, 113

C Cajetan 179, 182, 184, 194, 231, 259, 261–262, 264 Callaghan, John 122 Candia, Peter of 5, 9, 31–39, 61 Capreolus 179, 243, 264 Carleton, Thomas Compton 339– 342, 354, 356, 359, 364

374 Hircocervi & Other Metaphysical Wonders Clauberg, Johannes 20–21 Clement of Rome 232, 235–236 Colgan, John 121 Collins, James 288 Courtine, Jean-François 20, 67, 70, 72, 75, 79, 208 Cronin, Timothy 208 Cross, Richard 296, 306

D Darge, Rolf 5, 22, 65, 67–69, 80, 82, 187, 369 Davies, Brian 232–233, 236 Descartes, René 28, 188, 197, 207–209, 243, 269–270 Dewender, Thomas 5, 9, 14, 27, 95–96, 297, 369 Doig, James 208–209 Dominic of Flandria 243 Doyle, John P. 3, 6, 9–24, 66, 96, 195, 207–208, 213, 242, 259, 261, 288, 329, 337, 372 Dumont, Stephen 313–314, 318, 321, 327–328 Durand of Saint-Pourçain 122–123, 246 Durandus of Saint-Pourçain 69, 149, 180, 264

E

G Giacon, Carlo 189 Giles of Rome 243 Gilson, Étienne 10–13, 21, 69–70, 215–216, 252, 324 Godfrey of Fontaines 14, 298–299, 302 Gracia, Jorge E. 19, 67, 80, 178, 208–209 Grosseteste, Robert 33, 35

H Heidegger, Martin 13, 15–16, 24 Henry of Ghent 6, 10, 14, 73, 97, 217, 238, 264, 285–289, 292–293, 295–304, 306– 307, 309–310, 313–322, 324–328, 372 Heytesbury, William 97, 113, 119 Hickey, Anthony 121 Hoeres, Walter 70, 204–206 Hoffman, Tobias 14, 297, 299 Honnefelder, Ludger 5, 9, 66–67, 70–71, 77, 132, 213–228 Hurtado de Mendoza, Pedro 132, 341, 343, 353, 355

I Iavellus, Chrisostomus 243

Ebbesen, Sten 96–97, 113, 118, 133 Elorduy, Eleuterio 208 Empedocles 32 Epistemology 129, 155, 177, 179, 182, 186, 188, 270

J

F

Kant, Immanuel 10, 12, 65–67, 70, 208, 213, 223, 226–228, 269–273, 281, 283, 358 Kany, Roland 312 Keeler, Leo 358 Kenny, Anthony 229–230, 232– 233, 236

Feldman, Seymour 160–161 Fernández-Rodríguez, José Luis 243 Fleming, Patrick 121 Fonseca, Pedro da 29, 244, 264

Jadacki, Jacek Juliusz 340

K

 Index of Names Knebel, Sven 332 Knuuttila, Simo 96, 133, 227 Kobusch, Theo 14, 27, 133, 208–209, 297

L Lombard, Peter 31, 34, 166 Lossada, Luis de 332 Lynch, Richard 340, 343, 354

M Mahieu, León 178, 189 Maimonides, Moses 5, 9, 32, 34, 157–176, 370 Manser, Gallus M. 178, 189 Maréchal, Joseph 189 Marsilius of Ingham 9 Marsilius of Inghen 5, 95, 97, 113, 117–118, 133, 139 Mas, Diego 132 Maskulak, Marian 290 Mastri, Bartolomeo 27, 122, 140, 258–259 Mathias Aquarius 243 Maurer, Armand 10, 12, 16, 133, 229, 240 Mauro, Sylvester 339, 344–346, 356, 366–367 Mayronis, Francisco de 246 Meinong, Alexius 95 Millan-Puelles, Antonio 243 Molina, Thomas Luis de 264 Morawski, Joannes 340, 342–350, 352–365

N Nominalism 155

O O’Connell, Robert 324 Olivi, John Peter 24, 204–205

375 Ontology 17, 19, 21, 72, 92, 140, 177–179, 188, 204, 210, 219–220, 222, 226 Oviedo, Francisco 341, 354 Owens, Joseph 10, 13, 287

P Parmenides 291 Paulus, Jean 349 Peccorini, Francisco 178, 189 Perler, Domink 205 Phelan, Gerald B. 10, 16 Philip the Chancellor 33, 73 Pickavé, Martin 27, 69, 310, 314, 317–318, 321 Plato 32, 193, 234–235, 240, 278, 291, 324, 328, 330, 358 Plotinus 312, 324 Poinsot, John (of St. Thomas) 5, 21, 23, 25, 177–199, 201–203, 205–206, 209–210, 243–244 Porphyry 78 Prosper of Aquitaine 322–323 Pseudo-Dionysius 166 Ptolemaeus, Joannes Baptista 365 Punch, John 5, 121–122, 125–127, 132–133, 141–154, 245 Putallaz, François Xavier 279–280

R Rhodes, George de 355 Richard Rufus of Cornwall 220 Rinuccini, Giovanni Battista 122 Rubio, Antonio 341, 353

S Scotus, John Duns 5–6, 9–11, 14, 20, 24, 70–74, 76–80, 84–86, 89, 92–93, 122–123, 125–126, 130–132, 153, 179, 190, 210, 213–225,

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227–228, 252, 259–260, 264, 285–289, 292–299, 302–307, 313–314, 327–328, 335–336 Semery, Andreas 20, 27, 339, 356, 365–366 Signification 97, 100–101, 105, 107–109, 112–114, 118 Smith, Gerard 14, 296 Sommervogel, Carlos 339–340, 365 Soncinas, Paul 243, 258 Soto, Domingo De 29, 132, 243 Stein, Edith 6, 10, 285–293, 295, 298, 300–303, 307 Stoics 331 Studer, Basil 312 Suárez, Francisco 5, 9–19, 21–23, 25–27, 29, 65, 67–76, 79–93, 96, 130, 140–141, 145–146, 177–211, 213, 223, 226, 228, 241–249, 251–252, 254–264, 266– 268, 287, 333, 337–339, 341, 343, 351, 353, 355, 359, 363–364, 369 Supposition 100–101, 106, 108, 116

T Teske, Roland 6, 10, 287, 297, 309–310, 372 Timpler, Clemens 19, 21 Tinology 208 Transcendental Science 226

V Vázquez, Gabriel 195, 341, 353 Villoslada, Riccardo 343 Voltaire 274 Vos, Antonie 303

W Ward, Hugh 121 Wells, Norman 19, 183, 207–208 Wietrowski, Maximilian 20, 339 William of Auvergne 287, 372 William of Ockham 29, 96–98, 100–103, 113–115, 117, 132–133, 180, 213, 225– 226, 246 Wippel, John 14, 298–299, 302 Wolff, Christian 12, 14, 68–70, 213, 223, 226, 228 Wolfson, Harry 160–162

index of terms A Abstraction, 5–6, 10, 82, 86, 145, 147, 149, 177, 186, 188– 189, 193–194, 206–207, 210–211, 221, 276–277, 309, 312–313, 317–322, 324–326, 328 Augustinian 6, 10, 309–311, 313, 317, 321–322, 324, 328 De-Individualizing 207 Formal 77, 79–80, 82, 85–86, 104, 111, 117–118, 152, 181, 184, 189–193, 199–200, 206–210, 215, 220–226, 228, 243, 253–259, 261– 263, 267, 292, 299, 344–345 Three Degrees 147, 321 Agent, 37, 161–163, 170–171, 173, 179–189, 193, 201, 276–277, 351 Analogical 9, 19, 171–172, 174, 244, 246, 249, 267 Equivocal 164, 166, 172–174, 325 Univocal 171, 173, 221–222, 325 Analogy 10, 18, 24, 101, 157, 160, 165–176, 182, 185, 248–249, 263, 266, 272, 319, 328, 372 Appellation 97, 101–104, 111–113

B Being, 6, 9–24, 26, 31, 35, 37–38, 65–93, 95–96, 105–106, 109, 113, 117, 127–131, 135–137, 139–141, 144, 147–148, 150–154, 158,

160, 162, 164–165, 167, 169–170, 172–173, 176, 179, 182–186, 188, 191, 194–197, 200, 202, 204– 205, 207–209, 215–216, 218–233, 235, 239–241, 244, 247–263, 265, 271– 273, 276, 281, 285–293, 295–307, 310, 314–316, 322–341, 343–347, 350–351, 353–355, 357, 359–364, 367 Accidental 137, 148, 158, 163, 174, 198, 238, 289, 295, 329 as True 10, 17, 19, 329–330, 332–336, 338 Categorial 74, 76, 82, 85, 91–92, 222, 247 Divine 9, 13–14, 31, 35, 39, 68, 128, 157–160, 162–170, 172–176, 186, 215–216, 253, 263, 265, 275, 278, 296–302, 304–307, 312, 316–319, 321–322, 326, 356–357 Essential 6, 10, 38, 71, 76–78, 91–92, 150, 158, 172, 179, 183, 190, 192, 206, 214, 219, 230–231, 240, 274, 285– 290, 292–293, 298–303, 307, 310 Finite 35, 67, 131, 151, 180, 183, 224, 227, 253, 285–286, 289–292, 300–301, 307 Impossible 5, 9, 18, 20–21, 27, 76, 95–96, 100, 104–105, 110–111, 144, 158–159, 162, 198, 215, 227, 256, 263,

378 Hircocervi & Other Metaphysical Wonders 271, 312, 317, 329–330, 118, 128, 135, 137, 141, 335–340, 342–343, 345, 147, 150–151, 154, 169– 347, 349–352, 355–356, 170, 175, 177, 181–182, 359–362, 364–367 184, 190, 192, 194–197, Infinite 31, 33, 60, 67, 87, 131, 200, 208, 210, 221–222, 171, 224–225, 227–228, 229–233, 239–240, 244, 253, 301, 367 246–249, 251–256, 258, Intentional 180, 182, 198, 205, 261–262, 266, 268, 290– 287, 291, 298, 344, 347, 349, 295, 299, 301, 303, 306, 325, 351, 353, 356, 358, 363 328, 331–334, 338–341, Necessary 35, 37–38, 79, 81, 100, 343–345, 347–354, 105, 148, 160, 170, 173, 184, 356–363, 365, 367 188, 197, 201, 204–205, Supertranscendental 10, 19–21, 210, 216, 224, 238, 272, 277, 23, 25–26, 66, 340 291, 296, 305–306, 316, C 318, 322, 340 Objective 13, 18–19, 80, 149, Common Nature 190, 286–288, 178, 180, 184, 194, 197, 293–295, 370 207–209, 228, 247–248, Concept 15–17, 19, 68–83, 85, 88, 250–251, 254, 265, 267, 92, 101, 103, 107–111, 113, 271, 281, 297, 337, 341, 348, 115, 118, 140, 150, 174, 180, 350–351, 363 190, 194, 197, 199–200, of Reason 10, 18–19, 23–25, 204, 207–210, 215–230, 84–86, 96, 128, 150, 169– 240, 247–249, 257, 271, 170, 175, 194–197, 209, 306, 312, 315, 319, 325–328 217–218, 220, 241–267, Analogical 9, 19, 171–172, 174, 272, 295, 305, 336–341, 244, 246, 249, 267 343, 350–351, 353–355, Common 11, 15, 17, 65, 68, 359–360, 362–364 73–74, 77–78, 80, 115, 130, Possible 13–15, 27, 36–37, 55, 139, 146, 150–151, 171, 62–63, 66, 104–105, 110, 180, 184, 186, 190, 192, 118, 129, 131–132, 134, 204, 218–219, 221, 226, 137, 152–153, 167–168, 238, 245, 247, 286–288, 181, 184, 192, 194, 214, 293–295, 312, 319–321, 216–219, 221–223, 225, 325–328, 331, 346, 359, 227, 246–248, 258, 269– 364, 370 270, 273–274, 276–278, Confused 82, 230, 321, 334, 346, 283, 292–293, 296–298, 352, 358 307, 314, 316, 318–319, Formal 77, 79–80, 82, 85–86, 104, 321, 340–341, 343–344, 111, 117–118, 152, 181, 347, 351, 353, 356, 358– 184, 189–193, 199–200, 360, 363, 365–366 206–210, 215, 220–226, Real 15, 17–20, 23, 67–68, 71, 228, 243, 253–259, 77–82, 84–92, 106, 115,

 Index of Terms

379

Conceptual 20, 72–73, 76, 78, 261–263, 267, 292, 299, 82–83, 86, 88, 90, 92, 141, 344–345 178, 180–181, 205, 207, Imperfect 18, 81, 221, 251 210, 213, 220–222 Objective 13, 18–19, 80, 149, Formal 77, 79–80, 82, 85–86, 104, 178, 180, 184, 194, 197, 111, 117–118, 152, 181, 207–209, 228, 247–248, 184, 189–193, 199–200, 250–251, 254, 265, 267, 206–210, 215, 220–226, 271, 281, 297, 337, 341, 348, 350–351, 363 228, 243, 253–259, 261– of Being, 9–10, 12–24, 65–78, 263, 267, 292, 299, 344–345 80–85, 87–93, 96, 128–131, Intentional 180, 182, 198, 205, 137, 139, 141, 150, 152, 160, 287, 291, 298, 344, 347, 349, 167, 172, 182, 184, 186, 188, 351, 353, 356, 358, 363 195, 208, 215, 218–228, Modal 13, 77, 80, 84, 221–224, 252–254, 260–261, 281, 227–228 285–291, 293, 300–302, Numerical 190, 294 323, 325–330, 332, 334– Rational 90, 92, 129, 163, 208, 335, 337–338, 341 217, 240, 306–307 Conceptualism 96, 179, 189, 192, rationis ratiocinatae 190–191 207 Real 15, 17–20, 23, 67–68, 71, Consciousness 204–205, 271 77–82, 84–92, 106, 115, Creation, 14, 31–32, 35–39, 168, 118, 128, 135, 137, 141, 170, 262, 302–304 147, 150–151, 154, 169– Eternal 32–38, 127, 168, 237, 285, 170, 175, 177, 181–182, 289–290, 297, 299–301, 184, 190, 192, 194–197, 304, 306–307, 323 200, 208, 210, 221–222, ex nihilo 14, 40–41, 46, 289, 229–233, 239–240, 244, 302–304 246–249, 251–256, 258, 261–262, 266, 268, 290– Temporal 32, 35, 290–293, 301, 295, 299, 301, 303, 306, 325, 306 328, 331–334, 338–341, D 343–345, 347–354, 356–363, 365, 367 Distinction, 13, 17, 19, 33, 77, Virtual 190, 202, 218 79–80, 85–86, 105, 108, 117, 128, 132, 136–137, E 146–149, 152, 161–163, 171, 174, 181–183, 190, Emanation 35, 183, 207 192, 194, 197, 200, 202, 210, Empiricism 179, 188 218, 220–223, 229–230, Epistemology 9, 129, 155, 177, 232, 239–240, 255–256, 179, 182, 186, 188, 270, 261, 276, 287, 291, 300, 369–370, 374 331–332, 337, 350, 357, 359 esse cognitum 19, 195, 197, 208–209, 251, 254, 297, 346

380

Hircocervi & Other Metaphysical Wonders

esse essentiae 14, 286–288, 295–299, 301–305, 307 esse existentiae 299, 303, 305 esse intelligibile 14, 281, 304–306, 337 Essentialism 70 Eternity 5, 9, 31–32, 34–35, 38–39, 61, 265, 299, 301, 303–304 of the World 5, 9, 31–35, 38–39, 61, 165–166, 168, 174, 176, 222, 273, 276, 281, 292 Existence (esse), 13, 15, 229, 252 Existential Thomism 10, 16 Experiential Unit 290 Extrinsic Denomination 24, 88, 195, 254, 346, 351–352

F False Thing 330, 332 First Philosophy 17, 68, 75, 128, 214, 219, 226, 314

H haecceitas 76

I Impossible Object, 96, 105, 343, 359, 365–366 Insight 91–92, 129, 167, 224, 309 Intellect, 14, 18–19, 71, 77–80, 83, 86–87, 90–91, 100, 131, 144, 173, 179–189, 192–196, 199, 205–209, 216, 218, 222, 224, 228, 244, 247–251, 254–260, 262–263, 265–267, 269, 271, 275–281, 288, 294, 297, 299–300, 304–305, 315, 319–320, 322, 327, 329–330, 334–339, 341, 344–345, 349, 351, 354– 355, 363–364

Agent 37, 161–163, 170–171, 173, 179–189, 193, 201, 276–277, 351 Passive 37, 179–183, 193, 201, 250–251, 255, 292, 346 Possible 13–15, 27, 36–37, 55, 62–63, 66, 104–105, 110, 118, 129, 131–132, 134, 137, 152–153, 167–168, 181, 184, 192, 194, 214, 216–219, 221–223, 225, 227, 246–248, 258, 269– 270, 273–274, 276–278, 283, 292–293, 296–298, 307, 314, 316, 318–319, 321, 340–341, 343–344, 347, 351, 353, 356, 358– 360, 363, 365–366 Intention, 9, 193, 197, 254, 296, 323, 359 First 12, 17, 31, 34–36, 39, 67–68, 70, 73–75, 83–85, 91, 100, 104–108, 110–111, 113, 118, 121–125, 127–129, 131, 134, 137–141, 143–145, 147, 149–150, 152–153, 159, 165–167, 172, 175, 179, 188–189, 191, 193–194, 198, 200, 202, 204, 208–209, 213– 215, 217–219, 222–227, 230, 232, 236, 242, 244, 247–254, 256, 259–260, 262, 264, 270, 275, 278, 280, 287–288, 290, 293–294, 299–300, 302, 305–306, 310–312, 314–316, 318– 322, 328, 330–331, 339, 342–344, 346, 348–350, 355–356, 358–359, 362, 364 Second 12, 23, 31, 34–35, 37, 68, 70, 72, 75, 80, 85–86, 99, 106–107, 118, 122–125,

 Index of Terms 129, 134, 137, 140–141, 143–145, 152–153, 162, 166, 179, 193–194, 198, 200, 202, 208–209, 213, 222–224, 226, 232, 237, 242, 244–245, 247–254, 259, 261–262, 264–265, 272, 274–275, 278, 280, 288, 290, 296, 305–307, 310–311, 313, 318, 320, 329–332, 342–343, 345, 348–350, 353–354, 356–359, 364–365 Intentionality 5, 25–27, 177, 179–180, 182, 197–199, 203–207, 210, 259, 367

J Judgment 16, 271, 275–276, 278, 329–331, 351, 356–357, 359, 361 Existential 10, 12, 16, 183, 192, 236–237, 252–255, 291–293, 299, 303

381 333–336, 341, 352, 370–372 Subject of 20, 66, 84, 107, 110, 127, 129–130, 132, 137– 140, 149, 194, 217–220, 222, 224, 226, 271, 285, 287, 329, 333, 335, 347, 358 modus significandi 174–175

N Negations 90, 251, 264, 267, 337–339 Nominalism 96–97, 113, 117, 153, 188, 375 Non-Being 35, 99, 223, 244, 260, 330–332, 360–362

O Obediential Potency 38 Ontology 17, 19, 21, 72, 92, 140–141, 177–179, 188, 204, 210, 219–220, 222, 226, 375

L

P

Logic 96–98, 102–103, 114, 117–118, 177, 192, 194, 236–237, 243, 245, 248, 266, 291, 365, 371

passiones entis 68, 70, 72, 75–76, 78–79, 84–87, 93 Predication, 75–76, 85, 161, 163–164, 173, 194, 218, 220–223 Analogical 9, 19, 171–172, 174, 244, 246, 249, 267 Equivocal 164, 166, 172–174, 325 in quale 77, 219–221 in quid 77, 80, 219–221 Univocal 171, 173, 221–222, 325 Privations 251, 265, 267, 337, 339 Proposition 17, 25, 65, 70, 73, 102–103, 106, 108–110, 112, 116, 137, 142, 149, 158, 162, 244, 330, 334,

M Metaphysics 5, 9–20, 23–25, 66–71, 73–74, 76, 78–80, 85–89, 91–93, 96, 99, 108, 121, 127–133, 135–141, 145–147, 149–155, 160, 169, 177, 182, 189, 207– 211, 213–220, 222–228, 237–239, 243–245, 259, 266–267, 277, 285, 287, 296, 314, 318, 329–330,

382 Hircocervi & Other Metaphysical Wonders 342, 349–350, 352–353, 294, 296, 314–317, 319– 357–360 322, 370 Affirmative 37, 102, 107, 116, 158, Universal Intelligible 314–315 161, 163, 350, 357, 359, 361 propter quid, 134, 224 Binary 161–162 Demonstration 23, 32, 68, 127, Complex 17, 76, 82, 108–111, 223–224, 230 113, 115, 118, 131–132, Science 9–10, 12, 15, 17, 23, 134, 136, 139, 149, 179, 195, 66, 69, 71–74, 78–79, 217, 250, 279, 340 84–87, 92–93, 97, 127–129, Context 15, 26, 31, 36, 86, 88, 96, 131–154, 163, 177, 208, 99, 101–102, 106, 110, 137, 215, 217–220, 223, 226– 139, 141, 159, 191, 207, 210, 227, 231, 233, 235, 240, 223–224, 246, 256, 262, 244–245, 281, 370, 376 280, 293, 301, 307, 323, 335, quia, 18, 38, 40–60, 62–63, 71, 342–343, 369 74–75, 77, 82–84, 89, Contradictory 258, 345, 349–350, 91, 101, 108, 114–115, 357–358, 360–361 119, 134–135, 138, 148, Copulative 349 152, 171–173, 175, 181, Disjunctive 72, 74–75, 131, 185, 193–194, 196, 202, 223–224, 226, 346, 349 206, 224, 226, 238–240, Fictionalizing 349, 352, 364 247, 250, 253–256, 258, Mental 108–110, 114, 154, 260–261, 263–265, 274, 199–203, 205, 208–209, 277, 280–281, 298–299, 244, 247–248, 256–259, 303–305, 316–319, 321, 263, 266, 290, 293, 295 325–326, 334, 336–338, Negative 37, 74, 79, 87, 116, 161, 341, 343–348, 350–356, 176, 192, 250–251, 272, 360–363, 366–367 326, 361, 367 Demonstration 23, 32, 68, 127, Non-Fictionalizing 349 223–224, 230 Object of 5, 9, 15, 18, 68, 102, Science 9–10, 12, 15, 17, 23, 121, 127–129, 131, 141, 66, 69, 71–74, 78–79, 149–153, 155, 207, 217– 84–87, 92–93, 97, 127–129, 218, 220, 222, 226, 228, 131–154, 163, 177, 208, 239–240, 247, 276, 296, 215, 217–220, 223, 226– 341, 344–345, 347, 349, 227, 231, 233, 235, 240, 352, 354, 361 244–245, 281, 370, 376 Paradoxical 105 R Trinary 161–162 Universal 11, 74, 90, 100, 134– Realism 5, 9, 177–179, 195, 135, 172, 179, 187–199, 199–200, 205, 207, 210, 205–207, 209–210, 215– 246, 249–251, 275, 288 216, 225, 238, 240, 244, 247, Cognitive 61–63, 90, 134, 180– 255, 260, 278, 288–289, 183, 187, 189, 197–201,

 Index of Terms 203–208, 216, 248–250, 270–272 Conceptual 20, 72–73, 76, 78, 82–83, 86, 88, 90, 92, 141, 178, 180–181, 205, 207, 210, 213, 220–222 Direct 21, 107, 179, 186, 189, 195, 200, 204, 206–207, 260, 276, 279, 295, 312, 353, 364 Extreme 246, 345 Moderate 5, 9, 177–179, 199, 205, 210, 245–246, 249–251 Relations, 24, 90, 100–101, 139, 157, 159–160, 164–171, 175, 215, 251, 261–262, 265, 299, 303, 337, 339, 364 of Reason 10, 18–19, 23–25, 84–86, 96, 128, 150, 169– 170, 175, 194–197, 209, 217–218, 220, 241–267, 272, 295, 305, 336–341, 343, 350–351, 353–355, 359–360, 362–364 Real 15, 17–20, 23, 67–68, 71, 77–82, 84–92, 106, 115, 118, 128, 135, 137, 141, 147, 150–151, 154, 169– 170, 175, 177, 181–182, 184, 190, 192, 194–197, 200, 208, 210, 221–222, 229–233, 239–240, 244, 246–249, 251–256, 258, 261–262, 266, 268, 290– 295, 299, 301, 303, 306, 325, 328, 331–334, 338–341, 343–345, 347–354, 356–363, 365, 367 res significata 108, 174

S Seinsvergessenheit 13, 15–16 Semantics 96–97, 100–104, 115, 225

383 Signification, 97, 100–102, 105–110, 112–115, 118, 174–175, 334, 376 Simple Apprehension 331, 354, 361 Space 273, 282 Supposition 97, 100–104, 106–117, 345, 362, 367, 376

T Time, 32–35, 73–74, 96, 99, 103, 108–109, 139, 161, 166, 177, 183, 226–227, 235, 247, 273, 282, 290–293, 299, 301, 306, 311, 331– 332, 353, 361, 367 Tinology 20–21, 208, 376 Transcendental, 5, 9, 15, 20, 25, 65–69, 71–75, 79–85, 87–89, 91–93, 130–131, 140–141, 210, 216, 223, 225–228, 270–271, 295, 313, 322, 376 Philosophy 10–13, 17, 21, 25–27, 29, 65–66, 68, 70, 75, 90, 95–100, 104–105, 113, 117–118, 121, 128–129, 132–133, 160, 176–178, 182, 197, 207, 213–214, 219–220, 226–227, 231, 235, 241, 243, 245, 252, 269–270, 272–273, 275, 278–280, 285, 288, 302– 303, 307, 313–314, 318, 324, 328, 330, 364, 369–372 Science 9–10, 12, 15, 17, 23, 66, 69, 71–74, 78–79, 84–87, 92–93, 97, 127–129, 131–154, 163, 177, 208, 215, 217–220, 223, 226– 227, 231, 233, 235, 240, 244–245, 281, 370, 376 Transcendentality 72–75, 80, 92

384 Hircocervi & Other Metaphysical Wonders Transcendentals 66–70, 72–76, 79, 83–84, 88–90, 93, 131, 220, 226, 325

U Universal, 11, 74, 90, 100, 134–135, 172, 179, 187–199, 205– 207, 209–210, 215–216, 225, 238, 240, 244, 247, 255, 260, 278, 288–289, 294, 296, 314–317, 319–322, 370 Logical 9, 76, 97–98, 104, 113–115, 117–118, 161, 189, 193, 196–197, 200, 244, 367 Metaphysical 1, 3, 6, 10–15, 17– 19, 21, 23, 75, 80, 129–130, 178–179, 183, 189, 191, 193–198, 203, 206–207, 209–210, 215, 220, 242– 243, 245, 287–289, 292, 298, 302, 304, 309–310, 313–314, 316–318, 321– 322, 324–325, 327–329, 337 Physical 79, 179, 186, 189–193, 242, 247, 263, 282–283, 344 Platonic 10, 188, 193, 277, 309, 322, 324, 328 Univocity 20, 328