Hindu–Muslim Relations: What Europe Might Learn from India 9780815396833, 9781138625471, 9780429459894

Table of contents :
Cover
Title
Copyright
Contents
Preface
Acknowledgements
1 Inciting Europe’s imagination
2 Hindu–Muslim relations as a social drama
3 The quest for a Hindu nation
4 The Muslim quest for accommodation
5 Secularism under siege
6 The common man – or woman!
7 Raison de civilisation
8 Where to go from here
Appendix
References
Index

Citation preview

HINDU–MUSLIM RELATIONS

This book reconstructs Hindu–Muslim relations from a European standpoint. Drawing from the Indian context, the author explores options for Western Europe – a region grappling with the refugee crisis and populist reactions to the growth of Muslim minorities. The author shows how India can serve not only as a model but also as a warning for Europe. For example, European liberals may learn not only from the achievements of Indian secularism but also from its crisis. Based on extensive interviews with Indians from diverse backgrounds, from politicians to social activists and from the middle class to slum dwellers, the volume investigates a wide range of perspectives: Hindu and Muslim, religious and secular, moderate and militant. Relevant, engaging and accessible, this book speaks to a broad audience of concerned citizens and policy makers. Scholars of political science, sociology, modern history, cultural studies and South Asian studies will be particularly interested. Jörg Friedrichs is Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Oxford, UK. He grew up and started his career in Germany. Before coming to Oxford in 2007, he also lived in Italy and Spain. His interests include political sociology, international relations, religion and politics. He has published five books. His articles have appeared in many journals including International Organization, International Theory and Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs.

HINDU–MUSLIM RELATIONS What Europe Might Learn from India

Jörg Friedrichs

First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 Jörg Friedrichs The right of Jörg Friedrichs to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-0-8153-9683-3 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-138-62547-1 (pbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-45989-4 (ebk) Typeset in Bembo by Apex CoVantage, LLC

CONTENTS

CONTENTSCONTENTS

Prefacevi Acknowledgementsx 1 Inciting Europe’s imagination

1

2 Hindu–Muslim relations as a social drama

12

3 The quest for a Hindu nation

24

4 The Muslim quest for accommodation

42

5 Secularism under siege

62

6 The common man – or woman!

85

7 Raison de civilisation101 8 Where to go from here

114

Appendix122 References123 Index132

PREFACE

PREFACEPREFACE

Call me naïve, but I believe it is possible to learn from the achievements and mistakes of other people.When I lack experience doing something, I try to figure out what does or does not work for others in order to learn from them. For example, this is how I have learnt to sail a dingy on the river Thames. I first quizzed experienced sailors and observed them for hours on end, before I entrusted my son and myself to a boat. Thus far we haven’t capsized, although I am sure it will happen sooner or later. If this is how we can learn as individuals, why would it not be useful for us as members of communities, nations or even civilizations to enquire and observe what other communities, nations and civilizations do in order to learn from them? Native Europeans and Muslim minorities are rather inexperienced in dealing with one another, yet Europeans (like other people in the so-called West) seem to think they can solve any problems by following abstract principles like ‘celebrating diversity’ rather than learning from other parts of the world. This strikes me as unwise. Therefore, I have ventured to examine Hindu– Muslim relations to see what, if anything, Europe might learn from India. For good and for ill, Hindus and Muslims in India have coexisted for more than a thousand years. Despite the horrors of partition and the traumatic experience of communal violence, Muslims remain an integral part of the country. At a time of growing Muslim minorities, what better place for Europeans to look for insight than India’s ancient civilization?

Learning from India In the summer of 2015, I entered what ethnographers call ‘the field’ as a complete stranger. This had its downsides as I lacked familiarity with the terrain. But it also

Preface  vii

had its advantages. My Indian interlocutors would not associate me with any of the communities present in the country, and I enjoyed the license to ask them ‘stupid’ questions that only a stranger may ask. Not only have I found my interlocutors enormously patient and generous with their time, but I was also impressed by their wisdom and level of sophistication. It was a true privilege to interview luminaries and ordinary people from a great nation (a list of my interviews can be found at the end of this book). Although I did not have the time and money for extended fieldwork, I was able to conduct ample interviews in a number of cities. While many researchers give pride of place to hotspots of violence, I started from Bangalore – a city where Hindu–Muslim relations have been rather positive (Mohammad–Arif 2012). From there I went to Hyderabad, which in the 1990s was known for tensions in and around the Muslim-dominated Old City but has seen improved intercommunal relations since then (Rao and Thaha 2012). My third stop was Mumbai, which has a history of communal tension fomented by the Hindu nativist party Shiv Sena but, like Hyderabad, has seen considerable improvement (Hansen 2001; Eckert 2003; Contractor 2012). Finally, I went to Delhi to collect national-level perspectives.Through my interviews in Delhi, I was also able to fill gaps regarding the situation in other parts of India such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Otherwise, I have relied on existing scholarship to fill such gaps. In conducting my interviews, I tried to understand myself as an interested stranger learning from local insiders rather than as an academic researcher imposing a ready-made template (Agar 1996). One of my starting points was that, surely, different people and groups have different perspectives on how Hindu–Muslim relations are and should be like, as well as how they are and should be managed. As an interested stranger, I tried to avoid making assumptions about these perspectives. Instead, my aim was to find out the unadulterated views of my Indian interlocutors. As mentioned, many authors focus on communal riots and other dramatic aspects of Hindu–Muslim relations. Instead, I wanted to leave it to my interlocutors whether they wished to focus on riots or on something else. Therefore, I needed a procedure that would leave my interlocutors as much as possible in control, teaching me about their views and concerns rather than me interrogating them about my preconceived notions. But of course an interview is a two-way street. Any interviewer worth his or her salt will have certain areas they want covered. Any interviewer must sometimes push an interlocutor gently but firmly to delve into something he or she might not be particularly comfortable talking about. I, for my part, wanted to ensure that my interlocutors would cover Hindu–Muslim relations broadly and talk equally about any positive and negative aspects. In the interest of my research, I also needed to ensure a degree of standardization so that I would be able to compare and contrast interviews (AAVV 2002). In a situation like this, most authors rely on semi-structured questionnaires that ask relatively open questions in a flexible order, with follow-up questions

viii Preface

and prompts at hand to elicit further information.To create a more conversational atmosphere, I opted for an alternate approach and developed what I call an interview map: a visual representation of the area that I wanted covered (see Appendix). After polite conversation and the ritualistic exchange of business cards, I would use the interview map to introduce an interlocutor to my project. From then on, I would leave the interlocutor free to take an active role in shaping the terms of the conversation.The interview map would lie somewhere on a desk or table, and more often than not this would induce interlocutors to cover most of the area of interest. Interlocutors would sometimes take the map into their hands and move from one topic to another, following their own preferred sequence. I would use my fingers to steer them towards specific aspects as and when appropriate, and bring up certain issues once they had started talking about an area on the map. The procedure gave my interlocutors a sense of ownership and made them feel comfortable (I suspect that many enjoyed the opportunity to ‘lecture’ a European rather than getting lectured). Especially towards the end of the conversation, I would become more inquisitive and ask specific questions arising from what an interlocutor had said. We would also talk about any connections between different areas on the interview map that had emerged during our conversation. Finally, I would invite my interlocutors to share any insights that they felt might be useful for Europe. Following this tack, I have conducted about 50 interviews to capture a wide range of perspectives: Hindu and Muslim, secular and religious, moderate and militant. My interlocutors came from diverse backgrounds, from politicians to social activists and from the middle class to slum dwellers. Most interviews took place in July and August 2015. In December of the same year, I briefly returned to India to sit in on the India Ideas Conclave in Goa, an annual event organized by the Hindu nationalist India Foundation. I did not have to make any contribution of my own and was allowed to act entirely as an observer, conducting interviews and holding informal conversations during the breaks.

Plan of the book This book reconstructs Hindu–Muslim relations from a European standpoint. Drawing from the Indian context, I explore options for Western Europe – a region grappling with the refugee crisis and populist reactions to the growth of Muslim minorities. Many of my interlocutors were happy to provide specific advice for Europe, which I have concentrated at the end of the relevant chapters (3–5). After an introduction discussing how and why Europe might learn from India (Chapter 1), I develop a framework for studying Hindu–Muslim relations as a social drama (Chapter 2).This is followed by three chapters covering the perspectives of Hindu nationalists (Chapter 3), Muslim leaders (Chapter 4) and liberal secularists (Chapter 5). To complement these elite perspectives, I also explore the views of ‘common’ people: women in slums, Dalit activists and people in the

Preface  ix

countryside (Chapter 6). I then turn to the following question: How has India, throughout history and without losing its soul, been able to maintain its unique civilization in the face of Muslim and Christian rulers and missionaries, all the while providing a home to significant Muslim and other minorities (Chapter 7)? In the conclusion, I revert to the questions of what Europeans might learn from Hindu–Muslim relations (Chapter 8). Overall, my findings are hopeful and uncomfortable at the same time.They are hopeful because, despite the horrors of partition and communal violence, Muslims are an integral part of India. They are uncomfortable because peaceful coexistence does not come easy. In the Indian case, coexistence is the hallmark of an ancient civilization. Europeans have much to learn from Hindu–Muslim relations.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author is indebted to Barbara Harriss-White for invaluable advice; K.J. Kamath and his family for hospitality and help at the start of his fieldwork; and Abdul Hakeem for company in Bangalore and New Delhi. He also thanks Tanweer Alam, Sanjeevini Badigar, Kishalay Bhattacharjee, Hem Borker, Raphael Bradenbrink, Catherine Clarke, Michael Cook, Husain and Sameena Dalwai, Jatin Desai, Faisal Devji, Arndt Emmerich, Tanweer Fazal, Nandini Gooptu, Garima Jaju, Nithya Joseph, Nandinee Kalita, Veena Kamath, Lilayaqat Ayub Khan, Simi Malhotra, Rana Mitter, Rajdeep Pakanati, Aseem Prakash, Rai Mahimapat Ray, Vivek Redhu, Mujib Rehman, Abishek Sawant, Vikhar Ahmed Sayeed, Jyotirmaya Sharma, Ochintya Sharma, M.A. Siraj, Nikita Sud, Kate Sullivan and Raphael Susewind. The author wishes to thank Ashutosh Varshney and Johns Hopkins University Press for permission to use Figure 1.1 which was published in an earlier version in Varshney, Ashutosh. “Hindu Nationalism in Power?” Journal of Democracy 25:4 (2014), p. 42, Figure. © 2014 National Endowment for Democracy and Johns Hopkins University Press.

1 INCITING EUROPE’S IMAGINATION INCITING EUROPE’S IMAGINATIONINCITING EUROPE’S IMAGINATION

A stroll through London or Paris, Berlin or Rome is enough to convince anyone that Europe is becoming, and already is, ever more multicultural and multireligious.You may find a mosque or temple even in a small town. If you get off the bus in rural England, the owner of the corner shop may be Indian or Pakistani. In a German village, the fruit vendor may be a Turk. If you must go to hospital, your doctor may be a Buddhist from Sri Lanka (Eastern Europe has fewer migrants, but for the sake of simplicity I write ‘Europe’ when I mean Western Europe). ‘Native’ Europeans remain the majority. Most are Christian or agnostic. Some have adopted various forms of spirituality. In the meantime, immigrants have also brought their faiths. Islam is the largest non-Christian religion in Europe. Like all religions, Christianity included, Islam comes in different forms. Also, some Muslims are more religious than others. Despite such obvious diversity, many Muslims and native Europeans see each other as ‘us’ and ‘them.’ This is not only based on perceptions but also on realities. Most native Europeans and Muslims live rather segregated lives. Direct interaction is limited (Statham and Tillie 2017). Europeans – or, if you are also one: we – have for a long time lived in rather homogenous nation states, surrounded by European neighbours with whom we would trade or, eventually, go to war. Except for Spain and the Balkans, Muslims were people living far away. A European must travel a long way back in time, to medieval Spain or Southern Italy, or in space, to the Balkans, until she finds European examples of Muslims and non-Muslims living together, either peacefully or not. Until a few generations ago, Europeans had little opportunity to meet Muslims. Now that such opportunity abounds, both sides remain woefully unprepared. European majorities and Muslim minorities lack the experience of living cheek by jowl.

2  Inciting Europe’s imagination

How does this lack of experience impact the ability of Europeans to envision the future? The eternal optimists embrace positive visions of multicultural and multi-religious diversity. They are confident that things will work themselves out, but they have little idea of how this is going to happen. The signs of the times are not hopeful. Celebrated sites of live-and-let-live, such as Paris and Brussels, overnight become theatres of Islamist terrorism. The eternal pessimists fear that this may only be the beginning of much more serious troubles. How is Europe’s future actually going to look like, short of multiculturalist dreams or apocalyptic nightmares? As ‘we’ lack the experience, we also lack the imagination. At an everyday level, Europeans have been exposed to Muslim migrants for at most two or three generations. Europeans and Muslims simply do not know each other well enough to develop realistic visions of the future. In a situation like this, the best we can do is turn to the experience of others. Outside the West, relations between non-Muslim majorities and Muslim minorities are anything but new. So why not turn to the experience of non-Europeans as a substitute for experience made by us? Contemplating situations outside Europe cannot tell us what to do, but it can do three things. It can mitigate our lack of experience; it can incite our imagination; and it can enable us to learn. Understanding the experience of others can help us gain a better grasp of our situation. In this quest for learning from others, what better place to start than India? Hindus and Muslims in India not only have centuries of experience living together (or apart) but have also developed repertoires for managing their relations. An already multi-ethnic Hindu majority cohabits with a Muslim minority of more than 14% of the national population (2011 Census). Europe is similarly multi-ethnic and, before long, Muslims are likely to reach a similar population share. While one might think that the differences between India and Europe make it difficult to derive any lessons, this book shows that learning may take place on several fronts. As always, we may learn not only from the similarities but also from the differences.

Europe at a crossroads Europe has substantial and rapidly growing Muslim minorities. Is this a golden opportunity for Europe to enhance its cultural diversity and economic prosperity, and to show the world that any group exposed to Western values such as liberal democracy will ultimately embrace these values, perhaps after a transition period lasting for a generation or two? Or is it too much for Europe to accommodate millions of Muslims and other migrants every year? Europe is already stretched to its seams by the need to keep together dozens of member states and their nations. Is Muslim immigration the predetermined breaking point for the European project? These are vital questions. Are native Europeans able to reconcile the ways they live, feel and think with the ways many Muslims do? Is there an unbridgeable

Inciting Europe’s imagination  3

divide between Western cosmopolitan values and the more communitarian values prevalent among Muslims? If there is such a divide, does it imply permanent strife? Why should people not be able to find a viable modus vivendi? As one might expect in an open and pluralistic society, mild forms of contestation may be necessary to buttress coexistence, but democracy provides a framework for peaceful change that can help to avoid more fundamental conflict (Friedrichs 2013). So much for theory. In practice, the problem is not so much that native Europeans and Muslim immigrants cannot coexist. It is rather that Europeans have little idea of how ‘getting along’ with Muslim minorities might work. Harking back to Al-Andalus or the experience on the Balkans is of limited help. On the Iberian Peninsula, encounters with Muslims are remote in time (before 1492). On the Balkans, they have been traumatic in recent decades (wars in the 1990s). Neither the mythical historiography idealizing Al-Andalus (Lewis 2008) nor the more recent but unpleasant memories of equally mythical Balkan Ghosts (Kaplan 1993) can make up for the European lack of experience and imagination. Given their lack of experience and imagination, most Europeans either ignore the issue or resort to platitudes. In a typical conversation, one European might state that multiculturalism has failed whereas another might assert faith in cultural diversity. This is getting us nowhere. Moral abstractions like ‘multiculturalism’ and flashy slogans like ‘clash of civilizations’ are simply not helpful when it comes to finding concrete ways of getting along. It is naïve to assume that diversity is either a guarantee for harmony or a recipe for disaster. Diversity is a challenge, and a fact of life. Neither positive nor negative ‘vision’ can replace lived experience. Europeans will have to make it up as they go. Europe is at a crossroads. The future depends on native Europeans and Muslim minorities finding ways to live together and/or apart. If either side fails, the other is in control. If both fail, it is down to the vagaries of myriad day-to-day interactions. In the absence of a concerted effort, escalations can happen quickly and turn out pernicious. How much better to think about ways for native majorities and Muslim minorities to coexist peacefully. Exploring the wealth of experiences made elsewhere – for example in India – can be helpful in this regard.

Muslims in Europe One generation from now, by mid-century, many European countries, especially in Western Europe, are likely to have Muslim minorities in the order of 15% – like India today. Table 1.1 gives an overview of recent demographic projections (Pew Research Center 2017). The figures are from an authoritative report by the Pew Research Center (2017), providing estimates for the Muslim population and its growth in Europe from 2010 to 2050. Even if migration were to stop, the share of Muslims in European societies would grow significantly due to higher birth rates. If migration were to continue but refugee flows were to stop, the share of Muslims would

4  Inciting Europe’s imagination TABLE 1.1  Muslim minorities and their growth in Europe.

2050

Europe as a whole United Kingdom Germany France Sweden

2010

2016

Zero migration

Medium migration

High migration

3.8% 4.7% 4.1% 7.5% 4.6%

4.9% 6.3% 6.1% 8.8% 8.1%

 7.4%  9.7%  8.7% 12.7% 11.1%

11.2% 16.7% 10.8% 17.4% 20.5%

14.0% 17.2% 19.7% 18.0% 30.6%

Source: Pew Research Center 2017.

grow considerably more. If both migrants and refugees were to arrive at current rates, the share would grow even further and reach a level comparable to India. Of the three scenarios, the high migration scenario appears most plausible. It would be unreasonable to assume that migration, or even refugee flows, might suddenly come to a halt. True, refugee flows may not stay at current levels. However, even in the ‘high migration’ scenario, the report keeps projections artificially low in several ways. To begin with, it is assumed that all rejected asylum seekers will return to their countries of origin. What is more, the report fails to acknowledge that migration breeds migration: Many migrants and asylum seekers will marry spouses from their countries of origin and/or seek family reunions. Besides, the 2017 report starts from a lower baseline than a previous report published in 2015.1 All things considered, and in light of continued instability in the Middle East, it seems safe to assume that the ‘high migration’ scenario is not too far off the mark, neither for Europe as a whole nor for the three largest European countries: United Kingdom, Germany and France. In the meantime, Muslim population shares will continue to be even higher among younger people. According to my calculations based on the 2017 report, in 2016 the share of Muslims in Europe was as low as 1.3% for people over 60 but as high as 9.4% for children under 14. Given the character of post-Arab–Spring migration through the Balkans and across the Mediterranean, the composition of Muslim minorities is skewed even further towards younger people than would be the case given higher birth rates. The current wave of Muslim migrants is also predominantly male.This is destined to lead to further increases from family reunions. Taking all of this into account, several European countries are on track to having Muslim minorities of at least 15–20% by mid-century. In younger age brackets, Muslims are likely to account for even higher percentages. If current patterns of residential segregation continue, there are likely to be many cities and areas with more Muslim than ‘native’ European inhabitants.

Inciting Europe’s imagination  5

Is this a problem? Consider the example of France. The country is notorious for the segregation and self-segregation of its Muslims. Without going into the debate about radicalization, there is severe alienation between France’s secularist mainstream and parts of its growing Muslim minorities (Cinalli 2017). Muslimmajority suburbs are hotspots of social unrest, which may or may not be religiously motivated. According to a recent study, 32% of Muslim respondents find sharia more important than French law. 28% lean towards authoritarian worldviews. The figures are higher for Muslim youth, at almost 50%. Given that French Muslims tend to be younger, and their fertility higher, than the national average, the authoritarian and segregationist orientation of young Muslims is alarming (El Karoui 2016; Tabet 2016). Marseille, France’s second-largest city, is a case in point. About a third of the city’s population is Muslim. Among younger people, such as high-school students, an even higher percentage has a Muslim background. Within a generation, Marseille may become a Muslim-majority city (Lorcerie and Geisser 2011). The example of Marseille is evocative in the context of this study because, if current trends continue, the city may develop into a European Hyderabad. Like in Marseille, the historical centre of Hyderabad is Muslim-dominated and faces urban decline given the decay of its housing stock. Also like in Marseille, there is serious social dislocation not only in the Old City but also in other Muslim ‘ghettos’ (Rao and Thaha 2012). The case of Marseille is hardly unique. Other important European cities are moving towards similar situations. Birmingham and Bradford, Brussels and Rotterdam are already known as crucibles of cultures and, at the same time, as hotspots of cultural and religious tension. Rafaela Dancygier (2017, 51–76) has amassed overwhelming evidence that the urban concentration and segregation of Muslims contributes to increasing polarization. ‘Muslims living in urban enclaves are more religious and more conservative than the average Muslim.When it comes to nonMuslims, however, the opposite is true: Living in Europe’s cities is associated with social liberalism among this group’ (p. 76).

Hindu–Muslim communalism Let us abandon Europe for a moment and focus on the situation in India. The present section concentrates on Hindu–Muslim communalism and communal violence, but this is immediately followed by a section on India’s civilizational legacy of cultural diversity. Communalism and communal violence, as well as cultural diversity, are both equally aspects of the Indian experience. In a South Asian context, communalism is a pejorative term for the politics of religious identity. Identity politics can also be based on caste, class, ethnicity, language and region, but in those cases it is not called communalism. The term communalism is reserved for the politicization of religious identity, typically in

6  Inciting Europe’s imagination

opposition to other religious groups. Communalism is of course not always violent, but communal violence is one of its extreme expressions. Communalism is associated with intense conflict over issues that may or may not be themselves of a religious kind, prompting a ‘condition of fear, suspicion and hostility between members of different religious communities’ (Pandey 1990, 6). Invoking real or perceived threats from other religious groups, communalism tends to follow a winner-takes-all mentality. The pinnacle of Indian communalism is the cleavage, or better array of cleavages, between Hindus and Muslims (Heehs 1997; Upadhyay and Robinson 2012). This is of course not the only cleavage. There is also a legacy of Hindu–Sikh communalism dating back to the 1970s and 1980s (Simeon 2014), and Hindu communalists also rage against the conversion of lower-caste Hindus to Christianity and Buddhism (Katju 2015). Yet, it is hardly controversial to state that the Hindu–Muslim cleavage is the most intense hotbed of Indian communalism. Communalism goes back at least to the 19th century. In those days, the British painted Hindu–Muslim clashes as a perennial feature of Indian history that colonial government needed to hold in check. Against this, the freedom fighters of the Indian National Congress emphasized national unity. During the independence struggle, they projected an idyllic image of intercommunal harmony in precolonial times, implying that postcolonial India would revert to such an idyllic state of affairs. This was overly optimistic as communalism had both colonial and indigenous roots, and the fact that communal tensions continued has haunted India ever since (Anderson 2012). At the time of the independence struggle, the Congress was in competition against communal forms of religious nationalism, represented by the Hindu Assembly (Mahasabha) on the one hand and the Muslim League on the other. To denounce such religious nationalist counter-projects, the Congress itself adopted the colonial categorization of communalism as backward. According to the Congress, communalism was a parochial expression of group solidarity at a time when the opposite was needed, namely national unity to shed the colonial yoke and build a modern secularist state for all Indians regardless of religion. Predictably, the Muslim League rejected the nationalism of the Congress as Hindu hegemony in disguise. Hindu nationalists saw it as a betrayal of the Hindu majority. The independence movement therefore continued to be vexed by competition between secular and religious nationalism (Embree 1990). After the Muslim League had obtained Pakistan as a homeland for Indian Muslims, communal violence was the hallmark of partition. In 1947, unspeakable violence descended on the subcontinent. Over the next two years, when the Indian constitution was debated, the wounds were still raw. In the interest of social peace, it was necessary to ensure that Muslims would feel welcome in India.

Inciting Europe’s imagination  7

The Congress was thus forced to define Indian secularism as respect for religious communities. India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru believed in the virtues of socialism, modernization and development; he would have preferred a secularism less friendly to religion but had to accept this constitutional formula (Verma 2017). For about 15–20 years, Nehru and his Congress Party were able to keep a lid on communal violence. Then, communalism reappeared in the shape of riots in major Indian cities. While communal riots and other forms of communal violence are often understood as outbursts of ancestral hatred, nothing could be further from the truth. Local politicians eager to rally the communal vote were often deeply implicated. Hindu nationalists get most of the blame, and partly this is justified. It is important to note, however, that local politicians from the Congress and other secularist parties have also contributed to communal riots (Wilkinson 2004). According to the most reliable and most recent data available, India has seen more than 10,000 deaths from Hindu–Muslim riots between 1950 and 2010.The figure is based on the so-called Varshney–Wilkinson dataset, which relies on the meticulous analysis of press reports and appears more reliable than data from state and civil society sources (Figure 1.1).2

FIGURE 1.1 Hindu–Muslim

violence in India, 1950–2010.

Source: Varshney, Ashutosh. “Hindu Nationalism in Power?” Journal of Democracy 25:4 (2014), p. 42, Figure. © 2014 National Endowment for Democracy and Johns Hopkins University Press. Reprinted with permission of Johns Hopkins University Press.

8  Inciting Europe’s imagination

The data suggests that communal violence subsided soon after partition. This is remarkable because the separation between India and Pakistan had claimed countless victims on both sides (literally countless; certainly hundreds of thousands). After that, India saw two relatively quiet decades in terms of communal violence. Rioting spiked first in 1969 but remained otherwise subdued until the end of Indira Gandhi’s emergency rule in 1977. Subsequently, the level of rioting was on a high level until 1993, the year after the destruction of the Babri Mosque. Since then, the incidence of rioting has been back to pre-1977 levels apart from a dreadful spike in 2002, when atrocious violence took place in Gujarat. According to one of the contributors to the latest dataset, the most riot-prone states are Gujarat, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra.3 Tragic though it may be, 10,000 victims over 60 years is hardly a huge number for a country the size of India. Many more have died in traffic accidents, or even from the ‘dowry deaths’ of young women driven into suicide. In recent years, rioting has become less frequent and smaller in scale, although in 2013 there was a major riot in Muzaffarnagar, Uttar Pradesh. Since Narendra Modi came to power in 2014, riots have been eclipsed by other expressions of communal violence such as the lynching of Muslims and Dalits associated with cow slaughter (Varshney 2017). While the number of fatalities is lower than in previous decades, Hindu– Muslim violence remains hugely important at the political and symbolic level because it enacts a core cleavage – arguably the core cleavage – of Indian identity politics (Brass 2003, 2006).

Civilizational legacies There is no denial of Hindu–Muslim communalism and communal violence.Yet, it is only part of the story. When the focus is on conflict, more positive experiences of ‘everyday peace’ get lost (Williams 2015). What is more, a narrow focus on communalism and communal violence misses the bigger picture of Indian history. Communalism is a phenomenon of recent decades or centuries, but the history of Indian civilization reaches much further back. Indeed, Hinduism is the only polytheistic world civilization that has been resilient to Islam and Christianity. The Roman Empire became Christian in antiquity. Pagans in Northern and Eastern Europe were subsequently baptized. Soon after the Prophet died, Persia became Muslim. The Americas became Christian in the early modern era. Animists in Africa and elsewhere converted, or were converted, to Christianity or Islam. China, Japan and Korea have jettisoned their shamanist traditions. In South Asia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan have Muslim majorities. Buddhism dominates in Sri Lanka, Thailand, Myanmar and Bhutan. There are only two countries where the majority continues to be polytheistic: India and tiny Nepal. This is no minor accomplishment.With 15% of the global population, Hinduism is the third largest world religion. Only two religions have more adherents:

Inciting Europe’s imagination  9

Christianity has 31% and Islam 23% (Pew Research Center 2015, 6). According to the latest population census (2011), India has 79.8% Hindus, 14.2% Muslims, 2.3% Christians, 1.7% Sikhs, 0.7% Buddhists, 0.4% Jains and 0.2% ‘others.’ T   he overwhelming majority remains Hindu, despite the fact that Muslims have ruled most of India for at least six centuries. Less than one in 40 Indians is Christian, although Europeans have ruled over India for another couple of centuries. Buddhism was the official religion of Ashoka’s Empire and subsequent dynasties, but it has all but disappeared from India.4 In the 18th and 19th centuries, there were powerful Sikh dynasties in northwestern India, but less than one in 50 Indians is a Sikh. According to Jawaharlal Nehru, all of these potential challengers to Hinduism achieved little. They ‘came, made a difference, and were absorbed’ (Nehru 1946, 50). India, however, became more diverse in the process. Today, Muslims are the largest religious minority in India. They are present all over the national territory, whereas Christian and Sikh minorities are significant only in certain regions such as Kerala and Punjab. Given the enormous size of its population, India has one of the largest Muslim populations of the world. Unlike Pakistan, the country remains religiously diverse. India is home to an ancient civilization that, for good and for ill, has developed repertoires for the management of relations between Muslims and nonMuslims. As we will see in Chapter 7, there is a high degree of civilizational awareness: Most Indians have clear ideas as to what their civilization is and what it is not. A Hindu nationalist might identify with Hindu as opposed to Islamic civilization. A Muslim might counter that one does not have to be a Hindu to be an Indian. A secularist might emphasize India’s composite culture. All of them might agree that Indian civilization is distinct from ‘the West.’ T   his Indianspecific civilizational awareness, in all its varied expressions, is the result of a chequered history of home rule and foreign rule, as well as many centuries of Hindu–Muslim confrontation and coexistence.

Provincializing Europe? Many Europeans see Europe as the epitome of cosmopolitan values, but critics object that we should rather provincialize Europe (Chakrabarty 2000). In terms of the historical longue durée, Europe has been rather homogenous whereas India has been much more diverse. Until recently, most European states saw it as impossible to host a large non-Christian minority. In Spain and Portugal, Muslims were expelled and the remainder Christianized after 1492. Even Jews had to content themselves with a precarious existence at the margins of European societies, always facing the threat of persecution and, ultimately, extermination. In India, by contrast, a Hindu majority was able to coexist, for good and for ill, with Muslims and other minorities. Religious and cultural diversity in India is remotely comparable with the late Ottoman and Austro–Hungarian empires. Today, however, this is all history. In

10  Inciting Europe’s imagination

1923, half a million Muslims had to leave Greece and more than a million Christians had to leave Turkey. Since then, many more Christians have had to leave the Middle East (Chatty 2010). The Austro–Hungarian Empire left a legacy of diversity in Yugoslavia, one of its successor states. That legacy finally collapsed in the 1990s, leading to atrocious episodes of war and ethnic cleansing. Most of this was driven by both sides, Christians as well as Muslims, but neither Europe nor the Middle East can claim the mantle of religious and cultural diversity as a result. India has a much better record in this regard. This is of course not to deny the atrocious violence during partition, or the experience of communal riots. Despite such violent excesses, Hindus and Muslims have largely been able to coexist. Such coexistence has certainly not always come easy, but it has been a persistent feature of India for a very long time. Liberals in Europe and elsewhere bask in indignation at past communal outrages such as the 2002 carnage in Gujarat. The Gujarat riots are vividly remembered not only because of the staggering number of victims (up to 1,000 or more) but also because Narendra Modi was Gujarat’s Chief Minister at the time. Especially since Modi became Prime Minister in 2014, his detractors have presented India as a hotbed of communalism, despite the fact that communal rioting is hardly on the rise (for an example, see Kaul 2017; for a survey, see Kim 2017). Is Europe going to do any better? There have already been riots in Paris and London. Thus far, the character of such riots has been closer to urban unrest than to Indian-style communal violence (in fairness, though, Indian riots haven’t been all about communalism, either). Islamist terrorism has led to significant casualties in Europe.There are likely to be further acts of terrorism, perpetrated not only by radicalized Muslims but also by radicalized native Europeans. There have already been dramatic incidents of nativist terrorism, most notably the 2011 attack in Norway claiming 77 fatalities. There appears to be a risk of escalating spirals of communalization and counter-communalization (Dancygier 2010). Europeans should of course hold on to their cosmopolitan aspirations and values, but they also should acknowledge with honesty that they have no historical claim for the high ground.

Conclusion Europeans are less well-prepared than Indians to deal with the challenge of Muslims and non-Muslims living together (or apart). Over many centuries, Indians have developed repertoires for managing Hindu–Muslim relations. Today, Indians distinguish themselves by a high degree of civilizational awareness. Hindus, Muslims and religiously uncommitted secularists all identify with Indian civilization. Native Europeans, by contrast, have little experience dealing with Muslim minorities and few have the audacity to embrace Western civilization. Many Europeans see themselves as world citizens rather than belonging to a nation, religion or civilization. The very concept of civilization is seen as morally

Inciting Europe’s imagination  11

dubious and associated with the narrative of unavoidable ‘clash’ (Huntington 1996). Yet, one does not have to buy into such narratives to see the importance of civilization for relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. As I will show towards the end of this book, the European suppression of civilizational awareness is part of the problem rather than part of the solution. Not only do Europeans lack a repertoire for managing relations with Muslim minorities of various stripes and colours, they also lack raison de civilisation in shaping relations going forward.

Notes 1 The 2015 report estimated that, in 2010, there were 5.9% Muslims in Europe (Pew Research Center 2015). 2 The original dataset was updated by Nina Kaysser, Sonia Bhalotra, Irma Clots-Figueras and Lakshmi Iyer. 3 Nina Kaysser, presentation at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, Toronto, 2014. 4 Most Buddhists are recent converts following the example of Dalit leader B.R. Ambedkar (1891–1956).

2 HINDU–MUSLIM RELATIONS AS A SOCIAL DRAMA HINDU–MUSLIM RELATIONS AS A SOCIAL DRAMAHINDU–MUSLIM RELATIONS AS A SOCIAL DRAMA

India is a diverse country: dozens of languages and regions, thousands of castes and tribal groups, hundreds of thousands of villages. Unsurprisingly, there is not just one Hindu and one Muslim community. There are myriad communities and sub-communities, not only among Hindus and Muslims but also among any other social category. By the same token, Hindu–Muslim relations are not one but many. To capture this diversity without drowning in minute detail, my aim in this book is to study Hindu–Muslim relations as a social drama. A social drama is made up of different ‘characters’ playing different roles and viewing the same set of relations from divergent perspectives. There are divergent perspectives on how Hindu–Muslim relations are and should be like, as well as how they are and should be managed. After presenting Hindu nationalist, Muslim and secularist perspectives (Chapters 3–5), I present a number of subaltern views (Chapter 6). Apart from perspectives, there are different actors playing different roles. In the present chapter, I introduce some of these roles.

Divergent perspectives Most existing accounts of Hindu–Muslim relations privilege one perspective over all others. Secularist authors are typically close to the ideology of the Congress Party and deplore Hindu nationalism (Varshney 2002; Khurshid 2015). They find that Hindu nationalists are mostly responsible for India’s communalism, and they speak of them in vituperative ways (Jaffrelot 1996; Katju 2017). They tend to be more forgiving towards Muslim forms of communalism, because they see Indian Muslims as a vulnerable minority (Aiyar 2004; Engineer 2007). Most Muslim authors, unsurprisingly, write about Hindu–Muslim relations from a Muslim perspective. They are often more fiercely critical, or self-critical,

Hindu–Muslim relations as a social drama  13

than non-Muslim authors. Some blame the Congress and other secularist parties for not having done enough for India’s Muslims (Naqvi 2016). Others have shown remarkably little inhibition to call out Muslim communalism (Dalwai 1968; Zakaria 1996). The reason is perhaps that Muslim authors can afford doing so, whereas non-Muslim authors might be vilified as Hindu nationalists. Hindu nationalists are highly critical of Congress-style secularism and often hostile against Muslims (Goel 1994a, 1994b). Unsurprisingly, therefore, people adopting secularist or Muslim perspectives often treat them as ‘the enemy.’ In this book, I take a less judgmental approach. If we are to understand Hindu–Muslim relations as a social drama, then we must give a hearing not only to secularists and Muslims but also to Hindu nationalists. Given India’s political reality under Modi, there is no point trying to ignore or outlaw the Hindu nationalist perspective. Thus, I try to present each of these divergent perspectives in its own right. Does this mean that, as an author, I do not have a perspective of my own? Of course not. Coming from an increasingly multicultural and multi-religious Europe, I remain committed to liberal values. However, I feel that these values are endangered by unrecognized tensions between illiberal tendencies in Europe’s growing Muslim minorities on the one hand, and the ‘nativist’ or ‘populist’ reaction to such tendencies on the other. It troubles me that multiculturalists turn a blind eye to this tragedy. This is the perspective I bring to India, but otherwise my hope is to learn from the experience of Indians and the various ways they see the situation, rather than taking sides or imposing my own perspective. As a matter of fact, having a perspective does not preclude openness to other perspectives. Take for example the great Indianist Paul Brass. A humanist himself, in his research Brass has given a hearing to perspectives dissonant from his own, including the dehumanizing views of Hindu and Muslim communalists (Brass 1997, 2003, 2006). There is no doubt that Brass is as much committed to liberal and secularist values as anyone else, but when writing about Hindu–Muslim relations he steps back and gives a hearing to a variety of subject positions. Brass has thereby demonstrated that one may hold passionate views of one’s own yet provide a kaleidoscopic view of Hindu–Muslim relations from a variety of perspectives. Like Brass, I feel that my personal commitment to liberal values should not prevent me as a researcher from contemplating the full spectrum of perspectives and subject positions, including those dissonant from my own. Should that challenge my liberal views, so be it. Liberalism is facing serious problems, not only in Europe but also in India and elsewhere. If anything, it stands to be invigorated from the bold engagement of dissonant views. In short, my aim is to study Hindu–Muslim relations not so much in terms of my own views and principles but rather in terms of the perspectives found among the actors in this social drama. Perspectives are important not only because we need to understand where people ‘are coming from’ but also because they shape the way people act as representatives of their own community, as well as the way they treat people associated with other communities.

14  Hindu–Muslim relations as a social drama

Different roles The social drama of Hindu–Muslim relations is made up not only of perspectives but also of roles. Different actors, or dramatis personae, play different roles in the production of Hindu–Muslim relations. In the remainder of this chapter, let me introduce a selection of  ‘characters.’  We will encounter other characters later in the book, but let us start with the following: • Community brokers – leaders conveying patronage to specific social groups • Identity entrepreneurs – leaders mobilizing people around communal identities • Committed secularists – convinced liberals upholding Indian secularism • Gentleman communalists – hiding communalist views behind a secularist façade • Muslim dhimmis – hoping to benefit from submission to Hindu supremacy1

Community brokers Indian society is fractured into myriad social groups, or communities. Few vote on the basis of party programmes. Most vote on the basis of group loyalty.  A community may be defined by caste, language, region, ethnicity, religion or any combination of the above. In Mumbai, for example, there are lower-class Urdu-speaking Muslim migrants and lower-caste native Marathi-speaking Hindus. At the same time, most Indians are in dire need of access to resources such as clean water, healthcare, schooling and of course jobs. As a result of these two social realities – community bind and resource dependence – patronage is a crucial feature of Indian society and politics. Since patronage happens at the group level rather than individually, the community broker (a leader conveying patronage to a specific social group) is a ubiquitous figure. No Indian party is able to win a significant election without reliance on community brokers conveying patronage to voters, and votes to political patrons. Needless to say, it is hard to reconcile this with lofty democratic ideals. Most politicians accuse their adversaries of ‘vote bank politics’ while glossing over the inconvenient fact that nobody in democratic India can win an election without practicing patronage. Religion is only one defining characteristic of communities among others but, ever since the independence struggle, being Hindu or Muslim has been among the core cleavages on which people can be mobilized. Religion is often irresistible because it allows mobilization on a larger scale than, say, caste or language. Hence, Hindu and Muslim community brokers are important figures in Indian political life. Whenever I met a politician in his local office, there would be a waiting area outside where people were sitting for hours in order to bring their concerns to the politician. Evidently, these petitioners would belong to the community

Hindu–Muslim relations as a social drama  15

forming the ‘vote bank’ at election time.This made it visible to me that patronage and community brokerage are part of political business. Yet, it is fair to say that some specialize in community brokerage more than others. The Majlis Party (All-India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen, AIMIM; or MIM Party), a Muslim outfit in Hyderabad with pan-Indian aspirations, is a case in point (Alam 1996; Farooqee 2016). The Party holds the Muslim-dominated Old City of Hyderabad like a citadel and has held a seat in the Lower House of Parliament in New Delhi since 1984. It is headquartered in a historic building, the stately compound-cum-palace known as Darussalam, in an otherwise decrepit part of the Old City. The Party’s politicians have their local offices in their constituencies, as any Indian politician would. In addition, every day from 11am to 3pm they come to Darussalam to attend to the ‘grievances’ of citizens. Eighty-five to 90% of clients are Muslims, which is 20% higher than the overall share of Muslims in the population of the Old City (Jafri). Asaduddin Owaisi is the supreme leader of the Party and holds its seat at Parliament in New Delhi. Like his younger brother Akbaruddin, he is the scion of a patrician Hyderabadi family that has led the Party for several decades. Despite his duties in New Delhi, Asaduddin Owaisi regularly makes himself available to the ‘common man’ at the Party headquarters in Darussalam, Hyderabad. When I met him, during reception time, there were droves of clients waiting on the loggia where politicians sat behind a long desk to attend to what the Majlis Party calls their ‘grievances.’ Like other Party representatives and officials, Owaisi held court under the capacious front porch and talked to constituents one by one. When he beckoned me into the feudal interiors of Darussalam, he left behind a long queue of petitioners. For the interview, Owaisi received me in the sancta sanctorum, an exquisitely furnished hall at the rear of the building. When I asked him what the people queuing outside wanted, he told me: ‘Someone wanted a train reservation, so I give them my letter. (. . .) Then someone said: “Oh, we want some teachers in a school, please represent to the government.” ’ Others, he told me, wanted a new road, a sewage line, or a pension. Some wanted housing for the poor. Petitioners were often asking him to call companies to recommend them, or cousins, for jobs. Owaisi is conscious of the benefits patronage can bring: This is how it helps you during election time: When people come to you for work, even if you don’t do their work and the desired result doesn’t come out, at least the person who comes to you has the satisfaction that he has come and spoken to us. We tried our best, with good intentions. The result didn’t come out? He says: ‘OK, fine. The result has not come out, but they have tried their best.’ If the result comes out, then he remembers it. He says: ‘Yes, the work was done.’ T   he biggest problem is that we politicians are not accessible to the common man.You have to have that personal

16  Hindu–Muslim relations as a social drama

feeling. You know, he comes and argues with you. He comes and swears at you. Then he goes and, ‘Oh, I have come and argued with Mr Owaisi.’ That satisfaction he gets.

Identity entrepreneurs An identity entrepreneur is a leader trying to mobilize people around communal identities. Having introduced a Muslim leader in the last section, let us now meet a Hindu nationalist. Dr Surendra Jain is the All-India Secretary of the right-wing Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP). In our long interview, Jain did not mince words. He told me that India suffers from an Islamist onslaught. According to Jain, Hinduism is ultimately a matter of the heart. ‘It is our nature. We love our religion very much.’ In principle, he sees Hindus as tolerant and prone to accommodation. ‘Being a Hindu, I respect your faith and any other person’s faith.’ He claims, however, that Hindus are also victims.‘India is the worst sufferer from terrorism. Every day, there is some incident of terrorism in any place of India.’ He therefore highlights the limits of Hindu tolerance. When denied the respect due to them, Jain claims, Hindus have learnt to strike back.‘Hinduism is not so weak.’ He claims that, since 1992, Hindus retaliate when Muslims take to the streets and ‘kill Hindus and burn their shops and rape their ladies.’ There is no shortage of similar bravado from Muslim identity entrepreneurs. For example, Owaisi’s brother Akbaruddin is known for aggressive statements and has been in serious legal trouble for hate speech. To be sure, unlike Hindu communalists, Muslims have failed to unite at the pan-Indian level ever since the Muslim League disintegrated after independence. The Majlis Party has been trying to unite Indian Muslims, but with limited success. Nevertheless, in those few places where Muslims are locally in a majority, as in Kashmir or in the Old City of Hyderabad, the record shows that minoritarian Muslim identity politics can be every bit as vicious and ‘riot-prone’ as majoritarian Hindu identity politics. Especially from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, Hyderabad saw terrible riots. Even though communal tensions have calmed down since then, critical academics argue that the Majlis Party lets its constituents in the Old City down, catering to Muslim pride rather than producing tangible results for the community (Rao and Thaha 2012). Successful or not, liberal secularists try to engage in identity politics of a different kind. On the one hand, they envisage a non-communal civic identity for all Indians. On the other hand, they are committed to minority accommodation. As we will see, this leads to a peculiar form of identity politics where the public enemy is constructed as majoritarian ‘communalism.’ In this spirit of anti-­ communalist identity politics, a Congress politician interviewed for this book has declared himself a ‘secular fundamentalist’ (Aiyar 2004). While the strategy has allowed secularists to forge alliances with Muslims and other minorities, it has also put them at loggerheads with countless members of the majority who resent

Hindu–Muslim relations as a social drama  17

minority accommodation as ‘appeasement.’  To overcome this problem, there is a perennial temptation for secularist politicians to make a U-turn and borrow from the communalist script. Salman Khurshid, Foreign Minister (2012–14) under the last Congress government, is candid about this: ‘There are people in the Congress who say: “Why don’t we try to be like the BJP?” This has happened before in the Congress. It is happening again.’ Identity politics and community brokerage are separate activities. Those specializing in one do not necessarily specialize in the other. While myriad foot soldiers are involved in community brokerage, setting the tone for identity politics – ‘Who are we?’ – is up to the bosses. In the Majlis Party, for example, Asaduddin Owaisi and his brother Akbaruddin set the tone on communal identity, while others would follow suit. For example, Owaisi said: ‘I am a proud Indian Muslim. I am a proud Muslim.’  Were he to say this in a rally, people would note the omission of ‘Indian’ in the repetition and read it as a confession of pan-Islamic identity. Yet, identity politics and community brokerage are connected. Take for example the seemingly innocuous term ‘grievance,’ used by the Majlis Party. Whenever a constituent wants something from a politician, the Majlis Party calls it a grievance. The term grievance rather than, say, petition, indicates that victimhood plays an important role in addition to patronage. This is particularly evident in those cases where Muslims feel troubled by the police. Most of Hyderabad’s Old City is in decay and many of its denizens, Muslims or otherwise, have problems with law and order. The Party caters to this rebellious ethos. A common occurrence during Owaisi’s reception hours is that ‘some policeman is troubling them; they come and tell us.’2

Committed secularists Committed secularists are convinced liberals upholding ‘Nehru-style’ Indian secularism. While such secularism is somewhat besieged given the decline of the Congress since the 1970s and, more recently, after the Congress lost the 2014 national elections, various regional and caste parties subscribe to a similar ideology. Secularists remain entrenched in positions of power and influence, from state administration to universities and from the judiciary to non-governmental organizations.They are destined to retain an important voice in Indian public life. A return to power cannot be ruled out if there is disillusionment with the Modi government. While Western secularism, in its various manifestations, is characterized by an attempt to separate religion from politics, the mainstay of Indian secularism is trying to respect religious communities while opposing communalism (Bhargava 2010). Under Nehru, this kind of secularism was clearly dominant in Indian democracy. Since then, views have become more diversified but secularism continues to be celebrated as the opposite of communalism. Almost everyone in India pays lip-service to secularism and agrees that communalism is bad.

18  Hindu–Muslim relations as a social drama

Take for example Satish Sahney, a former civil servant steeped in the tradition of Nehru, as befits the director of the Nehru Centre in Mumbai. Sitting in a spacious office on the top floor of a monumental building overlooking slums and business districts, he deplores the tendency of seeing India’s social and political cleavages in terms of religion. ‘If you view everything from the point of view of religion, then you will always find that there is no meeting point.’ As one might expect, Sahney puts the constitution front and centre: Whenever I speak with my colleagues and friends, I only tell them one thing: ‘Don’t do anything. Just follow the constitution. Whatever the constitution of India says, follow that! If the constitution of India gives certain rights and duties to its citizens, they should be applicable to everyone. If a Muslim’s fundamental right is violated, we should all collectively defend that right. We are not doing any favour to the Muslims or Islam or anyone, we are only respecting our own constitution.’ While the political discourse of secularism sounds deceptively familiar from a European perspective, it is important to note the differences between Indian- and European-style secularism. European secularism is the result of a victory of the state over the church, as in France; of a compromise of the state with a weakened church, as in Germany; or of an embrace of secularization as a social reality, as in the UK (Joppke 2015). Indian secularism, by contrast, is an attempt of postcolonial elites to come to terms with the realities of a deeply divided society by welcoming all religions equally, while intervening in ‘benign’ but patronizing ways. Harsh Mander, a social activist, points out that this can lead to paradoxical effects. We talk about secularism. It’s central. It is part of our constitutional framework. But secularism in France would mean preventing a young woman from participating in a public programme while wearing the hijab. In India, defending her right to wear the hijab would be the secular thing.To prevent her would be anti-secular. This sounds straightforward. However, the failure of Indian secularism to strictly separate religion from politics has a paradoxical flip side. It allows secularists to identify with their own religious and civilizational legacy. Nehru, for example, was very fond of Hinduism in his book The Discovery of India (1944). This allows Indian secularists to look down on the civilization of others in ways that would hardly be acceptable in the West. Satish Sahney, for example, holds that that Muslims have only themselves to blame for their own backwardness: ‘They abdicated. They were, after all, a very advanced society. Muslims were not a backward society.They have been the rulers of this country for 700 years.Why did they go into their shell?’

Hindu–Muslim relations as a social drama  19

Gentleman communalists Gentleman communalists are people hiding communalist views behind a secularist façade. In India, communalism is a derogatory term reserved for one’s adversaries. Nobody in their right mind would embrace it. When moving into positions of power and prestige, it is mandatory to forswear communalism and embrace secularism. Conscious that their adversaries will leap on any display of communal ‘bigotry,’ gentleman communalists adopt a secularist posture. While shrouding themselves in a secularist cloak, gentleman communalists show their true colours in more intimate settings. Given the association of Hindutva with communalism, such duplicity is almost a must for any Hindu nationalist politician. However, Muslim leaders also sometimes adopt a secularist posture to conceal their communalist leanings. Even the Congress and other so-called secularist parties have had their share of gentleman communalists. Take for example an anonymous Hindu nationalist politician whom I interviewed at the headquarters of the governing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). While Hindu nationalists from the social-movement front were highly accessible, I found it difficult to find national-level interlocutors from the BJP. I therefore decided to walk straight into the door of the Party’s headquarters in Ashoka Road, New Delhi, asking for an interview with someone who could speak for the Party. After passing me around for a while, I landed in the office of National Secretary Arun Singh who gave me an articulate interlocutor high up the Party’s hierarchy. His identity remains confidential because he requested anonymity (Anonymous A).3 My interlocutor started off by telling me, regretfully, that, if we were meeting in private, then he would be able to speak freely. Now that he was talking in an official capacity, however, he was constrained by the party line. He told me that the party line was bland. What he would do, therefore, was give me his personal views off the record, to complement the official position. The discrepancy between the two positions is what makes him a gentleman communalist. The official view was indeed bland and is quickly told. Hindu–Muslim relations were good. As Prime Minister Narendra Modi was saying, all Indians should move together. Thanks to the efforts of the government, this was indeed happening. There were no problems between Hindus and Muslims, and there was no need for any changes in policy. All the government needed to do was to carry on encouraging all Indians to move together. When I asked my interlocutor about hot-button topics such as uniform civil code, reconstruction of the Ram Temple in Ayodhya and the constitutional autonomy of Kashmir, he responded that these were hugely divisive issues. The government was forced to take electoral arithmetic into account. For example, from the moment a project for a uniform civil code was introduced, public debate would focus on that only. Nothing was going to move in Indian politics under such circumstances. This would not be reasonable, nor could his party afford it politically. India was a divided nation, and the BJP had to unite people. This was necessary not only to gain but also to hold on

20  Hindu–Muslim relations as a social drama

to democratic power. He roundly condemned the use of violence to assert the supremacy of the Hindu majority. The presentation of the official party line took five minutes, at most. During the remaining 45 minutes of the interview, my interlocutor gave me remarkably frank statements on highly sensitive issues. For example, he denounced the way he claimed Muslims were taking over neighbourhoods: When Muslims coveted an area but their numbers were low, say 5%, they would start buying property at prices above market value. At 10–15%, they would start claiming communal privileges. At 30%, they would start trying to dominate the area. At 35%, they would go for dominance. Life would become so uncomfortable for non-Muslims that Muslims were able to buy up property at depressed prices. At 50%, an area would become lawless. Muslims would neither pay electricity bills nor respect normal rules. Should the state try to enforce the law, Muslims would react violently.When Muslims were around 80%, they would stop caring about others and start fighting amongst themselves, as they were doing in Pakistan. Especially during the later stages, he suggested, the process was irreversible. My interlocutor claimed that Muslims were loyal to the transnational community of the ummah rather than to the Indian nation. Except for a small number of Muslim patriots, their loyalties were located outside India, namely in Mecca and Medina (to my surprise, he did not mention Pakistan). He also talked about jihad and the injunction on Muslims to make the entire world Islamic. Ultimately, my interlocutor found, there was something wrong either with the way Islam was interpreted, or with Islam itself, given all the trouble emanating from it. While his Hinduism was more upper-caste and elitist than the folksy version championed by Surendra Jain, the identity entrepreneur, they both emphasized that Hinduism was not only accommodating but also resilient. Despite all assaults, Hinduism had withstood every threat and challenge. Muslim rulers had made limited headway. Christian missionaries had achieved little. One should not underestimate the strength of Hinduism. Given their experience, Hindus were not unprepared for Muslim attempts to gradually take over. Hindus knew how to prevail (Anonymous A).

Muslim dhimmis Now that they are in government, Hindu nationalists offer pliable Muslims a position subordinate to Hindu supremacy. In remarkable ways, this mirrors the subordinate position of non-Muslim dhimmis in pre-modern Islamic states. Dhimmi is an ancient term for a non-Muslim subject whose group has accepted subordinate status, trading protection for financial tribute and recognition of Muslim supremacy. Dhimmis were routinely humiliated at a symbolic level, but they were otherwise treated in decent ways (Friedman 2003). Whilst the subordination of non-Muslims as dhimmis has run its course as a formal arrangement in Muslim polities other than ‘Islamic State,’ in an ironic twist of fate, Hindu nationalists are

Hindu–Muslim relations as a social drama  21

now offering Muslims an arrangement that is similar to dhimmitude for all but name. Partly because they offer modest resources rather than imposing financial tribute, and partly because Muslims are so divided, Hindu nationalists find some Muslims receptive to the offer. This dawned on me when attending the 2015 India Ideas Conclave, organized by the India Foundation and convened by Ram Madhav. Madhav is General Secretary of the BJP and remains intimately connected to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). Among the participants, there were outspoken Muslim critics of contemporary Islam such as Tarek Fatah and Sultan Shahin. They and other Muslims in the audience suggested that they were the ones who had to take on the Islamists but needed a strong government to flank their move. From their perspective, Hindu nationalism offers a safe haven for ‘moderate’ Indian Muslims. In a charitable interpretation of the arrangement, a Muslim dhimmi is a Muslim hoping to benefit from submission to Hindu supremacy. Essentially, the deal is to gain protection and resources in exchange for such submission. In a less charitable interpretation, dhimmitude is an utterly oppressive arrangement. Congressman Mani Shankar Aiyar sees it as a form of political blackmail according to the motto: ‘Put us in power, and we will stop wrecking peace and tranquillity; don’t, and you will see what we do to you’ (Aiyar 2004, 161). Rajeev Gowda, a Congress spokesman, concurs: It is like a protection racket. You go to a shop and say, ‘You give me that much money, and I will protect you from any trouble. If you don’t give me money, I will create trouble.’  That’s how that works. They will create the trouble and cause violence, and come to power. After they have come to power, they will say, ‘Look, no riots are going on during our time because we are so good at promoting communal harmony.’ Salman Khurshid cites the Stockholm syndrome, a psychological condition under which victims sometimes side with their tormentors: ‘You begin to admire your oppressor. I haven’t analysed it enough, but it could be because, inside, there is something that says, preserve yourself. It is the selfish gene. Preserve yourself by making peace with your oppressor.’ While there is a kernel of truth to this, Hindu nationalists offer Muslims not only ‘protection’ but also modest resources.The Hindu nationalist RSS even offers an organizational platform, the Muslim Rashtriya Manch (MRM). The MRM is a foster child on the outer galaxy of the ‘family’ of Hindu nationalist organizations (sangh parivar) incubated by the RSS. The spiritual mentor (margdarshak) of the MRM is Indresh Kumar, a fulltime celibate activist and senior leader of the RSS. When I interviewed Kumar, he claimed that Muslims had initially come to him as supplicants because he understands Islam. He had accepted to show them the ‘proper path.’ According to Kumar, the problem with Indian Muslims is that many are loyal to ‘Arabs’ or

22  Hindu–Muslim relations as a social drama

Pakistan rather than India, and want to rule.This he sees as unnatural given that, in his view, 98% of Indian Muslims are descendants of Hindus and thus indigenous. Kumar told me that Indian Muslims had to stop believing in the superiority of Islam. They had to discard ‘Arab internationalism’ and love India. The task of the MRM was to teach them ‘how you should act, how you should think, what should be your spiritual ways.’  Without Muslim fundamentalism, ‘the world and the country and the community can be so sweet.’ ‘I always say to the Muslims: If conversion is there, conflict will be there. Follow your own path, respect all other paths. Have respect for your path, respect other paths. Then there will be peace. Otherwise, there will be conflict.’ Muslims shouting Pakistan zindabad (‘Long live Pakistan’), he suggested, should be sent packing to Pakistan with their families and belongings. Shridhar Damle, a well-informed observer of the RSS, told me he had interviewed Kumar in 2015. Kumar had told him most Muslims wanted a decent life and protection from radical Muslims.This, Damle finds, is in line with a statement by the journalist Arun Shourie, who remains an authority in Hindu nationalist circles. He recalls that, in 1994, Shourie suggested that, after two BJP victories, non-Sunni and non-orthodox Muslims would ‘come to us for protection.’ While the MRM is perhaps a fringe phenomenon, there are other indicators that heterodox Muslims might be interested in accepting subordinate status. Before 2014, the northwestern state of Gujarat was lionized as a place where Muslims had turned to Narendra Modi for protection and patronage, offering him their loyalty (Kishwar 2014). Regardless of the 2002 carnage in Gujarat, the Ismaili Bohra community kept warm relations with Modi, who was then Chief Minister. The same can also be seen outside of Gujarat. In 2015, at the Hindu mega-festival of Kumbh Mela, Bohras served 70,000 cups of tea to pilgrims and were duly commended by Hindu nationalists as ‘true nationalists’ and ‘real Indians’ (Abbas 2016).

Conclusion The social drama of Hindu–Muslim relations arises from the complex interplay of divergent perspectives. At the same time, different actors play different roles and pursue different tasks. This chapter has briefly introduced secularist, Muslim and Hindu nationalist perspectives. It has also suggested a preliminary list of dramatis personae: community brokers, identity entrepreneurs, committed secularists, gentleman communalists and Muslim dhimmis. Community brokers convey patronage to specific social groups. While such groups can be defined by any number of markers of distinction, such as language or caste, community brokerage always has the effect of entrenching identities. When the community is defined by religion, it entrenches what Indians call communal identities. Identity entrepreneurs exploit the existence of entrenched communal identities to mobilize people in support of their community and against

Hindu–Muslim relations as a social drama  23

other communities, for example Hindus against Muslims. This further entrenches communalism and may conjure up intense intercommunal confrontation. Committed secularists deplore such practices but have a problem of credibility. They have a desire to overcome community brokerage, but they hardly can help but engage in patronage themselves. They may oppose identity politics, but even secularist parties cannot dispense with identity when it comes to mobilizing people. Gentleman communalists hide their true colours behind a secularist façade, publicly moderating their stance while keeping alive the flames of communalism. Muslims, as a minority, are offered various forms of real or token accommodation. Hindu nationalists, in particular, offer Muslims an ironic form of Muslim dhimmitude where they can gain protection and resources in exchange for submission to Hindu supremacy. These are not the only roles and perspectives in the social drama of Hindu– Muslim relations. We will also meet political pundits like M.J. Akbar whose aim is to offer commentary on Hindu–Muslim affairs. We will meet intellectuals performing similar functions in the media and universities. We will meet people handling more operational issues, for example a minority commissioner and a former police chief.We will meet social activists and public servants. Not to forget subalterns who see Hindu–Muslim relations differently from the elites.

Notes 1 Especially the terms gentleman communalist and Muslim dhimmi are of my own coinage. 2 In case of genuine police harassment, the term grievance is factually accurate. 3 After the interview, he obtained clearance from the National Media Convener of the BJP, Shrikant Sharma.

3 THE QUEST FOR A HINDU NATION

THE

QUEST FOR A HINDU NATIONTHE QUEST FOR A HINDU NATION

Hindu nationalists claim that India is, or should be, a Hindu nation. As we will see, they do so on the basis of a Narcissism–Frustration–Regression (NFR) nexus. They construct an idealized Hindu Self, explain how that Self is frustrated and victimized by a non-Hindu Other, and explain why deviations from the idealized Self are necessary to conquer that Other. Ironically, the means to conquer the nonHindu Other are at variance with the idealized Hindu Self. Whatever one may think of it, Hindu nationalists have been quite successful with this strategy. This is because their discourse resonates with wider sections of society. Hindu nationalists are, so to speak, the vanguard of all those who want India to be a Hindu nation. Such public resonance is one of the reasons why Hindu nationalism is appealing to Indian voters. To begin with, Hindu nationalists paint an idealized picture of Hindus as uniquely tolerant and inclusive (narcissism). Next, they claim that acting in accordance with their lofty principles does not work with Muslims and other minorities, who shamelessly take advantage of Hindu benevolence (frustration). This is then used to justify a treatment of the non-Hindu Other that jettisons the idealized Hindu Self (regression). In the next section, I trace the NFR nexus from interviews conducted with Hindu nationalists. Subsequently, I discuss the way historical memories contribute to the Hindu imagination: short-term and selective memory of Hindu–Muslim communalism and riots, remembrance of ‘foreign’ rule and proselytization in previous centuries, and commemoration of the way Hinduism has for more than a thousand years been resilient to the real or perceived onslaught of Muslims and others. This is followed by a discussion of Hindu nationalist prescriptions for India, as well as their suggestions for Europe.

The quest for a Hindu nation  25

In the conclusion, I present my own reflections on what Europeans may take home from this. European self-perception also suffers from narcissism, given the discrepancy between what we identify with (democracy, human rights) and what we practice (regime change, military intervention). This makes us more susceptible to the NFR nexus than we like to think.

The NFR nexus To begin with, Hindu nationalism is not about antagonizing out-groups but embracing the in-group. Critics who denounce ‘othering,’ for example when they see Hindus as vilifying Muslims, miss this important point: Hindu nationalism is as much about as selfing the Self as about othering the Other. This dawned on me in a conversation with a young academic in Hyderabad. She is not a Hindu nationalist but holds cosmopolitan views and teaches apolitical subjects. In a casual chat while we were both sitting at some work stations, and while I was waiting for another interview, she claimed that ‘respect’ was a quintessential Hindu virtue. In her view, Hindu culture socializes people into manifold forms of respect: looking up to elders who rightfully hold authority, trying to understand those who are different from oneself, and adjusting to others when social harmony is at risk. Hindus would give way to others in need. After this benign picture of the Hindu Self, however, she noted that there is a flipside to all of this. Respecting authority figures can turn into servility. Understanding others and adjusting to them can make you exploitable and prone to ‘appeasement.’ She would clearly identify as a cosmopolitan, but the substance of what she said seemed to imply that Hindus are too good for this world. In a tough world where no good deed goes unpunished, as it were, the Hindu-specific respect is bound to be frustrated. One might be tempted to conclude that, if Hindus do not want to be victims of exploitation then they need to become tougher themselves. If ‘we’ are too good for ‘them’ and if ‘they’ frustrate ‘us’ in ways that make us their victims, then ‘we’ need to change gears and show them their place. Having listened, I mirrored back to her that this was what I understood. She did not agree. Maybe I had not understood her properly, or maybe she did not like the implications of what she had said. Either way, it got me thinking that Hindus might sometimes be following a three-step: First, they paint an idealized picture of the in-group. Second, they claim that the in-group is frustrated in encounters with an out-group because its lofty standards are not reciprocated. Third, to avoid this in the future and punish the out-group, they conclude that the in-group must suspend its standards when dealing with the out-group. The result is that the in-group regresses into a reverse image of the idealized Self. We may call this socio-psychological mechanism, which also occurs in other areas, the Narcissism–Frustration–Regression nexus. Frustrated by the lived

26  The quest for a Hindu nation

experience of intercommunal relations, narcissism gives rise to victimhood, and the idealized Self degenerates into the opposite of what it claims to be. Hindu nationalism is understandable from this perspective. It runs somewhat like this: ‘We are inherently good, but they exploit us.They make us victims of our own benevolence. Why should we accept that? They are tough, but we can also be tough. They are united, but we can also be united. Isn’t democracy majority rule? Let us make sure they cannot take advantage of us.’ Under the spell of the NFR nexus, Hinduism may flip into the opposite of the idyllic picture it likes to draw of itself. Thus, Hindu nationalists often raise incompatible claims. On the one hand, they proclaim Hindu dharma as universal. On the other hand, they claim that Hinduism is a value system among others and therefore deserves respect. On the one hand, they claim that Hinduism is not a religion but a way of life. On the other hand, they claim that Hinduism is a religion like others and therefore deserves respect. These claims may seem incompatible, but in the Hindu nationalist imagination they are reconciled by relying on the NFR nexus. One does not have to be a Hindu nationalist to be prone to the NFR nexus. The young academic I met in Hyderabad, for example, is a cosmopolitan. What is more, the fact that there is a socio-psychological mechanism does not mean that people acting under its influence cannot have a point. Good-hearted people are at risk of exploitation. Nevertheless, it would seem that, with a less elevated view of themselves, they would assess situations more realistically. They might then not get frustrated, which in turn would protect them from becoming the opposite of what they aspire to be.

Narcissism Hindu nationalists start and end many conversations with lofty claims about Hinduism. The claims somewhat vary in content, but they always imply that Hinduism is inherently noble. For example, this is what one of my interlocutors, Indresh Kumar, had to say about gatherings of the Hindu nationalist RSS: After a speech or anything, when we have to finally call off our programme, we always chant, Praniyon mein sadbhavna ho: ‘Not only the people but even the cows and buffaloes, all should be happy with each other.’ Even keeda makoda [insects and bugs], pashu-pakshi [animals and birds], ghoda-kutta [horses and dogs]. We always say, Vishva ka kalyan ho: ‘The world should feel happy. The world should be on the path of welfare.’ W   e always chant that. When we say this thing, it is also for you, not only for me. It is for the whole world. In our preaching, even if we have said that it is an Islamic conspiracy, it is a Christian conspiracy, in the end we will pray to God that there should be good feelings among people and everyone should prosper. Even you are included.1 Whether you have met me or not, I pray for you that we should

The quest for a Hindu nation  27

live together with happiness, not with quarrel, not with struggle, not with riots. We should live jointly, in happiness. It is our permanent prayer. Or take Rama Jois, an RSS loyalist and high-ranking former judge and politician from Karnataka. Jois has authored a book entitled Dharma: The Global Ethic (Jois 2010). In the interview, he claimed that dharma stands higher than religion and that only dharma can redeem humanity, citing the Upanishads: vasudhaiva kutumbakam, ‘the entire world is one family.’ In his view, religion is a particular mode of worship whereas dharma is a universal code of conduct. ‘Religion divides humanity. Dharma unites humanity. That is the difference.’ While Jois cites extensively from Sanskrit scriptures, other RSS leaders speak a more modern language. But, like Jois, they claim to be cultural rather than religious nationalists. A few weeks after meeting Jois, I went to the RSS headquarters in Jhandewala Road, New Delhi. After clearing security and walking into the main building, I first had a conversation with an old man who did not understand much English. The old man introduced me to Jitendra Kumar, Officer in Charge, who gave me an interview in a quiet room. Subsequently, we were joined by Anil Vartak, contact person for Hindu organizations abroad, from Nepal to the United Kingdom and the USA. Kumar and Vartak are both seasoned officers. Like all other RSS officers at this senior level, they are unmarried ‘full timers’ (pracharaks) following an ascetic lifestyle. Even though he had entered the room later, Vartak echoed the same themes and repeated almost the same words that Kumar had used before. What I heard from the two RSS officers was similar to what I heard from other people close to the RSS, suggesting intense indoctrination. Thus,Vartak asserted that Hinduism is about nationality and culture rather than religion. ‘Anyone who loves this country   artak emphasized that Hinduism is more of a of Hindustan or India is a Hindu.’ V cultural-geographical term, not one referring to religion. A few months later, at a talk organized by a Hindu nationalist think tank, I heard a similar culture-based account of Hinduism. The speaker was Dattatreya Hosabale, Joint Secretary of the RSS. According to Hosabale, the people living in Bharat (India) have since time immemorial shared a value system and worldview that uniquely supports peaceful coexistence. He claims that, insofar as a nation is formed by the people of a land sharing the same culture, the foundation of ‘unity in diversity’ has always been the Hindu-specific culture.2 In Hosabale’s view, Hindu culture is what unites Indians when religion and language divide them. He accepts that there can be different religions and languages in one nation, and that these can be many nations and languages under one religion. Nevertheless, he insists that there must be one culture. ‘Culture is what makes the nation.’ For that reason, he suggests, Hindu nationalists do not like the notion of composite culture. He grants that a culture can have many expressions, but ultimately it must be one. We should celebrate diversity, but unity is more important. Only with unity, diversity is worth celebrating. Culture reflects

28  The quest for a Hindu nation

a society’s shared values and principles. While Hindu culture is compatible with the universal values of humanity, he asserts, Hinduism is the expression of these universal values in the unique Hindu way.3

Frustration In the Hindu nationalist imagination, the noble Hindu Self is constantly frustrated by negative experiences made in encounters with the ignoble Muslim Other. In the words of Ashwath Narayan, a local BJP politician in Bangalore, Karnataka: ‘It’s not like they tolerate us.’ Or, as RSS leader Indresh Kumar puts it, the Muslims learn from their leaders: Strong muscle power is needed. Weaponry should be strong. Hatred about other religions and communities is a basic need. Hatred will be full of victory. The more hatred you have about the others, the more easily you can be a ruler. Hindu nationalists doubt the loyalty of Muslims to the nation.They feel that Muslims belong to a transnational community of believers and, as such, their loyalty to India is questionable. Barring a few exceptions, they see Muslim loyalties located outside India, in Mecca and Medina. A BJP official gave me a telling example. At his home, the domestic helpers were lower-caste Muslims. One of them, a ‘boy,’ was exhibiting loyalty to Muslim holy places outside India. He had told the boy many times to abandon these loyalties, but he hadn’t. Most Muslims were just drifters, trying to lead decent lives. But that did not alter the fact that, as a community, Muslims had their loyalties outside India (Anonymous A). When Muslims are not seen as intolerant or disloyal, they are seen as backward. This backwardness is seen as frustrating modernization efforts. ‘They have more wives, more marriages. They don’t believe in family planning. They have more children. Hindus have two. Muslims have 15 or 20’ (Jain). An economics professor in Hyderabad expresses a similar sentiment, claiming that Muslims do not practice birth control and can have up to 12 (sic) wives. Normally, he claims, Muslims have ‘four or five wives, a dozen children.’ Muslims are unable to take care of all these children properly, and their family situation is chaotic. Unsurprisingly, he finds, the Muslim community is unable to develop because it is bogged down by internal strife, which makes it also aggressive against outsiders (Nagarjuna). Residential segregation entrenches such views. The same professor told me that he had never been to the Muslim-dominated Old City of Hyderabad, as it was unsafe for a Hindu to go there alone. Even without having seen the area, he was confident that he knew exactly what it was like. When I told him that I had actually been there, he quipped:‘You would have seen green flags on houses; Pakistani flags.’ He was honestly surprised when I informed him that I had in fact seen some green banners, as green is the colour of Islam, but no Pakistani flags at all.

The quest for a Hindu nation  29

Hindu nationalists express dismay that Muslims support communalist leaders. For example,VHP man Surendra Jain deplores that Muslims support the likes of Asaduddin Owaisi, Abu Asim Azmi or Azam Khan rather than the kind of patriotic Muslim leaders he would welcome: towering national figures such as the late President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, secularist leaders like the independence hero Shah Nawaz Khan or even the Muslim figureheads of the BJP such as Mukhtar Abbas Naqvi, Minister of State, or M.J. Akbar, party spokesperson. Jain claims that Hindus are the victims of an Islamic onslaught. Muslims in India ‘are doing all kinds of atrocities on Indian people. They are helping the jihadi people. They are helping the terrorist people.’  Jain complains that Muslims lack respect for Hinduism. ‘They are not ready to accept our feelings.’ On the contrary, ‘the wrath is faced by the Hindu people in India.Why? Are we responsible for it? No.’ In the face of such victimization, he claims, ‘pseudo-secular’ politicians have betrayed the Hindus for selfish reasons. Guided by despicable motives, such politicians are seen as pawns in the hands of unscrupulous Muslims. They ‘concede to their every demand’ and ‘are always with them, whatsoever may be their deeds.’ As is typical of Hindu nationalists, Jain claims that Hindus are by nature tolerant and prone to accommodating others. ‘Faith should not be questioned. Faith should be respected.’  The problem, he suggests, is that Islam and Christianity do not reciprocate such generosity. In the face of other religions, which are out to exploit Hindu tolerance and accommodation, Jain emphasizes that there are clear limits to Hindu generosity. ‘It is not like we have our treasures in the open. Anyone can come and pick them up. Loot is there, and everyone is coming and looting. Christian missionaries, Mohammedan people. Hinduism is not so weak.’ In Jain’s view, cow slaughter is a case in point. Should they not respect our faith? They must. Can I be allowed to kill pigs in Saudi Arabia? Can I be allowed to kill or sell the meat of pig in Pakistan? I will be killed. I must respect the sentiments of the majority people, the sentiments of the land.

Regression As we already begin to see, it is a short way from feelings of frustration and victimization to proclaiming the need for relentless retaliation. In the process, the cherished Hindu Self becomes more similar to the loathed Muslim Other than it would like to acknowledge. The conceptual groundwork is relatively subtle. For example, Jain made the usual claim that Hinduism is not a religion but a way of life, citing the Supreme Court and asserting that the values of Hinduism are the shared values of the entire world as one family. But after talking about Muslims for a while, he subtly changed terminology and said that Hinduism was uniquely respectful

30  The quest for a Hindu nation

of ‘other religions.’  This is not a slip of tongue but indicates that even Hinduism becomes a religion when in rivalry with Christianity, Islam or any other religion. Next, let us consider an interview with one of the founding figures of the RSS, ‘Guruji’ Golwalkar (1971). In this interview, which is still on the Internet as the ‘official stand’ of the RSS, Golwalkar demands religious education where people should be given ‘true knowledge of Islam’ and ‘true knowledge of Hinduism.’ The parallelism already shows that Hinduism is seen as religion. At the same time, Golwalkar sticks to the notion of Hinduism as a way of life. This allows him, later   hile the idea in the same interview, to claim that there are ‘Hindu Muslims.’ W of Hindu Muslims would be inoffensive if ‘Hindus’ simply meant ‘Children of Bharat,’ it becomes divisive in a context where the term Hinduism is juxtaposed with other religions. Something similar has happened with the term Indianization (Bharatiyakaran). In the interview cited above, Golwalkar declares that all Indians, including Muslims, should look to India rather than some foreign lands. This sounds inoffensive. In the mouth of a local politician, however, Indianization means that, for Indians to ‘bond’ together as a nation, they cannot be allowed to keep their separate identities (Narayan). This already sounds more restrictive. When expressed explicitly in the context of Hindu–Muslim relations, Indianization means that Muslims, whose key allegiance might be to ‘Mecca and Medina,’ must transfer their loyalty to India. As we have seen, this may culminate in highly repressive demands: Muslims shouting Pakistan zindabad (‘Long live Pakistan’) should be sent packing to Pakistan (I. Kumar). Demanding that Hinduism must assert itself against Islam, or demanding that Hindus must assert themselves against Muslims, belies the claim that, unlike religions, Hinduism is a unifying force, and that, unlike Muslims, Hindus are tolerant. Once Hinduism becomes something asserting itself against others, the gloves come off and Hindus see themselves as entitled to forms of conduct that exactly mirror what they detest in others. According to Jain, for example, Muslims have forced Hindus to pay them back in their own coin. Post-1992, Hindus are retaliating. They never start any communal violence. But they are not ready to bear the wrath of communal violence as of now. We are not going to bear the burden of their jihad now. Now Hindus are retaliating (. . .). Because we are tired of being beaten, being killed, our ladies being taken away in the name of love jihad. (. . .) Now Hindu [sic] cannot sit silently as he was before 1992. Now he will retaliate if the state machinery does not come forward to save him from the jihadis. How can this be made compatible with lofty proclamations of dharma and Hindu tolerance? In principle this seems impossible, but the Narcissism–Frustration– Regression nexus makes it possible.Within this nexus, some people can specialize

The quest for a Hindu nation  31

more on narcissism, others on the expression of frustration, and still others on the justification of regression. Thus, Jois and Jain are both members of the sangh parivar, but the former is an intellectual directly serving the RSS whereas the latter is an identity entrepreneur for the VHP. Their separate roles may explain their seemingly divergent stances. Jois puts the emphasis more on Hindutva as a noble cause for humanity, whereas Jain positions Hindus and Hinduism in opposition to Muslims and Islam. These are different moves in the same game. Incidentally, the RSS has even found a way of recurring to Hindu doctrine to rationalize such duplicity: Sanatana dharma is concerned with moral universals; yuga dharma provides the ethics for a given age; and apad dharma offers latitude in situations of distress. Hindus are committed to sanatana dharma in an ideal world, accept yuga dharma as part of the human condition in this day and age, and embrace apad dharma to prevail over others (Damle).

Short and long memories Like any other Indian elite, Hindu nationalist leaders talk much about the past. But their short-term memory is less developed than their long-term memory. As far as the short term is concerned, they selectively remember communalism and communal violence, especially when perpetrated by Muslims. Otherwise, their imagination is captured by the remembrance of historical events that date back considerably further, such as Muslim (and, subsequently, European) rule and proselytization. Harking back even further, they proudly commemorate Hindu civilization as an ancestral framework of socio-religious order that has been, and continues to be, resilient to the onslaught of Muslims and various other challengers.

Communalism and riots No discussion of Hindu nationalism is complete without reference to communalism and riots. After all, this is what Indian and Western critics claim Hindu nationalism is all about. Ever since the days of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, critics have described Hindu nationalism as Hindu communalism writ large. At the time of the Hindu nationalist revival of the 1980s, India’s leftist and liberal circles expressed concern about Hindutva as communalist or even fascist (Panikkar 1991). This concern made way to outright alarm after the destruction of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya and subsequent riots in the early 1990s (Bidwai, Mukhia and Vanaik 1996; Vanaik 1997). Western scholars have expressed similar views, denouncing Hindutva as Hindu communalism in disguise (Jaffrelot 1996; Nussbaum 2007). For obvious reasons, Hindu nationalists shun the labels their opponents would like to stick on them. Instead, they assert that Hindutva is a noble cause that has

32  The quest for a Hindu nation

nothing to do with petty rifts between communities. They emphasize that communal violence is an expression of local fractures whereas Hindutva is a unifying force that, if anything, will put an end to the divisive politics surrounding communal violence. When I asked my Hindu nationalist interlocutors about their views on communal violence, some would flatly deny that Hindu nationalists have ever had anything to do with it. Others would put the blame on Muslims and/or so-called pseudo-secularist leaders. Still others would trivialize Hindu– Muslim violence as spontaneous clashes arising from uneasy cohabitation among underclass slum dwellers. What to make of it? On the one hand, there is no denying the affinity between Hindu nationalism and Hindu communalism. From the Arya Samaj to the Hindu Mahasabha and from the sangh parivar to the BJP, Hindu nationalism and Hindu communalism have always been connected. On the other hand, it is unfair to equate Hindutva with communalism as leftists and liberals often do. Not every Hindu nationalist is a communalist, and not every communalist is a Hindu nationalist. Many votaries of Hindutva are simply religious nationalists, basing their patriotism on religion rather than ethnicity or language. Many communalists are driven by petty concerns of this or that local community, rather than being religious nationalists.

Muslim rule and proselytization While Hindu nationalists play down communalism and riots, they play up the remembrance of Muslim rule. In this context, they often express their pride in the staying power of Hinduism. As evidence, they point to the limited success of Muslims to convert Hindus. Some Hindus converted over many centuries of Muslim rule, but a great majority did not, unlike what happened in other parts of the Islamic crescent, from North Africa to Indonesia. This is how Surendra Jain explains the limited number of converts despite the ‘fact’ that, for centuries, India was exposed to Muslim conquerors and Islamic proselytization: The credit goes to our strong bonds to our religions, to our traditions. We could sacrifice everything, but not our religion. It is our main thrust. That is why the Islamists or the missionaries, they could not succeed to that extent which they succeeded in many other nations. They converted the entire nation in one year, two years, even in five years or ten years. But they could not succeed here. They converted crores of Hindus, no doubt [1 crore = 10 million]. They killed lakhs of Hindus, no doubt [1 lakh = 100,000]. They took away lakhs of our mothers and sisters as sex slaves in their countries. Even then, they could not convert the entire nation. Jain does not deny that some Hindus did convert to Islam. After all, most Indian Muslims are not the progeny of foreign conquerors or traders but descendants of

The quest for a Hindu nation  33

native converts. However, he sees this ‘third type’ of Indian Muslims as ‘the worst sufferers.’ In his view, they are torn between Indian patriotism and Islam as a ‘foreign’ religion. He feels that Muslims should identify only with India, and finds their continued identification with Islam pathological. The natural law says that they should hate the people who put various atrocities on their ancestors. It is a natural law.They should try to hate them. They have killed their ancestors. They have taken their mothers and sisters as sex slaves. Even then, this third type of Muslims, which is 90–95% of the Islamic society, now at this time, they are with the people who intruded, who came here as invaders. Absurdly, in Jain’s view, Indian Muslims continue to identify with the religion of their erstwhile tormentors and ‘lay wrath on the entire Hindu society.’ In contrast with the progeny of Muslim converts for whom Jain has only pity and scorn, he praises those Hindu ‘warriors,’ or Kshatriyas, who would rather become ‘untouchables,’ or Dalits, than convert to Islam or pay tribute to Muslim rulers. According to this narrative, some of India’s Dalits are actually the progeny of heroic Hindus who were pushed down the social ladder because they refused to convert to Islam.This serves two functions at once. It extends a palm leaf to Dalits who, historically, have been treated unkindly by upper-caste Hindus. At the same time, it puts the blame for their low social status on Muslims, thus exonerating upper-caste Hindus. An anonymous BJP official high up the Party’s hierarchy makes a similar claim. He suggests that the Valmiki caste of Dalits originally were Kshatriyas pushed down the social ladder due to their refusal to convert. The Valmikis, he claims, are ‘handsome people,’ showing their warrior lineage. He further suggests that the Valmikis are uniquely successful in competing against lumpen elements among the Muslims. The secret of their success, he claims, is a mimicry of sorts whereby the Valmikis have adopted features from their Muslim oppressors in their diet, dress code, seclusion of women etc., while at the same time antagonizing them, for example by raising pigs to keep the Muslims away from their living quarters. He claims that in the Old City of Hyderabad, where many other Hindus have moved out, the Valmikis hold on to their slums thanks to such time-honoured practices (Anonymous A).4

Hindu civilization The greatest source of pride for Hindu nationalists is Hindu civilization, which in their view has always been and will always be resilient to any challenge. This became clear from various interviews, including a frank exchange of views with a senior BJP politician working in the Modi government. The politician is from a top family and resides in one of the largest offices I have ever seen, in one of

34  The quest for a Hindu nation

the iconic blocks built by Edwin Lutyens. Unfortunately, I cannot give his name because he told me the interview was not for attribution (Anonymous B). Instead of the usual interview, the politician first quizzed me about my own views. He then gave me a tour d’horizon, making three points about Indian civilization. His first point was that ‘Hindu–Muslim engagement is very ancient.’ T   here were two societies, a Hindu and a Muslim one, which had coevolved over a ‘long   here were ancient echoes and memories attached to that and chequered history.’ T history.The result was a variety of ‘problems,’ ‘fault lines,’ and ‘deep cultural differ  et, it was clear that Hindus had kept the upper hand in the civilizational ences.’ Y encounter. The politician recommended the writings of William Dalrymple who had understood that ‘Islam in India is different from elsewhere because it has changed.’ Indian Islam was an adaptation to Hindu civilization. Despite countervailing tendencies like ‘Deoband’ and ‘Salafism,’ Islam had become ‘Indianized,’ as could be seen from Indian forms of Sufism. What is more, in India the encounter had taken place in the heartland of the civilization, whereas in Europe it had happened only at the fringes (Andalusia, Balkans). His second point expanded on the notion of civilizational synthesis. One of the most impressive features of Indian civilization was its ‘syncretic ability,’ an ability that European civilization was lacking. Hindu civilization was ‘syncretic and assimilative: it absorbs.’ Buddhism and Jainism had both at one time posed a challenge to Brahminical Hinduism, but subsequently they were reabsorbed. Buddhism was a religion of the book, which showed Hinduism’s capacity to absorb even scriptural religions. Islam had not been absorbed but, at least to a degree, been transformed by its encounter with Hinduism. Islam in India was not like Islam in Iran, Saudi Arabia and so on. It was softer and more inclusive. Hence, interreligious coexistence and mutual respect were possible, to a degree. Emphatically, this was not due to Islam but Indian civilization. As evidence, he invited me to look at Islam elsewhere. His third point was that, despite having benefitted from the encounter with Hinduism, there were serious problems with Muslims and Islam. Deep fault lines remained.There was coexistence, not integration. Christianity had its own history of intolerance, but it had come a long way. When asked whether someone like Gandhi could go to heaven, some Christians might have difficulties but ultimately even the pope would accept it as a possibility (maybe not every pope, but ‘this pope would’). Christians were accepting, to an extent, that non-Christians can be saved. ‘We are all children of God.’ Not so for Islam, where no kafir (unbeliever) can ever go to paradise. On the one hand, he found, this was understandable: How could you accept those whose souls you consider doomed? On the other hand, he regretfully concluded that between Hindus and Muslims there could only ever be coexistence, nothing more. The upshot was that, while Hinduism was inherently accommodative and conducive to cultural synthesis, there were practical limitations to this. In the case of Islam, even Indian civilization could only reach to coexistence level. In the

The quest for a Hindu nation  35

politician’s view, there were unavoidable limits for Hindus to coexist with Muslims although, without the benign influence of Indian civilization on Islam, even such coexistence would hardly be thinkable.The problem was not with Indian civilization but with the worldview expressed in the shahada: La ilaha illallah muhammadur rasulullah. (‘There is no God but Allah. Muhammad is God’s messenger.’)

Prescriptions for India There are significant differences in style between the spiritual outpourings of an RSS ideologue like Rama Jois and the street-fighting ethos of an identity entrepreneur from the radical fringe like Surendra Jain, who worked for Bajrang Dal before moving to the VHP. Similarly, there are significant differences between the intellectual aloofness of the BJP politician cited in the last section (Anonymous B) and the gentleman communalist at the BJP headquarters, introduced in Chapter 2 (Anonymous A). Despite such differences, there is a remarkable consistency not only to the Hindu nationalist worldview but also to what Hindu nationalists prescribe for India and its Muslims. Ultimately, what Hindu nationalists demand is this: ‘Don’t identify as Muslim or Christian or Brahmin or whatever. You are Bharatiyas: sons, children of Bharat Mata [Mother India]’ (Jois). This does not mean that Indians cannot be Muslims, but they are expected to identify with India rather than Islam. There is no level playing field between Hindus and other communities. On the one hand, Hindu nationalists see the reconversion of Muslims and Christians to Hinduism as a noble cause and would welcome them to ‘come home’ (ghar wapsi) to their Hindu roots. On the other hand, they adamantly oppose Muslim and Christian attempts to convert Hindus to Islam and Christianity (Katju 2015). The upshot is that Muslims and other minorities should accept their subordinate status within a framework of Hindu hegemony.

‘Real secularism’ Hindu nationalists claim that ‘pseudo-secularist’ politicians are biased in favour of Muslims. In contrast to this, they claim, Hindu nationalism stands for ‘real secularism.’ In their view, pseudo-secularists support religious minorities for opportunistic reasons, regardless of whether or not they deserve it, whereas real secularists support only those communities who show respect for other religions. Jain claims that the attitude of the real secularist is as follows: He respects all religions, but he also respects the laws of the land. He does not believe in favouritism to any particular section of a religion simply because of his ulterior motives. He respects the laws of the nation. He respects the interests of the nation. The pseudo-secularist people try to favour a certain section of a particular religion in the name of secularism

36  The quest for a Hindu nation

for their ulterior motive. The ulterior motive may be money. The ulterior motive may be status. It may be political power. More specifically, Jain finds it pseudo-secularist to expect a Hindu to wear a Muslim cap or to celebrate Eid while not expecting a Muslim to come to the temple or to celebrate Diwali. He also finds it wrong to assume that Muslims are secularist simply because they belong to a minority, while expecting from Hindus that they must earn their secularist credentials. In a similar vein, an RSS officer claims that ‘ambitious politicians’ from the Congress and other such parties stir up the Muslims against the Hindus, telling them that they should be different and that, by claiming such difference, they can ‘get many things in their interest.’ Fortunately, he suggests, Modi is now telling the Muslims: ‘You are part of India. Maybe you go to the masjid [mosque], but you are Indians. Become part of the country, and there will be no problem.’ He welcomes that Modi is showing the Muslims: ‘Your forefathers are from this country, not from Iran or Arabia.’ In his view, Modi’s message is that Hindus and Muslims can live together because Muslims have similar interests as Hindus. He claims that this is somewhat new to Indian Muslims, but that now, with Modi, they are finally realizing it (J. Kumar). Rama Jois argues that there is a fundamental difference between the secularism of the West, which is a reaction to an overbearing church, and the Indian kind of secularism, which is ‘respect for all religions.’ On the one hand, this echoes an established scholarly position (Bhargava 2010). On the other hand, Hindu nationalists demand ‘respect for all religions’ from a partisan rather than a neutral perspective. In their view, ‘real secularism’ comes down to Hindus respecting other religions as long as those other religions respect Hinduism. This means that Hindus remain free to withdraw their respect when they feel it is not reciprocated. To some extent, ‘real secularism’ opens space for coalitions with Muslims willing to engage in mutual respect. In Jammu and Kashmir, for instance, there has been a coalition government of Hindu nationalists and non-orthodox Muslims going beyond the ‘disloyalty-traitor syndrome’ and committed to preserving the state’s ‘composite culture’ against Islamist onslaughts.5 In such coalitions, the Hindu nationalists remain in control because it is they who determine, in any given situation, whether Muslims are sufficiently respectful of Hindus. Hindu nationalists become highly emotional when they feel that Muslims are being ‘appeased.’ T   hey attribute the blame for appeasement not only to the Muslims but also to ‘pseudo-secularists.’ On the one hand, they explain appeasement by the ‘aggressiveness’ of Muslims making exploitative claims. On the other hand, they blame ‘pseudo-secularist’ politicians, typically from the Congress but also from other ‘so-called secular’ parties such as Samajwadi Party, Bahujan Samaj Party, Janata Dal and various other regional and caste parties. Ultimately, the Hindu nationalist version of secularism follows the Narcissism– Frustration–Regression nexus. To begin with, Hindu nationalists paint Hinduism

The quest for a Hindu nation  37

as the epitome of secularism and respect for other religions. Next, they claim that disrespectful Muslims and their ‘pseudo-secularist’ minions short-change the unwitting Hindu majority. Finally, they propose ‘real secularism’ whereby Hindu respect for Muslims is conditional on Muslim respect for Hindus. When required, secularism becomes a vehicle for teaching Muslims respect. All of this provides Hindu nationalists with a narrative that they can mobilize for their purposes. In this narrative, Hindus are the real secularists. But, having been frustrated and victimized by Muslims, they are forced to be tough. The following statement wraps it up nicely: ‘We do not need a certificate to be secular. That is why we allowed outsiders to come and prosper in our country. However, they misused our goodwill. The Christians and Muslims do not believe in sarva dharma samabhava [all religions are equal]’ (cited in Katju 2003, 120–21).

Muslim ‘upliftment’ Hindu nationalists find that Muslims are responsible for their own backwardness. ‘If we consider them as backward, are Hindus responsible for it? They are backward, if they are, due to their own religious faith’ (Jain). Accordingly, it is the responsibility of Muslims to improve their own situation. Old-school Hindu nationalists prefer the idea of ‘upliftment’ to more modern notions such as upward social mobility. According to the Bhagavad Gita, Chapter 6, Verse 5: ‘Uddharet atmana – one has to uplift oneself by one’s own efforts’ (Jois). Others prefer the language of development. Jitendra Kumar suggests that India should follow the model of ‘Modi’s Gujarat where Muslims are not an anti-social element. They are now working for the development and interest of Gujarat.’ Apparently, RSS officers are sometimes ‘sitting together with Muslims to reduce tensions.’  Kumar finds that the Muslims feel ‘comfi’ in such meetings and appreciate the cultural affinity. West Bengal, he asserts, has 30% Muslims, many of whom are joining the BJP. Muslims feel that ‘the future is in the BJP’s hands,’ so ‘why not join?’ Kumar predicts that, before long, Muslims will still go to mosques or even madrasas, but they will live for the interest of the nation. ‘That is all we want.’6 Another RSS officer concurs that Muslims ought to contribute to the development of the nation. ‘It is incumbent on them to join for the future, progress and so on’ (Vartak). A professor of economics praises the transformative power of development. ‘If their income increases, they are capable of spending more. Their standard of living increases. Their savings increase. Their children can go to better schools. There will not be any conflict at their home’ (Nagarjuna). Like most other Hindu nationalists whom I interviewed, the professor does not support the idea of job reservations for Muslims, which he associates with vote bank politics. I found only one Hindu nationalist endorsing job reservations for Muslims: Ashwath Narayan, Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) for the BJP in Bangalore, Karnataka. Reservations for Muslims are already practiced in his

38  The quest for a Hindu nation

state. Narayan admits that Muslims suffer from negative stereotyping and unfair discrimination. For example, a Muslim who is entirely peaceful may be falsely associated with terrorism.Yet, even Narayan feels that ultimately it is the responsibility of Muslims and their leaders to address their own backwardness. He finds it objectionable when Muslims ‘take two steps backward and ask others to come forward.’

Perennial issues There are at least three standing items in the arsenal of Hindu nationalist demands: (re)building the Ram Temple at Ayodhya, introducing a uniform civil code to do away with special laws for communities, and repealing the autonomy statute for Muslim-majority Kashmir under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. Especially when it comes to demanding a uniform civil code to do away with sharia rules and other special provisions for Muslims, Hindus are seen as victims of appeasement: ‘We Hindus are asking: Consider both of us on the same lines. Don’t try to give them more and us less rights. Give both of us the same rights’ (Narayan). In practice, the BJP leadership understands that insisting on such claims is unrealistic. The Party must strike a balance between the hard core of the sangh parivar and moderate currents in the electorate. Those supporting the Party because of Modi’s development agenda or because of disillusionment with the Congress might not appreciate a radical stance (Anonymous A). Take for example Varun Gandhi, a scion of the Nehru–Gandhi family. After I had contacted his office, he called me back and told me that his position was simple: ‘Religion should stay out of politics. India is a syncretic country. Issues of religion are highly delicate.’7 Varun Gandhi is an estranged grandson of Indira Gandhi. Like his mother Maneka, he supports Modi and the BJP. He speaks for others who support the BJP not because they are convinced Hindu nationalists but because they are disappointed with the Congress, despite their adherence to mainstream secularist values.

Suggestions for Europe Hindu nationalists have strong views about what Europeans should learn from the Indian experience.These views are controversial, but let me first present them in their own right. Subsequently, I will take a more critical stance by reverting to the NFR nexus. In Jain’s view, India suffers from an Islamist onslaught that Europe is also going to face as immigrant populations continue to grow. He sees events like the 2015 assault on the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo as minor incidents – minor in the way that ‘they are the reflection of a big trend that you are going to face in the future.’ He suggests that, like their Indian coreligionists, European Muslims

The quest for a Hindu nation  39

will uphold a separate identity and demand separate laws. In his view, Muslims start raising demands for special treatment when they exceeded 5% of the population, as is already the case in several European countries. When they exceed 10%, they ‘start struggling and doing all nuisance with the local people. When they exceeded 15%, Muslims will definitely demand a separate nation as they are doing in India.’ Jain finds that there is no point in trying to reach a compromise with Muslims. If you compromise with jihadis, their demands increase like anything. It cannot be fulfilled.That is why their many leaders say: ‘Thanks to your secular principles, we will conquer you. And thanks to our religious principles, we will dominate you forever.’  We must try to understand that we both have the same problems. He suggests that people in the West are in denial, attributing terrorist attacks to lunatics rather than acknowledging that the perpetrators are genuinely fighting in the name of Islam. He criticizes that, except for France at one time, as well as Putin’s Russia, no European ever dares to say in plain words that ‘Islam is a threat for us.’ He finds that the tendency to sugar-coat the Muslim threat is not so much a matter of political correctness but rather a ‘suicidal effort.’ The remedy, Jain suggests, is to demand that migrants must respect the culture of the land. He finds that every nation has some culture, and it is improper to allow people to ignore that culture in the name of multiculturalism. When migrants insult the culture of their host country, one should tell them: ‘All right, the doors are open for you – not to come in, but to go outside.’ A BJP politician working for the government (Anonymous B) feels that Europe lacks the syncretic ability of Indian civilization. As we have seen, he finds that Hindu civilization has a unique syncretic ability that has shaped Indian Islam in its image, making coexistence between Hindus and Muslims if not easy then at least possible. Regretfully, he suggests, achieving even such a limited modus vivendi with Muslims would be very hard for Europe. A high-ranking BJP official (Anonymous A) puts it more drastically. He suggests that, like India, Europe is facing serious trouble from Muslims but feels that the challenges are going to be significantly harder for Europe than for India. Initially, Europe might be able to withstand Muslim lawlessness to a better degree because institutions are strong and the host societies are modern. However, India has developed ways of dealing with Muslims that will continue to work in the future. He compares India with an organism that has been exposed to all sorts of germs while growing up. Europe, by contrast, is like an organism that has been spared exposure to such germs. He suggests that this makes Europe much more vulnerable. He suggests that one should add Europe’s problems with ageing societies and the decline of family values among Europeans who hardly want to have any children – a perfect recipe for disaster.

40  The quest for a Hindu nation

The BJP official finds that political correctness is a considerable problem in Europe. Leaders should call the problems by their name, as France had done of late. In his view, another problem is the inability of non-Muslim elites to agree on anything. He finds Muslims incredibly united compared to their host societies. To bring this home, he draws a hypothetical comparison: Put three non-Muslim leaders into a room, and they will not agree on anything even after three years. One will demand birth control, but the other two won’t agree.Two will prescribe education to fix Muslim backwardness, but the third one will say that this is not going to address the issue. Put 3,000 Muslims into a room, and they will act like one man after three minutes; or maybe not exactly like one man as there are divisions, but Muslims will act collectively. In his view, Europeans must act before it is too late and the situation becomes irreversible. His prescription is to impose the same rules on minorities as on everyone else, plus mandatory birth control. Whether in India or Europe, minorities must respect the law of the land. Ashwath Narayan, the BJP politician in Bangalore, puts it more diplomatically: If I have migrated to your country, [then] if I practice my own way, live on my own terms, without integrating with your society, how can I expect you to integrate me? If I don’t integrate, I am not patriotic about the place where I’m living. Can I stand alone? Otherwise, I should not migrate to your place. Once I’m coming, I should mentally prepare. I should decide if I have come there to stay temporarily or permanently. If I am coming there for a permanent stay, I should integrate with society.

Conclusion Hindu nationalists are prone to the Narcissism–Frustration–Regression nexus. However, the same applies to others as well. Many movements on the left and right are afflicted by the NFR nexus, which reflects a general human tendency of turning against others when suffering frustration. Individuals behave in this way, and so do social groups and communities. We must keep an open mind as to when the NFR nexus is pathological and when it is rather a healthy defence mechanism. It is pathological when it leads to people blaming their victims without even noticing. In some situations, however, it can also be justified. Good-natured people do get exploited, and sometimes they have no other choice than to push back. Fortunately, there is a practical way to avoid the NFR nexus. Instead of indulging in an idealized self-perception, we may form a more realistic and less narcissistic view of ourselves. This should enable us to be less frustrated when others disappoint our expectations. Rather than feeling victimized, we may then analyse the situation and develop strategies to deal with others appropriately, but short of

The quest for a Hindu nation  41

regressing into the opposite of what we aspire to be. Harbouring a less elevated view of ourselves may be helpful in negotiating relations with others. Europeans should bear this in mind when pondering whether to accept any of the Hindu nationalist suggestions outlined above. What is more, ‘we’ in the West should think hard about whether and how we might be susceptible to the NFR nexus ourselves. Like Hindu nationalists, we are often narcissistic in claiming adherence to superior moral values. For example, many of us profess a belief in democracy and human rights. There is of course nothing wrong with these values, but when their pursuit becomes frustrated, we start looking out for villains. When these villains target innocent foreigners, our governments sometimes resort to regime change and humanitarian intervention. In the course of such intervention, terrible atrocities are committed. Thereby, we and our leaders risk undermining the values that we so cherish. Nevertheless, few of us own up to the inconvenient truth that Western practices are at variance with the exalted view of the West as a champion of democracy and human rights. It gets even worse when we feel victimized ourselves. Then we declare the state of exception and resort to emergency measures (Agamben 2005). Under the guise of counterterrorism, we compromise the values we claim to hold dear. This may be unavoidable and even justified when the threat is real, but beware of the Narcissism–Frustration–Regression nexus.

Notes 1 Par ant mein hum pray yahi karenge bhagwan se, sab mein sadbhavna ho, sab ka bhalla ho. Uss mein aap sab included hain. 2 Hosabale cited approvingly Huntington and Harrison (2000). 3 Address by Dattatreya Hosabale, Joint General Secretary of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), at the India Ideas Conclave, Goa, 17 November 2015. 4 The point about the Valmikis as fallen Kshatriyas is also found in the interview with Anil Vartak. 5 Address by Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, at the India Ideas Conclave, Goa, 16 November 2015. 6 On the ‘Gujarat model’ of Muslim integration under Modi, see also Kishwar (2014). 7 Phone call, 8 August 2015.

4 THE MUSLIM QUEST FOR ACCOMMODATION THE MUSLIM QUEST FOR ACCOMMODATIONTHE MUSLIM QUEST FOR ACCOMMODATION

Compared to the united front presented by Hindu nationalists, Muslims offer a heterogeneous picture. While the sangh parivar is spread all over India, there is no equivalent pan-Indian Muslim movement. While the BJP claims to represent all Hindus, there is no political party to unite all Indian Muslims. Depending on region or locality, Muslims vote for a wide range of non-Muslim parties.They are not just a minority. They are a fragmented minority. Unlike Hindu nationalists, Muslims therefore seek accommodation and security rather than hegemony and supremacy. Their immediate concerns are of a practical nature: a share of job reservations, better access to education and, above all, no riots. Beyond such specific demands, Muslims can hardly agree on what they want and how to get it. Almost all Muslims and their leaders seek accommodation of one form or another, but they seek different kinds of accommodation and they do so in different ways. This chapter provides a spectrum of views held by Muslim leaders.1 In the first section, I discuss the weakness of Muslim leadership. Next, I present three types of Muslim leaders: identity entrepreneurs, community brokers and Muslim figureheads. Subsequently, I discuss different ways by which Muslim leaders represent their community and seek accommodation for it: continuing to embrace the secularist establishment; operating through Muslim-led parties; and submitting to Hindu supremacy in exchange for resources and protection from Hindu nationalists. I then survey the views of Muslim leaders on key issues, from discrimination to job reservations and from education to communal violence. As in other chapters, I assess their suggestions for Europe and ponder which lessons, if any, can be taken from India.

The Muslim quest for accommodation  43

‘Where are the Muslim leaders?’ There is an adage among Indians: Muslim leadership is weak. Apart from the first generation of independence leaders, most Muslims serving in the Congress and other secularist parties were figureheads. In the current BJP government, Muslim leadership seems even weaker. Several of my interlocutors asked the same rhetorical question: ‘Where are the Muslim leaders?’  They would first reminisce about independence leaders such as Maulana Azad, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai and Sheikh Abdullah from Kashmir. Then, they would deplore the absence of such towering figures in contemporary Indian politics.When pressed, they would of course not deny that there are Muslim leaders of some kind. But they would still insist that there are no tall Muslim leaders, or that there are no enlightened Muslim leaders, at the national level. Take for example Najeeb Jung, Lieutenant Governor of New Delhi (2013–16). Jung finds that one can count India’s enlightened Muslim leaders on the fingers of one hand: Maulana Azad (1888–1958), Sheikh Abdullah (1905–82) and Abdul Faridi from Uttar Pradesh (1913–74). Obviously, they are all dead. After them, no one else comes to his mind. At present, he laments, there is no enlightened Muslim leader – ‘unless you say that I am a leader.’ We discussed the prospects for him to become a national Muslim leader. Jung was palpably excited by the idea but cautioned that becoming a Muslim leader was more easily said than done. Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, had himself struggled in this regard. A Muslim leader had to ‘change his dress code and personality.’ This was a serious problem for secular people. Jinnah, for that matter, ‘did not know how to pray; I do not know how to pray.’ In the case of Jinnah, at some point ‘his wife wanted so serve ham sandwiches; he almost fainted because that could have finished his political career’ (see Chagla 1973, 117–19). The bottom line was that it is hard to be an enlightened Muslim leader. In fact, there were no such leaders. A Muslim intellectual in Bangalore notes that the problem is particularly acute in North India. The Muslim intelligentsia from Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal migrated to Pakistan after partition, leaving behind a leadership vacuum. He deplores the fact that, since then, the Muslim leadership in these states, as well as their successor states (Jharkhand, Uttarakhand and Chhattisgarh), has come ‘from the religious class, which does not understand the modern concept of nation state, secular state, constitutional state, gender relations, or minoritymajority relations’ (Siraj). A Muslim social activist from Uttar Pradesh is similarly unhappy with reactionary ‘socio-religious leaders’ who thrive on polarizing narratives rather than pursuing community development of a kind that might lead to progress for Muslims (Alam 2016). Another explanation comes from M.J. Akbar, a Muslim intellectual and author of several books. At the time of the interview, Akbar was a BJP spokesman. He

44  The Muslim quest for accommodation

is now Minister of State for External Affairs. Akbar claims that, for many decades, India’s Muslims have ‘outsourced’ their leadership to non-Muslim parties. The Congress is the prime example, but not the only one. In Uttar Pradesh, the Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party have for at least two decades not just survived but thrived on the Muslim vote. Janata Dal in Bihar is another case in point. In West Bengal, Muslims have for 35 years supported the Marxists who ‘used them to win elections, and then did nothing for them,’ despite the fact that West Bengal is about 30% Muslim. Akbar suggests that, on the one hand, Muslims have been comfortable serving as a vote bank. On the other hand, their aspirations are legitimately high. This creates not only dissatisfaction but also the space for communalist leaders such as Owaisi. But is the Majlis Party going to be able to attract non-Muslim voters in sufficient numbers to consolidate its presence outside Hyderabad? Akbar doubts it. Ultimately, he finds, there is no reasonable alternative to outsourcing power to established political parties – and be it the BJP.

Three types of Muslim leaders While there appears to be a shortage of tall and enlightened Muslim leaders at the national level, there is no shortage of Muslim leaders as such. In what follows, we meet seven of them.To begin with, we meet three identity entrepreneurs: Asaduddin Owaisi (Majlis), Abu Asim Azmi (Samajwadi) and Al-Nasser Zakaria (Congress). Subsequently, we meet two community brokers: Jaffer Sharief (Congress) and turncoat politician Mumtaz Ali Khan. Finally, we meet two Muslim figureheads: Roshan Baig (Congress) and, again, M.J. Akbar (BJP).

Identity entrepreneurs Muslim identity entrepreneurs seek to attract followers by appealing to Muslim pride. A good example is Asaduddin Owaisi. Radiating out from its headquarters in Hyderabad and with variable success, his Majlis Party has in recent years tried to expand into other parts of India. Starting with Maharashtra, the Majlis has aspired to become a pan-Indian Muslim political party. As we have already seen in Chapter 2, Owaisi is the paragon of a ‘proud’ Muslim. Owaisi is the Party’s only Member of Parliament at the Lok Sabha in New Delhi, and a prominent but controversial figure. On the one hand, he holds a degree from the London School of Economics and is a barrister at Lincoln’s Inn, London. On the other hand, he does not shirk from using a colourful Islamist idiom when catering to his Muslim constituents. His political formula is a mix of youthful identity politics and old-style community brokerage. Despite the media image of a tough-talking and hard-hitting leader, the element of patronage remains very important. Who would have

The Muslim quest for accommodation  45

expected a member of parliament and the supreme leader of an important party to sign off on train reservations and lobby for sewage lines? Yet, this is precisely what Owaisi was doing when we met for the interview (see p. 15). When I enquired whether this was normal, he proudly asserted that, unlike elsewhere, the arrangement at Darussalam was ‘open,’ with people meeting and gathering in a public space. ‘Other parties? I’m sure, if you go round, nowhere in India will you find such a strong arrangement.’ Yet, Owaisi’s trademark is identity politics rather than patronage. Speaking up on behalf of Muslims as a community is what makes him and his party known beyond the confines of Hyderabad, and potentially attractive to a wider Muslim electorate. Respect for Muslims, and Muslim self-respect, is high on his agenda. Owaisi is eager to reap electoral gain from the perception of discrimination and injustice against Muslims. Indeed, critical academics argue that the Party caters to Muslim pride rather than delivering results, thus betraying its local constituents in Hyderabad. For example, when urban planners propose a refurbishment of the decrepit Old City, the Majlis Party adamantly opposes it (Rao and Thaha 2012). Muslim identity politics works because it appeals to sentiments of victimization. Owaisi started the interview by talking about Muslim underrepresentation. He bitterly complained that, while many Muslims were happy to vote for secular candidates, non-Muslims were hardly willing to vote for a Muslim candidate even when the Muslim was presented on the list of a secularist party. As a result, Muslims did not get the political representation they deserved. Owaisi demands respect for the people he represents as Muslims and not just as individuals. ‘If you say that we will respect you if you dissolve your identity as a Muslim, then that cannot happen.’ In his view, people who make respect conditional in such ways should not be respected themselves. To Hindu nationalists, who might do just that, he has to say: ‘I can respect a person who accepts the differences between us, but whose core ideology does not mean that I should be annihilated or that my identity should be finished. I cannot respect those organizations.’ Another Muslim identity entrepreneur is Abu Asim Azmi, the president of the Samajwadi Party in Maharashtra. As a politician, Azmi acts as a representative of Muslim migrant workers from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar in large cities of Maharashtra, notably Mumbai and Bhiwandi. He represents Shivaji Nagar, a Muslim slum in Mumbai, in Maharashtra’s Legislative Assembly, but he has been under pressure since Owaisi’s Majlis Party entered the fray. In the 2014 state election in Maharashtra, Azmi lost Bhiwandi while Owaisi obtained two seats thanks to his greater appeal to Muslims and Dalits (for more on this, see further below).2 Azmi is less successful than Owaisi, but he has gained notoriety with bold statements on behalf of Muslims. In our interview, he went as far as saying: ‘If Islamic government rules everywhere, then it is going to be good for everybody.’ He qualified this in various ways, as he typically does after controversial

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statements. Azmi is a friendly man with a modern taste and does not look at all like a zealot.Yet, he heavily engages in identity politics. Also in Mumbai, I met Congress spokesman Al-Nasser Zakaria. Given the secularist credentials of his party, this young man is an unlikely Muslim identity entrepreneur. Yet, Zakaria identifies as a Muslim first. He proudly declares that young Muslims are becoming more religious: ‘When it is time for prayers, they run to the mosque because we feel that everything belongs to Almighty, so we have to go and thank him for that.’ He qualifies that wearing a skullcap or a burka is not what makes you a good Muslim. ‘You have to understand Islam, and then you have to practice Islam. It is difficult. Islam is one of the most difficult religions.   et, Zakaria claims, ‘there is But if you truly practice it, then it is one of the best.’ Y no justice for Muslims in India,’ neither in the judicial system nor in the job market, education or elsewhere.This is what he has to say to people who offend Islam: ‘Your freedom stops where my nose begins. It’s as simple as that. If you attack, we will retaliate. And we will retaliate very hard.’ He qualifies such rhetoric with Congress-style secularist soundbites highlighting tolerance, but his main persona in our interview was that of the proud Muslim.

Community brokers One should not be misled by Muslim identity politics. At the end of the day, even Muslim identity entrepreneurs primarily pursue a better deal for their community. If identity politics is what gets Muslim leaders into the news, community brokerage is what sustains them as politicians. We have already seen in Chapter 2 how much Owaisi is engaged in community brokerage. Similarly, Azmi emphasizes the importance of patronage at least as much as identity politics. ‘The previous Congress government has not done anything for Muslims. Muslims are hungry, you know. They are not getting justice.’ Other Muslim leaders try to stay clear of identity politics and focus almost entirely on patronage.Take for example Jaffer Sharief, a retired Congress politician and former Railway Minister (1991–95).3 While Sharief retired a long time ago, he exemplifies a kind of patronage politics that remains relevant even after India’s transition to capitalism in the 1990s. Sharief recalls the day when Indira Gandhi anointed him as a Congress candidate for the 1971 national election, proclaiming at a rally: ‘The majority should carry the minority. The minority should walk together with the majority. Thus only we can be one nation and one people.’ T   hese were solemn words. In practice, however, Sharief ’s role was to serve as a community broker. He was a conduit for underprivileged minorities to gain access to public resources. When appointing a Muslim as chairman of the Railway Service Commission, Sharief instructed him: ‘We are Muslims. Don’t be afraid to give jobs to Muslims, but at the same time no Hindu should be deprived.’ T   he policy led to a ruckus

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in Parliament, which had to be adjourned. When the House finally reconvened, Sharief remembers Indira Gandhi as saying: Shut up. Have you seen what he has done? (. . .) For the first time you are seeing that some Muslims are appointed. (. . .) While appointing Hindus, he has appointed Muslims also, which was not done before. What is wrong with that? Sharief ’s mission was to build support for the Congress via patronage. For instance, he brought an important railways company to Bangalore. He is convinced that the approach was correct. ‘For every religion, it is basically an economic thing: employment opportunities, artisans, small scale industries, trade.’ People need facilities. ‘Health, education. What more do they need? If they have shelter, what more do they need? Drinking water, health, and education.’ Sharief is an interesting example of how patronage can produce its own kind of leader. At one point during our conversation, an elderly couple brought flower bouquets and touched his feet. Sharief gave them his blessing by patting their heads. It is remarkable that, as a Muslim, he accepted such homage. I do not think this comes natural to someone like Sharief, whom I found incredibly kind and humble as a person. Rather, this is what he had to become because of the community he served. If your mission is patronage, then you become a patron. After all, is that not what even your clients are expecting from you? Holding court in a stately mansion becomes de rigueur, even when you cannot afford it from your private fortune or official salary. The size of Sharief ’s estate on the outskirts of Bangalore does raise eyebrows, given that he is the son of a revenue inspector and has attended school only to sixth grade. Sharief was accused of corruption in the 1990s but ultimately cleared of all allegations. Next, let us consider Mumtaz Ali Khan, another politician from Bangalore who started his career about one decade after Sharief had retired. Unlike Congress loyalist Sharief, Khan has a remarkably elastic attitude towards party membership. His political career began in 2004, when a ‘very close friend of mine, a senior police officer, very close to my house, retired from service. He forced me to join the BJP, which he had joined.’ After the 2008 state elections, Khan became an acolyte of Chief Minister Yeddyurappa. Three years later, when Yeddyurappa left the BJP and founded the Karnataka Janata Party, Khan initially followed him but then re-entered the BJP. In 2013, when the BJP lost, Khan shifted to the Congress, only to leave the Congress one year later and enter Janata Dal (Secular). During his time as a BJP politician under Yeddyurappa, Khan served as Minister for Minority Welfare. His brief was to ‘protect the interest of the minorities’ (The Hindu 2004). He claims that Yeddyurappa told his top officers: ‘Whatever Mumtaz Ali Khan wants, give it to him.’ Having served for three years as

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Muslim community broker in a BJP government, Khan can boast the following achievements: construction of a ‘Haj House’; token salaries for rural mosque leaders; restoration of mosques and Sufi shrines; construction of fences for Muslim graveyards; transfer of the Urdu Academy to the Ministry for Minority Welfare; international scholarships for minority students; and a special healthcare fund for minority people. Khan claims that, with him as Minister, the BJP did ‘wonders’ for Karnataka’s Muslim minority. Most of this amounted to bread-and-butter patronage for his Muslim constituents. Sometimes, however, Khan also followed an uncompromising Islamic line. He claims that he refused to give ‘bottles’ (alcohol) to voters, and he stood his ground against the managers of the five-star Windsor Manor Hotel in Bangalore. The hotel was on a leasehold from a Muslim trust fund (waqf), yet served alcohol and pork. Khan not only made sure that the lease agreement was renegotiated for the benefit of the waqf, but also insisted on the ‘Islamic point of view,’ which ‘does not allow liquor’ and where the ‘very sight of the pig is avoided.’ People objected that a five-star hotel without alcohol is impossible, but Khan did not budge and fought the case all the way up to the Supreme Court, which ‘upheld our contention including pork and drinks.’ What is the difference between a community broker of the Congress, like Sharief, and one close to the BJP, like Khan? The mindset of the former is more liberal, whereas the mindset of the latter is more cultural-religious. For example, when highlighting the importance of respect, Sharief refers to respect between individuals believing in different religions whereas Khan refers to respect between religious communities. Khan’s collectivist view of respect is compatible with the Hindu nationalist vision of the BJP, and it comes as little surprise that, in an interview of 2013, Khan has declared himself close to the Hindu nationalist RSS.4

Muslim figureheads Some Muslim leaders are neither at the forefront of community brokerage nor do they take particular pride in identity politics. With due respect, we may call them Muslim figureheads. Their main task is to signal to the Muslim community that there is a place for their leaders at the top table. Take for example Roshan Baig, Minister of Urban Development and Haj for the Congress government of Karnataka (until 2018). Baig has been the public face of the Muslim community in Bangalore for at least three decades (MohammadArif 2012). After an initial spell with the Janata Party in the 1980s, he turned to the Congress and since then has served in various capacities, including as Home Minister for the government of Karnataka. Baig suggests that the secret for improving Hindu–Muslim relations is, essentially, being nice to Muslims. ‘You need to give a sense of confidence to the minorities. Let them feel happy.’ He claims that the majority owes the minorities

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a particular generosity and kindness. ‘We must give them jobs.We must give them love. We must give them affection.’ Baig posits himself as an example: ‘In my political career, Hindus have helped me. Hindus have been very good to me.’ He suggests that, if the majority acts like this, Muslims will reform themselves without further prodding. At the same time, he acknowledges that Muslims also need to ‘learn affection for their Hindu friends’ and win over their hearts. Muslims should condemn terrorism and, instead, ‘follow the Sufi path’ of Islam with a friendly face. When you get up in the morning, you can’t show to the Hindu brothers ‘hmm’ [cuts a grumpy face]. You have to live and survive. Tomorrow, your children and your grandchildren have to grow up here. In 50 years or so, you will go. But your children, their children, their children will have to live in this country. So, instead of that ‘hmm’ [cuts the grumpy face again]: ‘Hello brother! How are you? Come, let’s have some tea. Let’s have some coffee. Hey, today is our festival. Come, have biryani with us.’ Like the Congress and other secularist parties, the BJP also has its Muslim figureheads but they are more like Muslim dhimmis, accepting protection and limited resources for their community in exchange for submission to Hindu supremacy (on the concept of Muslim dhimmis, see Chapter 2). A good example is M.J. Akbar, an eminent former journalist and author of celebrated books about Hindu–Muslim relations (1985, 1988). In 2014, Akbar turned from a public intellectual into a BJP spokesman. Since then, many of his former friends despise him and see him as the paragon of a political opportunist. However, this is not entirely fair as Akbar provides principled reasons for turning away from the Congress and joining the BJP. Akbar cites Narendra Modi as saying: ‘Hindus have to make a decision. Either they want to fight poverty, or they want to fight Muslims. And Muslims have to make a decision. You either want to fight poverty, or you want to fight Hindus. You can’t do both.’ He further claims that, for decades, India’s Muslims have been let down by secularist ‘hypocrites.’ They got nothing. I say this repeatedly. I say it in public. I use Quranic examples. If you look at the Medina model of the Prophet (Medina is where he became a political leader), you will see that he came to a pact with every single community. Do you know the one community that he always warned Muslims against? There is a Quranic injunction against it, not just a hadith. The munafiqeen, the hypocrites. He said over and over: ‘Abdullah, never ever come to any terms with the hypocrites.’ In Akbar’s view, one cannot trust the hypocrites. They are ‘people who will use you and then do nothing for you.’ He laments that, instead of relying on the

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democratic system to assert their interests as a community, Muslims have outsourced power to the hypocrites of the Congress and other so-called secularist parties. With the sole exception of Kerala, where the Muslim League has ‘really protected their interests,’ the Muslims got ‘nothing’ in return. In this narrative, joining the BJP is not a career move (Akbar is now Minister of State for External Affairs) but a leap of faith on behalf of a community that has no other choice. Other parties have let the Muslims down, and the emergence of a panIndian Muslim party is unlikely because Muslims are a minority almost everywhere. When I asked Akbar whether he is confident that, under Modi, there are going to be real results for the Muslims and not more hypocrisy, he said: ‘Yes, I hope so.’

How to represent a minority Indian Muslims live in a country dominated by non-Muslim majorities. The best they can hope for is minority accommodation. However, different Muslim leaders seek different kinds of accommodation, and they do so in different ways. Some hope that Muslims will thrive if their elites embrace the secularist establishment. Others pursue a better deal through Muslim-led parties. Still others try to reap communal dividends from submitting to Hindu supremacy.

Embracing secularism Traditionally, most Muslims leaders embrace the secularist establishment. Thus, Congress veteran Sharief praises the secularism of his party, including respect for all religions and none. He recalls that, on political rallies, he would solemnly recite Gandhi’s 11 vows, or principles, culminating in the formula of sarva dharma samabhava (equality of religions). In his experience, this worked wonders in electoral campaigning. Hindu voters, in particular, would greatly appreciate a Muslim reciting the vows. ‘It is all about how you accept and respect other religions.You don’t have to accept them, but you should respect them.’ In terms of personal religiosity, Sharief is a mystic, an eclectic and a syncretist. As a mystic, he has a spiritual rather than a theological vision of God. ‘There is a spirit. You may call it God, you may call it anything. There is something unseen that leads us.’  As an eclectic, he contemplates insights from any number of sources. He holds astrologers in high esteem. When serving as a minister, he went to a soothsayer. When the soothsayer’s advice clashed with that of his doctor, he took the soothsayer to a Hindu renouncer to settle the issue. As a syncretist, Sharief considers Sufi-inspired Islam as compatible with certain forms of Hinduism. They believe in Shiva. Shiva has no form. It is a stone, round. They worship it. It has no form.This is similar to Islam.We don’t believe in any form. (. . .) God is everywhere. God is in the air. God is in you. God is in everybody. Every human being has God.

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This leads to a humanist vision that is religious and secular at the same time. ‘I as a human being should respect you, recognize you. Same thing you also do. (. . .) God has given us birth as human beings. We have to go by the basic values of human life.’  To bring this home, Sharief uses a simple analogy. Do we not, as humans, give way even to animals when driving a car? Why, then, would we not respect fellow human beings regardless of their creed? Compared with Sharief ’s worldly wise religiosity, Congressman Zakaria is a religious orthodox. He embraces secularism, but he embraces Islam even more. He laments that only 5–6% of Indian Muslims pray five times a day because ‘they don’t follow Islam,’ but he is delighted that Muslims are finally gaining a better knowledge of Islam and a deeper understanding of its precepts. ‘Muslims are getting more religious, especially the young generation.’ But this does not stop Zakaria from embracing mainstream secularism. He finds that the Congress has a unique ‘history of running this nation.’ He concedes that this history is ‘chequered,’ but the Congress is ‘the only party that has held   hanks to the Congress, Muslims enjoy freedom Hindus and Muslims together.’ T of religion. ‘In India, the government doesn’t restrict it.You see so many mosques everywhere.You throw a stone, you hit a mosque.’ Sharief and Zakaria are from different generations and represent different types of Muslim leaders, but they agree that the best way to serve the interests of their community is to embrace a secularist establishment that shows itself eager to accommodate minorities.The same applies to Muslims embracing other secularist parties, such as Samajwadi or Bahujan Samaj.

Muslim-led parties Instead of joining non-Muslim parties, Muslims can form their own parties. If successful, these Muslim-led parties may then enter political coalitions as and when expedient. The premise is that, when operating through their own parties, Muslims can be more vocal, seeking better deals for the community than might be possible when joining non-Muslim parties. Thus, the fundamental premise of Owaisi’s Majlis is that Muslims can achieve better results if their cause is championed by a Muslim party than if they support other parties. This does not prevent the Majlis from collaborating with other parties. The Muslim League pursues a similar strategy in Kerala, and so does Badruddin Ajmal’s United Democratic Front in Assam. It is important to note that all successful Muslim-led parties have one feature in common. They operate in areas where Muslims are not just an important group but actually constitute the majority in part of the territory. In such situations, Muslim parties can be firmly entrenched. However, it is difficult for them to break free from their demographic strongholds and win elections in other parts of India, whether at the regional or at the national level. India’s first-past-the-post system of majority voting makes it very hard, if

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not impossible, for Muslim parties to expand to areas where Muslims are not demographically dominant. The point deserves some discussion. Might a party like the Majlis not leave the ‘Muslim ghetto’ through coalition building with other disadvantaged groups such as Dalits? Owaisi sees Dalits as fellow sufferers from the Hindu establishment, welded together with Muslims by ‘common issues of unemployment, illiteracy, injustice.’ Consistent with this view of Muslims and Dalits as marginalized victims, the Majlis courts Dalits in Maharashtra and elsewhere. This is not the first time the Party has tried this strategy. A stalwart of the Majlis recalls that, in 1986, the Party’s first mayor of Hyderabad was a Dalit. Until then,   he coalition with Dalits the Majlis had been ‘branded as the party of Muslims.’ T led to an ‘image makeover.’ For five years, Muslims and Dalits would alternate. When there was a Dalit mayor, there would be a Muslim deputy. When there was a Muslim mayor, there would be a Dalit deputy. Five of the Party’s 38 local councillors were non-Muslims: four Dalits and one Tribal (Jafri). It seems likely that the strategy was influenced by scheduled- and lower-caste parties in North India, such as Bahujan Samaj and Samajwadi. At the time, these parties were co-opting Muslims in order to win elections in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.The Majlis in Hyderabad did the same, but from the Muslim end: co-opting Dalits rather than being co-opted by them. Given that Muslims and Dalits are both strong in Hyderabad, the strategy worked from 1986 to 1991. Can the Muslim–Dalit alliance be revived in Hyderabad, and can it be replicated elsewhere? According to Owaisi, the secret of success is to make Dalits ‘feel respectable, politically respectable.’ I wondered if it might not be difficult for a Dalit to identify with a party that is officially called Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (Council of the Union of Muslims), Owaisi declared that he would accept a name change if it were going to help the cause. He even suggested that, if necessary, he might be willing to accept a Dalit in the politburo. In Hyderabad, radical Dalits are receptive but less radical Dalits vote for the BJP (Chapter 6). Elsewhere the challenge is that, even when supported by Dalits, the Majlis can win seats only if the rest of the vote is divided. This sometimes happens, but there is no guarantee that it will happen again in the next election. Consolidating any seats is therefore impossible. Owaisi is a strategist and understands this. When I asked him if the strategy is not a gamble, his body language was that of someone taking a risk without being confident of the outcome. Indeed, the facts on the ground have been less than encouraging. In 2014, the strategy gained the Party two seats in the Legislative Assembly of Maharashtra. However, the same strategy failed in subsequent elections in Bihar (2015) and Uttar Pradesh (2017).5 Abu Asim Azmi also finds that coalition building between Muslims and marginalized Hindus is a challenge. On the one hand, he confirms: ‘If Dalits and Muslims come together in reality, then 100% there is future.’ On the other hand, he

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confesses that building coalitions between Muslims and backward-caste Hindus has not worked well for his party.6

Submitting to Hindu supremacy Another route for Muslim leaders to pursue community accommodation is to undergo a Faustian bargain with the Hindu nationalists.The strategy is to become a Muslim dhimmi, extracting protection and resources in exchange for submission to Hindu supremacy. Muslim leaders embarking on this strategy have a legitimation problem. For decades, Indian Muslims have been in an alliance with the Congress and other secularist parties. During all these years, Muslims and Hindu nationalists were sworn enemies. How can a Muslim justify defection to the Hindu nationalist camp as anything other than political opportunism? Abdul Hakeem, a Muslim journalist in Karnataka, finds that the collaboration of Indian Muslims with Hindu nationalists is entirely justified. ‘Congress people don’t save us.’ In his view, the Congress has side-lined Muslim leaders ever since the death of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991.Why not switch loyalties? He suggests that the BJP already receives 15–20% of the Muslim vote. In a situation where all communities worry about their culture, Hakeem finds it normal that Hindus claim India as Hindu rashtra. In his view, this is unproblematic insofar as everyone, including the Hindu nationalists, accepts that India is a secular state. Indeed, he holds these propositions to be equally true: ‘We belong to a secular state. We belong to a Hindu nation.’ Hakeem accepts the point, often made by Hindu nationalists, that Hinduism is uniquely tolerant. ‘Hindus are secular in our country. Because of Hindus we live here.’ Hindus, Muslims and Christians should be, and are to an extent, united ‘because of our Indian culture.’ Unfortunately, ‘uneducated’ or ‘uncultured’ Muslims have an ‘arrogant attitude.’ In his view, this is wrong. Muslim identity should fall in line with Indian patriotism. ‘I am an Indian, but my culture is foreign.’ Despite the fact that ‘our forefathers converted,’ ‘we are Hindus, 100%.’ Hakeem admits that Muslim culture and religion have come from outside and are foreign, but he insists that Indian Muslims themselves are not outsiders but Indians. M.J. Akbar, the secularist intellectual turned BJP stalwart, provides a similar justification in more eloquent words. Like Hakeem, he accepts the claim that Hinduism is uniquely tolerant and accommodating. More than any other world civilization, Hinduism believes in ‘faith equality rather than faith supremacy’ and is distinguished by a ‘tensile strength to absorb.’  According to Akbar, Muslims have benefitted from this and were transformed by the experience in highly positive ways. Whereas Muslims normally would conquer alien civilizations, ‘the interesting thing about Hinduism is that Islam also adapted to its culture.’  Within generations, Muslim invaders realized that, to rule India, they had to become

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Indians. Thus, the Muslims themselves contributed to creating the evocative ‘Ganga–Jamuna relationship’ where both cultures, Hindu and Muslim, intimately embraced one another. Akbar deplores that, after this mythical period of peaceful coexistence, Muslims started a rejection process in the mid-18th century, when Delhi had been sacked by Persian armies and when the Mughal Empire entered its decline. He laments that, ever since then, Muslim elites have grappled with the reality of living in a ‘post-Muslim-power’ India. According to Akbar, Muslims have developed two damaging ‘theories’: a fundamentalist theory of restoration and a separatist theory of distance which, eventually, led to the two-nation theory which, in turn, led to the reality of partition. The upshot of this narrative is that Muslims have only themselves to blame for the breakdown of peaceful coexistence with their Hindu neighbours. Akbar suggests that, after the horrors of partition, the masses of Muslims in North India found themselves left behind by their elites, which had migrated to Pakistan. Initially, the Congress filled the void left by the exodus of India’s Muslim elites, offering patriotic Muslims a political home. Eventually, however, the Congress turned out to be ‘the biggest hypocrite of all.’ It claimed a monopoly position in the political representation of Muslims but, far from delivering on its many promises, it prevented Muslims from fulfilling their aspirations. Akbar finds that, given this betrayal, defecting to the Hindu nationalist camp is a justified move. Given that the secularist ‘hypocrites’ have failed to deliver, turning to the BJP becomes a matter of political wisdom. From this perspective, Indian Muslims simply have no other choice than to submit to Hindu supremacy. All of this is compatible with the Hindu nationalist narrative, making Akbar a suitable mouthpiece for the BJP. Critics may see it as ‘dining with the devil,’ and indeed it remains to be seen if submission to Hindu supremacy can yield the desired results, namely resources for the Muslim community and protection from riots. But, clearly, some Indian Muslims are now sufficiently desperate to go down that route.

Specific concerns Muslim leadership is fragmented. All Muslim leaders want minority accommodation, but they have diverging views on how to represent their community and what kind of accommodation to pursue. As one might expect, the specific concerns raised by Muslim leaders are also diverse. Nevertheless, a limited number of concerns come up more frequently. First, Muslim leaders often deplore victimhood and discrimination. Second, they demand job reservations and affirmative action. Third, they lament the socioeconomic backwardness of their community and call for education as a remedy. Fourth, they conjure up the trauma of communal violence.

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Victimhood and discrimination One would expect Muslims to play heavily on victimhood and discrimination. After all, they are a minority. Hindus are the majority, yet claim to be victimized by minorities (Chapter 3). If this is so, then how much more are Muslims going to harbour such resentment. It is indeed not hard to find Muslim leaders venting resentment. For example, Azmi finds that discrimination against Muslims is ‘everywhere.’ He claims that even Muslims with qualifications as engineers cannot find suitable jobs. An NGO leader in Hyderabad complains: ‘All over the country, they have marginalized Muslims in a systematic way’ (Z. Khan). Others, however, take a more nuanced view. For example, Owaisi finds that Muslims do not suffer discrimination in sectors like computing or engineering. Why, he asks, would anybody discriminate against a qualified candidate in those sectors? ‘India faces a huge human resources crunch. If you are educated, then the discrimination with you comes down.’ In Owaisi’s view, one should focus on discrimination in the state sector and public education. In particular, he has strong views about the political underrepresentation of Muslims. He feels that, with only 4–5% of seats in parliamentary assemblies, Muslims are inadequately represented. The reason, he finds, is that ‘the political parties don’t give enough tickets to Muslim candidates.’ He adds that, even when a Muslim does get a ticket, he is unlikely to win the election because ‘the other communities don’t vote for Muslims.’ Owaisi claims that this is detrimental to community development. He further warns that, if the problem of underrepresentation is not addressed, there will be ‘black sheep which might create more disharmony in the society.’ In a similar vein, he expresses negative sentiment about the police in Hyderabad and elsewhere. Owaisi blames the police for discriminating against Muslims and calls for institutional reforms to teach the police more respect. Zakaria, the Congress spokesman, holds similar views. Like Owaisi, he acknowledges that Muslims are better off the private than in the public sector. ‘It’s a win-win situation. They need a workforce. If educated Muslims come forward and if they are hiring them, they profit and the Muslim man or woman gets employment.’  Also like Owaisi, he feels that Muslims, who are around 14% of the Indian population, should receive commensurate representation in the national parliament and state assemblies. He laments that Muslims have been marginalized ‘in the field of education, in government jobs, quality of living, in the economy.’ Accordingly, he demands more justice in society, economy, politics and the judicial system. The day before our interview, Zakaria had been at the funeral of Yakub Memon, a terrorist suspect who had been hanged after a long ordeal. He told me with pride that, at the funeral, he had shaken hands with Memon’s brother.

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He lambasted the ‘injustice’ meted out against Muslims, culminating in a blanket verdict. ‘There is no justice for Muslims in India.’

Job reservations and affirmative action Complaints about victimhood and discrimination are matched by demands for job reservations and affirmative action. Thus, Owaisi demands reservations for Muslims in the state sector and public education. ‘This is most important to us. It will really help the community.’ In education, he welcomes a scheme rolled out after the Sachar Report (Sachar 2006) and demands that any Muslim who wants a scholarship should get one: ‘Anyone who applies, give it to him.’ The federal state of Karnataka, where Muslims are entitled to 4% of public sector jobs under the reservation for Other Backward Classes (OBCs), is at the vanguard of job reservations for Muslims. Roshan Baig, the Congress politician, praises Karnataka for being ahead of neighbouring Maharashtra in this regard. He wishes reservations for Muslims could be more than 4%, but he is not hopeful given a Supreme Court ruling that at least 50% of public sector jobs must be filled on the basis of merit. He is delighted that, in principle, ‘everything is possible’ for Muslims in the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), but he expresses disappointment that Muslims remain seriously underrepresented in the security sector, especially in sensitive jobs – notably intelligence. Baig laments that low-skilled Muslims are victims of discrimination in the private sector because of the ‘attitude’ of other communities. He specifically refers to small-key jobs like lift operator or receptionist. He feels that big companies should offer more jobs to Muslims as a matter of ‘social justice,’ but otherwise he finds that affirmative action ‘cannot be mandatory; it should be out of love and affection.’  As a further instrument for social justice, he supports the idea of an equal opportunity commission that should discuss how to give minorities ‘due representation.’  At the same time, he suggests, it is incumbent on Muslims themselves to give up their ancestral vices of susti, masti, zabardasti (laziness, profligacy, aggressiveness). Mumtaz Ali Khan, the turncoat politician, finds that reservations are needed   his makes because people have an ‘inborn quality of helping their own people.’ T it difficult for outsiders to find a job. Without reservations, he feels, minorities and lower castes do not stand a chance. In his view, Muslims need job reservations both in the public and in the private sector. Given the ceiling on reservations imposed by the Supreme Court, he finds that the only way of providing secure jobs for Muslims is to incorporate them under the umbrella of the OBCs. Abu Azmi from the Samajwadi Party in Maharashtra deplores the fact that, whereas Dalits have access to reservations for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (ST/SCs), there are no such reservations for Muslims. He gives the following example: ‘In the same caste, people are sweepers. They are sweepers in the Hindu caste, and in the Muslim caste also. But if they are Muslims, they will

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not get reservation. If they are Hindus, they will get reservation.’ He demands at least 10% reservations for Muslims. It would not bother him if that meant going beyond the 50% ceiling on job reservations imposed by the Supreme Court.

Backwardness and education If there is one point on which Indian elites can agree across the board, then it is that Muslims are ‘backward’ and education is the panacea to address that backwardness. On that much, even Muslim leaders agree. For example, Owaisi argues that more needs to be done in the field of education in order to advance Muslim community development. He cites a report that has found the highest dropout rate in schools among Muslims and Dalits (Kundu 2014, 74–97). It starts at the age of 11. There is a sharp increase in the dropout rate by the time the Muslim or Dalit student reaches the age of 13. It is higher than for the Hindus or other communities. Education would go a long way in creating harmony, ensuring that confrontation does not happen and that you have more representation of Muslims in the government sector, in the private sector. This in itself will have a huge impact. Owaisi claims some credit for the modernization of Muslim education.‘Our party runs an engineering college, a medical college, a school of nursing, a pharmacy, and an MBA college. We have been running these for more than 20–30 years.’ He emphasizes that there have been similar developments in other parts of South India, including Karnataka and Kerala. There is a lot of work which has been done in the field of education for the Muslims by the Muslims – not by the government, but in the private sector. Muslims have established colleges, whether it is primary schools or secondary schools. Not madrasas [religious schools], but English medium schools and professional colleges. In Bangalore, Karnataka, an informer told me about the Al Ameen Foundation. He claimed that the foundation runs as many as 200 secular schools and colleges, with more than 41,000 students and 3,000 employees; that more than 50% of students and employees are non-Muslims; that access is entirely based on merit; and that more than half of the scholarships go to Hindus. He credits the foundation for being so secular-minded that the state of Karnataka provides generous support to Al Ameen’s dental, medical and engineering colleges (Hakeem). Others are less sanguine. The principal of a Jesuit college in Bangalore told me that it is ‘a big lie’ for the Al Ameen Foundation to claim the mantle of secularism. When I asked him, ‘How do you know?’ he replied, with laughter: ‘I was next to their college.’ He further added that he had seen concrete data and had ‘known

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them for years’ (Pinto). In Hyderabad, the so-called ‘Owaisi schools’ have a reputation of being unaffordable to those who need them most. While ‘secular’ schools are a source of pride, madrasas are a source of embarrassment.Whenever the topic comes up, Muslim leaders become apologetic.They emphasize that the Sachar Committee has found that only 4% of Muslims send their children to madrasas (Sachar 2006, 75).They add that Muslims sending their children to madrasas do so because they cannot afford normal school fees. For these children, it might be better to attend a madrasa than to receive either no education at all or even more inadequate education in a state school.7 Only Zakaria, the Congress spokesman, finds that madrasas are a good thing. He sees them as ‘centres of learning’ where children learn about Islam and sharia. He praises the practice of memorizing the Quran by heart. M.J. Akbar, by contrast, states: ‘I just wish that, of their own accord, without being forced to, and without the state interfering with their rights, the madrasas would produce children and graduates who can function in a 21st century economy.’

Communal violence Given past traumatic experience, Muslims are deeply concerned about communal violence. In almost every interview, I asked my interlocutors if they would be surprised if a major riot were to occur over the next five years or so. Only one Muslim leader, M.J. Akbar, said that he would be surprised. As one might expect from a BJP spokesman, he expressed trust in Modi. However, he admitted that Modi might not be able to prevent an escalation in a federal state like Uttar Pradesh if the Chief Minister of that state were unwilling to send in the police. There is some disagreement among Muslim leaders as to who exactly is to blame for communal violence. Most blame the Hindu nationalists, and specifically the BJP. Others, like Owaisi, blame the police. A former police chief of Andhra Pradesh, himself a Muslim, blames the ‘lumpen’ elements in the slums of Old Hyderabad and elsewhere. Some miscreants, he suggests, have made it big time. ‘The same people who initially started as foot soldiers are becoming senior leaders.’  They might fan the flames of communalism from the commanding heights of the Municipal Councils, Legislative Assembly or even Parliament (Basith). In one of my longest interviews, Majlis veteran Syed Jafri spent more than half of the time providing me with minute details about past riots in Hyderabad, starting from 1967 when he was 12 years old. With the partial exception of Hyderabad’s last major riots in 1992, he invariably exonerated his own party and blamed others. In his view, especially the Congress and the BJP but also some other political parties have been responsible. Jafri gave a variety of further excuses, from the random escalation of minor incidents to the idea of pent-up communal

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tensions in urban slums. Then, suddenly, he went on to give me a very different explanation. If you go by the pattern of communal riots, you will find that, only where the minorities constitute a substantial chunk, there will be a conflict of interests between the two communities. The Hindus would think that ‘our supremacy would end.’  The Muslims would think that ‘we have to assert ourselves.’  Where either community is in the smaller number, you won’t have any communal riots. 5% Muslims – no riots. Only 5% Hindus in some place – no riots. [Riots take place where] both communities have substantial numbers and their economic, social and other interests clash. Several Muslim leaders share the view that the Hindi Belt in North India is a more likely place for communal riots than, say, Telangana or even Maharashtra. For example, Owaisi feels that in Hyderabad – ‘inshallah’ – riots will not happen because ‘there is a huge amount of maturity. People have understood that this is not in the interest of anyone.’ He finds that Uttar Pradesh, where 50,000 people were displaced in the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots, is another matter.

Suggestions for Europe Hindu nationalist and secularist leaders were more than willing to impart unsolicited lessons to me, the European, on how to relate to Muslim minorities. I have not received similar advice from Muslim leaders. It is possible that Hindu nationalists assume that there is complicity between themselves as representatives of India’s Hindu majority and me as a representative of Europe’s non-Muslim majority. It is equally possible that secularists assume that there is complicity between themselves and someone from ‘liberal’ Europe. Did the Muslims assume, on the contrary, that they were speaking about minority issues to someone representing the non-Muslim majority in Europe?8 Even so, the dearth of Muslim suggestions for Europe is puzzling when compared to the ebullience of Hindu nationalist and secularist leaders. The only interesting suggestion came from M.J. Akbar. He suggests that ‘a functioning democracy does not have minorities.’ In his view, the concept of minority is not so much about demographic strength but rather about political weakness. In a functioning democracy, he claims, everybody is empowered as an individual citizen so the very concept of minority becomes meaningless. He admits that there will always be disadvantaged groups, but ‘poverty has no religion.’ If the problem is economic, then it can be solved economically.9 Europeans might agree, although it is worth emphasizing that Muslims in Europe have access to welfare. Even so, the idea of empowering Muslims as individuals seems more resonant with European values than the idea of empowering

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them as minorities. One may wonder, however, if the ascendancy of multiculturalism does not defeat such liberal common sense.

Conclusion Indian Muslims are a fragmented community, and their leadership is relatively weak. Few Muslims would question their loyalty to India, and most want minority accommodation rather than identity politics from their leaders. This does not mean that identity politics never resonates with Muslims, but patronage is more important in day-to-day politics. Secularist parties offer Muslim leaders publicly visible positions as Muslim figureheads. Even the Hindu nationalist BJP has Muslim figureheads, although they arguably look more like Muslim dhimmis. Let us compare the findings of this chapter with the situation in Europe. As in India, Muslims in Europe are fragmented and diverse. They come from different ethno-linguistic backgrounds and subscribe to different strands of Islam. As in India, there is a shortage of ‘enlightened’ Muslim leaders. Also as in India, there is no shortage of Muslim clerics and community leaders claiming to represent their flock. However, their highly conservative views often disconnect them from those they claim to represent. Unsurprisingly, European states have been struggling to set up effective Muslim councils (Warner and Wenner 2006; Ciciora 2018). As in India, Muslim community brokers are active at the local level. Especially in countries where electoral laws are liberal and citizenship is easily obtained, mainstream parties are willing to make concessions to co-opt the Muslim vote. Even conservative parties sometimes enlist Muslim figureheads (Dancygier 2017). Unlike India, however, Europe is unlikely to produce Muslim dhimmis. The reason is, quite simply, that nativism in Europe is unable to put as much pressure on Muslims to submit to the majority as Hindu nationalism in India. As in India, some Muslim leaders embrace secularism and liberal values. Sadiq Khan, the mayor of London, is a liberal Muslim with roots in South Asia. He won on a Labour ticket and supports gay marriage. Chem Özdemir, leader of the German Green Party, sees himself as a ‘secular Muslim.’ He was born in Germany as a son of Turkish parents. When he was replaced by an ethnic German in January 2018, nobody saw it as a snub to Muslims or Turks. Like India, Europe is difficult terrain for Muslim-led parties. In countries like Britain, with its first-past-the-post system, Muslim parties are a non-starter.10 In countries where seats are allocated on the percentage of votes, Muslim parties can make minor inroads.11 While local Muslim parties might be possible in areas where Muslims have reached sufficient numbers, everywhere else Muslims are better served by joining existing mainstream parties. The specific concerns of Muslims in India and Europe are similar, but the imageries are different. In Europe as in India, Muslims demand better access to education and the labour market; but in India the key demand is reservations, whereas in Europe it is social justice and affirmative action. In Europe as in India,

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Muslims invoke discrimination and victimhood; but in India the typical complaint is Hindu communalism, whereas in Europe it is Islamophobia. In Europe as in India, Muslims assert that they feel insecure; but Muslims in India have a more plausible claim to be victims of harassment, whereas European Muslims must at the same time shield themselves from association with religious extremism and Islamist terrorism.

Notes 1 A Muslim leader is a leader who identifies first and foremost as a Muslim. This is not the case of every leader who happens to be a Muslim. For example, Salman Khurshid is a Muslim but identifies primarily as a secular citizen. Such leaders are covered in Chapter 5, alongside other secularists. 2 Azmi admitted that his party was facing problems in Maharashtra, but he saw it as more stable in its core area of Uttar Pradesh where it had ‘a good vote bank among Muslims’ – a rare case of a politician admitting to vote bank politics. Be that as it may, the Samajwadi Party lost Uttar Pradesh to the BJP in March 2017. 3 Offices previously held: Minister of State for Railway (1980–84); Minister of State for Irrigation (November–December 1984); Minister of State for Energy (February 1988– December 1989). 4 http://twocircles.net/2013apr25/mumtaz_ali_khan_sociology_politics.html#. VssgSU1FDmg, interview of 25 April 2013, accessed on 12 January 2018. 5 In Bihar, Muslims continued to support the Janata Dal (United). In Uttar Pradesh, Muslims continued to support the Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party, which however were defeated by the BJP in March 2017. 6 In the 2014 state election in Maharashtra, even the backward castes defected to Owaisi. 7 As we will see in the next chapter, secularists make similar points. 8 It would be interesting for a Muslim from Europe to conduct similar research. 9 Ironically, Akbar made much of the fact that Muslims and Hindus have separate cultures. 10 The far-left Respect Party (2004–16) in the UK was at most a partial exception. 11 In the Netherlands, the Turkish-led Denk party won three seats in the 2017 parliamentary election.

5 SECULARISM UNDER SIEGE

SECULARISM UNDER SIEGESECULARISM UNDER SIEGE

With Modi in power, India’s secularist elites have taken a beating. The secularism championed by the Congress and various regional and caste parties is under siege. Yet, Indian secularists do not surrender but hope for a comeback once the political climate has changed. In the meantime, they retain influential positions in public service, civil society, universities, media and so on. To some extent, this shields them from an unfriendly political climate.1 Yet, secularists suffer from unresolved tensions. On the one hand, they stand for minority accommodation. On the other hand, many Hindus resent this as ‘appeasement.’ On the one hand, the constitution mandates a friendly attitude towards religious minorities (Art. 25–30). On the other hand, secularists are also progressivists.They find it difficult to justify that people deserve a more favourable treatment because they belong to this or that religion. To resolve this tension, secularists seek better justifications for minority accommodation. As we will see in this chapter, some of these justifications are more compelling than others. After a short section on secularism, I introduce a number of secularist politicians and social activists. Subsequently, I present ways by which secularists are trying to redefine Indian secularism in ways that seem more compatible with their own progressivist values. Then I discuss their prescriptions for India and their suggestions for Europe. In the conclusion, I show how Indian secularism can serve European liberals not only as a model but also as a warning.

Conflicted secularism The characteristic purpose of secularism is to define and confine religion. Western secularism defines religion as the domain of personal faith. Some countries, like France, confine the space for individuals to engage in religion to the private

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sphere. Other countries, such as the United States, embrace public religion but keep it separate from state institutions (Casanova 1994). Either way, religion is seen as something personal rather than collective (Joppke 2015). Indian secularism is different. It also defines and confines religion, but it does so not for private individuals but for collectives (Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, etc.). It defines religion as a communal matter and carves out a space where religious communities are autonomous. Under this collectivist regime, the confinement of religion is rather loose and the state’s role is to be friendly towards, rather than restrict, religious communities (Bhargava 2010). Ever since Nehru (1946), Indian secularism has been traced back to the ‘composite culture’ of pre-modern India. Otherwise, India has inherited secularism from the British Empire, when imperial administrators used ‘religion’ to sort colonial subjects, presenting themselves as aloof from, but friendly towards, religious communities (Pandey 1990). What was then flaunted as benign neutrality is now called secularism (for an oft-cited critique, see Nandy 1988). Indian secularists have a constitutional mandate to uphold this tradition of community accommodation. Almost by definition, the majority does not need accommodation. Hence, secularists support minorities. The minorities, in turn, have grown into an important support base for secularists. Today, the Congress is only one of several secularist parties. There are also regional and caste-based secularist parties such as Samajwadi and the Bahujan Samaj. To some extent, supporting Muslims and other minorities has served these parties well. Increasingly, however, it has cost them part of the crucial ‘Hindu vote.’ Minority accommodation is resented by those who feel that, in a democracy, the majority should rule. In their view, accommodating Muslims is ‘appeasement.’ It can be devastating for a party to be seen as appeasing Muslims, as the Congress had to learn. Since then, secularists have been on a tightrope walk: accommodating minorities while avoiding the taint of appeasement. If this sounds like a dilemma, it is actually worse. It is a catch-22 situation. While Hindu nationalists blame secularists for ‘pandering’ to Muslims, or ‘pampering’ them, Muslims accuse secularists of betrayal and neglect. A Congress politician laments: ‘We lost because Muslims said we hadn’t done enough, and Hindus said we were doing too much for Muslims’ (Khurshid). It seems almost impossible for any secularist party to get this right. After the horrors of partition, the fathers of the constitution were eager to restore peaceful relations between Hindus and Muslims. Understandably, therefore, they prescribed minority accommodation. However, this has always been an uneasy compromise. Nehru and other first-generation leaders were more interested in modernization and development than in the preservation of communal prerogatives. Their goal was to build an India where people would be individual citizens rather than members of organic communities. Since then, Indian secularists have been conflicted between the constitutional mandate of minority accommodation and their own progressivist ideas and ideals.

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Secularists have always wanted to move away from minority accommodation towards something more ‘progressive.’ In addition to modernization and development, their progressivist values encompass social justice, an aversion against communalism and a commitment to cultural diversity. Like it or not, however, the dynamic of democratic mass politics and the continuing reality of communal segregation in the country keep dragging Indian secularists back to minority accommodation.

Indian secularists Secularists yearn for an India inhabited by individual citizens for whom religiosity is a matter of personal belief or even choice, but they cannot change the fact that Indian secularism was designed to deal with the reality of religious communities. They would like to have the broadest possible support base in the mainstream of Indian society, but they cannot escape the fact that they have relied for generations on a platform of religious and other minorities. They identify as Indian citizens rather than with the communities into which they were born, and they form a democratic elite regardless of whether, in private, they are Hindus or Muslims, Christians or Sikhs, Buddhists or atheists. Even so, they cannot alter the reality of communal segregation. Let me illustrate this with a selection of secularist politicians and social activists.

Secularist politicians The classical secularist position is summarized by Satish Sahney, director of the Nehru Centre in Mumbai (whom we have met in Chapter 2). Sahney is a votary of the neo-Hindu Arya Samaj and a devotee of Swami Vivekananda, but he would ‘very much want to have an India where religion is personal.’ He finds it ‘important to acknowledge that Islam has been in this country at least from the 8th or 9th century onwards. We cannot say, let us get rid of Islam.’ Mani Shankar Aiyar is more of a ‘secular fundamentalist,’ as per the title of his 2004 book. Aiyar was MP for the Congress (2010–16) when he received me in a back office in the Upper House of Parliament. He had previously served as a cabinet minister under Manmohan Singh (2004–09). Aiyar shares many views with Sahney. Both have great admiration for Nehru. Yet, there is one key difference. Unlike Sahney, who feels that Muslims deserve accommodation only up to a point, Aiyar favours accommodation without any ifs and buts. He finds that minorities should be allowed to retain full autonomy with regard to their internal matters, including gender norms, because ‘to impose reform on such matters is to force a minority community into a majoritarian fold.’ He finds that such autonomy deserves protection even when this means leaving a maledominated community under the control of illiberal, segregationist leaders. He provides two reasons for this. First: ‘In our constitutional order, liberalism in

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personal law matters is an intra-community issue, while secularism is an intercommunity issue.’ Second: ‘Secularism respects diversity and is not threatened by the difference. On the contrary, secularism celebrates the difference, the glory of diversity’ (Aiyar 2004, 201, 249). Another interesting case is Salman Khurshid. He served as Foreign Minister (2012–14) during Manmohan Singh’s second term in government. A Muslim himself, Khurshid has authored a book on Indian Muslims (2015). One might expect him to be strongly in favour of minority accommodation. Surprisingly, however, Khurshid has a reserved attitude on how far Muslims should be accommodated. He is opposed to the idea that the state should treat Muslims differently on the basis of their minority status.While Aiyar embraces accommodation whatever the implications, Khurshid disassociates himself from appeasement. Khurshid identifies as a citizen first – one who just happens to be a Muslim. His understanding of Islam is liberal and moderate. He wants to be elected as a secularist politician and not as a Muslim. His home constituency is an area where Muslims are less than 15%. Arguably, this is part of why he lost his seat in the national election of 2014. Even so, he remains steadfast: ‘If somebody says, go to a Muslim-majority area, I will say, no, I don’t want to.’ Khurshid deplores the attitude of Muslim leaders in the Congress, who engage in a ruinous contest of religious outbidding and might say about another Muslim in their own party: This guy is not a Muslim. He only has a Muslim name. I’m the Muslim. I’m the one who goes to prayer five times a day. I’m the one who goes on the haj. I’m the one who has shaved his head for the haj. I’m the one who says bismillah every time I speak. Finally, let us consider a high-ranking Congress politician acting at the national level. He began the interview by stating with pride: ‘I am a practicing Hindu. I am staunchly secular. I won’t let my religion get mixed up with my public policy.’ But then, when I asked him a few probing questions, he swiftly changed gears and made a number of statements which, he conceded, were politically incorrect. He presented Muslims as a potential threat to social stability. This culminated in the verdict that Muslims and other minorities should ‘be managed much more carefully. Nobody wants civil unrest. I’m sorry, I need to rush. Don’t get me in trouble’ (Anonymous C).2

Social activists Another interesting spectrum of secularist perspectives is offered by social activists. Take for example Irfan Engineer, an extraordinarily liberal Muslim and the director of an advocacy NGO in Mumbai. Like his late father, Ashgar Ali Engineer, he belongs to a progressive strand of the Dawoodi Bohra sect. His vision of Islam is

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Sufi-inspired. He hopes that, one day, religious identity will wither away and faith will become a matter of personal choice. ‘My religion, for me, guides me in how I relate to my call. It is an individual matter.’ In his view, political stability should never come at the price of leaving individuals hostage to illiberal communities. ‘I would rather be for the liberation of people from these communal identities.’ Engineer asserts that Muslims in secularist India are better off than their coreligionists in Muslim-majority countries such as Pakistan and Bangladesh. In India, Muslims enjoy not only freedom of religion but also greater personal safety.To be sure: ‘In every country, there is discrimination against minorities. In India, Muslims and Christians happen to be victims of this discrimination.’  Even so, Engineer prefers the situation in India to that in, say, Saudi Arabia. In India, ‘Muslim women can agitate. They can wear a miniskirt if they like. They will have to deal with their families, but that’s it. The state will not come in-between.’ Harsh Mander, a former state official, is a different type of activist. The first thing I noticed at his Centre for Equity Studies was that, to all appearances, there were Europeans or Americans working for him. Maybe these were interns, but they did not look, talk and dress like Indians. During the interview, Mander used props familiar from Western discourse to convey the idea that Indian society is fundamentally flawed. He suggested that Indian Muslims suffer from ‘race discrimination’ and ‘Islamophobia,’ and need ‘safe spaces.’ He rejected the idea that there are differences between communities and that any trouble can possibly emanate from Muslims. ‘Muslims are just one more community,’ enriching India and adding diversity. ‘If you pose this as a challenge, that’s where the problem starts.’ In his view, there are no problems with Muslims but only with people who have false and ‘homogenizing’ views about them. Many of Mander’s terms, such as race discrimination and Islamophobia, as well as arguments, such as Muslims being misconstrued as the Other when they are actually like everyone else, were familiar to me from multiculturalist discourse in my native Europe. In India, however, Mander was the only person I met who promoted such political correctness. In his view, Muslims are a ‘solidarity partner.’  They ‘have a future in India largely in solidarity with other disadvantaged people.’ India’s problem, he claims, is not so much inequality as such but rather the normative framework in which inequality is legitimized. His aim is to change that framework, getting people to celebrate diversity and become ‘inclusive’ (Mander 2015). Farida Khan, who represents Muslims at the National Commission for Minorities, holds an interestingly different perspective. Prior to her current appointment, Khan acted as an activist in the struggle against communalism. She would affiliate with civic groups rather than political parties. Even now that she acts in an official capacity, she continues her activist approach. When following up on communal riots, for example, she tries to hold state institutions accountable in resolute ways that her chairman is not always comfortable with.3

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Khan’s relation with Islam is ambivalent. ‘I like my little religious ritual because it is a part of my growing up, but I am not really a believer.’  She has been ‘more or less atheist most of my life; but I do respect people’s religion.’  When her husband died from cancer, ‘the only thing that really gave me solace was sitting and praying.’  She has a ‘difficult relationship with religion, but I totally respect people who are religious.’  The same applies to communities: There are communitarian identities to which there is some emotion attached which you can’t take away. You can’t just say that people who are religious and who have lived in traditional surroundings are suddenly going to feel part of everything in the same way.

Redefining secularism Indian secularism stands for community accommodation. Most secularists lean towards more progressivist values. One way or another, all secularists covered in this chapter struggle with this contradiction. Farida Khan’s ambivalence shows how hard it is for an upright secularist to reconcile her progressivist inclinations with the reality of religious communities. Few secularists are as honest as Farida Khan. Most others have an urge to redefine secularism as being not so much about community accommodation but rather something more compatible with their progressivist values. Some argue that any problems in Hindu–Muslim relations are not about cultural difference but socioeconomic backwardness. Others claim that, in reality, the Muslim question is about a minority suffering injustice and discrimination at the hands of an oppressive majority. Some suggest that communities do not exist in their own right but have been created, or even fabricated, by devious communalists. Still others celebrate India’s cultural and religious diversity, forgetful of the social reality of communal segregation. Alas, none of this can do away with social reality. Religious identities do not evaporate into thin air because secularists have decided that the real issue is something else. Nor does reality change because elites have chosen to change the way they talk about it. Instead, the stubborn recalcitrance of religious communities continues to haunt Indian secularists.

Socioeconomic backwardness Progressive secularists struggle with the idea that people deserve preferential treatment because they belong to this or that religious minority. This is quite understandable, not only because most secularists hold progressivist values but also because they need to counteract the appearance of ‘appeasing’ minorities. Shouldn’t a modern state end discrimination based on religion, rather than being seen as ‘pandering’ to religious minorities?

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But, whether progressive secularists like it or not, minorities remain part of their support base and minority accommodation remains a constitutional mandate. Hence, if minority accommodation cannot be justified on the basis of communal belonging, progressivists need to find some other justification. One way to do so is to deny that Muslims are, or should be, accommodated as a religious minority; and, instead, to emphasize that Muslims need support because of their socioeconomic ‘backwardness.’ Helping Muslims embark on the path to modernization and progress is an agenda progressivists can wholeheartedly embrace, unlike the idea of accommodating religious minorities. ‘Backwardness’ is an ugly term, but in India it is a permanent fixture of political discourse. The Indian constitution enshrines ‘the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.’ In subsequent decades, scores of lower castes were classified as ‘Other Backward Classes.’  Such ‘weaker sections’ of society are entitled to reservations (guaranteed job quotas) in the public sector, as well as other forms of affirmative action such as privileged access to education and scholarships. In India, socioeconomic backwardness comes with entitlements. There is debate among progressivists as to who is more backward: Muslims or Dalits? Some claim that Muslims are an even weaker section of society than Dalits. ‘On every yardstick of poverty, the Muslims, particularly in North India, tend to fall below the scheduled castes even if slightly above the scheduled tribes.’4 Others claim that the situation of Muslims is ‘perhaps as bad as that of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes’ (Pinto). Assessments with regard to the relative backwardness of Muslims and Dalits vary, and both sides to the debate refer to official reports (Sachar 2006; Misra 2007; Kundu 2014). Ultimately, however, progressivists agree that both Dalits and Muslims are backward and need support. Socioeconomic backwardness expresses itself not only in poverty but also in lack of education. Some secularists take issue with education for Muslims in communitybased religious schools, called madrasas. Others do not find that madrasas are a problem. They point out that, according to the Sachar Committee (2006, 75), only 4% of Muslim children receive their education from madrasas. They claim that Muslim parents send their children to madrasas not so much for religious reasons but rather because madrasas offer decent education free of charge (Mander).5 Like many secularists, Khurshid finds that few Muslims would send their children to madrasas if there were effective free education. Sahney takes a more critical view: ‘The grievances of Muslims are in one way genuine. They feel alienated. On the other hand, we may have to concede one thing: To a great extent, the Muslim society is responsible for their backwardness.’ He feels that Muslims have fallen behind not only because the state has failed to impose secular education but also due to their own negligence. In Sahney’s view,

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Muslims lack education because they are under reactionary clerics. He laments that Muslims do not have secularist leaders who would tell them: Look, all right, you go to the madrasa to learn how to offer namaz [prayer]. You should know about the Quran.You should know about your religious text. But one hour a day is good enough. Farida Khan, the Minority Commissioner, has an academic background as a professor of educational studies and can speak with authority on the subject.While admitting that Muslims have been neglected by the state, she feels that they also have a regrettable tendency to segregate into their own educational institutions – not only madrasas but also, for example, schools where the language of instruction is Urdu. Khan mentions Muslim trusts setting up private schools for Muslims all across India, from Gujarat to Karnataka and from Telangana to Kerala. Based on her intimate knowledge of the sector, Khan also questions the honesty of lip-service paid to Muslim education. She considers education a ‘soft sector’ where talk is cheap.‘Nobody is going to say no to education. Nobody is going to deny that children need to be in school.’ In a sarcastic voice, she calls it ‘This thing of, “If Muslims get educated . . .” ’

Injustice and discrimination Another way to redefine Indian secularism on more progressivist terms is to regard Muslims as victims of injustice and discrimination at the hands of the Hindu majority and the Indian state. Every progressivist can subscribe to the idea of fighting injustice and discrimination. Doesn’t this sound much better than accommodating Muslims as a religious minority? Many secularists assert that Muslims are victims of injustice and discrimination. A social activist finds that the ‘social common sense’ in the country is that India is a Hindu nation where others have at best a marginal space (Puniyani). An academic feels that, while in theory the Indian state is impartial to communities, this is not the way it actually works. He claims that Hindu majoritarianism is deeply embedded in everyday forms of governance, leading to an experience of discrimination among Muslims and other minorities (Fazal). The labour market, and especially public sector employment, is a key area where most secularists agree that Muslims suffer from injustice and discrimination. ‘They don’t get jobs in government. There are very few government jobs [for Muslims]. Even public sector undertakings, multinationals: the numbers are astounding how few Muslims are employed in most of these places’ (F. Khan). According to a social activist, the reason for such discrimination is the communalist bias among people in authority. ‘There is some officer. He is recruiting some people, so he has power. It is touch and go: same type of post, similar qualifications, more or less. Obviously,

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Muslims are discriminated against.’ Private employers, he finds, are even more ‘reckless’ than the state in bypassing Muslim applicants (Puniyani). In the housing sector, too, Muslims are said to suffer from injustice and discrimination. Scholars debate whether the term ‘ghetto’ is appropriate to describe Muslim slums (Gayer and Jaffrelot 2012), but another social activist does not have any such qualms: ‘If you go to Muslim ghettos anywhere in the country, you can be sure that it is most poor in terms of infrastructure that the state provides: road, sewage, water; education, healthcare . . .’ Further up the social ladder, ‘middle-class Muslims are pushed out of middle-class housing societies’ (Engineer). Law and order is another area where Muslims are seen as victims of injustice and discrimination. A social activist finds that Muslims are overrepresented in India’s prison population. ‘If they take action against ten Muslims, they take action against five Hindus.’ For the same crime, ‘a Hindu will get one year and a Muslim can get two or three’ (Hussain). Rajeev Gowda, a Congress spokesman, finds the police ‘communal in their practices.’ He sees a ‘difference between how Hindu rioters are treated and how Muslim rioters are treated.’ Hindu rioters get away ‘scot-free,’ but their Muslims targets are ‘hanged.’ Gowda also sees serious Muslim underrepresentation in the police and the security sector more generally. An academic finds the police not only ‘very Hindu’ but also biased against Muslims. Muslims are discriminated against because there is an aura about them which has come up in the last few years that they are the ones who are antinational, they are the ones who are terrorists.Whenever there is a problem, you go and try to arrest and torture [sic] members of the Muslim community. (Katju) As we have seen, many secularists find serious injustice and discrimination against Muslims. However, not everyone exonerates Muslims from all responsibility. For example, an educationist squarely puts the blame on the Muslims themselves. He fights for Dalit emancipation and sees Muslims as potential allies in this political struggle. Nevertheless, he cautions that Muslims are ‘not an enlightened community.’ Under the influence of reactionary Mullahs, ‘they haven’t invested a sufficient amount of money in enlightenment’ (Pinto). Others add qualifiers to claims about injustice and discrimination against Muslims in law and order, the housing sector and the labour market. A minority commissioner concedes that Indian law and police are ‘often very, very hard on poor people. It may not have to do with Muslim and Hindu at all. A poor Hindu would be suffering almost as much’ (F. Khan). A social activist similarly qualifies his verdict. On the one hand, the security apparatus thinks ‘that almost every educated Muslim is a potential terrorist danger.’ On the other hand, there are ‘many cases in which Muslims have got justice.’  The activist finds that the recruitment of

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police officers is stacked against Muslims, but Muslims themselves have ‘not made enough efforts to be recruited’ and language issues are partly to blame (Engineer). Regarding the housing situation, the same social activist finds that Muslims themselves self-segregate and discriminate against non-Muslims: ‘Sometimes, even Muslim housing societies discriminate and do not allow a Hindu to purchase a house’. Regarding slums, a Muslim academic with a public-service background finds that Hindus are hardly better off than Muslims. He appreciates that Muslim slum dwellers see the state as discriminating against them, ignoring them or picking their homes first for demolition. However, he considers this only a perception. While suffering from equal discrimination, Hindu slum dwellers cannot claim minority status and therefore frame their grievances differently (Abid). Regarding the labour market, the former Lieutenant Governor of New Delhi, himself a Muslim, finds it ‘rubbish’ to claim that ‘there is no justice for Muslims.’ If he were recruiting ten people and chose to select nine or even ten Hindus, did that mean he was discriminating against Muslims? Or might the Muslim candidates be insufficiently educated (Jung)? Salman Khurshid, former government minister and also a Muslim, expressed a similar view: ‘I’ll be fair. It is not all discrimination. It is just the state of affairs. A lot of Muslims feel that this is discrimination. But it is not necessarily. It is a state of affairs that has built-in injustices.’ What to make of it? On the one hand, several high-level public enquiries have consolidated the view that Muslims suffer from discrimination and injustice (Sachar 2006; Misra 2007; Kundu 2014; see also Basant and Shariff 2010). There are empirical studies suggesting that socially disadvantaged groups, including Muslims, suffer from discrimination in the housing sector (Ahmad 2012; Thorat et al. 2015). There is also evidence of anti-Muslim discrimination on the labour market (Thorat and Attewell 2007). Especially in the military and in the security sector, Muslims are underrepresented (Khalidi 2010). On the other hand, there is countervailing evidence. Muslims suffer less discrimination further up the social ladder. Wealthy Muslims from respected families live cheek by jowl with Hindus in the most upmarket neighbourhoods. Educated Muslims thrive at the top end of the labour market, for example in the computing sector, although they may still be experiencing subtle forms of discrimination (Banerjee et al. 2009; Williams et al. 2017). Muslim representation in the police depends very much on the region. Maharashtra has 11% Muslims but only 3.8% Muslim police officers, whereas Andhra Pradesh has only 9.8% Muslims but 13.5% Muslim police officers (Yui 2015, 867). Interestingly, my secularist interlocutors were short and factual about Muslim backwardness. They spent far more time discussing Muslim victimhood. This is understandable because, while it is hardly controversial to state that Indian Muslims are socioeconomically backward, injustice and discrimination against Muslims is a controversial topic where the jury is out on important issues (it certainly seems fair to assert that marginal Muslims suffer from injustice and discrimination; however, the same holds true about marginal Hindus and other marginal sections of Indian society). All things considered, singling out Muslims as victims

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of injustice and discrimination is not only a statement about social reality. It also serves a discursive function in allowing secularists to move away from the idea of minority accommodation and redefine Indian secularism in a way that seems more resonant with progressivist values.

The communalist foe Secularists often make it a point that they are ‘inclusive’ and opposed to any kind of ‘othering.’ However, they have their own surrogate enemy: communalists. This is a safe enemy to have, as all ‘good’ people can agree that communalists are ‘bad.’ Blaming communalism on the communities is controversial, but raging against individual communalists is considered good form.This opens another way of redefining secularism, from a framework for minority accommodation into a mandate for upright people to fight the communalist foe. Many secularists present secularism in this way. For example, a social activist finds that ‘the battle’ is not between Hindus and Muslims but between secularists like himself and others who are communalists. He also made the argument, repeated by many others, that Hindu and Muslim communalists ‘feed on one another,’ with mobilization on one side allowing leaders on the other side to foment communal resentment for counter-mobilization (Mander). Does that mean that all forms of communalism are equally bad? One might think so, but many secularists are more concerned with Hindu than with Muslim communalism. Thus, Aiyar (2004, 250) regards ‘majority communalism as by far the greater danger.’  An academic sees Hindu nationalism as a nation-wide ideological project, whereas the Muslim communalism of the Majlis Party and other such movements is confined to local politics (Katju). Not every secularist agrees that Muslim communalists are the lesser evil. The Lieutenant Governor of New Delhi (2013–16) finds that there are ‘as many Owaisis around’ as there are Hindu nationalist communalists. He sees both sides as ‘equally responsible’ and suggests that about 15% of people in either community are communalists (Jung). A Congress politician is uneasy with ‘many of the stricter interpretations of the sharia’ and laments that ‘some groups amongst the Muslims see the history of the Muslim presence in India, where you had a variety of emperors who ran a lot of North India, as the high point of their existence’ (Anonymous C). Interestingly, the same politician is willing to condone Muslim communalism because he sees it as a reaction to systemic injustice. He welcomes the communalism of the Majlis Party because, in his view, people like Asaduddin Owaisi articulate the anger of Muslims in a professional way. ‘Of course that makes him a very polarizing figure but, if that articulation was not there, the divide could get worse.’  Muslims need someone like Owaisi ‘to stand up for the community’s point of view and against the perceived injustice to the community.’

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While Hindu and, to some extent, Muslim communalists are easy targets, secularists also point the finger at one another. The politician cited above asserts that, in 2013, the Samajwadi Party tried to profiteer from the riots in Muzaffarnagar, betraying secularism in order to consolidate its Muslim vote bank. ‘This sort of cynical calculation can ultimately rip apart the fabric of secular India’ (Anonymous C). Some secularists blame the Congress establishment itself for having fomented communalism. An academic finds that, ever since the emergence of mass politics in the late colonial era, Hindu majoritarianism has been irresistible for Congress leaders trying to mobilize the masses. Even during the heydays of the Congress, he claims, the putatively secular state was communalist in that sense. Hence, in the experience of Muslims and other minorities, ‘the state is not an impartial arbiter; it is a partisan state’ (Fazal). While secularists disagree on who exactly is to blame, most agree that communalism does not originate from the communities but from the machinations of communalists.This may be accurate to a degree, but it also serves a discursive purpose, namely to move secularism away from minority accommodation towards something more in line with progressivist ideas.

Celebrating diversity Another way of redefining secularism along more progressivist lines is to celebrate diversity. Like in the West, it is almost de rigeur in some secularist circles to display a fondness of cultural and religious diversity. Congress politician Aiyar finds: ‘If you impose uniformity, you end up weakening unity. Whereas the more you celebrate diversity, the stronger becomes the unity of the nation.’ In his book, Aiyar (2004, 231) praises ‘the quintessentially Indian concept of living separately together – which is what the celebration of diversity is all about.’ When Indian secularists celebrate diversity, what they mostly have in mind is ‘composite’ culture. For example, the former Lieutenant Governor of New Delhi asserts that Muslims have enriched India with their poetry, painting and architecture. ‘This is what happens when a new religion is introduced in an established ancient society.’ He praises the syncretic culture at Sufi shrines, called dargahs, and emphasizes that, in dargah culture, syncretism can go as far as accommodating Sufi saints into the Hindu pantheon (Jung). Similarly, a social activist praises India’s composite culture of syncretism and acceptance.‘We have Hindus who worship at Muslim dargahs. That syncretism is a tradition which is comfortable with diversity. It does not get panicky and anxious when people look and worship differently’ (Mander). Not every secularist shares such rosy views. Sahney, for example, sees diversity as a fact of life rather than something to celebrate: ‘We in India will have to learn to live with diversity and to be mature enough not to fight over things which are not worth fighting for.’ For the sake of social peace it is essential that every

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community, including Muslims, feels at home in secularist India. Sahney draws an analogy between a family and the nation. ‘When a family has a discord, everyone suffers. It is not just one person who suffers. Everyone suffers.’ When disenchanted secularists talk about diversity, what they have in mind is not so much composite culture but rather the reality of a divided society. Thus, an academic declares himself willing to embrace communal mobilization as an unavoidable feature of Indian politics. People are religious. People have affinities towards different groups. If there are people who feel discriminated against on the basis of certain identities, like Dalits, then if they come together, I do not see it as a problem. It has to happen. (. . .) Let Hindus mobilize. No issue. Let Muslims mobilize. No issue. Let Dalits mobilize. No problem. But when it becomes confrontational, then there is a problem. (Shajahan) In the view of this academic, communalism can even be a good thing as long it does not become confrontational. He did not explain how communalism and communal mobilization can be anything other than confrontational. Instead, he reiterated: ‘You cannot have a society where religion does not matter.You cannot have a society where caste does not matter.’

Prescriptions for India Thus far, we have discussed four different strategies of redefining India’s communitybased secularism to make it more compatible with progressivist values. In line with these strategies, secularists offer a corresponding set of prescriptions: socioeconomic progress to address Muslim backwardness, social justice to address discrimination against Muslims, eradication of communalism as the root of all evil and promotion of diversity as a kind of panacea. In terms of actionable advice, some strategies seem more productive than others. As we will see, secularists have elaborate views on progress for Muslims to address their backwardness. Suggestions on delivering justice, eradicating communalism and promoting diversity are somewhat vague by comparison. In those areas, progressivists are at risk of reinforcing patterns of identity politics rather than working towards practical solutions.

Progress for Muslims Secularists agree on the need for socioeconomic progress among Muslims, but this is where the consensus ends. Some take a bleak view. Sahney, for example, believes that it will take a century or more. Others believe that progress is automatic if only the Muslims are supported without top-down pressure or external

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interference. Mander agrees on the need for ‘lifting them up’ but finds that Muslims should not be forced to ‘conform to any homogenous idea of what it is to be Indian.’  They should be left free to ‘be themselves’ in terms of language, faith, dress code, diet and so on. In a similar vein, Aiyar (2004, 201) is confident that Muslims, on their own, are eager to modernize. ‘Progress is inevitable if they are left to themselves to arrive at intra-community solutions to these issues. It is only when those outside the community denigrate, hector and self-righteously lecture others that this process is hampered.’ While this might suggest that the best a secularist can do is step aside and wait for social development among Muslims to run its own course, progressivists believe that it is their duty to actively promote it. Therefore, they support various forms of affirmative action for Muslims. Typically, the focus is on job reservations. The key argument for such reservations is that, if there are caste-based reservations, then ‘we should not exclude some castes because they happen to have a religion’ (Khurshid). This seems very reasonable. Indeed, while the Indian constitution in theory does not allow for reservations based on religion, some states like Andhra Pradesh and Kerala have included poor Muslims under reservations for ‘Other Backward Classes.’ A Jesuit educationist would go even further. He feels that all jobs must be allocated on the basis of reservations. ‘If the Muslims are 14%, they must be represented with 14% in the private sector as well as the public sector.’ He dismisses a 1992 ruling by the Supreme Court that at least 50% of public sector jobs must be based on merit. This he sees as a conspiracy of upper-caste judges, praising the state of Tamil Nadu where reservations are already at 69%. ‘You cannot have a long-term policy if you don’t have representation of all sectors and communities. If their voices are not heard, you might experience violence.’  He demands that all castes and communities must have reservations. As there are countless castes and communities in India, I asked him whether this means that, if some group has 0.5% of the population, it must receive 0.5% of all jobs. He said yes: ‘Whatever the number of castes may be’ (Pinto). Others, however, are concerned that reservations reinforce rather than overcome social segregation into castes and communities. A secularist politician finds that reservations should not be based on caste or religion but on actual backwardness in terms of livelihood, family background, rural origin, level of education and so on (Anonymous C). A social activist is uneasy about reservations because they do ‘injustice to other people who are excluded.’ He suggests that one should measure from time to time which classes are socially, educationally and economically backward (Engineer). An academic finds that Muslim reservations only ‘add to the politics of appeasement and all the debates around that’ (Shajahan). During the last two Congress governments (2004–14), many progressivists have shifted their focus to ‘equal opportunity,’ a much broader agenda of affirmative action that may or may not include reservations. Khurshid, for example, favours equal opportunity because, unlike reservations, it is about individuals and would

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therefore de-communalize affirmative action. Khurshid regrets that the Congress failed to push through the relevant legislation. I was greatly supportive of equal opportunity because you didn’t have to say, give Muslims equal opportunity.You had to say, give everyone equal opportunity. Muslims will get included. The mistake that we made, which was forced upon us by some NGOs and some of our own Muslim colleagues, was that, no, you must give something to Muslims. The social activist Irfan Engineer agrees. He claims that only a strong equal opportunity commission can tackle a situation where certain classes of citizens are systematically excluded not only from the state sector but also from private sector employment, education, housing and so on.‘Once that commission is there, and people have some effective body to which they can carry their grievances of exclusion, I don’t think you will require reservations.’ In his view, the equal opportunity commission should be entrusted to representatives of civil society and the judiciary rather than politicians. It should develop transparent indicators to determine who should receive affirmative action. It should also act upon complaints of ‘structural discrimination against any group of citizens.’ Engineer deplores the fact that now, with the Congress relegated to the opposition, the equal opportunity bill is in ‘deep freeze’ or even ‘cold storage.’ Secularists set much hope in education as an instrument to foster progress for Muslims. While reforming education is difficult and takes decades to bear fruit, secularists find it hard to imagine what else, if not education, might address Muslim backwardness. A Congress politician is proud that his party places strong emphasis on ‘additional training for minority communities’ and ‘balancing madrasa education with technical skills-based education’ (Anonymous C). Sahney concurs: ‘In an open society, how do you progress? You have to equip yourself with some skill.’ Therefore, he suggests, Muslims should abandon religious education in madrasas and ‘take to modern education, which will give them employment.’ Many secularists agree that madrasa education is a roadblock on the way to progress that needs to be cleared. According to Khurshid, ‘Madrasas must be modernized. It is a waste of time to have madrasas that don’t offer a curriculum which is suitable for employment. Language skills – English and other languages – are important.’  The best solution, he suggests, is to offer effective free education programmes. ‘Very few people will then go to madrasas.’ That said, Khurshid favours a gentle approach in pursuit of modernization. The mistake some people make is to dictate and say: ‘You guys are conservative. You must change.’ Y   ou have to understand them. You have to understand why a madrasa is the way it is, and then try to work with them from within rather than from the outside.

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An academic is confident that, once opportunities for skill development and modern education become available to Muslims, ‘things will fall in place. You don’t need to talk about justice. You don’t need to talk about bureaucracy. You don’t need to talk about independence. Things will fall in place.’ He cites the example of Kerala, a state in South India where education has ‘paid off significantly in terms of their achievement. Muslims from Kerala are not very backward.’ He contrasts this with the situation in North India, where Muslim communities are stuck with occupations in ‘small enterprises: handicrafts, handloom, power loom and that kind of stuff.’ In his view, skill development is the best way to support Muslim communities. To begin with, one should support professional skills where Muslims are already strong. At the same time, one should raise the level of ambition and educational attainment of the next generation.This, he suggests, will generate social capital, thus helping Muslim communities to gradually move up the sociocultural and socioeconomic ladder (Shajahan).

Justice for Muslims Others see Muslims not so much as backward but rather as victims of injustice and discrimination. From their perspective, the purpose of affirmative action is social justice rather than socioeconomic progress. I would have expected concrete suggestions on how to promote social justice for Muslims.To my disappointment, I heard few such suggestions. An academic with a public service background demands that the state should be more eager to engage Muslims positively rather than distrusting them (Abid). Somewhat more concretely, a Congress politician finds it important to address Muslim underrepresentation in the police and especially the armed forces. He finds it unfair to cite national security as an excuse for the exclusion of Muslims. Instead, ‘the presumption should be that everyone is a loyal Indian’ (Gowda). Satish Sahney, himself a Hindu, finds that Muslims deserve accommodation as a matter of courtesy rather than justice. In his view, ‘adult human beings’ should be willing and able to accommodate others and adjust to their behaviour even when those others seem immature. ‘If I can see your compulsion for a certain thing and if I can move a little this side and accommodate you, I think I should accommodate you.’ He cautions, however, that chivalry towards Muslims should have its limits. ‘Whatever is legitimate must be given without any reservation. What is not legitimate should never be given, no matter what the pressure is.’

Eradicating communalism Given the prominence of the communalist foe in the secularist imagination, I would have expected concrete suggestions on what to do about it. As in the

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case of ‘justice for Muslims,’ I was disappointed. Instead, I heard utopian visions of an India where community does not play any role. To cite just one example, Irfan Engineer finds that ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ are constructed identities that must ‘wither away.’  Like caste and gender, they shouldn’t matter. Only two of my interlocutors put forward specific ideas on how to eradicate communalism. First, a social activist deplores India’s political culture where electioneering comes down to identity politics. ‘We feel that we have to belong to a certain social or religious group so that we can extract the maximum from the system.’  He suggests that the only solution is to abandon identity politics and to move towards a new culture of ‘ideology politics’ where people stand up for their rights not as community members but as individual citizens (Hussain). Second, and more concretely, an academic suggests that Indian democracy, and specifically the first-past-the-post system, is prone to exploitation by communalists, which has ‘killed the ability of people to live with each other.’  As a remedy, he recommends a move from majority voting to proportional representation. ‘On a scale of 1 to 10, for me the change in the election system would be the first. That is absolutely crucial’ (Sharma). One may wonder, however, if proportional representation might not be even more exploitable for communalists?

Promoting diversity Most secularists are committed to diversity one way or another. Sahney, for example, feels that there should be a ‘commitment to accept that this is a diverse country’ where ‘everyone should feel at home.’  An academic would ‘like that everybody should be together and religion should not define identity. One’s defining identity should be as a citizen.’ In her view, there needs to be ‘more mingling, there has to be more dining, intermarrying; one has to be together.’  She would even go a step further and demand that everyone should be a ‘universal citizen and cosmopolitan citizen.’  Without further specification, she concludes: ‘I would put my effort behind organizations, state efforts, which are trying to do that’ (Katju). In the field of education, ideas about promoting diversity are more concrete. As we have seen, many secularists are opposed to madrasas. Farida Khan would ‘wish them away’ because they are segregated schools. Instead, she suggests, people should demand better state-run schools. After all, it is the state’s responsibility to offer secular education of reasonable quality. If such education were available, marginalized Muslims would stop sending their children to madrasas.There might still be a place for madrasas as theological seminaries, but otherwise they would become redundant.This is a mantra I have heard from many secularists.The question, however, remains if state-run schools for Muslims would be less segregated than madrasas.6

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Suggestions for Europe While Europeans have a certain reputation for ‘lecturing’ Indians, I found it refreshing to get lectured by Indian secularists for a change. Aiyar, the Congress politician, finds that Europe, with its troubled history of religious intolerance, lacks ‘the civilizational experience to handle today’s problems.’ India has ‘a much richer soil on which to experiment with secularism’ because ‘secularism emerges from our civilizational experience.’  Aiyar compares 666 years of Muslim rule in India (1192–1858) with 685 years of Muslim rule in Spain (711–1492), bemoaning that, unlike India, Europe has wiped out its Muslim legacy. In his view, the essence of Indian civilization is to ‘synthesize and harmonize,’ whereas the essence of Western civilization is ‘to slice and divide.’ T   he West is ‘totally incapable of comprehending unity in diversity.’ He welcomes ‘the rise of multiculturalism in several proud single-culture nations like France and Britain.’ Confronted with large religious minorities, Europe should ‘learn from the Indian example of a multi-religious, secular society’ (Aiyar 2004, 230, 253, 263–64).

India as a model Like Aiyar, many other Indian secularists see their country as a model for Europe. According to a social activist, Europeans must decide ‘whether you want to have countries and societies where people are comfortable with themselves, including Muslims, or whether you want more homogenized societies where people come in and have to conform.’ He admits that diversity can pose certain challenges, but the problem ‘may not be with the Muslims; it may be with you.’ Europeans must learn that diversity ‘is the most wonderful thing civilization can offer. Everything that we have in this country is because of absorbing so much.’ India, he asserts, is a shining example: ‘Our encounter with Islamic traditions and culture, our encounter with the British, our encounter with the Chinese – each of these encounters has enriched us’ (Mander). The other side of the same coin is that Europe is in desperate need of what India already has. Or, as an academic puts it: Compared to cosmopolitan India, a large section of European society is ‘extremely provincial’ or, he is sorry to say, of ‘abysmal provinciality’ (Sharma). Others graciously acknowledge that Europe finds itself in a different situation than India. Farida Khan, the minority commissioner, highlights the fact that, unlike in India, the presence of Muslims in Europe is ‘a new immigration sort of thing.’ Satish Sahney, the head of the Nehru Centre, feels that Europe is facing a more challenging situation than India, where Islam has ancient roots and most Muslims are the progeny of Hindu ancestors who converted to the religion during centuries of Muslim rule. In Europe, most Muslims are recent immigrants from the Middle East. This is ‘going to be a very big challenge’ because the ‘cultures are so, so different; it is almost like a clash.’  Sahney cites the example of secularist France which, he understands, ‘is doing its best’ to confront Muslim parents

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who do not want their daughters to participate in coeducational sports activities and receive sexual education. Now, this is absurd. This cannot be accepted. If it is part of the curriculum of the country and part of the education system, then the system cannot be changed for you. If it doesn’t suit you, you can choose where you want to send your children for education. But the country’s system cannot be changed and should not be changed. A Congress politician finds that, on the one hand, Muslim immigrants in Europe ‘have not integrated, or been integrated, as well as they should be.’ On the other hand, he feels that in Europe there is less historical baggage. Europe has an opportunity to shape a common future with Muslims whereas, in India, there is always a risk that people would say: ‘You did this to us 500 years ago.’  At the same time, the politician recognizes a need for Europe to manage migration. ‘You should think about the national interest and manage things carefully, in a pragmatic manner – without losing your soul, without losing your democratic ideals, but making sure you do it in a politically careful and sustainable manner’ (Anonymous C).

India as a warning If some present India as a model for Europe, others see it as more of a warning. Mazher Hussain, a social activist in Hyderabad, warns that Europe may become like India, with dire consequences for minorities and majorities alike. He feels that immigration might communalize Europe, leading to the same kind of identity politics that has done so much damage to Indian democracy. ‘Anywhere in the world, if you look at the minority population, for them identity politics is a way of survival and self-protection. Whereas, when the dominant community adopts this, that is where it goes towards becoming authoritarian.’ Hussain finds that there is nothing Europeans can do to get to the root of the problem. In the age of globalization, curbing immigration would be ‘unethical and improper.’  What is more, ‘demographic change will come, whether or not you allow immigration.’  The trouble starts when the native majority mobilizes against the minorities. ‘Any society, it does not matter where, when the dominant community starts identity politics, there can be no space for the minorities.’ Hussain sees Europe on a trajectory towards communal riots in a matter of five or ten years. This, he feels, will ‘test and challenge the European claim of being secular.’ The upshot is paradoxical. To remain true to its ‘liberal, inclusive, progressive and all-encompassing’ values, Europe must restrain its majorities even at the expense of democratic freedoms. Should majorities mobilize against minorities, authorities must control the way the media, and especially social media, are ‘treating diversity, migrants and all that.’

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P.K. Shajahan, an academic, suggests a model to describe how communalization unfolds, whether in Europe or elsewhere. The key to the model is a social constellation where a dominant majority and marginalized minorities are caught in a vicious circle of identity-based mobilization and counter-mobilization. On the minority side, marginality is experienced as social exclusion, reinforcing communal identity. The minorities are likely to mobilize in order to reap concessions from the majority.To the extent that the minorities benefit from such concessions (e.g. affirmative action), they acquire a vested interest in the perpetuation of their minority status, leading to more mobilization further down the line. On the majority side, critics will interpret any concessions to the minority as appeasement. They will ask: ‘Why are we doing this?’ Increasing sectors of the majority will become concerned about ‘the erosion of resources of the state and the nation.’  They will find that, in a democracy, counter-mobilization is the only way to stop the state from supporting minorities. When the migrants come, you initially think, ‘Oh, we are a very, very accommodating community,’ taking care of those who come through insurance, inclusion and various other kinds of things. When a large amount of people demands limited resources, then it is, ‘Oh, are we sharing our resources with this community?’

The need to get real Surinder Jodhka, a sociologist, finds that Europe needs to get real about the challenges posed by Muslim immigration. ‘You can’t manage it because you are not recognizing the reality.’  Jodhka welcomes an open, empirical way of approaching the problem and is willing to concede that Europe might need a debate about migration management. At the same time, he cautions that migration is not only a question of political will and ethical values but also of real economic and political ‘compulsions.’  As much as governments may wish to manage migration, he finds that this is impossible because of vested interests and the demand for labour. Since native Europeans do not have ‘the numbers,’ migration flows from developing countries are inevitably going to increase. What is more, Europe’s ageing societies will need human beings to support them. ‘Nobody can stop it. Historically, that phase of segregation is over.’ Under such circumstances, communalization is unavoidable. ‘You become communal when you are confronted with difference. Prejudice becomes discrimination when you enter the marketplace.’ Abstract values and ideological worldviews ‘just don’t become relevant unless they’re encountered with a concrete person who is going to serve you food tomorrow morning.’  As a remedy, Jodhka recommends not only exploring ‘the realities of the Muslim world’ but also how Indians, ‘in a very smart way,’ are able to make Muslims feel welcome

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while actually neglecting them. ‘People will handle it on their own. This is how it should be.’

Conclusion Indian secularists suffer from a dilemma. On the one hand, they are guardians of a constitution that looks favourably towards religious communities and provides a framework for minority accommodation. Until fairly recently, accommodating Muslims has served secularist parties well in terms of winning elections and holding power. On the other hand, the idea of minority accommodation flies in the face of the progressivist values held dear by most secularists. At the same time, secularists suffer from the reputation of trying to ‘appease’ Muslims. In order to come to terms with this dilemma, Indian secularists pursue a variety of seemingly progressive ways of supporting Muslims. Ever since Nehru, the classical way of doing so is to support Muslims not so much as a religious community but rather in terms of their socioeconomic ‘backwardness.’ Especially the idea of equal opportunity may have the potential of de-communalizing support for Muslims and other marginal people and groups. Unfortunately, however, secularists have not been very successful with this strategy. Therefore, secularists seek other ways to redefine minority accommodation along progressivist lines. Some frame the problem in terms of injustice and discrimination against Muslims, and call for social justice to address such victimization. The crux is that minorities need accommodation that pays off in real terms rather than theatrical forms of identity politics. Others call for the eradication of communalism and the promotion of cultural diversity. In doing so, they blissfully ignore the reality of communal segregation in the country. In all of these attempts, progressivists are up against fundamental facts of life. Muslims are far from united, but they are not simply a class of ‘backward’ citizens waiting to catch up with more advanced sections of society. Many Muslims feel victimized by injustice and discrimination, but neither Indian secularists nor anybody else seems to have clear ideas on how to address this problem. Nor does anybody seem to have a solution for communalism or a formula for promoting diversity in a way that would advance progressive values. Until recently, European liberals have been spared the dilemma of reconciling their values with the imperatives of minority accommodation. Western nation states had inequalities and in some cases ethnic divisions, but religious communities hardly played a role. Political cleavages were about class or ideology rather than community and culture. However, this has changed with mass migration, which has led to the rise of Muslim and other minorities. Now that Europe is increasingly multicultural and multi-religious, European liberals are caught in a conundrum that is similar to the dilemma Indian secularists have experienced for decades. As liberals, most Europeans would like to see

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people as individuals rather than members of religiously defined groups. As multiculturalists, however, they often feel compelled to embrace the very communities that, as liberals, they see with increasing concern. Deep down, European liberals know that multiculturalism is regressive rather than progressive, just like Indian secularists know that minority accommodation is regressive rather than progressive. Nevertheless, they find ways to delude themselves that multiculturalism is compatible with their liberal values, just like Indian secularists find ways to delude themselves that minority accommodation is compatible with progressivist values. Like Indian secularists, European liberals prefer celebrating diversity to confronting communal discord. They tend to suggest that any difficulties ‘native’ Europeans might experience with Muslim immigrants are about socioeconomic inequalities rather than religion or culture. Instead of demanding that Muslims must do more to integrate with their host societies, they claim that Muslims are victims of discrimination and injustice at the hands of ‘xenophobic’ or ‘Islamophobic’ majorities. The term ‘communalism’ remains unfamiliar in Europe, but liberals have found another label to suggest that the real problem does not lie with the minorities but with majority mobilization: ‘populism.’ But, like in India, the problems do not go away because liberals redefine them in progressivist terms or use euphemistic or derogatory language. Instead, illiberal tendencies in Europe’s increasingly ‘diverse’ societies threaten to undermine celebrated accomplishments. For example, Islamist understandings of ‘Muslim family law’ (commonly known as sharia) are an affront to liberal values. Under such circumstances, liberal permissiveness may have illiberal consequences. For instance, it empowers Muslim men at the expense of Muslim women. Or, to cite another example, many Muslims find that views critical or disrespectful of Islam are ‘blasphemy.’  Some liberals defend freedom of expression, but others support laws against ‘hate speech.’ Even short of formal legislation, Europeans increasingly enforce political correctness. This contributes to a culture of (self-)censorship that further undermines liberal values such as freedom of expression and freedom of speech. What European liberals fail to appreciate is that multiculturalist complicity with illiberal practices plays into the hands of so-called populists. Something similar has already happened in India, where secularists have lost power to Hindu nationalists. It is also in this regard that India may serve European liberals not only as a model but also as a warning.

Notes 1 For the sake of simplicity, I write ‘secularism’ for the ideology of the Congress and other leftist and centrist parties. But we should note that almost everyone in India, including the Hindu nationalists, claims the mantle of secularism. 2 Although he later came back with more politically correct statements about ‘the idea of India, which is inclusive and secular and celebrates diversity,’ I keep his identity confidential to shield him from any adverse consequences for his career.

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3 Khan has the humility to acknowledge that sometimes her chairman has a point. ‘He understands the situation very well. He keeps me in check. I get really angry and I start shouting.’ 4 Mani Shankar Aiyar, personal communication, 29 March 2016. 5 Mander also finds that, in a state school, Muslim children ‘might be facing an extremely hostile environment.’ 6 Urdu-medium state schools in Maharashtra, for example, are highly segregated (Shaban 2015).

6 THE COMMON MAN – OR WOMAN!

THE COMMON MAN – OR WOMAN!THE COMMON MAN – OR WOMAN!

Indians agree that pride of place should be given to aam aadmi, the ‘common man’ – or woman. The Congress ran its 2004 electoral campaign on the theme. Ten years later, Narendra Modi suggested that the aam aadmi should replace the maharaja as Air India’s mascot (Sinhal 2014). There is even a political party called Aam Aadmi. Despite or precisely because of such lip-service, Indians keep deploring that, in reality, the common man remains neglected. By the same token, scholars agree that we should study not just elites but common people such as women in slums, Dalits and lower castes, and people in the countryside. Indeed, important aspects of Hindu–Muslim relations get lost when common people are written out of scholarship. After all, they are the ones living cheek by jowl with other communities, whereas elites can celebrate the diversity of their neighbourhoods from the privacy of their homes. How to study Hindu–Muslim relations from the bottom up, starting with the experience of common people? Obviously, this is more easily said than done. It is impossible to state anything meaningful on Hindu–Muslim relations in general based on the situation in this village or that slum. For all practical intents and purposes, we must avoid drowning in detail. Unavoidably, therefore, the scholar of Hindu–Muslim relations will turn to elites. Not only can members of the elite claim a wider perspective. It is also easier to locate English-speaking upper-caste urban men with an impressive education and an even more impressive address book than, say, to gain access to marginal women in slums or villagers speaking vernacular tongues.Yet, it remains true that an excessive focus on elites bears the risk of stunted perspective. Privileged people live in nominally diverse ‘bubbles’ that are, in reality, rather homogenous. They do not know from experience how Hindu–Muslim relations are like for common people. To hedge against the distortions resulting from this,

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I have made an effort to reach out to common men and women. This is only a minor corrective to the ‘elite biases’ inherent in my study, but it is better than nothing and sheds light on realities that are often overlooked. The aim of this chapter is to mitigate three biases. First, the male bias: While the political management of communal affairs, like Indian society more generally, is male-dominated, women play an important role in negotiating relations at the family level and in everyday life. Second, the upper-caste bias: Scheduled and backward castes are often subsumed under upper-caste Hindu hegemony, but some push back and seek alliances with Muslims and other subaltern groups. Third, the urban bias: For all its megacities, India remains an agrarian country. In the countryside, both communal segregation and syncretic practices survive. Far from confirming the bromide that India is such a diverse country that any generalization is impossible, this chapter shows that diversity does not rule out general trends. Despite the infinite variety of communities and localities, which must be acknowledged, I will pin down a number of tendencies that align with observations made in other chapters.

Women in slums Slums are places where people from marginal communities ‘rub shoulders.’  On the one hand, people in slums live in constant fear of communal conflict. This generates pressure to get along. On the other hand, marginal communities in densely populated spaces are compelled to compete for scarce resources. Hence, the gloves come off more easily. As we will see, women in slums are no exception. If anything, they experience this tension more directly.

Dharavi, Mumbai Dharavi, Mumbai’s largest slum, is very diverse in terms of ethnicity, language and religion. About 700,000 migrant workers from all over India live cramped together on less than a square mile. Compared to other slums, Dharavi is firmly established. Most buildings are made of brick. There are TV stores, jewellers and computer shops. Yet, there is poverty. Many houses are makeshift. Despite Dharavi’s ‘cosmopolitan’ character, most people live on lanes where specific castes or communities dominate. Some remember the Hindu–Muslim riots of 1992. Through this labyrinth, Congress Party worker Abishek Sawant led me to a meeting with female migrant workers. After climbing a flight of escape ladders, we arrived at the day care centre called Diwya – Development and Integration of Women and Youth Association. Diwya is run by women from the slum and presents a fascinating microcosm of its ethnoreligious diversity. At the day care centre, I met eight women. Most of them are third-generation migrants from other Indian states such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Telangana and Karnataka. None of them speaks English, most use

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Hindi, and only one is proficient in Marathi. The Congress Party worker (who sponsors the organization) explained to me that, even when a woman is a third generation migrant and her son is fourth generation, neither will be considered Maharashtrian. Abishek Sawant also acted as translator during the interview.1 Five of the women are Hindu, two are Christian and one is Muslim.The Muslim woman is the daughter of a Hindu mother and a Muslim father. She reports that her family celebrates both Hindu and Muslim festivals, and that it is fun. The two Christian women are both from Muslim families but converted to Christianity when they married their husbands. The women take pride in their working-class identity. ‘No one of us begs and eats. Everyone works hard.’  They are proud that people in Dharavi are not only hard workers but also street fighters. ‘Everyone is ready to fight, Muslims no less than Hindus.’ For example, people fight for water. ‘When we are filling water, they say: “Don’t. You can draw after we have filled.” They say this, and this starts the fight.’ Religious festivals are another source of contestation. One community might try to prevent the other from lighting firecrackers. Even motorcycle accidents can take a communal turn when one driver is Hindu and the other Muslim. Either might call in bystanders from his community to prevail in the ensuing brawl. The women see religion in rather practical terms. They use the vernacular word for ‘caste’ rather than ‘religion,’ and they agree that communities provide valuable protection in times of trouble. A Muslim woman suggests that people want to live in an area dominated by their religious ‘caste’ because they think: ‘If something untoward happens tomorrow, it will be nice if we are in the majority.’  Otherwise, the women feel that belonging to a religion is onerous. A Hindu woman suggests: ‘If I were a Christian, I wouldn’t have to put a bindi [red dot on her forehead].’  Similarly, a Muslim finds: ‘I wouldn’t be in purdah [wearing the veil].’ Community and gender are more important to these women than religious doctrine. In orthodox Islam, a non-Muslim husband must convert when marrying a Muslim; whereas a non-Muslim bride can keep her religion as long as she agrees to raise the children in Islam. In the slum, no one seems to be aware of that rule. There were two women, related to one another, who had converted from Islam to Christianity for their husbands. They suggested that the dominant gender dictates religion: ‘Whatever the guy’s family wants, happens. If the guy is a Muslim, the Hindu girl will have to convert to Islam. If the guy is a Hindu, the Muslim girl will have to convert to Hinduism.’  Others objected that, in an intercommunal marriage, religion is not determined by gender but by community. A Hindu woman asserted that, Muslims being the dominant community, a Hindu marrying a Muslim must convert to Islam regardless of gender. The women were unable to agree whether Hindu–Muslim love marriages are a good or a bad thing. The younger and less experienced women suggested, romantically, that one should follow one’s heart, but those married emphasized

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the importance of safeguarding social acceptance and gaining the family’s blessing. A Muslim woman said: ‘A Muslim girl would have difficulty adjusting to the customs of a Hindu family. Families don’t accept girls so easily.’  A Hindu woman said: ‘They say that love is blind. They don’t understand that they need to live in society. They have to work with society. If later the girl refuses to compromise, a divorce [‘talaq’] can happen immediately.’  Another woman summed it up: ‘If she is ready to commit and live her life, and doesn’t care about society, then go and get married. But make sure you realize that your family members will cut off their relation with you.’ In terms of how to improve intercommunal relations, some highlighted the importance of respect. One woman said: ‘I am a Hindu, but I go to church and find it good as well. Teaching mutual respect is most important.’  Another woman reported that she was told at home: ‘We shouldn’t discuss the conflict too much. If we talk too much, we will get caught up with it.’  Others unabashedly put the blame on the other community. A Hindu said she detested Muslims who were shouting slogans such as: ‘If I am a Muslim, why must I go to the Hindus? Why must I listen to their drumbeats? I only want to listen to adhan [call to prayer].’ Another alleged that, unlike Hindus, Muslim men train their womenfolk to use knives in order to prevail in communal brawls. ‘If there is a community clash, then we only have Hindu men fighting, but as Muslims the whole family comes out, men and women, to fight.’ Overall, Dharavi seems so diverse in terms of language and religion, ethnicity and caste, that traditional distinctions risk breaking down. Precisely for that reason, community is important. People are insecure and need solidarity networks, not least to fend off other communities that are equally insecure but might gain the upper hand in a clash. Communities do mingle in this densely populated area, but people are all the more conscious of what divides them from other communities and have limited inhibition to express negative sentiment about them.

Hyderabad, Old City In Hyderabad’s decrepit Old City, a majority of Muslims live nearby Dalits and lower-caste Hindus. The communities live in such close vicinity that they cannot ignore each other, but they are thoroughly segregated by neighbourhoods. In the area I visited, women play an important role in negotiating communal relations. They are empowered to do so by Shaheen, a women’s centre operating in some of the most deprived areas of Old Hyderabad.2 The women’s centre lies at the intersection of three neighbourhoods, each dominated by a community: Sultan Shahi is inhabited by Muslims; Patel Nagar by backward-caste Hindus; and Valmiki Nagar by Dalit scavengers who came from North India centuries ago. Other adjacent neighbourhoods are similarly

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segregated. In all three of the neighbourhoods, I saw boys playing on the street but no girls. In Valmiki Nagar, the Dalit slum, even women were absent from the streets. The reason is that the Valmikis practice purdah (female seclusion). Astonishingly, seclusion is more extreme in Valmiki Nagar than in nearby Muslim neighbourhoods. Jameela Nishad, the founder and head of Shaheen, is a socially engaged poet. She hails from a Muslim family and has spent her childhood in the area where Shaheen now has its main office. She reminisces it as a place where Muslims and Hindus, including Kayastha Brahmins (a caste of scribes and administrators), were living in communal harmony. When she and her sisters grew older, the family moved to the New City to give the girls an adequate education. But they would go back at least once a year to see relatives and celebrate festivals. Nishad laments that her childhood paradise came under threat in the early 1990s, around the time of the nation-wide Hindu nationalist mobilization to demolish the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya. Before long, communal segregation became more intense in the Old City of Hyderabad. Her childhood paradise became known as the ‘India-Pakistan border.’  After the 2002 riots in Gujarat, she founded Shaheen to counter segregation and empower women. ‘All girls from all communities should live together, eat together and spend time together.’ Reclaiming the streets was the first mission. According to Nishad, the mobility of girls is severely limited in the Old City. Girls from one community are not supposed to enter the area of another community. A Muslim girl ‘cannot go alone, even if she is in a burka. She must have a guard with her, either her mother or her husband or somebody, to carry her around. She doesn’t have independence.’  Dalit girls are even more severely constrained. In defiance of communal segregation and female seclusion, Muslim girls from Sultan Shahi started to patrol the area together with Hindu girls from Patel Nagar. At the beginning, enlisting Dalit girls was difficult. However, Dalits joined after ‘Muslim girls started going there, sitting in their house, and teaching them something.’  Since then, Shaheen has expanded its area. According to Nishad, there are six centres in 20 slums, covering 67,000 people. Every month, Shaheen holds meetings on public squares to mark its presence. Initially, people would pelt stones. Later, the meetings were accepted. ‘Now, the MIM [Majlis] corporator, an elected person, comes to Shaheen, stands on the dais [podium], and talks about empowerment of girls. He takes the mike of Shaheen and talks to the public about empowering girls.’  This is remarkable because the Majlis Party is known as socially conservative (see Chapter 4). Shaheen does not shy away from controversial activities. In 2012, a Hindu girl from the Lodha caste wanted to marry her childhood love, a poor Muslim of her own age. Her family opposed the liaison and forced her into an arranged marriage with an older Hindu man, who was a relative of an upcoming BJP politician who

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is now a Member of the Legislative Assembly.The girl walked out of the arranged marriage and took refuge with Shaheen. At that point, the politician came to the centre and told them to drop the case. Every day, a group of young boys would come round and wait for something or the other, to create disturbances. That happened for 15 to 20 days. Then, when they saw that the girl was strong, that Shaheen was not yielding to what they wanted, they attacked Muslim houses. According to Nishad, the politician ‘was not bothered about the breaking of the relationship. [He] was only particular that this girl should not marry a Muslim man.’  Shaheen did not budge. In order to terminate the arranged marriage, they filed a legal case against the husband. The girl spent six months under shelter, partly in a ‘very secret place somewhere around Secunderabad.’  Then she married the poor Muslim, her childhood love. Neither had much of an education, and the husband had no job. Nishad recalls: ‘She said, I will work myself and live with him. I said, fine. We tried to find a job for her, and we got her a job.’3 Nishad told me that most of the women working at the centre are ‘survivors’ of domestic violence and that Shaheeen has helped almost 1,000 women ‘who have suffered.’  Supporting such women unavoidably ruffles feathers, but according to Nishad this happens in some communities more than in others. Husbands from Hindu backward castes tend to compromise. For example, they would promise not to beat their wives any longer. Dalit husbands would also compromise, but their community would expect any disputes to go through communal arbitration in the clan council (biradari). The Dalits would treat a woman taking shelter at Shaheen as an outcaste; she could return, however. Muslim husbands were most difficult. They had big egos and were often unwilling to compromise. Therefore, Nishad finds, ‘breaking relationships’ happens more among Muslims than in the other communities. It is not that love marriages do not happen. It is not that they do not have premarital sex. Everything happens, but everything is behind the burka. When they come to Shaheen, the man thinks: ‘If the woman is there and if I have to compromise, she is powerful.’  When we articulate issues and show that she has this right and that right, sometimes they agree to compromise. But sometimes the marriage breaks. Most of the people among Muslims call it ‘talaq centre.’ Talaq is the word for divorce. Any girl who comes to Shaheen mentally prepares herself: ‘Either, if he agrees to compromise, it’s okay; or, if he doesn’t agree, I need to take divorce.’ In 50% of the cases! Nishad recalls that, when Shaheen opened in 2002, the first attacks on the centre were not perpetrated by men but by women from each community. Only then, the men came. In the case of the Muslims, it happened after Friday prayer. In

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the case of the Hindus, after drinking. In the case of the Dalits, the entire biradari would come every time a girl had taken shelter at Shaheen. Soon after, the Muslims issued a fatwa backed by the Majlis Party: ‘This organization is talking about freedom of girls, which is not acceptable to us. It is against our religion. These people are provoking our girls. They play with their passion and emotions. This has to be removed.’  Shaheen challenged the fatwa in court and won the case.

Dalits and lower castes Scheduled and backward castes, as well as tribal and other subaltern communities, are commonly subsumed under the designation of Hinduism. But some push back against the Hindu embrace. For example, a backward-caste intellectual has authored a pamphlet: Why I Am Not a Hindu (Ilaiah 1996). Such insubordination notwithstanding, Hinduism offers accommodations that many subalterns find hard to refuse. As we have seen in Chapter 2, even some Muslims are willing to submit to Hindu supremacy in exchange for resources and protection. In what follows, let us discuss subaltern strategies between submission and insubordination.

Subaltern insubordination Critics of Hindu hegemony claim that upper-caste elites try to absorb subalterns into Hinduism in order to consolidate their own claim for leadership, or even to use them as foot soldiers in communal clashes where they might fight against Muslims and other non-Hindu communities.This, the critics suggest, is not in the best interest of the subalterns. In their view, subaltern communities should join forces against the very elites who claim to have their interests at heart but in reality only exploit them.They suggest that, instead of allowing themselves to be used as pawns in the fight against Muslims, scheduled and backward castes should join forces with ‘oppressed’ Muslims to challenge the oppressive Hindu hegemony. Father Ambrose Pinto, a Jesuit educator, ardently believes in such insubordination. In his view, ‘an egalitarian society can emerge only when there is assertion from below.’ Pinto finds that the Muslims of India are as poor as the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Therefore, he sees the SC/STs and Muslims as natural allies in the struggle for emancipation. When it comes to that struggle, he finds that religion should not stand in the way of solidarity. On the contrary, he sees Indian Islam as ‘a religion of protest as far as the subalterns are concerned.’ The ancestors of Indian Muslims, he asserts, were lower- and outcaste converts from Hinduism, and their conversion was originally a protest against the Hindu caste society.While condemning the Hindu nationalist version of identity politics, Pinto is strongly in favour of identity politics when adopted by Dalits, Muslims and other subaltern groups. A delegation of leaders from the Ambedkar Student Association at the University of Hyderabad is on a similar wavelength. Six of them are Dalits, and one is an

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‘outcaste’ (arzal) Muslim. They are followers of Ambedkar, an independence hero and Dalit leader. The group is close to the Bahujan Samaj, a Dalit party based in the North Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. The student leaders define their identity in opposition to what they call ‘Hindu Brahminical hegemony.’ They show themselves very bitter and resentful about that hegemony. For centuries, they have humiliated my ancestors. They have killed my ancestors. They never felt that we belong to this land. As an educated Dalit, I tell my family members: ‘Don’t believe these Hindu people. They always keep us under their feet. They never support us. They never give us anything.’  Only Ambedkar. He is an emancipator. He is a pathfinder for us. He is an ideal for us. (. . .) Only Ambedkar. No one else. We follow Ambedkar. We believe in Ambedkarism. We study. We believe only in writing. Not in violence. [After a pause:] Sometimes in violence also. Sometimes we have to fight with the right wing. We fight. Sometimes they try to beat the Dalit boys. These upper-caste people, these professors, they try to give us lower marks. If they come to know that you belong to the Mala or Madiga community [Dalit ‘castes’], they will not give you good marks even if you write nicely. Then we have to go and fight. As followers of Ambedkar, the student leaders renounce Hinduism and claim that Dalits are ‘separate from the Hindus.’ In their view, Hinduism is an oppressive caste system that excludes and humiliates Dalits and other subaltern groups. They detest that system and paint it in the most negative terms possible. ‘There is complete segregation amongst the Hindus themselves, and also between Hindus and Muslims.’  They admit that there is also segregation among Dalits and Muslims, but they feel there should be solidarity ‘against the same enemy.’  They insist on the need to build coalitions with other subaltern groups to ‘emancipate’ all those excluded and humiliated by Hinduism. ‘The minorities and the Dalits: this is the only hope.’ It does not matter to them who takes the lead in building such coalitions. A Muslim party encourages Dalits to join. A Dalit party encourages Muslims. The BSP is doing it from the north. The MIM [Majlis Party] is doing it from the south. Both are shooting at one point only, namely the Hindutva Brahminical hegemony. Like other student organizations, their group acts as a lobby to secure resources for Dalits and other subaltern groups, especially tribals. They demand that all jobs, ‘100%,’ must be allocated on the basis of caste and community. To my surprise, they even admit to practicing vote bank politics. In India, people commonly accuse their opponents of vote bank politics but would not admit to it themselves.

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But the Dalit student leaders candidly told me that they were experimenting with political strategies to gain ‘some kind of vote bank.’ They feel that, socialism having failed, subaltern identity politics is the only way forward. ‘There are identities, but these identities should be in alliances. The emergence of identities also leads to emancipation.’  A few months after the interview, their group was in the news when one of their leaders, Rohith Vemula, committed suicide stating that ‘my birth is my fatal accident’ (Indian Express 2016). The case was politicized because, although the suicide note did not state this explicitly, the act could be interpreted as an expression of Dalit victimhood. As we have seen, victimhood is an important part of Ambedkarist discourse. In that discourse, Muslims are fellow victims from upper-caste oppression and strategic allies in the struggle for emancipation. The student leaders asserted that accusing Muslims of communalism is only a ploy to prevent them from openly challenging the ‘Hindu Brahminical hegemony.’

Subaltern submission While some Dalits fight against ‘Hindu Brahminical hegemony’ and seek alliances with other subaltern groups, including Muslims, to prevail in that struggle, others submit to Hindu hegemony. As mentioned, it is fairly common for scheduled and backward castes to act as ‘useful idiots’ for Hindu nationalist leaders, for example by filling their vote banks or even by acting as foot soldiers in communal clashes. Dalits have been involved in many Hindu–Muslim riots. Thus, a senior Dalit academic finds that Dalits themselves are under the spell of Hindu hegemony. In support of this claim, he mentions that Dalits have been implicated in plenty of anti-Muslim riots, including the 2002 carnage in Gujarat and the 2013 riots in Muzaffarnagar. He adds that it is easy to play Dalits and poor Muslims against one another because they are forced to compete for niches in the same social space. He suggests that, given this competitive situation, the dream of an emancipatory Dalit–Muslim alliance is a phantasy (Jondhale). Indeed, one should not underestimate the pressure on poor Muslims to submit to Hindu supremacy. When walking through Dharavi, I was amazed by the visibility of Shiv Sena emblems. While Shiv Sena is a Marathi nativist and staunchly Hindu nationalist party, Dharavi is a crucible for migrant workers from all over India, many of whom are Muslims. For decades, people in Dharavi have suffered from Shiv Sena’s brutality (Hansen 2001).There should be little love lost between Shiv Sena and people in Dharavi, especially Muslims.Yet, during a walk through the area, I saw many Shiv Sena emblems: a man sporting an umbrella with Party insignia, a portrait of the Marathi hero Shivaji on a corner house and so on. Shiv Sena and Shivaji represent the Hindu nationalism and anti-migrant sentiment of the native Marathis.Why, then, are there Shiv Sena emblems in a migrant slum where Marathis are at best a small minority? I kept asking this question.

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A Muslim politician in Mumbai finds: ‘Shiv Sena is powerful. They are fighting. They are goondas. People are afraid of them.’ He suggests that Muslim migrants from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar do not like Shiv Sena but vote for it because they are afraid. ‘If they don’t, they will be beaten.They won’t be allowed to work.They won’t be allowed to open shops. The Marathi police supports Shiv Sena’ (Azmi). A social activist indicates that Hindu nationalist banners in places like Dharavi are hung by non-Marathis to signal their submission to Shiv Sena in an attempt to buy peace and gain access to patronage. Even among Muslims, he suggests, there are community brokers profiteering from being on good terms with Shiv Sena. They would tell their fellow Muslims: ‘Okay, you have a problem. I have approached this political party. I will try to get it sorted out for you’ (Puniyani). This must be all the more appealing to poor Muslims because Shiv Sena is known to have a strong presence in slums as a social organization (Eckert 2003). An academic finds that this kind of ‘pragmatic negotiation’ is part of the ‘survival kit’ of vulnerable people (Mohan). Another academic goes even further and suggests that Shiv Sena has active support among Muslims. ‘Muslims and backward people suffer from a lot of problems: no civic amenities, problems with education, and discrimination. They say that Congress has not stood by us. Why don’t we go with Shiv Sena?’ (Katju).Whatever the exact reasons, or combination of reasons, it is clear that poor Muslims sometimes submit to Hindu hegemony in order to gain protection and patronage – becoming Muslim dhimmis.

People in the countryside According to the latest census (2011), only 29% of Hindus but 40% of Muslims live in cities (Times of India 2015). Hence, while the urban focus of other scholarship is regrettable, it is more justifiable when it comes to Muslims.Yet, almost 70% of the Indian population is rural. Despite having some of the largest cities in the world, India remains a country of villages. Hindu–Muslim relations in the countryside are also relevant because that is where ‘tradition’ is most directly in conflict with ‘forces of modernity.’ On the one hand, communal segregation and syncretic practices remain strong in the countryside. On the other hand, they are increasingly threatened by social change (Sikand 2003; Assayag 2004; Bigelow 2010).

North India Given the vastness and diversity of the Indian countryside, it would have been impossible for me to gain a rounded picture from direct observation or from local informers. The best I was able to do, as an outside observer coming from distant shores, was to consult a leading specialist on rural India. Surinder Jodhka, Professor of Sociology, is a senior Sikh academic with decades of experience studying the countryside, especially in North India.

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To my surprise, Jodhka started the conversation with a number of generalizations. First, the concentration of Muslims is, and has always been, lower in the countryside than in urban areas. Second, landowners tend to be less from Muslim than from Hindu communities. Third, rural Muslims are socially segregated in ways that are similar to the Hindu caste system. Jodhka hastened to add that any generalization must be qualified in the face of local variation. In Jodhka’s view, the key question in any rural situation is which community owns the land. As the dominant class, the landowners set the terms of social segregation. In principle, the landowners can be Hindu or Muslim. In Palwal, Haryana, for example, the Meow Muslims are the majority and dominant class.4 In Madhubani, Bihar, by contrast, the land is owned by upper-caste Hindus. ‘The lowercaste Hindus and Muslims would intermingle, but the upper-caste Hindus would treat Muslims as polluted people and they would not want to have anything to do with them.’  This has consequences for day-to-day life: Muslims might buy from lower-caste Hindu shops and vice versa, but no upper-caste Hindu would buy from a Muslim. Jodhka highlights the traditional syncretism in many parts of India where people might follow the practices of their caste without having to decide whether they are Hindu or Muslim. The Jogi community in Uttar Pradesh is a case in point. Nowadays, the Jogis are seen as Muslims, but there are still traces of their old syncretic culture. Says the wife of a Jogi singer: Muslims don’t accept us as Muslims, and maulvis [Muslim dignitaries] ask us to quit singing Ramayana [Hindu epic] and saffron attire. On the other hand, Hindus also don’t like us and many of them ask us to either leave Islam or leave Jogi garb and sarangi [musical instrument associated with Hinduism]. We live in fear and to save us from such people, most young Jogis have left the tradition. We still follow both religions but I’m not sure of my children. No one asked religion from our forefathers but now people ask. (Wife of a Jogi musician, cited in Bano 2017) Citing another example, Jodkha mentions the Gurjars in Haryana. They are a dominant caste and can be Hindu or Muslim – or both. But fewer and fewer Gurjars follow syncretism. Some whom their neighbours thought were leaning towards Hinduism have come out as Muslims, building a mosque and hiring a maulvi for themselves and other emerging Muslims. They are going to be in trouble [when coming out as Muslims], but they still do it. This sharpening of identities is a universal phenomenon. Muslims who were invisible have become visible over the last 30 to 35 years. This has happened everywhere. Perhaps they always were Muslims, and we just didn’t see them as such. It is also possible that these categories are because

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of the state. Or for some other reason, such as media. The categories have come to be more marked. Therefore, you discover that they are Muslims. You ask them again and again: ‘What is your religion?’ If nobody asks that question, it doesn’t exist. When you go on asking them, then suddenly they start patronizing the mosque. Suddenly, local people realize that the maulvi is not only going to those five butcher families.5

South India While Jodhka is a specialist of North India, Vijay Thambanda, professor at a local university in Karnataka, is an expert on the rural south. He gave me a tour d’horizon of Karnataka to show just how diverse the countryside can be, with distinctions over distinctions. As a general rule, he suggests, Hindu–Muslim relations are better in northern than in southern Karnataka where the BJP has been ‘aggressive’ for at least four decades, fomenting Hindu communalism. Thambanda goes on to list further distinctions: 1 One part of northern Karnataka formerly belonged to the Bombay Presidency, which was directly ruled by the British. Here, Hindu–Muslim relations are stable despite occasional tensions, especially between Muslims and Marathi-speaking Hindus. 2 Another part of northern Karnataka belonged to the princely state of Hyderabad, which was ruled by Muslims. This has left a legacy of communal tensions, for example when Hindus suspect that Muslims are trying to convert lower-caste people to Islam. 3 On the coastal belt, Muslims dominate business. Many have spent time as migrants in the Gulf area. Some have come back with money ‘from Dubai.’ Their upward social mobility has led to Hindu resentment and, eventually, communal tensions. 4 In the southern hinterland, Muslims used to be employed on plantations, but many have moved up, acquiring property and entering politics. Some Hindus resent this. There is also resentment against Malayalam-speaking Muslim workers from Kerala.6 Thambanda suggests that there are further distinctions when descending to the level of specific localities but, even so, he is happy to venture one generalization: Lower-caste Hindus are on better terms with lower-caste Muslims than with upper caste-Hindus. He finds that this is partly because lower-caste Muslims practice syncretism, which allows them to mingle with lower-caste Hindus who (unlike upper-caste Hindus) follow similar forms of folk religiosity. Although somewhat outside his area of expertise, Jodhka was also willing to discuss situations in South India. He told me that, on the Malabar Coast in Kerala, Muslims have always been landowners but are currently ‘expanding.’  As in coastal

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Karnataka, Muslims on the Malabar Coast are able to buy up land because migration to the Persian Gulf has enriched many individuals. At the same time, Muslims come back from the Gulf ‘with hyper-awareness about their religious identity.’ While Muslim culture in Kerala used to be highly diverse, migration is leading to ‘some kind of Islamization and what perhaps one could call Arabization of Islam.’ Needless to say, Hindus resent the upward mobility of Muslims and their ostentation of Islam, enabling the Hindu nationalist BJP to gain strength on the Malabar Coast. In Jodhka’s view, a ‘new global Islamic identity’ frames the Muslim mind, not only in urban contexts but also in the countryside. ‘Women who wore saris ten years back now wear burkas.’  There is a similar trend among Hindus. ‘If you look at the Indian Hindu, you will see that people who were very diverse, Dalits for example, are now defining themselves as aggressive Hindus. They are becoming part of the RSS.’ The result is a ‘declining rural landscape.’7

Folk syncretism Many Indians praise Sufi shrines as places of Hindu–Muslim encounter, sometimes adding that these dargahs are in decline in urban areas but continue to thrive in the countryside. Despite considerable constraints on my time, I decided to visit one urban and one rural shrine. I was richly rewarded and, with hindsight, wish I had allocated more time to ‘dargah culture.’ The urban shrine, Haji Ali Dargah, is located on an islet in the Arabian Sea off Worli, Mumbai’s main island. People in colourful dresses walk over a pedestrian bridge to the mosque and shrine. The sanctuary is mostly frequented by Sufi Muslims worshipping at the tomb of their saint to the tune of mystical qawwali music. Devotees also take a ritual bath on the rocky shore of the islet.This is reminiscent of Hindu rather than mainstream Muslim religious practices. At Haji Ali Dargah, people set aside a few hours of their busy urban lives for a spiritual experience in a festive atmosphere. Contrary to stereotypes about dargahs as places of Hindu–Muslim encounter, I was not able to identify any Hindus at the shrine. It is possible, however, that some of the people taking the bath would identify as Hindus rather than Muslims. The next day I travelled to Haji Malang Dargah, which is in a rural area 60 km from Mumbai. The guardian of the Sufi shrine is the descendant of a Brahmin family. Even today, several members of the board of trustees are Hindus. Muslims and Hindus alike come to worship at the shrine, with Hindus sacrificing coconuts. In 1982, the Hindu nationalist Shiv Sena, a local party, started claiming the shrine as the tomb of a Hindu saint, Shri Machhindranath. Since then, Haji Malang Dargah, or ‘Jai Shri Malang Baba’ as the Hindu nationalists call it, has been one of India’s many disputed sanctuaries. The Hindu nationalists have fought the case all the way up to the Supreme Court, without reaching a settlement. Every

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year, Hindu nationalists come to the fair (urs) to disrupt the festivities (Saif 1996; Narvekar 2006; Nair 2013). At the foot of the mountain, where the pilgrimage begins, there are shops selling souvenirs and Sufi memorabilia. There is also a small temple for the monkey-shaped Hindu god Hanuman. To mark its claim for the contested site, Shiv Sena has erected a tiny shakha (branch) at the start of the pilgrimage route. To reach the Sufi shrine on the hilltop, one must walk over countless stairs. From there, one can hike further to an ancient Marathi fortress crowning the rocky peak. The climb from the foot of the mountain to the shrine takes about two hours. For most of the time, a pilgrim would see Hindu rather than Muslim devotional symbols. In terms of wayside shrines, the goddess Durga appears to be the most prominent deity apart from Hanuman. Next to one of the Durga temples, there is a portrait of the Marathi hero Shivaji. The Hindu saint Sai Baba of Shirdi is also ubiquitous, for example on calendars near the till of food vendors in the shacks along the trail.8 Overall, Hinduism has a stronger visual presence than Islam. There are wayside tombs of minor Sufi saints, but otherwise the scenery is mainly Hindu. About 15 minutes before reaching the dargah, the presence of Hinduism declines abruptly. From then on, Muslim symbolism dominates the trail. In vicinity of the main sanctuary, there are numerous Muslim guesthouses. Past the dargah on the path to the Marathi fortress, Muslim symbolism continues to dominate but, further along the ridge, there is a grotto where people try to pin coins to the natural stone ceiling, in an act of ‘popular superstition’ that, to the best of my understanding, can hardly be associated with either Hinduism or Islam. When descending, I met two massive men. They shouted in unison: ‘Haji Malang Baba. Haji Malang is great. Haji Malang is powerful god.’ T   hey were clad in white, not giving away their religious identity. I did not ask them if they were Hindu or Muslim. Given their statement, the question might not have meant much to them. Would a Muslim say that Haji Malang is a god? Would a Hindu worship a haji, i.e. someone who has completed the haj to Mecca? Soon after, a group of male pilgrims started a conversation with me. This time, I did ask them if they were Hindu or Muslim. They had two leaders. One wore the customary Muslim skullcap and introduced himself as a Muslim. The other introduced himself as a Hindu. He did not wear a skullcap, but otherwise donned the same white dress. They did not ask me about my religion. Instead, they asked me how I liked India and wanted me to repeat: ‘India is great!’ The milieu at Haji Malang seamlessly combines popular Sufi Islam with lower-caste Hinduism. It gives livelihood to hundreds of people: not only Hindu and Muslim ‘holy men’ but also beggars, hucksters and food vendors. It is indeed a place of Hindu–Muslim encounter. However, the idyll is overshadowed by Hindu nationalists claiming the site for Hindus alone.

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Conclusion India is without doubt a diverse country. Especially the ‘common man,’ much more than India’s cosmopolitan elites, comes in many different stripes and colours: Hindu and Muslim, Dalit and tribal, urban and rural. In about half the cases, the ‘common man’ is actually not a man but a woman. Despite all this diversity, some careful generalizations are in order. First, it is difficult for subalterns to build stable coalitions. As we have seen in Chapter 3, Hindu nationalists celebrate Hinduism as uniquely inclusive. Radical sections of the scheduled and backward castes do not buy this. They find uppercaste hegemony patronizing and oppressive rather than inclusive and accommodating. To oppose ‘Hindu Brahminical hegemony,’ they want to bring scheduled and backward castes into political coalitions with Muslims and other subaltern groups. This sometimes works in elections, but it is inherently unstable because Hindu hegemony is hard to resist. Scheduled and backward castes often act as ‘useful idiots’ for upper-caste leaders, for example as vote banks or even as foot soldiers in communal clashes. Anti-elite coalitions are also made difficult by the fact that poor Muslims occupy similar social niches as scheduled and backward castes. They are direct competitors. Some Muslims submit to Hindu supremacy, thereby becoming what we may call Muslim dhimmis, rather than joining Dalit or backward-caste activists in the fight against ‘Hindu Brahminical hegemony.’ Second, practical accommodations are more realistic than intercommunal harmony. As we have seen in Chapter 4, most Muslim leaders most of the time seek practical accommodations for their community; but some of them sometimes play up identity in rather aggressive ways. The interview at the day care centre in Mumbai suggests a similar pattern for people living in slums.The ladies I have met in Dharavi are vulnerable and insecure. They highlight the need for accommodations with other communities. At the same time, they are also strong women and take rightful pride in their toughness. This implies a readiness to ‘fight’ for one’s own against other communities. A similar picture emerges from the Old City of Hyderabad. The women at Shaheen have found practical accommodations and transgressed communal boundaries, but they also experience resistance from the communities they serve. The differences that separate the communities are genuine and difficult to overcome. One wonders how much the goodwill gained through conscious efforts can help to prevent or mitigate communal clashes if and when the situation arises. Third, the Indian countryside remains culturally rich but is by no means the syncretic idyll secularists would like it to be. As we have seen in Chapter 5, secularists are proud of India’s composite culture. Hindu–Muslim syncretism is indeed evident in the countryside. Especially at the lower-caste level, communal identities remain fluid. However, this is threatened by a trend towards standardized forms of religiosity. Localized practices are displaced by ‘mainstream’ forms of

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Hinduism and ‘globalized’ forms of Islam influenced by Middle Eastern models. The spread of mass media and migration to the Persian Gulf play a role in this, especially where returnees from the Gulf are upwardly mobile. In some areas, such as South Karnataka and the Malabar Coast, the standardization of religion goes hand in hand with the assertion of Hindu nationalism and/or political Islam. My field visit to a rural dargah near Mumbai shows this in a microcosm. On the one hand, lower-caste syncretism is very much alive but, on the other hand, Hindu nationalism has made significant inroads.

Notes 1 As a university graduate from an established Marathi family, Sawant is eager to convey a cosmopolitan flair. At one point, he instructed a woman (in Hindi): ‘Don’t answer his question from a Hindu–Muslim angle. Think like a human being.’ He ‘edited’ some of his translations to make them sound less communalist. I have corrected for the resulting distortions by having the entire recording translated by a native speaker. 2 Field visit to the Shaheen Women’s Resource and Welfare Association, Hyderabad, 26 July 2015. 3 Shaheen also stops child marriages. For legal reasons, they may do so only for Hindus and Dalits. They cannot do anything about child marriages among Muslims because they are legal under Muslim family law. 4 According to Jodhka, the Muslim Patels play a similar role in Bharuch, Gujarat. 5 Another example are the Malkana, as well as other ‘Muslim Rajputs’ in Rajasthan. 6 Finally, there is the area around Bangalore which is now a cosmopolitan city. 7 Jodhka mentions love marriages (including Hindu–Muslim liaisons) as yet another symptom of the ‘fragmentation of the village’ but cautions that probably 95% of rural marriages are still arranged. 8 Hanuman, Durga and Sai Baba seem to form a trinity in lower-caste Hinduism. Even in distant Delhi, rickshaw drivers have a triptych of the three in their driver’s cabins.

7 RAISON DE CIVILISATION

RAISON DE CIVILISATIONRAISON DE CIVILISATION

In the course of a long and chequered history, not only Hindus but also Muslims and other Indians have more than once reinvented themselves. But they always have done so in ways that enabled them to maintain their collective identities. For the Hindu majority, this is a remarkable achievement. Hinduism is the only polytheistic world civilization that has come down through the ages, despite centuries of exposure to Muslim and Christian rulers and missionaries. Albeit in a different way, Muslims and other minorities have also benefitted from Hinduism’s staying power. They were forced to adjust to the host civilization, but India has provided and continues to provide them a home where they can keep their religion and maintain their identity. What has enabled Hindu, Muslim and Christian Indians to achieve an ability to coexist peacefully that others, including Western societies, aspire to surpass but struggle to reach? How come that Hinduism has been able not just to survive but even to thrive when other non-Abrahamic world civilizations, from Pharaonic Egypt to Zoroastrian Persia, have succumbed? The answer lies hidden in plain sight. Indians are capable of what we may call raison de civilisation. When talking to Hindus and Muslims in India, I have been struck again and again by how conscious they are of their own civilization, as well as the civilization of others.They know what civilization they belong to, and they know how to relate to those whom they see as belonging to other civilizations. This took me by surprise. In the West, and especially in Europe, the idea of civilization has been discredited. Liberals in particular despise it.To them, the very idea that ‘we’ might have a civilization to defend sounds like anathema. Not so in India. Different sections of Indian society understand ‘their’ civilization differently, but they all view it as Indian. Hindu nationalists identify Indian civilization with Hinduism, and they expect other communities to become more

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‘Hinduized.’ Few Indian Muslims are willing to go down that route, but most identify with Indian rather than Middle Eastern Islam, embracing a Muslim identity that has been shaped by the encounter with Hinduism. Even secularists wax lyrical about Indian civilization, praising its ‘composite’ or syncretic culture and thereby implying that Hinduism is its cultural bedrock but not its only manifestation. The common denominator is Indian civilization. Despite the divergent goals and mental dispositions of the participants, this is the shared strategic frame of reference in which everyone operates.1 Why is this so? Again, the answer lies hidden in plain sight. Whether they acknowledge it or not, in India even secularists and Muslims are compelled to pursue their specific versions of raison de civilisation under the auspices of Hindu hegemony. Whatever one may think of Hindu hegemony, it shapes the rules of engagement. After a brief digression on strategic interaction between groups, I discuss Hindu hegemony in terms of three civilizational stratagems: first, absorbing other civilizations by means of cultural synthesis; second, confronting other civilizations by emulating their most threatening features; and, third, accommodating subalterns and outsiders in ways that consolidate Hindu hegemony.

Strategic interaction Unlike states, civilizations have no leaders. Unlike individuals, they cannot think. How can they act strategically? The answer is that civilizations can of course not pursue strategies, but people can pursue raison de civilisation. Even without leaders, they can deliberately assert their collective identity in encounters with civilizational outsiders. Few Indians will need convincing about this, but let me briefly digress for the benefit of Western readers. When enough people relate strategically to an outside group, there is group intentionality (Tollefsen 2002; Tomasello 2009; Tuomela 2013). To illustrate this, consider a case from the animal kingdom. Imagine an encounter between a type of predator and a type of prey: say, dolphins versus sardines. Dolphins have developed techniques for hunting sardines, and sardines have learnt to dodge dolphins. Schools of sardines react in marvellously adaptive ways to the coordinated onslaught of dolphins and other predators (Ward et al. 2011). When dolphins and sardines thus engage one another, group intentionality enables strategic interaction that, while enacted by individual animals, amounts to a leaderless form of rationality.2 If animals can do this, then how much more can humans. Among animals, instinct prevails. Humans can think.They are more aware of the context in which they operate. Landowners and peasants, herders and farmers, soldiers and civilians, capitalists and workers – all of them can analyse their strategic situation and act accordingly. This capacity to think elevates group intentionality to the level of what Émile Durkheim has called collective consciousness.

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Durkheim (1893, 84) defines collective consciousness as ‘the set of beliefs and sentiments common to the members of a given society on average’ (author’s translation). The qualifier ‘on average’ is important. Individual beliefs and sentiments vary, but this does not prevent them from converging on some average. The average in one group is different from the average of (equally divergent) beliefs and sentiments in another group. Similarly, raison de civilisation does not presuppose that everyone is always on the same page. What counts are the beliefs and sentiments common to the members of the relevant group ‘on average.’

Hindu hegemony The linchpin of Indian raison de civilisation is Hindu hegemony. For most of the past 2,500 years, Hindus were under Buddhist, Muslim, Sikh and Christian rulers, yet preserved what we now call Hinduism by reproducing a hegemonic order whereby a sociocultural core (Aryans first, Brahmins and Kshatriyas later, then upper castes, now forward castes) presides over multiple layers of subaltern groups. The most marginal subjects drop out, becoming outcastes. Despite their abject status, Hinduism depends on even the outcastes accepting Hindu hegemony rather than joining another social or religious system (Dumont 1980; Milner 1994). Hindu hegemony thus consists of a sociocultural core presiding over a multilayered structure of progressively more subaltern or formally excluded groups. According to one scholar, since time immemorial this has been ‘the power dynamic underlying Indian civilization.’ What has persisted through history is a rather continuous civilizational structure that is recognizably Indian and which takes the form of an extended dialogue between an overlapping network of groups who consider themselves, and are considered by others to be at the center of society, and other groups – sometimes overlapping, sometimes discrete – who consider themselves, and are considered by others, to be at the periphery of the society. (Mahmood 1993, 730) Just like Hindu gods come in avatars, Hindu hegemony comes in different shapes. In the mists of time, so-called ‘Aryans’ may have ruled over non-Aryans in this way. Before long, the priestly Brahmins may have presided over the other three varnas (estates). In ancient times and up to the middle ages, the typical arrangement in a Hindu kingdom was that the Brahmins would accept the martial Kshatriyas as the ruling class as long as the latter would support Brahminical hegemony over the rest of society. In the meantime, a more differentiated caste structure evolved in which the Brahmins and other upper castes presided over the lower castes, with social and tribal outcastes relegated to the margins. This pattern of upper-caste hegemony did not change much when Muslims and other ‘invaders’ replaced the

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Kshatriyas as the ruling class. When that happened, the upper castes would accept a stratum of non-Hindu overlords who would in turn allow the upper castes to perpetuate their hegemony over Hindu society (Kulke and Rothermund 2016). Hegemony took many different manifestations, but the Brahmins would always sanction the prevailing order as dharmic, or cosmically ordained. As such, hegemony is far from unique to India. It is a common constellation of order where those in authority obtain compliance from subalterns not so much by coercion but rather by accommodation (Bocock 1986). What is unique to India is that variations of a specific and articulate hierarchical pattern have persisted through the ages. In that pattern, a social apex (Aryans, Brahmins, upper castes) would layer subaltern groups by rewarding greater acculturation with greater accommodation. Some groups would be closer to the apex than others, and the most marginal ones would be excluded as ‘untouchables’ or ‘tribals.’ Hindu civilization has been able to persist by replicating this hierarchical pattern despite centuries of non-Hindu rule. According to Mani Shankar Aiyar, Hinduism is a ‘very strong social system.’ On the eve of partition, he claims, Muslim and Christian missionaries had made relatively little headway. At a time when India still included Pakistan, only 24% of Indians were Muslim despite 666 years of Muslim rule.3 ‘In India, and India alone, did Islam come up against a civilization and a spirituality that stubbornly refused to be subordinated by an outside culture and an alien religion.’ Nevertheless, Aiyar (2004, 9) emphasizes that Islam was exceptionally hard to crack: ‘If the Indian experience was unique for Islam, so was the encounter with Islam unique for Hinduism. Other religions had been assimilated or marginalized; Islam alone could neither be swallowed whole nor be swept into a corner.’ In what follows, I present three civilizational stratagems that, together, have enabled Hindu hegemony to assert itself in the face of internal and external challenges, from Buddhism to Islam and colonial rule. As a result of this long history, in contemporary India even secularists and Muslims pursue raison de civilisation under the auspices of Hindu hegemony.

Three stratagems Over hundreds if not thousands of years, Hindus have developed three civilizational stratagems to assert their hegemony. The first stratagem is cultural synthesis. Revered authorities such as Swami Vivekananda, Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru have all praised India’s syncretic or composite culture, which results from the amalgamation of Hinduism with elements of other civilizations. In ancient times, Hindu civilization was enriched by the encounter with Hellenistic Greece. Later, a reformed Hinduism was able to ‘reabsorb’ Buddhism. India’s trysts with Islamic Central Asia and Persia, as well as colonial Portugal and Britain, resulted in further waves of cultural synthesis. In most cases, the civilizational challenges

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were absorbed into Hindu civilization. In other cases, such as Islam, a contender was not entirely absorbed but to a significant extent transformed in the process. While cultural synthesis sounds idyllic, Hindu hegemony is also capable of a more adversarial stratagem: emulation. Over the past 1,500 years or so, Hindus have successfully confronted real or perceived challenges from other civilizations by emulating whatever appeared most threatening about those challenges. To begin with, emulation was an important part of the way Hinduism reabsorbed Buddhism in medieval times. Later, it seems, Hindus responded to the challenge from Islam by trying to beat the Muslims at their own game. Later still, Hindu elites adopted similar tactics in trying to come to terms with colonialism and Christianity. In all of these cases, Hindus have confronted civilizational challenges by emulating precisely those traits of other civilizations that they found the most challenging. Despite the display of primordialist attitudes, Hindu nationalists are latter-day votaries of this stratagem. The third stratagem is the negotiation of submission to hegemony by means of accommodation. The basis of any hegemonic order is for the social core to accommodate subalterns and outsiders in ways that make them accept their subordination. In the case of Hindu hegemony, almost any social group is offered (more or less generous) accommodation, provided that it is willing to embrace or at least accept whichever place is assigned to it. This includes even outcastes and, to a significant extent, Muslims and other non-Hindus. The sustainability of Hindu hegemony rests on an informal social bargain whereby subalterns and outsiders accept ‘their place’ in exchange for accommodation. Indian democracy is a case in point. Hindu civilization often receives praise for its ‘inclusiveness,’ but it is important to note that this inclusiveness is an expression of hegemony (Hacker 1983; cf. Halbfass 1988, 403–18).

Cultural synthesis When confronted with external or internal challenges, Hinduism is famously capable of cultural synthesis. Despite an appearance of immutability, Hindu civilization has shown unique staying power precisely because it has not been static but ready to undergo change and reform itself when required. When facing internal or external challenges, the first reaction would of course be cultural conservatism. When such challenges would not go away, however, Hindus have been able to respond in remarkably flexible ways. They would first identify in the ‘Other’ traits that might strengthen the Hindu ‘Self,’ and they would then fuse those traits into a cultural and religious synthesis with time-honoured Hindu practices and principles. Finally, they would vest this new synthesis in the same old cloak of immutable order (sanatana dharma). The encounter between Hindu and Muslim civilization is an interesting case in point and suggests that cultural synthesis may also affect the challenger. According

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to Nehru (1946, 201), Hinduism felt the impact of Islam while ‘Islam in India also became somewhat different from what it was elsewhere. The fierce monotheism of Islam influenced Hinduism, and the vague pantheistic attitude of the Hindu had its effect on the Indian Moslem.’ Aiyar elaborates: ‘We don’t reject and we don’t eject.We assimilate.’ In his view, ‘assimilate really means synthesizing.’  There is a ‘process of absorption, assimilation, and then synthesis.’  Aiyar highlights the eclectic tendency of Hinduism to incorporate from other traditions whatever suits it. ‘Contemporary Hinduism is the consequence of the impact of Islam.’ Almost coinciding with the period of Muslim rule in India, we had the bhakti movement in Hinduism which took a lot of values out of Islam and incorporated them into the Hindu value system, above all the concept of musawat, or equality, which is in sharp contradiction to the Hindu belief that your condition in the present world, or your present life, is determined by your actions in your previous life and therefore there is a kind of ordained natural order in which some are at the bottom of the ladder and others are on top. When Islam came and showed us that the sultan and the beggar wash in the same water before they walk in to pray, and that there is no priest but only a prayer leader, it was a revelation that you could have direct communication with God. The bhakti movement, as the word itself indicates, was that the bhakta, or novice, chose a god, an ishta devata, one godhead that he preferred over others, and then devoted himself directly, without even going to the temple, to this godhead and could communicate directly with God, and God could communicate directly with them. These are all thoughts that are alien to the Hindu tradition. They were incorporated in it as a result of the contact with Islam. In Aiyar’s view, the emergence of the devotional bhakti movement is just one example of how Hinduism is able to fuse elements from other traditions into novel forms of synthesis. ‘We retain what we have, while absorbing what is attractive about what we don’t have.’ As a result of cultural synthesis, even Indian Muslims are sometimes willing to contemplate the idea that Hinduism and Islam are birds of one feather. Jaffer Sharief, the former Railway Minister (1991–95), believes that Hinduism is compatible with his own brand of Sufi-inspired Islam. ‘God is everywhere. God is in the air. God is in me. God is in you. God is in everybody. Every human being has God.’  Almost like a Brahmin, Sharief emphasizes that, at the end of the day, religion is about universal spirituality. In support of this claim, he cites the Shaivites who do not worship idols but round stones called Shiva lingams. It is similar to Islam. We don’t believe in any form. We pray. We believe in the existence of God.We believe God is all-powerful.We believe there is an

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unseen power that guides us.The human race is one race.We have to follow that humanitarian ethos. Cultural synthesis sounds almost unobjectionable, but there is also a more negative side to it. Swami Agnivesh, a social activist and Hindu renouncer, finds that the Hindu caste system has rubbed off on other religions that have come to India. ‘Among Muslims, you have caste. Among Christians, you have caste.’ In his view, Hinduism ‘is considered to be very tolerant and cosmopolitan, but it also has the stigma of the caste system and untouchability, which is the most abominable thing   hile he finds the caste system morally that can happen to any human society.’ W indefensible and feels that is has had a negative effect on Indian Islam, he concedes that it has also had the positive effect of making Indian Muslims more moderate than they would otherwise be. ‘Islam is not the same as adopted elsewhere. We have Shias and Sunnis living in peace – not like Baluchistan.’ Long before joining the Hindu nationalist movement, M.J. Akbar envisioned cultural synthesis as a devious process of assimilation rather than spiritual crosspollination.Writing in the 1980s, he dreaded ‘the power of absorption and assimilation, a gradual process which works on the principle of erosion, not subjugation, therefore making the battle far more subtle, far more difficult.’ He suggested that Hinduism had ‘digested’ previous civilizational challenges such as Buddhism and might do so again with Islam (Akbar 1985, 110–11).4

Emulation There is a competitive edge to cultural synthesis that is better captured by the notion of emulation. Observers of Hindu nationalism find that the movement has often relied on ‘stigmatization and emulation’ (Jaffrelot 1996, 11–79; 2016; cf. Sharma 2003). In what follows, I show that emulation is not just a feature of Hindu nationalism but has roots in Hinduism itself, which looks back to an ancient history of confronting rivals by emulating their strengths. The founding fathers of Hindu nationalism had the impression that Muslims were far more united than Hindus. To prevail over their Muslim rivals, they concluded, Hindus also had to unite. In reaction to the foundation of the All-Indian Muslim League (1906), Hindu nationalists founded their own party, the Hindu Mahasabha (1915). In reaction to the Khilafat movement (1919–22), a Muslim mobilization in defence of the fledgling Caliphate, Hindu nationalists formed the paramilitary grassroots organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (1925). In response to the establishment of Pakistan as a Muslim state, Hindu nationalists demanded that India should become a Hindu rashtra. There are startling similarities between the rise of the Muslim League in the 1930s and the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party from the 1980s onwards (Ashraf 2017). It seems that, in recent years, Hindu extremists have even copied the modus operandi of militant jihadists (Jaffrelot 2010).

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The Hindu nationalist emulation of political Islam continues a very old pattern.The first serious challenge to Hindu civilization in recorded history emerged from inside. Buddhism started as an offshoot of Hinduism (after all, the Buddha was an upper-caste Hindu). One of the Buddha’s aims was to liberate people from caste and other social strictures, thereby jeopardizing Hindu hegemony. For centuries, much of India was under Buddhist rulers, from Ashoka’s Maurya Empire in the 3rd century BCE until the end of the Pala Empire in the 12th century ce.Yet, Buddhism all but disappeared from India between, roughly, 600 and 1200 ce. The demise of Indian Buddhism is even more remarkable if we consider that northern India and Nepal had been its cradle. While Buddhism slowly fizzled out from its Indian home turf, it spread all the way to Afghanistan, Central Asia, Indonesia, Korea and faraway Japan (Sen 2015). Satish Sahney recalls that Nehru was once asked by the French intellectual and politician André Malraux: ‘How did you get rid of Buddhism?’ Nehru did not have an instant answer, but Sahney asserts that, in the Middle Ages, there was a fear that Buddhism would wipe out Hinduism. According to Aiyar, the advent of Buddhism was the first time Hinduism confronted a life-threatening challenge and, after a struggle lasting for centuries, overcame it by emulating the challenger. ‘There was a conversion, or a reconversion, that took place after Adi Shankara had succeeded in incorporating large elements of the Buddhist philosophy.’  Aiyar explains that the Hindu philosopher and theologian Shankara (8th century ce) borrowed significant elements of contemporary Buddhist doctrine. Thus invigorated, Shankara turned Advaita Vedanta into the dominant sect of Hinduism. Shankara also reformed Hindu monasticism, borrowing elements from practices in Buddhist monasteries. After these reforms, people would increasingly join Hindu rather than Buddhist monasteries. Aiyar finds that, having emulated key features of Buddhism, Hindus were equipped to prevail over their Buddhist rivals. The historical details of Buddhism’s ouster from India are poorly understood. Probably, Buddhism gradually fell in disrepute due to the excesses of Tantric sects, leaving the high ground to Hindu revivalists. From around 1100 ce, when Muslim invaders permanently settled in India, they struck alliances with Hindu elites which may have used those alliances to finish off their Buddhist rivals. Thus, it is hardly an accident that important Buddhist centres like Nalanda were destroyed whereas Hindu structures remained in place (Verardi 2011). Having reformed itself to oust Buddhism, maybe with a little help from Muslim invaders, Hinduism faced the next big challenge from the religion of those invaders. As in the case of Buddhism, Hinduism adopted Islamic elements in order to stay its ground. In the last section, we have encountered a celebratory account according to which the encounter between Hinduism and Islam ushered in spiritual cross-pollination and cultural synthesis. Others, however, take a less idyllic view. They argue that Hindus were threatened by the warrior ethos of Muslim invaders and cite the Maratha Empire and Sikhism as belated reactions to the

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Muslim onslaught. Historian Michael Cook notes that, after violent encounters with Muslim invaders, Hindu warrior castes in northwestern India adopted a militant form of Sikhism in 1699 when Gobind Singh, the tenth Guru, reformed them in into a corps of religious warriors, the Khalsa. Like the Maratha Empire, the Khalsa posed a military challenge to Muslim rule during the 18th century, accelerating the decline of Mughal power. This hostility was tinged with emulation: the stress on communal solidarity, communal militancy, and the aspiration to rule look very much like a Hindu appropriation of Islam, an attempt – by no means unsuccessful – to beat the Muslims at their own game. (Cook 2014, 238) During the colonial period, emulation remained a key way by which Hindus confronted civilizational challenges.This time, the challenge arose from European rulers and Christian missionaries. The so-called neo-Hinduism of the 19th century, with its emphasis on monotheism and the Vedic scriptures, arose from the emulation of Christianity. Some elements of this emulation were less peaceful than others. In response to Hindus being converted to Christianity or Islam, Hindus developed the practice of counter-proselytization (variously called shuddhi, paravartan, or ghar wapsi). Today, Hindu nationalists continue this practice which is often accompanied by intercommunal tensions and violence (Katju 2015). Hindu nationalists find that, in India’s democratic order, Muslims have been able to extract disproportionate concessions. The reason, they suggest, is Muslim ‘aggressiveness.’  They see this aggressiveness as a competitive strength of the Muslims and claim that Hindu communalism is an act of counter-aggression to ‘show the Muslims their place.’  A Hindu nationalist has put this mimetic strategy in chilling terms: ‘Hindus need to learn from Muslims, especially concerning how they treat their minorities in Islamic countries, where minorities must live according to the wishes of the Islamic state’ (cited in Brass 2003, 312). The common denominator of the examples listed is emulation. One ends up emulating precisely what one loathes about a rival, in order to ‘best’ (or should we say: ‘worst’?) that rival. In response to an alleged Muslim ploy, called love jihad, according to which Muslim boys seduce Hindu girls to breed more Muslims, the Hindu nationalist Vishva Hindu Parishad is fuming with ire. Paradoxically, however, the VHP has come up with nothing less than a mirror image of the same canard, namely that Hindu boys should groom and marry Muslim girls in order to dilute Islam’s growing demographic strength and breed more Hindus. There are 200 million Muslims in India nowadays and as of today 40 million are coming of marriage age. We only need 40 million Hindu love jihadis to finish Islam in India once and for ever. (. . .) If you marry a Muslim

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then it will bring two benefits for the Hindu religion: the Hindus will grow by one [person], and the Muslims will decrease by one. (Hindu nationalist website, cited in Iwanek 2016, 372)5

Accommodation Hegemonic order requires the accommodation of subalterns and outsiders in ways that make them accept their subordination (Bocock 1986). Hindu hegemony is no exception. In India, the stabilization of hegemony by means of accommodation is an almost ubiquitous phenomenon. Leaving to one side the most obvious historical example, namely the caste hierarchy where even the most marginal groups had some ‘space’ carved out for them, let us examine a more contemporary case: Indian democracy. Democratic order is widely understood as a great equalizer but, in India, democracy itself has also become a conduit for the stabilization of hegemony by means of accommodation. According to an eminent Muslim intellectual, India’s politicians are like brokers who strive to sell political democracy to the masses and enjoy the pay-off from the economic hegemony of the upper classes, in a bid to retain their own power by mediating between the two within a tolerable level of tension, and reconcilable conflict, whose management then becomes their main preoccupation. (Khan 1994, 63) In other words, Hindu hegemony has become the hegemony of democratic elites. In a democratic society, the masses must be satisfied. Given the need for winning elections, the ruling class must more than before co-opt those formerly considered untouchable, as well as religious minorities. While the elites continue to expect that those co-opted are willing to accept ‘their place’ in the hegemonic order, an ideology openly sanctioning the hegemony of ruling elites is untenable in a democratic society. For both normative and constitutional reasons, there needs to be a pretence that every Indian, including the most abject outcaste, is a citizen. Therefore, the upper castes have reinvented themselves as ‘forward castes.’  The outcastes have been rechristened Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SC/STs). The lower castes are now called, and call themselves, Other Backward Classes (OBCs). But even in this euphemistic guise, the old hegemonic pattern shines through. Outcastes and backward classes covet what is, patronizingly, called ‘reservations,’ and try to move up the social ladder through ‘sanskritization’ (Srinivas 1956). While enabling a modicum of social mobility, this perpetuates India’s ancestral order whereby the upper crust stabilizes its hegemony by accommodating lesser people.6 If we look at their rhetoric, secularists and Hindu nationalists are at loggerheads. If we pierce through their rhetoric, however, few establishment figures challenge the principle of hegemony and accommodation by their deeds. The

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dispute is not so much about whether there should be hegemony but rather how the hegemonic order should look like, and how much accommodation of what groups is needed to preserve the hegemony of which elites. Secularists present themselves as egalitarians and pursue upper-caste hegemony with a sense of guilt, yet they hardly upend it in practice. Ever since ‘Pandit Nehru,’ the Congress has been in the hands of upper-caste leaders. Even now that its grip over Indian politics has weakened, the Congress remains in the hands of the Nehru–Gandhi clan. To buttress its authority, the Congress is committed to the generous accommodation of marginal groups and religious minorities. The Congress has co-opted Muslim leaders like Maulana Azad during the independence struggle and Jaffer Sharief under Indira Gandhi (Chapter 4). The Congress has introduced job reservations for Dalits, tribals and backward castes. The Congress has paid lip-service to equal opportunity for Muslims and other disadvantaged groups (Chapter 5).Yet, radical Dalits point out with some justification that the Congress and even India’s communist parties remain firmly under the control of upper-caste elites (Chapter 6).7 Hindu nationalists know just as well as secularists that hegemony implies accommodation. They only disagree on how much accommodation is needed for which groups. Given that their core constituency is the Hindu majority, they lambast secularists for ‘appeasing’ Muslims. However, the idea of accommodating Muslims is not alien to Hindu nationalists either. While they find that Muslims and other minorities should not be ‘pampered’ with too much accommodation, Hindu nationalists offer their own package. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh has a Muslim branch, the Muslim Rashtriya Manch.The Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) tries to co-opt Muslim leaders and attract Muslim voters.What is on offer is mainly the option of becoming Muslim dhimmis.This is far less generous than what secularists offer, but it is still an attempt to consolidate hegemony by means of accommodation.

Under hegemony As we have seen in Chapters 4 and 6, ‘proud’ Muslims and radical sections of the scheduled and backward castes vociferously object to Hindu hegemony. They oppose the hegemonic pretentions of Hindu nationalist and even secularist elites, and they claim that what they want is social and cultural emancipation rather than hegemonic accommodation. At first glance, this seems revolutionary. Radical subalterns and outsiders, as well as their political leaders and intellectual sympathizers, rage against ‘Hindu Brahminical hegemony’ and pursue anti-establishment coalitions. For decades, they have sometimes won important elections with this strategy, for example in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. At closer inspection, however, the likes of Nitish Kumar in Bihar, Mayawati and Akilesh Yadav in Uttar Pradesh, and Asaduddin Owaisi in Telangana are as keen on minority accommodation as anyone else. Nobody fights

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harder for ‘reservations’ than precisely those leaders, and their political supporters expect nothing less. If there is one thing that subalterns across India have learnt from history, then it is that seeking accommodation is what works. Given their marginal status and desperate need, doing so is almost irresistible for them. Muslim leaders are a case in point. Some seek accommodation by embracing liberal secularism. Others are willing to submit to Hindu nationalism in exchange for protection and moderate resources, becoming Muslim dhimmis. Even those presenting themselves as radical outsiders, like Owaisi, ultimately seek accommodation. It all comes down to a desperate choice. Indian Muslims may either submit to Hindu hegemony in exchange for accommodation, or they may straddle outside the established order alongside radical Dalits and their sympathizers. Most have responded by incorporating Hindu hegemony into their raison de civilisation. There is an element of compulsion to this, but the effects are not all negative. All in all, Indian Muslims seem uniquely ‘moderate’ when compared to coreligionists elsewhere, from Pakistan to the Middle East and Europe. By 2017, less than 50 Muslims had travelled from India to Syria to become foreign fighters.8

Conclusion For much of India’s history, Hindu society was subject to non-Hindu rule but gained strength and resilience from the continuation of a hegemonic order whereby a sociocultural core presides over multiple layers of subaltern groups. This has come in various guises over the centuries, but the fundamental structure of hegemonic order has remained intact. Foreign rulers came and went, but Hindu hegemony remains the bedrock of Indian civilization. Hindu hegemony has persisted on the back of three civilizational stratagems: cultural synthesis; emulation of rivals; and accommodation of subalterns and outsiders. Taken together, these stratagems have enabled Hindu civilization to come to terms with a variety of challenges. Unlike other civilizations, Hinduism has withstood Muslim and Christian rule.With moderate modifications, the same old stratagems are still observable in Hindu–Muslim relations. Not only Hindu nationalists but also secularists and even Indian Muslims pursue raison de civilisation under the auspices of Hindu hegemony. It is debatable whether this is good or bad. Hinduism is famous for its ‘inclusiveness.’  At closer inspection, Hindu inclusiveness is not only tolerant but also oppressive. The Other is assigned a more or less marginal position as an extension of the Self, recognized for only as long as the Other conforms to the standards of recognition set by the Self (Hacker 1983; Halbfass 1988, 403–18). It is easy to understand why self-conscious subalterns, from radical Dalits to ‘proud’ Muslims, find this objectionable. On balance, however, raison de civilisation has served Indians well. There would hardly be a distinctive Indian civilization had upper-caste elites not perpetuated Hindu hegemony through the ages. Hindus appreciate this. Even Indian Muslims

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would hardly be better off in the absence of Hindu hegemony. Despite occasional tensions, Muslims are accepted by the Hindu majority as an inextricable part of India.What is more, it appears that Muslims are more moderate and enjoy greater freedom and security in India than in Pakistan or the Middle East.

Notes 1 On civilization as a strategic frame of reference, see Arnason (2003, 11); Petito (2016). 2 Some call it ‘swarm intelligence’ (Krause, Ruxton and Krause 2009; Ward and Webster 2016). 3 According to the 1941 census, 65.9% of Indian subjects were Hindu and 23.8% Muslim (Brush 1949). 4 At the time when Akbar wrote this, he was a celebrated liberal secularist. In 2014, he joined Modi’s BJP. His fatalist attitude about the digestive power of Hinduism may have motivated the step. 5 This would be amusing if it were not so serious. There have been lynchings over love jihad. 6 The use of democracy for the negotiation of hegemony through accommodation is likely to be a key reason why India, unlike other developing countries, has been able to preserve its democratic order since independence. 7 A member of the Ambedkar Student Association said: ‘Even in the Communist Party, you can see that the Bengali bhadralogs [gentlemen] and the Kerala upper-caste people are leading the Party in a very systematic manner.’ 8 This compares to thousands of Muslim foreign fighters from the Middle East and Europe (Barrett 2017).

8 WHERE TO GO FROM HERE

WHERE TO GO FROM HEREWHERE TO GO FROM HERE

As we have seen in this book, Hindu nationalists, Indian Muslims and secularists all share a strategic frame of reference: Indian civilization as shaped by Hindu hegemony. Hindu nationalists embrace a rather narrow vision of Hindu hegemony in the quest for a Hindu nation. Muslims have internalized Hindu hegemony and seek accommodation. Secularists follow their progressivist impulse in trying to expand the circles of hegemonic ‘inclusiveness.’ Even Dalits and other disadvantaged groups find it difficult to escape Hindu hegemony as a strategic frame of reference. Every section of Indian society, in its own way, pursues raison de civilisation within a shared framework of Hindu hegemony. This has worked out rather well, not only for Hindus but also for Muslims. Both sides have been able to develop repertoires for managing their coexistence. Compared to the Middle East or even Europe, Indian Muslims appear remarkably mellow (Fazal 2014).They unquestionably belong to India, and India has few radical Islamists and exports almost no Islamist terrorists (Barrett 2017). This is not to belittle the atrocious violence at the time of independence, when Pakistan partitioned from India. Nor is it to belittle more recent communal clashes and the ongoing conflict in Muslim-majority Kashmir. Hindu– Muslim relations have never been trouble-free. Yet, Hindus and Muslims get along rather well if we consider the magnitude of the challenge. As we will see further below, Hindu–Muslim relations are better than many comparable situations elsewhere. Western Europe must rise to similar challenges, but the signs of the times are not hopeful. India has 14.2% Muslims, more than 172 million people (2011 Census). Relations are peaceful apart from tensions in Kashmir and occasional outbursts of communal violence. Thus far, Europe has only 4.9% Muslims, which

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amounts to about 26 million people (Pew Research Center 2017, 26). But violence has already occurred, and tensions appear to be rising. There is little reason for confidence that Europe will do better than India when Muslims gain a comparable share of the population and when, eventually, a number of Muslim-majority areas begin to emerge. In India, Hindus and Muslims have developed ways to manage their relations. In Europe, such repertoires for managing coexistence are at best beginning to emerge.

10% is more than it sounds According to the latest report by the Pew Research Center (2017), most Western European countries have Muslim minorities greater than 5%: France (8.8%), Sweden (8.1%), Belgium (7.6%), Netherlands (7.1%), Austria (6.9%), United Kingdom (6.3%), Germany (6.1%), Switzerland (6.1%), Norway (5.7%), Greece (5.7%) and Denmark (5.4%).1 Given the effects of family reunions and migrants seeking spouses from their home countries, several European countries are on track to having Muslim minorities of at least 15–20% by mid-century. Indeed, if recent trends continue, the Pew Research Center projects a population share of 14% Muslims for Europe as a whole by 2050. This does not sound like all that much, until one realizes that intercommunal relations in countries with 5–15% Muslims can be far more difficult than percentages might suggest. A list of such countries can be gleaned from another report by the Pew Research Center (2015).2 With less than 6% Muslims, Thailand has faced upheaval in its Muslim-dominated southern provinces and the Philippines has fought insurgencies on its southern island of Mindanao. With less than 9%, the Central African Republic has seen severe ethnoreligious unrest since 2012. With less than 10%, Kenya has been under attack from Al-Shabaab and has seen violent Islamist radicalization in its coastal areas. In Sri Lanka, Buddhist vigilantes persecute a Muslim minority of less than 10%.3 With 10%, Russia has seen war and upheaval in Chechnya and other areas of the North Caucasus. Anti-Muslim xenophobia is rampant in big cities like Moscow, where at least 1 million and perhaps as many as 2 million Muslims reside. While every situation is in some ways unique, it would amount to special pleading to claim that none of this has anything to do with the presence of Muslims. Clearly, problems often start well below 10–15%. But fortunately there are more positive cases. In Bulgaria, where almost 14% of citizens are Muslims, communal relations have been peaceful since the early 1990s (DeDominicis 2011). Singapore has 14% Muslims and relies on censorship and affirmative action to maintain what the regime calls religious harmony (Tan 2008). While there is no doubt that Singapore is authoritarian and paternalistic, it is stable. Together with Bulgaria and Singapore, India is also one of the more positive cases. Despite all the problems, the situation in India is less dramatic than in many other countries that have 5–15% Muslims.4

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Europe and India The jury is out on where, along the spectrum of experiences, Europe will fall. Having examined the Indian case in detail, a systematic comparison with Europe is in order. On the one hand, India and Europe have many relevant features in common. On the other hand, important differences must be taken into account. In Europe as in India, Muslim minorities and non-Muslim majorities are diverse. Hindus and Muslims belong to different sects and speak different languages. Hindus are Shaivite or Vaishnavite; they speak Hindi, Marathi and many other languages. Indian Muslims are Sunni or Shia; they speak Urdu and many other languages, especially in the South. Something similar happens in Europe. Native Europeans belong to different nations and denominations. European Muslims can be Turkish or Arab, South Asian or Indonesian, Sunni or Shia. Neither in India nor in Europe does such diversity rule out collective identification with the non-Muslim majority or the Muslim minority. Another similarity is the political weakness of Muslims. India and Europe are both difficult terrain for Muslim-led parties because fragmented minorities cannot win elections except in local enclaves. In India, there is no nation-wide Muslim party. Most Muslims vote for non-Muslim parties which appoint Muslim figureheads to attract the Muslim vote. These Muslim figureheads act as community brokers, offering patronage for votes (Chapter 4). Something similar happens in Europe: Muslims are courted by mainstream parties, but Muslim parties remain a non-starter (Dancygier 2017). It is therefore unsurprising that, in Europe as in India, Muslim leadership is weak. Indians across the political spectrum deplore the scarcity of high-calibre secular Muslim leaders. The same could be said about Muslim leaders in Europe. Outside the party system, Muslims form religious and sociocultural associations. The leaders of such associations sometimes rally their members around communal concerns. These so-called community leaders are often so conservative that they end up being disconnected not only from the majority but also from the minorities they claim to represent. Yet, in the absence of high-calibre secular Muslim leaders, they get disproportionate attention (Alam 2016). There are also important differences. The majority of Indian Muslims are descendants of Hindus who converted to Islam centuries ago. After a long and chequered history, Indian Muslims have adjusted to their minority status.They are an integral part of secularist India, and there is no reason to doubt their loyalty to the nation. Few Indian Muslims would prefer to live in an Islamic republic like Pakistan. In Europe, most Muslims are either migrants themselves or the children and grandchildren of migrants. Many see themselves as Muslims rather than identifying with their host society.5 In India, most Muslims are poor. Many are genuinely destitute. In Europe, Muslims are poorer than the average European but they have access to generous

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welfare systems. Being poor in Europe means something quite different from being poor in India. Native–Muslim tensions in Europe may turn out less tractable than Hindu– Muslim tensions in India. Indian Muslims have learnt to accept Hindu hegemony, and most are loyal to the nation. Muslims in Europe remain shaped by their migrant background, limiting their identification with the host country (Statham and Tillie 2017). As Europe’s Muslims become more settled and their numbers grow, it remains to be seen whether they develop a deeper loyalty to their host countries or simply become more assertive. In the latter case, native Europeans are unlikely to know how to respond adequately because, unlike Hindus in India, they have not learnt how to accommodate minorities in a way that stabilizes order (Chapter 7).

Regaining balance Many Europeans suffer from a strange kind of bipolar disorder. On the one hand, they lecture Indians and other non-Western people about the blessings of diversity. On the other hand, they engage in self-flagellation about the xenophobia they find in their own ranks. While a degree of inconsistency is perhaps normal, it seems that Europeans need to regain a sense of balance. The tendency to lecture others is blasé. Europe has a poor record dealing with cultural diversity. Too much blood has been shed on the altar of Christian sectarianism and ethnic nationalism. The 20th century saw atrocious ethnic cleansing, as well as attempts to exterminate Jews and Gypsies. Even if we assume that Europeans are now genuinely committed to multiculturalism, the experience of recent years suggests that this is not working particularly well. Europe has seen urban unrest in Paris and London; has been targeted by Islamist terrorism; and plays host to disgruntled minorities (see for example Joppke 2009). Given their dismal record, Europeans ought to become more humble. They have little reason to claim that their approach is superior to non-Western approaches or yields better results. But nor should Europeans fall into the opposite trap of self-flagellation. Some argue that it is only for ‘our’ Islamophobia that Muslim migrants fail to integrate. They assume that minorities as such are eager to integrate but are prevented from doing so by xenophobia.When there is evidence of segregationist attitudes among minorities, they interpret these as a reaction to xenophobia. Take for example a recent survey on the attitude of British Muslims (Phillips 2016). The report was released by Trevor Phillips, a writer and public figure with impeccable credentials. Phillips found segregationist and reactionary attitudes in Muslim communities and conceded that multiculturalism had failed. The response? ‘Trevor Phillips’ research on British Muslims is dangerous and wrong. No wonder Islamophobia is on the rise’ (Akeel 2016).

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On the one hand, it is important for Europeans to avoid the Narcissism– Frustration–Regression nexus (Chapter 3): An idealized self-perception is frustrated by real-world encounters with others, leading to a regression into forms of behaviour that are the opposite of the idealized self-perception. Hindu nationalists often fall prey to this fallacy. However, Europeans are not immune either. They often indulge in a narcissistic self-perception as champions of cultural diversity. When this is frustrated by the distressing experience of encountering people who do not live up to their expectations, Europeans regress into the opposite of their idealized self-perception. For example, they engage in intrusive counterterrorism practices at home and in harmful forms of military intervention abroad. On the other hand, Europeans should not fall into the other extreme of always blaming only the ‘Self ’ and never the ‘Other’ when problems arise. Instead, they should understand that the entire blame-game is counterproductive. Contrary to utopian phantasies, coexistence between real people who are different is always going to be rife with difficulties. When one group challenges another group’s way of life, the other group is compelled to respond in some way. This applies not only to minorities trying to assert themselves vis-à-vis the majority, but also to the majority who might find a minority overly intrusive. Tensions do not need to escalate into violence, but they are to be expected when different people or groups pursue incompatible interests. A realistic goal in such situations is not so much social harmony but rather to develop repertoires for both sides to manage their conflicts peacefully (Friedrichs 2013). Europeans need to regain a sense of balance. Neither should they idealize Europe as a beacon of diversity, nor should they flagellate themselves. Neither should they demonize Muslims as a mortal threat to their values, nor should they lionize them as harbingers of multiculturalism. Both sides are who they are. They must learn to live with each other and/or apart. As long as Europeans are the majority, they will want to set the terms of the relationship. There is no need to demand assimilation, but nor is there a need to accommodate Muslims and other minorities at any cost. As a minimum, it is reasonable to expect that all minorities must fully participate in the education system and on the labour market. If there is anything else Europeans find non-negotiable, such as gender equality, then they must communicate it clearly. Muslims and other minorities need to know what the majority expects from them.

Liberalism in a squeeze Indian secularists face a dilemma that they hardly admit to themselves. They are the guardians of a constitution that requires them to respect religious communities, but their liberal leanings lead them to wish these communities away (Chapter 5).Western liberals face a similar dilemma.They have adopted multiculturalism, but their liberal values are in conflict with illiberal tendencies in the communities

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they embrace. Like Indian secularists, they hardly admit to themselves that they are in a squeeze (for a classical example, see Taylor 1994). Liberal multiculturalists distort themselves in a surreal attempt to have the cake and eat it. They are highly individualistic and cherish emancipation from all kinds of dependence, but they take a paternalistic stance towards collectivist minorities. They see themselves as champions of enlightenment values, but sympathize with communal obscurantism. They cherish free speech, but not when it might offend a minority. They call for unrestricted debate, but they disqualify those disagreeing with them as racist, xenophobic or Islamophobic. To the extent that multiculturalism empowers reactionary forms of identity politics that fly in the face of liberal values, liberals must end their alliance with multiculturalism. They might either stand on their own or, if that is impossible, enter alliances with social forces other than illiberal minorities. During the 19th century, for example, when liberalism was at its most progressive, it operated in a strategic alliance with nationalism in many European countries (Poggi 1978). India can serve European liberals as a model and as a warning. It can serve them as a model insofar as Indian secularists have for a few decades been able to square their commitment to liberal principles with the accommodation of Muslims. It can serve them as a warning because, ultimately, this has not worked. Hindu nationalists have sent the secularists into the wilderness. It remains to be seen whether and when they will return. Something similar may happen in Europe. If liberals do not come up with a coherent programme, the ongoing cycle of communalization and counter-communalization is likely to continue. It seems likely that this will continue to result in so-called populism, and European liberals may be swept away by it.

European civilization? For Europeans, recovering or developing raison de civilisation is a challenge. The very concept of civilization is associated with delusions of grandeur from which contemporary Europeans, understandably, wish to distance themselves. Once upon a time, Europe applied its ‘standard of civilization’ to the rest of the world (Gong 1984). France pursued la mission civilisatrice. Britain took on ‘the white man’s burden.’  Today, Europeans claim, this is water under the bridge. Talk about civilization is unpopular. Europeans are proud of their values but, even though these values derive from Western civilization, they dare not speak its name.6 Yet, is there any alternative to developing raison de civilisation if native Europeans are to assert themselves in the presence of Muslims and other minorities who, for all their diversity, are highly conscious of their civilization? Is it not unwise for native Europeans to play down their civilizational identity at a time when Muslims and other minorities are playing up theirs? For obvious reasons, a European raison de civilisation can hardly emerge from history. Unlike India, Europe cannot claim a legacy of inclusion and syncretism

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that might bode well for the future. If there ever was a European civilization, then it used to exclude and reject Muslims and other non-Christian minorities rather than developing a civilizational synthesis. Hence, Europeans should project themselves into the future rather than trying to recover a history that never was. Ever since the French Revolution, Europeans have invented themselves anew rather than harking back to a glorified past. This is challenging. However, it need not be impossible to develop raison de civilisation from contemporary or future-oriented values. There have already been attempts in this direction, albeit at the national rather than at the European level. In 2000, German conservatives followed a Syrian– German scholar (Tibi 1998) in demanding that immigrants should conform to the national hegemonic culture, or Leitkultur. In 2005, the British Labour government launched a debate about British values to which all citizens, including minorities, should conform (Joppke 2008). Three years later, the French Conseil d’État (2008) invoked the ‘essential values of the French community’ to justify restrictions on the full-body veil, elevating secularism (laïcité) and gender equality to the rank of republican values. Thus far, this has lacked credibility because particularistic identities were invoked in pursuit of universal values.This is a contradiction in terms. How do ‘Britishness’ and British values differ from, say, Dutch-ness and Dutch values? What is the difference between German and, say, Swiss Leitkultur? With the partial exception of France, where nationalism has always doubled as universalism, the debates have fizzled out rather quickly (Joppke 2008). Going forward, however, there is no need for Europeans to invoke particularistic national cultures. Instead, they may invoke European or Western civilization, and they may do so in ways that highlight future aspirations rather than harking back to some glorified past. This has two advantages. First, unlike particularistic national cultures, European or Western civilization is inherently universalistic. Second, it can be asserted against other civilizations that highlight more communitarian values – as happens to be the case for Muslim civilization (Gellner 1994). Paradoxically, this has dawned not on liberals but, of all people, on so-called populists. Perhaps surprisingly given their nativist roots, populist movements in Europe have recently moved from a national to a civilizational framework. They have come to embrace Christianity not so much as a religion but rather in terms of European or Western civilization. At the same time, they claim the mantle of secularism and cosmopolitan liberalism from a multiculturalist left that almost unconditionally welcomes Muslims and other minorities even when their practices are manifestly opposed to liberal secularist values (Brubaker 2017). As the pejorative term populism indicates, Europe’s established liberal elites are appalled. This is hardly surprising. Populist movements are ragtag coalitions of dissatisfied groups who relentlessly take on the ‘liberal’ establishment. They are led by mavericks who often lack intellectual sophistication, and there are unpalatable connections with the far right. However, there is no reason why this

Where to go from here  121

should disqualify the ideas as such. Populists are right that multiculturalism cannot claim to be liberal if it systematically sanctions illiberal practices. European liberals ought to address the contradictions in their own theory and practice, rather than stigmatizing as a populist whoever dares to expose these contradictions. As Karl Popper (1945) stated famously, open society must know its enemies. If this is so, then European liberals may find that liberalism has not only enemies but also potential allies among populists. To be sure, some populists are enemies of open society, but many act in defence of liberal principles such as freedom of expression and gender equality. Conversely, some Muslims are friends of open society, but many promote illiberal principles such as men ruling over women and the exemption of Islam from criticism and ridicule (Phillips 2016; El Karoui 2016; Pew Research Center 2012, 2013). If friendliness towards open society is the criterion, then European liberals should seriously reconsider their alignments.

Conclusion Unless and until native Europeans gain clarity on who they are and who they aspire to be, they cannot develop suitable strategies for relating to Muslim minorities. Everybody, including Muslims, will benefit if viable terms of engagement and rules of coexistence are found before relations descend into a maelstrom of communalization and counter-communalization. As we have seen, the Indian experience provides helpful clues for Europe. Ultimately, however, Europeans will have to develop their own ways of dealing with the situation. We must develop our own raison de civilisation, with ‘civilization’ understood not so much in terms of what defined us in the past but rather in terms of the values we hold for the future.

Notes 1 The figures refer to 2016. Eastern Europe hardly accepts migrants and remains more homogenous. 2 Leaving Western Europe to one side, there are 20 such countries: Bulgaria, Central African Republic, Fiji, Gabon, Georgia, Guyana, India, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Suriname,Thailand,Togo,Trinidad and Tobago, and Uganda. 3 Myanmar is not included because, even before the recent Muslim exodus, the share of Muslims was only 4%. 4 Other more positive cases include Fiji (6.3%), Gabon (11.2%), Guyana (6.4%), Liberia (12%), Malawi (13%), Suriname (15.2%), Togo (14%), Trinidad and Tobago (5.9%) and Uganda (11.5%). For Europe this is comforting only to a limited extent because, in all of these cases except for Gabon and Uganda, the demographic share of Muslims is not growing but either stable or declining (Pew Research Center 2015). 5 Fundamentalist beliefs and identification with the Islamic ummah can lead to ‘national disidentification’ (Maliepaard and Verkuyten 2018). 6 This is somewhat disingenuous. The West stands in a continuity of imposing civilization (Donnelly 1998).

APPENDIX Interview map used during fieldwork in India AppendixAppendix

Hindu–Muslim Relations How are they like? How should they be like?

How are they managed? How should they be managed?

•

harmonious < ---- > confrontational

•

By people like you / by your community

•

warm < ---- > cold

•

By others:

•

Other aspects?

     

Other community / communities Police, state, etc. Employers Schools Parties Etc.

Politics

Society

Economy

City

State

Nation

REFERENCES

REFERENCESREFERENCES

Interviews Abid, Mohammed Ahsan. Professor at the Tata Institute of Social Sciences. Hyderabad, 24 July 2015. Agnivesh. Social activist and Hindu renouncer (swami). New Delhi, 4 August 2015. Aiyar, Mani Shankar. Member of Parliament, Rajya Sabha (Congress). New Delhi, 10 August 2015. Akbar, M.J. Member of Parliament, Lok Sabha, and National Spokesperson (BJP). New Delhi, 11 August 2015. Ambedkar Student Association. Group interview with members at the University of Hyderabad. Hyderabad, 26 July 2015. Anonymous A. Senior party official (BJP). New Delhi, 7 August 2015. Anonymous B. Senior politician working in government (BJP). New Delhi, 10 August 2015. Anonymous C. Senior party official (Congress). New Delhi, 4 August 2015. Anonymous D.Young academic (social scientist). Hyderabad, 24 July 2015. Azmi, Abu Asim. Member of the Legislative Assembly and leader of the Samajwadi Party in Maharashtra. Mumbai, 31 July 2015. Baig, Roshan. Minister of Urban Development and Haj (Congress) in Karnataka. Bangalore, 21 July 2015. Basith, M.A. Former Director General of Police in Andhra Pradesh. Hyderabad, 24 July 2015. Damle, Shridhar. RSS expert and Hindu intellectual. Goa, 15–16 November 2015. Development and Integration of Women and Youth Association (DIWYA). Group interview with staff. Dharavi, Mumbai, 29 July 2015. Engineer, Irfan. Director of the Centre for Study of Society and Secularism. Mumbai, 28 July 2015. Fazal, Tanweer. Professor of Political Sociology, Jawaharlal Nehru University. New Delhi, 6 August 2015. Gowda, Rajeev. Member of Parliament, Rajya Sabha, and National Spokesperson (Congress). New Delhi, 4 August 2015.

124 References

Hakeem, Abdul. TV Journalist. Bangalore, 17 July 2015. Hussain, Mazher. Executive Director of the Confederation of Voluntary Associations (COVA). Hyderabad, 21 July 2015. Jafri, Syed Amin. Member of the Legislative Council (Majlis Party) in Telangana. Hyderabad, 23 July 2015. Jain, Surendra. All-India Secretary of the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP). Rohtak, 7 August 2015. Jodhka, Surinder. Professor of Rural Sociology, Jawaharlal Nehru University. New Delhi, 6 August 2015. Jois, Rama. Hindu intellectual (RSS) and former judge and politician. Bangalore, 17 July 2015. Jondhale, Surendra. Head of the Department of Civics and Politics, University of Mumbai. Mumbai, 28 July 2015. Jung, Najeeb. Lieutenant Governor of New Delhi (2013–2016). New Delhi, 5 August 2015. Katju, Manjari. Professor of Politics, University of Hyderabad. Hyderabad, 22 July 2015. Khan, Farida. Member of the National Commission for Minorities. New Delhi, 3 August 2015. Khan, Mumtaz Ali. Former Minister of Minorities, Welfare, Waqf and Haj (BJP) in Karnataka. Bangalore, 16 July 2015. Khan, Zaheeruddin. Head of the Siasat media and civil society conglomerate. Hyderabad, 25 July 2015. Khurshid, Salman. Foreign Minister, 2012–2014 (Congress). New Delhi, 11 August 2015. Kumar, Indresh. RSS leader and ‘guide’ of the Muslim Rashtriya Manch. New Delhi, 11 August 2015. Kumar, Jitendra. RSS officer. New Delhi, 10 August 2015. Mander, Harsh. Centre for Equity Studies and Aman Biradari. New Delhi, 5 August 2015. Mohan, Sudha. Professor at the Department of Civics and Politics, University of Mumbai. Mumbai, 28 July 2015. Nagarjuna, Boppana. Professor of Economics, University of Hyderabad. Hyderabad, 26 July 2015. Narayan, Ashwath. Member of the Legislative Assembly (BJP) for Malleshwaram in Bangalore, Karnataka. Bangalore, 20 July 2015. Nishad, Jameela. Women’s rights activist and head of the NGO Shaheen. Hyderabad, 24 July 2015. Owaisi, Asaduddin. Supreme leader of the Majlis Party and Member of Parliament, Lok Sabha. Hyderabad, 25 July 2015. Pinto, Ambrose. Principal of St Aloysius College. Bangalore, 19 July 2015. Puniyani, Ram. Chairman of the Centre for Study of Society and Secularism. Mumbai, 30 July 2015. Sahney, Satish. Director of the Nehru Centre, Mumbai. Mumbai, 31 July 2015. Shajahan, P.K. Dean at the Tata Institute of Social Sciences. Mumbai, 30 July 2015. Sharief, Jaffer. Former Railway Minister (1991–1995). Bangalore, 16 July 2015. Subsequent visit for Eid feast, 18 July 2015. Sharma, Jyotirmaya. Professor of Politics, University of Hyderabad. Hyderabad, 23 July 2015. Siraj, M.A. Journalist and Muslim intellectual. Bangalore, 19 July 2015. Thambanda,Vijay Poonacha. Professor of History, Kannada University (Hampi). Bangalore, 17 July 2015. Vartak, Anil. RSS officer. New Delhi, 10 August 2015. Zakaria, Al-Nasser. Congress spokesperson for Maharashtra. Mumbai, 30 July 2015.

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INDEX

aam aadmi 85; see also common man/ woman Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammed 43 accommodation see minority accommodation Advaita Vedanta 108 affirmative action 56; see also equal opportunity; job reservations Afghanistan 8, 108 Agnivesh, Swami 107 Aiyar, Mani Shankar 12, 16, 21, 64 – 5, 72, 73, 75, 79, 104, 106, 108 Ajmal, Badruddin 51 Akbar, M.J. 23, 29, 43 – 4, 49 – 50, 53 – 4, 58, 59, 107 Al Ameen Foundation 57 – 8 Al-Andalus 3, 34 alcohol 48, 91 All-India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM) see Majlis Party Al-Shabaab 115 Ambedkar, B.R. 11, 92 Ambedkar Student Association 91 – 3, 113 Andalusia 3, 34 Andhra Pradesh 58, 71, 75 Anonymous A, senior BJP official 19 – 20, 28, 33, 35, 38, 39 – 40 Anonymous B, senior government politician 33 – 5, 39 Anonymous C, senior Congress Party official 65, 72, 73, 75, 76, 80

appeasement 25, 36, 38, 62, 63, 65, 67, 75, 81, 82, 111; see also minority accommodation Arab region: Arabia 36; Arab internationalism 22; Arabs 21, 116; Arabization of Islam 97; Arab Spring 4; Dubai 96; Saudi Arabia 29, 34, 66; Syria 112; see also Middle East Aryans 103, 104 Arya Samaj 32, 64 Ashoka 9, 108 Assam 51 asylum seekers 4; see also migration atheism 64, 67 Austria 115; Austro-Hungarian Empire 9 – 10 Ayodhya 19, 31, 38, 89; Babri Masjid 8, 31, 89; Ram Temple 19, 38 Azad, Abul Kalam 43, 111 Azmi, Abu Asim 29, 45 – 6, 52 – 3, 55, 56 – 7, 94 Babri Masjid 8, 31, 89; see also Ayodhya backwardness 6, 68, 75; lower castes 6, 28, 53, 56, 68, 85, 86 – 91, 95, 97 – 8, 99 – 100, 110; Muslims 18, 28, 37, 38, 57, 67 – 9, 71, 76 – 7, 82; see also Other Backward Classes (OBCs); Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SC/STs) Bahujan Samaj Party 36, 44, 51, 52, 61, 63, 92

Index  133

Baig, Roshan 48 – 9, 56 Bajrang Dal 35 Balkans 1, 3, 4, 34 Bangalore vii, 37 – 8, 47 – 8, 57, 100 Bangladesh 8, 66 Belgium 115 Bhagavad Gita 37 bhakti 106; see also Hinduism Bharat 27, 30; Bharatariyakaran 30; Bharat Mata 35 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 17, 19, 107; communalism 32, 58, 96 – 7; Muslims 19 – 22, 28 – 9, 37, 38 – 40, 47 – 50, 53 – 4, 111 Bhiwandi 45 Bhutan 8 Bihar 8, 43, 44, 45, 52, 86, 94, 111 biradari 90 – 1 Birmingham 5 birth control 28, 40 blasphemy 46, 83, 121 Bohra Muslims 22, 65 Bombay Presidency 96; for Bombay see Mumbai Bradford 5 Brahmins 34, 35, 97, 104, 106; hegemony 92 – 3, 99, 103 – 4, 111; Kayastha 89 Brass, Paul 8, 13 Britain, British see United Kingdom Brussels 2, 5 Buddha, Gautama 108 Buddhism 6, 8, 64, 103, 115; disappearance from India 9, 34, 104 – 5, 107, 108; Maurya Empire 9, 108; Pala Empire 108; Tantric sects 108 Bulgaria 115 burka 46, 89, 90, 97 caste 74, 75, 78, 87, 99, 110; disappearance from India 9, 34, 104 – 5, 107, 108; lower/backward 6, 28, 53, 56, 68, 75, 85, 86 – 91, 95, 97 – 8, 99 – 100, 110; among Muslims 28, 56 – 7, 75, 91 – 2, 95 – 6, 107; scheduled/outcaste 56 – 7, 68, 86, 88 – 95, 103 – 4, 110; system 92, 103 – 4, 107; upper/forward 20, 33, 75, 85 – 6, 91, 95, 111, 112 – 13 censorship 83, 115; freedom of expression/ speech 83, 121 Central African Republic 115, 121 Central Asia 104, 108 Centre for Equity Studies 66

Charlie Hebdo 38 Chechnya 115 Chhattisgarh 43 China 8, 79 Christianity, Christians 1, 8 – 9, 29, 34; Catholic pope 34; conversion 6, 20, 29, 32, 35, 87, 101, 104, 109; Europe 1, 9 – 10, 117, 120; India 6, 9, 34, 37, 64, 66, 87, 107, 109; Middle East 9 – 10 civilization vi, 8 – 9, 79, 101; awareness/ suppression 9, 10 – 11, 101 – 3, 119 – 20; ‘clash’ 3, 6, 11, 79; European/western 10, 34, 79, 101, 118 – 21; Indian/Hindu ix, 5, 8 – 9, 18, 31 – 5, 39, 53 – 4, 79, 101 – 13, 114; Islamic/Muslim 9, 53 – 4, 105 – 7; raison de civilisation 11, 101 – 13, 114, 119 – 21 coexistence see peaceful coexistence collective consciousness 102 – 3 collective intentionality see group intentionality colonial era 6, 73, 105, 109; British Empire 63; Portugal 104 committed secularists 17 – 18, 23; see also Indian secularism common man/woman 15 – 16, 85 – 100; aam aadmi 85 communal harmony see social harmony communalism 5 – 6, 72, 74, 78, 83; communalization 10, 81, 119, 121; Hindu 6, 16, 19 – 20, 31 – 2, 61, 72 – 3, 96, 109; Hindu-Christian 6; HinduMuslim 5 – 8, 12 – 13, 23, 72 – 3, 82; Hindu-Sikh 6; Muslim 13, 16 – 17, 72 – 3; struggle against 6, 17, 66, 77 – 8; see also gentleman communalists communal violence 5 – 8, 10, 31 – 2, 58 – 9, 109; Dalits 91, 93, 99; Gujarat 8, 10, 22, 89, 93; lynchings 8, 113; Muzaffarnagar 8, 59, 73, 93; ‘post-Babri’ 8, 16, 30, 31, 58, 86; riots 6, 7 – 8, 21, 31 – 2, 52, 54, 58 – 9, 66, 70, 80, 93 communist parties 111 communities vi, 12, 14, 22 – 3, 35, 40, 53, 64, 66 – 7, 69, 75, 82 – 3, 85; community development 28, 43, 55, 56 – 8, 74 – 7; Hindu 12, 95; illiberalism 13, 64 – 5, 66, 83, 118 – 19; marginal 85 – 100; Muslim 12, 77, 95, 117; religious 6 – 7, 14, 17, 35, 48, 63, 67 community brokers 14 – 16, 17, 22 – 3, 44, 46 – 8, 60, 94, 116

134 Index

composite culture 9, 27, 36, 63, 73 – 4, 102, 104 – 7; cultural synthesis 34, 79, 102, 104 – 7, 108, 112, 120; folk religion 86, 94 – 8, 99 – 100; GangaJamuna relationship 54; religious syncretism 34, 38, 39, 50, 73, 102, 104, 119 – 20 Congress Party see Indian National Congress Constitution of India 6 – 7, 18, 38, 62 – 4, 68, 75, 110, 118 conversion 8, 87; to Buddhism 6, 11; to Christianity 6, 20, 29, 32, 35, 87, 101, 104, 109; Dalits 33, 91; ghar wapsi 35, 108, 109; to Islam 22, 32 – 3, 35, 53, 79, 87, 109, 116; reconversion to Hinduism 108 Cook, Michael 109 cosmopolitanism 79; Europe 3, 9, 10, 120; India 25 – 6, 78, 99, 100 counterterrorism 41, 118 cow slaughter 8, 29 culture 27 – 9, 120; composite 9, 27, 36, 63, 73 – 4, 102, 104 – 7; cultural synthesis 34, 79, 102, 104 – 7, 108, 112, 120; folk religion 86, 94 – 8, 99 – 100; GangaJamuna relationship 54; syncretic 34, 38, 39, 50, 73, 102, 104, 119 – 20 Dalits 33, 88 – 94, 97, 112, 114; alliance with Muslims 45, 52 – 3, 70, 74, 91 – 3, 112; backwardness 57, 68; competition with Muslims 33, 93 – 4, 99; cow slaughter 8; job reservations 56 – 7, 111; role in riots 91, 93, 99;Valmikis 33, 88 – 91; see also Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SC/STs) Dalrymple, William 34 dargahs 48, 73, 97 – 8, 100; see also Sufism Dawoodi Bohras 22, 65 Delhi 15, 44, 54, 100; BJP headquarters 19; RSS headquarters 27 democracy 2 – 3, 26, 59, 63, 80 – 1; Europe 2, 25, 41, 80; India 14, 17, 19 – 20, 49 – 50, 64, 78, 80 – 1, 105, 110 – 11; see also elections; political parties demography 59, 115; Europe 3 – 5, 39, 80, 81, 114 – 15; India 2, 9, 59, 94, 104, 109 – 10, 114; majority 24 – 41, 46, 48, 81, 118; minorities 46, 59, 66, 91 – 4 denial 8, 39, 81 – 2 Denk Party 61 Denmark 115 Deoband 34

development 7, 37, 38, 63 – 4, 69 – 72; community development 28, 43, 55, 56 – 8, 74 – 7; developing countries 81, 113 Development and Integration of Women and Youth Organization (Diwya) 86 – 8 Dharavi 86 – 8, 93 – 4, 99 dharma 26, 27, 30 – 1, 104; sanatana dharma 31, 105; sarva dharma samabhava 37, 50 discrimination against Muslims 38, 45, 55 – 6, 61, 66, 69 – 72, 76, 77, 81, 82 – 3, 94; housing sector 70, 71; justice 70 – 1; labour market 55 – 7, 69, 71; police 17, 55, 70, 71, 77 diversity 1, 5, 9 – 10, 12, 27, 79, 80, 85 – 6, 116, 117 – 18, 119; celebration 2, 3, 64, 65, 66, 67, 73, 79, 83; promotion 74, 78, 82; social reality 3, 73 – 4, 81 – 2, 85 – 100 divorce 88, 90 Diwali 36 domestic violence 90 dowry deaths 8 Dubai 96 Durga 98, 100 Durkheim, Émile 102 – 3 Eastern Europe 1, 18, 131 education 47, 55 – 8, 68 – 9, 76 – 7, 78, 80, 118; madrasas 36, 57, 58, 68 – 9, 76, 78; religious 30; skill development 76 – 7; state schools 37, 57 – 8, 68 – 9, 78, 84, 123 Egypt 101 Eid 36 elections: India 14 – 16, 17, 19, 44 – 6, 50, 51 – 3, 55, 65, 78, 85, 99, 110, 111, 116; Europe 60, 61, 116; majority voting 51, 78; proportional representation 78 emancipation 70, 91 – 3, 111, 119 emergency rule 8 emulation 105, 107 – 10; see also raison de civilisation Engineer, Ashgar Ali 12, 65 Engineer, Irfan 65 – 6, 70, 75, 76 equal opportunity 75 – 6, 82, 111; commission 56, 76; see also affirmative action Europe 1 – 5, 9 – 11, 38 – 41, 59 – 61, 79 – 83, 114 – 21; civilization 34, 79, 118 – 21; demographic change 3 – 5, 39, 80, 81, 114 – 15; Eastern 1, 18, 131; integration 2; values 2 – 3, 9 – 10, 13, 39, 41, 59 – 60, 80, 82 – 3, 118 – 21; Western viii, 1, 3, 114, 115

Index  135

European history 9 – 10, 79, 80, 119 – 20; Al-Andalus 3, 34; Austro-Hungarian Empire 9 – 10; British Empire 63; colonial era 6, 73, 105, 109; Portugal 104 European Muslims 3 – 5, 9 – 10, 38 – 40, 59, 60 – 1, 114, 115 – 17; demographic trends 3 – 5, 80, 114 – 15; migrant background 1 – 4, 38 – 9, 40, 79 – 81, 82, 83, 115, 116 – 17, 120; parties 61, 116; segregation 1, 4, 5, 117; socioeconomic status 59 – 60, 116 – 17 Faridi, Abdul 43 Fatah, Tarek 21 Fatwa 91 France 4 – 5, 38, 39, 40, 79, 115, 119, 120; Conseil d’État 120; laicism/secularism 5, 18, 62 – 3, 79 – 80; Marseille 5; Paris 2, 10, 117; Revolution 120 freedom of expression, freedom of speech 83, 121; censorship 115 frustration see Narcissism-FrustrationRegression (NFR) nexus Gandhi, Indira 8, 46 – 7, 111 Gandhi, Maneka 38 Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (Mahatma) 31, 34, 50, 104 Gandhi, Rajiv 53 Gandhi,Varun 38 Ganga-Jamuna relationship 54 gender 43, 64, 78, 87, 118, 120, 121; see also women gentleman communalists 19 – 20, 23, 35; see also communalism Germany 1, 4, 18, 60, 115, 120 ghar wapsi 35, 108, 109 globalization 80, 100 Golwalkar, M.S. 30 goondas 94 Gowda, Rajeev 21, 70, 77 Great Britain see United Kingdom Greece 10, 115; ancient 104 group intentionality 102 Gujarat 8, 69, 100; ‘model’ of Muslim integration 22, 37; riots 8, 10, 22, 89, 93 haj 48, 65, 98 Haji Ali Dargah 97 Haji Malang Dargah 97 – 8, 100 harmony see social harmony Haryana 95

hate speech 16, 83; see also freedom of expression, freedom of speech healthcare 14, 47, 48, 70 hegemony 104, 110 – 11; ‘Brahminical’ 92 – 3, 99, 103 – 4, 111; Hindu 6, 35, 86, 91 – 4, 102, 103 – 13, 114, 117 hijab 18 Hindi 59, 87, 100, 116 Hindu civilization see Indian civilization Hindu hegemony see hegemony Hinduism 8 – 9, 33 – 5, 91 – 2, 97 – 100, 101 – 13; accommodation 20, 25, 29, 34, 53, 73, 91, 110 – 11; bhakti 106; civilization 8 – 9, 31, 33 – 5, 39, 53 – 4, 101 – 13; culture 25, 27 – 8, 39, 53, 54, 104; inclusiveness 24, 99, 105, 112; Islamic influences 105 – 7, 108; limits 16, 29, 30, 34 – 5, 53, 99, 107, 112; neoHinduism 64, 109; religion 8 – 9, 16, 26, 30, 32, 36 – 7, 99 – 100, 106 – 7, 109 – 10; resilience 8, 20, 24, 31 – 5, 101, 104, 112; sanatana dharma 31, 105; Shaivism 50, 106, 116; tolerance 16, 24, 26 – 7, 29, 36 – 7;Vaishnavism 116; way of life 26, 29 – 30; see also caste; dharma; hegemony Hindu Mahasabha 6, 32, 107 Hindu nationalism 12, 21, 24 – 41, 60, 72, 93 – 4, 100, 107; Hindutva 19, 31 – 2, 92; moderate 38; Narcissism-FrustrationRegression (NFR) nexus 24 – 31, 36 – 7, 40; radical 35; victimhood 26 Hindu rashtra 53, 107 Hindutva 19, 31 – 2, 92; see also Hindu nationalism history see European history; Indian history Hosabale, Dattatreya 27 – 8 humanitarian intervention 41 human rights 25, 41, 118 Huntington, Samuel 11, 41 Hussain, Mazher 70, 78, 80 Hyderabad vii, 14, 44, 52, 55, 59; New City 89; Old City 5, 15, 16 – 17, 28, 33, 45, 58 – 9, 88 – 91, 99; Owaisi schools 57, 58; princely state 96; university 91 identity: collective 81, 101, 102, 116, 119; Hindu 16 – 17, 24 – 31, 97 – 8; Muslim 16, 17, 39, 45, 53, 97, 99, 101 – 2; ‘other’ 25, 66, 72, 112; political 16, 17, 53; real/constructed 66 – 7, 77 – 8; religious 5 – 6, 66, 67, 97, 98; ‘self ’ 25, 112; working-class 87

136 Index

identity entrepreneurs 16 – 17, 22 – 3, 44 – 6 identity politics 5 – 8, 16 – 17, 78, 80; Hindu nationalist 16, 24 – 41, 91; Muslim 16, 17, 44 – 6, 60; ‘othering’ 25, 66, 72, 112; secularist 16 – 17, 23, 74, 82, 91; subaltern 91 – 3; see also communalism inclusiveness: Hindu 24, 99, 105, 112; liberal 80; among Muslims 34; secularist 66, 72, 83, 114 independence see Indian history India ix, 8 – 10, 33 – 8, 53 – 4, 60 – 1, 74 – 82, 101 – 13, 115, 116 – 17; Bharat 27, 30, 35; countryside 85 – 6, 94 – 100; democracy 14, 17, 19 – 20, 49 – 50, 64, 78, 80 – 1, 105, 110 – 11; demography 2, 9, 59, 94, 104, 109 – 10, 114; North 9, 43, 52, 54, 59, 68, 72, 77, 92, 94 – 6, 108, 109; South 57, 77, 96 – 7 India Ideas Conclave viii, 21 Indian Administrative Service (IAS) 56, 62 Indian civilization vi, ix, 5, 8 – 9, 18, 31 – 5, 39, 53 – 4, 79, 101 – 13, 114; see also hegemony Indian history ix, 2, 6, 8 – 9, 34 – 5, 80, 101, 103 – 4, 107 – 9, 112; colonial era 6, 63, 73, 104, 105, 109; foreign rule 9, 24, 103 – 4, 112; independence 6, 16, 113, 114; independence struggle 6, 14, 29, 43, 92, 111; Maurya Empire 9, 108; Mughal Empire 54, 109; Muslim rule 20, 32 – 3, 53 – 4, 72, 79, 104, 106, 108 – 9; Pala Empire 108; partition 6 – 7, 10, 16, 43, 54, 63, 104; violence vi, ix, 6, 8, 10, 54, 114 Indian Islam 8 – 9, 32 – 5, 39, 50 – 1, 53 – 4, 60 – 1, 79, 91, 97 – 8, 102, 104, 116; civilization 9, 53 – 4, 105 – 7 Indianization 30, 34 Indian Muslims 12, 21, 42 – 61, 66, 67 – 72, 94, 107, 112 – 13; ‘aggressiveness’ 28, 36, 56, 99, 109; backwardness 18, 28, 37, 38, 57, 67 – 9, 71, 76 – 7, 82; caste 28, 56 – 7, 75, 91 – 2, 95 – 6, 107; community development 43, 55, 57; lack of enlightenment 43 – 4, 60, 70, 116; leaders 19, 29, 40, 42 – 61, 65, 99, 111, 116; loyalty to India 17, 21 – 2, 53, 70; parties 42, 50, 51 – 3, 92, 116; pride 16, 17, 44 – 5, 46, 112; progeny of converts 22, 32 – 3, 53, 79, 91; progressive 60, 65 – 6, 112; underrepresentation 45, 55, 56, 57, 70, 71, 75, 77; victimhood 17, 45, 52, 55 – 6, 69 – 72; weakness of leadership 43 – 4, 112, 116

Indian National Congress 6 – 7, 62 – 5, 73, 75 – 6, 111, 116; communalism 6 – 7, 19; loss of power 17, 62, 119; Muslims 43, 44, 46 – 50, 53 – 4, 94; Nehru-Gandhi clan 38, 63, 111 Indian secularism 6 – 7, 17 – 18, 19, 62 – 84; Congress 13, 17, 46; other parties 7, 13, 19, 23, 43, 50 – 1, 63; politicians 17, 64 – 5; ‘real’ vs. ‘pseudo’ 29, 32, 35 – 7; see also committed secularists Indonesia 32, 108, 116 integration: European 2; of minorities 34, 41 intermarriage 78, 87 – 8, 109 – 10 Iran 34, 36; Persia 8, 54, 101, 104 Islam 1, 20, 30, 34 – 5, 45 – 6, 50 – 1, 87, 121; European 1, 39, 60 – 1, 79 – 80, 116; Indian 8 – 9, 32 – 5, 39, 50 – 1, 53 – 4, 60 – 1, 79, 91, 97 – 8, 102, 104, 116; Islamic civilization 9, 105 – 7; Ismaili 22, 65; Middle Eastern 10, 34, 100, 102, 112, 114; political 21, 36, 44, 83, 100, 108, 114, 115; prohibition of alcohol 48; prohibition of pork 29, 33, 48; Quran 49, 58, 69; Shia 107, 116; Sufi 34, 48, 49, 50, 65 – 6, 73, 97 – 8, 106 – 7; Sunni 22, 107, 116 Islamic State 20 Islamism 21, 36, 44, 83, 100, 108, 114, 115 Islamization 97 Islamophobia 61, 66, 83, 117, 119 Italy 1 Jaffrelot, Christophe 12, 31, 107 Jafri, Syed Amin 15, 52, 58 – 9 Jain, Surendra 16, 28, 29, 30 – 1, 32 – 3, 35 – 6, 37, 38 – 9 Jainism 9, 34 Jammu and Kashmir 16, 19, 36, 38, 43, 114 Janata Dal 36, 44, 61 Japan 8, 108 Jews 9, 117 Jharkhand 43 jihad 20, 29, 30, 39, 107 Jinnah, Muhammad Ali 43 job reservations see reservations Jodhka, Surinder 81 – 2, 94 – 7 Jogis 95 Jois, Rama 27, 31, 35, 36, 37 Judaism 9, 117 Jung, Najeeb 43, 71, 72, 73 kafir 34 Kalam, A.P.J. Abdul 29

Index  137

Karnataka 27, 28, 37 – 8, 47 – 9, 53, 56, 57 – 8, 69, 86, 96 – 7, 100; Bangalore vii, 37 – 8, 47 – 8, 57, 100 Kashmir see Jammu and Kashmir Kenya 115, 121 Kerala 9, 50, 51, 57, 69, 75, 77, 113; Malabar Coast 96 – 7, 100; Malayalam 96 Khalsa 109 Khan, Azam 29 Khan, Farida 66 – 7, 69, 70, 78, 79 Khan, Mumtaz Ali 47 – 8, 56 Khan, Sadiq 60 Khan, Shah Nawaz 29 Khan, Zaheeruddin 55 Khilafat movement 107 Khurshid, Salman 12, 17, 21, 63, 65, 68, 71, 75 – 6 Kidwai, Rafi Ahmed 43 Korea 8, 108 kshatriyas 33, 103 – 4 Kumar, Indresh 21 – 2, 26 – 7, 28, 30 Kumar, Jitendra 27, 36, 37 Kumar, Nitish 111 Labour Party 60, 120 language 5, 12, 14, 22, 27 – 8, 32, 69, 70, 75, 76, 86, 88, 116 law and order 17, 70; police 55, 58, 70, 71, 77, 94, 123 Leitkultur 120 liberalism 5, 10, 16 – 17, 32, 60, 64 – 6, 101, 120; crisis 13, 60, 82 – 3, 118 – 19, 120; open society 76, 121; values 2, 13, 60, 80, 83, 118 – 19, 120 – 1 London 10, 44, 117; mayor 60 love 48 – 9, 56; for India 22, 27; love jihad 30, 109 – 10; marriage 87 – 8, 89 – 90, 100; of religion 16 lower castes 6, 28, 53, 56, 68, 85, 86 – 91, 95, 97 – 8, 99 – 100 Lutyens, Edwin 34 lynchings see violence Madhav, Ram 21 madrasas 36, 57, 58, 68 – 9, 76, 78 Maharashtra 8, 45, 59, 75; no reservations for Muslims 56 – 7, 71; riots 8, 59; state elections 44, 45, 52, 61; Urdu-medium schools 84 Majlis Party 15 – 17, 44 – 5, 51 – 3, 89, 91; communalism 17, 72; Muslim-Dalit alliance 45, 52, 92; Owaisi schools 57 – 8, 69; pan-Indian aspirations 44; riots 58 – 9

majority 24 – 41, 46, 48, 81, 118; see also demography Malayalam 96 Malraux, André 108 Mander, Harsh 18, 66, 68, 72, 73, 75, 79 Marathi people 93 – 4, 96; language 14, 87, 116; Malanggad 98; Maratha Empire 108 – 9; Shivaji 93, 98; see also Shiv Sena marriage 4, 90; arranged 89 – 90, 100; child 100; conversion 87; divorce 88, 90; gay 60; interreligious 78, 87 – 8, 109 – 10; love 87 – 8, 89 – 90, 100; polygamy 28 Marseille 5 Maulana Azad see Azad, Abul Kalam Maurya Empire 9, 108 Mayawati 111 Mecca 20, 28, 30, 98 media 23, 62, 80, 96, 100 Medina 20, 28, 30, 49 Meow 95 Middle East 10, 100, 102, 112, 113, 114; Arabia 36; Dubai 96; Gulf 96, 97, 100; Iran 34, 36; migration to Europe 4, 79; Persia 8, 54, 101, 104; Saudi Arabia 29, 34, 66; Syria 112 migration 4, 80; asylum seekers 4; Europe 1 – 4, 38 – 9, 40, 79 – 81, 82, 83, 115, 116 – 17, 120; labour 14, 45, 86 – 8, 93 – 4; Pakistan 43, 54; Persian Gulf 96, 97, 100; refugees 3 – 4 minorities 46, 59, 66, 91 – 4; Europe 1 – 5, 10 – 11, 38 – 40, 59 – 60, 79 – 83, 115, 117 – 21; India 5 – 8, 20 – 2, 35 – 8, 42 – 61, 64 – 5, 67 – 78, 115; Muslim 2, 8 – 10, 60 – 1, 82 – 3, 114 – 21; see also demography minority accommodation 42, 50 – 4, 62 – 4, 67 – 78, 82 – 3, 110 – 12, 117 – 18; appeasement 25, 36, 38, 62, 63, 65, 67, 75, 81, 82, 111; equal opportunity 56, 75 – 6, 82, 111 missionaries 20, 29, 32, 101, 104, 109 mobilization 14, 16 – 17, 22 – 3, 74; countermobilization 72, 81; majority 37, 73, 80, 83, 89; minority 81, 107 modernity 8, 43, 67, 94 modernization 6 – 7, 28, 57, 63 – 4, 68, 75, 76 – 7 Modi, Narendra 8, 10, 19, 22, 36, 37, 38, 49 – 50, 58, 85 Moscow 115 Mosque 1, 36, 37, 46, 48, 51, 95 – 6, 97; Babri Masjid 8, 31, 89; Friday prayer 90

138 Index

Mughal Empire 54, 109 multiculturalism 1 – 3, 13, 39, 60, 66, 79, 82 – 3, 117 – 21 Mumbai vii, 14, 45 – 6, 94; Dharavi 86 – 8, 93 – 4, 99; Haji Ali Dargah 97; Shivaji Nagar 45; Worli 97 Muslim dhimmis 14, 20 – 2, 49, 60, 94, 99, 111, 112 Muslim figureheads 29, 42, 43, 48 – 50, 60, 116 Muslim League 6, 16, 107; Kerala 50, 51 Muslim Rashtriya Manch (MRM) 21 – 2, 111 Muslims see European Muslims; Indian Muslims Muzaffarnagar 8, 59, 73, 93 Myanmar 8, 121 Nalanda 108 Naqvi, Mukhtar Abbas 13, 29 Narayan, Ashwath 28, 30, 37 – 8, 40 Narcissism-Frustration-Regression (NFR) nexus 24 – 31, 36 – 7, 40; Europe 40 – 1, 118 National Commission for Minorities 66 nationalism 32; Europe 117, 119, 120; India 6, 12, 25 – 6, 31 – 2 nativism 10, 13, 60, 80, 83, 93, 119, 120 – 1 Nehru, Jawaharlal 7, 17 – 18, 31, 64, 111; on civilization 9, 104, 105 – 6, 108; clan 38, 63, 111 Nehru Centre 18, 64, 79 Nepal 8, 27, 108 Netherlands 115, 120; Denk Party 61 New Delhi 15, 44, 54, 100; BJP headquarters 19; RSS headquarters 27 Nishad, Jameela 89 – 91 North Africa 32 Norway 10, 115 ‘other’ see identity Other Backward Classes (OBCs) 6, 28, 53, 56, 68, 75, 85, 86 – 91, 95, 97 – 8, 99 – 100, 110 Ottoman Empire 9 – 10 outcastes 56 – 7, 68, 86, 88 – 95, 103 – 4, 110 Owaisi schools 57, 58 Owaisi, Akbaruddin 15, 16 – 17 Owaisi, Asaduddin 15 – 16, 17, 29, 44 – 5, 51 – 2, 55, 56, 57 – 9, 72, 111 – 12 Özdemir, Chem 60

Pakistan 8, 9, 20, 22, 28, 29, 66, 112, 113, 116; Baluchistan 107; ‘Pakistan zindabad’ 22, 30; partition 6, 8, 43, 54, 89, 104, 107, 114 Pala Empire 108 Paris 2, 10, 117 Parliament of India 47, 55, 58; Lower House 15, 44, 45; Upper House 64 parties see political parties partition 6 – 7, 10, 16, 43, 54, 63, 104; Pakistan 8, 9, 20, 22, 28, 29, 66, 112, 113, 116; violence vi, 6, 8, 10, 54, 114 Patels 88, 9, 100 patronage 14 – 16, 22 – 3, 44 – 5, 46 – 8, 60, 94, 116 peaceful coexistence ix, 3, 115, 118, 121; Hindus and Muslims 10, 27, 34 – 5, 39, 54, 114 – 15 Persia 8, 54, 101, 104; Gulf 96, 97, 100; Iran 34, 36 Pew Research Center 3 – 4, 8 – 9, 114 – 15, 121 Philippines 115, 121 Phillips, Trevor 117, 121 Pinto, Ambrose 57 – 8, 68, 70, 75, 91 polarization 5, 43, 72 police 17, 55, 58, 70, 71, 77, 94, 123 political correctness 39, 40, 65, 66, 83 political Islam 21, 36, 44, 83, 100, 108, 114, 115 political parties 14, 19, 23, 43, 44, 47, 55, 60, 63, 107, 123; Aam Aadmi 85; Bahujan Samaj 36, 44, 51, 52, 61, 63, 92; BJP 17, 19 – 22, 28 – 9, 37, 38 – 40, 47 – 50, 53 – 4, 96 – 7, 107, 111; communist 111; Congress 6 – 7, 17, 19, 43, 44, 46 – 50, 53 – 4, 62 – 5, 73, 75 – 6, 94, 111; in Europe 60, 61, 116; Janata Dal 36, 44, 61; Majlis 15 – 17, 44 – 5, 51 – 3, 57, 58 – 9, 72, 89, 91; Muslim-led 42, 50, 51 – 3, 92, 116; regional/caste 17, 36, 52, 62, 63; Samajwadi 36, 44, 45, 51, 52, 56, 61, 63, 73; Shiv Sena 93 – 4, 97 – 8 polygamy 28 Popper, Karl Raimund 121 populism 10, 13, 60, 80, 83, 93, 119, 120 – 1 pork 29, 33, 48 Portugal 9; colonial era 104 poverty 49, 59 – 60, 68, 70, 75, 86, 91, 93 – 4, 99, 116 – 17 progress 80; for Muslims 37, 43, 74 – 7; progressivism 62 – 84, 114 provincializing Europe 9 – 10

Index  139

Puniyani, Ram 69, 94 Punjab 9 purdah 33, 87, 89 Quran 49, 58, 69 raison de civilisation 11, 101 – 13, 114, 119 – 21; accommodation 42, 50 – 4, 62 – 4, 67 – 78, 82 – 3, 110 – 12, 117 – 18; cultural synthesis 34, 79, 102, 104 – 7, 108, 112, 120; emulation 105, 107 – 10 Rajputs 100 Ram Temple see Ayodhya Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) 21 – 2, 26 – 8, 29, 31, 35, 37, 97, 107 reconversion to Hinduism 35, 108, 109 refugees 3 – 4; refugee crisis viii; see also migration regions of India 5, 9, 12, 14, 17, 36, 42, 51, 62, 63, 71; Andhra Pradesh 58, 71, 75; Assam 51; Bihar 8, 43, 44, 45, 52, 86, 94, 111; Chhattisgarh 43; Gujarat 8, 10, 22, 69, 89, 93, 100; Haryana 95; Jammu and Kashmir 16, 19, 36, 38, 43, 114; Jharkhand 43; Karnataka 27, 28, 37 – 8, 47 – 9, 53, 56, 57 – 8, 69, 86, 96 – 7, 100; Kerala 9, 50, 51, 57, 69, 75, 77, 96 – 7, 113; Maharashtra 8, 44, 45, 52, 59, 61, 75; New Delhi 15, 44, 54, 100; Punjab 9; Tamil Nadu 75; Telangana 59, 69, 86, 111; Uttarakhand 43; West Bengal 27, 43, 44 regression see Narcissism-FrustrationRegression (NFR) nexus religion 6 – 7, 14, 18, 38, 50 – 1, 62 – 3, 67, 74, 106; eclecticism 50, 106; festivals 22, 36, 49, 87, 89; freedom of 51, 66; mysticism 50, 97; in the plural 1, 8 – 9, 18, 34, 48, 107; subaltern 6, 11, 86 – 91, 94 – 8, 108; syncretism 86, 94 – 8, 99 – 100; see also Buddhism; Christianity, Christians; Hinduism; Islam; Judaism resentment 55, 63, 72, 96 reservations: education 56; jobs 68, 110 – 12; for Muslims 37 – 8, 42, 56 – 7, 60, 75 – 6; train 15, 45 respect 6, 17, 88, 118; Hindu nationalist discourse 16, 22, 25 – 6, 29, 35 – 7, 39, 40; Islamist discourse 45, 48, 50 – 1, 52, 55, 61; secularist discourse 6, 17 – 18, 65, 67, 83 Respect Party 61

riots see violence Roman Empire 8 Rotterdam 5 Russia 39, 115, 121; Moscow 115 Sachar Report 56, 58, 68, 71 Sahney, Satish 18, 64, 68 – 9, 73 – 4, 76, 77, 78, 79 – 80, 108 Sai Baba of Shirdi 98, 100 Salafism 34 Samajwadi Party 36, 44, 45, 51, 52, 56, 61, 63, 73 sanatana dharma 31, 105 Sangh Parivar 2, 31, 32, 38, 42; Bajrang Dal 35; Muslim Rashtriya Manch (MRM) 21 – 2, 111; Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) 21 – 2, 26 – 8, 29, 31, 35, 37, 97, 107;Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) 16, 31, 35, 109 – 10; see also Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Sanskritization 110 sarva dharma samabhava 37, 50 Saudi Arabia 29, 34, 66; Mecca 20, 28, 30, 98; Medina 20, 28, 30, 49 Sayeed, Mufti Mohammed 36, 41 Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SC/STs) 56 – 7, 68, 86, 88 – 95, 103 – 4, 110 schools 37, 57 – 8, 68 – 9, 78, 123; madrasas 36, 57, 58, 68 – 9, 76, 78; Owaisi schools 57 – 8; Urdu 69, 84 seclusion of women 33, 87, 89 secularism 16, 17 – 18, 36, 62, 83; Indian 6 – 7, 17 – 18, 19, 35 – 7, 62 – 84; model and warning 62, 79 – 81, 83, 119; western 5, 17, 18, 36, 62 – 3, 79 – 83, 120 Secunderabad 90 segregation 1, 5, 64, 75, 81, 82, 86, 89, 92, 94 – 5, 117; education 78, 84; residential 4 – 5, 28, 88 – 9 ‘self ’ see identity Shaheen 88 – 91, 99 Shahin, Sultan 21 Shaivism 50, 106, 116 Shankara, Adi 108 sharia 5, 38, 58, 72, 83 Sharief, Jaffer 46 – 7, 48, 50 – 1, 106 – 7, 111 Shia Islam 107, 116 Shiva 50, 106; Shaivism 106, 116 Shivaji 45, 93 – 4, 98 Shiv Sena vii, 93 – 4, 97 – 8 Shourie, Arun 22

140 Index

Sikhism 6, 9, 63, 64, 103, 108 – 9; Khalsa 109 Singapore 115, 121 Singh, Gobind 109 Singh, Manmohan 64, 65 slums 18, 32, 33, 45, 58 – 9, 69 – 70, 71, 85 – 91, 93 – 4, 99 social activists 65 – 7; Dalit and backwardcaste 91 – 3, 99; Hindu nationalist 16, 35, 21 – 2 social harmony 3, 25, 118; communal 21, 57, 89, 99; disharmony 55; everyday peace 8; precolonial 6; religious 115 socialism 7, 93 social justice 56, 60, 64, 74, 77, 82 South Asia 5, 6, 8, 60, 116 Spain 1, 9; Andalusia 3, 34; Muslim rule 79 Sri Lanka 1, 8, 115, 121 Stockholm syndrome 21 strategic interaction 102 – 3 subalterns 12, 86, 91 – 4, 99, 102, 103 – 5, 110 – 13 Sufism 34, 48, 49, 50, 65 – 6, 73, 97 – 8, 106 – 7; dargahs 48, 73, 97 – 8, 100 Sunni Islam 22, 107, 116 Supreme Court of India 29, 48, 56 – 7, 97 swarm intelligence 113 Sweden 4, 115 Switzerland 115, 120 syncretism 34, 38, 39, 50, 73, 102, 104, 119 – 20; composite culture 9, 27, 36, 63, 73 – 4, 102, 104 – 7; cultural synthesis 34, 79, 102, 104 – 7, 108, 112, 120; folk religion 86, 94 – 8, 99 – 100; GangaJamuna relationship 54 Syria 112 talaq 88, 90 Tamil Nadu 75 Telangana 59, 69, 86, 111 terrorism 16, 38, 49, 55 – 6, 70; counterterrorism 41, 118; Hindu extremist 107; Islamist 2, 10, 16, 61, 114, 117; nativist 10 Thailand 8, 115, 121 Tibi, Bassam 120 tolerance 16, 24, 29, 46, 53, 107, 112; intolerance 16, 28, 29, 30, 34, 79 tribal people 12, 52, 68, 91, 92, 99, 103, 104, 111; see also Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SC/STs) Turkey 10; migrants 1, 60, 61, 116

unbeliever 34 Uniform Civil Code 19, 38 United Democratic Front 51 United Kingdom 4, 18, 27, 115; Birmingham 5; British Empire 6, 63, 79, 96; British values 120; Labour Party 60, 120; London 10, 44, 60, 117; Muslims 117; Respect Party 61 United States of America (USA) 27, 63 universalism 26 – 7, 28, 31, 78, 106 – 7, 120 untouchables see Dalits upper castes 20, 33, 75, 85 – 6, 91, 95, 111, 112 – 13 urban decline 5, 45 urban unrest 10, 117 Urdu 14, 48, 116; schools 69, 84 Uttarakhand 43 Uttar Pradesh vii, 43, 44, 45, 52, 86, 92, 94, 95, 111; riots 8, 58, 59, 61, 73, 93 Vaishnavism 116 Valmiki Dalits 33, 88 – 91; biradari 90 – 1 Varshney, Ashutosh 12;Varshney-Wilkinson dataset 7 Vartak, Anil 27, 37, 41 Vedas 109 Vemula, Rohith 93 victimhood 24, 40 – 1, 61, 82 – 3; Dalit 93; Hindu 16, 25 – 31, 38; Muslim 17, 45, 52, 55 – 6, 69 – 72 violence vii, 20, 21, 75, 92, 115, 118; communal 5 – 8, 10, 31 – 2, 58 – 9, 109; Dalits 91, 93, 99; domestic 90; Gujarat 8, 10, 22, 89, 93; lynchings 8, 113; Muzaffarnagar 8, 59, 73, 93; partition vi, 6, 8, 10, 54, 114; ‘post-Babri’ 8, 16, 30, 31, 58, 86; riots 6, 7 – 8, 21, 31 – 2, 52, 54, 58 – 9, 66, 70, 80, 93; urban unrest 10, 117 Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) 16, 31, 35, 109 – 10 Vivekananda, Swami 64, 104 vote bank politics 14 – 15, 37, 44, 61, 73, 92 – 3, 99 West 2, 9, 18, 39, 40 – 1, 101; civilization 10, 34, 79, 101, 118 – 21; discourse 31, 66, 73, 117; nation states 82; secularism 5, 17, 18, 36, 62 – 3, 79 – 83, 120; values 2 – 3, 9 – 10, 13, 39, 41, 59 – 60, 80, 82 – 3, 118 – 21; see also Europe

Index  141

West Bengal 27, 43, 44; bhadralogs 113 Western Europe viii, 1, 3, 114, 115; see also Europe women 8, 33, 66, 83, 85 – 6, 97, 121; in slums 86 – 91, 99; see also gender world religions 8 – 9; see also Buddhism; Christianity, Christians; Hinduism; Islam; Judaism

xenophobia 83, 115, 117, 119 Yadav, Akilesh 111 Yeddyurappa, B.S. 47 Yugoslavia 10 Zakaria, Al-Nasser 46, 51, 55 – 6, 58 Zoroastrianism 101