Hindu Widow Marriage 9780231526609

Table of contents :
Contents
Preface
A Word About the Translation
Hindu Categories for First-Time Readers
Chronology: Events Pertaining to the Widow Marriage Movement in Bengal
Introduction
A Short Life of Ishvarchandra Vidyasagar
Widow Marriage in Bengal
Hindu Widow Marriage as Modern-Day Commentary
The Real Significance of Hindu Widow Marriage
Hindu Widow Marriage: The Complete English Translation
Book One
Book Two
Glossary
Bibliography
Index of Sanskrit Passages
Index of Names and Terms

Citation preview

Hindu Widow Marriage

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NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN

HINDU W IDOW MARRIAGE NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN

Ishvarchandra Vidyasagar A complete translation, with an introduction and critical notes, by Brian A. Hatcher

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS NEW YORK

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Columbia University Press Publishers Since 1893 New York Chichester, West Sussex Copyright © 2012 Columbia University Press All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bidyasagara, Isvaracandra, 1820–1891. [Vidhavavivaha prachalita haoya uchita ki na etad-vishayaka prastav. English] Hindu widow marriage / Ishvarchandra Vidyasagar ; a complete translation, with an introduction and critical notes, by Brian A. Hatcher. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 978-0-231-15633-2 (cloth : alk. paper) isbn 978-0-231-52660-9 (e-book) 1. Remarriage (Hindu law) 2. Widows (Hindu law) 3. Remarriage—India. 4. Widows—India. I. Hatcher, Brian A. (Brian Allison) II. Bidyasagara, Isvaracandra, 1820–1891. Bidhababibaha pracalita haoya ucita ki na. III. Title. kns544.w54b52155 2011 306.84—dc22 2011012672

Columbia University Press books are printed on permanent and durable acid-free paper. This book is printed on paper with recycled content. Printed in the United States of America c 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 References to Internet Web sites (URLs) were accurate at the time of writing. Neither the translator nor Columbia University Press is responsible for URLs that may have expired or changed since the manuscript was prepared.

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Ishvaraya samarpitam astu

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CONTENTS

Preface

ix

A Word About the Translation

xiii

Hindu Categories for First-Time Readers xvii Chronology: Events Pertaining to the Widow Marriage Movement in Bengal xxv Introduction

1

A Short Life of Ishvarchandra Vidyasagar 3 Widow Marriage in Bengal

10

Hindu Widow Marriage as Modern-Day Commentary The Real Significance of Hindu Widow Marriage

30

41

HINDU W IDOW MARRIAGE: The Complete English Translation Book One 57 Book Two 71 Glossary Bibliography

217 223

Index of Sanskrit Passages

233

Index of Names and Terms 237

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PREFACE

It gives me great pleasure to present for the first time a complete, annotated translation of Ishvarchandra Vidyasagar’s epochal two-part work promoting the cause of widow marriage. While I have been researching and writing about Vidyasagar for some time now, it is really only with this book that I tackle what is by all accounts his most notable achievement as both a Sanskrit scholar and a social reformer. If that seems odd, I would be the first to admit it. Indeed, in the preface to my Idioms of Improvement (1996), I acknowledged that readers might be surprised to find a book on Vidyasagar that did not give special attention to the widow marriage campaign. In my defense, I felt then, and continue to feel, that in order to understand Vidyasagar’s goals and methods in promoting widow marriage, we do well to begin with some preliminary investigation of his world and worldview. I attempted that task in Idioms of Improvement, and now the time has come to make good on my implicit promise to build on that preliminary work and address Vidyasagar’s approach to the question of widow marriage. Since my overriding concerns in this volume are to make the complete text of the original Bengali work accessible to English-language readers and to venture some thoughts on what makes the work so significant, I have necessarily been able to provide only a brief overview of Vidyasagar’s life and career. I hope readers will look to Idioms of Improvement for more extensive treatment of the multiple factors of biography, intellectual formation, and historical context that played so crucial a role in shaping a work like Hindu Widow Marriage. In a nice bit of symmetry, my earliest research on Vidyasagar was funded by a Fulbright-Hays Fellowship during 1989 / 1990, while work toward this volume was greatly facilitated by a Senior Fulbright-Hays Fellowship during 2006 / 2007. Both fellowships allowed me to conduct the kind of extensive research in India and the United Kingdom that was so essential for producing this annotated translation. I wish to express my sincere thanks to the

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U.S. Department of Education for the generous support and lasting impact of both fellowships. While this book was in the final stages of production, I accepted a position at Tufts University. I would like to thank my new colleagues and the administration at Tufts for helping make the transition as smooth as possible. I would also like to register a special thanks to my former faculty colleagues, the administration, and staff at Illinois Wesleyan University for making my years there both productive and happy. During my tenure at IWU, I was the beneficiary of several grants and leave opportunities that assisted my ongoing research into Vidyasagar and colonial Bengal, none more important than a yearlong sabbatical during 2006 / 2007 that allowed me to complete this translation. Funds from the Provost’s Office at IWU and the McFee Professorship in Religion also helped support various aspects of this project. I would also like to thank one IWU student in particular, Dan DeWeert, who read the entire manuscript of Hindu Widow Marriage over the summer of 2009 and helped me think about the best way to present the text to readers with little or no background in Hinduism or colonial Bengal. I hope I have been able to achieve that goal to some degree. Several of my colleagues elsewhere lent their help and guidance at various stages of the project. I especially want to thank Rosane Rocher and Ludo Rocher, both of whom offered not only crucial scholarly assistance but also personal friendship and encouragement over the years. I hope they both know how much this work has benefited from their active interest. Rachel McDermott, Paul Courtright, Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, and Timothy Dobe read portions of the book in draft form and offered valuable comments and suggestions. Several others helped me identify and locate hard-to-find Sanskrit passages, among them Patrick Olivelle, Tim Lubin, and Jim Benson (who also gave me a wonderful refresher course on Paninean grammar one afternoon in the stacks of the India Institute Library). My thanks as well to Deven Patel, Michael Dodson, Indira Peterson, John Cort, Jack Hawley, and Shankar Dutta, all of whom have taken a real interest in the project. In Kolkata, Hena Basu has remained an invaluable and unflappable research assistant. And the librarians and staff at the following institutions deserve my sincerest thanks for assisting with countless requests over the years: the Asiatic Society, the National Library of India, the Sanskrit Sahitya Parishat, the Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, the Bangiya Sahitya Parishat, the Bodleian Library, the British Library, and the library of the School of

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Oriental and African Studies. Needless to say, none of these individuals or institutions should be held accountable for any errors that might appear in this work. I would be remiss if I did not thank Wendy Lochner at Columbia University Press for so heartily embracing this project and helping guide it toward its present form. Irene Pavitt expertly (and patiently) oversaw production of the text, while Jan McInroy provided thoughtful and sharp-eyed copyediting. A Grant-in-Aid from the Faculty Research Council at Tufts University provided support for the index, which was prepared by Katherine Ulrich. I thank her for her careful and timely work. I would also like to thank Rukun Advani of Permanent Black for making it possible to bring out a South Asia edition of Hindu Widow Marriage. To Benjamin Gardner, I am indebted for the cover art. But most especially, to Alison and Gerrit, I extend my endless thanks for your love, your support, and your patience, especially during the transitions and separations of 2010/2011. Normal was good, wasn’t it? It is my hope that this translation will do justice not merely to Vidyasagar’s accomplishments as a social reformer but also to his attempt as a Sanskrit pandit to apply his indigenous intellectual tradition to the emerging challenges of the colonial era. That said, criticism of Vidyasagar, his reform agenda, and the legacy of his most cherished reform will necessarily continue. I would be the last to say he doesn’t merit continued critical scrutiny. He certainly was no stranger to criticism in his own lifetime and—as Hindu Widow Marriage reveals—he had his own sometimes playful, sometimes caustic ways of dealing with his opponents. His were times of momentous change, not least in things religious, and what I most admire about him is that he was always forthright about the precariousness, if not impossibility, of speaking about ultimate things. As he liked to say, quoting a passage from the Mahabharata: dharmasya tattvam nihitam guhayam, “the nature of righteousness is shrouded in mystery.” One suspects that he voiced this view with equal parts irony and sincere conviction, since if he valued righteousness he also mistrusted those who claimed too firm a hold over it. Certainly his reluctance to tell people what to believe has always struck a sympathetic chord in me. I therefore dedicate the book to him, using a playful double entendre first employed by one of his contemporaries when making a similar dedication to the inimitable Ishvarchandra.

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A WORD ABOUT THE TRANSLATION

Hindu Widow Marriage is a translation of the two books published by Ishvarchandra Vidyasagar in January and October 1855 under the same title, Vidhava-vivaha prachalita haoya uchita ki na etad-vishayaka prastava (hereafter, Vidhava-vivaha). The translation is based on the fourth edition of 1872 (as reprinted in Vidyasagar-granthavali, 2:12–187). This translation offers readers an opportunity to study the complete text, restoring significant portions of Book Two that Vidyasagar omitted when making his own translation, Marriage of Hindu Widows (see table 2). All translations from Bengali and Sanskrit are my own unless otherwise noted. When transliterating Sanskrit and Bengali terms, I have avoided the use of diacritical marks, which can prove intimidating to non-specialists. Also in transliterating, I have chosen to follow Sanskrit orthography rather than Bengali pronunciation in order to make the translation accessible to the widest range of readers. Thus one finds the form vivaha rather than bibaho. While this does take away from the Bengali particularity of the text, it hopefully greatly expands its potential audience. In translating the text of Vidhava-vivaha for English readers, one of the challenges I faced was to preserve a sense for the structural form of the original, which might be compared to a layer cake. The body, or “cake,” of the text consists of Vidyasagar’s ongoing argument, which is composed in Bengali. Within this layer, he inserts several bits of “icing” in the form of Sanskrit passages that function as proof texts. These passages consist of selections from major canonical works of Hindu law such as Manu. Sometimes these Sanskrit passages themselves contain further bits of “icing” in the form of passages drawn from Sanskrit commentaries composed by figures like Madhavacharya. In the original work, these Sanskrit passages (root text and commentary) were also printed in the Bengali script. Immediately following these passages, Vidyasagar provides a translation or restatement in Bengali. Then he returns to his running argument. Happily, in this translation the continuous flow of

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English to render the Bengali argument, Sanskrit texts, and commentaries in some respects mirrors the appearance of continuity in the original text conveyed by the use of Bengali script throughout. I have, however, chosen to omit the numerous (and sometimes lengthy) Sanskrit passages themselves in an effort to reduce apparent redundancy and to make the work more user-friendly. In place of the Sanskrit passages, I have substituted a numbered rubric (not found in the original) and a brief textual reference (e.g., “Sanskrit passage 1.1: Yajnavalkya 1.4–5”). Immediately following this rubric is my translation of Vidyasagar’s translation or restatement of the original Sanskrit passage. This material is set in a smaller typeface to distinguish it from the body of Vidyasagar’s argument. When these Sanskrit passages include a portion of Sanskrit commentary, the commentary appears in italics. It is hoped that this treatment will not only help convey the layered nature of the text but also highlight Vidyasagar’s attempt to adduce scriptural proofs while addressing the views of important legal commentators. Readers should bear in mind that Vidyasagar occasionally cites the same Sanskrit passage in more than one place, while providing different Bengali renderings. In all cases I follow Vidyasagar’s Bengali. The two books of Vidhava-vivaha originally contained more than one hundred footnotes. While this is one index of how skillfully Vidyasagar employed the conventions of the modern printed book, I have chosen to eliminate the majority of these notes. In many cases, they offer only the most rudimentary textual citations (e.g., “From Udvahatattva”). Instead, textual citations are provided using the rubric just described. However, I have retained Vidyasagar’s footnotes whenever they provide essential information or elaborate on discussions related to the main argument. In this way, readers are given a complete translation of Vidhava-vivaha and can also appreciate the overall structure of the work. All endnotes are my own. Throughout, I refer to the two books of Vidhava-vivaha as if they were a single work, using for my title Hindu Widow Marriage. While the word “Hindu” does not appear in the original Bengali title, it should be noted that Vidyasagar adopted the term for the title of his own translation, Marriage of Hindu Widows. Elsewhere in that translation, he made similar changes, as when he inserted the word “Hindus” into the opening sentence of what had originally been Book One: “Many Hindus are now thoroughly convinced of the pernicious consequences arising from the practice of prohibiting the

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Marriage of widows” (Marriage of Hindu Widows, 1). Elsewhere in the same text, where he had originally spoken of the “people of India,” he also adopted the rubric “Hindus” (Marriage of Hindu Widows, 3). By contrast, readers of this translation will notice that the term “Hindu” originally appeared in only one location (see Topic 6 of Book Two, where it is used twice). Apart from “Hindu,” the other significant word in the title is “marriage.” Even though Vidyasagar is often credited with championing the “remarriage” of widows, I believe that he actually preferred the idiom “marriage” (as in the central concept, vidhava-vivaha). This may reflect his desire to avoid the stigma attached to “remarriage” and “remarried women” (see the discussion in Topic 3 of Book Two). According to local custom in Bengal, which Vidyasagar opposed in this instance, a woman’s first marriage marked her only true religious entitlement. Second marriages, and the sons produced thereby, were considered legally and socially problematic. For the success of his campaign, it would have been important to avoid such associations. We may assume this is why he typically spoke of “marriage” (vivaha), though he does occasionally use words like “remarriage” (e.g., punarbar-vivaha). For more on this, see the discussion of Sanskrit passage 1.6.

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HINDU CATEGORIES FOR FIRST-TIME READERS

Without a doubt, Hindu Widow Marriage poses certain challenges for newcomers to the Hindu tradition. While the basic goal of the work is immediately intelligible, it actually contains a variety of discrete arguments on selected topics of Hindu law, many of which can be somewhat dense and technical. Nevertheless, I would not have taken the trouble to translate this work if I did not think it could be read and appreciated without vast amounts of specialist training. Readers equipped with even a basic knowledge of the fundamental conceptual categories and social norms of the tradition will be able to appreciate both the argument and the significance of the work. One might even say that for those just beginning to learn about Hinduism, Hindu Widow Marriage provides an excellent illustration of one modern attempt to think about the world in light of normative Hindu ideals. It is as if Vidyasagar takes readers on a guided tour of the classical Hindu tradition, with widow marriage as his organizing theme. Even so, a bit of background will allow first-time readers to feel better prepared for that tour. Toward that end, I offer some brief comments on four broad conceptual categories that are important to keep in mind when reading Hindu Widow Marriage. Readers with some background in the Hindu tradition may wish to skip this section.

Sources of Authority Hindus revere the Vedas as revelation (shruti ). These texts represent the most sacred, transpersonal source of religious authority. However, the Vedas actually offer precious little by way of rules for social and ethical behavior. For this, Hindus look to a variety of sources, all of which are in play in Hindu Widow Marriage. Broadly, Vidyasagar’s appeal is to the authoritative treatises (shastra) on duty (dharma, a term that may be rendered as “law” or “religion”

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or “righteousness,” depending on context). Taken as a collective body of law, the dharmashastra, or authoritative treatises on duty, are often referred to as tradition (smriti ) in order to distinguish them from revelation. There are several major works of dharmashastra in the Sanskrit tradition, which as a whole offer something like the legal codes for orthodox Hinduism. The most important among these texts are the books ascribed to Manu, Yajnavalkya, Narada, and Parashara. Vidyasagar often refers to these individual works as samhita, meaning “collection” (e.g., Parashara Samhita). Hindu religious and social norms are also recorded in a variety of other texts. This includes the genre of purana, which are lengthy works of myth and legend, as well as itihasa, which are histories or epics such as the Mahabharata and Ramayana. Finally, there are numerous medieval digests (nibandha), or compendia of legal matters. For Bengalis, the digests on selected topics of law composed by the sixteenth-century digest writer Smarta Raghunandan Bhattacharya, oft cited in Hindu Widow Marriage, are of great importance (e.g., Udvahatattva, dealing with marriage). Beyond these written texts, there stands the authority of custom (achara). In lieu of clear injunctions in the Vedic or the smriti texts, the custom of learned men is understood to provide a third canon for behavior. In the case of the ban on widow marriage, it is in fact custom that represented the real obstacle to change, since in Bengal those occupying the highest rank in Hindu society did not allow the custom of widow marriage. Vidyasagar knew this all too well, but he was also convinced that it could be shown that the authoritative treatises on duty allowed for widow marriage in certain circumstances. Since the authoritative treatises on duty are supposed to represent a higher authority than custom, he argued that existing custom should be overruled. As he saw it, custom should be no bar to reform where proper authority could be found in the dharmashastra and other texts of smriti.

Hindu Society Rightly or wrongly, for many people, Hinduism is synonymous with the “caste system.” Setting aside for now the purported equation of Hinduism with caste, we need at the very least to be more precise in our basic terminology. When thinking about Hindu law and the so-called caste system,

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we must recognize that the authoritative treatises present what is in fact an ideal template for society rather than an empirical description. Within this ideal template, the operative concept is not in fact “caste,” but “class” (varna). The classes of the authoritative treatises are the four ideal hierarchical strata of Hindu society: the ritually superior Brahman, the politically powerful Kshatriya, the economically central Vaishya, and the lowest class, assigned to serve these three higher “twiceborn” classes, the Shudra. These four are sometimes rendered conveniently as Priest, King, Commoner, and Serf, respectively. However, even the authoritative treatises recognize that society is in fact much more complex than this ideal template would lead us to believe. A second concept is thus introduced—that of “caste” ( jati, which indicates something like a birth group). The precise relationship among the four classes and the various birth groups is a complicated issue, as is the matter of understanding class and caste as practiced throughout South Asia. Thankfully, readers of Hindu Widow Marriage will discover that the subtleties of class / caste are in fact not vitally important. Nevertheless, the fundamental dynamics of social hierarchy and ritual prerogative, not to mention the constant potential for social ostracism, all very much come into play in the text. What is more, the systemic conservatism of the class / caste social structure must be borne in mind when considering the very limited success achieved by the widow marriage movement. To appreciate the issues treated in Topics 10 and 11 of Book Two, for instance, it may help to know that along with class the other great organizing scheme for twiceborn Hindu society is that of “stage of life” (ashrama). These stages are, once again, four in number and arranged in a linear order. They are taken to mark the ideal life-trajectory of any “twiceborn” Hindu male (that is, any male member of the top three classes, Shudras being ritually excluded by definition). According to this scheme, a twiceborn male’s ritual life properly begins when he is initiated into the life of the Vedic student. After completing the requisite period of study, he proceeds to the life of the householder. Having raised sons of his own and seen the birth of grandsons, he becomes eligible to enter the final two stages, which are dedicated more intensively to religious pursuits: the stage of forest-dweller and solitary renouncer. Taken along with varna, the ideal of ashrama frames a collective vision of duty known as varnashrama-dharma, the “duties of class and stage of life.” For many Hindus, varnashrama-dharma is a distinguishing marker of the tradi-

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tion, an essential code that is often described as sanatana, or “eternal.” Likewise, this eternal set of duties is understood by many to be synonymous with what we routinely call Hinduism. The rubric of varnashrama-dharma and the notion of an eternal Hindu moral vision have both proved to be central for colonial and postcolonial attempts to define and defend Hinduism. In this respect, one of the fringe benefits of reading Hindu Widow Marriage is that in attending to Vidyasagar’s debates with his opponents, we are taken to the heart of modern contests over the meaning of this “eternal” Hinduism.

Marriage and Sons Marriage (vivaha) is obviously the duty at the very center of this work. It would be too difficult in this context to summarize Hindu views of marriage. Suffice it to say that marriage is considered a life cycle “rite” (samskara) of central importance. Technically, marriage is known as the “gift of a virgin” (kanya-dana). This is a crucial concept to bear in mind while reading Hindu Widow Marriage. The rite of giving (dana) a virgin (kanya) to an eligible male marks the commencement of the stage of householder existence. According to Manu, the householder is the most important ashrama, for without a wife a male Hindu householder cannot perform his requisite duties, from producing male offspring, to worshipping the gods, to attending to his ancestors. Of these many duties, the production of a son is considered essential because it is the son who guarantees the continuity of the family line. It is the son who will light the father’s funeral pyre. In so doing, he both advances the latter’s spiritual progress beyond this world and also helps to carry on the duties of the lineage in this world. The centrality of this issue within the argument of Hindu Widow Marriage will become immediately apparent to readers. Indeed, the precarious nature of marriage and procreation means that great pains must be taken to address possible impediments to the fulfilling of the householder’s duty. For instance, the authoritative treatises on duty recognize that it is sometimes the case that a husband is unable to sire sons. It may be that he has gone mad, become impotent, or abandoned his home to become a renouncer. Alternatively, sometimes wives are barren. How, then, does the householder gain a son? The authoritative treatises take pains to address such matters,

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considering every conceivable scenario and issuing injunctions (vidhi ) and prohibitions (nishedha) on what should and should not happen. It turns out that sons can be acquired in a variety of ways. Adoption is the most obvious alternative, but questions and controversies nevertheless arise: What sorts of adoption are permissible? Under what circumstances? And what status will an adopted son have when it comes to issues of inheritance? This last issue is one on which the lawmakers and the digest writers generated a great deal of debate and legislation (for a collection of texts on the issue of inheritance alone, see A Complete Collection of Hindu Law Books on Inheritance, translated into English by S. S. Setlur). Property matters and how property is bequeathed can, of course, be a contentious issue. This was true in premodern India, as the classical lawbooks and medieval digests clearly attest. Under British rule, matters of property and inheritance took on new and further implications as the lawbooks were yoked to the imperatives of an emergent colonial state and capitalist economy. Readers should therefore bear in mind that behind the heated debates over widow marriage stands the thorny issue of property rights. While Hindu Widow Marriage played a crucial role in garnering support for passage of Act XV of 1856, when it came to the matter of property rights the act proved to be something of a mixed blessing. Widows were granted the right to marry, but any widow who chose to marry forfeited whatever right she might otherwise have had to her first husband’s property. As a variety of subsequent acts issued during the twentieth century indicate, there was much that needed rectifying about the handling of marriage, succession, and inheritance in the original Act XV (for a list of these subsequent acts, see the chronology). For many present-day reformers, the goal of achieving full and equal rights for Hindu women has yet to be achieved. To pursue this topic here would take us far beyond the text of Hindu Widow Marriage, but the bibliography lists a sampling of works that can help orient readers in this area.

The Levirate and the Four Eons Besides adoption, the authoritative treatises also envision solving the problem of “issue” by what is known in the biblical traditions as the levirate (niyoga). According to the dharmashastra, if a husband was unable to produce a son—

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whether from impotence, death, madness, or some persistent ailment—his brother could be enjoined to perform the necessary act. Obviously, this was viewed as a sensitive issue, both socially and morally. Recourse to such a tactic would call for great ritual care and enormous restraint. The treatises specify just how and when such niyoga can be performed. Even so, it is generally recognized that this particular strategy is fraught with danger; it could prove destructive both to the marriage bond and to the larger fabric of Hindu society. To address the tension between the ideal of niyoga and the dangerous reality, the authoritative treatises invoke a pervasive Hindu system of cosmology and time reckoning. According to Hindu cosmology, the universe comes into being and dissolves back into primordial chaos on a cyclical basis, a process that spans what are to mere mortals nigh immeasurable spans of time. Within any cycle of creation, the human social, moral, and religious universe declines progressively. The authoritative treatises and other texts picture a primordial mythical eon ( yuga) in which humans live far longer than in subsequent eons; in this primordial eon they are wiser, more moral, and more spontaneously given to religious activity. This is the Age of Truth, or Satya Yuga, and during this cosmic eon humans can be expected to carry out extensive religious and ritual ceremonies; they also can be held to the highest moral standards without fear of failure. But from here, things inevitably go downhill, declining through three succeeding eons: the Dvapara, Treta, and Kali yugas. The fourth of the eons, the Kali Yuga, is the darkest and most degenerate. During the Kali Yuga, the human life span is short and the baser passions run amok; there is very little hope for strenuous religious and moral exertion. If a religious practitioner during the Satya Yuga could be expected to live a life of great sacrifice, austerity, and personal renunciation, during the Kali Yuga such a person can scarcely be expected to do more than make the most basic religious gifts (for a rather nice overview of the idea of the decline of religious duty across the yugas, see Topic 12 of Book Two). Needless to say, we are currently thought to be living in the Kali Yuga. This summary should provide enough context to make sense of what the lawmakers think of the levirate as an option for the Kali Yuga. Clearly, the men of this degenerate eon cannot be expected to responsibly assume the moral challenge of sleeping with their brothers’ wives for the purpose of producing offspring. For this reason, niyoga is considered one of the so-called kalivarjya rites—those rites that must be shunned during the Kali Yuga. As readers will

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see, there are also other such rites and actions that should be shunned in the Kali Yuga. This is a special eon that calls for special rules. All of this brings us, finally, to the theme of widow marriage (vidhavavivaha). It is Vidyasagar’s argument that of all the lawbooks, it is the authoritative treatise composed by Parashara that contains the specific norms and guidelines for life during the Kali Yuga. As such, if we are looking for rules to guide us in the possible reform of Hindu marriage practices during the present eon, we should look to Parashara first, and not Manu or the other lawmakers. In verse 4.28, Parashara appears to provide an explicit injunction that would sanction the marriage of widowed women (as well as women who find themselves in four other dire circumstances). As readers will discover, however, questions immediately arise: How are we to understand the meaning of Parashara 4.28? What is its relationship to the rules and injunctions found in the other authoritative treatises? Is this really a rule for the Kali Yuga, or is it intended for other yugas? How can we know? And finally, even if Parashara has enjoined this, what are we to make of the fact that people in nineteenth-century Bengal did not follow this practice as a matter of local custom (deshachara)? That is, how are we to resolve a tension between scriptural injunction and community practice?

Suggested Readings Readers wishing to put more flesh on these issues might wish to consult a translation of Manu, which is the lawbook most translated and discussed in the modern era. An accessible translation is Wendy Doniger and Brian K. Smith, The Laws of Manu. I would particularly recommend chapter 3, on marriage and the householder’s life; chapter 9, on women and types of sons; and chapter 10, on types of castes and the problem of the outcast (another theme running throughout Hindu Widow Marriage). For a useful discussion of selected topics in the interpretation of Sanskrit legal literature, see Ganganath Jha, Studies in Hindu Law. For one of the most insightful discussions of the widow marriage movement in relation to the systemic constraints of caste society and gender norms in modern India, I recommend Sekhar Bandyopadhyay’s essay “Caste and Social Reform: The Case of Widow Marriage,” in his Caste, Culture, and Hegemony: Social Domination in Colonial Bengal. A broad discussion of Hindu

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law and the colonial state can be found in Rajeev Dhavan, “Dharmasastra and Modern Indian Society: A Preliminary Exploration.” A readable anthropological discussion of women and marriage practices in Bengal can be found in Lina Fruzzetti, The Gift of a Virgin: Women, Marriage, and Ritual in Bengali Society. For a single book that helps put Hindu Widow Marriage in its broader context, consult Sumit Sarkar and Tanika Sarkar, eds., Women and Social Reform in Modern India: A Reader.

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CHRONOLOGY Events Pertaining to the Widow Marriage Movement in Bengal

1757 1772 1820 1828 1829 1830 1833 1835 1837 1845 1850

1855 1856 1857 1858 1870 1872 1891 1937 1955 1956

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Raja Rajvallabh of Vikrampur seeks approval for widow marriage Birth of Rammohun Roy Warren Hastings issues his Plan for the Administration of Justice Birth of Ishvarchandra Vidyasagar (September 26) William Bentinck becomes governor-general Regulation XVII abolishing practice of suttee (December 4) Establishment of Dharma Sabha to contest the abolition of suttee Death of Rammohan Roy in England William Bentinck returns to England Indian Law Commission addresses question of widow marriage British Indian Society seeks opinions on widow marriage Establishment of Sarvashubhakari Sabha Vidyasagar publishes “Evils of Child Marriage” in Sarvashubhakari Patrika Vidyasagar publishes Book One of Hindu Widow Marriage ( January) Vidyasagar publishes Book Two of Hindu Widow Marriage (October) Act XV, The Hindu Widow’s Remarriage Act ( July 25) Indian Rebellion Vidyasagar resigns from government service Vidyasagar publishes his first tract in opposition to high-caste polygamy Act III, Native Marriage Act or Brahmo Marriage Act (March 19) Age of Consent Bill (passed March 19) Death of Vidyasagar ( July 29) Act XVIII, Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act Act XXV, Hindu Marriage Act Act XXX, Hindu Succession Act

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Hindu Widow Marriage

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He called it “the single greatest good deed” of his lifetime—his role in promoting the passage of Act XV of 1856, which granted Hindu widows the legal right to marry.1 It was an accomplishment for which he would be both lionized and vilified. Among supporters of Ishvarchandra Vidyasagar, the question was not whether the reform was valid or appropriate; this much was clear. Rather, the more interesting question was what explained his extraordinary commitment to the cause. Many viewed it as a manifestation of his boundless compassion, while others reckoned that it stemmed from his prodigious wisdom as a Sanskrit scholar. Still others, like the poet Michael Madhusudan Dutt, saw both the compassion and the wisdom working in tandem with the robust “energy of an Englishman.”2 Among Vidyasagar’s detractors, the verdict was perhaps more clear and decisive. He was thought by many to be too newfangled; in their view, his exposure to Western learning and institutions had caused him to lose touch with his Hindu values, if not to renounce them outright. In the passage of Act XV some Hindus saw an ominous sign of the kinds of evil that were sure to flow from the introduction of Christian values and Western learning in India. But this perception was not limited to Hindus alone. When Indian soldiers in the army of the East India Company rebelled against their British officers, triggering the so-called Mutiny of 1857, there were those among the British who viewed the uprising as the inevitable outcome of having too aggressively promoted the reform of Indian society and customs.3 In our own day, estimates of the nature and significance of Vidyasagar’s reform campaign remain equally conflicted. Was Vidyasagar truly an emancipator of women or merely a reconstituted voice for patriarchal Brahmanical values? Was he perhaps just one particularly savvy elite male Hindu who chose to take up the plight of the widow as a pretext for exercising power in the colonial context? Furthermore, did the passage of Act XV really achieve

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2 Introduction

the goal of transforming attitudes toward women, marriage, and Hindu custom? If it did, why does widow marriage remain even today a relatively rare event among high-caste Hindus? If it did not, what was it about the genesis and expression of the new law that undercut its intended purpose? Does the rather qualified success of this particular legislative reform reveal something profound about the limits of reformist initiatives in early colonial India? Finally, to what degree did Vidyasagar actually believe in the texts he called upon to support widow marriage? These and other questions remain very much in play even today, as scholars return again and again to ponder the career of Vidyasagar, the history of the widow marriage campaign, and the significance of Act XV. We shall take up such questions in due course. For now, one thing remains certain. Vidyasagar’s Hindu Widow Marriage amounts to the most important single document shaping the outcome of the widow marriage campaign. However one views Hindu Widow Marriage, there can be no denying its status as an epochal work in the history of modern India. Its role in igniting contentious debate over the issue of widow marriage, in galvanizing public support for the reform, and in shaping official government policy can scarcely be questioned. Likewise, the very text of Hindu Widow Marriage constitutes an impressive monument to the application of traditional Sanskrit learning within the field of progressive social reform. Whether or not one agrees with Vidyasagar’s overall argument or endorses his particular interpretation of Hindu legal literature, it remains the case that his wide-ranging, critical review of brahmanical sources on the issue of widow marriage is a tour de force of modern Sanskrit exegesis and commentary. At the same time, the stirring appeal that forms the conclusion to Book Two (an expansion of the original appeal found at the end of Book One) must rank as a classic of modern Hindu reformist rhetoric.4 The one thing, then, that must strike us as odd—given the epochal and controversial nature of the reform and the undoubted stature of the man at the vortex of the issue—is that this work has never before been presented to English-language readers in its entirety. True, Vidyasagar did publish his own English version in 1856 under the title Marriage of Hindu Widows. However, the quality of the translation is poor, bearing the hallmarks of a non-native speaker adopting the archaic “legalese” of the colonial courts. More important, his English version is really not a translation in the strictest sense, nor is it complete. Vidyasagar omitted a great deal of material from the original two Bengali books and reframed certain more technical issues for his English-

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3 Introduction table 1

Vidyasagar’s Principal Published Works on Widow Marriage

1855

The essay “Vidhava-vivaha” appears in the journal Tattvabodhini Patrika ( January) Vidhava-vivaha, Book One ( January) Vidhava-vivaha, Book Two (October) Selections from Vidhava-vivaha, Book Two, appear in the journal Tattvabodhini Patrika ( November) Vidyasagar’s partial English translation, Marriage of Hindu Widows Vidhava-vivaha, 2nd ed. (Books One and Two) Vidhava-vivaha, 3rd ed. (Books One and Two) Vidhava-vivaha, 4th ed. (Books One and Two), the edition reprinted in most collections of Vidyasagar’s works Vraja-vilasa, a pseudonymous tract attacking Vrajnath Vidyaratna of Nadia Vinaya-patrika, a pseudonymous tract addressing the Hindu Dharma Rakshini Sabha of Jessore ( Yashohara) Ratna-pariksha, a pseudonymous tract attacking Bhuvanmohan Vidyaratna, Prasannacandra Nyayaratna, and Madhusudan Smritiratna*

1856 1857 1862 1872 1884 1886

*See Madhusudan Smritiratna, Vidhava-vivaha prativada.

reading audience.5 While he does not say so, his decision to truncate the original work may reflect a concern that scriptural exegesis would mean little to non-Hindu readers. It may also simply reflect the fact that he prepared the English version in great haste during the heat of the controversy. And while the publication of his English-language version coincided with passage of Act XV in 1856, this did not mark the end of his engagement with the issue. He continued to revise the Bengali text of Hindu Widow Marriage over the coming decades and was still vigorously debating his opponents as late as the 1880s (for an overview of his publications on widow marriage, see table 1). This only makes it all the more remarkable that no one has yet paused to give the original Bengali books the kind of careful scrutiny they so clearly merit. The present translation aims to redress this oversight by translating the work in its entirety and providing additional critical notes.

A Short Life of Ishvarchandra Vidyasagar Ishvarchandra Bandyopadhyay was the oldest son born to a Brahman family of limited means in rural Bengal on September 26, 1820. His family boasted a lineage of Sanskrit scholars, or pandits (from the Sanskrit pandita, “learned, wise”), going back several generations. However, the family suffered severely

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4 Introduction

from widespread socioeconomic disruptions and rural impoverishment associated with the advent of British rule in Bengal. Ishvarchandra’s own father had to forgo training to become a pandit in order to find work to support his family. In retrospect, his decision to seek employment in the growing metropolis of Calcutta (now Kolkata) was a momentous decision for the history of India. Shortly thereafter, he brought his firstborn son to the city for an education. So began Vidyasagar’s lifelong association with the one city that represented the epicenter of change in early colonial India.6 At the age of eight, Ishvarchandra was enrolled in the Calcutta Government Sanskrit College. The British had only recently established the college, in the hope both of preserving India’s traditional Sanskrit heritage and of training a new cadre of judge-pandits who could assist them in the task of administering Hindu law in the British courts. Ishvarchandra ended up studying at the Sanskrit College for twelve years, completing his education there in 1840. He was by all accounts much loved by his teachers and admired for his quick intellect. He won numerous prizes in philosophy, poetry, and Sanskrit composition. Upon completion of his studies, he was awarded the honorary title of Vidyasagar, meaning “ocean of learning.”7 Although the title is far from uncommon for a pandit, it would not be long before the name Vidyasagar would call to mind but one man. At this point, the young Vidyasagar could have accepted an official position in the British courts as a so-called judge-pandit. However, this was not to be his path. Instead, his first salaried position was as head writer (seristadar) at the College of Fort William, an institution established in 1800 for the training of East India Company civil servants. Here he distinguished himself through his obvious command of Sanskrit, Bengali, and English. Within a short time, he was invited by colonial administrators at the college to compose texts for use in teaching Bengali. Beyond earning high praise for the schoolbooks he created (and for which he remains famous to this day), he also began to garner attention for his administrative abilities. In 1851 he was appointed by the Council of Education to fill the newly created post of principal at the Sanskrit College. This was no small achievement, considering that colonial institutions were at this time typically supervised almost exclusively by Europeans. While serving in this role, Vidyasagar outlined and oversaw the implementation of a comprehensive scheme of curricular reforms. Through these, he aimed to transform the Sanskrit College into a first-rate academy of Sanskrit learning and a center for training future

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5 Introduction

educators who would then be sent forth to staff a host of newly created Bengali schools (in the creation of which Vidyasagar also had an active hand). Although a Sanskrit pandit by heritage and training, he betrayed little of the resistance to innovation that is often associated with pandits. He was in fact rather aggressive in his attempt to find ways to mediate Western learning through the indigenous idioms of Sanskrit and Bengali. He made it his special mission to demonstrate that the emerging Bengali prose of his era could be harnessed to the demands of colonial education, literature, and social change. As I have written elsewhere, in Vidyasagar we have an example of the dynamic convergence of European and Sanskritic intellectual traditions “within the local, vernacular context of colonial Bengal.”8 During his tenure as principal of the Sanskrit College, Vidyasagar took on a variety of other official assignments. As assistant inspector of schools for South Bengal, he worked energetically to promote the spread of vernacular education. Possessing a shrewd head for business, he used his official position to promote the widespread adoption of a range of schoolbooks and primers that he composed and published independently. Central to this plan were elementary primers like Varnaparichay (Introduction to the Alphabet) and Bodhoday (The Dawn of Knowledge), as well as his retellings of epic themes from Sanskrit such as Shakuntala (a retelling of the great drama of Kalidasa) and Sitar Vanavas (based on the story of Sita’s abduction as told by Bhavabhuti). Works like these also helped cement his reputation not simply as a leading Bengali prose stylist but also as a central figure in Calcutta’s elite Hindu society. His commitment to education and social change soon brought him into contact with other leading lights in the area of social and religious reform, men like Debendranath Tagore and Akshaykumar Datta. Vidyasagar joined both men for a time in promoting the goals of a reformist association known as the Tattvabodhini Sabha.9 For over a decade, Vidyasagar worked actively in the Sabha, especially in connection with its influential journal, Tattvabodhini Patrika (first published in 1843). It was in the pages of the Patrika that he first published a short essay in support of widow marriage. This was in January 1855. The essay earned Vidyasagar instant notoriety. Here was one of Bengal’s most widely known Sanskrit intellectuals mustering the resources of the authoritative treatises of Hindu law to demonstrate that widow marriage conformed to the dictates of sacred duty (dharma). Many of his fellow pandits were shocked. And they no doubt realized that when Vidyasagar’s accomplishments as a Sanskrit scholar

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6 Introduction

were coupled with his enormous literary and rhetorical skills, the task of opposing him would prove difficult. Nonetheless, as we shall see, many would try. Numerous books and pamphlets were composed in opposition to Vidyasagar’s proposal. However, it is safe to say that none ever rose to the same level of social vision or demonstrated the same meticulous scholarship. And it goes without saying that none could match Vidyasagar’s humanitarian empathy.10 Not for nothing did his admirers liken this “ocean of learning” (vidya-sagara) to an “ocean of mercy” (karuna-sagara). Vidyasagar’s January 1855 essay was almost instantly republished in book form. A second, much longer version followed that fall. Before the year was out, the two books of Hindu Widow Marriage were at the center of a mighty controversy, with Vidyasagar’s name invoked far and wide. Many of the leading lights among Calcutta’s Hindu nouveaux riches, jealous to guard their newfound social prestige, joined the opposition and recruited pandits eager to challenge Vidyasagar’s claims. The palatial homes of such patrons became the setting for formal debates over the technical and legal issues at stake.11 For his part, Vidyasagar knew all too well that he was fighting an uphill battle. High-caste custom in Bengal clearly dictated that a widow should spend her remaining days in a life of constant celibacy and near-constant austerity. In Bengal at this time, high-caste Hindus practiced polygamy. It was quite common for elderly men to take several young wives, since a particularly eligible Brahman groom—no matter his age—was thought to bring distinction to a bride’s family. Child widowhood was correspondingly common. However, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the combined forces of English education, Christian missionary polemics, government intervention, and Hindu reform had converged to foster an environment in which the plight of the child widow garnered considerable public attention. As we shall see, Vidyasagar was not the first to promote widow marriage in the modern period. By mid-century, both the British government and many of Vidyasagar’s English-educated contemporaries had come to believe that the prevailing custom was no longer tenable. We notice, for instance, that in the wake of Vidyasagar’s initial proposal, several local periodicals carried announcements from private citizens offering prizes to the first man who accepted a widow as his bride.12 Vidyasagar’s name was soon being invoked in popular slogans and poetry; some weavers in the districts around Calcutta even began to produce decorative sarees that featured the benediction “Long live Vidyasagar!” wo-

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7 Introduction

ven along their borders. No matter one’s position on the issue, there could be no doubting who stood at the center of the controversy. Success came to the reformers on July 26, 1856, when Hindu widow marriage was officially sanctioned by the passage of Act XV.13 The first marriage, organized by Vidyasagar and his colleague Madanmohan Tarkalankar, followed in short order.14 According to the Hindoo Patriot, a crowd of nearly eight hundred people turned out for the celebration, which was held on December 7, 1856, in the presence of numerous pandits who supported the change. Jubilantly, the paper went on to proclaim: The last argument of the oppositionists namely, that the law lately passed was unnecessary and would remain inoperative is crushed beneath the weight of facts. It remains now for the country to accept this change with a cordial acknowledgment of its benefits, and for the hypocritical heads of families to cease wailing fancied dangers to which they aver Hindooism is freshly exposed, and turn their anxiety towards the interests of genuine social morality.15

While there were to be several more of these marriages (including one involving Vidyasagar’s only son, Narayan), it also soon became evident that colonial legislation was going to be powerless to transform the deep-seated customs of high-caste Hindus.16 Once the excitement of the campaign began to wane, it became clear that marriage practices in Bengal would remain largely unchanged. In hindsight we see all too well that the mere passage of a law could do little to overcome the powerful forces of social disapproval and the sense of stigma associated with widow marriage. Even so, it is fair to say that passage of Act XV marked the high point of colonial Hindu reform. As Charles Heimsath noted, “The crusade for the emancipation of Indian women became the first tenet of the social reform movement everywhere in India.”17 Meanwhile Vidyasagar continued to labor on other fronts, working tirelessly for the government throughout the 1850s. Talk of change was everywhere. Going into the decade, the government had affirmed its basic policy of benevolent social reform. It had even begun to explore more aggressive ways to provide increased access to education. In both areas, Vidyasagar played a leadership role, mediating between official policy and local opinion. As with

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8 Introduction

the widow marriage campaign, he was lionized and vilified in equal parts. His name became synonymous with reform, whether one supported change or not. Then, in 1857, rebellion struck. Much of northern India was wracked by bloody expressions of discontent and anger, occasioned at least in part by the widespread transformation of Indian society and economy under the British. While the precise causes of the so-called Indian Mutiny were complex, and while the revolt took different forms in different regions from Bengal to Delhi, the brute fact of such violent dissent served to radically alter British and Indian attitudes toward liberal, reform-based policy.18 Once order was restored across northern India late in 1858—often achieved through acts of ruthless retaliation—official policy began to change. The government curtailed its high-minded efforts to promote the transformation of Indian society. Simultaneously, there was a chastening of native opinion regarding the fundamental intentions of the British in India. In November 1858, governing power was transferred from the East India Company to the British Crown, setting the stage for the advent of a full-blown imperial Raj— a period of direct rule predicated on racialized notions of difference between Britons and Indians.19 It was at this very moment, late in 1858, that Vidyasagar announced his intention to resign from government service. While the precise reasons for his decision will likely never be known, in his official letter of resignation he cited exhaustion and increasing disappointment with government policy. He was only thirty-eight years old. His career was far from over. Over the next three decades, he carried on his efforts to improve literature, education, and social life in Bengal. He continued to actively promote both Sanskrit and Bengali language and literature. He edited and commented on major Sanskrit classics, translated Shakespeare into Bengali, and continued to write schoolbooks, primers, and readers. Drawing on his earnings from publishing, he engaged in philanthropy, supporting a range of charities large and small; he was ever willing to assist desperate widows or to bail out struggling poets like Michael Madhusudan Dutt. Throughout all this, his commitment to education remained strong. He was deeply involved in the creation and administration of the Metropolitan Institution, a college in northern Calcutta that lives on today as Vidyasagar College. In the 1870s, Vidyasagar embarked on another battle for social reform, this time challenging the custom of high-caste Hindu polygamy. It was the

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natural corollary to his earlier battle against the ban on widow marriage, and it was to prove equally hard fought. As we have already seen, the practice of polygamy was a direct factor contributing to the problem of child widowhood. Vidyasagar approached the issue in the same way he had conducted his earlier campaign, combing the Hindu scriptures for proof that polygamy was not sanctioned by the authoritative treatises. He produced another pair of densely argued works of scriptural interpretation, imbued with the same spirit of rational argument, textual mastery, and humanitarian zeal as his earlier books on widow marriage. And once again, he found himself engaged in acrimonious battles with a wide range of pandits from across Bengal, some of whom had actually supported his earlier work on behalf of Hindu widows. While his strategy remained congruent with that of the widow marriage campaign, the times had changed. Not only had the tremors of the Mutiny of 1857 dampened British support for reform, but Indians were no longer eager to turn to an alien government for help with their social problems. Instead of drafting appeals for official legislation, Bengali intellectuals began to write novels, poetry, and social criticism predicated on the quest for selfrespect and cultural preservation. The period beginning in the 1870s and running into the early twentieth century is thus widely associated with a kind of cultural and political sea change in which idioms of revival and regeneration begin to displace those of reform. In this new era, the antiquity and spiritual integrity of the Hindu tradition were evoked as a bulwark against the onslaught of foreign rule. Such developments were to fuel the eventual emergence of Indian nationalist sentiment.20 In this new context, there was little hope of appealing to the British in support of an overhaul of a practice such as polygamy, which was so intimately associated with Hindu social life in Bengal. Even if Indian intellectuals might well acknowledge the rational arguments against the custom, the zeitgeist called for cultural preservation. As a result, the anti-polygamy campaign ended in failure. Defeat came hard for Vidyasagar. He grew increasingly disenchanted with his contemporaries, whether they were English-educated elites or traditionally trained Sanskrit pandits. Around this time, he began to withdraw from Calcutta society, seeking occasional respite in the remote reaches of the Santhal Parganas, a region in western Bengal peripheral to both brahmanical Hindu culture and colonial society. It would have been an odd place to look for either a Sanskrit pandit or an urban social reformer,

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which must surely have been an overriding factor in his decision to build himself a cottage there. In time, he struck up a close relationship with the largely non-Hindu tribal population. All the same, he never gave up on Calcutta. Nor did the city give up on him. His reformist zeal and stubborn personal convictions may have earned the ire of orthodox Hindus, but those same qualities also won him countless admirers. Numerous young men were inspired by Vidyasagar’s combination of traditional scholarship, enlightened individualism, and openhanded philanthropy. With or without his consent, he became something of a guru figure to a new generation of Bengali intellectuals. Many were those who paid the aging reformer a visit at his handsome residence in northern Calcutta. Such visitors included the politician Surendranath Banerjee, the young poet Rabindranath Tagore, the mystic Sri Ramakrishna, and the latter’s favorite disciple, Narendranath Datta, who would go on to win worldwide recognition as Swami Vivekananda.21 Later in life, Vivekananda paid singular homage to Vidyasagar by announcing, “There is not a man of my age in Northern India, on whom his shadow has not fallen!”22 When Vidyasagar died on July 29, 1891, few doubted that Bengal had lost one of its greatest public figures.23 Nonetheless, the complexities of the man remained all too evident, just as they do today. Here was one of the moral leaders of Bengal’s so-called Renaissance, a man who seemed to have singlehandedly shaped everything from Bengali literature and publishing to official policy on any number of issues, whether it be Hindu law or vernacular education or university curricula. Yet here, too, was a Brahman intellectual who had made use of his ritual prerogatives and deep learning not merely as a bully pulpit for attacking other Hindus but also as a resource for advocating social, moral, and intellectual change. Beginning with his earliest biographers, and continuing into present-day scholarship, commentators struggle to capture the essence of a man who at any one moment appears both traditional and modern, orthodox and iconoclastic, compassionate and cantankerous.

Widow Marriage in Bengal Social reform in nineteenth-century Bengal had as its focal point the plight of the Indian woman. From debates over the abolition of widow immolation at the beginning of the nineteenth century to the heated controversy

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over the Age of Consent Bill in 1890 / 1891, the Indian woman stood at the center of British and Indian attempts to “improve” society. Or, as Ruby Lal has recently pointed out, we might better speak of the “girl-child / woman.”24 She reminds us that the extensive literature on women and reform in colonial India is positively preoccupied with “child-wives,” “child-brides,” and “infant marriages.”25 Images of the Indian girl-child / woman as victim are rife: she is a victim of infanticide, married as a mere baby, condemned to concremation, widowed as a young child, forbidden to remarry, and thereby tempted into a life of prostitution and adultery. One has to wonder at this endless (not to say lurid) fascination with the vulnerability of the female victim. As contemporary postcolonial scholarship has shown, one of the ways the British sought to distinguish themselves from Indians (especially after 1857) was by promoting a discourse of gendered difference. The British prided themselves on their “masculinity.” By contrast, they feminized India as a geopolitical space fit for colonial domination, typecast the Bengali male as weak and effeminate, and evinced paternalistic concern for the redemption of the helpless Indian woman.26 It is imperative to keep this background in view when discussing the history of social reform in early colonial India. That history typically commences with Rammohan Roy’s oft-eulogized efforts to eradicate the custom of widow immolation, or suttee (from the Sanskrit, sati ).27 In 1818 Rammohan began actively arguing for abolition of the custom, even though it appeared to be sanctioned by the authoritative treatises on Hindu duty. In a foreshadowing of Vidyasagar’s campaign, his appeal was grounded both in rational argumentation and in the interpretation of Hindu religious texts. As he states in the conclusion of his first published tract against the practice: “By forsaking prejudice and reflecting on the Sastra, what is really conformable to its precepts may be perceived, and the evils and disgrace brought on this country by the crime of female murder will cease.”28 The genesis and expression of Rammohan’s views are endlessly fascinating. He has recently been described as “India’s first ‘public man’”—an advocate of constitutional liberalism for India, who promoted a system in which India would join actively with a reformed British Parliament to safeguard the interests of the Indian people against the otherwise despotic rule of the East India Company.29 He was raised in a “Brahmin Mughal service family”; was trained in Arabic, Persian, and Sanskrit literature; and displayed a keen awareness of current events around the globe.30 He could boast interlocutors among

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12 Introduction

Hindu elites, Unitarians, British administrators, and evangelical Christians. And he shared with all these groups the desire to “improve” India. Utilitarian philosophy as promoted by Jeremy Bentham (himself aware of Rammohan’s work) was at the time making its impact in official circles among British administrators, who often supported the rational quest for social change, especially in the face of what they would have called “native obscurantism.” When it came to the eradication of suttee, Rammohan’s cause was greatly benefited by the arrival in 1828 of Governor-General William Bentinck. Bentinck presided over the heyday of liberal-minded reform, a time when the British went from being “merely a company of plundering merchants” to becoming actively involved in shaping (or reshaping) some of “the most sacred areas” of Indian life.31 In Bentinck, Rammohan found a powerful ally. In November 1829, Bentinck provoked the wrath of orthodox Hindus by announcing passage of Regulation XVII, which outlawed the practice of suttee.32 Thus while there appears to be something utterly sui generis about Rammohan and his pioneering reform, we do well to remember the larger colonial context. As Thomas Metcalf has argued, “the dramatic representation” of a social evil like widow immolation “was essential to the self-image of the [British] Raj.”33 Central to colonial ideology was a tone of benevolent paternalism, which construed the Indian as passive, weak, or effeminate. What the British offered, of course, was the strong hand of a wise and compassionate ruler. What better proof of British civility and moral superiority could there be than their manifest concern to improve the lot of India’s women, the very weakest of an already weak people? This is precisely the mind-set that caused Bentinck to be memorialized among liberal Britons for his singular accomplishment in eradicating the stain of suttee. From this vantage point, the agency and the glory belong to Bentinck. From the later vantage point of Indian nationalist discourse, the story would be told with a somewhat different emphasis. In the narratives framed by Indian writers commencing in the closing decades of the nineteenth century, Rammohan Roy came to acquire a position far more exalted than Bentinck had in Britain. We must recall that by this point Indian opinion had shifted markedly away from the quest for government-assisted reform toward the preservation of Indian culture integrity. It is in this ideological context that Rammohan began to emerge as the very “Father of Modern India.” What was foregrounded was his ability to work with the intellectual resources of the Hindu tradition to initiate change, rather than the coincidence of his interests

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and those of the colonial administration. In other words, Rammohan came to be invoked during this period as a kind of cultural progenitor, the first man not only to promote reform but to inspire the overall regeneration of India. Rammohan’s image and legacy as liberal reformer must therefore be viewed in a double aspect. First, we must bear in mind the fact that his anti-suttee campaign was itself deeply enmeshed in the larger field of British colonial discourse. This reminds us that we must understand this reform and others in relation to the ideology of colonial rule. Second, we must recall that notwithstanding the complex genesis of his attitudes, Rammohan would become in due course an important cultural emblem representing the possibility for Indian-led reform. This process began almost immediately after his death in England in 1833, well before his full-blown apotheosis in the later nationalist imaginary. As such the image of Rammohan as spirited Hindu reformer was already able to work as a powerful model for subsequent reformers like Vidyasagar. For Vidyasagar, it would seem, Rammohan served as a reminder of the ongoing need to address the predicament of the Indian woman. Because as Vidyasagar knew, the plight of the Indian woman had by no means been resolved with the passage of Regulation XVII. Almost as soon as Regulation XVII was passed, a new question arose: What is to become of the widow who has been spared the horrors of concremation, not least the child widow?34 As is well known, Hindu widows were often (if not always and everywhere) subject to harsh deprivations, abuse, and neglect. Such treatment has its roots in the authoritative treatises on duty, which place severe restrictions on a widow’s conduct. As the legal treatise attributed to Manu (Manava-dharmashastra) enjoined, “She should be long-suffering until death, self-restrained, chaste, striving (to fulfil) the unsurpassed duty of women who have one husband.”35 Forbidden to marry another man; compelled to shave her head, discard her jewelry, and undertake regular fasting; and ever unwelcome at major life-cycle rites, the widow often lived as a veritable outcast. Biographies of Vidyasagar, as of several other reformers, typically feature poignant scenes in which the future reformer comes face-to-face with a suffering widow. In his autobiography, Vidyasagar recounts how his father— destitute and alone on the streets of Calcutta—received food and water from a compassionate widow. Vidyasagar tells us that whenever he was told about this act of mercy on the part of one so scorned by society, it kindled a blaze of sorrow in his heart. He tells us that he traced his “profound respect for women” to this story.36 One of his admirers tells us that Vidyasagar har-

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14 Introduction

bored throughout his life a profound indignation at the way his coreligionists treated widows: Even at the end of his life, when he no longer had the energy to toil as he once had, this dissatisfaction burned in his heart like a fire kindled in the bowels of the earth. When the subject was raised, this fire revealed itself in rays of flame like the fiery eruption of a volcano. His heart . . . was so smitten by the depravity, artificiality and ignominy of present-day society, it caused him to tremble in pain as if from a scorpion’s sting. . . . One day he returned home after seeing an unfortunate widow. . . . [He said,] “Just once I would like to meet the Lord of this world, if only I might. If there is a Lord, how can he tolerate such oppression?”37

So, at least, goes one rather hagiographical account of the origin of Vidyasagar’s commitment to widow marriage. We understand that such writings aim to highlight a single reformer’s bold and courageous stance. As in the case of later figurations of Rammohan, such writings are predicated on the quest to render the reformer’s stance as unique and original. As is the case with Rammohan, though, the story is never this simple. Historians point out that the colonial-era concern with widow marriage “was not new in the history of India.”38 Efforts at widow marriage in eastern India are typically traced back at least to the middle of the eighteenth century. In 1757 Raja Rajvallabh of Vikrampur (in present-day Bangladesh) watched his daughter become a widow while she was still just a young girl. Devastated by this tragedy and emboldened by his position as local ruler, Rajvallabh began to inquire whether there might be grounds for sanctioning widow marriage. Toward this end, he consulted pandits from southern and eastern India. In his support, these pandits issued a ruling (known in Sanskrit as a vyavastha) that widow marriage was consistent with Hindu law.39 According to later sources, these pandits based their decision on Parashara 4.28, the very passage that would later be the linchpin in Vidyasagar’s argument: Nashte mrite pravrajite klibe cha patite patau | Panchasvapatsu narinam patiranyo vidhiyate || [The authoritative treatises prescribe remarriage of a woman if her husband is missing, deceased, is determined to be impotent, has become a renunciant, or has been outcast.]40

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15 Introduction

At this time there was another ruler who sought to promote himself as the leading voice of Hindu orthodoxy in Bengal. This was Raja Krishnachandra, ruler of Nadia, an ancient center of learning situated on the banks of the Bhagirathi River just north of Calcutta.41 Because of Krishnachandra’s reputation as a wise arbiter of Hindu duty, Rajvallabh sent a delegation of his own scholars to Nadia. Their mission was to convince Krishnachandra’s pandits to issue a second ruling in support of widow marriage. Things did not go as Rajvallabh hoped. Krishanachandra sternly opposed Rajvallabh’s proposal. In this, he apparently followed the judgment of one of his court pandits, Gopal Nyayapanchanan (died late eighteenth century). Nyayapanchanan argued that widow marriage was opposed to the authoritative treatises of Hindu law. Furthermore, he pointed out that the practice would be in direct conflict with prevailing local custom (deshachara).42 The author of the chronicle of Krishnachandra’s rule recounts a tale that used to circulate about this event. According to this story, while Rajvallabh’s pandits were in Nadia visiting Krishnachandra’s court, they were entertained with sumptuous meals. On one such occasion, they were presented with a buffalo calf and were told that Krishnachandra had sent it for their meal. Rajvallabh’s pandits were aghast. As orthodox Hindus, they absolutely refused to touch any such food. “But,” Krishnachandra’s servants retorted, “there is no prohibition in the authoritative treatises against eating buffalo meat.” To this the pandits responded, “While it is true there is no such direct prohibition, in this part of the world it is neither the practice nor the custom to eat such meat.” The servants were waiting with their reply: “Let us get this straight: On the one hand, you say that you don’t eat buffalo meat because it contravenes local custom, but on the other hand, you come here to advocate Hindu widow marriage even though it too is opposed to local custom?” The pandits were caught off guard and could only withdraw in defeat.43 The same chronicle in which we find this story tells us that the issue of widow marriage was reawakened almost a century later during the life of another of Nadia’s rulers, Raja Shrishchandra (ca. 1820–1858). In some respects, Shrishchandra was more progressive than his forebear Krishnachandra. That is to say, Shrishchandra was not necessarily opposed to ideas of social and religious reform. He had supported the establishment of a local branch of the reformist Brahmo Samaj (founded in 1828 by Rammohan Roy), and he also favored the spread of English education. Acting on his liberal instincts, Shrishchandra directed his pandits to examine the question of widow mar-

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riage. While they acknowledged that there was nothing in the authoritative texts to suggest an outright prohibition of the practice, they also expressed their reluctance to endorse something that was clearly opposed to prevailing custom. Pointedly, they spoke of their dependence on the goodwill of other wealthy patrons in the area. As ritualists and legal specialists, these pandits depended for their means of survival on garnering invitations from rulers, landholders, and wealthy Hindus. Were they to publicly endorse widow marriage, it seemed certain that such invitations would dry up—along with their livelihood. As if to test Shrishchandra’s resolve, his pandits asked him if he could promise to attend to all their financial needs in the face of their probable ostracism. He was not prepared to make such a commitment, and the matter apparently ended there.44 The great difference between these earlier instances and the advent of Vidyasagar was, of course, the expansion of British power in Bengal and across India. During Rajvallabh’s lifetime, the British were just beginning to intervene more aggressively in the politics, economy, and social life of eastern India. Over the next one hundred years, this would lead to profound changes in everything from landholding and education to the practice of religious life. Especially important in this respect were changes made to British ruling policy by Governor-General Warren Hastings in 1772. Hastings was inclined to view India, and Hindus in particular, with a certain respect. In his eyes, Indians were a people with an “ancient constitution” that had been preserved “unchanged from the remotest antiquity.”45 Out of deference to this so-called constitution, in his Plan for the Administration of Justice (1772), Hastings enunciated a goal of enforcing both Hindu and Muslim law according to the respective canons of those traditions.46 Beyond committing the British to following the authoritative treatises (in the case of Hinduism), Hastings simultaneously made it necessary for the British to actively train Sanskrit scholars who could interpret those texts for them. This is the original impulse behind such developments as the creation of the Government Sanskrit College and the official post of judge-pandit. This is also, according to some (as we shall see), a decision that led in due course to the privileging of Hindu scripture in colonial understandings of Hinduism. If we place Hastings alongside Bentinck, we can begin to identify some of the fundamental ambiguities that haunted British policy in India—and that dogged the pursuit of reform. Under Hastings, the British pledged to abide by the laws of Hinduism. Here, in a word, was a commitment to non-

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intervention; indeed, this was the stated policy of the East India Company. But in Bentinck we actually notice a pronounced urge to intervene, to “improve” India. Beyond this basic ambivalence, the approach to reform was itself “internally inconsistent, if not contradictory.” Beginning with Hastings, the British prioritized written texts as the “codes” to follow in legal matters. But the law courts tended to ratify existing Brahmanical norms and customs. As such, the courts promoted some of the very customs that “the government sought to discourage through its legislation”—customs like the ban on widow marriage.47 This tension between the texts of the sacred books and the customs of the local population lurks at the very heart of the reform project. It helps us appreciate how even a putatively successful reform such as that promoted by Vidyasagar could in fact fail to usher in any meaningful change. Despite these profound and lingering contradictions, the ideology of reform held great sway for a time, inspiring not just Britons like Bentinck but also indigenous intellectuals like Rammohan, as we have seen. In one sense, Rammohan simply followed Bentinck’s lead by suggesting that you can justify change if you can show that it really amounts to the restoration of an ancient law.48 Intervention was thus partially disguised behind the pretext of returning to earlier (and therefore more binding) textual authority. Once Regulation XVII was on the books, the question became: Would widow marriage be the next great reform? There had in fact been discussion among Rammohan’s followers as early as 1819 regarding the morality of asking a widow to live the remainder of her life in celibacy, which was at that time the only option open to her.49 Rammohan had himself expressed concern over the plight of widows, especially since this issue dovetailed with questions of inheritance and polygamy.50 Because the fate of a young widow, once freed from the necessity of dying on her husband’s funeral pyre, was so closely tied to the question of the possibility of her remarrying, there was good reason to think that Rammohan might take up this second cause. Sadly for like-minded reformers, Rammohan died while visiting England in 1833. Regardless, the expectations placed on him in the popular imagination are suggested by the remarks of a later observer, a contemporary of Vidyasagar: Rajah Rammohun Roy . . . was constantly spoken of in many a native family, as having gone to England with the avowed object of bringing about the marriage of Hindu widows. We do not know exactly how this impression got abroad, but it was so firm, especially in the female mind, that the old

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18 Introduction

widows often jocularly talked of their marriage on the return of Rammohun Roy. We have heard that the subject of the marriage of Hindu widows engaged the attention of Rajah Rammohun Roy, but have not as yet met with proofs as to whether he earnestly carried on the discussion, or made efforts to influence public opinion.51

Nemai Sadhan Bose points out that the issue of widow marriage began to gain increasing prominence in public debates during the 1830s. “This was only natural,” he notes, “as the movement was a logical consequence of the abolition of Sati in 1829.”52 Bose refers to a letter in the Calcutta journal Samachar Darpan, from March 14, 1835, in which an unmarried high-caste girl lamented the sufferings of Hindu widows. This letter prompted a second submission on the following day from a group of women in Chinsurah ( just north of Calcutta) in which the correspondents asked: “Why cannot a wife marry again after the death of her husband when a husband can marry after the death of his wife? Cannot a woman have desire for marriage like a man?”53 While Bose suggests that it was the Christian missionaries who took the lead in this area, he also notes that English-educated Bengali graduates of the Calcutta Hindu College were also vocal in their support. Bose refers to material published in 1837 in the progressive Bengali periodical Jnananveshan, which suggests that the issue was very much alive. A notice in the Friend of India, an English-language Christian periodical, from this time also confirms that “the marriage of Hindoo widows has lately engaged much of the attention of the Hindoo community.”54 It was at this moment, in 1837, that the Indian Law Commission, headed by J. P. Grant, took up the question of widow marriage.55 Interestingly, the commission appears to have been partially motivated by a fear that allowing the continued prohibition of widow marriage might lead to an increase in the practice of female infanticide.56 Writing to judges in Calcutta, Madras, and Allahabad, Grant asked them to comment on whether a law allowing widow marriage should be passed and whether it violated Hindu law or custom. In reply, the judges noted the desirability of such a law, based largely on what we might call humanitarian grounds. However, they went on to add that such a law would fly in the face of Hindu beliefs about the role and status of the wife. They could not therefore recommend legislation. In this context, Benoy Ghosh reminds us of a further contradiction inherent in British policy. The East India Company’s goals turned on making

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19 Introduction

profits for its shareholders; the official stance of non-intervention was calculated above all to maintain an atmosphere conducive to trade. Yet the government had clearly supported reform in the past. Would non-intervention in the interests of profit be allowed to trump humanitarian reform? How long could the government deny that public opinion was turning in favor of widow marriage—not just in Bengal, but in other provinces as well? Indeed, the fact that this issue had been taken up by Indian reformers in other major cities across India was a further factor that put pressure on the government to overlook the policy of non-intervention.57 As one biographer of Vidyasagar summarizes this period: Some 19 or 20 years before Vidyasagar’s agitation, a Mahratta Brahman of Nagpore in the Central Provinces of India, started a movement on the subject, but without success. About the same time, a Madrasee Brahman made attempts to get a Law passed on the subject, but failed. Some time after this, Babu Mati Lal Sil, one of the greatest millionaires of Calcutta, made strenuous exertions in this direction. It is said, that he even promised a present of ten thousand rupees to the first man who would lawfully marry a widow.58

No matter the official will at this point, it was becoming increasingly clear that the issue was not going to go away. During the 1840s, the possibility of allowing widow marriage continued to be bandied about regularly. The Bengal Spectator ran a piece in April 1842 that referred to the earlier efforts of Raja Rajvallabh and then stated its own opinion quite clearly: “What other Shastrical objections can there be to the commencement of the re-marriage of Hindu widows? It has been shown . . . that it obtained in ancient times and is still prevalent among the lower orders of our countrymen in some parts of India.”59 Shortly after this, in 1845, the secretary of the British Indian Society, William Theobold, addressed an inquiry on the matter of widow marriage to two important voluntary associations representing the poles of elite opinion in Bengal, the Tattvabodhini Sabha (associated with Debendranath Tagore) and the Dharma Sabha (associated with Radhakant Deb, scion of one of Calcutta’s newly prosperous Hindu families, who claimed to represent orthodox opinion).60 It seems likely that it was Theobold’s inquiry that led Rammohan Roy’s former associate Ramachandra Vidyavagisha (a pandit closely associated with the Tattvabodhini Sabha) to issue his own ruling in support of widow

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20 Introduction

marriage.61 By contrast, pandits associated with Radhakant Deb’s Dharma Sabha argued that widow marriage was not in accord with the authoritative treatises.62 That Deb was also head of the influential Shobhabajar family of northern Calcutta reminds us that the interests of pandits and patrons often worked in harmony to thwart change.63 By the 1850s, it must have seemed to many that the moment had finally come to press the issue. Just one year earlier, the editor of the influential Bengali periodical Sambad Bhaskar had commented that many of the young people in Calcutta were beginning to question Hindu customs affecting women.64 Indra Mitra has gathered evidence of the important developments during this period, which need not be rehearsed in detail here. But Mitra rightly reminds us that it was in 1850 that Vidyasagar published his first social-reform tract, a short essay opposing the custom of child marriage. Argued from an almost purely rational vantage point, this essay provides an important early indication of Vidyasagar’s sensitivity to the widow’s plight. In “The Evils of Child Marriage,” Vidyasagar wrote: The widow’s life is nothing but misery. For her this wonderful world is nothing but a desolate wasteland. . . . If, on her fast day, she should become thirsty or fall prey to some mortal illness, the heartless law forbids her to receive even a drop of water or medicine on the tip of her parched tongue. Just consider the dire straits faced by a young girl who has been required to marry as a child and who later loses her husband; is there anyone who suffers more pain and endures more hardship than her? Who can describe the all-consuming sorrow visited upon a tender young girl who must take this arduous vow in childhood, a vow that transforms her body through the grueling observance of ascetic discipline? We have all seen hundreds of such unfortunate young girls ourselves, fasting through the nights, hungry and thirsty, emaciated and pale, as good as dead. And yet not even the compassionate amongst us has the courage to defy the cruel laws of the treatises and customs of the land to show mercy on them in their pitiable condition.65

Readers of Hindu Widow Marriage will recognize the same palpable sense of urgency that appears to be rooted in an ability to empathize with the sufferings of others (consider, for instance, Vidyasagar’s comments on the experience of widowhood in Topic 6 of Book Two). It bears noting that for all the persuasive power he unleashed in this essay, Vidyasagar did not adopt the same rhetorical strategy when he set out to

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compose his works on widow marriage. In Hindu Widow Marriage, he subordinates commonsense argumentation and humanitarian appeal to the task of investigating the testimony of Hindu authoritative treatises. In a move that has given many of his humanist admirers pause, he actually chooses to search for scriptural proof texts to demonstrate that there were no valid grounds for opposing widow marriage. We shall return to this issue later, but for now we may simply note that this turn toward scripture should not be seen as a retreat from rational argumentation. Like Rammohan before him, Vidyasagar was convinced that unbiased reason actually allowed one to determine “what is really conformable” to the authoritative treatises.66 If the clouds were gathering by 1850, the storm eventually broke in January 1855 with the publication of Vidyasagar’s first essay.67 To be precise, the original salvo was launched in the pages of the Tattvabodhini Patrika, the journal of the progressive Tattvabodhini Sabha. The title of the original essay was the same as that which would be carried on the two books translated here: “Vidhava-vivaha prachalita haoya uchita ki na etad-vishayaka prastava” (A Proposal on the Question of Whether or Not to Promote Widow Marriage).68 Precisely why he chose this moment and this venue, we cannot say, although we know he had been active in the Tattvabodhini Sabha for some time and evidently shared the organization’s reformist viewpoint. However this may be, clearly Vidyasagar sensed the time had come to press the issue. He must have been impressed by the immediate excitement generated by his essay, because later the same month he reprinted the essay as an independent book. The original print run for Book One was two thousand copies. These sold out quickly, and three thousand more copies were printed. We are told that as many as fifteen thousand copies were eventually published.69 By February, the editors of the Hindoo Patriot remarked that publication of Vidyasagar’s modest pamphlet had “set the small portion of noodledom comprised within the limits of Calcutta and its neighbourhood into an uproar.”70 Looking back at this period, Peary Chand Mitra would confirm the impression that 1855 was “the great year of discussion and agitation on the subject of the marriage of Hindu widows.” His comment that Vidyasagar’s pamphlets had “created much sensation” seems a decided understatement. More helpfully, he noted that the pamphlet “roused a great deal of party spirit” with “the Vidyasagurites sternly contending that the view expressed there was the correct one, while the Dharma Sabhites resolutely reiterated their conviction that the Shaster had not been fully examined.”71

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We may compare Mitra’s remarks with those made in February 1855 by Vidyasagar’s friend Akshaykumar Datta, in the pages of the Tattvabodhini Patrika. Writing in the next issue after the first essay appeared, Datta remarked that even though the question of widow marriage had arisen before, the present movement was something entirely new. Widow marriage had become the main topic of conversation among the residents of Calcutta. It had sent pandits off to their “bug-eaten” manuscripts in search of passages in support of the current prohibition. Datta noted that such attempts were supported by groups of wealthy traditionalists (prachin-sampradayi) who offered prizes to anyone who could counter Vidyasagar’s arguments. Echoing Mitra’s comment, he also noted that on this issue people fell into one of two camps—those who supported the reform unconditionally and those who did not. As for the people who fell into the latter group, Datta remarked that they were of two basic types. Some opponents were simply too inured to longpracticed evils; others were clearly afraid of the powerful faction leaders who could threaten supporters of the cause with social ostracism.72 As the essays by Mitra and Datta suggest, debate over the issue was carried out both in the press and in the parlors of the elites. But we also know that it flowed out onto the streets of Calcutta, where popular poets like Dasharathi Ray busily composed songs to garner enthusiasm and capture listeners.73 In one poem, Ray poked fun at Vidyasagar’s enormous influence by imagining him as the ruler or family head (karta) not only of Bengali Hindus but of the British government as well. Ray provides an interesting example of a nonBrahman, with no power to sanction local custom or submit petitions to the Legislative Council, who managed to express an important voice of popular resistance—both to the hegemony of brahmanical social custom and to that of the colonial government.74 In response to the furor he had caused, and with the intention of answering the many criticisms of his proposal that were beginning to appear, Vidyasagar set to work on a second pamphlet. Interesting evidence has come to light of how chaotic a period this was for him. Benoy Ghosh suggests that Vidyasagar may have drawn some of his arguments in Book Two from an essay composed in March 1855 by his younger contemporary Rakhaldas Haldar. Haldar had initially jotted his own ideas down in response to a pamphlet published by Prasannakumar Mukhopadhyaya.75 While Vidyasagar purportedly promised to acknowledge Haldar’s essay when composing Book Two, he

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nowhere mentions Haldar in the work. This is all the more surprising since the parallels between Vidyasagar’s refutation of Prasannakumar and Haldar’s arguments are rather striking. However, rather than suggesting that Vidyasagar somehow took advantage of his younger friend’s work, we might try to put ourselves in Vidyasagar’s position—sifting texts, arguing with opponents, and hastily trying to compose and print his second book. It was surely a time of great confusion, and we can easily imagine that not every debt was fully acknowledged.76 Be that as it may, Vidyasagar did publish a second book, under the same title as the first, in October 1855. In it, he took the opportunity to dramatically expand his argument, both by including many more selections from Sanskrit legal literature and by attempting to respond to objections that had been raised to his proposal. While it seems that he had hoped to publish Book Two in the Tattvabodhini Patrika—no doubt in the interest of getting it as widely disseminated as possible—the second work turned out to be far too long for the Patrika to print. The editors had to settle for publishing just the introduction and the concluding sections.77 When the book itself appeared, it was fully ten times the length of Book One.78 Sometime after this, Vidyasagar set to work on his own English translation. Precisely when he found time to do this, or whether he received assistance along the way, is not fully clear.79 What is clear is that he was keen to reach as many readers as possible, including those who could read neither Bengali nor Sanskrit. His Marriage of Hindu Widows, which appeared in 1856, purports to give the full version of his arguments and includes passages from the original Sanskrit texts, this time printed in Devanagari font (as opposed to the Bengali font, which is used in the original). However, as readers of this translation will learn, there is a great deal of material from Book Two that did not make it into Marriage of Hindu Widows. We do not know why Vidyasagar omitted this material. Perhaps he felt that his English readers would have little way to process the merit of extensive arguments based on somewhat arcane Sanskrit sources and occasional grammatical technicalities. Whatever the reason, the truncated status of the English version means that hitherto readers have not had access to the full scope of Vidyasagar’s argument. This translation rectifies this problem by making all of Book Two available in English for the first time (for a list of topics and a comparison with Vidyasagar’s English version, see table 2).

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table 2 Comparison of Topics in Hindu Widow Marriage, Book Two, and Chapters in Marriage of Hindu Widows (1856) Topics in Hindu Widow Marriage

Chapters in Marriage of Hindu Widows

1. The passage from Parashara refers to a married woman, not to a virgin who has been betrothed 2. The passage from Parashara is a matter for the Kali Yuga, not other yugas 3. Parashara’s injunction on marriage is not in conflict with Manu 4. Parashara’s injunction on marriage is not opposed to the Vedas 5. The passage enjoining marriage is from Parashara, not Shankha 6. The passage enjoining marriage is not spurious. It is from Parashara 7. The passage from Parashara enjoins marriage; it does not prohibit it 8. The rules established by Dirghatamas do not prohibit widow marriage 9. There is no prohibition of widow marriage in the Brihat Parashara Samhita 10. The Parashara Samhita lists duties only for the Kali Yuga, not for other yugas 11. The entire Parashara Samhita describes the duties for Kali Yuga, not just the first two chapters 12. Parashara addresses the duties of only the Kali Yuga; he does not describe the duties of other yugas 13. The teaching of the duties for the four yugas provided by Parashara Samhita is not authoritative 14. The passage from Parashara stating that “The duties compiled by Parashara are the duties for the Kali Yuga” is not a credible passage 15. The Manu Samhita does not provide a description of the different duties for the four different yugas 16. In the Parashara Samhita, there is a prohibition on abandoning an outcast wife, but there is no prohibition on neglecting an outcast husband 17. Interpretive passages found in the authoritative treatises on legal literature have validity

1. The text of Parasara applies to females actually married, not to virgins merely betrothed 2. The marital text of Parasara refers to the Kali-Yuga, not to the other yugas 3. The marital injunction of Parasara is not opposed to Manu 4. The marital text of Parasara is not opposed to the Vedas 5. Not included

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6. Not included 7. Not included 8. Restrictions of Dirghatama are not prohibitory of the marriage of widows 9. Not included 10. The Parasara Sanhita teaches the dharmas of the Kali-Yuga alone, not of other yugas 11. Not included 12. Not included 13. Not included 14. Not included

15. In the Manu Sanhita, the different dharmas of the four yugas are not defined 16. Not included

17. Not included

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25 Introduction

Topics in Hindu Widow Marriage

Chapters in Marriage of Hindu Widows

18. There is no prohibition on giving away a virgin a second time after betrothal if the groom is missing 19. The injunction of Parashara regarding marriage is not restricted to the lower castes 20. A father may give a widowed virgin again in marriage 21. At the marriage of a widow, the gift should be made with reference to the father’s clan 22. The sacred utterances used for the first marriage should be used for the second

18. Not included

23. Marriage to a married woman is no more commended than is marriage to a married man 24. Local custom is not a greater source of proof than the authoritative treatises 25. Conclusion

19. Not included 20. The father can make a gift of his widowed daughter 21. Not included 22. The mantras (nuptial texts) to be used on the occasion of a second marriage are the same as those that are used on the occasion of a first marriage 23. In matrimonial alliances, unmarried damsels are preferable to married ones in the same way as unmarried men are to married ones. 24. The custom of the country is not a stronger authority than the Sastras 25. Conclusion

Note: Book Two of Hindu Widow Marriage is composed of twenty-five discrete topics addressing various objections raised in response to Book One. When Vidyasagar translated Book Two in 1856, he referred to the topics as chapters and omitted several of them, even as he retained the numbers assigned to them in the original work. This table compares the contents of the original Bengali work with the abbreviated contents of the English version. Titles from Marriage of Hindu Widows follow Vidyasagar’s wording. The second edition of the translation (1864) further omits chapter 15. This is the basis of the 1976 reprint.

I hope that this brief summary of Vidyasagar’s work during 1855 and 1856 serves to suggest something about the climate of debate and public controversy. It bears noting that the widow marriage movement triggered a veritable explosion of print-based polemics in Calcutta and beyond. Within just the first year, Peary Chand Mitra reported that “no less than thirty tracts were published at different times.”80 He tells us that Bengali periodicals expressing support for Vidyasagar included Sambad Bhaskar, Tattvabodhini Patrika, and Masik Patrika, while the reform was supported by English-language papers like the Hindoo Patriot. Some progressives, like Mitra himself, actually found themselves torn. Mitra confessed that a less partial observer might well con-

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clude that the reform violated the proper meaning of the authoritative treatises.81 Nevertheless, he supported the idea of widow marriage on moral and social grounds. Voices of disapproval rang from countless directions. Kashiprosad Ghose, editor of the Hindu Intelligencer, was forthright in raising reservations. As early as February 1855, Ghose wrote: Granting for the sake of argument that the re-marriage of Hindu widows, is ordered by the Hindu law, still, as it has never taken place during the five thousands of years, which have rolled away since Parasara wrote his book, and as it is not known that it was never resorted to, in the three preceding ages, it is quite useless to cite that law in favour at such a distance of time.

And he added, “There are many other evils, which might be removed with less labour.”82 As far as Kashiprosad Ghose was concerned, mere textual authority was not enough to authorize reform. Far more important was the fact that the Hindus of Bengal, even if they had once allowed widow marriage, had long since ceased to practice any such custom. In a later column, he went on to argue that Bengalis should adopt a legal principle long recognized by the British: usage makes for law.83 This sort of argument was the most formidable obstacle to acceptance of Vidyasagar’s scripture-based reform. Why should Hindus adopt a practice that had apparently been prohibited by custom since time immemorial? Some opponents even resorted to language that hinted at the need for national self-determination in such matters. A passage from the Eastern Star is notable in this regard: Much as we wish that the absurd and cruel custom should be abolished of obliging the women who have been unfortunate enough to lose their husbands, to drag on a life of wretchedness and asceticism we cannot yet help agreeing with old Bengal that the proposed legislative interference on this subject is improper and quite uncalled for. The legislative body of the country, not being a representative assembly of the people for whom it legislates, is under the necessity of using great care and circumspection in the enactment of laws, so as to enact no laws but what are adapted to the state of society. . . . It is argued that according to the Hindu Shastras, the remarriage of widows is valid. . . . Now if the thing itself be valid, but

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27 Introduction

the community has chosen to set it aside—it is for the community itself to bring it back into use, and all extraneous influence exerted by authority, assumes the form of tyranny.84

Quite apart from its logic, this objection is notable for providing a very early indication of the rise of nationalist sentiment, especially in connection to perceived attempts by the British to interfere with Indian social and cultural life. We begin to appreciate that a range of arguments and rationales could be mustered in support of either position. Some, like Peary Chand Mitra, supported the reform on moral grounds but questioned the validity of scriptural proof; others accepted both the moral need for reform and its scriptural legitimacy. By the same token, some opponents, like Kashiprosad Ghose, were willing to admit that the reform might have genuine scriptural sanction but were unwilling to see this as sufficient grounds for overturning accepted custom. On the farthest extreme were those who challenged Vidyasagar’s interpretation of scripture and simultaneously rejected the idea that mere scriptural proof texts could undo centuries of binding Hindu practice. Not surprisingly, such opponents often questioned the vitality of Vidyasagar’s faith as a Hindu.85 They also questioned his bona fides as a pandit, pointing out that he had never taught in a traditional Sanskrit school, or chatushpathi (thereby calling attention to his training under the auspices of the British government). They even at times questioned his basic grip on reality. As one pandit scornfully put it, “What won’t a crazy man say or a hungry man eat?”86 Representatives of such extreme positions can be found congregating on the margins of Vidyasagar’s second pamphlet, as it were. In the course of Book Two, he frequently refers to their opinions as well as to the books and pamphlets they published (largely in Bengali) to attack his reform. Readers may be surprised to discover how far some opponents would go in their attempts to refute Vidyasagar. The grammatical creativity of Kalidas Maitra, discussed in Topic 7 of Book Two, is a particularly striking example.87 Being able to listen in on the give-and-take of these exchanges is one fringe benefit of making a full and annotated translation of Hindu Widow Marriage available to readers. Much of the drama of such exchanges is missing from Vidyasagar’s own English rendering. In this translation, we have the opportunity to finetune our understanding of just how traditional-minded intellectuals argued and interacted with opponents during this reform campaign.

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At least one curious episode also emerges. In his preface to the second edition of Vidhava-vivaha, which appeared in 1857, Vidyasagar comments at length on a case in which his opponents turned out to have once upon a time been his allies. Apparently, sometime before he published the original book in 1855, a well-to-do member of the Navashakh caste by the name of Shyamcharan Das had approached several Sanskrit scholars seeking their approval of his widowed daughter’s remarriage. These scholars issued a ruling (vyavastha) in which they pronounced that widow marriage was in accordance with the authoritative treatises. To substantiate this fact, Vidyasagar attached a facsimile of their ruling at the end of the second edition of Hindu Widow Marriage. The signatures of the various pandits are clearly legible. He then told his readers a bit about some of the signatories: The late Kashinath Tarkalankar was the preeminent scholar of legal literature in this land. Bhavashankar Vidyaratna and Ramtanu Tarkasiddhanta can be ranked among the chief scholars of legal literature. Tarkasiddhanta Bhattacharya is the Court Scholar of the Datta family of Mangala. Thakurdas Chudamani and Harinarayan Tarkasiddhanta are also acclaimed scholars in this land and are members of the court of Raja Kamalkrishna Dev. Muktaram Vidyavagish can be ranked among the most knowledgeable of scholars. He is a member of the court of the well-known Prasannakumar Thakura.88

One reason Vidyasagar provides this additional information is that these very same pandits subsequently switched sides in the debate. In fact, many became vocal opponents of the reform. Such a shift is all the more remarkable in that someone like Bhavashankar Vidyaratna had at one time been awarded the winner’s prize in a formal debate precisely for successfully arguing in support of widow marriage. On that occasion, Bhavashankar’s opponent had been Vrajnath Vidyaratna, a prominent pandit from Nadia (the very place made famous by Raja Krishnachandra’s earlier opposition to widow marriage).89 What might have caused Bhavashankar’s remarkable volte face? Vidyasagar was apparently as puzzled as we are. He commented derisively: Previously . . . [these men] signed their own names to the ruling because they agreed that widow marriage was in accordance with the authoritative texts. And now they apparently have become fierce opponents who say that it is not. Who can fathom the innermost conscience of these men? 90

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One clue to understanding Bhavashankar’s reversal lies in Vidyasagar’s reference to the aristocratic families of Calcutta who employed these men as pandits. We have already had occasion to ponder the role of elite Hindu patrons in determining the attitudes of their pandits. No doubt Bhavashankar’s change of heart had less to do with impartial Sanskrit scholarship than with the politics of Hindu society in Calcutta. Readers of this translation will see that the names of such pandits and patrons are legion, including (in addition to those just mentioned) such men as Dinabandhu Nyayaratna and Nandakumar Kaviratna, each associated with important attempts to oppose the reform. One striking indication of the resistance that Vidyasagar faced can be gleaned from the footnote that appears at the bottom of the first page of Book Two. Here he lists the names of more than twenty pandits from around Bengal who opposed him by advocating a more limited reading of Parashara 4.28. This footnote reminds us that what follows in Book Two is in fact a sort of print-based version of a traditional scholarly debate (shastra vichara).91 One difference, however, is that this debate did not concern just Sanskrit scholars, nor did it take place in the court of a local Hindu ruler like Raja Krishnachandra. This was a truly public debate, conducted in full view of educated Bengali readers. By translating the authoritative treatises from Sanskrit, Vidyasagar actually invited the educated reader into the realm of scholarly debate. Indeed, he charged his readers to “consider calmly” the options available to them and, like pandits themselves, “make [their] own determination” (see Topic 25 of Book Two). While many readers and active participants in the debate no doubt envisioned the Legislative Council of the British government in the role of local ruler, surely all recognized that the times had changed. This was an important moment in the emergence of the colonial public sphere. The complexity and exuberance of the widow marriage debate have yet to be told in full. More could be written about its character as a public event; about the proliferation of published tracts for and against the reform (lasting throughout the remainder of the century); about the active contestation of the issue, not just among Sanskrit scholars but in the print media as well; and about the many petitions that were filed for and against the reform.92 However, this is not the place to attempt a complete reconstruction of the social, political, and cultural ramifications of the widow marriage movement. The more modest goal of this work is to provide a complete translation of the two

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books that stood at the very heart of the campaign. Hopefully, this translation will encourage others to undertake further study, both of the widow marriage movement and of the ongoing articulation of scriptural knowledge in the colonial context.

Hindu Widow Marriage as Modern-Day Commentary Why is it that the widow marriage campaign is widely discussed in scholarship on modern India and yet Vidyasagar’s Hindu Widow Marriage has never before been translated in full? Part of the answer must lie in the simple fact that the work is in fact fairly technical—at least insofar as it amounts to a sustained engagement with Sanskrit legal sources. Put somewhat differently, it is one thing to restate Vidyasagar’s basic claim that widow marriage is approved by the authoritative treatises, but it is quite another matter to work one’s way through the many discrete topics that make up his argument. In fact, a reader might well ask what is to be gained by plowing through this dense thicket of Sanskrit quotations and legal jargon. Isn’t it enough simply to note that Vidyasagar zeroes in on a single verse from Parashara, which he takes as proof of the viability of widow marriage? In reply, I would argue that no, it is not enough. I would like to suggest that there is actually much to learn by taking the time to examine not just what Vidyasagar says but how he says it. Among the many reasons to read Hindu Widow Marriage in its entirety is that the text provides a fascinating example of the redeployment of premodern textual sources and interpretive strategies in the service of a modern reformist cause. In this respect, Hindu Widow Marriage provides compelling evidence of the continued saliency of premodern intellectual practices during a period that is often thought to have been dominated by European norms of learning. While some contend that the nineteenth century witnessed the gradual death of Sanskrit knowledge systems, Hindu Widow Marriage actually provides rather striking evidence of the continued life of Sanskrit in colonial India.93 This is not to say that indigenous traditions of Sanskrit scholarship did not face immense pressure from colonial bureaucracy, English-language education, and European Enlightenment epistemologies. It is merely to remind us that this pressure was not experienced universally or in the abstract but somewhat unevenly and always in rather particular, concrete ways. Rather

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than representing a uniform diffusion of ideologies and practices across time and space, colonial modernity can be appreciated only as a variegated set of engagements among a range of actors. Rather than emphasizing a grand epistemological tidal shift in colonial India, we therefore need to investigate how particular individuals negotiated the ebb and flow of intellectual currents. Instead of presuming the sudden demise of Sanskrit intellectual life, we need to be alert for signs of the persistence of certain attitudes, commitments, and practices, in this case among Bengal’s traditional intelligentsia. This means we must necessarily rethink some of our assumptions about Sanskrit intellectuals. In this connection, it is also necessary to pay attention to how pandits have hitherto been represented in Western historiography.94 If we are to understand the particular articulation of modernity among Sanskrit intellectuals, we must jettison long-held stereotypes with roots in the discourse of European exceptionalism and colonial domination. Images of the Sanskrit pandit as a hidebound “scholastic” completely oblivious to the changes taking place around him or as a kind of cultural dinosaur standing in the way of progress reveal much more about British attitudes toward Indian society than they do about the actual lives and attitudes of colonial pandits. Instead of vilifying pandits or writing them out of our histories, we do well to ask just how they responded to changing times. We may begin by considering how difficult it has been for scholars to make sense of Vidyasagar’s appeal to Sanskrit authoritative treatises in Hindu Widow Marriage. Hitherto this issue has prompted two sorts of questions. On the one hand, if he was indeed an authentic (or traditional) pandit, how was he able to approach Hindu scripture in a historical and critical fashion? On the other hand, if he was in fact modern in his outlook, then why did he invest so much energy in interpreting scripture? Answers once again fall into two general categories: either Vidyasagar’s appeal to the authoritative treatises is viewed as a clever strategic ploy, or it is tolerated as a regrettable weakness on his part. In the former case, one tends to argue that Vidyasagar relied on proof texts only because he found them convenient for advancing his cherished agenda. This is the tenor of Asok Sen’s otherwise insightful analysis of Vidyasagar’s widow marriage campaign. Sen admits that Vidyasagar’s arguments in Hindu Widow Marriage had a “distinct tone of reason.” However, he goes on to say that Vidyasagar “attempted to tap the root of popular sentiment” by appealing to the authoritative treatises.95 Sen assumes that no

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truly modern reformer could seriously be committed to scriptural texts or the worldview that they represent. Therefore, it must be that Vidyasagar used the authoritative treatises in an instrumental fashion to garner support for his views. According to this view, Vidyasagar’s modernity is revealed by his tactical genius for taking advantage of popular religious beliefs.96 If one prefers the other explanation, the goal is often to show that for all his purported modernity, Vidyasagar remained enslaved by his naïve belief in the authority of Hindu scripture. According to this view, Vidyasagar displayed an almost stubborn (and, for many, certainly regrettable) faith in the power of scripture as scripture to secure his success. This seems to be the view of Vidyasagar’s younger contemporary Bankimchandra Chatterjee. While Bankim had no sympathy for Vidyasagar’s campaign, he was not prepared to question Vidyasagar’s profound faith in the authoritative treatises.97 When it comes right down to it, neither explanation is adequate. Not only do both presume that modernity is antithetical to something called tradition (represented in this case by the Hindu scriptures), but both also fail to understand the individual pandit in relation to his broader social and intellectual context. Must we construe a particular pandit’s use of the authoritative treatises as evidence either of his “modern” cynicism or his bondage to “tradition”? Is it not possible that a pandit like Vidyasagar simply sought some way to deploy his mastery of the authoritative treatises within a changed religious and social context?98 As for the question of Vidyasagar’s faith in the authoritative treatises, perhaps the emphasis is misplaced. In Topic 24 of Book Two, in which he refutes the argument that widow marriage is opposed to local custom, he invokes “faith” (astha) in the authoritative treatises less as a statement of his own personal conviction and more as a warning to his opponents about their apparent hypocrisy. How can they boast faith in the Hindu scriptures and then turn around and ignore the greater authority of those same scriptures over local custom? Vidyasagar seems to say that as a pandit he is only pointing out to them what ought to be done in light of their sacred traditions. In this respect, is it really so surprising that a Sanskrit pandit who was interested in promoting social change would seek to conform such change to the sanction of scripture? Not to mention that in so doing he could also take advantage of the intellectual tools he knew best, tools for interpreting Hindu scripture? Hadn’t these tools served pandits well in the past?99

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Colonial pandits shared long-established disciplines for memorizing, analyzing, debating, and teaching the theoretical and normative literature of the Hindu tradition. Whether trained in village schools or colonial colleges, pandits’ lives were shaped by patterns of embodied praxis integrated with pervasive beliefs about the working of the intellect, the structure of the social world, the prerogatives of power, the virtues of learning, and the wisdom of tradition. To be sure, the colonial sphere introduced pandits to new institutions (e.g., law courts, universities, newspapers, and voluntary associations), new modes of behavior (e.g., wearing socks and shoes, greeting colleagues with a handshake, and working at a desk), and new methods of critical reflection (e.g., epigraphy, comparative philology, and historical-critical study). However, such institutions, practices, and modes of reflection never fully supplanted or suppressed the intellectual world of the pandit. Pandits exercised powers of resistance, redefinition, and redeployment even as they adopted new intellectual tools, learned new technical skills, and formed new kinds of association. They put these new tools, skills, and associations to the service of a variety of ends (such as editing Sanskrit texts, deciphering inscriptions, delivering legal rulings, or debating social customs) that they continued to understand against the backdrop of their own practices and beliefs. One goal of this translation is to allow readers to observe Vidyasagar as he puts the traditional skills of a pandit to work in pursuit of what is otherwise a very modern task: the opening up of scriptural interpretation to a new public sphere with the end of shaping colonial law. Toward this end, I hope to provide readers with some background on modes of premodern reading and argument as practiced in such areas as Hindu law and exegesis. If Vidyasagar saw his role as that of mediating Sanskrit legal reflection to a Bengali reading public that was ill-equipped to plumb the original sources, my task must likewise be to help English-language readers appreciate some of the more technical aspects of Hindu Widow Marriage.100 If we begin with the question of Vidyasagar’s sources, readers will notice that the argument of Hindu Widow Marriage is woven across a framework of Sanskrit passages, more than 250 all told. In technical terms, these passages serve as sources of proof or “valid means of knowing” ( pramana). However, as important as these sources are for his argument, Vidyasagar also understood that success depended on more than merely reproducing a series of proof texts. Only an ability to approach these sources using recognized methods of

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argument and analysis would ultimately be persuasive.101 In this regard, his position should not be viewed as “scriptural” in a narrow sense. His was not blind obedience to “holy writ.” Rather, as we have already noted, Vidyasagar saw the proper interpretation of the authoritative treatises as a matter of rational analysis.102 As we know, the central source of proof for Vidyasagar is Parashara 4.28, a passage that one scholar has dubbed “the most controversial verse on the topic of marriage.”103 “Controversy” is the key word here. It reminds us right off that the meaning of Parashara 4.28 is by no means self-evident. How is this verse to be understood? Does it indeed sanction widow marriage? Does it promote widow marriage for our current world eon, the Kali Yuga? Are we to understand the meaning of this verse as the author intended it, as later commentators have explained it, or in light of commonly accepted practice in Bengal? What authority does Parashara have as compared with other great lawmakers, such as Manu? To raise such questions is to appreciate the real challenges faced by Vidyasagar in advancing his argument. And to appreciate how questions like this are answered, we must explore the dynamic interplay between the framework of Sanskrit citations and Vidyasagar’s running argument.104 In this respect, it may help to think of Hindu Widow Marriage as a modern reworking of the classical genre of text and commentary or, as Vidyasagar frequently styles it in Book Two, the pairing of samhita and bhashya. The samhita passages comprise the “root” (mula) text, which is effectively an amalgam of proof texts drawn from several works. The samhita of first importance is Parashara (also known as Parashara Smriti), a text composed during the first millennium of the Common Era. However, many other root texts are cited throughout the work, notably the law books of Manu, Yajnavalkya, and Narada. These represent the most important sources of classical Hindu law (dharma). While these are the proof texts, we must bear in mind that such root texts are rarely read on their own. Rather, they are typically accompanied by a commentary, or bhashya (also known as vyakhya or tika). In the case of Parashara, the most important bhashya is that of the fourteenth-century scholar Madhavacharya, which Vidyasagar both quotes and takes issue with at several points. Apart from these sources of Hindu law, Vidyasagar also quotes and comments on a range of other Sanskrit literature, including passages from the Veda, the Puranas, and a handful of medieval legal digests (nibandha), not to mention assorted epic and literary works. Interestingly, he

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also includes one or two references to contemporary published materials on Indian history and epigraphy. Nonetheless, Vidyasagar’s chief concern is with Parashara as interpreted by Madhava (the so-called Parashara-Madhaviya). There is, in fact, an interesting parallel between Hindu Widow Marriage and the Parashara-Madhaviya. It has been suggested that even though the Parashara-Madhaviya is technically a commentary on the root text of Parashara, it actually bears the hallmarks of a medieval legal digest, or nibandha.105 Unlike commentaries, which typically take a single text as their focus, nibandhas gather together a range of passages relevant to the discussion of a selected topic.106 The digest writer’s goal is to reconcile a range of conflicting works, and in his digest he offers his own interpretation as the best way to achieve harmony among disparate sources.107 This is almost exactly what Vidyasagar seeks to do in Hindu Widow Marriage. With widow marriage (vidhava-vivaha) as his topic, he seeks to provide a consistent and harmonious interpretation of Parashara when viewed alongside other authoritative treatises. Whether we choose to think of Hindu Widow Marriage as a modern digest or as a modern version of a Sanskrit commentary, the important point is that we appreciate the debt owed by the text to long-standing Sanskrit intellectual models. These models may be thought of as applying especially to the realms of exegesis and hermeneutics. The former term denotes the attempt to arrive at a clear grasp of a particular text and the terminology in question. The latter term denotes the attempt to apply some higher level of interpretation in order to ascertain the true meaning of the text. In both respects, the task of extracting meaning from a text involves a curious irony. On the one hand, commentators need to affirm that the root text necessarily communicates all the truth one needs to know. Especially in the case of sacred literature, it must be the case that everything is already there in the text; nothing should need to be added. But on the other hand, commentators are driven by the need to derive further truth from the text. This they do by exploring allusions, proposing etymologies, or pondering multiple levels of meaning.108 This dynamic tension between respect for the integrity of a root text like Parashara 4.28 and the need to draw from it a new or deeper meaning is at the heart of Vidyasagar’s Hindu Widow Marriage. The overall format of Hindu Widow Marriage reflects a similar tension between traditional scholarship and modern publishing. To illustrate this point,

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consider how Gary Tubb and Emery Boose compare the work of a classical Sanskrit commentator like Hemachandra (writing in the Jain tradition) with a modern printed book: In some ways a work like Hemachandra’s is equivalent to one of our modern books in which extensive footnotes and appendices are provided, but there is an important practical difference between the two formats: in a modern work the additional material is presented in a number of separate notes whose connection with the main text is merely signaled by typographical symbols or references, but in a Sanskrit work the additional material is usually presented in a more continuous composition that relies on a large body of conventional terminology and special syntactical devices in fulfilling its role as a commentary on the original text.109

While Tubb and Boose structure their comparison to bring out a contrast, readers of Hindu Widow Marriage will quickly realize that this remarkable text actually displays both sets of formal characteristics. On the one hand, it very clearly looks like a modern book, right down to its many footnotes. On the other hand, in classic commentarial fashion, Vidyasagar employs the same sort of “continuous composition” favored by a scholar like Hemachandra. This fluid interweaving of root texts and commentarial material gives Hindu Widow Marriage a distinctively traditional feel. Beyond overall format, Vidyasagar also borrows several other conventions from traditional commentarial practice. Ideally, a commentary seeks to balance lower-level exegesis and higher-level interpretation. Put differently, proper construal of grammar should go hand in hand with formulating arguments or anticipating objections from one’s opponents.110 The various services provided by a commentary are in fact summarized in the following way by a Sanskrit couplet: “The five characteristics of a commentary are: (1) word division, (2) stating the meaning of the words, (3) analysis of grammar, (4) construal of sentences, and (5) the answering of objections.”111 While Vidyasagar clearly did not set out to write a commentary in the narrow sense, we can identify many of the same operations in Hindu Widow Marriage. To begin with, Vidyasagar tells us in the opening of Book Two that his goal is to make the “meaning and purport” of the Sanskrit texts available to the general reading public. This is why at various points in the text he

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calls his opponents to task for attributing “forced” meanings to words or for failing to interpret individual words consistently from one Sanskrit passage to the next (see Topic 1 of Book Two). When his opponents propose questionable textual readings, he is not afraid to delve into the intricacies of Sanskrit grammar (as he does in Topic 7 of Book Two) or to explore the ways in which particular words can have different meanings in different contexts (as he does in Topic 3 of Book Two).112 But beyond these lower-level tasks, the single most important task that Vidyasagar undertakes is the higher-order one of answering objections. Here, as in the world of traditional Sanskrit scholarship, the commentator effectively creates an independent work.113 By commenting on a root text, an author is able both to link his arguments to an authoritative source (perhaps revealed literature itself) and to address any objections that have been raised in connection with that source. This dynamic is most evident in philosophical commentary, where establishing a new conclusion (known as a siddhanta) requires rejecting any earlier objections (known as the purvapaksha). The same is true in Vidyasagar’s case. He knows that sources like Parashara and Manu come to him freighted with commentaries and centuries of legal reflection. He also knows that contemporary pandits had begun formulating their own interpretations of such texts, often in direct opposition to his own. For his argument to prevail, it must be grounded in the scriptural sources, address the prior arguments found in the commentarial literature, and respond to the objections of his peers. It is precisely the task of addressing his opponents that leads to the prolixity of Book Two. As Vidyasagar points out in the opening to Book Two, no sooner had Book One appeared than numerous individuals began to raise objections (apatti ) to his proposal. He tells us that his goal in Book Two is to answer them all. Accordingly, twenty-four of the twenty-five chapters that make up Book Two address a separate objection or topic of debate. Some of these chapters are quite lengthy, including more than twenty or thirty individual Sanskrit citations (see Topics 1 and 3). Others, such as Topic 4, are quite brief. By October 1855, Vidyasagar had collected as many of the objections as he could find circulating in print media and the pandit societies of colonial Bengal; he had also gone in search of further sources from the root texts to bolster his own argument; and, finally, he had composed an elaborate series of detailed answers to the various claims and objections of his opponents. In

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a sense, the objections animate and drive Book Two. While he does not refer to his opponents by name in his running narrative, he uses footnotes to refer to relevant individuals and publications. In the footnotes, we find the names of several key opponents.114 Vidyasagar’s approach to answering his opponents is shaped by the practice of oral argument in India.115 One can almost imagine the author and his interlocutors engaged in an animated debate in the court of a local patron. Typically, written commentarial style in Sanskrit mirrors this lived practice of intellectual argumentation: Ordinarily discussion proceeds by a series of objections and refutations that lead to confirmation of the commentator’s view. In this discussion the commentator may examine the implications of the text, defend views represented in the text against those of rival schools, defend his interpretation of the texts against other interpretations, and introduce his own insights. . . . He may support his arguments by citing examples and comparisons . . . or by appealing to the authority of other texts, other teachers, and common experience.116

To keep the reader abreast of quotations, claims, and counterclaims, the commentator employs a variety of stylized conventions. Many of these Sanskrit conventions carried over smoothly into Bengali, so that Vidyasagar could easily employ terms like arthat (which is to say), tatparya (purport), and ityadi (etc., routinely used to avoid the necessity of naming all the relevant items in a list or category under discussion). While Hindu Widow Marriage avoids a heavy-handed use of such conventions (Vidyasagar no doubt valued readability over pedantry), it does help to bear in mind the conventions of commentarial composition, if only to appreciate the form and rhythm of the text. Readers will notice repeated use of such phrases, especially in Book Two. Readers may also be struck by Vidyasagar’s habit of referring to his “respected opponents” (prativadi mahashay). While this may seem overly repetitive or formulaic, I have retained all such references because I believe they help capture the dialogic quality of the argument. Turning to the argument of Hindu Widow Marriage, it may help to introduce some basic terminology and principles. As should be clear by now, the argument centers on the question of whether widow marriage is enjoined or prohibited by the authoritative treatises on Hindu law. The purpose of such

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treatises is to provide either injunctions (vidhi) or prohibitions (nishedha) on certain forms of behavior. In the area of marriage customs alone, there are countless injunctions in the various legal samhitas regarding such issues as marriage, adoption, inheritance, legitimate types of son, and so on. To complicate matters, not all samhitas preserve the same injunctions on the same topics. Nor do the injunctions of the samhitas always appear to accord either with the revealed texts of the Vedas or with the various epic and other sources to which Hindus routinely look for guidance in matters of religion, family life, or social behavior. Thus having found his proof text in a passage from Parashara Samhita, Vidyasagar then had to demonstrate that this passage represented the appropriate guide for practice in our current eon, known as the Kali Yuga (for more on time reckoning, see the section “Hindu Categories for First-Time Readers”). The overall format of Hindu Widow Marriage neatly mirrors a method of argumentation known as “investigation” (mimamsa).117 According to this method, one begins by stating the subject matter or topic to be discussed. This is known as the vishaya, a Sanskrit term carried over into Vidyasagar’s Bengali. Regarding this subject matter, a particular doubt is then raised. The term that Vidyasagar uses here is once again taken from Sanskrit, samshaya. The identification of this doubt presents a dilemma for the author to clarify. In order to do this, the author must consider the competing sides of the argument. First, the prima facie view of the opponent is presented. This is known as the “prior position,” or purvapaksha. To this view, an answer (uttara) is proposed. Finally, the author offers his determination (nirnaya). This resolves the dilemma, and the matter is settled.118 If we look at Topic 1 of Book Two, we notice that it commences with both a statement of the topic and the identification of a particular doubt with respect to the correct interpretation of the passage from Parashara: Some have determined that the intention of the passage from Parashara regarding marriage is to specify that upon the disappearance, etc., of a bridegroom who has been betrothed to a virgin she can be married to another bridegroom. Such people contend that it was never Parashara’s intention to say that a married woman who becomes a widow may marry again.

As Vidyasagar indicates, some opponents claim that Parashara’s injunction pertains not to widows but only to girls (that is, virgins [kanya]) who have

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been betrothed to men who subsequently died before the wedding could be performed. So we have a topic—widow marriage—and a doubt: Does Parashara 4.28 apply to widows generally or only to girls who have lost their betrothed? In good commentarial fashion, Vidyasagar next states his goal: “[We must] consider whether the determination of my respected opponents is valid.” This leads him into a detailed discussion of various sources and opinions. As is characteristic of the entire text, Vidyasagar’s commentary-cum-argument is carried out in Bengali, with Sanskrit proof texts inserted at appropriate junctures as evidence. For each Sanskrit passage adduced, Vidyasagar provides his own Bengali rendering (for the benefit of his many readers who would not otherwise have had the ability to understand the Sanskrit).119 This is the pattern followed throughout the work. Along the way, Vidyasagar must not only consider Parashara in relation to the other authoritative treatises compiled by the likes of Manu and Yajnavalkya, but also address the question of how subsequent commentators and digest writers viewed Parashara.120 As J. Duncan M. Derrett has pointed out, pandits in Vidyasagar’s day rarely worked directly, let alone solely, from root texts. Rather they approached root texts like Manu, Yajnavalkya, and Parashara by relying on a wide range of digests that had been composed in the millennia following the compilation of the earliest samhitas.121 If Vidyasagar has been acclaimed for his work in the widow marriage campaign, I would like to suggest that his genius lies in the decision to create a modern species of traditional legal reflection that could accomplish the goal of advancing a contemporary reformist cause in terms faithful to his own intellectual heritage. We recognize his modernity from the decision to harness his own heritage to new developments in publishing, public life, and colonial governance. He was not modern simply because he promoted widow marriage. We know that the idea of promoting widow marriage had been around for some time. And one might even argue that he was not consistently modern in all his attitudes. One thinks of his abiding respect for the sanctity of the authoritative treatises of Hinduism and his fairly unreconstructed paternalism. Hence, if we wish to see him as modern it should be because he chose to publish a printed work of commentary intended for popular consumption, written in engaging Bengali prose that would at the same time identify, translate, and explicate a range of Sanskrit sources relevant to a pressing colonial reform issue.122

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The Real Significance of Hindu Widow Marriage How, then, are we to judge the significance of Hindu Widow Marriage, both as text and as epochal socioreligious event? As we take up this question, it may be wise to remind ourselves that Vidyasagar was not merely a social reformer. He was a man of many talents and commitments: teacher, scholar, administrator, reformer, entrepreneur, philanthropist, publisher, and printer. One could argue that he wrote in order to teach; that he taught in order to educate and reform society; and that his skills as publisher and printer allowed him to advance all his goals, whether as administrator, educator, reformer, or philanthropist.123 Hindu Widow Marriage emerges from the same coalescence of energies and goals. It represents something like a microcosmic portrait of Vidyasagar.124 We need to remember this when we refer to Vidyasagar as a social reformer. That label, while telling us something important about the man, also conceals a great deal. Vidyasagar was a Brahman pandit raised in rural Bengal who subsequently attained recognition within the educational and bureaucratic framework of British rule; he was a modern-minded educator committed to promoting Bengali as a language of “improvement”; and he was a prolific author, publisher, and printer who possessed shrewd business skills. Hindu Widow Marriage reminds us of all these facts and forces us to attend to those things that made Vidyasagar such a distinctive figure. For too long, this epochal work and its creator have been dealt with using handy labels that tend to situate widow marriage within the narrative of Indian “reform” or “progressive movements.” Part of what is lost thereby is a chance to appreciate the real significance of Hindu Widow Marriage. What makes the text significant in one respect is simply the insight it provides regarding the learning, wit, and political savvy of its author. For all the technical mastery on display, we also discover irony, satire, and genuine warmth of feeling.125 Consider the powerful conclusion to Book Two (Topic 25). Here Vidyasagar departs from the commentarial approach adopted in preceding chapters and makes a series of emotional appeals aimed directly at the conscience of his readers. He asks them to ponder the suffering of young widows who live lives of isolation and deprivation. At this point, he also introduces a different sort of argument than has come before. Adopting an almost sociological perspective, he conjures an image of the kind of social malaise he feared would follow from continuing to prohibit widow marriage.

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This is also the point at which Vidyasagar resorts to a bit of fearmongering, invoking the dark specters of adultery, prostitution, and abortion.126 He reminds his readers how natural it would be for a lonely young widow to be tempted into illicit liaisons. Unwanted pregnancies would almost certainly be terminated out of fear of social stigma. The picture is as graphic as it is patriarchal. Notwithstanding its problematic assumptions about gender, sexuality, family, and society, we can appreciate the wisdom of this rhetorical strategy. Vidyasagar knew that his vision of lonely child widows lured into back-alley encounters and shameful abortions would register powerfully with his readers. And the very fact that we may now look askance at this display of male anxiety should remind us that Vidyasagar’s modernity may rest more on his canny abilities as an author than on some abstract notion of “enlightenment.” Once we acknowledge this, we can begin to think again about what Hindu Widow Marriage really accomplished. On a charitable reading, we might say that Vidyasagar’s campaign was trapped by the limits of his own imagination. In the words of Monmayee Basu, his proposal “only solved the problem of how to get widows remarried where marriage was possible or desirable.” It did not fundamentally reframe understandings of gender or womanhood; it failed to usher in a real change in upper-caste marriage patterns; and it failed to redress the problem of a woman’s limited rights to property.127 Less charitably, some have seen Vidyasagar’s work as nothing less than a project to maintain male high-caste hegemony predicated on suspect claims about the authority of Hindu scripture. Lata Mani, for one, has argued that the great scripture-based reform attempts, commencing with Rammohan Roy’s campaign against suttee, were premised on an overly “textualized” image of Hinduism.128 This image, inspired and promoted by Orientalist scholar-administrators beginning with William Jones and Henry Thomas Colebrooke, attempted to enshrine and authorize one narrow version of brahmanical Hinduism. Once codified and blessed with the imprimatur of Western Orientalist scholarship, this single Hindu “tradition” took on the character of immutability.129 On this reading, it should be no surprise that the men most active in scriptural reform were high-caste male elites like Vidyasagar, since they were both the beneficiaries and the self-proclaimed guardians of this codified version of Hinduism. According to Mani, the great campaigns to improve the lives of Hindu women (right down to the Age of Consent Bill in 1891) were really not about women at all. Women were little more than pawns in the hands of patriarchal agents

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who sought to strengthen their own power in the emerging colonial paradigm. Furthermore, it has been well documented that one of the unintended consequences of the government’s decision to ratify a high-caste reform measure like widow marriage was to suggest that the customary ban on marrying widows was in fact a marker of high caste standing. Caste groups seeking more respect in the emerging colonial order were more likely to uphold the ban. Thus, far from promoting the practice, the new act actually hampered meaningful social change.130 For scholars like Mani, this only reveals the fundamental error of yoking reform to colonial notions of Hindu law. More recently, a similar if more nuanced argument has been advanced by Sekhar Bandyopadhyay.131 Like Mani, Bandyopadhyay is concerned with demonstrating that the advent of colonial modernity in Bengal promoted a retraditionalizing of Hindu religious and social practice. He highlights the paradox whereby increased education and literacy in places like Calcutta actually fostered a cementing of traditional norms. In this view, Vidyasagar’s opponents were fighting to retain their cultural hegemony. Bandyopadhyay argues that in view of entrenched caste and gender attitudes, Vidyasagar’s reform had no chance; indeed, it was all but dead on arrival.132 Part of the problem, he suggests, is that Vidyasagar premised his reform on a misunderstanding of the importance of scripture in relation to both oral tradition and local custom.133 According to this view, Vidyasagar was blind (or at least insensitive) to the fact that his attempt to generate arguments based on classical legal texts was premised on a view of “scripture” that had in fact been promulgated by the British. While Vidyasagar plumbed the scriptures in search of proof texts in support of widow marriage, he failed to realize that some Hindu communities actually supported the prohibition on widow marriage as a way to demonstrate their orthodoxy. Furthermore, and fatally, while the prior ban on suttee could be enforced with the powerful sanction of legal punishment, Act XV did no more than approve the validity of widow marriage. It did not provide a sanction strong enough to change local practice. As a study in the long-term failure of the widow marriage campaign, Bandyopadhyay’s analysis is trenchant and illuminating. It reminds us of the ultimate lack of harmony between the reformist vision of Calcutta’s educated elites and the realities of orthodox Hindu hegemony. At the same time, I fear Bandyopadhyay can do little to take us inside the creative vision and strategic choices made by Vidyasagar. In his account, as in Mani’s, there is a real danger of turning the author of Hindu Widow Marriage into a colonial dupe or a

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modern naïf. Whereas Mani leaves one wondering whether Vidyasagar would have even thought of consulting the legal samhitas had the British not told him to do so, Bandyopadhay tempts one to ask how such a learned scholar could have gotten it so wrong. But one has to ask, Did he really get it so terribly wrong? Was he too stubborn or naïve to see what he was up against? There is no reason to doubt that Vidyasagar recognized the strength of his opponents’ argument from custom. Not only does the word “custom” (achara) appear regularly throughout the pages of Hindu Widow Marriage, but he directly addresses the problem at the very outset of Book One: “If we are to consider the topic of widow marriage we must first of all recognize that it is not a custom promoted in this land. Hence, if widows are to be given in marriage, it will be necessary to institute a new custom.” This makes it clear that his goal is precisely to establish a new pattern of local custom. However, the premise behind his argument is that no new custom will be able to command people’s respect if it cannot be shown to be in accord with the fundamental tenets of the Hindu tradition.134 In other words, he finds himself somewhat trapped; he recognizes the power of custom, but believes that the only way to correct customary practice is to provide compelling scriptural proof. As the conclusion to Book Two reveals, he ultimately attempts to turn the trap on his opponents by demonstrating the hypocrisy of lauding the integrity of local custom even as it undercuts the norms of Hindu scripture. The way to accomplish this goal is first of all by determining “whether or not widow marriage is a required sacred performance” (second paragraph of Book One). In his opinion, the Hindu scriptures hold out the only genuine promise of returning to a more legitimate social practice. By returning to the norms of Hindu scripture, women will be treated more justly and equitably. At the close of Topic 23 of Book Two, he cites the well-known words of Manu: “The gods take delight in the family wherein women are treated with affection” (Sanskrit passage 2.23.4). Commenting on this passage, Vidyasagar writes that “the misconduct of men has led to the ruination of women. It is heartbreaking to consider the plight of women in India today. The custom of ensuring the happiness and affection of women has nearly disappeared. . . . [M]en today fail to behave toward women as they have been instructed” (Topic 23 of Book Two). These words mark the transition into Topic 24, the last topic taken up before the conclusion of Book Two. In Topic 24, Vidyasagar returns to the

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central question of deciding how much binding authority “local custom” (deshachara) should have in guiding social practices. As a pandit who had studied law and passed the examinations to become a judge-pandit in the British courts, Vidyasagar was aware of the counterarguments. He may even have known the passage from Devannabhatta that seems to make local custom the supreme authority: “The Custom of a country should receive the first consideration; and in every country its Custom alone should be observed.”135 The whole purpose of Topic 24 is to provide a compelling answer to this sort of position. Relative to the overall length of Book Two, Topic 24 is surprisingly brief. This might suggest that Vidyasagar recognized how difficult it was to refute the argument from custom. His tone at the outset of the section seems to confirm this, since he almost grudgingly begins: “Now I must make my best effort to arrive at a determination on one final objection.” It isn’t a strong beginning, and we can almost see him looking around for help. In fact, we know Vidyasagar did directly consult other pandits on this question. He tells us in the preface to the fourth edition of the work that his colleague Taranath Tarkavachaspati (a mighty scholar in his own right) provided him with one of the proof texts he cites in Topic 24: “Just as Smriti cannot be accepted if it competes with the Veda, so too local custom is not acceptable if it contradicts Smriti.”136 It could be that passages such as this constituted for Vidyasagar a rather straightforward counterargument to those who promoted local custom. And this might then explain the brevity of Topic 24. Perhaps he felt that no more argument was needed. Certainly this single verse seems to encapsulate Vidyasagar’s entire strategy in Hindu Widow Marriage. Put simply, there may be times when local custom is a valid source on which to base norms of conduct. However, if custom contradicts the fundamental teachings of the authoritative treatises, then it must be abandoned. Parashara provides proof that the legal treatises sanction widow marriage. Therefore, the practice should be promoted. Of course, Vidyasagar was not so naïve as to think that proof texts alone would be enough to sway popular opinion. He must have recognized that the force of cultural inertia and the fear of social ostracism were strong impediments to reform. No doubt this is why he resorted to one further stratagem in the conclusion to Book Two. Here, employing equal measures of reason and irony, Vidyasagar makes a final assault on local custom. Put simply, he points out that customs can and do change. More important, he provides

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concrete evidence of specific customs that had evolved over time in his own region of Bengal. In so doing, he hopes to pull the rug out from under those who opposed reform on the grounds of an immutable and sacrosanct custom. Perhaps the tardy arrival of such critical historical thinking within Hindu Widow Marriage will strike some as too little too late. But it should remind us that the parties in conflict are not simply two factions of retrograde scripturalists. Rather, by bringing historical change into the spotlight, Vidyasagar offers what might be called a new scriptural hermeneutic. His historically informed reading of Hindu practice allows him to skewer the kind of hypocrisy that placed blind allegiance to social norms on a higher plane than genuine respect for the scriptural norms of conduct. Such historical awareness informs the mock paean that he dedicates to the rule of local custom: Thanks to your privileged status, there is no sin in eating, associating, or exchanging gifts with those who are destroyers of caste and who spend their time performing actions that degrade righteousness, simply because they are diligent in their defense of what is popular. (Topic 25 of Book Two)

Such passages certainly make it difficult to argue that Vidyasagar failed to appreciate the power of local custom. They also make it hard to construe his appeal to legal texts as evidence of a textualized brahmanical paternalism that sought to impose “scripture” on a dumb public. To the contrary, the concluding two sections of Hindu Widow Marriage reveal the degree to which the entire work is a reasoned attempt to harness the authority of the legal texts for the purpose of changing a custom wrongly viewed as sacrosanct. If anything, one might even say that Vidyasagar breaks the Brahman’s hold over scripture by arguing his case before the court of public opinion. In this respect, the real significance of Hindu Widow Marriage is not that it is a great work of humanitarian “social reform” in some abstract sense. Nor is it, conversely, that the text reveals the ugly face of brahmanical arrogance and Hindu patriarchy empowered by a colonial ideology premised on the privileging of scripture over customary law. Rather, the text is most significant for what it reveals about the attempt of one modern Indian intellectual to mobilize enduring elements of the Sanskrit tradition for promoting change. Alternatively, we might concede that the text is indeed both “reformist” and “brahmanical,” but only if we understand these terms somewhat differently. This is progressive reform predicated on mastery of classical scriptural exege-

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sis. This is brahmanical privilege deployed to demonstrate the hypocrisy of brahmanical social practice. When all is said and done, we may still be right to ask why the great reforms of the nineteenth century placed women so squarely in the foreground and yet achieved so little for them in reality. We may rightly question the logic of predicating a law to enhance women’s choices on the argument that without such freedom women would fall prey to unrestrained sexual desire. We may also question the viability of attempting to legislate social change on the basis of Hindu legal codes that not only were largely inaccessible to the majority of the population but also were being bent to the interests of an oppressive imperial regime. We may also wonder whether the use of Sanskrit sources in a work like Hindu Widow Marriage does not, ironically, mark the beginning of the end of Sanskrit’s saliency for indigenous intellectual practice.137 But none of these concerns should blind us to the fact that in this remarkable text we find Vidyasagar (and, indirectly, even his opponents) putting the traditions of Sanskrit scholarship to work in an emerging colonial public sphere. This is ultimately what makes this text so significant. Placing Hindu Widow Marriage before English-language readers will, I hope, generate renewed interest in the colonial life of Sanskrit and encourage further efforts to develop more historically detailed accounts of the fascinating particulars of social reform in modern India.

Notes 1. The words appear in a letter that Vidyasagar wrote to one of his younger brothers in 1884. For a longer selection from the letter, see Hatcher, “No Slave to Custom,” 128–129; for the Bengali letter, see Benoy Ghosh, Vidyasagar o Bangali Samaj, 239. 2. Dutt’s much-quoted epitome of Vidyasagar as having “the genius and wisdom of an ancient sage, the energy of an Englishman, and the heart of a Bengali mother” is taken from the poet’s letters, as cited in Ghosh, Vidyasagar o Bangali Samaj, 362. 3. Tanika Sarkar, “Wicked Widows,” 86. 4. Heimsath long ago wrote: “The most famous social reform movement which emerged from the numerous reform societies, discussion groups, and literary activities of mid-century Bengal was the crusade for widow remarriage, rightly linked to its chief promoter, Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar” (Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform, 79). 5. As Vidyasagar puts it in the preface, the translation is “neither entire nor literal” (Marriage of Hindu Widows, ii). In his English translation, Book One is titled Marriage of Hindu Widows (1–17), while Book Two is titled Marriage of Hindu Widows: The Rejoinder (18–109). For a comparison of contents, see table 2.

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48 Introduction 6. For a detailed investigation of Vidyasagar’s upbringing and education, his goals and accomplishments as an educator and author, and an interpretation of his religious and moral worldview, see Hatcher, Idioms of Improvement. 7. Readers may note that Vidyasagar signed the two books of Hindu Widow Marriage using the name Ishvarchandra Sharma. “Sharma” is a common title for Brahmans in Bengal. 8. Hatcher, Idioms of Improvement, 264. 9. For more on Vidyasagar’s connection with the Sabha and a translation of two early works he composed in association with the group, see Hatcher, Bourgeois Hinduism. 10. There is no space to develop this claim here, but an appreciation of the superior quality of Vidyasagar’s works can be found in Sarkar, “Wicked Widows,” 111. For one illustration of his strengths as a writer, one might compare his Bengali prose with that of the passage from an opponent quoted in the opening of Topic 5. 11. Sekhar Bandyopadhyay offers a fine analysis of the role of such faction leaders and patrons in the context of the widow marriage campaign in Caste, Culture, and Hegemony, 120–123. 12. Biharilal Sarkar reports that the Sambad Prabhakar announced such a prize in the amount of Rs 1000, in Vidyasagar, 178n.89. 13. For the text of Act XV, “The Hindu Widow’s Re-marriage Act,” see Gupte, Hindu Law of Marriage, 67–69; or Gopalakrishnan and Sethi, Codified Hindu Laws, appendix C. 14. The bride and groom were Shrishchandra Vidyaratna and Kalimati Devi. It was a memorable day in the history of India, according to Ghosh, Vidyasagar o Bangali Samaj, 265. 15. Quoted in Benoy Ghosh, comp., Selections from English Periodicals, 242. 16. It was in the context of defending Narayan’s decision that Vidyasagar proclaimed widow marriage his most important accomplishment. See Ghosh, Vidyasagar o Bangali Samaj, 239. 17. Heimsath, Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform, 14. 18. For a fascinating and detailed account of the Mutiny in Delhi, see Dalrymple, Last Mughal. 19. On these developments, see Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj. 20. Sartori speaks of a turn away from the liberal, reformist temper of the early nineteenth century toward a distinctively “culturalist paradigm,” in Bengal in Global Concept History, 7. On changing attitudes to reform from Bengal to Bombay, see Sumit Sarkar, Modern India, 1885– 1947, 70–71. 21. On one occasion, Rabindranath invited Vidyasagar to join some of his younger contemporaries in forming an academy of literature. Vidyasagar famously refused, claiming there was no point in involving “bigwigs” since they could not be made to agree on anything. See Dutta and Robinson, Rabindranath Tagore, 83. 22. Quoted in Vivekananda, Life of Swami Vivekananda, 342–343. 23. For a taste of the high-flown rhetoric prompted by his passing, see “In Memoriam: Pundit Iswara Chandra Vidyasagar,” 363. 24. In “Recasting the Women’s Question,” Lal builds on and reconsiders a wealth of literature on the issue of women and reform in modern India. A key point of departure is Partha Chatterjee, “Nationalist Resolution of the Women’s Question.” 25. Lal, “Recasting the Women’s Question,” 323. There is insufficient space here to explore Lal’s contention that for all her centrality, this same “girl-child” is in fact largely absent from debates over the reform of women’s lives. Lal’s point is that “colonial logic minoritizes women by denying them, somewhat ironically, their very minority—which is to say their status as girlchildren” (323). Figures for compassionate reflection, these girl-children are simultaneously denied the capacities of change, growth, and development that one would associate precisely with

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49 Introduction children. It is worth noting that one of the hottest new television shows in India in 2009, Balika Vadhu, or Child-Bride, features the plight of a young girl caught up in an illegal child marriage. See http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/05/26/indias-child-bride-tv-sen_n_207658.html. 26. For a helpful discussion of this dynamic as it is manifested in colonial ideology, see Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, esp. 92–112. 27. A sati is literally a “virtuous woman.” By extension, it refers to a wife who chooses to burn herself with her dead husband’s body, a rite known as sahamarana, or “dying along with [the husband].” In Bengali, this practice is often referred to as satidaha, or the “burning of a virtuous woman.” 28. Quoted in Killingley, Rammohun Roy in Hindu and Christian Tradition, 35. Killingley notes that Rammohan was not the only Indian of the time to express his opposition to the practice (4). Mrityunjay Vidyalankar had delivered an opinion to the Supreme Court in 1817 that opposed the custom, even using an argument that Rammohan himself would later apply. 29. Bayly, “Rammohan Roy and the Advent of Constitutional Liberalism in India,” 29. 30. Ibid., 28. 31. Wolpert, New History of India, 212–213. 32. Transcripts of Bentinck’s Minute of November 8, 1829, on the suppression of Sati; the Preamble to Regulation XVII; and Bentinck’s letter of December 4 to the Court of Directors regarding passage of the Regulation can be found in Majumdar, Raja Rammohun Roy and Progressive Movements in India, 139–148, 153, 154–155, respectively. 33. Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, 96. 34. The trope of the “widow bowed in misery” remains powerful to this day. See Basu, Hindu Women and Marriage Law, in Agnes, Chandra, and Basu, Women and Law in India, 67. 35. Manu 5.158; see Laws of Manu, trans. Doniger and Smith, 115. 36. Hatcher, Idioms of Improvement, 42. 37. Shivnath Shastri, “Panditavar Ishvarchandra Vidyasagar,” 7–8. 38. Basu, Hindu Women and Marriage Law, 71. 39. A version of this event is recounted in Kartikachandra Ray’s biography of Raja Krishnachandra of Nadia, the Kshitishavamshavalicharita (listed in the bibliography under “Sanskrit Texts and Translations”). Brief information on Rajvallabha is found in Hunter, Statistical Account, 123. 40. Vidyasagar, Hindu Widow Marriage, Book One, Sanskrit passage 1.6. 41. Bose, Indian Awakening and Bengal, 209. For background on particular pandits and centers of learning in Bengal, see Sinha, Pandits in a Changing Environment. 42. On Krishnachandra and Nyayapanchanan, see Radhi, Navadvipa-Mahima, 345. Nyayapanchanan was the author of several Nirnaya-style works (e.g., Prayashchitta-nirnaya, Tithinirnaya, Daya-nirnaya, etc.). 43. The story is told in the Kshitishavamshavalicharita and is summarized in Ghosh, Vidyasagar o Bangali Samaj, 241. 44. Ghosh, Vidyasagar o Bangali Samaj, 241. The cause was again taken up in later years by Kalikrishna Mitra (1822–1891), who was inspired by Vidyasagar’s campaign. However, his efforts were opposed by the zamindar of Ula, Bamandas Mukhopadhyay. See Candicharan Bandyopadhyay, Vidyasagar, 193. 45. Quoted in Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, 10. 46. Ludo Rocher, “Law Books in an Oral Culture,” 254. 47. In this paragraph, I have been quoting from Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, 100. 48. Ibid., 99. 49. Majumdar, Raja Rammohun Roy and Progressive Movements in India, 18.

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50 Introduction 50. Rammohan, “Brief Remarks regarding Modern Encroachments on the Ancient Rights of Females, according to the Hindoo Law of Inheritance,” in English Works of Raja Rammohun Roy, 373–384. 51. Peary Chand Mitra, “Marriage of Hindu Widows,” 359. 52. Bose, Indian Awakening and Bengal, 209. Heimsath comments that the reform “seemed a natural development from the Act prohibiting suttee: after protecting widows from selfimmolation, the government might be disposed toward removing restrictions on their remarriage” (Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform, 82). 53. Quoted in Bose, Indian Awakening and Bengal, 209. 54. Quoted in ibid., 210. For the Bengali text of the Jnananveshan notice, see Brajendranath Bandyopadhyay, Sambad patre sekaler katha, 98–99. See also Maloni, “Iswarchandra Vidyasagar and the Changing Status of Women in Bengal,” 121. 55. Ghosh, Vidyasagar o Bangali Samaj, 242–244. 56. Government of India, Eighty-first Report of the Indian Law Commission, 15. 57. While Hindu Widow Marriage was composed for a Bengali audience, Vidyasagar does refer to his audience as the “people of India” (bharatavarshiya loka) rather than as “Bengalis” more narrowly. See Topic 25 of Book Two. 58. Subal Chandra Mitra, Isvar Chandra Vidyasagar, 272. In 1869 in Bombay, the great reformer M. G. Ranade joined the Widow Remarriage Association, but famously failed to marry a widow after his first wife died. See Forbes, Women in Modern India, 25. Works on widow marriage were published across India well after passage of Act XV. See, for instance, Row’s Hindu Law on Marriage, published in Madras in 1880. 59. Cited in Indra Mitra, Karunasagara Vidyasagar, 242. 60. Mitra, “Marriage of Hindu Widows,” 359. 61. Mitra, Karunasagara Vidyasagar, 243, quoting from a notice of Ramachandra’s death published in the English-language Bengal Hurkaru on March 11, 1845. 62. See the foreword to the formal ruling published by the Dharma Sabha in 1846 as Vidhava vivaha nishedha vishayaka vyavastha evam tadiya bhashartha samgrihita haiya dharma sabhar anumatyanusare mudrita haila. See also Mitra, Karunasagara Vidyasagar, 243–244. 63. In 1845, Nilakamal Bandyopadhyay of Bowbazaar called a meeting to express public support for widow marriage, but apparently fear of the rich and powerful leaders of society meant that ultimately nothing came of the meeting. See Bandyopadhyay, Vidyasagar, 192; and Vidyaratna, Vidyasagar-jivanacharita, 112. 64. Maloni, “Iswarchandra Vidyasagar and the Changing Status of Women in Bengal,” 121. The editor of Sambad Bhaskar, Gaurishankar Bhattacharya, singled out Kashiprosad Ghosh, editor of the Hindu Intelligencer, for his backward views on such matters. See Ghosh, comp., Selections from English Periodicals, 254. 65. My own translation of “Balyavivaher dosha.” See Vidyasagar, “Evils of Child Marriage.” 66. Rammohan, quoted in Killingley, Rammohun Roy in Hindu and Christian Tradition, 35. 67. Supposedly, Vidyasagar had a “eureka” moment late in 1853, when he came across the passage from Parashara (Sarkar, Vidyasagar, 172). Another biographer describes Vidyasagar’s quest for a scriptural warrant as even more serious than Rama’s quest to rescue his wife Sita (Bandyopadhyay, Vidyasagar, 194). Sumit Sarkar rightly questions such overly dramatic accounts in “Vidyasagar and Brahmanical Society,” in Women and Social Reform in Modern India, ed. Sarkar and Sarkar, 143n.74. 68. Vidyasagar, “Vidhavavivaha prachalita haoya uchita ki na etadvishayaka prastava.” 69. Arabinda Poddar, introduction to the reprint edition of Marriage of Hindu Widows, ix.

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51 Introduction 70. Ghosh, comp., Selections from English Periodicals, 116. See also Bose, Indian Awakening and Bengal, 213; and Mitra, Karunasagara Vidyasagar, 253. 71. Mitra, “Marriage of Hindu Widows,” 359. 72. Paraphrasing from Akshaykumar Datta, “Vidhavavivaha,” 180–187. This essay has recently been reprinted in a valuable collection of Datta’s essays, Shreshtha prabandha, 29–38. 73. For some examples of poems and songs, see Sarkar, Vidyasagar, 183–186. 74. Cakravarti, Dasharathi Rayer pamchali, 657. 75. Prasannakumar is listed among those who rejected Vidyasagar’s reading of Parashara Smriti. See Book Two, footnote 1. Vidyasagar addresses Prasannakumar’s opinions directly in Topic 6 of Book Two. 76. On this issue, see Ghosh, Vidyasagar o Bangali Samaj, 249–250; for Haldar’s composition, see 536–541. In his preface to the fourth edition of Vidhava-vivaha, Vidyasagar attempted to answer the charge that he had based his books on the unacknowledged work of others. He names several individuals from whom he received assistance, but even here he does not mention Haldar. See Vidyasagar-granthavali, ed. Cattopadhyaya, Bandyopadhyay, and Das, 2:13–16. 77. Vidyasagar, “Vidhavavivaha vishayaka dvitiya pustaker upakrama bhaga o upasamhara bhaga.” 78. In the Cattopadhyaya, Bandyopadhyay, and Das edition of Vidyasagar-granthavali, the book runs to 163 octavo pages. On its title page, it substitutes “dvitiya pustaka” (Book Two) for the subtitle used on the title page of Book One, “etadvishayaka prastava” (“a proposal on this matter”). 79. Sarkar indicates that Vidyasagar got help with the English version from Anandakrishna Basu, with whom he had studied English when he was younger, in Vidyasagar, 186. 80. Mitra, “Marriage of Hindu Widows,” 359. 81. Ibid., 363. 82. Ghosh, comp., Selections from English Periodicals, 114. 83. This is a paraphrase. He actually says, “Consuetude doth make law; desuetude doth destroy its efficacy” (ibid., 115). 84. Ibid., 137–138. 85. Maitra, Paunarbhava khandanam; Vidyasagar’s comments in the conclusion to Book Two. 86. This comment and the previous criticism are found in Smritiratna, Vidhava-vivaha prativada. 87. Compare Vidyasagar’s complaint about the “cleverness” of another opponent, in Book Two, footnote 119. 88. Translated from the preface as reprinted in Vidyasagar rachana-samgraha, 2:17. 89. Vrajnath apparently debated Vidyasagar on at least one occasion. In a debate at the influential Shobabajar house in northern Calcutta, Radhakant Deb awarded Vidyasagar a shawl for successfully arguing his case. Later, under pressure from local Hindus, Deb convened a second debate at which he declared Vrajnath the winner. See Sarkar, Vidyasagar, 73–74; and Mitra, Isvar Chandra Vidyasagar, 266–269. In 1884 Vidyasagar published a satirical attack on Vrajnath Vidyaratna titled Vraj-vilasa (The Comedy of Vrajnath). 90. Vidyasagar rachana-samgraha, 2:17–18. For more context, see Datta, “Vidhavavivaha,” 180–187. 91. Vidyasagar was not the first, or only, Sanskrit intellectual to adopt this mode of framing the discussion. See Dinabandhu Nyayaratna, Vidhavavivahavada. 92. Petitions in favor ran nearly equal to those against (23 versus 28, respectively). However, the 5,191 total signatories to petitions in support of the measure were massively outnumbered by their opponents, who generated 55,746 signatures. See Sarkar, “Wicked Widows,” 84. For

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52 Introduction a discussion of some characteristic petitions, see Government of India, Eighty-first Report of the Indian Law Commission, 16. 93. For a now-classic statement of the decline of Sanskrit, see Pollock, “Death of Sanskrit.” My response to this thesis can be found in Hatcher, “Sanskrit and the Morning After.” 94. For some recent work that addresses this problem, see Rosane Rocher, “Henry Thomas Colebrooke and the Marginalization of Indian Pandits”; and Hatcher, “What’s Become of the Pandit?” 95. Asok Sen, Vidyasagar and His Elusive Milestones, 75. Elsewhere, Sen remarks that the task of finding scriptural sanctions presented Vidyasagar with a “purely intellectual challenge,” suggesting that he felt little real commitment to the authoritative treatises (73). 96. Haldar argues that Vidyasagar was “a man of very practical turn of mind, he knew he must beat the orthodox at their own game, prove with scriptural texts that widow remarriage is permitted by Hindu sastras, if he was to win complete victory” (Vidyasagar, 45). Sen Gupta suggests that for Vidyasagar, “practical commonsense came first and scriptural support was intended only to disarm thoughtless opposition” (“Vidyasagar,” 137). 97. Bankimchandra Chatterjee, Bankim rachanavali, 2:318. Somewhere in between the two poles lies Partha Chatterjee’s interpretation, which is equally unsatisfying: “Vidyasagar, despite his professed disregard for the sanctity or reasonableness of the sastra, felt compelled to look for scriptural support for his programmes” (Nation and Its Fragments, 25). 98. Of the reliable interpreters of Vidyasagar, it is Tripathi who best appreciates this dimension of Vidyasagar’s shastric reform, in Vidyasagar. 99. In the preface to his English translation, Vidyasagar tells us: “I did not take up my pen before I was fully convinced that the Sastras explicitly sanction their [Hindu widows’] remarriage” (Marriage of Hindu Widows, i). 100. On Vidyasagar’s goal of mediating Sanskrit learning through Bengali, see Hatcher, “Sastric Modernity.” 101. Vidyasagar’s refutation of Madhavacharya’s reading of Parashara 4.28 in Topic 2 of Book Two is an excellent example of his commitment to meeting his opponents on the grounds of accepted commentarial practice. 102. The medieval polymath Vachaspati Mishra states that the principles governing the treatment of legal procedures are based on logic, not revelation. See Vivadachintamani of Vachaspati Mishra, xxi. 103. Krishna Datta, “Controversy over a Verse on the Remarriage of Hindu Women,” 7. 104. As Lingat noted long ago, the essential task of interpreting texts on Hindu dharma is “the search from amongst the rules of smriti, for that which ought to be held for an obligatory rule of conduct, viz. a rule the breach of which is a sin, a rule of dharma” (Classical Law of India, 148). In this task, the interpreter has to work from the formal properties of the text, which means he must have mastery of such disciplines as grammar, logic, and exegesis. 105. Manu’s Code of Law, 70. 106. Jimutavahana’s Dayabhaga, 5. 107. Ludo Rocher comments on Jimutavahana in this regard in ibid., 32. 108. I borrow here loosely from ideas expressed in Lopez, Elaborations on Emptiness, chap. 10. 109. Tubb and Boose, Scholastic Sanskrit, 3. 110. For a representative example of this balance, see Madhavacharya’s discussion of Parashara Samhita 1.24, as quoted in Vidyasagar, Hindu Widow Marriage, Book Two, Sanskrit passage 2.17.5. 111. My translation of a verse quoted in Tubb and Boose, Scholastic Sanskrit, 3, borrowing their basic terminology.

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53 Introduction 112. In Topic 9 of Book Two, Vidyasagar challenges his opponents’ reading by giving an elementary lesson on the need for agreement between noun and adjective, noting that a plural adjective cannot modify a noun in the singular. In Topic 15 of Book Two, we see him address the way his opponents eliminate, misconstrue, or ignore key terms like “all” or “chief” (as applied to the noun dharma) in order to make their point. 113. Tubb and Boose, Scholastic Sanskrit, 2. 114. An important early tract composed in response to Hindu Widow Marriage was Nyayaratna’s Vidhavavivahavada, published in 1855. Others include a tract attributed to the pseudonymous “Bridegroom,” Shriyuta Ishvarachandra Vidyasagara ghataka viracita vidhava vivaha vidhayaka kulapanjikar kono vara pradatta bhramoddharaka pratyuttara; and Padmalochan Nyayaratna, Vidhava vivaha prachalita haoya atyanta anuchita etadvishayaka pramana-samuha. 115. Tubb and Boose, Scholastic Sanskrit, 5. 116. Ibid., 174. 117. Of exegesis, or mimamsa, H. T. Colebrooke wrote: “The written law, whether it be sruti or smriti, direct revelation, or traditional, is subject to the same rules of interpretation. These rules are collected in the Mimansa, which is a disquisition on proof and authority of precepts. It is considered as a branch of philosophy; and is properly the logic of law” (quoted in Ludo Rocher, “Schools of Hindu Law,” 171n.2). See also Kisori Lal Sarkar, Mimamsa Rules of Interpretation, 62; and Pashupatinath Shastri, Introduction to the Purva Mimamsa, 179–222. 118. Viewed in terms of the traditions of dharmashastra, what Vidyasagar is engaged in is known as vyavahara, or “legal procedure,” which is the means for arriving at judgments in cases of uncertainty (samdeha-nirnaya-hetu). On this, see Davis, “Hinduism as a Legal Tradition,” 245. For a succinct illustration of the commentarial technique of responding to a doubt that might be raised by an opponent, see Book One, footnote 2. 119. Overall, this persistent doubling of Sanskrit passages and Bengali translations lends a certain overdetermined quality to Hindu Widow Marriage, which is partially obscured in this translation, which eliminates the Sanskrit. But the text feels overdetermined in other ways as well. For instance, in his discussion of Kshetraja sons in Topic 6 of Book Two, Vidyasagar works relentlessly (we might even say tiresomely) to deprive his opponents of any loopholes that might allow for objections. Likewise, in Topic 7 of Book Two, one almost pities Vidyasagar, who feels compelled to rehearse basic grammatical rules in order to dismiss an objection that even his wiser opponents conceded was invalid. 120. It is worth pointing out that within the specific area of Hindu law, this could mean addressing a continuity of textual practice that extended from the seventh to the eighteenth centuries. See Derrett, History of Indian Law, 15. 121. Ibid., 16. Especially important in Bengal in this regard were the Dattaka-mimamsa of Nanda Pandita and Dattaka-candrika of Kubera. Attentive readers will notice that Vidyasagar often cites these two texts. 122. On the capacity of Sanskrit commentary to promote innovation, see Pollock, “New Intellectuals in Seventeenth-Century India,” 11. 123. In 1847 he established the Sanskrit Press and Depository with his friend and fellow pandit Madanmohan Tarkalankar. See Ghosh, Vidyasagar o Bangali Samaj, 163ff. At the Sanskrit Press, he developed a simplified Bengali typographic “sort” still known as the “Vidyasagar Sort.” See Ross, Printed Bengali Character, 129. 124. The fact that he continued to make editorial changes to Hindu Widow Marriage after passage of Act XV, along with the fact that he produced an English translation in 1856, suggests that Vidyasagar was doing something more than just arguing Hindu law.

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54 Introduction 125. Topic 19 of Book Two provides a brief but delightful skewering of a scholar of logic (nyaya) who attempted to refute Vidyasagar’s arguments. 126. He first tried this tactic in the short conclusion to Book One; in Book Two, he makes the threat more dramatic. The Bengali term vyabhichara could mean either “adultery” or “prostitution.” In my translation, I use the latter word, since this is what Vidyasagar preferred for his own English translation. The other operative term is bhrunahatya, or “abortion.” 127. Basu, Hindu Women and Marriage Law, 82. 128. Mani, “Contentious Traditions,” which draws on her earlier essay “Production of an Official Discourse on Sati in Early-Nineteenth-Century Bengal.” For a recent analysis informed by Mani’s perspective, see Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, 99–106. 129. For a persuasive argument that the British turned to codifying Hindu law out of an anxiety engendered by the challenge of understanding local custom, see Wilson, “Anxieties of Distance.” 130. For further exploration of the issues of gender, reform, and the textualization of Hindu law under colonial rule, see O’Hanlon, “Issues of Widowhood”; and Carroll, “Law, Custom, and Statutory Reform.” 131. Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, “Caste and Social Reform: The Case of Widow Marriage,” in Caste, Culture, and Hegemony, 108–141, originally published as “Caste, Widow Marriage, and the Reform of Popular Culture in Colonial Bengal.” 132. Bandyopadhyay, Caste, Culture, and Hegemony, 109, where he quotes Sen, who saw Vidyasagar’s reform as ending in “unavoidable defeat” (Vidyasagar and His Elusive Milestones, 6). In the words of Derrett, Vidyasagar “worked for years to enable widows to remarry and eventually he overcame the legal barrier; he was unable to overcome the ethno-characterology of his people” (Death of a Marriage Law, 186). 133. Bandyopadhyay, Caste, Culture, and Hegemony, 118. 134. Notice that in Topic 21 of Book Two, he gives an example of one popular custom that had no sanction in the authoritative treatises. 135. Cited and translated in Jha, Studies in Hindu Law, 14. Devannabhatta was not widely read in Bengal, which may explain why he is nowhere cited in Hindu Widow Marriage. 136. Vidyasagar, Hindu Widow Marriage, Book Two, Sanskrit passage 2.24.3. 137. There is an argument to be made that the reformers’ use of scriptural sources to promote reform degrades into the practice of invoking scripture as a mere “emblem” of cultural authenticity in the nationalist and postcolonial periods. This is an issue I hope to explore in more detail in the future.

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NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN HINDU WIDOW MARRIAGE The Complete English Translation

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NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN BOOK ONE

Nowadays most people appreciate the great misfortune caused by our failure to promote the custom of widow marriage. There are many who are now prepared to give their own widowed daughters in marriage.1 Even those who do not have the courage to go this far will nonetheless acknowledge that it is necessary to begin promoting the practice. In times past, the preeminent scholars of this land debated whether or not the marriage of widows was in accordance with the authoritative treatises. Sadly, when the debate is raised today, scholars hankering for victory are so eager to advance their own position that they rarely consider investigating the truth of the proposal.2 It is no surprise that when such scholars gather for debate there is precious little hope that the finer points of the matter will come to light. In those debates both parties race to claim victory over their opponents. We all know what sort of detailed inquiry gets produced like that. While such debates rarely allow a determination to be made in the matter, they have at least produced one important result. There are many who now wish to learn the finer points of the matter. Sensing this eagerness on the part of so many people, I began to examine the matter as carefully as I could. And since I have met with success thus far, I now offer to the general public the present work, composed in the popular language of the land. I ask everyone to read it and consider the matter objectively. Then decide whether or not widow marriage should be promoted. If we are to consider the topic of widow marriage we must first of all recognize that it is not a custom promoted in this land. Hence, if widows are to be given in marriage, it will be necessary to institute a new custom. But if it should turn out that widow marriage were a forbidden performance, it would be entirely inappropriate to institute it or promote it. No religious person will undertake a performance that is prohibited. Therefore, before

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all else, we must determine whether or not widow marriage is a required sacred performance. The people of this land will scarcely be persuaded if we appeal to reason alone in order to show that widow marriage is a required sacred performance. However, if we can establish that it is a required sacred performance according to the authoritative treatises, people will consent and will agree to act accordingly. In this land the authoritative treatises are the ultimate valid authority in all such matters. Everyone accepts that actions in agreement with the authoritative treatises are required sacred performances. Therefore, we must begin by determining whether or not widow marriage is in accord with the authoritative treatises. When setting out to determine whether or not widow marriage is in accord with the authoritative treatises one must first indicate which authoritative treatises consider it a required sacred performance and which do not. Treatises that are authoritative on grammar, poetics, rhetoric, and philosophy are not authoritative in this matter. One must consult those treatises that are considered authoritative treatises on duty; it is these that are considered authoritative in this matter.3 Yajnavalkya Samhita indicates which treatises are dharmashastra, or “authoritative treatises on duty”:

Sanskrit passage 1.1: Yajnavalkya 1.4–5 The following are composers of authoritative treatises on duty: Manu, Atri, Vishnu, Harita, Yajnavalkya, Ushanah, Angiras, Yama, Apastamba, Samvarta, Katyayana, Brihaspati, Parashara, Vyasa, Shankha and Likhita, Daksha, Gotama, Shatatapa, Vashishtha.

The treatises composed by these men are the authoritative treatises on duty.1 The people of India follow all the duties indicated in these authoritative treatises.4 All the duties approved in the authoritative treatises on duty are required sacred performances; all the duties proscribed in these treatises are prohibited. If widow marriage is approved by the authoritative treatises on duty, it may be accepted as a required sacred performance. If it is proscribed by the authoritative treatises on duty, it should not be included among our required sacred performances.

1. In addition to these, a few authoritative treatises composed by ancient sages such as Narada, Baudhayana, etc., can also be included among the authoritative treatises on duty.

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59 Book One

Next we must consider whether or not all the duties described in the authoritative treatises on duty are to be followed in every yuga.5 The authoritative treatise on duty composed by Manu makes a determination in this matter:

Sanskrit passage 1.2: Manu 1.85 Because the energies of human beings decline in sequence with the ages, the duties of the Satya Yuga are one thing; the duties of the Treta Yuga are another; the duties of the Dvapara Yuga are another; and the duties of the Kali Yuga are another.6

In other words, the people of later yugas are not capable of following all the duties that were adopted by the people of earlier ages; this is because in every succeeding yuga the powers of human beings decline. The people of the Treta Yuga did not have the power to adopt the duties of the Satya Yuga and the people of the Dvapara Yuga did not have the power to adopt the duties of either the Satya or the Treta Yuga. The people of the Kali Yuga do not have the power to adopt the duties of the Satya, Treta, or Dvapara Yugas. We must conclude, therefore, that the people of the Kali Yuga are incapable of adhering to the duties of earlier ages. Someone might well ask: If that is the case, then what duties should the people of the Kali Yuga observe? The authoritative treatise on duty composed by Manu tells us simply that there are different duties for different yugas. Manu does not specify the different duties for the different yugas. By contrast, in the authoritative treatises on duty composed by Atri, Vishnu, Harita, and the others, we do not find the idea of “different duties for different yugas.” These authoritative treatises on duty merely indicate a selection of duties; there is no investigation of the particular duties that apply in particular yugas (in keeping with the idea that the power of humans decreases with every succeeding yuga). However, the authoritative treatise on duty composed by Parashara does indicate which duties should be adopted during each particular yuga. In the first chapter of the Parashara Samhita we find the following:

Sanskrit passage 1.3: Parashara 1.24 The duties indicated by Manu apply to the Satya Yuga, the duties indicated by Gotama apply to the Treta Yuga, the duties indicated by Shankha and Likhita

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apply to the Dvapara Yuga, and the duties indicated by Parashara apply to the Kali Yuga.

In other words, the people of the Satya Yuga should adhere to all the duties indicated by Lord Manu, the Self-Created One. The people of the Treta Yuga should adhere to all the duties indicated by Lord Gotama. The people of the Dvapara Yuga should adhere to all the duties indicated by Lord Shankha and Lord Likhita. And the people of the Kali Yuga should adhere to all the duties indicated by Lord Parashara.2 It turns out that only Lord Parashara has indicated duties for the Kali Yuga. The people of the Kali Yuga should adhere to those duties. When one considers the beginning of the Parashara Samhita, it becomes clear that its specific purpose is to indicate the duties of the Kali Yuga.

Sanskrit passage 1.4: Parashara 1.1–18 Long ago some sages inquired of Lord Vyasa, “O son of Satyavati, please tell us which duties and customs are beneficial during the Kali Yuga.” Lord Vyasa replied, “I am not a master of all matters; how can I speak of duty? Regarding this matter you should inquire of my father.” So the sages went along with Lord Vyasa to the hermitage of Parashara. With folded hands Lord Vyasa and the sages greeted Parashara, circumambulating, bowing, and praising him. The great sage Parashara welcomed them calmly and inquired after their welfare. Then Lord Vyasa said, “Father, I have heard from you the duties indicated by Manu and the other sages for the Satya, Treta, and Dvapara Yugas. Nor have I forgotten what I heard. All duties were created in the Satya Yuga, but all duties are destroyed in the Kali Yuga. Therefore, tell me about the universal duties of the four classes of men.” When Vyasa had finished, the great sage Parashara began to speak in great detail about duty.7

In the opening of the second chapter of the Parashara Samhita we also find it clearly stated that, 2. At this point concern may be voiced as to whether it is only the authoritative treatise on duty composed by Manu that applies to the Satya Yuga, only that of Gotama to the Treta Yuga, only that of Shankha and Likhita to the Dvapara Yuga, and only that of Parashara to the Kali Yuga. Or do the authoritative treatises on duty composed by the other sages sometimes also apply? The answer is that the authoritative treatises on duty composed by Manu, Gotama, Shankha and Likhita, and Parashara are the authoritative treatises for the Satya, Treta, Dvapara, and Kali Yugas, respectively. In each of these yugas, these authoritative treatises are the preeminent sources of proof. Portions of other authoritative treatises on duty may also apply, provided they do not contradict the chief authoritative treatises.

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Sanskrit passage 1.5: Parashara 2.1 Furthermore, I shall extol the duties and customs to be performed by householders during the Kali Yuga. In accord with what Parashara has formerly spoken, I shall tell of the duties that are universally applicable to the four classes of men and their stages of life. That is, I shall tell of all the duties men of the Kali Yuga should perform.

Seen in this light, there can be no doubt that Parashara Samhita is the authoritative treatise on duty for the Kali Yuga. Having confirmed that Parashara Samhita is the authoritative treatise on duty for the Kali Yuga, we should next investigate what duties Parashara Samhita indicates for widows. In the fourth chapter of that book it is written,

Sanskrit passage 1.6: Parashara 4.28–30 The authoritative treatises prescribe remarriage of a woman if her husband is missing, deceased, is determined to be impotent, has become a renunciant, or has been outcast.8 The woman who lives a life of celibacy after her husband’s death goes to heaven after her death. The woman who immolates herself on her husband’s funeral pyre lives in heaven for as many years as there are hairs on the human body, namely 3,500,000,000 years.9

Parashara provides three injunctions regarding widows during the Kali Yuga: marriage, celibacy, or immolation. Of these, the custom of immolation has been abolished by government order.10 Widows thus have two options, marriage and celibacy. They may either marry or adopt celibacy as they see fit. During the Kali Yuga it is very difficult for widows to live a life of celibacy. This is precisely why Lord Parashara, out of concern for the welfare of the world, delivers his injunction regarding marriage before he mentions the other two. Furthermore, the injunction regarding marriage for a woman who experiences one of five dire situations—such as having a husband who is missing—is clearly indicated. When such conditions apply, the remarriage of widows is determined to be a required sacred performance for the Kali Yuga in accordance with the authoritative treatises. It can thus be concluded that widow marriage is a required sacred performance enjoined by the authoritative treatise for the Kali Yuga. Now we must consider whether, if a widow remarries, her son should be designated

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a paunarbhava, or Son of a Remarried Woman.11 Parashara Samhita makes a determination in this matter. In prior yugas there were rulings regarding twelve types of sons. But Parashara has made injunctions for only three kinds during the Kali Yuga. Thus:

Sanskrit passage 1.7: Parashara 4.22 Natural, Adopted, Artificial—these are the three kinds of sons.3

Parashara gives an injunction regarding three types of sons for the Kali Yuga: Natural, Adopted, and Artificial.12 He does not mention the paunarbhava, or Son of a Remarried Woman. Instead, when he gives the injunction on widow remarriage he refers to the child born from the womb of a married widow as a son, thereby enjoining us to accept him as a “son.” The question thus arises: Should such a son be called Natural, Adopted, or Artificial? We cannot refer to him as either an Adopted or an Artificial son, because when someone else’s son is made a “son” according to the injunctions of the authoritative treatises, then in keeping with the particulars of the injunctions, he is called either an Adopted or an Artificial son. But the son born from the womb of a married widow is not someone else’s son. Hence we cannot call him an Adopted or an Artificial son. The characteristics of the Adopted and the Artificial son as indicated by the authors of the authoritative treatises do not apply to the son

3. On the basis of this passage it appears there are in fact four types of sons: namely Natural, Kshetraja, Adopted, and Artificial. But in his Dattakamimamsa, Nanda Pandit explains that for the purpose of the Kali Yuga only three sons are recognized: Natural, Adopted, and Artificial. I concur, and I provide here Nanda’s explanation of this passage. sanskrit passage 1.16: dattakamimamsa on parashara 4.22 (1857 ed., 21) When speaking on the topic of duties for the Kali Yuga, Parashara says, These are the sons: Natural, Kshetraja, Adopted, and Artificial. Here the Artificial son should be understood along with the Adopted son. But the Kshetraja should not be considered a son in the Kali Yuga, since it is prohibited by virtue of the prohibition on the levirate. One might object that since this involves the prohibition of something that is otherwise enjoined there is some reason for doubt. However, we say no, since otherwise many errors would follow as a result. If you ask why Parashara uses the word “Kshetraja,” we reply that it serves as a modifier of the word “Natural.” For Manu says (9.166): The one begotten by a man in his own field, in his properly married wife, should be known as Natural; he is the first among sons. [Trans.: I provide my own translation directly from the Sanskrit of Nanda Pandit, since Vidyasagara does not render the passage in Bengali in the original text. His note in his English translation basically repeats the comment provided here but omits the Sanskrit passage (Marriage of Hindu Widows, 8).]

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63 Book One

born from the womb of a married widow. But the characteristics specified for a Natural son apply perfectly. Thus,

Sanskrit passage 1.8: Manu 9.168 A son who is happily given by a mother or a father, in accordance with the injunctions of the authoritative treatises, to a person of the same caste who has no son, is the Adopted son of the person who receives him.

Sanskrit passage 1.9: Manu 9.169 A person who has the qualities of a son, and who can distinguish virtues and faults, when made the son of someone of the same caste, is an Artificial son.

Sanskrit passage 1.10: Manu 9.166 The son born to a married woman of the same caste is a Natural son, and he is the first son.

The characteristics of a Natural son, namely that he be born to a married woman of the same caste, apply in every respect to the son born to a married widow of the same caste. Therefore, since Parashara has given the injunction for marriage of widows in the Kali Yuga; and since among the twelve kinds of sons he has made injunctions for only three kinds; and since neither the Adopted nor the Artificial son has the characteristics of a son born to a married widow, whereas the Natural son does in every respect; then we must necessarily recognize such a son as a Natural son. We cannot say that Parashara intended to define a son born to a married widow in the Kali Yuga as a paunarbhava, or Son of a Remarried Woman. In all the prior yugas, the practice was to consider such a son the Son of a Remarried Woman. If Parashara intended that during the Kali Yuga such a son should also be called the Son of a Remarried Woman, then he certainly would have included the Son of a Remarried Woman in his classification of sons. The problem of classification aside, there is no use of the word paunarbhava in the Parashara Samhita.

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Therefore, there can be no doubt that a son born to a married widow in the Kali Yuga should be considered a Natural son and not the Son of a Remarried Woman.13 It has been established that the authoritative treatises enjoin widow marriage as a required sacred performance during the Kali Yuga. Now we must investigate whether or not valid prohibitions in this matter can be found in other authoritative treatises.14 Many people say that while there are injunctions regarding widow marriage during the previous yugas, it is prohibited during the Kali Yuga. But since Parashara Samhita stipulates only those duties for the Kali Yuga, and since we clearly find an injunction concerning widow marriage among those duties, it is simply not possible to say that widow marriage is a prohibited act. Those who espouse the prohibition of widow marriage in the Kali Yuga know very well which authoritative treatises they follow. They attempt to demonstrate that passages from the Brihannaradiya Purana and Aditya Purana quoted by Smarta Raghunandan in his Udvahatattva prohibit widow marriage in the Kali Yuga.15 For this reason, I quote those passages here and indicate their meaning and purport.

Sanskrit passage 1.11: Brihannaradiya Purana 22.13–16, quoted in Udvahatattva Sea voyage, carrying of the water pot [as a renouncer], marriage of women from other castes by the twiceborn, the siring of sons by a husband’s brother, the killing of animals in the Madhuparka [rite], the eating of meat during postmortem rites, taking up the duties of the forest-dweller, the giving away again of a virgin who has been given to another man, the performance of celibacy for an extended period, human sacrifice, the horse sacrifice, pilgrimage unto death, and cow-slaughter—performance of all these duties is prohibited by the wise during the Kali Yuga.16

In no part of this passage is it demonstrated that widow marriage is prohibited. Some people attempt to demonstrate that the prohibition on giving a virgin in marriage who has already been given to another man amounts to a prohibition of widow marriage. But they do not understand the purport of this prohibition. In prior yugas it was the practice to betroth a virgin to one man, but if a better groom were found, the virgin would be given to him instead. Thus:

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Sanskrit passage 1.12: Yajnavalkya 1.65 A virgin should be given only once; anyone who takes back a virgin who has already been given should be treated as a thief. But if a groom superior to the first is found, the virgin given to the first groom may be taken back; that is, rather than marrying her to [the first groom], the virgin may be given to the superior groom.

While for earlier yugas the authoritative treatises sanctioned the practice of giving a virgin to a superior groom after she had already been given to another groom, the passage from the Brihannaradiya Purana prohibits this practice. Therefore, it cannot be conclusively shown that this prohibition is a prohibition on the marriage of widows in the Kali Yuga. Furthermore, since the Parashara Samhita clearly enjoins widow marriage during the Kali Yuga, it does not seem appropriate to rely on a forced reading of this passage from the Brihannaradiya Purana to say that it amounts to a prohibition of widow marriage.17

Sanskrit passage 1.13: Aditya Purana, quoted in Udvahatattva Extended celibacy, carrying of the water pot [as a renouncer], siring of sons by a husband’s brother, giving a virgin who has already been given, marrying virgins of another class by twiceborn men, killing of Brahman assailants in a religious war, adoption of the forest-dwelling life, abbreviating the period of impurity in accordance to character and Vedic learning, extending to death the rule of expiation for Brahmans, the error of consorting with sinners, the killing of animals in the Madhuparka [rite], marrying other than Natural and Adopted sons, eating by a twiceborn householder of food offered to him by Shudras of the Dasa, Gopala, Kulamitra, and Ardhasiri castes, undertaking pilgrimages of great length, cooking of a Brahman’s food by a Shudra, falling from a high place, entering into fire, and killing of the elderly—all these acts have been prohibited by the great-souled wise men at the beginning of the Kali Yuga for the preservation of the world.

There is no part of this passage that demonstrates that widow marriage is prohibited. The portion pertaining to the prohibition of giving a virgin who has already been given cannot be said to be a prohibition on widow marriage,

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as we have demonstrated in our consideration of the passage from the Brihannaradiya Purana (Sanskrit passage 1.11). Some might say that the prohibition on marriage of widows is proven by the fact that the Aditya Purana prohibits accepting anything but Natural or Adopted sons. Such people intend to say that in prior yugas a son born to a remarried widow was called a Son of a Remarried Woman. Since in the Kali Yuga there is a prohibition on accepting anything but Natural or Adopted sons, it would follow that there would also be a prohibition on accepting the Son of a Remarried Woman. The purpose of marriage is to produce sons. If there were a prohibition on accepting the Son of a Remarried Woman (which would include a son born to a married widow), then it would follow that widow marriage itself is also prohibited. At first glance this objection does appear to be a forceful one. Were it not for Parashara Samhita it might well suffice to prove the prohibition on widow marriage. But it may also be that those who raise this objection (in order to ensure the prohibition on widow marriage) do not know of Parashara Samhita. For while it is true that in prior yugas sons born to married widows were designated Sons of Twice-Married Women, our review of this matter has just conclusively demonstrated that in the Kali Yuga sons born to married widows are to be considered Natural sons, not Sons of Twice-Married Women. Therefore, if such sons are Natural and not Sons of Twice-Married Women, how can the prohibition on accepting anything but Natural or Adopted sons be used to prove the prohibition of widow marriage in the Kali Yuga? Once one explains the purport of the Brihannaradiya and Aditya Puranas, it becomes impossible to use these passages to establish the prohibition on widow marriage in the Kali Yuga. Should the proponents of the prohibition not be satisfied with this explanation—that is, should they deny that widow marriage is in accordance with the authoritative treatises by continuing to insist that the passages from the Brihannaradiya and Aditya Puranas support the prohibition—then we must consider which authoritative treatise carries more weight, the injunction supporting widow marriage in the Parashara Samhita or the prohibitions on widow marriage found in the Brihannaradiya and Aditya Puranas. Should we follow Parashara Samhita in reckoning widow marriage a required sacred performance or, following the Brihannaradiya and Aditya Puranas, should we conclude that widow marriage is a forbidden performance? If we are to make a determination in this matter, we must investigate what conclusion the authors of the authoritative treatises reach in cases

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where two authoritative treatises come into conflict. Lord Veda Vyasa makes the following determination in his own Samhita:18

Sanskrit passage 1.14: Vedavyasa-smriti 1.4 In cases where conflicts are apparent among Veda, Smriti, and Purana, Veda is the valid authority; and where Smriti and Purana are in conflict, Smriti is the valid authority.

In other words, when the Veda says one thing about a matter, Smriti another, and the Puranas yet another, we wonder what should be done. What authoritative treatise should we follow? After all, human beings have three authoritative treatises. But by following one authoritative treatise, we might violate the other two. And we know that anyone who violates the authoritative treatises is said to be unrighteous. This is why Lord Vyasa determined that if Veda, Smriti, and Purana come into conflict we should follow Veda rather than Smriti and Purana. And if Smriti and Purana come into conflict, we should follow Smriti rather than Purana. Consider the following, then: First of all, according to our explanation of the passages from the Brihannaradiya and Aditya Puranas, there is no way to say they prohibit widow marriage; secondly, even if it can be demonstrated that these passages do prohibit widow marriage in some sense, there would be a conflict between Parashara Samhita and the Brihannaradiya and Aditya Puranas. Parashara enjoins widow marriage for the Kali Yuga, while the Brihannaradiya and Aditya Puranas prohibit it. But Parashara Samhita is a Smriti, whereas the Brihannaradiya and Aditya Puranas are Puranas. The creator of the Puranas himself [i.e., Vyasa] has legislated that in cases where there is a conflict between Smriti and Purana, one should follow Smriti and not Purana. Hence, even if the Brihannaradiya and Aditya Puranas prohibit widow marriage, we must overlook them and choose to follow the injunction regarding widow marriage found in the Parashara Samhita. As such, there can be no objection to the conclusion that the authoritative treatises enjoin widow marriage as a required sacred performance during the Kali Yuga. At this point, it might still be objected that even though widow marriage is a required sacred performance during the Kali Yuga in accordance with the authoritative treatises, it is contrary to the custom of learned people and therefore should not be adopted. If we are to counter this

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objection, we must investigate precisely when the custom of learned people becomes a valid authority. Lord Vashishtha makes the following determination on this matter in his own samhita:

Sanskrit passage 1.15: Vashishtha Dharmashastra 1.3–4 Whether in matters of this world or the next, one should follow the duties enjoined by the authoritative treatises. If an injunction cannot be found in the authoritative treatises, then the custom of learned people is a valid authority.19

In other words, a human being should follow the duties enjoined in the authoritative treatises; and in cases where the authoritative treatises provide neither an injunction nor a prohibition, he should perform whatever duties are found in the traditions of the learned. In such cases, by adopting the custom of the learned as a valid authority, he recognizes the performance of that duty to be equal to the performance of a duty enjoined by the authoritative treatises. Since Parashara Samhita clearly contains an injunction regarding widow marriage during the Kali Yuga, it is neither reasonable nor is it in accordance with the authoritative treatises to conclude that just because it is contrary to the practice of learned people widow marriage must be a forbidden performance. Vashishta has legislated that the custom of learned people is to be followed only in cases where no injunction can be found in the authoritative treatises. Therefore, since widow marriage is in every respect a required sacred performance during the Kali Yuga, there can be no further doubt or objection in this matter. Young girls whom misfortune turns to widows suffer unbearably throughout their lives. Only those whose virgin daughters, sisters, and daughters-inlaw have been made widows while still children can truly feel their pain. How many hundreds of widows turn to the evil of prostitution and commit the sin of abortion, bringing shame on the families of their husbands, fathers, and mothers, all because they are unable to live a life of chastity? Were the custom of widow marriage to be promoted, it would put an end to the suffering of widows, to the evil of prostitution, and to the sin of abortion. And the shame experienced by the families of all three types of women would end. As long as this beneficial custom is not promoted, the torrent of prostitution, abortion, and family shame will only grow stronger, as will the torment of widows.20

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In conclusion, I humbly beseech the public to consider this matter. After carefully reviewing everything I have written demonstrating that widow marriage is in accordance with the authoritative treatises, please consider whether or not widow marriage should be promoted.

21

January 1855

Calcutta. Sanskrit College Shri Ishvarchandra Sharma22

Notes 1. Vidyasagar was criticized for his rhetoric here, since he does not specify just who these “many” people are. See Maitra, Paunarbhava khandanam, 22. 2. Vidyasagar was not the only one to make this charge. His opponents complained of the same problem. In the preface to Vidhavavivahavada, Dinabandhu Nyayaratna says that desire for victory and fear of failure cloud the ability of interpreters to correctly investigate such an issue. A similar point is made in Kaviratna and Vidyaratna, Vaidhavya dharmodaya, book 2:3. 3. The operative term, as revealed in the sentence that follows, is dharmashastra. In his English translation, Vidyasagar glosses dharmashastra as “the works comprising the whole body of ceremonial and religious observances, moral duties, and municipal law” (Marriage of Hindu Widows, 2). For translation equivalents of crucial terminology, see the glossary. 4. In his English translation, Vidyasagar modifies “people of India” (bharatavarshiya loka) by adding the qualifier “Hindus” (Marriage of Hindu Widows, 3). 5. On Hindu conceptions of time, see “Hindu Categories for First-Time Readers.” Henceforth, the Sanskrit term yuga will be retained to avoid any possible confusion. 6. This verse also appears in Parashara. For background on Parashara and Manu, see Lingat, Classical Law of India, 187–188. 7. Although it is not immediately evident here (as in several other cases), Vidyasagar often significantly abbreviates the original Sanskrit passage when rendering it in Bengali. 8. Somewhat surprisingly, Vidyasagar does not translate the crucial Sanskrit phrase panchasvapatsu, or “in five dire situations.” The phrase invokes the important concept of apad, or “times of distress” (after Lingat, Classical Law of India, 39), which calls for special kinds of duties. Of the five situations mentioned by Parashara, it may be the fifth that will be least obvious to readers. The relevant Sanskrit word is patita, which Vidyasagar elsewhere renders as a condition of “degradation” (Marriage of Hindu Widows, 7). Put simply, to be patita is to be outcast due to sinful behavior, a condition leading to the loss of one’s share in any inheritance, according to Kane, History of Dharmasastra, 3:612–616. I would like to thank Rosane Rocher for helping me appreciate the precise connotations of this term. 9. Parallel passages of Parasara 4.28 appear in Narada (12.97), Agni Purana (154.6), Garuda Purana (107.8), and Vishnudharmottara Purana (2.87.11, 3.329.14). The Naradiyamanusamhita (12.99) employs the grammatically correct form patyau rather than patau. See Naradiyamanusamhita with the Bhashya of Bhavasvamin, 144. For the views of medieval commentators like Medhatithi (ca. tenth century c.e.) and Maskari (ca. eleventh to twelfth centuries c.e.), see Krishna Datta, “Controversy over a Verse on the Remarriage of Hindu Women,” 11.

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70 Hindu Widow Marriage 10. In one of the few contemporary historical references in these tracts, Vidyasagar mentions the abolition of the custom of widow immolation (sati or sahamarana) by Lord William Bentinck in Act XVII of 1829. 11. In his English translation, Vidyasagar renders paunarbhava as “the son born of a widow on her remarriage” and adds an explanatory note: “A son born of a woman married a second time. In the prior yugas the Paunarbhava was considered as an inferior sort of son” (Marriage of Hindu Widows, 8). 12. Vidyasagar translates the word kshetraja as “son of the wife.” The term refers to a son conceived by someone other than the husband and applies especially to a son produced by the levirate. For simplicity’s sake, I leave the term untranslated throughout. Notice that while Vidyasagar here follows Nanda Pandit’s treatment of sons, the latter actually rejected the possibility of widow marriage. See Datta, “Controversy over a Verse on the Remarriage of Hindu Women,” 13. 13. Vidyasagar’s interpretation of paunarbhava would receive a quick rejoinder from Maitra, Paunarbhava khandanam, 48. 14. In his English translation, Vidyasagar adds “other than the Parasara Sanhita” (Marriage of Hindu Widows, 10). 15. Vidyasagar’s opponents argued that while Parashara claims to provide rulings for the Kali Yuga, some of the practices he enjoins appear in lists of acts prohibited during the Kali Yuga, most notably widow marriage. One such list appears in the Aditya Purana, a source quoted by the sixteenth-century authority Raghunandan, whose digest on marriage Vidyasagar mentions here. See Kane, History of Dharmasastra, 3:885. 16. This is a list of the so-called kalivarjya—duties that are prohibited during the Kali Yuga. On this concept and the various duties, see Batuknath Bhattacharya, “Kalivarjyas.” 17. Rendering kashtakalpana as “forced reading.” In his own translation of this passage, Vidyasagar uses the phrase “forced construction” (Marriage of Hindu Widows, 12). 18. Vidyasagar translates bhagavan as “auspicious” (ibid., 15–16). I have chosen to use “Lord” throughout this translation. 19. While Vidyasagar claims to translate Vashishtha, the text actually reads: prashasyatamo bhavati loke pretya ca svargalokam samashnute (1.3) and shrutismritivihito dharmah (1.4). For other passages in praise of conduct (achara), see Vashishtha 6.1–8. 20. Decades later, one opponent ridiculed Vidyasagar for attempting to stem the “torrent” of immorality by building a “dike” of law, and suggested that one might just as well argue in favor of the marriage of prostitutes, since they were the ones producing all the abortions. See Smritiratna, conclusion to Vidhava-vivaha prativada. 21. Book One is dated 16 Magha, 1911 Samvat. 22. Immediately following this colophon, the earliest Bengali editions of this tract carried the following postscript by Vidyasagar: One final word: Should anyone have any doubts or objections after reading this work, I would be most grateful if they would kindly distribute them in an independent book or write them down and send them to me.

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NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN BOOK TWO

When I first published my proposal concerning the promotion of widow marriage, I firmly believed that as soon as the people of this land heard the title of the book and grasped its purpose they would respond with scorn and disbelief. I believed they would neither pick it up nor read it with the appropriate intent or earnestness. Frankly, I believed that all the effort I had invested in compiling the book would be for nought. But as luck would have it, people responded so earnestly to my publication of the book that in a little over a week the first two thousand copies were exhausted. I took heart on seeing this and had another three thousand copies of the book printed. Those too were snatched up eagerly and were exhausted in just a few days. Considering how earnestly and widely the book has been received, there could be little doubt that my efforts in compiling the proposal had been amply rewarded. Happily, many people—both worldly individuals and scholars of the authoritative treatises—showed their gratitude by writing replies to the proposal; these were printed and disseminated for the consideration of the general public. The fact that so many people chose to lavish such effort and expense on the matter was no small thing to rejoice in, especially since I had concluded that many would respond to my proposal with scorn and disbelief. It is especially noteworthy that many of the respected people who replied may be counted among the most well-placed, eminent, and learned people in this land. What could be more fortunate for me and for my humble proposal than that it should be read, reflected upon, and answered by the most important people in this land? But I regret that of all the respected people who have begun to write replies, so few really understand in what fashion such a weighty matter should be debated. There are some who become angry and upset at the mere mention of the words “widow marriage.” Many of these replies clearly demon-

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strate that if one becomes upset during a debate, one loses the ability to investigate the truth. Many people stubbornly turn their backs on debate, whether fairly conducted or not, and offer nothing more than false and baseless objections. But it could nonetheless be said that their goal in raising such objections is realized. I say this because most people in this land do not know the authoritative treatises. When two parties begin to debate the authoritative treatises, most people have no way to investigate the facts; they are unable to discern the relative strength of the sources of proof employed by the competing parties. The least objection leads them to have doubts. At first, many who read my proposal concluded that it was in accord with the authoritative treatises. But after hearing a few objections, they begin to say the matter is completely opposed to the authoritative treatises. It doesn’t help that worldly people do not know the authoritative treatises; they are unable to understand the meaning or grasp the purport of a Sanskrit passage on their own. To help them understand, one must communicate in the vernacular. This way they can investigate the facts. I fear that many respected people pursue their own agenda by distorting the meaning of a few chosen passages. Readers less well versed in Sanskrit then accept what they write as the truth. One can scarcely blame the reader. Who would suspect that someone setting out to debate the authoritative treatises on duty would resort to deceit and clever tricks? Who would suspect that someone would not only put forward explanations at odds with the words of the sages but would then disseminate them publicly with utter candor? It is even more distressing that several of my respected opponents enjoy satire and derision. Up till now I had no idea that satire and derision were major components in debates concerning the authoritative treatises on duty.1 In any event, we are not all alike and we do not all conform to the same fashion. Our different inclinations have their roots in our distinct natures. When it comes to a matter as important as this, it would be far better to adopt a method suited to the subject matter than for each of us to proceed in a fashion that happens to suit our particular nature. What amazes me is that people seem to think that satire and derision make an objection more persuasive. Initially I was greatly troubled to see so many responses of this kind. But then I read one particular response and all my troubles disappeared. The name of the author of this particular reply was not given; it was disseminated under the name “A Bridegroom.”2 Though this “Bridegroom” was quite old

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and widely respected for his learning, his reply demonstrated a fondness for satire and derision. From this I concluded that it was common for the learned people of this land to employ satire and derision when replying to a speaker in a debate over authoritative treatises on duty. Had he known this is how ignorant people argued, I am sure this eminent and respected gentleman—a man whom all agree is among the most learned—would never have done so.3 I am immensely grateful, nonetheless, to all my respected respondents, and I want to thank them a thousand times over—even those who may not have responded in this fashion. That they took the trouble to respond demonstrates that the scholars and respected people of this land are indeed concerned with this proposal. Their replies indicate that this is not the sort of proposal about which one can long remain lukewarm, whether out of apathy or disdain. I would have been far more troubled had they shown no concern or been too indifferent to reply. They have employed a variety of sources of proof in order to demonstrate that what I propose does not accord with the authoritative treatises; they have listed numerous treatises in their own publications, often after great effort and investigation. Now we must see how serious their objections are. Have we finally exhausted all the arguments that purport to prove that widow marriage is opposed to the authoritative treatises? If we turn now to an examination of these objections, we should be able to put to rest any doubts about whether or not widow marriage accords with the authoritative treatises. My respected opponents have written copiously in their own publications. However, not everything they have written directly applies to the matter at hand. Anything that does appear to apply I shall attempt to address as best I can. I have taken great trouble and proceeded with great care in preparing this reply. I humbly request that my readers read this reply carefully from beginning to end, if only as a gesture of respect. If they do even this much, all my care and effort will have been rewarded. topic 1: the passage from parashara refers to a married woman, not to a virgin who has been betrothed4 Some have determined that the intention of the passage from Parashara regarding marriage is to specify that upon the disappearance, etc., of a bridegroom who has been betrothed to a virgin she can be married to another

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bridegroom. Such people contend that it was never Parashara’s intention to say that a married woman who becomes a widow may marry again.1 At this point we must consider whether the determination of my respected opponents is valid. Parashara has written,

Sanskrit passage 2.1.1: Parashara 4.28 The authoritative treatises prescribe remarriage of a woman if her husband is missing, deceased, is determined to be impotent, has become a renunciant, or has been outcast.

If we follow the actual meaning of every word used by Parashara in this passage, then in the case of five dire situations a married woman may marry again.5 His intention is plain to see, especially if we avoid a forced reading that projects different meanings onto words. The only meaning we can arrive at is that which he intended. Only under special circumstances should one abandon the straightforward meaning of a word in order to force a different meaning onto it. No such circumstances apply in the present context. Even the commentator Madhavacharya, who opposes widow marriage, acknowledges that this passage from Parashara enjoins remarriage for women who are married, etc. He writes,

Sanskrit passage 2.1.2: Madhava on Parashara 4.28–30 As is the case when a younger brother marries before an elder brother or a younger brother establishes the sacred fire before his elder brother, [Parashara] reveals an injunction that for certain reasons and in some cases women may marry again.

1.

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1. From Agadapada Maheshchandra Chudamani 2. From Konnagar Dinabandhu Nyayaratna 3. From Kashipur Shashijivan Tarkaratna Janakijivan Nyayaratna 4. From Ariyadaha Shriram Tarkalankar 5. From Putiya Ishanchandra Vidyavagish 6. From Sayadabad Govindakanta Vidyabhushan Krishnamohan Nyayapanchanan

7. 8. 9. 10.

Ramgopal Tarkalankar Haradhan Kaviraja Madhavram Nyayaratna Radhakant Tarkalankar From Janai Jagadishvar Vidyaratna Scholar in the court at Anduliya Ramdas Tarkasiddhanta From Bhavanipur Prasannakumar Mukhopadhyay [Trans.: No location given] Nandakumar Kaviratna Anandachandra Shiromani Ganganarayan Nyayavachaspati

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The authoritative treatises prescribe remarriage of a woman if her husband is missing, deceased, is determined to be impotent, has become a renunciant, or has been outcast. He reveals that rather than marrying again, adoption of the institution of celibacy yields greater fruit. The woman who lives a life of celibacy after her husband’s death goes to heaven after her death. He reveals that immolation along with the deceased husband yields even greater fruit than celibacy. The woman who immolates herself on her husband’s funeral pyre lives in heaven for as many years as there are hairs on the human body, namely 3,500,000,000 years.

The verse that follows “If her husband is missing” [Parashara 4.28]—namely “After her husband’s death” [Parashara 4.29]—announces that more fruit comes from celibacy than from remarrying. That being the case, it cannot be that Madhavacharya understands Parashara to prohibit marriage for widowed women. After all, it only makes sense to say that more fruit comes from a life of celibacy than from marriage if the preceding verse [i.e., Parashara 4.28] has actually allowed marriage for widowed women. If we look at Narada Samhita, it can clearly be seen that the injunction on marriage expressed in the verse “If her husband is missing” [Parashara 4.28] is not meant to apply to young girls who have been betrothed. Thus,

Sanskrit passage 2.1.3: Narada 12.97–101 The authoritative treatises prescribe remarriage of a woman if her husband is missing, deceased, is determined to be impotent, has become a renunciant, or has been outcast. If her husband is missing, a Brahman woman should wait for eight years; if she has no offspring, she may marry after waiting four years. A Kshatriya woman should wait six years; if she has no offspring, three years. A Vaishya woman, if she has offspring, four years; if not, two. There is no calculation of the time to wait for a Shudra woman. If he is missing, but one has heard he is still alive, then one should wait twice as long as previously stated. If one receives no news, the previous rules for time apply. This is the opinion of Brahma, Lord of Creatures. Therefore, if in some cases a woman marries again it carries no fault.

Since it stipulates that it is the husband who is missing, etc., the injunction regarding remarriage found in the passage “If her husband is missing” [Parashara 4.28] cannot apply to a girl who is betrothed. The passage goes

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on to stipulate five special conditions. If the husband is missing and there are offspring, there is one time calculation; if there are no offspring there is another. What need would there be to discuss offspring if these injunctions applied only to a betrothed girl? You may say that even if the Narada Samhita does promote the marriage of widowed women, it is nevertheless an authoritative treatise for the Satya Yuga and not the Kali Yuga. As such it cannot be used to show that remarriage of widowed women is allowed. To this I say, Yes, Narada Samhita is indeed an authoritative treatise for the Satya Yuga. However, the words used by Narada in this passage appear in the exact same form in the passage from Parashara. Whatever meaning we find in the passage from Narada should be the same meaning we find in the passage from Parashara. The meanings of words do not change as the yugas change. Whatever a word meant in the Satya Yuga, it continues to mean in the Kali Yuga. Thus, since there is not the least discrepancy in wording between the passage from Narada and the passage from Parashara, there can be no discrepancy in the meaning, either. As a result, insofar as the passage “If her husband is missing” [Parashara 4.28] is identical in both Samhitas, it must necessarily advance the same meaning. Any attempt to find a difference of meaning here is just confused.6 Hence it can be shown without a doubt that the injunction regarding marriage in the passage “If her husband is missing” [Parashara 4.28] does not apply narrowly to the case of virgins who have been betrothed. Some have ruled that the passage from Parashara regarding marriage does pertain only to girls who have been betrothed. They try to show that some passages contain prohibitions on the marriage of already married women. They go on to say that if the passage from Parashara applies to an already married woman this would lead to a conflict with these other passages. They argue that since there are several passages that promote the marriage of betrothed girls, the way to resolve this apparent conflict is to say that all such passages apply to the marriage of betrothed girls. In other words, we should rule that the passage from Parashara pertains to betrothed girls, the idea being that if you make such a ruling, all passages will be in agreement and there will be no conflict. If this passage applies to betrothed girls, we should try to bring it into agreement with similar passages. This is how my respected opponents seek to demonstrate that the passage from Parashara does not enjoin widow marriage. But on this matter I would like to say the following: Just as one can find some passages that prohibit remarriage of married women, so too one can find a passage from Kashyapa that prohibits remarriage of betrothed girls. Thus,

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Sanskrit passage 2.1.4: Kashyapa, quoted in Udvahatattva The betrothed, that is the virgin who has been given verbally; the mind-given, that is the virgin who has been given mentally; the virgin who is auspicious because of rites performed, that is whose hand has taken the marriage thread; the one who has touched water, that is who has been given away; the one whose hand has been taken, that is the virgin for whom the clasping of hands is complete; the one who has circled the fire, that is the virgin who has performed the kushandika ceremony; and the daughter of a woman who has already been married; these seven remarried [punarbhu] virgins should be avoided as the lowest of the lineage. If these seven virgins mentioned by Kashyapa are given in marriage, they will destroy their father’s lineage just like fire.

Kashyapa includes betrothed virgins among those with whom marriage should be avoided. By giving them the designation “remarried,” Kashyapa effectively prohibits marriage of betrothed virgins. He enjoins us to avoid betrothed virgins and married women equally. Now, if there are passages that prohibit remarriage of married women, then the passage from Parashara cannot authorize remarriage of married women. However, if the passage from Kashyapa prohibits the remarriage of betrothed girls, then likewise the passage from Parashara cannot authorize the remarriage of betrothed girls. Is it really possible to avoid conflict here? Can we harmonize these passages with respect to the issue of whether betrothed girls may be married? It would seem that for all passages to be in agreement on this matter and for all conflict to be avoided, it would make the most sense to abandon the foregoing attempt and try the following.7 While there may be injunctions or prohibitions on this matter in passages by Kashyapa and others, these passages do not specify a particular yuga. These amount to general injunctions or general prohibitions that apply to all yugas. Any injunctions or prohibitions on this matter that mention the Kali Yuga are special injunctions or prohibitions that apply strictly to the Kali Yuga. Should we find independent injunctions or prohibitions for the Kali Yuga, there is no need to worry about harmonizing the general injunctions and prohibitions with the special injunctions and prohibitions. Everyone knows that a special injunction or prohibition takes precedence over a general injunction or prohibition.8 As such, the way to avoid conflict here is by carefully harmonizing all the injunctions or prohibitions on this matter in the authoritative treatises that explicitly mention the Kali Yuga. If we can do this, we should be able to

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determine whether the marriage of widowed women is enjoined or prohibited during the Kali Yuga. We should begin by listing all the authoritative treatises in which the remarriage of married women is prohibited during the Kali Yuga. Thus,

Sanskrit passage 2.1.5: Adi Purana, quoted by Madhava at Parashara 4.28 There are five actions that should not be performed in the Kali Yuga: the remarriage of widows, the rite of primogeniture, the slaughter of cows, the bestowing of sons on a brother’s wife, and carrying the water pot.9

Sanskrit passage 2.1.6: Kratu, quoted by Madhava at Parashara 1.34 During the Kali Yuga one should not bestow sons through a brother-in-law, give away betrothed virgins, slaughter cattle in sacrifice, or carry the water pot.

Sanskrit passage 2.1.7: Brihannaradiya Purana 22.15 During the Kali Yuga one should not give away again a virgin who has been given to another man.

Sanskrit passage 2.1.8: Aditya Purana, quoted in Udvahatattva During the Kali Yuga it is prohibited to give away again a betrothed virgin.

From this we can see clearly that Adi Purana, Kratu Samhita, Brihannaradiya Purana, and Aditya Purana contain general prohibitions on the remarriage of married women.2 But the Parashara-Samhita reads,

2. My respected opponents are exceedingly eager to interpret the word “betrothed” (datta) as “married” (vivahita). To humor them, in the present context I will give the word “betrothed” the meaning of “married.”

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Sanskrit passage 2.1.9: Parashara 4.28 The authoritative treatises prescribe remarriage of a woman if her husband is missing, deceased, is determined to be impotent, has become a renunciant, or has been outcast.

From this we see that in five circumstances there is an injunction to allow married women to remarry. Since we can find injunctions and prohibitions regarding the remarriage of widows during the Kali Yuga, I think we should determine whether it is possible to avoid conflict by harmonizing all these passages. In Adi Purana and other texts we find a general prohibition on the marriage of married women. When Parashara says “if he is missing” [Parashara 4.28], this constitutes an exception. Put differently, while Adi Purana and other texts generally prohibit the marriage of married women during the Kali Yuga, there are five circumstances in which Parashara enjoins the marriage of married women during the Kali Yuga. Even though Adi Purana and other texts contain a general prohibition, if we follow the special injunction of Parashara in these five circumstances, then marriage should be allowed. Apart from these five circumstances we should follow the prohibition of Adi Purana and the other texts. The rule regarding general versus special injunctions or prohibitions is that the general injunction or prohibition applies except in cases of a special injunction or prohibition.10 During the Kali Yuga, and in five circumstances, Parashara gives an injunction to allow the remarriage of a married woman. We should adhere to that injunction. In all other cases—for instance, in the case of husbands who are mean, immoral, or without virtue—we should adhere to the [general] prohibition. In these cases it should not be possible for married women to remarry. So when one determines the circumstances for both the injunction and the prohibition there is no discrepancy. Consider, first of all,

Sanskrit passage 2.1.10: Katyayana, quoted by Madhava in appendix to Parashara, chap. 2 If a virgin is given in marriage to a man who is from another caste, who has been outcast, who is impotent, who is immoral, who is of the same clan, who is a servant, or who is sickly, then even though she is married she should be given again to another groom along with her clothing and jewelry.

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Sanskrit passage 2.1.11: Vashishtha, quoted in Udvahatattva A virgin who has been given in marriage to a man whose conduct violates proper norms, who is impotent, an outcast, an epileptic, immoral, sickly, or a false ascetic—as also a virgin who is married to a man of the same clan—may be taken away, that is such a virgin may be given in marriage to another man.3

Sanskrit passage 2.1.12: Narada 12.97 The authoritative treatises prescribe remarriage of a woman if her husband is missing, deceased, has renounced the duties of this world, is found to be impotent, or has been outcast.

Thus, without specifying a particular yuga, Katyayana, Vashishtha, and Narada each make a general assertion that for all yugas it is permissible for a married woman to undergo the rites of marriage a second time if her husband is outcast, impotent, missing, violates proper conduct, is immoral, sickly,

3. Dinabandhu Nyayaratna quotes the same passage, saying that it pertains to betrothed virgins. [Trans.: Here Vidyasagara reproduces Sanskrit passage 2.1.11 but does not retranslate it.] I do not follow his explanation. The meaning of the passage is that even though a virgin has been given to someone whose conduct violates proper norms, or who is impotent, outcast, etc., she may nevertheless be taken from such a man. In other words, such a virgin may be given again to another man in marriage. So, too, a virgin married to a man of the same clan may be taken away. Since the word “given” has been used in the case of a man whose conduct violates proper norms, etc., it is possible to think this case applies to a betrothed virgin [i.e., “one who was given verbally”]. But in the case of a virgin who is “married” to a man of the same clan, how can we speak of a “betrothed” virgin? While the word “given” may be understood as meaning both “betrothed” and “married” [vivahita], the word “married” [udha] can only mean “married according to the rites” [vivahasamskrita]; it never means “betrothed.” Since this passage clearly uses the word “married” [udha] in one place and the word “given” in another, the proper meaning must be “married” [vivahita]. As such, this passage applies to the case of married women and not to the case of betrothed virgins. The respected Nyayaratna did not discuss the meaning of this passage in Part One of his self-published book, Vidhavavivahavada. However, in the journal Sambadjnanodaya, where he proposes that the practice of widow marriage is not in accord with the authoritative treatises, he provides the following explanation of this passage: The meaning intended here is that if, after betrothal, he hears that the groom is not of the proper lineage or does not respect proper norms, or if he learns that the groom suffers from impotence or is outcasted or an epileptic or suffers from some illness, or if he learns that the groom is a false ascetic, or is from the same clan, then the father may give the virgin to another groom. Here the respected Nyayaratna conceals the word “married” [udha]—as found in the phrase “married to a man of the same clan” [sagotrodha]—choosing to mention only the phrase “man of the same clan” [sagotra]. If it was a mistake that led him to write “man of the same clan” instead of “married to a man of the same clan,” then we cannot really fault him. But if it was his express intention to deliberately conceal the word “married,” then this was highly unjust. [Trans.: See Nyayaratna, Vidhavavivahavada, 16.]

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epileptic, a renouncer, of the same clan, a servant, is determined to be from a different caste, or has died. Now,

Sanskrit passage 2.1.13: Adi Purana, quoted by Madhava at Parashara 4.28 There are five actions that should not be performed in the Kali Yuga: the remarriage of widows, the right of primogeniture, the slaughter of cows, the bestowing of sons on a brother’s wife, and carrying the water pot.

Sanskrit passage 2.1.14: Kratu, quoted by Madhava at Parashara 1.34 During the Kali Yuga one should not bestow sons through a brother-in-law, give away betrothed virgins, slaughter cattle in sacrifice, or carry the water pot.

Sanskrit passage 2.1.15: Brihannaradiya Purana 22.15 During the Kali Yuga one should not give away again a virgin who has been given to another man.

Sanskrit passage 2.1.16: Aditya Purana, quoted in Udvahatattva During the Kali Yuga it is prohibited to give away again a betrothed virgin.

Thus, in Adi Purana and the other texts there is a general prohibition on the remarriage of married women during the Kali Yuga. But then Parashara says,

Sanskrit passage 2.1.17: Parashara 4.28 The authoritative treatises prescribe remarriage of a woman if her husband is missing, deceased, is determined to be impotent, has become a renunciant, or has been outcast.

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In five circumstances, there is an exception to the general prohibition made by Adi Purana and the other texts. In other words, there are five circumstances in which it is permissible for a married woman to remarry during the Kali Yuga.11 I would like everyone to notice: First we determine that there are passages from sages like Katyayana which state that it is generally permissible in all yugas for a married woman to remarry. Then, we notice that in Adi Purana and some other texts there is a general prohibition on the remarriage of married women during the Kali Yuga. But then we notice that according to Parashara there are five circumstances, such as a missing husband, etc., when there is a special injunction allowing the remarriage of married women during the Kali Yuga.12 When weighing general and special injunctions, a special injunction or prohibition is more forceful. If there is no special injunction or special prohibition, then a general injunction or prohibition applies. So to begin with, Katyayana and the other sages provide a general injunction allowing remarriage of married women in some cases, without mentioning any yuga in particular. This injunction applies generally for all yugas. But Adi Purana and some other texts prohibit this practice during the Kali Yuga. This, then, amounts to a special prohibition for the Kali Yuga. As such the general injunction of Katyayana and the other sages, while it still applies to the other three yugas, no longer applies to the Kali Yuga. And since Adi Purana and the other texts do not mention any special circumstances, the marriage of married women is generally prohibited in all cases during the Kali Yuga. But Parashara, after mentioning five circumstances (like a husband who is missing, etc.), provides a further injunction allowing the remarriage of married women during the Kali Yuga. Therefore Parashara’s injunction itself becomes a special injunction. This means that the general prohibition found in Adi Purana and the other texts is overruled in five special circumstances, such as when a husband is missing, etc. Put differently, among all the various cases where a husband might be outcast, impotent, missing, a violator of proper norms, immoral, sickly, epileptic, a renouncer, dead, from the same clan, a servant, or from a different caste, Parashara’s special injunction should be taken to apply only in five particular circumstances: when a husband is missing, dead, a renouncer, impotent, or outcast. In every other case—such as when he violates proper norms, is immoral, sickly, epileptic, is from the same clan, is a servant, or is from a different caste—the general prohibition of Adi Purana and the others applies.

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This is what one usually finds in the case of general versus special injunctions and prohibitions. For example,

Sanskrit passage 2.1.18: Exact source not verified One should perform the twilight ritual every day.13

Here the Vedas clearly provide a general injunction to perform the twilight ritual every day. But,

Sanskrit passage 2.1.19: Jabali, quoted in Shuddhitattva, section 89 During a state of ritual impurity, one should not perform the twilight ritual, the five sacrifices, or the obligatory actions enjoined by the legal literature. When the ritual impurity has ended, one should resume them.

Here Jabali prohibits the performance of the twilight ritual during a time of ritual impurity. Even though the Vedas generally enjoin the twilight ritual, Jabali’s special prohibition suspends the twilight ritual for ten days. In other words, the general injunction pronounced by the Vedas to daily perform the twilight ritual still applies, except for the ten days of ritual impurity addressed by Jabali’s special prohibition.14 Furthermore,

Sanskrit passage 2.1.20: Manu 2.130 Any Brahman, Kshatriya, or Vaishya who does not perform the twilight ritual in the morning and the evening should be excluded from the religious rites just like a Shudra.

But,

Sanskrit passage 2.1.21: Vyasa, quoted in Tithitattva, section 239 One should not perform the twilight ritual in the evening at the start of a new calendrical house, on full moon days, new moon days, or on days commemorating a death; if one does, one commits the sin of patricide.15

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We see here that Manu Samhita contains an injunction to perform the twilight ritual in the morning and the evening, and specifies that sin will be incurred for neglecting such performance. Nevertheless, because of Vyasa’s special injunction, the evening twilight ritual should be suspended at the start of a new calendrical house, etc. In other words, the general injunction regarding performance of the evening twilight ritual always applies, except—in light of Vyasa’s special prohibition—at the start of a new calendrical house, etc. In the Vedas there is a prohibition:

Sanskrit passage 2.1.22: Commonly cited aphorism16 One should not harm the life of any creature.

But elsewhere in the Vedas there are injunctions:

Sanskrit passage 2.1.23: Taittiriya Samhita 5.3.12.1 One should sacrifice by killing a horse.

Sanskrit passage 2.1.24: Taittiriya Samhita 3.3.9.2 One should sacrifice to Rudra by killing a cow.

Sanskrit passage 2.1.25: Taittiriya Samhita 6.1.11.6 One should sacrifice to the deities Agni and Soma by killing a cow.

Sanskrit passage 2.1.26: Taittiriya Samhita 2.1.1.1 One should sacrifice to the deity Vayu by killing a white goat.

Even though a general prohibition on the killing of animals is clearly stated in the Vedas, we can see that in some circumstances the killing of animals during sacrifice is enjoined by means of special injunctions. The general prohibition

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on harming creatures applies except in those cases where the force of a special injunction applies, as in the case of the Ashvamedha and Rudrayaga sacrifices, etc. This is why Lord Manu has written,

Sanskrit passage 2.1.27: Manu 5.41 In these few cases—in offerings to a guest, the solemn sacrifice, offerings to the fathers, and offerings to the gods—one should harm animals; otherwise one should not.17

Since there is a special injunction to harm animals in these few cases, one may indeed harm animals—in these few cases. Apart from this, in keeping with the general prohibition in the authoritative treatises against harming creatures, one should not harm animals. Even though clear injunctions and clear prohibitions may be made in a general fashion, we can see that there are also special injunctions and special prohibitions that operate in specific cases. In any other case, the general injunctions and prohibitions apply. In precisely the same fashion, there is a general prohibition on the remarriage of married women during the Kali Yuga. But in accordance with Parashara’s special injunction, there are five circumstances—namely when a husband is missing and so on—when it is enjoined that a married woman may be married again. In the Adi Purana and other texts, there is a general prohibition; in Parashara Samhita, in five circumstances, there is a special injunction. Hence, except in these five cases, the general prohibition applies. In this fashion, all the passages may be harmonized. Such a determination appears to be completely proper and reasonable. topic 2: the passage from parashara is a matter for the kali yuga, not other yugas 18 In explaining the passage from Parashara Samhita regarding the marriage of widowed women, Madhavacharya concludes,

Sanskrit passage 2.2.1: Madhava on Parashara 4.28 Parashara says this injunction regarding remarriage of widows is a matter for other yugas because, as the Adipurana says, there are five actions that should not be performed

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in the Kali Yuga: the remarriage of widows, the right of primogeniture, the slaughter of cows, the bestowing of sons on a brother’s wife, and carrying the water pot.

Here it is essential to consider whether the judgment given by Madhavacharya is proper or not. To do this we must first understand the purpose of Parashara Samhita. This we can do by understanding the intention of the Samhita as well as the gloss and explanation of the purport as given by Madhavacharya. The Samhita reads:

Sanskrit passage 2.2.2: Parashara 1.1–2 Now, then, long ago Lord Vyasa was seated in focused meditation in an ashram in a forest of deodar trees on a Himalayan peak. The sages asked him, “O son of Satyavati, now that it is Kali Yuga, what is the meaning of duty and of purity? And what conduct will be beneficial to humans? Please tell us as best you can.”

The commentary reads:

Sanskrit passage 2.2.3: Madhava on Parashara 1.1 The meaning of the word “now” is that since the sages understood what duties applied in the Satya, Treta, and Dvapara Yugas, they were asking about the duties of the Kali Yuga.

The commentary continues:

Sanskrit passage 2.2.4: Madhava on Parashara 1.1–2 The meaning of the word “then” is that since no matter how thoroughly one reads one still would not know duty completely, and since even if one knew the duties of the other yugas one would still not know the duties of the Kali Yuga, then—namely, for these reasons— the sages inquired.

This clearly shows that at the beginning of the Kali Yuga the sages who knew the duties for the three yugas—Satya, Treta, and Dvapara—were driven by a desire to understand the duties of the Kali Yuga. For this reason, they inquired about the matter of duty in the Kali Yuga. The Samhita reads:

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Sanskrit passage 2.2.5: Parashara 1.3–4 The brilliant Vyasa, master of shruti and smriti, was seated with his students. His brilliance was like the fire and the sun. When he heard their words, he said, “I am not an expert in all matters. How shall I speak to you of duty? On this matter, you should inquire of my father [e.g., Parashara].” Thus did Vyasa speak.

The commentary reads:

Sanskrit passage 2.2.6: Madhava on Parashara 1.3–4 Lord Vyasa’s intention in saying he was not an expert in all matters was to suggest that since you [students] are now inquiring about the duties of the Kali Yuga, [you should know] I learned about the duties of Kali from my father. My father alone is wise in this matter. Hence people say that “kalau parasharah smritah,” that is, “the duties compiled by Parashara are the duties for the Kali Yuga.” You should inquire about these duties from my father since I too have learned them from my father. There is no need to look to tradition when the original speaker is available.

The commentary continues:

Sanskrit passage 2.2.7: Madhava on Parashara 1.3–4 To say that you should inquire of my father is to rule out other creators of smriti. Even though Manu and the others certainly know the duties of the Kali Yuga, Parashara is the wisest regarding these duties, due to the power of his special austerities. Just as among the various schools like Kanva, Madhyandina, Kathaka, Kauthuma, Taittiriya, etc., Kanva is somewhat superior, so too is Parashara superior to all the Smriti creators regarding the duties of the Kali Yuga. If Lord Vyasa, who is the propagator of traditions regarding the duties of the Kali Yuga, is himself reluctant to speak about these duties when Parashara is available, then what need we say about the words of other sages?

From this it can easily be established that Parashara is the wisest of all other creators of smriti, like Manu and the rest, when it comes to the duties of the Kali Yuga. And the chief authoritative treatise for the explication of the duties of the Kali Yuga is Parashara Smriti. The Samhita reads:

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Sanskrit passage 2.2.8: Parashara 1.11 Oh, Father, so fond of your devotees, if you consider me your devotee and if you have affection for me, then instruct me in duty. I will be indebted to you.

So Lord Vyasa questioned his father in order to learn about duty. The commentary and the Samhita continue as follows:

Sanskrit passage 2.2.9: Madhava on Parashara 1.13–15 Vyasa worried that Parashara might say to him, “Manu and the others have described many duties. Among these, which duty do you wish to know?” Hence before asking about the duty he wished to know, Vyasa first indicated the duties he understood. I have heard from you the duties described by Manu, Vashishtha, Kashyapa, Garga, Gotama, Ushana, Atri, Vishnu, Samvarta, Daksha, Angiras, Shatatapa, Harita, Yajnvalkya, Apastamba, Shankha and Likhita, Katyayana, and Prachetasa. I have not forgotten what I heard. These are the duties for the Satya, Treta, and Dvapara Yugas.

The commentary and the Samhita continue:

Sanskrit passage 2.2.10: Madhava on Parashara 1.16 Now Vyasa asks about the duties he wishes to know. All duties were born in the Satya Yuga; all duties are destroyed in the Kali Yuga. Therefore, please tell me something about the duties that are common to the four classes.

To this the commentator adds:

Sanskrit passage 2.2.11: Madhava on Parashara 1.16 In the Vishnu Purana it says, In the Kali Yuga there is no performance of the duties enjoined for the four classes of men and the stations of life. And in the Adi Purana it says,

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During the Kali Yuga it is not possible to perform those duties enjoined for the Satya Yuga because everyone, women and men alike, is addicted to sin. During the Kali Yuga it is impossible for humans to perform arduous duties; hence the intention of the Parashara Samhita is to describe duties that can be performed without difficulty.

As is evident, the duties described by Manu and the rest are duties for the Satya, Treta, and Dvapara Yugas. In the Kali Yuga it is impossible to perform all these duties. Hence, Vyasa asks Parashara about the duties humans can perform without difficulty during the Kali Yuga. The Samhita reads:

Sanskrit passage 2.2.12: Parashara 1.18 When Vyasa had finished speaking, Parashara, the best of sages, began to describe in detail the duties, both subtle and great.

Clearly, after hearing Vyasa’s request, Parashara’s affection for his son led him to speak about the duties of the Kali Yuga. The Samhita reads:

Sanskrit passage 2.2.13: Parashara 1.34 Parashara also enjoined atonement.

The commentary notes:

Sanskrit passage 2.2.14: Madhava on Parashara 1.34 Parashara’s name is invoked in connection with the Kali Yuga because when it comes to the various time periods, the sole purpose of Parashara Samhita is to describe the duties of the Kali Yuga. Parashara is also considered the chief authority on the matter of atonement during the Kali Yuga.

This leaves no doubt that Parashara’s purpose is to describe the duties of the Kali Yuga, and that when it comes to the duties of the Kali Yuga, Parashara’s opinion outweighs that of the other sages.19

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Now I ask you to consider this carefully: In light of these few passages selected from Parashara and the few comments and explanations provided by Madhavacharya, can it not be established beyond doubt that the purpose of the Parashara Samhita is to describe the duties of the Kali Yuga? If we may conclude that the sole purpose of the Parashara Samhita is to describe the duties of the Kali Yuga, then it must be acknowledged that the entire book of the Parashara Samhita is dedicated to investigating the duties of the Kali Yuga. And if it is acknowledged that the entire book investigates the duties of the Kali Yuga, then it would not be proper to say that the passages enjoining the remarriage of widowed (and other such) women apply to other yugas. The point is, how can it be proper to say that at the dawn of the Kali Yuga, when the sages (who knew the duties of the Satya, Treta, and Dvapara Yugas) inquired about the duties and conduct of the Kali Yuga, Parashara chose to describe all the duties of the Kali Yuga in detail—with the sole exception of a duty that he said was from some other bygone yuga? There really can be no doubt that Parashara has enjoined the remarriage of widowed (and other such) women only for the Kali Yuga. As the preceding has shown, even Madhavacharya himself, in commenting on and explaining the purport of these passages, has determined that the purpose of the Parashara Samhita is the description of duties that apply only to the Kali Yuga. This being so, how can it be proper to reach a ruling that is opposed to the intention of the author of the Samhita and that is not in keeping with the commentary and explanations provided by Madhavacharya himself? As it turns out, even Madhavacharya’s comments on the three passages that address marriage, celibacy, and immolation [i.e., Parashara 4.28–30] fail to cohere if we say that the passage on marriage refers to another yuga. For instance, he says [repeating, while truncating, Sanskrit passage 2.1.2]: He reveals an injunction that for certain reasons and in some cases women may marry again, as when he says A woman whose husband is missing, deceased, etc. He reveals that rather than marrying again, adoption of the institution of celibacy yields greater fruit, as when he says The woman who . . . after her husband’s death etc. He reveals that immolation along with the deceased husband yields even greater fruit than celibacy, as when he says On the human body, etc.

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Following the sort of ruling given by Madhavacharya, marriage is a duty for other yugas, while only celibacy and immolation are duties for the Kali Yuga. He sees no connection between the passages enjoining celibacy and immolation and the passage enjoining marriage. In other words, [for Madhavacharya] the injunction given by Parashara regarding the remarriage of women is intended for prior yugas. When it comes to widows during the Kali Yuga, Parashara has enjoined only celibacy and immolation. Since he is not in favor of the remarriage of widows in the Kali Yuga, Madhavacharya takes this passage [Parashara 4.28] as a ruling for another yuga. However, he cannot reconcile this with his own interpretation regarding the passage on celibacy, which indicates that performance of the vow of celibacy brings greater merit than remarriage. In Madhavacharya’s opinion, marriage is a duty for other yugas, while celibacy is a duty for the Kali Yuga. But if one is not allowed to remarry during the Kali Yuga, how can we speak of celibacy yielding greater merit?20 We must reconcile the following three statements: (1) The remarriage of women is enjoined by the authoritative treatises. (2) If one adopts celibacy rather than remarriage, one gains greater merit. (3) Immolation yields even greater merit than celibacy.21 There is clearly a relationship among these statements and as such all three must refer to the same yuga. If we say remarriage is a duty for the other yugas, but not for the Kali Yuga, we would also have to say that celibacy and immolation are duties for the other yugas. But if we acknowledge that celibacy and immolation are duties for the Kali Yuga, then we also have to acknowledge that remarriage is a duty for the Kali Yuga. It makes no sense otherwise to say that only one of these matters pertains to the other yugas while the other two pertain to the Kali Yuga. Basically Madhavacharya is so eager to rule that the injunction regarding marriage is a matter for other yugas that he fails to see that his own explanation yields a completely improper ruling. Furthermore he ignores the intention of the sage who composed the Samhita. Madhavacharya himself states that during the Kali Yuga it is impossible for humans to undertake arduous duties. This explains the intention of the Parashara Samhita, which is to describe duties that can be accomplished without difficulty. For his part, Parashara considers marriage something that can be accomplished without difficulty. This is why he permits marriage as the very first option for all widows. Because he considers celibacy more arduous, he says that should a woman live in celibacy she will go to heaven. In this fashion

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he permits celibacy for women who are able to undertake it. Immolation he takes to be the most arduous duty of all. Any woman who performs immolation will dwell for untold years in heaven. He therefore permits immolation only as a last resort for those women who are capable of undertaking it. By contrast, Madhavacharya rules that the easily accomplished duty of marriage is a matter for other yugas, while reserving the two more arduous duties for the Kali Yuga. Please bear in mind that the purpose of the Parashara Samhita is to describe those duties that can be accomplished without much difficulty. Recall, too, that in the Kali Yuga it is not possible for humans to undertake arduous duties. If this is the case, how can Madhavacharya’s ruling be a fitting one? During the age of Kali, people’s capacities have significantly decreased compared to those of people during other ages. Madhavacharya delivers a ruling in which he reserves the two most arduous duties for the age of Kali, while saying that the easily accomplished duty is intended not for the Kali Yuga but for the other yugas. It is utterly amazing to claim that since the people of prior yugas had greater capabilities, they were entitled to duties that were more easily accomplished, while the people of the Kali Yuga, whose capabilities are far diminished, are not entitled to the more easily accomplished duties. Let me make this clear. If the people of the Kali Yuga have far less capabilities than the people of prior yugas (which is to say they are incapable of undertaking arduous duties); and if Parashara—who set out to write the duties of the Kali Yuga—began by permitting all widowed women to undertake the most easily accomplished duty of marriage; then one cannot rule that the duty of marriage is not intended for widows during the Kali Yuga. At least one cannot do this and still claim to be following the path of reason, let alone following the intention of the creator of the Samhita himself. It defies the intention of the Samhita’s creator to say that the passage from Parashara is a matter for another yuga. This is made clear in the writings of Bhattojidikshita, who says:

Sanskrit passage 2.2.15: Chaturvimshatimatasamgraha, section on marriage It cannot be said that the passage from Parashara, If her husband is missing [Parashara 4.28] refers to a duty for the other yugas that is prohibited in the Kali Yuga because the Parashara Samhita was compiled with the express promise of stating the duties to be performed during the Kali Yuga.

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This should remove any doubt that Madhavacharya’s ruling regarding the other yugas—as well as his own commentary on the three passages—is opposed to the intention of the sage who created the Samhita. We should now consider the relative weight of the sources of proof on which Madhavacharya relies in making his ruling. Once we do this, we shall be able to determine the degree to which his ruling is a proper one. When it comes to the passage from Parashara regarding marriage, Madhavacharya is unable to establish that it pertains to other yugas and not the Kali Yuga, since this is neither the intention of the Samhita nor the meaning of the passage. Nor can it be the purport. He makes his ruling with the support of only a single passage from the Adi Purana. He intends to say that even though Parashara is an authoritative treatise on duty for the Kali Yuga; and even though this text contains an injunction allowing the remarriage of widowed women; nevertheless we find that the Adi Purana prohibits the remarriage of widowed women during the Kali Yuga; therefore it must be the case that the injunction in Parashara does not apply to the Kali Yuga, but to other yugas. There are two objections we can offer to such a claim. First, a careful reading of the entire Adi Purana fails to uncover the passage cited by Madhavacharya. More to the point, when one considers the framework of the Adi Purana, it is unlikely that such a passage would appear there. This would suggest that the passage chosen by Madhavacharya is unattested. Can a ruling based on an unattested passage have any authority? Second, even if we accept that this passage appears in the Adi Purana, it is nonetheless improper to use it as a basis for overruling the passage from Parashara. On the one hand, the Parashara Samhita is a Smriti, whereas the Adi Purana is a Purana. In my first book [i.e., Book One] I have conclusively shown that whenever there is a disagreement between Smriti and Purana, Smriti always takes precedence.4 Therefore in the present instance, we should reject the opinion of the Purana and adopt that of the Smriti. It will not do to overrule the Smriti passage on the basis of a passage from a Purana. On the other hand, as I have already shown in this connection, we have here a case of general versus special rulings. Rather than overruling the passage from Parashara on the basis of the passage from the Adi Purana, it is far more proper (and would be accepted practice) to overrule the passage from Adi Purana on the basis of the passage from Parashara.5

4. See the discussion of Sanskrit passage 1.14 in Book One. 5. See the concluding portion of Topic 1 in Book Two.

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The passage from the Adi Purana is taken from a general authoritative treatise; the passage from Parashara is taken from a special authoritative treatise. One does not negate or overturn a special authoritative treatise by means of a general authoritative treatise; one negates or overturns a general authoritative treatise by means of a special authoritative treatise. I ask you once again to consider Madhavacharya’s ruling that the injunction on marriage found in Parashara pertains to the other yugas. In the first place, it is opposed to the intention of the creator of the Samhita; in the second place, his own commentary contradicts itself; in the third place, the source of proof upon which he relies in making his ruling is unattested; in the fourth place, even if this source of proof were attested, his ruling remains opposed to the determination of Vyasa that in cases of conflict between Smriti and Purana, Smriti is preeminent; and in the fifth place, negating a special authoritative treatise by a general one goes against commonly accepted exegetical practice. Overall, then, we must conclude that any ruling taking this as a matter for other yugas is improper in every respect. Now some might object. They might say that since Madhavacharya was a preeminent scholar, we should accept his ruling without considering whether it is proper or improper. To this I would reply that Madhavacharya was indeed an exceedingly accomplished scholar; he should be accorded the greatest respect. But he was also capable of error. Not every ruling he made should be considered a source of proof like the Vedas. Whenever later authors have found one of his rulings to be improper, they have refuted it. Consider the following examples:

Sanskrit passage 2.2.16: Nirnayasindhu, chap. 1, section on ISHTI-NIRNAYA What Madhavacharya has said is not acceptable because it is opposed to the opinions of Karkabhashya, Devajani, Shri Anantabhashya, and all the other authors connected to the Vajasaneyi branch, and it is also rejected by many others.

Sanskrit passage 2.2.17: Nirnayasindhu, chap. 2, section on BHADRA-NIRNAYA Madhavacharya has fallen into a net of confusion by making his investigation in terms of the general meaning of the statement.

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Sanskrit passage 2.2.18: Nirnayasindhu, chap. 1, section on EKADASHI-NIRNAYA Madhavacharya makes this ruling, but we must not accept it if we are to arrive at the proper ruling.

Sanskrit passage 2.2.19: Nirnayasindhu, chap. 2, section on ASHVINA-NIRNAYA You may say that since it is in the Skanda Purana, and since Madhavacharya has also said it, this ruling must be good; but then there would be no truth in the other authoritative treatises.

Sanskrit passage 2.2.20: Nirnayasindhu, chap. 2, section on PHALGUNA- NIRNAYA Hemadri, Madhavacharya, and others have arrived at this ruling, but it is not acceptable because then both statements become useless.

Sanskrit passage 2.2.21: Tithitattva, section 114 on JANMASHTAMI If you say that the ruling of Anantabhatta and Madhavacharya is good, you render the other authoritative treatises useless; they will have no other application.

We can see that anytime Kamalakar Bhatta or Smarta Raghunandan found a ruling by Madhavacharya to be improper they refuted it, providing the requisite sources of proof in each instance.22 This being the case, it would be neither fitting nor well considered to continue honoring Madhavacharya’s ruling if it is improper.

topic 3: parashara’s injunction on marriage is not in conflict with manu Nearly all of my respected opponents have concluded that widow marriage conflicts with Manu. They intend to show that even if the passage “If her

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husband is missing” [Parashara 4.28]—which Parashara has enjoined for widowed women during the Kali Yuga—is an injunction on marriage, it cannot be accepted because it conflicts with Manu. For as Brihaspati has written,

Sanskrit passage 2.3.1: Brihaspati, Samskarakanda 1.13 Manu has collected the meaning of the Vedas in his own Samhita; therefore he is preeminent. Any Smriti that is opposed to Manu is not commendable.

This passage from Brihaspati demonstrates that Manu is preeminent and any Smriti that is opposed to him is not to be accepted. In the Chandogya Brahmana it is said,

Sanskrit passage 2.3.2: Chandogya Brahmana, quoted by Kullukabhatta on Manu 1.1 What Manu has said is the greatest medicine.

Here, too, we find an explanation from the Veda that Manu is the greatest medicine, which is to say he is the preeminent authority. How can Parashara’s injunction on marriage be adopted if it conflicts with Manu Smriti? My respected opponents’ objection is not a reasonable one. While Brihaspati praises the preeminence of Manu Smriti, and rejects any Smritis that are in conflict with Manu, he makes no reference to particular yugas. By contrast, Parashara has determined that Manu Samhita is the principal authoritative treatise for the Satya Yuga. Since the passage from Brihaspati provides no special instruction, it can be reconciled with the passage from Parashara if we say, first, that Manu Smriti is preeminent for the Satya Yuga, and second, any Smriti that conflicts with Manu during the Satya Yuga should be rejected. Put differently, Manu Samhita was the paramount Smriti for the Satya Yuga; any other Smriti that was in conflict with Manu Smriti had to be ruled out as unacceptable. It does not follow that during the Kali Yuga any Smritis that conflict with Manu have to be rejected. Instead, in certain cases Smritis that conflict with Manu are accepted, and the practices they promote are adopted throughout India. There are sources of proof for this. Manu has said:

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Sanskrit passage 2.3.3: Manu 9.94 A man of thirty should marry a virgin of twelve. Or a man of twenty-four should marry a virgin of eight. If one marries in violation of this age rule, one violates duty.

In this case Manu has made two kinds of age rules for marriage. He has said that if one transgresses these two age rules, one violates duty. But Angiras has said,

Sanskrit passage 2.3.4: Angiras, quoted in Udvahatattva A virgin of eight is called Gauri; a virgin of nine is called Rohini; a ten-year-old virgin is called a Kanya; after that a virgin is called a Rajasvala. Therefore, at the tenth birthday, learned men take care to give away the virgin. In this way no evil accrues even from improper timing.23

In this particular case, Angiras has indicated the approved age for marriage is eight, nine, or ten years. And he does not consider it an error of timing if one diligently sets out to give a virgin in marriage during her tenth year. But he has given no rule of timing regarding men, be they twenty-four or thirty. Consider then whether the Smriti of Angiras is opposed to Manu Smriti. Manu has enjoined that twelve and eight are the approved times for virgins to marry and he has said that to do otherwise is to violate duty. But Angiras has said that the approved time for marriage is in the eighth, ninth, or tenth year; he has even enjoined that one should diligently give away a virgin in marriage during her tenth year regardless of the question of timing. In his opinion, the twelfth year is never an approved time for marriage. Now, whose opinion are we to follow, Manu’s or Angiras’s? In this case I do not think Manu’s opinion should be adopted. If we were to follow Manu’s opinion, we would have to marry twelve-year-old virgins to thirty-year-old grooms, and eight-year-old virgins to twenty-four-year-old grooms in order not to violate duty. But absolutely no one follows this rule regarding the age for marriage. On the contrary, people follow Angiras’s opinion that the eighth, ninth, and tenth years are the approved ages for marriage. Clearly when it comes to marriage no one adopts Manu’s opinion; instead they adopt Angiras’s, which is opposed to it. Manu has said:

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Sanskrit passage 2.3.5: Manu 9.163–165 A Natural son is entitled to all the wealth of his father. Out of compassion he may give the other sons what they need to survive. But at the time of dividing the inheritance, a Natural son should give a sixth or a fifth of the wealth to his brother who is Kshetraja. The Natural and Kshetraja sons are both entitled to the inheritance. The other ten kinds of sons, such as the Adopted and so forth, may share in the lineage and the wealth, each in succession.

If a person has many sons, such as Natural, Kshetraja, Adopted, Artificial, etc., the Natural son may claim all the wealth, after settling one fifth or at the least one sixth of it on the Kshetraja son. Out of compassion, he may give the Adopted and the rest whatever they need to survive. If there is no Natural son, the Kshetraja son is entitled to all the wealth. And if there is no Kshetraja son, the Adopted son is entitled to all the wealth. In this way Manu says that in cases where there are many sons (like Natural, etc.), the Natural is master of the entire inheritance, the Kshetraja is entitled to only a fifth or a sixth part, and the Adopted and other sons are entitled only to what is required for survival. In the absence of one type of son, he declares the next type of son is entitled. But Katyayana has said,

Sanskrit passage 2.3.6: Katyayana Smriti, quoted in Dayabhaga When a Natural son is born, Kshetraja, Adopted, and other sons of the same caste may receive one third of the inheritance; sons who are not of the same caste should receive only what is needed for survival.24

In this case, Katyayana has declared that Kshetraja, Adopted, and other sons of the same caste are entitled to one third of the inheritance, while sons who are not of the same caste are entitled only to what is required for survival. Does this mean that Katyayana Smriti is opposed to Manu Smriti? Manu allows for the Kshetraja to be given only a sixth or a fifth share, while Adopted and other sons are to receive only what is needed for survival. But Katyayana enjoins that the Kshetraja, Adopted, Artificial, Son of a Remarried Woman, and all other sons should be given a third share. In Manu’s opinion, if there is a Natural son, the Adopted son is entitled only to what is needed for

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survival.6 In Katyayana’s opinion, when there is a Natural son, the Adopted son is entitled to one third of the inheritance. We should ask, then, whether in this case we ought to follow Manu’s opinion or Katyayana’s. It seems to me that in this case Manu Smriti should not be adopted. Rather, the Katyayana Smriti should be accepted, even though it is opposed to Manu. That is, when there is a Natural son, the Adopted son, rather than receiving merely what is needed for survival, is entitled to one third of the inheritance. But if the purport of the passage from Brihaspati [e.g., Sanskrit passage 2.3.1] was to show that during the Kali Yuga no Smriti should be accepted if it conflicts with Manu, how could we follow Katyayana Smriti in this particular case? Manu has said:

Sanskrit passage 2.3.7: Manu 9.69–71 A virgin who has been betrothed, but whose husband dies before marriage, should be taken by her brother-in-law according to this injunction.7 Until the birth of a son, the brother should go in private to this virgin—who bears the marks of widowhood—once in each season. A wise person will not bestow a virgin upon another groom, should her husband die prior to marriage, even if she has not been given away. To give again to a second groom someone who has at one time been given to another is to incur the sin of stealing a virgin.25

In cases where the groom dies prior to marriage, Manu prohibits the giving again of the betrothed virgin to another groom. He enjoins the levirate for the sanctioned production of a single son. Once a son is born, he enjoins a lifetime of widowhood, as indicated by the adjectives “clad in white” and “of pure conduct.”26 Hence, in Manu’s opinion, if a groom dies before marriage, a betrothed virgin may not be given in marriage again. After securing the birth of a single son by the sanctioned rite of levirate—for the purpose of preserving her husband’s family line—the virgin should live out her life as a widow. But Vashishtha has said:

6. However, if the Adopted son is endowed with all the virtues, he is entitled to share the inheritance, even if there is a Natural son. Thus: sanskrit passage 2.3.39: manu 9.141 Of the man who has adopted a son adorned with every virtue, that son shall take the heritage, even though from a different family. 7. Such “taking” is for the purpose of bestowing a son, according to the duty of the levirate (niyoga).

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Sanskrit passage 2.3.8: Vashishtha, chap. 17 If a virgin has been given away verbally and by the touching of water, and afterward the groom dies, and yet marriage has not taken place with the invocation of sacred utterances, then that virgin should remain with her father. If a virgin has merely been betrothed by word, and the marriage rite has not been completed along with the invocation of sacred utterances, then she may be given to another groom according to the injunctions. Her status as a virgin is not changed merely by betrothal.

Vashishtha has enjoined that when a groom dies before marriage, a virgin retains her status as a virgin and may be rightly given away to another eligible male. Does this mean Vashishtha Smriti is opposed to Manu Smriti? Manu prohibits the giving away of a virgin to another groom if she has been betrothed and the groom dies before the marriage; he enjoins that she live a life of widowhood after producing one son by levirate. But Vashishtha has enjoined that she may rightly be given again to another eligible male. We must investigate whether, in this particular matter, people follow Manu Smriti or they accept Vashishtha Smriti, which is opposed to Manu. It seems to me that in this case we should accept the Vashishtha Smriti and follow the practice it endorses. That is, if a groom should die before the rite of marriage is completed, people should follow Vashishtha’s injunction and give her again to another eligible male. We should not make her live the life of a widow by following Manu’s opinion that she not be given to another eligible male. It becomes clear from practice that in certain cases during the Kali Yuga people do adopt Smritis that conflict with Manu. And since Parashara himself determines that the duties described by Manu apply to the Satya Yuga, we have to say that Brihaspati’s claim regarding the preeminence of Manu, and the unacceptability of Smritis that oppose him, is also a matter for the Satya Yuga. It is not fitting to ignore Parashara’s determination that particular Samhitas are preeminent in particular yugas and insist, on the basis of the passage from Brihaspati, that Manu is preeminent in all yugas. For as we have just seen, Smritis opposed to Manu Smriti are not in fact repudiated but are highly recommended. Now, when it comes to the following passage:

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Sanskrit passage 2.3.9: Brihaspati, Samskarakanda 1.13 Any Smriti that is inconsistent with Manu is not recommended.

How can this be fitting? And as for this:

Sanskrit passage 2.3.10: Brihaspati, Samskarakanda 1.1327 Manu has collected the meaning of the Vedas; therefore he is preeminent.

What are we to make of this saying? While Manu has collected the meaning of the Vedas in his own Samhita, have not Yajnavalkya, Parashara, and the others also collected the meaning of the Vedas in their respective Samhitas? Do their own Samhitas somehow collect matters of their own invention, matters that are opposed to the Vedas? It cannot be that they do not know the Vedas. And it cannot be that they have not collected the meaning of the Vedas in their own Samhitas. Surely, if Manu collects the meaning of the Vedas in his Samhita, Yajnavalkya, Parashara, and the other creators of Samhitas have done the same. Brihaspati praises the preeminence of Manu’s Samhita on the grounds that he collects the meaning of the Vedas. And yet if the same can be said of all the Samhitas, how can it be reasonable to rule that Manu is preeminent and the others are not? After all, just because something makes one Samhita preeminent, does that mean other Samhitas are not preeminent? If people acknowledge that all the sages are omniscient and free from error or confusion, and if all the sages have collected the meaning of the Vedas in their Samhitas, then we ought to say that all the sages possess equal knowledge. And do not think that I have merely invented a determination to the effect that all creators of Samhitas possess equal knowledge. In his commentary on Parashara, Madhavacharya makes the very same determination:

Sanskrit passage 2.3.11: Madhava’s introduction to Parashara, chap. 1 All right, if the authority of Manu Smriti is somehow decided, then what about Parashara Smriti? Because the Veda nowhere praises Parashara the way it does Manu, it becomes difficult to account for the authority of Parashara Smriti.

Having raised this doubt, Madhavacharya then determines:

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Sanskrit passage 2.3.12: Madhava’s introduction to Parashara, chap. 1 It is not the case that Parashara’s glories are not sung in the Vedas. Vyasa is called the son of Parashara. In this connection, when the Vedas call Vyasa “Parashara’s son” it is a way of praising him. Everyone acknowledges the glories of Veda Vyasa. If Veda Vyasa is glorified in the Vedas as the son of Parashara, then we need hardly say anything more about the inconceivable glories of Parashara. As such, Parashara is undoubtedly equivalent to Manu. The same reasoning can be applied in the case of Vashishtha, Atri, Yajnavalkya, and the rest. Since their glories are also sung in the Vedas, they too are equivalent to Manu.

If the compilers of the Samhitas are recognized as omniscient sages free from error, and if they have all compiled the meaning of the Vedas in their own Samhitas, and if their glories are sung in the Vedas, then there can be no doubt that all the sages are worthy of the same respect. The only distinction is that each Samhita is considered preeminent for a particular yuga. Manu Samhita is preeminent during the Satya Yuga, Gotama Samhita is preeminent during the Treta Yuga, Shankha and Likhita are preeminent during the Dvapara Yuga, and Parashara is preeminent during the Kali Yuga. Consequently, if Manu Samhita and Parashara Samhita are the authoritative treatises for different yugas, how can they conflict with one another? From all this we may conclude that Manu Samhita is the preeminent authoritative treatise for the Satya Yuga and Parashara Samhita is the preeminent authoritative treatise for the Kali Yuga. There is no conflict between the two. What Brihaspati says about Manu being preeminent, and about the unacceptability of Smritis that conflict with him, should apply only to the Satya Yuga. In the present age, a particular Smriti that opposes Manu may be accepted. As such there can be no objection to accepting the injunction given by Parashara regarding the marriage of widowed women (and other women), even if it conflicts with Manu. We must now consider whether or not the remarriage of widowed women truly conflicts with Manu Samhita or with other Samhitas. Manu has said,

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Sanskrit passage 2.3.13: Manu 9.175 A woman who has been abandoned by her husband, or who has become a widow, may by her own volition become a Remarried Woman; that is, she may marry another man. The son born to her is called the Son of a Remarried Woman.

Vishnu has said,

Sanskrit passage 2.3.14: Vishnu Smriti 15.8 A woman who remains a virgin and is married again according to the rites is called a Remarried Woman.

Yajnavalkya has said,

Sanskrit passage 2.3.15: Yajnavalkya 1.67 Whether a virgin or not, a woman married again according to the rites is called a Remarried Woman.

Vashishtha has said,

Sanskrit passage 2.3.16: Vashishtha Samhita, chap. 17 A woman who abandons her husband because he is impotent, outcast, or mad, or whose husband has died, when she marries another man, is called a Remarried Woman.

We see, then, that Manu, Vishnu, Yajnavalkya, and Vashishtha extol the duty of the punarbhu, or Remarried Woman. They provide injunctions for a woman to undergo the rites of marriage again when her husband is outcast, impotent, or mad, when her husband has died, or when she has been abandoned by him. Some say that while Manu and the others mention the paunarbhava, or Son of a Remarried Woman, this is merely the name used to designate a son produced in this fashion. They do not accept that this sort of son is sanctioned by the authoritative treatises.8 Such a determination is a product 8. This is the view of people like Kalidas Maitra of Serampore and others. [Trans.: See Maitra, Paunarbhava khandanam, 48.]

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of their imagination; it does not accord with the authoritative treatises. All the Samhitas that contain injunctions concerning sons reckon the Son of a Remarried Woman to be a son in accordance with the authoritative treatises. After listing the characteristics of twelve types of son, beginning with the Natural son, Manu says in conclusion,

Sanskrit passage 2.3.17: Manu 9.180 In the absence of a Natural son, when there is the possibility of a lapse in the postmortem rites, the sages describe the characteristics of the eleven types of son beginning with the Kshetraja as being fit substitutes for a son.

And,

Sanskrit passage 2.3.18: Manu 9.184 In the absence of a more excellent son, the next most inferior son is entitled to the inheritance.

In listing the characteristics of the twelve kinds of son, Yajnavalkya, too, has said,

Sanskrit passage 2.3.19: Yajnavalkya 2.132 Of these twelve types of son, when the earlier mentioned is absent, then the next one is entitled to perform the postmortem rites and to receive the inheritance.

Insofar as Manu and Yajnavalkya describe the Son of a Remarried Woman as being entitled to perform the postmortem rites and to receive the inheritance, it is exceedingly hard to believe that the Son of a Remarried Woman is not a son in accordance with the authoritative treatises. Some say that when Manu lists the twelve kinds of son, he describes the Son of a Remarried Woman as tenth, and that this indicates that the Son of a Remarried Woman is an inferior kind of son. It is true that the Son of a Remarried Woman is an inferior son in Manu’s opinion, but not in the opinion of Yajnavalkya, Vashishtha, and Vishnu. They even rank the Son of a Remarried Woman higher than they do the Adopted son. Yajnavalkya describes the Son of a Remarried Woman as sixth and the Adopted son as seventh, and en-

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joins that in the absence of an earlier mentioned son, the next one is entitled to perform the postmortem rites and to receive the inheritance. This means that the Son of a Remarried Woman is entitled to perform the postmortem rites and to receive the inheritance before the Adopted son. In other words, the Son of a Remarried Woman is superior to the Adopted son. Vashishtha describes the Son of a Remarried Woman as the fourth type of son:

Sanskrit passage 2.3.20: Vashishtha, chap. 17 The Son of a Remarried Woman is fourth.

In other words, of the six types of son in the first class, the Son of a Remarried Woman is fourth, while the Adopted son is second among six types of son in the second class. That is,

Sanskrit passage 2.3.21: Exact source uncertain The Adopted son is second.

Vishnu also describes the Son of a Remarried Woman as fourth. He describes the Adopted son as eighth:

Sanskrit passage 2.3.22: Vishnu Smriti 15.7, 15.18 The Son of a Remarried Woman is fourth. The Adopted son is eighth.28

He concludes his list of sons by saying,

Sanskrit passage 2.3.23: Vishnu Smriti 15.28–30 Among these, the earlier mentioned son is superior; he is entitled to the inheritance and he should support the other sons.

Therefore, even though in Manu’s opinion the Son of a Remarried Woman is listed as tenth and is reckoned to be inferior, in the opinion of Yajnavalkya he is seventh, while in the opinion of Vashishtha and Vishnu he is listed as fourth and he is considered superior to the Adopted son. Manu Samhita is

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the chief authoritative treatise for the Satya Yuga and in that yuga the Son of a Remarried Woman was considered an inferior kind of son. If Manu’s ruling applied to all yugas, there would be no way Yajnavalkya would have listed him in seventh place nor Vishnu and Vashishtha in fourth place. But since Manu, Yajnavalkya, Vishnu, and Vashishtha each enjoin rites for the remarriage of widowed women by describing the duties of the Son of a Remarried Woman, there is no way we can properly and reasonably say that widow marriage is opposed to the opinions of Manu or the other sages. I am sure that those who say this is opposed to the opinion of Manu and the others have never taken a close look at their respective Samhitas. If they knew the details they would not promulgate such false and baseless claims. Put simply, the marriage of widows is not opposed to the opinions of Manu and the others. It is just that in the opinion of Manu and the other sages, a woman married for a second time is called a punarbhu, or Remarried Woman, and a son born to her is called a paunarbhava, or Son of a Remarried Woman. The only real difference is that according to Parashara, during the Kali Yuga such a woman and such a son are not reckoned to be punarbhu and paunarbhava, respectively. Had Parashara wished to call such a woman during the Kali Yuga a punarbhu, he surely would have used the term; and had he wished to call such a son a paunarbhava he surely would have mentioned that term when he listed the various types of son. We can find ample proof in popular practice today that such a woman is not reckoned a punarbhu; likewise today such a son is not reckoned a paunarbhava. He is considered a Natural son. For instance, if the groom dies after betrothal but before the rites of marriage have been performed, or if for some reason the relationship is terminated, then that virgin can again be given in marriage to another groom. In another yuga this sort of married virgin and her son would be called a punarbhu and paunarbhava, respectively. Thus:

Sanskrit passage 2.3.24: Kashyapa, quoted in Udvahatattva There are seven kinds of punarbhu virgins who should be shunned as the basest in the lineage: the Vagdatta, or one who has been given away verbally; the Manodatta, or one who has been given away mentally; the Kritakautukamangala, or one upon whose wrist the marriage thread has been tied; the Udakasparshita, or one who has been given away according to the injunctions; the Panigrihitika, or one who has taken the hand in marriage; the Agniparigata, or one who has undergone the Vedic ceremony; and the Punarbhuprabhava, or one who has been born in the

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womb of a punarbhu. These seven virgins mentioned by Kashyapa will destroy a husband’s family just like fire.29

Nowadays four of these punarbhu women are routinely married, namely the Vagdatta, the Manodatta, the Kritakautukamangala, and the Punarbhuprabhava. In other words, if the groom should die after a verbal betrothal, after mental consideration of marriage, or after the marriage thread has been tied, or if for some reason the relationship is broken off, such a virgin can still be married to another groom. Even a son born to a punarbhu virgin can be married. In previous yugas such married virgins were called punarbhu and their sons were called paunarbhava. But nowadays these kinds of women are not called punarbhu nor are their sons called paunarbhava. People think of such a woman as being just the same as a woman who has married for the first time. They view her son as being just like a Natural son. Such a son can perform the postmortem rites for his parents just like a Natural son; and like a Natural son, he is entitled to receive the inheritance. In fact, since he is in every way taken to be a Natural son, most people would not even think of calling him a paunarbhava, or Son of a Remarried Woman. So among the seven types of punarbhu women and the seven types of paunarbhava sons identified in other yugas, four are found today. But they are not reckoned to be punarbhu and paunarbhava. Such a woman is reckoned to be just like a woman married for the first time and such a son is everywhere reckoned to be a Natural son. If marriage of the remaining three types of punarbhu were attested, then common sense would suggest that in these cases, too, the woman would be considered the same as a woman married for the first time and her son would be accepted as a Natural son. Therefore, if we first follow Parashara’s intention and conclude that what in other yugas were called punarbhu are now equivalent to women married for the first time and what were called paunarbhava are now called Natural sons; and then we also notice that it is now popular custom to treat what in other yugas were called the four types of punarbhu women as equivalent to women married for the first time; and beyond that if we go on to accept what in other yugas were called the four types of paunarbhava sons as being like Natural sons; then in the end what objection can we have during the Kali Yuga to viewing a widowed woman who remarries and her son as equivalent to a woman married for the first time and her Natural son—regardless of the fact that in another yuga they might have been reckoned as punarbhu and paunarbhava, respectively?

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There is even clear evidence in the Mahabharata that a son born to a woman who has married for a second time may be accepted as a Natural son during the Kali Yuga. The Naga king, Airavata, had a virgin daughter who became a widow. The Naga king gave her to Arjuna. The son born to Arjuna—by the virgin who had been married a second time—was named Iravan. There is a clear indication that he was considered a Natural son. Thus we read:

Sanskrit passage 2.3.25: Mahabharata, Bhishma Parvan, 6.90.7–9a30 The Naga king’s virgin daughter bore Arjuna a glorious, heroic son named Iravan. Suparna had slain the virgin’s husband and the great-souled Naga king Airavata gave his sorrowful, distraught, and sonless daughter to Arjuna. Arjuna took as his wife this virgin who was eager to marry.

Sanskrit passage 2.3.26: Mahabharata, Bhishma Parvan, 6.90.82 Not knowing that his natural-born son had been slain, Arjuna carried on fighting against the kings who were protecting Bhishma.

Here we have evidence that someone who in previous yugas would have been called the Son of a Remarried Woman was from the very beginning of the Kali Yuga accepted as a Natural son.31 We should now consider the meaning and purport of the passages selected by my respected opponents from the Manu Samhita in order to show that widow marriage is opposed to the Manu Samhita. They select this half passage in order to explain that widow marriage is opposed to Manu:

Sanskrit passage 2.3.27: Manu 5.162c–d And there is no authoritative treatise that refers to the second, or subsequent, man of a good woman as her husband.

However, if one reviews the meaning and purport of this passage, there is no way to arrive at the meaning they intend. Thus,

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Sanskrit passage 2.3.28: Manu 5.160–162 If her husband should die, a woman who lives a life of celibacy will go to heaven, even if she bears no son, just as faithful men who live celibate lives go to heaven even if they have no sons. A woman who becomes a prostitute out of greed for a son is scorned and does not attain her husband’s world. A son born by another man is not a son; a son born to another man’s wife is not a son; and there is no authoritative treatise that refers to the second, or subsequent, man of a good woman as her husband.

Which is to say,

Sanskrit passage 2.3.29: Vashishtha Dharmasutra 17.2 Men with sons win unending worlds; the Vedas say there is no heaven for a man without sons.

A woman might turn to prostitution out of fear there is no heaven for someone without a son and out of a corresponding greed to attain heaven by having a son. But authoritative treatises like the above suggest that any woman who becomes pregnant by another man is scorned and thereby loses heaven. This is why a son produced by another man in violation of the sanctions is not reckoned a son. You might say that another man who produces a son should be called a woman’s husband, but this is not in accordance with the authoritative treatises; there is no authoritative treatise that considers another man to be the husband of a good woman. In other words, if a woman takes up wanton ways out of a desire to gain heaven and tries to have a son by another man in violation of the sanctions, the authoritative treatises do not allow such a man to be called her husband. This is because in the authoritative treatises the word “husband” indicates the man to whom a woman has been legally married according to the rites. Therefore the purport of the half passage selected by my respected opponents [i.e., Sanskrit passage 2.3.27] is that if a widowed woman becomes a prostitute out of greed for a son, any other man she approaches in violation of the sanctions cannot be reckoned her husband. However, the purport of this passage is not to stipulate that a woman who has been married according to the rites cannot take a second husband. If that were the case, how could we reconcile what Manu himself says in his section on sons when he gives an injunction regarding the paunarbhava? There he

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describes the Son of a Remarried Woman as entitled to perform his father’s postmortem rites and to inherit his wealth. My respected opponents cite the following:32

Sanskrit passage 2.3.30: Manu 9.65 There is no mention of remarriage of widows in the injunctions on marriage.

Here my respected opponents make a second attempt to show that widow marriage is opposed to Manu. To do so, they read this half passage literally, without first reviewing the section on sons. They fail to consider that if they wish to say this passage contains an absolute prohibition on widow marriage, it leaves them no way to reconcile the passage with Manu’s other injunction regarding the paunarbhava in the section on sons. They are able to make the point they wish to make only if they read this half passage in isolation. But if one reviews the section on sons and considers its purport, there is no way to prove their point:

Sanskrit passage 2.3.31: Manu 9.59–68 In the absence of a son, a woman rightly appointed may gain the desired son by her husband’s brother or some other relative. The appointed individual, anointed with ghee and maintaining silence, may during the night implant one son in the widow’s womb, but never a second. Thinking that the rightful goal of the levirate may not be accomplished by a single son, the sages who know the authoritative treatises on the levirate have consented to the production of a second son in the widowed woman. When the goal of the levirate has rightly been accomplished for the widow, they should live together as father-in-law and daughter-in-law. If the two who are appointed behave out of selfish desire and in violation of the injunction, they should be outcast as a man who has slept with his daughter-in-law and a woman who has gone to her father-in-law’s bed. Brahmans, Kshatriyas, and Vaishyas should not appoint a stranger for the production of a son in a widowed woman; if they do appoint a stranger, they cause the destruction of the eternal laws of righteousness. Among the sacred utterances pertaining to marriage, there is not a single mention of the levirate and in the case of the injunctions for marriage there is no mention of the acceptance of widows.33 Those twiceborn men who know the authoritative treatises condemn this as the law of beasts. During the rule of Vena this practice was common among men. In an earlier

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age, that great royal sage ruled over the entire earth, but desire led him to lose his reason and thus he caused the mixing of the classes. Ever since then, any man blinded by delusion, who appoints a stranger to produce a son for a widowed woman, is scorned by the holy ones.

To be sure, if one considers this entire section it could appear to provide either a prohibition on Kshetraja sons or a prohibition on widow marriage. The first passage [Manu 9.59] introduces the topic of producing a Kshetraja son when there is no son, while the last passage [Manu 9.68] concludes the section on the production of Kshetraja sons. When we find an injunction and a prohibition regarding Kshetraja sons in the introduction and the conclusion—and when all the passages in between apply to the same topic—there can be no doubt that this section addresses only the production of Kshetraja sons. The passage relied upon by my respected opponents, who wish to demonstrate that widow marriage is opposed to Manu, also contains in its first half a clear reference to the levirate (used here in connection with the production of Kshetraja sons). This being so, the ambiguous word “acceptance” in the second half of the passage should not be taken in the sense of “grasping the hand [in marriage]” but—in light of the tenor of the section—in the sense of “the production of Kshetraja sons.” The word for “acceptance” [vedana] derives from the verbal root vid. This root can be taken either in the sense of “grasping the hand [in marriage]” or in the sense of “the production of Kshetraja sons.” When used in the context of marriage, it would indicate “grasping the hand [in marriage],” but when used in a section on the levirate, it indicates “the production of Kshetraja sons.”34 Thus:

Sanskrit passage 2.3.32: Vishnu Smriti 24.9 One should not marry a virgin who is from the same clan or lineage.

Notice that in this context we find the root vid used in a section on marriage, where it is to be taken in the sense of “grasping the hand [in marriage].”

Sanskrit passage 2.3.33: Manu 9.69–70 Let a virgin whose husband dies after betrothal but before marriage choose her husband’s brother; this is the injunction. The husband’s brother should go

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to a virgin who bears the marks of widowhood once in her proper season in accordance with the rules, until a son is produced.

Notice that in this case the root vid is used in a section on the levirate in the sense of bestowing a Kshetraja son.35 Now consider:

Sanskrit passage 2.3.34: Manu 9.65c–d In the case of the injunctions for marriage there is no mention of the acceptance of widows.

In this case the root vid, as it appears in the word for “acceptance” [vedana], should be taken in the sense of bestowing a Kshetraja son, since the section pertains to the levirate. In fact, it would be improper for us not to understand “acceptance” in this sense.

Sanskrit passage 2.3.35: Manu 9.65 Among the sacred utterances pertaining to marriage, there is not a single mention of the levirate and in the case of the injunctions for marriage there is no mention of taking widows for the purpose of bestowing Kshetraja sons.

This interpretation applies; the following interpretation does not: Among the sacred utterances pertaining to marriage, there is not a single mention of the levirate and in the case of the injunctions for marriage there is no mention of the remarriage of widows.36

Manu sets out to prohibit the duty of the levirate. This passage [i.e., Manu 9.65] provides that prohibition. Among all the sacred utterances pertaining to marriage, there is no mention of performing the levirate with widows. And in the case of the injunctions for marriage there is no mention of taking a widow for the purpose of producing a Kshetraja son. Put differently, sons are produced by the levirate and the production of sons is a duty of marriage. But Manu does not reckon the levirate to be a particular form of marriage nor does he mention the levirate (that is, the taking of a woman for the purpose of producing a son in accordance with duty) when discussing the sacred utterances or the injunctions pertaining to marriage. Instead, he prohibits this

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practice as contravening the authoritative treatises. What is more, since he prohibits the production of Kshetraja sons in the first half of the passage on the topic of the levirate, it would have been improper if he had prohibited widow marriage in the second half, since that topic had not arisen and was not under discussion. It is extremely useful and quite proper to point out that among the sacred utterances pertaining to marriage cited in connection with the topic of the levirate there is no mention of the levirate itself. But when considering the injunctions that pertain to marriage in connection with the topic of the levirate there would be no need to point out that one finds no mention of the remarriage of widows. Why should the question of prohibiting widow marriage suddenly arise when making a determination on whether to prohibit the injunction on the levirate? However that might be, the word “marriage” [vivaha] is not used in this case; instead the word used is “acceptance” [vedana], which can signify “grasping the hand [in marriage]” or “production of Kshetraja sons.” Considering the force of the topic under discussion here, “acceptance” should be taken to signify “production of Kshetraja sons.” In fact, choosing to interpret the word “acceptance” here as denoting marriage—with the goal of thereby promoting a prohibition on widow marriage—only demonstrates an inadequate understanding of the topic.37 If you consider the following determination made by Lord Brihaspati, there can be no doubt that this topic contains only a prohibition on the injunction to perform the levirate; it is neither an injunction nor a prohibition on widow marriage. Thus:

Sanskrit passage 2.3.36: Brihaspati 25.16–17, quoted by Kullukabhatta on Manu 9.68 Manu himself has given an injunction regarding the levirate and he himself has issued a prohibition. Because of the decline in the yugas, others are unable to carry out the levirate according to injunction. During the Satya, Treta, and Dvapara Yugas, human beings are endowed with asceticism and knowledge, but during the Kali Yuga, there is a loss of energy among humans. While the sages of earlier eras had all sorts of children, the people of today, who are devoid of energy, are unable to have all these children.

As this suggests, in the first five passages under the topic of the levirate Manu clearly gives injunctions regarding the levirate, whereas in the remaining five

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passages he clearly prohibits the levirate. Now it would not be proper for a single person to issue both injunctions and prohibitions on a single matter under a single topic. This is precisely why Lord Brihaspati has determined that the injunction given by Manu regarding the levirate is intended for the Satya, Treta, and Dvapara Yugas, while the prohibition regarding the levirate is intended for the Kali Yuga. Therefore, in light of the explanation provided by Brihaspati for the topic of the levirate in Manu Samhita, it is certain that the straightforward meaning of this topic is a prohibition on the injunction concerning the duty of the levirate. In this connection it is worth noting that the Narada Samhita forms a portion of the Manu Samhita. In fact, it is because Narada abbreviates the extensive Samhita composed by Manu that his is called Narada Samhita. Similarly, the versions of Manu Samhita that circulate today are referred to as Bhrigu Samhita because they were revealed by Bhrigu.38 At the beginning of Narada Samhita, it is written:

Sanskrit passage 2.3.37: Narada, introduction to chapter on VYAVAHARA For the welfare of all creatures, Lord Manu Prajapati created an authoritative treatise dedicated to the preservation of conduct. This authoritative treatise is composed of 100,000 verses. After arranging this authoritative treatise into 1,000 chapters, Manu Prajapati presented it to the divine sage, Narada. While reading this authoritative treatise with Manu, the divine sage realized that it would be difficult for humans to study such an exceedingly prolix book; therefore he distilled its essence in 12,000 verses. This abbreviated book he presented to Sumati of the lineage of Bhrigu. While reading with the divine sage, Sumati saw that the powers of human beings tended to decline along with their lifespans, so he distilled its essence in 4,000 verses. Humans study the Manu Samhita, which was created by Sumati. The gods, celestials, and others read the expansive book of 100,000 verses. Its first verse is: This world was darkness; nothing could be known. Then the four-faced Lord Brahma revealed himself. After beginning thus, the work proceeds through one topic after another. The ninth topic is “Practice.” This is the introduction to the topic of practice composed by the divine sage Narada.39

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You can see from this that Narada Samhita is merely a distillation of Manu Samhita. Narada created an extract from the huge Manu Samhita of 100,000 verses. Now earlier we saw that Narada Samhita enjoins that in five circumstances—such as when the husband is missing—a woman may marry again.9 This means that it is not just Parashara who enjoins that women may marry again in five unusual circumstances. Manu also enjoins this. This is why even Madhavacharya attributes the passage “If her husband is missing” [Parashara 4.28] to Manu when he quotes it in his commentary on Parashara. Notice:

Sanskrit passage 2.3.38: Madhava on Parashara 4.28 Manu, too, has said, The authoritative treatises prescribe remarriage of a woman if her husband is missing, deceased, has become a renunciant, is determined to be impotent, or has been outcast.

As such we may conclude that, far from being opposed to the opinion of Manu, widow marriage actually conforms to Manu’s opinion. Since Parashara quotes the complete passage from Manu in his own Samhita when enjoining widow marriage, it is disingenuous at best to attempt to explain that widow marriage is opposed to Manu. topic 4: parashara’s injunction on marriage is not opposed to the vedas Some have tried to establish that Parashara’s injunction on marriage is opposed to the Vedas.10 Since the Vedas are the ultimate authoritative treatise in this land, my opponents intend to suggest that if Parashara’s injunction on widow marriage is opposed to the Vedas, it must not be accepted. Lord Veda Vyasa has determined that:

9. See Sanskrit passage 2.1.12. 10. For instance, Nandakumar Kaviratna and his supporters, Sarvananda Nyayavagisha, and the members of Raja Kamalakrishna Bahadur’s council. [Trans.: Vidyasagara omits this note in his English translation (Marriage of Hindu Widows, 70).]

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Sanskrit passage 2.4.1: Vedavyasa-smriti 1.4 In cases where conflicts are apparent among Veda, Smriti, and Purana, Veda is the valid authority; and where Smriti and Purana are in conflict, Smriti is the valid authority.40

My respected opponents cite the following Vedic passage:41

Sanskrit passage 2.4.2: Taittiriya Samhita 6.6.4.3 Just as two tethers can be tied to a single post, so one man may marry two women. Just as one tether cannot be tied to two posts, so one woman may not marry two men.

Relying on this Vedic passage, they conclude that the injunction on remarriage is opposed to the Vedas. My opponents cite the words “one woman may not marry two men” in order to show that the injunction on widow marriage is opposed to the Vedas. But we should note that their determination in this matter is not in keeping with the intention of the Vedic passage they cite. The purport of the passage just cited is that just as at any one time two tethers may be tied to a single post, so too at any given time one man may marry two or more women. Likewise, just as at any one time one tether cannot be tied to two posts, so too at any one time one woman may not marry two men. The purport is by no means that if her husband dies a woman may not marry another man. And this explanation of the purport is not just a figment of my own imagination.42 Nilakantha, who commented on the Mahabharata, quotes and provides an explanation of the following Vedic passage that clearly suggests this purport:

Sanskrit passage 2.4.3: Aitareya Brahmana 3.23.1 One woman may not have several husbands at one time.

Sanskrit passage 2.4.4: Nilakantha on Mahabharata, Adi Parvan, 1.195.27 This Vedic passage shows that one woman is prohibited from marrying several husbands at one time, but that no fault arises from marrying several husbands at different times.

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Therefore, the attempt by my respected opponents to say that widow marriage is opposed to the Vedas is futile. My respected opponents might well consider that if widow marriage had at any time been opposed to the Vedas, it would not have been practiced in the Satya, Treta, or Dvapara Yugas. topic 5: the passage enjoining marriage is from parashara, not shankha 43 Someone has determined that the passage relied upon by Parashara in making his ruling regarding widow marriage is from Shankha, not Parashara. He contends that Parashara has merely quoted it in his Samhita as an example.11 The purport of making such a determination regarding Parashara’s passage on marriage is this: If the passage is not from Parashara then one cannot insist on the marriage of widowed women during the Kali Yuga. It would mean that widow marriage is not approved by the authoritative treatises for the Kali Yuga. Since my respected opponent does not know Sanskrit himself, he bases his determination on the explanation provided by a renowned scholar of Smriti.12 In order to demonstrate how this determination was made, I quote a portion of his book: Vidyasagar has written in support of his cherished goal of widow marriage as it pertains to the duties of Kali Yuga. Motivated by a desire to understand the gist of the passage from Parashara, which is taken from another source, I have endeavored to publish below the gist of what I learned from a particular pandit. To begin with, Vidyasagar relies on only a single passage taken from the Parashara Samhita to show that during the Kali Yuga widow marriage is approved by the authoritative treatises and to demonstrate that it should be adopted rather than prevented. When we examine the context it is certain that the practice must be prevented.

sanskrit passage 2.5.1: parashara 4.27–28 If the elder brother is alive, there should be no worry about establishing the household fire. If he consents, it should be done. As the passage from 11. I refer to Krishnakishor Niyogi. [Trans.: I have not been able to find any publications attributed to this author. See Book Two, note 44.] 12. Bhavashankar Vidyaratna. [Trans.: For more on Bhavashankar, see the introduction.]

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Shankha says, If her husband is missing, has died, has adopted the renouncer’s stage of life, has been determined to be impotent, or has been outcast, then in these five dire circumstances another husband is enjoined for a woman. In light of this passage, the sage Lord Parashara wondered whether or not the apparent requirement to perform an action prohibited by the authoritative treatises might also apply elsewhere under dire circumstances. The illustration in support of this was enjoined by the sage Shankha, propagator of duty during the Dvapara Yuga, in the passage “If her husband is missing.” The reason for this utterly prohibited and cursed resort was so that during dire times a husband and his wife could attain heaven by producing a son. This accounts for the phrase shankhasya vachanam yatha, which means “as shown in the entire passage from Shankha.”44

When my respected opponent refers to the phrase shankhasya vachanam yatha, or “as shown in the entire passage from Shankha,” it might lead people to suppose that the entire passage “if her husband is missing” [in Parasara 4.28] can be found in the Shankha Samhita. In fact, it cannot. This passage is not in the Shankha Samhita. I do not understand what my respected opponent means when he renders the phrase “as shown in the entire passage from Shankha.”45 Furthermore, he fails to explain this particular passage correctly. The actual explanation is:

Sanskrit passage 2.5.2: Parashara 4.27 If the elder brother is alive, the youngest should not establish the household fire; but if he receives permission, he may. This is Shankha’s opinion.

Such is the actual explanation of this passage. Notice that this passage has no connection with the one that follows it. It is not the case that Parashara uses the phrase shankhasya vachanam yatha, or “this is Shankha’s opinion,” to indicate that he is going to quote a passage from Shankha as an illustration in his own Samhita. Even if the words “this is so-and-so’s opinion” never appeared in any other Samhita, my respected opponent’s explanation would still not be a fitting one. I quote a portion of the Atri Samhita pertaining to the topic of establishing the household fire. My readers may consider whether my opponent’s explanation applies.

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Sanskrit passage 2.5.3: Atri 109–110 If his elder brother is missing or has been ill for a long time, the younger brother may establish the household fire after receiving permission. This is Shankha’s opinion. Without the elder brother’s permission, the younger brother should not establish the household fire, study the Veda, or perform austerities or postmortem rites.

In this light, if the passage “If her husband is missing” [i.e., Parashara 4.28] appeared after the phrase “this is Shankha’s opinion,” one might think it made sense to say it is a passage from Shankha quoted as an illustration. You might say that since in the passage from Atri Samhita the words “he should not establish the household fire” appear after the phrase “this is Shankha’s opinion,” it must represent a passage from Shankha quoted as an example. But this would not be proper. The purpose of the passage “he should not establish the household fire” is not to serve as an illustration. It is set down to show the meaning of the preceding passage. There is another context in which the phrase “this is Shankha’s opinion” appears in the Atri Samhita:

Sanskrit passage 2.5.4: Atri 259–260 People killed by cows or Brahmans and outcast people should not be cremated. This is Shankha’s opinion. A twiceborn man who sleeps with an untouchable woman out of desire should be purified by three penances according to the ordinances of Prajapati.

Here too we read “this is Shankha’s opinion.” But there is no way we can properly say that the passage following it is a passage from Shankha quoted as an illustration. The second passage has no connection with the first passage. In these two passages, two separate matters are treated. Furthermore,

Sanskrit passage 2.5.5: Atri 275–279 If a Brahman woman should have contact with a menstruating Brahman woman, she should fast for one night and be purified by the five products of the cow. If a Brahman woman should have contact with a menstruating Kshatriya woman,

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she will be purified in three nights; this is Vyasa’s opinion. If a Brahman woman should have contact with a menstruating Vaishya woman, she should fast for four nights and be purified by the five products of the cow. If a Brahman woman should have contact with a menstruating Shudra woman, she will be purified in six nights; this is the injunction when contact is made by choice. If the contact is by accident, let the penance be divine. This is the ruling on purification indicated for the four classes.

According to the explanation preferred by my respected opponent, in this case we should understand the third verse to be a passage quoted from Vyasa, since at the end of the preceding verse it says “this is Vyasa’s opinion.” But while “this is Vyasa’s opinion” does appear at the end of the second verse, it is wrong to say that the third verse is a passage from Vyasa quoted as an illustration. Each of the five verses actually offers an independent ruling. If you attempt to explain that in other Samhitas the words “this is so-andso’s opinion” are used in cases where another passage is quoted as an illustration, then consider the following:

Sanskrit passage 2.5.6: Exact source uncertain If a Brahman should sip water that has been touched by the hoof of an ass, he clearly drinks wine; this is Yama’s opinion.

Sanskrit passage 2.5.7: Exact source uncertain When a man steals gold, the king should be told. The king should beat the thief with a club. If the thief lives, he should be released from the sin of theft. Or else, he may put on bark garments, enter the forest, and perform the penance for brahminicide. Or he may embrace a metal image of a woman that has been heated in a fire. In such fashion he is released from the sin of stealing gold. This is Samvarta’s opinion.

In these two cases I can see no way to say a passage has been quoted as an illustration, since Yama and Samvarta each say “this is Yama’s opinion” or “this is Samvarta’s opinion” in their own respective Samhitas. In fact, whenever we read “this is so-and-so’s opinion,” the purport is to indicate that something is so-and-so’s opinion on a particular matter. It is not

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meant to indicate that the passage following it is quoted from some other Samhita as an illustration. If this were the purport of saying “this is so-andso’s opinion,” then Yama and Samvarta would not have said “this is Yama’s opinion” or “this is Samvarta’s opinion” in their own respective Samhitas. My respected opponent was apparently so eager to explain the gist of Parashara Samhita that he failed to follow its meaning and purport. My respected opponent cannot establish a ruling that the passage “if her husband is missing” [Parashara 4.28] is from Shankha and not Parashara. Hence he cannot show either that the remarriage of women is an action applying only to dire circumstances in the Dvapara Yuga or that this is not a duty for the Kali Yuga. Therefore, my respected opponent’s efforts have proven fruitless. topic 6: the passage enjoining marriage is not spurious. it is from parashara 46 Someone has determined that:13 1. If Parashara had approved of widow marriage during the Kali Yuga, then he would not have deplored the condition of widowhood. 2. If Parashara intends that a woman may marry when her husband is impotent, then how can there be an injunction regarding Kshetraja sons in the Parashara Samhita? That is, if a woman abandons her impotent husband to marry, then she becomes the wife of someone else. She does not remain the wife of the impotent man. Thus there can be no possibility of producing Kshetraja sons for the impotent man. 3. Therefore, the passage on marriage does not belong to Parashara. If it did, there would be no contradiction. This spurious passage was inserted into the Samhita at the behest of some Hindu ruler at a difficult point in Indian history. The purport of these remarks is that if Parashara approves of widow marriage during the Kali Yuga, why does he enjoin that the condition of widowhood is deplorable? If a woman knew that she could remarry after her

13. Prasannakumar Mukhopadhyaya of Bhavanipur [Trans.: For more on Prasannakumar, see the introduction.]

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husband’s death, would she bemoan the loss of her husband? With no cause for sorrow, how can we say the condition of widowhood is deplorable? Such objections do not stand up to scrutiny because even if remarriage were possible it confounds experience to say that a woman would not feel unbearable grief and distress on the loss of her husband. Bear in mind that a man may remarry as many times as he loses his wife—and nearly all such men do remarry. And yet, even so, a man feels stricken at the loss of his wife; he is distraught with grief and nearly loses his mind. If men are so overcome with grief at the loss of their wives when remarriage is not only possible for them but nearly certain, can we really imagine that women do not also experience great distress? Since women far outstrip men in their feelings of love and grief, would they not feel devastated at the loss of their husbands—even if remarriage were an option? The relationship between a man and a woman is the cause of all happiness in married life. If either the man or the woman dies, the other surely experiences unbearable distress. Now it may be true that a brief moment of suffering is nothing compared to the lifelong suffering of widowhood. But nevertheless, no one doubts that even a moment of unbearable suffering is still a great misfortune. Suppose a man marries a second time after the loss of his first wife; suppose new bonds of love form with his new wife. Even so, he will never forget the love and affection he felt for his first wife. Whenever he recalls those past times, the long-extinguished flames of grief will flare up in an instant. Should women ever be fortunate enough to see the custom of widow marriage promoted, the mere knowledge that remarriage is possible will not be enough to diminish the pain they feel at the loss of their husbands. Long after becoming another man’s wife, a woman will remember the love and affection she had for her first husband; her heart will burn with grief whenever she recalls past times. You may ask whether a woman would really feel grief at being separated from a husband who was poor, sickly, or stupid—let alone from one for whom she felt no love or affection. You might ask how a woman in such a marriage could possibly deplore the condition of widowhood. But such an objection is also improper. It may well be true that a woman in that sort of situation might feel less grief at the loss of her loved one. But who will release her from the bonds of widowhood and all the sorrows that accompany it? This is especially true since a woman who showed no love for a poor or sickly husband will never find release in widowhood. She will be widowed again and again for her offense. And if this is the case, we need hardly fear that the condition of widowhood will

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cease to be deplored once there is a possibility for remarriage. Truly, the passage in question does not conflict with the other passage enjoining marriage. These passages would be in conflict only if one were to argue that becoming a widow is no cause for distress. In that case it would be improper to describe the condition of widowhood as deplorable. Furthermore, one should consider that,

Sanskrit passage 2.6.1: Parashara 4.14 After death, the woman who neglected her husband because he was poor, sickly, or foolish is born as a snake and is widowed again and again.

Sanskrit passage 2.6.2: Parashara 4.12 The woman who does not bathe at the end of her period before serving her husband goes to the netherworld after death and is widowed again and again.

Sanskrit passage 2.6.3: Parashara, but not attested in Madhava 47 The man who abandons a wife who is neither evil nor outcast will be born seven times as a woman and will experience widowhood again and again.

These three passages mention the idea of becoming a widow again and again. This demonstrates that there is no conflict with passages that enjoin widow marriage. If anything, these three passages actually support widow marriage. If there were no injunction regarding the remarriage of widows, how could it be possible for a woman to become a widow “again and again”? My respected opponent interprets the phrase “experience widowhood again and again” to mean that it happens in one birth after another. But this interpretation simply does not apply in the case of the first passage, since if she becomes a snake after dying there can be no possibility of her suffering as a widow in birth after birth. As for the third passage, here the words “again and again” would be unnecessary. It would have been sufficient to say sapta janma bhavet stritvam vaidhavyanca or “born seven times as a woman and widowed.” There

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would have been no need to add the words punah punah, or “again and again.” Had the passage said “born seven times as a woman and widowed” we might have understood it to mean “widowed in each birth.” But by saying “born seven times as a woman and widowed again and again” it clearly means she is widowed again and again in each birth. In other words, far from conflicting with widow marriage, this passage actually provides excellent support for it. Going further still, we should understand the words punah punah to mean “again and again” and not “in birth after birth.” Whenever the words punah punah are used—as in “he says punah punah” or “he sees punah punah” or “he writes punah punah”—we should always take them to mean “again and again.” Of course when something cannot happen in a single lifetime, then the words punah punah can be used in the sense of “in birth after birth.” For instance, we say [in Bengali] punah punah narake yay. We understand the purport to be “he goes to the netherworld in birth after birth.” Since it is not possible to go to the netherworld more than once in a lifetime, we understand this saying to mean that in each successive life he goes to the netherworld. Even in this case the words punah punah mean “again and again”; they do not literally mean “in birth after birth.” We arrive at this meaning only because of the context. Were there no injunction in Parashara Samhita regarding the remarriage of widowed (and other) women, there would be no way a woman could become a widow again and again in one lifetime. We could only understand it to mean that she would become a widow in one life after another. But since Parashara Samhita does contain an injunction regarding the remarriage of widowed (and other) women, it is perfectly possible for a woman to become a widow again and again in one lifetime. There is no need to take punah punah to mean “in birth after birth.” Since there is nothing wrong with taking punah punah to mean “again and again” in one lifetime, it cannot mean “in birth after birth.” Just because Parashara allows a woman to leave her impotent husband in order to remarry, it is unreasonable to argue that this rules out the need for Parashara Samhita to contain an injunction regarding Kshetraja sons. It is true that a woman may leave her impotent husband and marry. But in lieu of, or even prior to such a marriage, she may also produce a Kshetraja son by an appointed person in order to preserve her previous husband’s line. This she may do if she has his consent and if she follows the injunctions of the

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authoritative treatises. Alternatively, if her husband is going to die before she has produced a son for him she may, before she remarries, produce a Kshetraja son to preserve his line—provided he gives her his permission. Does it really matter if it would be unlikely for a woman to produce a Kshetraja son in the five cases in which Parashara has enjoined women to remarry? What matters is that there is a provision for the production of Kshetraja sons. If the husband is sickly or if his seed does not have the power to produce a son, someone may be appointed to produce a Kshetraja son in order to preserve his line—with his permission and in accordance with the injunctions of the authoritative treatises. As such, it is really not reasonable to say that since there is an injunction regarding the remarriage of women there is no way to have an injunction regarding the production of Kshetraja sons. In my first book I explained that in keeping with Nanda Pandit’s opinion regarding the matter of Kshetraja sons, it is Parashara’s view that during the Kali Yuga there are only three types of sons—Natural, Adopted, and Artificial. Parashara makes no injunction regarding Kshetraja sons.48 Whether he makes an injunction regarding Kshetraja sons or not, such a passage could still not be said to conflict with the injunction on marriage. My respected opponent has concluded that the injunction regarding marriage [in Parashara 4.28] is spurious. He argues that there are two passages— one in which Parashara deplores the condition of the widow and one in which he mentions Kshetraja sons—that conflict with this other injunction on marriage [in Parashara 4.28]. He says it is not possible for one man to include in a single work passages that conflict with one another. He concludes that this passage is spurious and that it was inserted into the Samhita at the behest of a Hindu ruler during some difficult time in Indian history. But if these three passages do not in fact conflict, then he has no right to raise such an objection. Nor can he claim that the so-called spurious passage enjoining marriage was willfully inserted into the Samhita at some point by some person. Madhavacharya lived a long time ago. When he wrote his commentary on the Parashara Samhita, he offered a gloss and explanation for this passage. He did not consider it to be spurious. My respected opponent must therefore admit that the people of Madhavacharya’s day did not think this passage was spurious. If we start calling everything spurious that doesn’t fit our way of thinking, it won’t be long before every passage will be called spurious, since people’s opinions differ so greatly.

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topic 7: the passage from parashara enjoins marriage; it does not prohibit it49 Someone has determined that Parashara does not provide an injunction regarding marriage. This person claims that in the phrase patiranyo vidhiyate [at Parashara 4.28; literally, “another husband is enjoined”] there was originally a prefix a- before the word vidhiyate [i.e., avidhiyate], which was subsequently elided. This would yield the meaning na vidhiyate [literally, “is not enjoined”]. Were one to read na vidhiyate, it would mean there is no injunction. This would then mean that rather than enjoining widow marriage, the passage from Parashara actually prohibits it.14 But it is pure folly to turn an obvious injunction into a prohibition by employing such a device. The prohibition intended by my respected opponent is neither proper nor can it be said to be the intention of the sage who compiled the Samhita. If my respected opponent had looked at the Narada Samhita, he would never have dared imagine such a prohibition.50 He says the passage “if her husband is missing” should read avidhiyate. This is how he attempts to prove there is a prohibition on women remarrying. But what about where it says that “if he is missing” a Brahman woman with children may marry another man after waiting for eight years, or for four years if she has no children [see Narada-smriti 12.98]? How could this be proper?15 If there is no injunction regarding marriage in the passage “if her husband is missing” [Narada 12.97 = Parashara 4.28], then it would be absurd for the following passage to say that when her husband is missing a woman may marry after waiting eight years or four. Besides, one never sees the word avidhiyate used in place of vidhiyate. According to the rules of grammar, negative compounds cannot be formed from words that are inflected [i.e., a verb].51 In fact, even my respected opponent acknowledges that such a word is both improper and unattested. So the very means he has adopted for creating a proper word according to the rules of grammar is also fruitless. Realizing to his dismay that one cannot form a negative compound from an inflected word, he abandons that approach, since he cannot claim that the inflected word vidhiyate has been made into a negative compound. He realizes it is not possible for the prohibitive word na to be added to the

14. Referring to Kalidas Maitra of Serampore. [Trans.: See Maitra, Paunarbhava khandanam, 50, 53–54.] 15. See the earlier discussion of Sanskrit passage 2.1.3.

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word vidhiyate and to then have the na become a- in order to yield avidhiyate. So he says that what we have is an indeclinable, prohibitive word a, which appears as an independent word before the word vidhiyate. He appeals to a grammatical rule which specifies that when appearing after the final -o of the word anyo, the word a would disappear.52 While there is indeed a grammatical rule stating that the syllable a- following a word ending in either -e or -o should disappear, there is also another grammatical rule16 which states that this euphonic rule does not apply to one-syllable, indeclinable words. That is, in the case of one-syllable, indeclinable words like a, i, u, etc., there is no application of euphonic rules regarding the loss, lengthening, or transposition of form.53 So even if we were to imagine that there was an independent word a in front of the word vidhiyate (as a way to get around reading avidhiyate), there is no way—according to the rules of grammar—for there to be the loss of this syllable a. My respected opponent is so eager to establish his own preferred meaning that he adopts the grammatical rule enjoining loss of a- following words ending in -e and -o. However, if he does this, he must also follow the rule that prohibits such euphonic change in the case of one-syllable, indeclinable words. Perhaps he might try to argue that even though grammar does contain such a prohibition in the case of one-syllable indeclinable words, the sages do not always adhere to the rules of grammar. Even if there is a prohibition in the case of one-syllable indeclinable words, what is to prevent such euphonic combination in the sayings of the sages? If my respected opponent wishes to say this, then my question to him is: If grammar contains a prohibition on the formation of negative compounds from inflected words, what is to prevent the creation of such compounds in the sayings of the sages?54 My respected opponent acknowledges there is a prohibition in grammar on the forming of negative compounds from inflected words. So he then says that the sages would never form negative compounds because they would be unwilling to disobey the rules of grammar. They form their words according to the rules of grammar. But would it not be exceedingly ungrammatical for the sages, who recognize the prohibition on euphonic combination in the case of one-syllable indeclinable words, to disobey the rules of grammar and, in a fit of desperation, allow precisely such euphonic combination in the case of one-syllable indeclinable words?55 16. Panini 1.1.14: nipata ekajanan. [Trans.: See Panini’s Grammatik, 3.]

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My respected opponent endorses the suspect notion that even though we read vidhiyate and not avidhiyate—that is, even though we agree that Parashara enjoins marriages rather than prohibits them—this is nevertheless still at odds with the complete text of Parashara Samhita. Parashara refers to the condition of widowhood among women as a kind of offense that merits punishment, just as he singles out for blame the marriage of a girl who has already begun her menses. In other words, if Parashara had intended to support widow marriage, he would never have enjoined punishment for the condition of widowhood nor would he have singled out for blame the marriage of girls who have begun their menses. I have already addressed the question of whether there is a contradiction between the injunction regarding punishment for the condition of widowhood and the passage on widow marriage.17 Now it is necessary to consider whether the fact that Parashara assigns blame for the marriage of girls who have begun their menses is somehow opposed to the rest of the text. My respected opponent apparently intends to say that if widow marriage were promoted, even widowed virgins who have begun their menses could be married. His point is that if Parashara has singled out the marriage of such virgins for blame, then how could he intend widow marriage in those cases? Anyone who married such a widowed virgin would be blameworthy and would require atonement. This objection is completely improper and unreasonable. When Parashara singles out for blame the marriage of a menstruating virgin, this applies to the occasion of a virgin’s first marriage, not to a widow’s marriage. This becomes evident when we examine the topic thoroughly. Thus:

Sanskrit passage 2.7.1: Parashara 7.4–8 An eight-year-old virgin is called Gauri; a nine-year-old virgin is called Rohini; a ten-year-old virgin is called Kanya. After that, virgins over eleven years old are called Rajasvala. If a virgin has not been given away by her twelfth year, her father’s people drink her menses month after month. If they see a virgin menstruate, a mother, father, and brother go to hell. Any Brahman who, blinded by ignorance, marries that virgin becomes someone who should not be spoken

17. See Topic 6 of Book Two.

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to, who should not be served with other guests, and whose wife is called a Vrishali (that is, Shudra) woman. Any twiceborn man who spends one night with a Vrishali woman may be purified by three years of daily alms-begging and silent prayer.

A virgin should be given in marriage during her eighth, ninth, or tenth years. If she is not married by her tenth year, her father, mother, and brother go to hell. Whoever marries such a virgin is blameworthy and would require atonement. That such things apply only on the occasion of the first marriage should be beyond doubt. Of the five passages in this topic, my respected opponent selects only the last two to support his preferred position. He thereby hopes to suggest that they apply to the occasion of widow marriage. If one selects only two passages from a topic, or a single passage, or even a half a passage, it can be made to apply to any matter. But if one examines the entire topic, this sort of attempt becomes most implausible. What is more, we have already seen that the Narada Samhita contains an injunction for women to marry even when they have had children. And elsewhere we read:

Sanskrit passage 2.7.2: Yajnavalkya 1.67 Whether a virgin or not, a woman married again according to the rites is called a Remarried Woman.

This passage from Yajnavalkya allows for the marriage of a woman who is not a virgin. As such it is pointless to suggest that the same blame applies in this case as it does in the case of a father [who gives away], or a husband [who marries], a virgin who has started her menses. Any effort to establish that widow marriage is prohibited on these grounds is bound to be futile. topic 8: the rules established by dirghatamas do not prohibit widow marriage Someone has said that in the Adi Parvan of the Fifth Veda, the Mahabharata, a rule is established for women to have only one husband in this life.18 Thus: 18. I refer to “A Bridegroom.” The members of Raja Kamalakrishna Bahadur’s council have also raised this objection. [Trans.: For publication details, see Bridegroom, Shriyuta Ishvarachandra Vidyasagara.]

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Sanskrit passage 2.8.1: Mahabharata, Adi Parvan, 1.104.34–36a The great sage Dirghatamas said: “Henceforth I have established restrictions in this world. A woman shall have only one husband, who will shelter her for her entire life. A woman shall have no other man, whether her husband is dead or alive. If she takes another man, she will be outcast without a doubt.”

The purport in providing this citation is to suggest that the Mahabharata contains a rule that women should remain with a single husband for their entire lives. Since there is a rule about her spending time with her husband as well as a ruling that any violation of this rule leads to hell, it cannot be appropriate to say women can remarry. I do not understand how my respected opponent can think that Dirghatamas’s establishment of this rule communicates a prohibition on the rightful remarriage of women. The actual meaning of Dirghatamas’s words is: “From today hence I have established the rule that a woman shall submit to her husband alone as long as she lives; that is, a woman shall spend her time in submission to her husband. A woman shall not approach another man, whether her husband is dead or alive. If she approaches another man, she will be outcast without a doubt.” The purport here is that a woman shall live her life in dependence on her husband alone. If she approaches another man while her husband is unwell or upon his death—which is to say, if she becomes an adulteress (vyabhicharini )—she will be outcast. In prior ages, the evil of adultery (vyabhichara) was not even considered an evil. We see this clearly in another portion of the Mahabharata:

Sanskrit passage 2.8.2: Mahabharata, Adi Parvan, 1.122.25b–27a Pandu said to Kunti: “Devoted princess! Those who know duty consider this to be duty, namely that in each of her seasons a woman will not fail to visit her husband; at all other times, she may do as she pleases. The virtuous praise this ancient duty.”

In other words, a woman should serve her husband during her season for the purpose of producing offspring; she should not approach another man.

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At other times a woman may approach another man as she pleases. In prior ages the virtuous accepted this sort of practice as duty. This custom of women enjoying themselves as they pleased had been promoted from ancient times. However, Dirghatamas established his rule in order to eradicate the custom. Dirghatamas clearly says that a woman shall not approach another man whether her husband is alive or dead; if she does, she will be outcast. It is evident that this is to prevent a woman from approaching other men, which is to say from being an adulteress. The purport is not to show that she may not seek the shelter of another man according to the injunctions of the authoritative treatises. When one examines what precedes and follows this topic, it is apparent that it is only a prohibition of the long-practiced custom of adultery and not a prohibition of legally seeking the shelter of another man. Thus:

Sanskrit passage 2.8.3: Mahabharata, Adi Parvan, 1.104.34–40 Dirghatamas’s wife, having acquired children, no longer satisfied her husband. Seeing his wife’s dislike for him, Dirghatamas asked her, “Why do you hate me?” Pradveshi replied, “A husband cares for his wife and supports [bharana] her; that’s why he’s called the supporter [bharta]. And because he protects [palana] her he is called her husband [pati]. But you have been blind since birth; I have worn myself out caring for and supporting you and your sons. I can no longer exert myself to care for and support all of you.” Hearing his wife’s words, the sage became angry. He said to his wife and sons, “Take me to the king; I’ll get you money.” Pradveshi said, “I don’t want the wealth you’ve gained. Do what you wish. I will not care for and support you as before.” Dirghatamas said, “Henceforth I have established restrictions in this world. A woman shall have only one husband, who will shelter her for her entire life. A woman shall have no other man, whether her husband is dead or alive. If she takes another man, she will be outcast without a doubt. From today hence, any woman who abandons her husband and approaches another man will be outcast. Even if she has wealth, she will not be able to enjoy it and hers will be continual shame and scorn.” The Brahman woman became angry on hearing these words of Dirghatamas and told her sons to throw him in the Ganges. Overcome by greed and delusion, Gautama and the others tied him to a raft. They asked themselves, “Why should we care for an old blind man?” And with this they threw him into the Ganges. Then they returned to their home.

Clearly Dirghatamas’s wife had experienced great hardship in caring for her blind husband. Unable to bear this hardship, she resolved to care for

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him and support him no longer. Angered at this, Dirghatamas established the rule that a woman should submit to her husband alone for her entire life. Should a wife lose affection for her husband and approach another man, she would be outcast. Seeing his own wife’s lack of affection for him, he realized she would abandon him; she would follow her desires and find another man with whom she might enjoyably pass the time. In his anger he established this rule to prohibit the long-standing practice of women following their own desires. In prior ages, the virtuous reckoned the practice of women following their own desires to be an eternal duty. No one found fault with this. Had Dirghatamas’s wife adopted this eternal duty, she would not have been scorned or reckoned unrighteous by virtuous society. But after Dirghatamas established his rule, any woman who approached another man—that is, became an adulteress—would become outcast and a focus of slander. If the purport of Dirghatamas’s rule was that a woman could never legally seek shelter with another man (which is to say, take another husband), why would Dirghatamas himself agree to produce a Kshetraja son for Sudeshna, the wife of King Bali, immediately after establishing this rule? For we read:

Sanskrit passage 2.8.4: Mahabharata, Adi Parvan, 1.104.41–45 That blind Brahman [Dirghatamas] floated downstream, passing through many lands. At that time King Bali, best of the knowers of duty, was bathing in the Ganges. When he saw the Brahman carried near him by the current, he grabbed him. After coming to know his story, he begged him for a child. “O fortunate one, please bestow upon my wife a son who is righteous and skillful.” The brilliant Dirghatamas consented to his request and the king brought him his wife Sudeshna.

Now, if the intention of Dirghatamas’s rule was to show that a woman may be outcast for approaching another man (which is in keeping with the injunctions of the authoritative treatises themselves), then as the creator of this very rule he would never have agreed to produce a son for King Bali’s wife. Surely he would have forbidden King Bali from allowing another man to perform the levirate for his wife in the interests of producing a son. In fact, elsewhere in the Mahabharata we find that Arjuna married the widowed virgin daughter

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of the Naga king Airavata.19 If the purpose of Dirghatamas’s rule had been to prohibit the remarriage of widows (and other women), then at a later date the Naga king Airavata would not have given his widowed virgin daughter to Arjuna; nor would Arjuna have agreed to marry the Naga king’s widowed virgin daughter. This is to say that in the absence of sons the authoritative treatises do permit the production of Kshetraja sons; and when separated from her husband, a woman’s acceptance of another husband is also permitted by the authoritative treatises. Basically these two cases bear no relation at all to Dirghatamas’s creation of a rule forbidding adultery, a practice that had been grounded in popular practice but that was not in accord with the authoritative treatises. Clearly Dirghatamas established his rule to forbid the long-standing evil of adultery. The sage Uddalaka’s son Shvetaketu created a similar sort of rule to forbid the practice of adultery:

Sanskrit passage 2.8.5: Mahabharata, Adi Parvan, 1.122.4–21a Pandu said to Kunti, “O fair, sweet-smiling one! In times past, women were unconstrained, independent; they enjoyed themselves as they pleased. If they forsook their husbands for another man, they were not thought unrighteous. That was duty in times past; that was probative duty. The sages respected that duty. Even today in the land of the northern Kurus that duty is respected and promoted. This eternal duty is highly favored among women. Listen as I tell you who it was that established the rule [prohibiting such behavior] and for what reason. I have heard that there was a great sage named Uddalaka. He had one son, named Shvetaketu. Listen as I tell you how and why it was that once upon a time Shvetaketu established that righteous rule after becoming angry. One day Uddalaka was sitting with Shvetaketu and the boy’s mother. At that time a Brahman came and took the hand of Shvetaketu’s mother. He led her away, saying, ‘Come with me.’ The sage’s son could not bear to see his mother led away in this fashion and became angry. Seeing Shvetaketu’s anger, Uddalaka said to him, ‘My child, don’t be angry; this is the eternal law. Everywhere in this world, the women of every class are unguarded. Just as cattle enjoy themselves as they wish, so too do humans enjoy themselves, each within their class.’ The sage’s son, Shvetaketu, could not bear this duty. He established the duty [prohibiting such behavior] for all men and women in the world. O fortunate one! I have heard that ever since that time this duty has been promoted among humans, but not among other creatures. Henceforth, let 19. See the discussion of Sanskrit passage 2.3.25.

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any woman who forsakes her husband incur a ghastly and awful sin equivalent to abortion. And let any man who forsakes a wife who has been virtuous and devoted to him since childhood incur the same sin here on earth. And let the same sin apply to any woman who has been appointed by her husband for the purpose of bearing a son, but who fails to follow his instructions. O timid one! This righteous rule was forcefully established long ago by Shvetaketu, son of Uddalaka.”56

This explanation of the purport of Dirghatamas’s rule seems entirely proper. Some may not be pleased with this explanation of the purport. Should anyone attempt to demonstrate that the establishment of this law amounts to a complete prohibition on the marriage of widowed women, they still cannot deny that the marriage of widows during the Kali Yuga is in accord with the authoritative treatises. Let us say I admit that Dirghatamas did establish this rule to prevent the remarriage of married women. Even so, he did not specify any particular yuga.57 Hence we can say that this rule was established generally, for all yugas. But Parashara has given a special injunction for the Kali Yuga. As such, Parashara’s special injunction is more binding than Dirghatamas’s general injunction. You may say that Dirghatamas’s establishment of this rule does not apply generally to all yugas, but only to the Kali Yuga. Even that causes no problem. Dirghatamas may have generally prohibited the marriage of married women in the Kali Yuga, but he has not specified any particular circumstances. But Parashara has specified five circumstances in his injunction. As such, while Dirghatamas established a general injunction, Parashara has offered a special injunction. We have already seen very clearly that a special injunction is more binding than a general one. Therefore, upon careful consideration we see that Dirghatamas’s rule can in no way be taken as a prohibition on the marriage of widows during the Kali Yuga. topic 9: there is no prohibition of widow marriage in the brihat parashara samhita58 Someone has said that Parashara clearly finds fault with remarried widows in the fifth chapter of the Brihat Parashara Samhita. He therefore suggests it would be foolish to imagine that Parashara supported an injunction allowing marriage of widows.20 20. I refer to “A Bridegroom.” [Trans.: For publication details, see Bridegroom, Shriyuta Ishvarachandra Vidyasagara.]

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Sanskrit passage 2.9.1: Brihat Parashara Samhita 5.56, 5.67c–d–68a–b One should not eat the food of someone who gives to one man a woman who has already been given to another man, because she is said to be a Remarried Woman. Any son of her lover, any husband of the woman who has married for a second time, and any Natural son of his—all these should be zealously excluded from religious and ancestral rites.

We need to consider more carefully the claim that the Brihat Parashara Samhita finds fault with remarried widows and that therefore it is foolish to imagine that Parashara supported an injunction allowing marriage of widows. If there were no injunction permitting widow marriage in the Kali Yuga, there could be no possibility of widow marriage in the Kali Yuga. Since the Brihat Parashara Samhita contains a prohibition on the sharing of food with remarried widows, it seems clear that widow marriage is a duty in the Kali Yuga. If widow marriage did not apply in the Kali Yuga, there would be no injunction against sharing food with remarried widows. Where there is no possibility of an occurrence, there is no need for a prohibition. Instead of thinking that the prohibition against sharing food with married widows in the Brihat Parashara Samhita prohibits widow marriage, we should instead conclude that such marriage is enjoined. There are those who doubt whether the injunction from Parashara Samhita regarding remarriage of widows in five circumstances (i.e., “if her husband is missing, etc.” [4.28]) constitutes a genuine marriage injunction. Their doubts should be removed by the passage from the Brihat Parashara Samhita (i.e., “One should not eat the food, etc.”), which prohibits sharing food with married widows. My respected opponent, although your goal was to destroy the ruling regarding widow marriage using the passage from the Brihat Parashara Samhita, you have in fact done us a great service. Should you attempt to say that since it is prohibited to share food with a woman who has married as a widow it must be that widow marriage is not enjoined, then I cannot agree. Such an objection is also unreasonable. If an eight-year-old virgin is widowed and does not remarry, but spends the rest of her life in true celibacy, we find that it is prohibited to share food with her:

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Sanskrit passage 2.9.2: Exact source not verified59 Whoever eats the food of a widow, eats the filth of the earth.

Here we see that when it comes to a prohibition on sharing food, the married widow and the celibate widow are treated alike. As such, there can be no particular reason for saying that the remarried widow is to be avoided more than the celibate child widow. Nor can we say that the prohibition on sharing food with a married widow indicates a prohibition on widow marriage.

Sanskrit passage 2.9.3: Brihat Parashara Samhita 5.67c–d–68a–b; compare Sanskrit passage 2.9.760 Any son of her lover, any husband of the woman who has married for a second time, and any Natural son of his—all these should be zealously excluded from religious and ancestral rites.

There is a discrepancy between the textual reading that my respected opponent adopts for this passage and the way he explains it. The textual reading he provides—parapurvapatirjatah—is not appropriate because both parapurvapatih and jatah have nominative case endings. Words ending in the nominative case typically are related to one another as noun and adjective. But in this particular instance, we cannot speak of the adjective being in agreement, since parapurvapatih is in the singular and jatah is in the plural.61 Except in the case of words for numbers, there can be no relation of noun and adjective between a singular and a plural form. Just as it is not possible to construe one as the subject and the other as the predicate, we are also not allowed to view one as a stem and the other as a suffix. In fact, the correct reading is not parapurvapatirjatah at all. The appropriate reading, which also conforms to the topic, should be parapurvapatiryashcha. In the Manu Samhita, in the context of exclusion from religious and ancestral rites, both the Didhishupati and the Parapurvapati are mentioned.62 Thus:

Sanskrit passage 2.9.4: Manu 3.166 Men who deal in sheep, men who deal in buffalo, the husband of a widow (parapurvapati ), and the one who takes away the dead—namely the one who

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burns corpses for money—these should be zealously excluded from religious and ancestral rites.

In this context, Manu speaks of zealously excluding the Parapurvapati from religious and ancestral rites; he says nothing of the Natural son born to the Parapurvapati. And:

Sanskrit passage 2.9.5: Manu 3.173 A Didhishupati is a man who is enjoined by the duty of the levirate upon the wife of his deceased brother, but who enjoys her out of his own desire, contrary to the injunctions.

In keeping with the definition Manu gives of the Didhishupati (as someone excluded from religious and ancestral rites), it makes no sense to speak of the Didhishupati as the husband of a woman who has married for the second time. The Didhishupati is a man who has been enjoined by the duty of the levirate upon the wife of a deceased brother for the purpose of producing a son, but who neglects the injunctions in order to enjoy himself. It is this Didhishupati who is to be zealously excluded from the religious and ancestral rites. What is more, the word “Parapurvapati” is not meant to indicate the husband of a woman who has married for a second time. A Parapurva is a woman who has abandoned an inferior husband to take refuge with a more excellent man. The husband [i.e., pati] of this Parapurva is a Parapurvapati. Thus:

Sanskrit passage 2.9.6: Manu 5.163 The woman who abandons her own inferior husband and takes refuge with a more excellent man is to be scorned in this world; she is called Parapurva.

Thus the correct reading and correct meaning of the passage from the Brihat Parashara Samhita selected by my respected opponent should be:

Sanskrit passage 2.9.7: Brihat Parashara Samhita 5.67c–d–68a–b; compare Sanskrit passage 2.9.3 All of the following should be zealously excluded from the religious and ancestral rites: The man who is the son of her Upapati—that is, a man conceived by her

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lover; the man who is a Didhishupati—that is, a man enjoined by the duty of the levirate on the wife of his brother for the purpose of producing a son but who neglects the injunctions in order to enjoy himself; and the man who is a Parapurvapati—that is, the man with whom a woman seeks refuge thinking him more excellent after leaving her inferior husband.

This textual reading and this meaning are both completely appropriate. The sons of the Upapati, the Didhishupati, and the Parapurvapati are all extremely blameworthy. This is why they are so zealously excluded. We must accept the technical definitions provided by Manu for both the Didhishupati and the Parapurvapati when considering their exclusion from religious and ancestral rites. If we were to define both the Didhishupati and the Parapurvapati as husbands of women married for a second time, there would be no point in specifying their exclusion using two separate concepts [i.e., Didhishupati and Parapurvapati]. If we choose to exclude both the Didhishupati and the Parapurvapati under one definition, we would also have to exclude the husband of a woman married for a second time. But if the two concepts are each used as the grounds for independent exclusions, then we have to accept the technical definitions provided by Manu. At the beginning of the topic of exclusion from religious and ancestral rites in the Brihat Parashara Samhita, it is written that if doubts arise, a determination of the meaning should be made by recourse to the words of Manu. Thus:

Sanskrit passage 2.9.8: Exact source not verified When fixing the meaning of difficult concepts, Manu should be adopted.

Therefore in this case we must adopt the technical definitions provided by Manu for the words “Didhishupati” and “Parapurvapati.” As such, my respected opponent’s reading of parapurvapatijatah and the meaning he adopts—namely, “the husband of a woman who has married for a second time, and any Natural son of his”—is neither appropriate nor valid. My respected opponent has written that in the Brihat Parashara Samhita, Parashara himself has found fault with remarried widows. Here I must point out that it is extremely unlikely that Parashara actually composed the Brihat Parashara Samhita. If one carefully examines both the Parashara Samhita and

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the Brihat Parashara Samhita, it becomes impossible to confirm Parashara’s authorship [of the latter]. In the Parashara Samhita it says:

Sanskrit passage 2.9.9: Parashara 1.18 When Vyasa had finished speaking, Parashara—the best of sages—began to investigate the major and minor points of duty at great length.

And as Parashara began his discussion of duty, he addressed Lord Vyasa, saying:

Sanskrit passage 2.9.10: Parashara 1.19 Listen, son, as I speak of duty, and let the other sages listen as well.

This makes it clear that Parashara himself composed the Parashara Samhita. But in the Brihat Parashara Samhita it says:

Sanskrit passage 2.9.11: Brihat Parashara 1.62 Now Suvrata will speak of the authoritative treatise that Parashara enunciated in response to Vyasa, which is suitable for the present Kali Yuga, applicable to the four stages of life, and intended for the welfare of the four classes.

Sanskrit passage 2.9.12: Brihat Parashara 1.63 With Parashara’s permission, the ascetic Suvrata spoke of this authoritative treatise, so conducive to the welfare of the four stages of life.

This clearly shows that Parashara did not compose the Brihat Parashara Samhita. Someone named Suvrata received Parashara’s permission to enunciate all the duties Parashara had told to Vyasa. Thus we find ourselves with two Samhitas, one accepted as Parashara’s own composition and the other said to have been collected by someone named Suvrata with the permission of Parashara. At the beginning of the Parashara Samhita we find evidence that the text was composed by Parashara himself. Furthermore, authoritative authors like Vijnaneshvara, Vachas-

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patimishra, Kubera, Shulapani, and Raghunandan have attested to this fact. Every passage they select under Parashara’s name has been taken from the Parashara Samhita as composed by Parashara. Madhavacharya, too, has written a commentary on the Parashara Samhita as composed by Parashara. As such, when it comes to reasons for accepting the authority of the book, we have ample evidence right in Parashara’s own Samhita. But when it comes to the Brihat Parashara Samhita we have no such reason. We also find no mention of the Brihat Parashara Samhita anywhere in the books written by Vijnaneshvara and the others. And no one has written a commentary on the work. Nor is it just that we lack sufficient grounds for proving the authority of the Brihat Parashara Samhita. There are also good grounds for actually doubting its authority. To begin with, Suvrata says that for the welfare of the world he will speak of all the duties delivered by Parashara to Vyasa. We conclude from this that Suvrata has collected in the Brihat Parashara Samhita all the duties spoken by Parashara. However, if you carefully consider both Samhitas from beginning to end, you notice striking differences between them. The Parashara Samhita collects everything Parashara himself has said. But one finds many additional passages in the Brihat Parashara Samhita. The Brihat Parashara Samhita contains detailed lists of such duties as funeral offerings, expiation, meditation, gift giving, royal obligations, and rules for the hermitage. There is no mention of such topics in the Parashara Samhita. If Suvrata included in the Brihat Parashara Samhita only the duties treated by Parashara, how is it possible that the Brihat Parashara Samhita contains additional material not found in the Parashara Samhita? Even if we allow for the possibility of additional topics, it should not be possible for the Brihat Parashara Samhita to contain topics that conflict with topics found in the Parashara Samhita. A bit of investigation reveals that many rulings in the Brihat Parashara Samhita are opposed to those found in the Parashara Samhita. For instance:

Sanskrit passage 2.9.13: Parashara 3.6 One who fails to perform the life-cycle rites from birth onward and who neglects regular worship is a Brahman in name only and should be treated as impure for a ten-day period.

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Sanskrit passage 2.9.14: Brihat Parashara 6.34 Parashara declares that a Brahman who neglects his regular worship and shuns good conduct should be treated as impure for a twelve-day period.

Sanskrit passage 2.9.15: Parashara, but not attested by Madhava 63 A man living abroad who hears [news of a birth] after ten days may be considered pure after three days; after a year he is immediately pure.

Sanskrit passage 2.9.16: Partially attested in Brihat Parashara 64 A man living abroad who hears news of a birth or a death before ten days have passed should be considered impure for the remaining days. After ten days he is immediately pure.

Sanskrit passage 2.9.17: Parashara 3.29 A one-day period of impurity shall apply for someone who dies for the sake of a Brahman, for the gaining of cattle or captured women, or in a battle.

Sanskrit passage 2.9.18: Exact source not verified Those who are killed for the sake of a Brahman or a cow are treated the same as Yogis; at their death they are immediately pure.

In the Parashara Samhita a period of ten days’ impurity is enjoined for a man who is a Brahman in name only; in the Brihat Parashara Samhita the period is twelve days. In the Parashara Samhita a period of three days’ impurity is enjoined for someone living abroad who hears news of a birth after a period of ten days. We notice that in the Brihat Parashara Samhita he is said to be

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immediately pure. The Parashara Samhita enjoins one day of impurity in the case of someone who is killed for the sake of a cow or a Brahman or who dies in battle. The Brihat Parashara Samhita enjoins that he is immediately pure. I assume that my respected opponent would agree that all these rulings are opposed to Parashara. I intentionally mention such cases where the two Samhitas contain opposing rulings. If Suvrata had merely collected the duties of Parashara in the Brihat Parashara Samhita, then the rulings of the two Samhitas would not be opposed. Clearly the two Samhitas were not composed by the same person; nor do they contain the duties as taught by one man. A second concern is that when one examines the commentary on Parashara, it becomes clear that the Brihat Parashara Samhita was not in circulation during Madhavacharya’s day. In the conclusion to his commentary on the second chapter of Parashara Samhita, Madhavacharya says:

Sanskrit passage 2.9.19: Madhava on Parashara 2.1565 Even though the Parashara Samhita should describe the duties of the stages of life after first describing the duties of the classes as is done in other Samhitas, because Vyasa had not asked about the duties of the stages of life, the teacher ( Parashara) neglects them. But for the benefit of my audience I have described them all.

Because Parashara does not recount the duties of the stages of life, the commentator draws upon the Samhitas of other sages to describe them. But the Brihat Parashara Samhita provides extensive description of the duties of the stages of life. If the Brihat Parashara Samhita had been in circulation during Madhavacharya’s day, he would not have said the reason Parashara failed to recount the duties of the stages of life was because Vyasa had not inquired. And he would not have sought to correct this deficiency in Parashara by collecting material from Samhitas compiled by other sages. If Parashara had collected the duties of the stages of life in another Samhita [i.e., the Brihat Parashara Samhita], it would not have been appropriate for the commentator to say that he had worked to correct Parashara’s deficiency by collecting material from the Samhitas of other sages. Therefore we can conclude without a doubt that the text known as the Brihat Parashara Samhita was neither known to Madhavacharya nor in circulation during his time. So just consider: If there is not the slightest mention of the Brihat Parashara Samhita in the works of such authoritative authors as Vijnaneshvara,

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Vachaspatimishra, Chandeshvara, Shulapani, Kubera, Hemadri, and Raghunandan; if there is no proof that the Brihat Parashara Samhita existed during the time of Madhavacharya; and if there are many instances of passages in the Brihat Parashara Samhita that are either unattested in, or opposed to, the universally accepted Parashara Samhita; then we can in no way agree that the Brihat Parashara Samhita was composed by Parashara; nor can we say it is a collection of the duties taught by Parashara. This is why it has long been said that the Brihat Parashara Samhita is without basis and unauthoritative. There can therefore be no doubt that when my respected opponent says Parashara casts blame on the remarried widow in the Brihat Parashara Samhita, he makes this claim without having carefully considered the matter. If my respected opponent were to carefully consider the meaning and purport of the two passages he has selected from the Brihat Parashara Samhita (in his effort to show that widow marriage is prohibited during the Kali Yuga) he would realize that this is not the point of the two passages. And even if it could be shown that these two passages do somehow prohibit widow marriage, this would still pose no problem. It is entirely unreasonable and unacceptable to rely on a baseless and unauthoritative Samhita to reject the ruling of a universally accepted and authoritative Samhita. topic 10: the parashara samhita lists duties only for the kali yuga, not for other yugas Several people have raised the objection that the Parashara Samhita does not merely describe the duties for the Kali Yuga, but describes duties for the other yugas as well.21 The purport of this objection is that if it were true that the Parashara Samhita describes duties for other yugas, then Parashara’s injunction regarding the remarriage of widows and other women would not be a duty for the Kali Yuga; it would be a duty for other yugas. In that case widow marriage would not be an action enjoined by the authoritative treatises for the Kali Yuga. In the Parashara Samhita there are injunctions on topics such as the horse sacrifice, on eating the food of Shudra castes like the Dasa, Napita, and Gopala, and on the restriction of Brahman impurity for issues of character and Vedic study. My respected opponents raise this objec21. I refer to Nandakumar Kaviratna and his supporters; the pandits of the court of Raja Kamalakrishna Deb Bahadur; Ramnidhi Vidyavagish of Murshidabad; Thakurdas Sharma of Varanasi; Shashijivan Tarkaratna; Janakijivan Nyayaratna.

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tion because they are certain that these are all duties for the Satya Yuga, not the Kali Yuga. But we have already seen that the sole purpose of the Parashara Samhita is to list the duties for the Kali Yuga.22 It simply cannot be possible that the Parashara Samhita lists duties for other yugas. Nor can we conclude that the intention of the Samhita is to address duties for other yugas, such as the horse sacrifice. Yet when they see that the Adi Purana, Brihannaradiya Purana, and Aditya Purana all prohibit the horse sacrifice during the Kali Yuga, my respected opponents go on to conclude that the horse sacrifice, etc., are duties for other yugas. To put this differently: In prior yugas the horse sacrifice was promulgated. Seeing that the horse sacrifice and other duties are prohibited for the Kali Yuga according to some authoritative treatises, my respected opponents conclude that these cannot be duties for the Kali Yuga. And since they find injunctions in the Parashara Samhita concerning the horse sacrifice, etc., they go on to conclude that Parashara Samhita must list duties for yugas other than the Kali Yuga. If we are to answer this objection, we must first determine whether all the prohibitions found in the Adi Purana, Brihannaradiya Purana, and Aditya Purana that are said to apply to the Kali Yuga are faithfully observed or not. There are no books that provide a history of the conduct and practices in our country. This means it will be impossible to successfully consider this topic completely.66 Still, to the degree that we can successfully consider this matter, there is clear evidence that the prohibitions of the Adi Purana, Brihannaradiya Purana, and Aditya Purana have not all been followed. There is clear evidence to show that all the duties prohibited in these books for the Kali Yuga have in fact been performed in the Kali Yuga. If these duties have been performed despite these prohibitions, then how can we conclude that all such prohibitions have actually been respected? The Adi Purana, Brihannaradiya Purana, and Aditya Purana mention several duties that are prohibited for the Kali Yuga, such as marriage of married women, right of primogeniture, ocean travel, carrying the water pot [as a renouncer], marriage by twiceborn men of women from other castes, production of sons by the levirate, slaughter of animals in the Madhuparka rite, consumption of meat at postmortem ceremonies, the duty of the forest-dweller, the giving of a virgin to a groom after she has already been given to another man, the practice of lengthy celibacy, cow sacrifice, human sacrifice, horse sacrifice, going on the great departure, 22. See Topic 2 of Book Two.

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entry into the fire, atonement unto death by a Brahman, adoption of sons other than Adopted and Natural, the contraction of Brahman impurity for issues of character and Vedic study, and eating the food of Shudra castes such as the Dasa, Napita, and Gopala.67 Now, there is clear evidence attesting to the practice of several of these during the Kali Yuga, in particular horse sacrifice, entry into the fire, carrying the water pot [as a renouncer], the practice of lengthy celibacy, ocean travel, going on the great departure, and marriage of married women. Consider the following:68 Six hundred and fifty-three years into the Kali Yuga, the Pandavas appeared on earth.23 I need hardly point out that they were renowned for having performed the horse sacrifice and for having gone on the great departure. And previously we have seen that the third Pandava, Arjuna, married the widowed daughter of the Naga king Airavata.24 Clear evidence can be found that there was a king named Shudraka who lived before Vikramaditya and who performed both the horse sacrifice and the entry into fire. Thus:

Sanskrit passage 2.10.1: Mricchakatika, introduction Shudraka studied the Rig Veda, Sama Veda, the authoritative treatises on mathematics, the sixty-four arts, and elephant training. Thanks to the grace of the great god, he gained a stainless eye of wisdom. After seeing his son consecrated as king, he performed the horse sacrifice with great ceremony. At the age of one hundred years and ten days he entered the fire.25

There is ample evidence to show that King Pravarasena performed the horse sacrifice four times. In the deed recording his gift of land to a Brahman named 23.

sanskrit passage 2.10.19: kalhana’s rajatarangini 1.51 (stein ed.)

After 653 years of the Kali Yuga, the Kuru-Pandavas appeared on earth. 24. See Topic 3 of Book Two. 25. In its treatment of future events, the Skanda Purana mentions Shudraka: sanskrit passage 2.10.20: skanda purana i.2.40.249–253 Three thousand two hundred ninety years from now during the Kali Yuga, there will be a king on earth named Shudraka. He will be a great hero and a man of preeminent spiritual attainment. He will slay all the evil kings who have grown powerful and, after worshipping Charbita, he will become a spiritual adept. Then, after twenty years, men of the Nanda lineage will become king. Chanakya will terminate the Nanda lineage and, after worshipping at Shuklatirtha, he will be liberated from all sin. Then after six hundred ninety years, Vikramaditya will become king (Kumarika Khanda of the Skandha Purana).

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Devasharmacharya, there is clear mention of his having performed the horse sacrifice four times.26 Thus:

Sanskrit passage 2.10.2: Prinsep, “Facsimiles of Various Ancient Inscriptions” The great king, Shri Pravarasena, lord of the land of Kataka, born to the lineage of King Vishnurudra, four-time performer of the horse sacrifice, etc.

And the same deed specifies that Pravarasena’s ancestors performed the horse sacrifice ten times. Thus:

Sanskrit passage 2.10.3: Prinsep, “Facsimiles of Various Ancient Inscriptions” They performed the horse sacrifice ten times.

We also have evidence that King Mihirakula, the lord of Kashmir, performed entry into the fire. Thus:

Sanskrit passage 2.10.4: Rajatarangini 1.309 (Stein ed.) After ruling for 70 years, the ferocious King Mihirakula, beset with many illnesses, entered into the fire.

Since King Mihirakula traveled to Simhala with his army to overthrow the lord of Simhala, we have clear evidence that the prohibition on ocean travel was not observed during his day. Thus:

Sanskrit passage 2.10.5: Rajatarangini 1.294–297 (Stein ed.) The queen put on a garment of gold made in the country of Simhala. When he saw the golden footprints upon her breast, King Mihirakula grew irate. He asked the chamberlain about the golden garment. The chamberlain said that garments made in the land of Simhala all bore the footprints of the king. Upon hearing this, [Mihirakula] set out for war. Such a river of ichor flowed forth from the cheeks of 26. See the Asiatic Society journal for November 1836, 728.

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his war elephants that the swollen southern ocean desired to embrace the Yamuna River. King Mihirakula went to war with the lord of Simhala and thereby calmed the anger he felt at the latter for placing his footprints on the breast of his queen.

There is clear evidence that King Jayapida’s messenger was sent to Lanka. Hence there is another source of proof that ocean travel was common. Thus:

Sanskrit passage 2.10.6: Rajatarangini 4.504 (Stein ed.) At the time of his departure, the king’s messenger fell from the boat into the sea. A fish swallowed him. Later, after piercing the belly of the fish, he reached the far shore.

There is evidence that the ruler of Kashmir, King Matrigupta, became a renouncer. Thus:

Sanskrit passage 2.10.7: Rajatarangini 3.320 (Stein ed.) The virtuous King Matrigupta went to Varanasi, renounced all his worldly affairs and adopted the life of a renouncer, after first donning the robes.27

In the year 961 c.e., King Suvastu had a temple built to the god known as Harshadeva Shiva.69 The dedicatory inscription for this temple clearly states that the king had practiced celibacy his entire life. Thus:

Sanskrit passage 2.10.8: Mill, “Restitution and Translation of the Inscription”28 Suvastu practiced celibacy his entire life. He went naked, was restrained, and lived as an ascetic. He was focused in worship on Harshadeva, devoid of the illusions of this world, fulfilled, and a spiritual hero. In the furtherance of duty, he had a great temple constructed to Harshadeva.

27. Even today renunciation is regularly practiced in virtually every part of India. 28. See the Asiatic Society journal for July 1835, 378.

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Sanskrit passage 2.10.9: Mill, “Restitution and Translation of the Inscription” He was a devout celibate and great Shaiva.

From all this we can clearly see that during the Kali Yuga such duties as the horse sacrifice, the great departure, the entry into the fire, renunciation, ocean travel, long-term celibacy, and the marriage of married women have been performed. There is no doubt that the people who lived earlier in the Kali Yuga knew and adhered to the authoritative treatises better than do the people of today. Yet they performed the horse sacrifice, the entry into fire, and other duties despite the prohibitions found in the Adi Purana and other texts. This provides clear evidence that in spite of the prohibitions found in the Puranas, the people of those times did not shy away from performing actions enjoined by the Smritis. In the Aditya Purana it says:

Sanskrit passage 2.10.10: Aditya Purana, quoted in Udvahatattva At the beginning of the Kali [Yuga] the great-souled wise men ruled that the horse sacrifice and other duties should be curtailed for the welfare of the world.

At the very end, to demonstrate the authority of this ruling given by the great-souled wise men, it says:

Sanskrit passage 2.10.11: Aditya Purana, quoted in Udvahatattva The rulings of the holy men, too, are as authoritative as the Vedas.

This instruction notwithstanding, the people of earlier times did not respect the prohibitions of the Puranas. They performed the horse sacrifice and other duties. Clearly they did not reckon all these prohibitions to be prohibitions. Beyond this, the Aditya Purana prohibits the adoption of sons other than those who are Adopted and Natural sons. But even today in Kashi and

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other districts people accept Artificial sons. This is why Nanda Pandit gives the following ruling in his Dattakamimamsa:

Sanskrit passage 2.10.12: Dattakamimamsa on Parashara 4.22 (1857 ed., p. 21) Even though, following the prohibition of the Aditya Purana, there are injunctions for the Kali Yuga regarding only the two sons, Adopted and Natural, since Parashara has enjoined the Artificial son as a duty for the Kali Yuga, Artificial sons are also acceptable in the Kali Yuga.70

We have seen that there is a prohibition on pilgrimages of great distance, but everyone knows that even today many people go on pilgrimages of great distance. And the prohibition on atonement unto death by a Brahman is observed only in theory, since even the well-known Udayanacharya, who reestablished Vedic religion after defeating the Buddhists, gave up his life in a fire of chaff. And not very long ago in Varanasi, an important gentleman who wished to eliminate his sins ended his life in a fasting ritual of atonement known as Prayopaveshana.29 Since Parashara has enjoined the horse sacrifice during the Kali Yuga and since there is ample evidence that kings have from time to time performed the horse sacrifice during the Kali Yuga, the horse sacrifice must be a duty for the Kali Yuga—just as it is for the other three yugas. In the same fashion, since Parashara mentions restrictions on rules of impurity as duties for the Kali Yuga, those too must be duties for the Kali Yuga. The reason we do not see Brahmans of today restricting the period of impurity is that Parashara has given a special injunction on the time of impurity for Brahmans who regularly perform the Agnihotra and Vedic study. Thus:

Sanskrit passage 2.10.13: Parashara 3.5 A Brahman who regularly performs the Agnihotra and Vedic study is pure within one day; one who studies only the Veda is pure within three days; and one who does neither is pure within ten days. 29. The man was Shyamacharan Bandyopadhyay.

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Since today there is no custom of performing the Agnihotra or Vedic study, it follows that there is also no related custom of restricting periods of impurity. And since eating the food of Shudra castes such as the Dasa, Napita, and Gopala is mentioned in the Parashara Samhita, it must also be a duty for the Kali Yuga. If eating the food of Shudra castes such as the Dasa, Napita, and Gopala is enjoined by Parashara for the Kali Yuga, you might ask whether the three superior classes like the Brahmans may eat the food of all these Shudra groups. In my opinion they may, and frequently do. If my respected opponents consider the passage from Parashara concerning the taking of food from the Dasa, Gopala, and other castes—along with the two passages that precede it—they will certainly have to concur:

Sanskrit passage 2.10.14: Parashara 11.18 Food such as uncooked rice, milk, and oil that is brought from the house of a Shudra is purified if it is cooked in the house of a Brahman. Manu has declared that such food may be eaten.

This passage establishes that a Brahman may eat food like uncooked rice that has been given by a Shudra, provided the Brahman cooks it. By contrast, it is a sin to eat food that has been cooked in a Shudra’s house.

Sanskrit passage 2.10.15: Parashara 11.19 If in dire circumstances a Brahman eats in the house of a Shudra, he may be purified by mental anguish or by one hundred repetitions of the Drupad formula.71

This passage establishes that there is no special sin incurred by eating food cooked in a Shudra’s house in dire circumstances. It would thus appear to follow that other than during dire circumstances it is a sin to eat food cooked in a Shudra’s house.

Sanskrit passage 2.10.16: Parashara 11.20 A Brahman may eat rice and other food given by Shudras such as the Dasa, Napita, Gopala, Kulamitra, and Arddhasiri castes—as well as food given by someone who has come to him for refuge—if he cooks it in their house.

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These three passages demonstrate that a Brahman may eat uncooked rice and other food given by a Shudra if he cooks it in the Shudra’s house; this is called eating “Shudra food” [shudranna]. If he takes uncooked rice and other food given by a Shudra to his own house and cooks it, it is not considered “Shudra food.” Under dire circumstances he may also eat rice and other food given to him in a Shudra’s house if he first cooks it. But whether in dire circumstances or not, it is never a sin to eat uncooked rice and other food given by such castes as the Dasa, Napita, and Gopala as long as he first cooks it. Now I ask: What is to prevent the taking of such Shudra food during the Kali Yuga? No one will say there is a sin in taking such Shudra food. Some understand the phrase shudranna or “Shudra food” to mean “food cooked by a Shudra.” But in this case the intention behind “Shudra food” is not “food cooked by a Shudra.” This is why the Aditya Purana initially has a prohibition on eating the food of such Shudra castes as the Dasa and Gopala, but then later on says that for the three [twiceborn] classes like the Brahmans, there is no prohibition on cooking and eating food given by a Shudra.30 When we later notice a prohibition on eating food cooked by a Shudra, we realize that the earlier prohibition must apply to eating uncooked rice and other foods. Bear in mind that the authoritative treatises call uncooked rice and other food given by a Shudra shudranna, or “Shudra food.” Thus:

Sanskrit passage 2.10.17: Tithitattva, section 160, Durgapujatattva Uncooked food of a Shudra is called “cooked food” and “cooked food” is called “remainder.”

Smarta Raghunandan Bhattacharya’s analysis of the phrase shudranna, or “Shudra food,” allows us to establish the correct explanation of the meaning and purport of the phrase. He writes:

Sanskrit passage 2.10.18: Ahnikatattvam, section 77 It is Shudra food if it is rice or other uncooked food given by a Shudra and if one is in a Shudra’s home at the time of eating. Thus Angiras has said: A Brahman who abstains 30.

sanskrit passage 2.10.21: exact source not verified

Brahman householders may eat the food of such Shudra castes as the Dasa, Gopala, Kulamitra, and Arddhasiri; when away on a lengthy pilgrimage, the three classes like the Brahmans may eat food given by Shudras after cooking it.

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from Shudra food should not eat milk or curds in a Shudra house because these too are Shudra food. On the topic of returning to his own home with rice and other uncooked food, Angiras has said: Just as water, no matter from whence it has come, is made pure by falling into a river, so too rice and other uncooked food taken from a Shudra’s home is made pure by entering a Brahman’s home. Parashara has said that upon entering a Brahman’s home, Shudra food is acceptable. Thus: It is Shudra food so long as a Brahman has not taken it; as soon as it is touched by the hand of a Brahman it is completely pure. The Vishnu Purana says that Shudra food may be accepted after being washed. Thus: When Shudra food enters his home, he should wash it. Angiras has said that Shudra food should be put in a different container. Thus: Milk given by a Shudra in his own container should be taken home in a different container. From all these passages it can be established that rice and other uncooked Shudra food is made pure by being brought home and that the sin of Shudra food applies only to food eaten in a Shudra’s home.

When we see that Parashara Samhita contains injunctions regarding such things as the Ashvamedha sacrifice—all of which are duties for yugas other than the Kali Yuga—we are tempted to conclude that Parashara does not just describe the duties of the Kali Yuga but also describes the duties for other yugas as well. However, there is no reasonable way to arrive at a determination that Parashara Samhita does not investigate the duties of the Kali Yuga alone. topic 11: the entire parashara samhita describes the duties for the kali yuga, not just the first two chapters72 Some have determined that only the first two chapters of Parashara describe duties for the Kali Yuga, and that the rest of the text, from chapter 3 onward, describes the duties applicable to all yugas. They have provided the following few facts as proof for this determination. First, the word “Kali” is used repeatedly in the first chapter; second, the word “Kali” does not appear in any chapter from the third to the twelfth, whereas we find in these chapters descriptions of such duties as the Ashvamedha sacrifice, which are for other yugas; third, at the end of the book, Parashara does not conclude by saying, “I have spoken of the duties of the Kali Yuga,” whereas at the end of the second chapter he concludes by mentioning the duties of the Kali Yuga.31

31. I refer here to Nandakumar Kaviratna and his supporters.

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I have already amply demonstrated that the sole purpose of the Parashara Samhita is to describe the duties of the Kali Yuga.32 In saying that the first and second chapters describe the duties of the Kali Yuga, my respected opponents partially acknowledge that this is the purpose of the Parashara Samhita. Now we must consider with what intention earlier authors have approached the Parashara Samhita. Madhavacharya says:

Sanskrit passage 2.11.1: Madhava on Parashara 1.34 The purpose of the Parashara Samhita is to describe the duties of the Kali Yuga for all matters.

Here we have clear reference to Parashara Smriti as the authoritative treatise for the Kali Yuga. It is evident that the entire book describes the duties of the Kali Yuga. It cannot be that only the first and second chapters concern the Kali Yuga, while the remaining ten chapters concern all the yugas. Nanda Pandit says:

Sanskrit passage 2.11.2: Dattakamimamsa on Parashara 4.22 (1857 ed., p. 21) It is true that only the word “Adopted” appears, but the Artificial son is also to be understood, since Parashara has given an injunction concerning Artificial sons in connection with the duties of the Kali Yuga.73

This passage concerning sons is found in the fourth chapter of Parashara. Therefore, in Nanda Pandit’s opinion the fourth chapter also describes the duties of the Kali Yuga. Bhattojidikshita says:

Sanskrit passage 2.11.3: Chaturvimshatimatasamgraha, section on marriage It cannot be said that the passage, if her husband is missing from Parashara [4.28] is an injunction for other yugas that is prohibited for the Kali Yuga because, as he [Parashara] 32. See Topic 10 of Book Two.

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affirms regarding the compilation of the Parashara Samhita: I will describe only the duties to be performed during the Kali Yuga.

This is what Bhattojidikshita has written regarding debate over the legal authority of the passage on marriage [4.28]. In his opinion the purpose of the entire Parashara Samhita is to describe the duties for the Kali Yuga.

Sanskrit passage 2.11.4: Madhava on Parashara 12.78 Anyone who spends a year associating with outcast individuals like the killers of Brahmans becomes outcast himself. Manu prescribes penance for him: Anyone who associates with such outcast individuals should undertake penance for the purpose of erasing the sin of association [Manu 11.182]. But the master (Parashara) prescribes no penance for the sin of association since there is no such sin in the Kali Yuga.

Since there is no sin of association in the Kali Yuga, Parashara does not prescribe penance for the sin of association. These words of the commentator [Madhavacharya] make it clear that the purpose of the Parashara Samhita is, from beginning to end, to describe the duties of the Kali Yuga. Since there are descriptions of penance in the final nine chapters of the Parashara Samhita, there is clear evidence that the entire book explicates the duties of the Kali Yuga and not just the first two chapters. So we can clearly see that the purpose of the Parashara Samhita is to describe the duties of the Kali Yuga. Therefore, it is baseless nonsense to say that only the first and second chapters apply to the duties of the Kali Yuga and that the other chapters apply to the duties of all yugas generally. The first chapter of the Parashara Samhita is effectively an introduction to the book. As such it frequently describes the Kali Yuga and the duties associated with it. At the beginning of the second chapter as well, there is only a single use of the word “Kali,” when Parashara says, “Hereafter I shall describe the conduct and actions of Kali Yuga.” After this there is no further need to mention the word “Kali” and thus at no other point is there any use of the word “Kali.” It is not fitting to conclude that only the first and second chapters apply to the duties of the Kali Yuga on the grounds that the word “Kali” does not appear in chapters three through twelve—as if to suggest that the remainder of the book applies to all yugas. In any case, I have previously

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established that it is not fitting to rule that chapters three through twelve do not apply to the duties of the Kali Yuga if one bases this decision on the fact that such injunctions—namely those found in chapter three (concerning the restrictions on impurity and the entry into fire) or those found in chapter eleven (concerning eating the food of Shudras like the Dasa and Gopala) or those in chapter twelve (concerning the horse sacrifice)—apply to other yugas.33 It is true that at the conclusion of the book Parashara does not say, “I have spoken of the duties of the Kali Yuga.” But since he began his description of duties by asserting, “I will speak of the duties of the Kali Yuga,” what harm is there if, at the conclusion of the book, he does not specify “I have spoken of the duties of Kali Yuga”? The introduction contains an assertion about speaking of the duties of the Kali Yuga. Even if the conclusion contains no mention of completing the duties of the Kali Yuga, what else are we to understand than that he has spoken of the duties of the Kali Yuga? And if the conclusion of the book does not mention completing the duties of the Kali Yuga, it also does not conclude by saying, “I have spoken of the duties of all yugas.” If we are not allowed to say that the entire book describes the duties of the Kali Yuga because it does not conclude with mention of having discussed such duties, then how can we say that it describes the duties of all yugas when it does not conclude with mention of having discussed the duties of all yugas? This is confirmed by the fact that while the beginning of the book contains an assertion about speaking of the duties of the Kali Yuga, the beginning of the third chapter does not contain any assertion about speaking of the duties generally applicable to all yugas. As such, it is both baseless and unreasonable to say that the last ten chapters [i.e., three through twelve] apply to the duties of all yugas when neither the beginning nor the conclusion mentions speaking of such duties. Now we must consider the viability of what my respected opponents attempt to establish regarding [Parashara’s] remarks on the duties of the Kali Yuga at the end of the second chapter. I quote below exactly what they have written: In light of this introduction—namely the assertion that the book’s topic is to speak about the duties of the Kali Yuga—the entire discussion should be understood to concern the duties of the Kali Yuga, right through the second chapter, which concludes or brings this inquiry to an end. Thus: 33. See Topic 10 of Book Two.

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sanskrit passage 2.11.5: parashara 5.25 and 2.1574 All who practice the duties of the Kali Yuga shall be short-lived. Because they ceaselessly practice evil, after death they shall fall immediately into the netherworld. Therefore, this is the eternal law of the four classes during the time of Kali. That is, they shall immediately adopt as their duty what is in fact sinful action. Let the scholars consider whether or not this verse serves to conclude the discussion of the duties of the Kali Yuga.75

If the explanation of this passage provided by my respected opponents is indeed the correct explanation, there would be nothing to prevent us from saying that this concludes the discussion of duties for the Kali Yuga. However, this explanation is not the right one; in fact, it turns the meaning completely upside down. My respected opponents have selected two half passages as if they were one passage. There is absolutely no connection between the first and second half passages. My respected opponents attempt to link one half passage to a second that follows it. They thereby subvert the meaning in their attempt to show that this marks the conclusion of the discussion of the duties of the Kali Yuga. The first half passage they cite is found in the following verse:

Sanskrit passage 2.11.6: Parashara 5.2534 If the Shudras turn away from serving the twiceborn to take up work like farming or trade, they will be short-lived and fall into the netherworld.

I provide here the remaining half passage along with the commentator’s gloss and explanation of purport:

Sanskrit passage 2.11.7: Madhava on Parashara 2.15; see Sanskrit passage 2.11.26 In this way he synthesizes the duties that support the livelihood of the four classes. This is the eternal law of the four classes. 34. Where [the Sanskrit text] reads patanti narakeshu cha the commentator [i.e., Madhavacharya] prefers nirayam yantyasamshayam. The meaning of the two readings is the same.

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Sanskrit passage 2.11.8: Madhava on Parashara 2.15 As many times as there have been Kali Yugas in the past, there have been Brahmans and others who farmed. In order to communicate this he uses the word “eternal.”

Here we clearly see that in the second chapter Parashara describes the duties that support the livelihood of the four classes, like farming, trade, and manual arts. He says:

Sanskrit passage 2.11.9: Parashara 2.15 This is the eternal law of the four classes.

With this he concludes the section describing the duties that support livelihood. There is no way to conclude from this that he also brings to a close his description of the duties of the Kali Yuga.

Sanskrit passage 2.11.10: Parashara 5.25 If the Shudras turn away from serving the twiceborn to take up work like farming or trade, they will be short-lived and fall into the netherworld.

My respected opponents join the previously mentioned half passage to the latter half of this passage. What they arrive at is:

Sanskrit passage 2.11.11: Spurious reading; see Sanskrit passage 2.11.5 They are short-lived and fall into the netherworld. This is the eternal law of the four classes.

My respected opponents cleverly make a single passage out of these two half passages and then supply a meaning that suits them. Thus: All who practice the duties of the Kali Yuga shall be short-lived. Because they ceaselessly practice evil, after death they shall fall immediately into the netherworld. Therefore, this is the eternal law of the four classes during the time of Kali. That is, they shall immediately adopt as their duty what is in fact sinful action.76

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They provide this sort of dubious meaning in a number of places. But when one sets out to debate the authoritative treatises on duty it is most unfair to use deceit and cleverness. The majority of my respected readers do not know Sanskrit. I choose to communicate my meaning in the vernacular so that they may understand. Since my readers depend upon a vernacular explanation, it is absolutely necessary to provide a reliable explanation in every instance. No respectable person would provide a dubious explanation in order to mislead people. Still, if my respected opponents are able to demonstrate that their explanation of the former two half passages is correct, and that this does indeed conclude the discussion of duties during the Kali Yuga, then I won’t hesitate for one minute to admit that their many other dubious explanations are valid as well—or to admit that widow marriage is indeed opposed to the authoritative treatises. My respected opponents have made a concerted attempt to demonstrate that this concludes the discussion of the duties of the Kali Yuga and that here [Parashara’s] inquiry comes to an end. But I have shown that this cannot be established. Their explanation that people who practice the duties of the Kali Yuga will be short-lived and will go to the netherworld might cause some to think that all the duties described by Parashara in the second chapter are evil; some might think that people who perform them will be short-lived and will go to the netherworld; and some might think that, as such, the duties of the Kali Yuga described by Parashara should be renounced as both harmful and damnable. If one relies on the dubious explanation provided by my respected opponents for the two half passages from the end of the second chapter, many could be led into this error. For this reason, I quote below, in its entirety, the second chapter of Parashara Samhita, along with the commentator’s gloss and explanation of the purport:

Sanskrit passage 2.11.12: Madhava on Parashara 2.177 In the previous chapter, the duties pertaining to the other world are chiefly described; next the duties of this world, which support livelihood, are chiefly described. First of all, he [Parashara] asserts which of these he will describe in this chapter. In keeping with the earlier words of Parashara I shall, to the best of my ability, next speak of the actions and customs to be performed by the householder during the Kali Yuga. What I shall describe are general duties for the four classes and stages of life.

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“In keeping with the earlier words of Parashara” means in keeping with the duties of the Kali Yuga described by Parashara in a previous era. “Next” means after the discussion chiefly of the six actions pertaining to the other world such as evening worship and bathing. The duties discussed, like farming and trade, are not possible for celibate students, forest-dwellers, or renouncers, so he says he speaks about the householder. During the Satya, Treta, and Dvapara Yugas only the Vaishya class is entitled to the duties of farming and trade; there were no householders [performing these duties] among the Brahmans and the others. Therefore he says he speaks about the Kali Yuga. This means that during the Kali Yuga all four classes may engage in farming, trade, etc.

Sanskrit passage 2.11.13: Madhava on Parashara 2.2 He describes the duties asserted: A Brahman possessed of the six actions like sacrificing, officiating, etc., may cause a Shudra who serves him to farm. If you ask what need a Brahman has with farming, when the means for supporting himself are officiating, teaching, and receiving gifts, the answer is that it is very difficult to support oneself during the Kali Yuga by officiating, etc. This is why Parashara has given the injunction regarding farming.

Sanskrit passage 2.11.14: Madhava on Parashara 2.3 He has described which kind of bull it is not proper to use for farming. A Brahman should not harness a bull to a plow if it is hungry, thirsty, or tired. And he must not harness a bull to a plow if it is missing a limb, sickly, or impotent.

Sanskrit passage 2.11.15: Madhava on Parashara 2.4 But he describes what kind of bull may be employed for farming. He may harness a capable bull to a plow for the first two watches of the day if it is of sound body—meaning it has no deformity of its hooves—if it is healthy, well-fed, watered, and rested. Afterward he should bathe it.

Sanskrit passage 2.11.16: Madhava on Parashara 2.6 He describes the use of grain produced through farming, Let him perform the five sacrifices and the Agnishtoma using the grain produced in the fields he has farmed.

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Sanskrit passage 2.11.17: Madhava on Parashara 2.7 A person who lives by farming grains such as sesame may be able to sell grains like sesame for a profit, so he makes a prohibition: A Brahman should not sell such things as sesame or ghee, milk, or honey. But if he has no other grain, and he cannot support himself except by selling sesame, or he cannot complete his religious duties, then he may sell sesame in lieu of another grain that is like it. And he may sell such things as grass and firewood.

Sanskrit passage 2.11.18: Madhava on a half-verse following Parashara Samhita 2.778 Now in order to speak of the remedy for the sin inherent in the act of farming, he first demonstrates what that sin is: A Brahman who farms incurs great sin. No matter how carefully one tries to farm, creatures are necessarily injured, and so there is sin.

Sanskrit passage 2.11.19: Madhava on Parashara 2.8 He makes clear the enormity of the sin: A farmer incurs as much sin in one day of farming with an iron-tipped plow as does a fisherman over the course of a year.

Sanskrit passage 2.11.20: Madhava on Parashara 2.9 Since the preceding [passage] shows how much sin is involved in farming, he now specifies how to prevent it: The sins of a miserly farmer are equal to those of someone who hunts with a noose, a fisherman, a hunter, or a fowler. Just as people who hunt with nooses and so on incur great sin, so too does a miserly farmer; this means that a farmer who is accustomed to giving does not incur such sin.

Sanskrit passage 2.11.21: Madhava on Parashara 2.10 Now he speaks of the remedy for the sin connected to farming, which he had previously mentioned: A farmer tainted with the sin of cutting trees, tilling the earth, and killing insect life is freed from all these sins by performing the sacrifice of the threshing-floor.

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The remedy for all the sins incurred by cutting, tilling, and killing is the threshing-floor, which means the gift of threshed paddy. The name for the gift of paddy is “the sacrifice of the threshing-floor.”

Sanskrit passage 2.11.22: Madhava on Parashara 2.11 Regarding the sin of not performing the sacrifice of the threshing-floor he says: The farmer who does not give some portion of the grain from his threshing-floor to twiceborn visitors is a thief and the greatest of sinners; he is called a slayer of Brahmans.

Sanskrit passage 2.11.23: Madhava on Parashara 2.12 He describes the amount of grain to be given: He is liberated from all sin who gives a sixth portion to the king, a twenty-first portion to the gods, and a thirtieth portion to Brahmans.

Sanskrit passage 2.11.24: Madhava on Parashara 2.13 Having spoken of the necessity for Brahmans to farm, he enunciates an injunction regarding farming among the other classes: Let a Kshatriya who farms also worship the gods and Brahmans. And let Vaishyas and Shudras work in farming, trade, and manual arts. In order to show that trade and manual arts are also general duties for the four classes in the Kali Yuga, just like farming, in this passage he mentions trade and manual arts.

Sanskrit passage 2.11.25: Madhava on Parashara 2.14 He addresses the following concern: If Shudras are also enjoined to farm and thereby earn their livelihood, does this mean that Shudras should give up serving the twiceborn during the Kali Yuga? If the Shudras give up serving the twiceborn in order to farm and do other activities, they will be short-lived and will certainly go to the netherworld. The Shudras should have no desire for anything apart from serving the twiceborn, eating their leftover food, and wearing their discarded clothing. If out of greed for gain they begin farming and other activities and give up serving the twiceborn even for one moment, they will suffer in this life and the next.

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Sanskrit passage 2.11.26: Madhava’s comment on Parashara 2.15 79 In this way he concludes the general duties that support the livelihood of the four classes. This is the eternal law of the four classes. In all the previous Kali Yugas, farming and other activities were the duties of Brahmans and others. This is why he uses the adjective “eternal” to describe the duties. In other words, by clearly stating that this was an eternal duty he makes it clear that in every single Kali Yuga the Brahmans and others farmed as a means of living.

I humbly request you read the second chapter of the Parashara Samhita from beginning to end and decide whether or not the explanation offered by my respected opponents—as well as the conclusion they provide regarding the duties of the Kali Yuga—may be called proper and fitting. They say, All who practice the duties of the Kali Yuga shall be short-lived. Because they ceaselessly practice evil, after death they shall fall immediately into the netherworld. Therefore, this is the eternal law of the four classes during the time of Kali. That is, they shall immediately adopt as their duty what is in fact sinful action.80

Furthermore, you may decide whether or not it is true that by performing the general duties of the four classes as described in the second chapter of Parashara people will be short-lived and destined for the netherworld. Consider this half passage:

Sanskrit passage 2.11.27: Parashara 2.15 This is the eternal law of the four classes.

My respected opponents provide the following interpretive gloss for this passage: Therefore, this is the eternal law of the four classes during the time of Kali. That is, they shall immediately adopt as their duty what is in fact sinful action.81

But I ask you, is this sort of interpretation proper?

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topic 12: parashara only addresses the duties of the kali yuga; he does not describe the duties of other yugas82 Someone has said: My dear sir, you have not examined the entire Parashara Samhita; you have chosen only a few topics that suit you. Is it any mark of excellence to take what learned people most value and focus only on what is undesirable? You must not conclude that Parashara only speaks of the duties of the Kali Yuga; he has written of the duties of other yugas as well.

sanskrit passage 2.12.1: parashara 1.25–26 and 1.23 He says that: One should renounce the homeland in the Satya Yuga, the village in the Treta Yuga, the lineage in the Dvapara Yuga, and the individual himself in the Kali Yuga. During the Satya Yuga one may be outcast merely through conversation; in the Treta Yuga, through contact; in the Dvapara Yuga, through accepting food; and in the Kali Yuga, through action. The chief duty of the Satya Yuga is austerity; the chief duty of the Treta Yuga is knowledge; the chief duty of the Dvapara Yuga is sacrifice; and the chief duty of the Kali Yuga is giving.83 In passages like these Parashara describes the duties of other yugas.35

My respected opponent thinks that because the four yugas are discussed in the three passages he quotes, it means Parashara describes the duties of the other yugas. But he needs to carefully consider with what intention Parashara discusses the four yugas in these three passages (and a few others). If he did, he would see that there is no way to conclude that Parashara describes the duties of the other yugas.

Sanskrit passage 2.12.2: Parashara 1.22 According to the sequence of the yugas, all the duties of men during the Satya Yuga are one thing; all the duties during the Treta Yuga are another; all the duties during the Dvapara Yuga are another; and all the duties during the Kali Yuga are still another. 35. Quoting Pitambar Sen Kaviratna. [Trans.: While I have been able to locate some Bengali publications by Pitambar Sen Kaviratna, I have not located the work to which Vidyasagar refers here and in footnote 37.]

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Here Parashara rules that due to the declining powers of men through the sequence of the yugas, the duties of each separate yuga are quite different. In the following few verses he speaks of the four yugas—Satya, Treta, Dvapara, and Kali—in order to show how with each successive yuga the powers of humans decline and their inclinations differ. Thus he says:

Sanskrit passage 2.12.3: Parashara 1.23 The chief duty of the Satya Yuga is austerity; the chief duty of the Treta Yuga is knowledge; the chief duty of the Dvapara Yuga is sacrifice; and the chief duty of the Kali Yuga is giving.

The people of the Satya Yuga were endowed with the most strength of all. As such the preeminent duty of that yuga is the arduous practice of austerity. But because humans have less and less power in every successive yuga, the preeminent duties for each successive yuga are the relatively less arduous practices of knowledge, sacrifice, and giving, respectively.

Sanskrit passage 2.12.4: Parashara 1.24 All the duties described by Manu apply in the Satya Yuga; all the duties described by Gautama apply in the Treta Yuga; all the duties described by Shankha and Likhita apply to the Dvapara Yuga; and all the duties described by Parashara apply to the Kali Yuga.

In other words, since human strength declines with every yuga, it becomes exceedingly difficult for people to perform the arduous duties prescribed by Manu. This is why each successive yuga has been ruled to have its own authoritative treatise on duty, each promulgating a less arduous path of duty.

Sanskrit passage 2.12.5: Parashara 1.25 One should renounce the homeland in the Satya Yuga, the village in the Treta Yuga, the lineage in the Dvapara Yuga, and the individual in the Kali Yuga.

This means that in the Satya Yuga one must renounce one’s homeland if outcasts dwell there. In the Treta Yuga one should renounce one’s village if it contains outcasts. In the Dvapara Yuga one should renounce one’s family if

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it contains outcasts. In other words, one should not give or receive virgins in marriage within one’s lineage. And in the Kali Yuga one should renounce the individual, meaning anyone who has been outcast. The people of the Satya Yuga were easily able to renounce their homeland if outcasts dwelt there, but the people of the Treta Yuga did not have such strength. They could not renounce their homeland, but only a single village if outcasts dwelt there. The people of the Dvapara Yuga did not have even this much strength. They could not renounce their village, but only their family if it contained outcasts; this means they would not give or receive virgins in marriage with that family. But the people of the Kali Yuga do not have such strength; they are unable to renounce homeland, village, or lineage. They can do no more than renounce an individual who has been outcast.

Sanskrit passage 2.12.6: Parashara 1.2684 During the Satya Yuga one may be outcast merely through conversation; in the Treta Yuga, through contact; in the Dvapara Yuga, through accepting food; and in the Kali Yuga, through action.

This means that in the Satya Yuga people could be outcast for talking to outcasts, which suggests that the people at that time did not speak to outcasts. The people of the Treta Yuga were not outcast by speaking with outcasts, but by touching them. The people of the Dvapara Yuga were outcast neither by speaking to nor by touching other outcasts, but by accepting food from them. The people of the Kali Yuga are not outcast by conversation, by contact, or by accepting food, but by the performance of actions that are degrading. This means that the people of the Kali Yuga do not have the strength to renounce speaking with, contacting, or sharing food with outcasts; as such, they are not outcast by conversation and other activities, but only by their own performance of degrading actions.

Sanskrit passage 2.12.7: Parashara 1.26 In the Satya Yuga an oath yields results in one day; in the Treta Yuga, in ten days; in the Dvapara Yuga, in one month; in the Kali Yuga, in one year.

This means that the people of the Satya Yuga were so strong that their oaths yielded results in one day. Because of the decline in human powers such re-

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sults were thought to come about in ten days, one month, and one year, respectively, for the Treta, Dvapara, and Kali Yugas.

Sanskrit passage 2.12.8: Parashara 1.28 In the Satya Yuga, one went to a recipient to bestow a gift; in the Treta Yuga, one gave the gift after first inviting the recipient; in the Dvapara Yuga, if the recipient came and begged, the gift was presented; in the Kali Yuga, the gift is given if the recipient pledges loyalty.

This means that the religious inclinations of humans during the Satya Yuga were so strong that if they desired to give a gift they went to the recipient and gave it. The religious inclinations of people during the Treta Yuga were not this strong; when they desired to make a gift, instead of going to the recipient, they summoned him and then gave. During the Dvapara Yuga, the religious inclinations of people were even weaker still. When they desired to make a gift, they neither went to the recipient nor summoned him; only if he came to them and begged did they give. And in the Kali Yuga, the religious inclinations of people were so weak that recipients didn’t even beg; without pledging loyalty, no amount of begging would earn a gift.

Sanskrit passage 2.12.9: Parashara 1.32 During the Satya Yuga the life-breath of men resided in their bones, in the Treta Yuga in their flesh, in the Dvapara Yuga in their blood, in the Kali Yuga in food.

This means that during the Satya Yuga if a man’s whole body dried up from austerity and other practices, he would not die as long as his bones remained; in the Treta Yuga the life-breath resided in the flesh, which is to say that if a man’s flesh dried up from excessive fasting, he would die; in the Dvapara Yuga the life-breath resided in the blood, which is to say that a man need not even deplete his flesh entirely, because if only his blood dried up, he would die; and in the Kali Yuga, the life-breath resides in food, which is to say that a man has no need to deplete his entire body, for if he merely stops eating he will most likely die. Now I ask everyone to consider whether the preceding does not make it clear that what Parashara rules is that there are differences in duties due to

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declining powers during the successive yugas. This is why the few passages I have cited speak of the four yugas; that is, to provide examples of these declining powers. It is not the case that all these passages speak of the duties pertaining to every yuga. By citing only three passages under this topic, my respected opponent thinks that Parashara also describes the duties of other yugas.85 But if he had reviewed the topic with a firm mind and had reflected on its purport, he most likely never would have thought such a thing.86 topic 13: the teaching of the duties for the four yugas provided by parashara samhita is not authoritative87 Some say: It can be seen from the introduction and conclusion to each chapter of the Parashara Samhita that the Samhita indicates duties for the four yugas. Since this might not dawn on people whose logic is deficient, we select certain passages from the Samhita to show that its teaching on the duties for the four yugas is authoritative. In the first chapter it is written:

sanskrit passage 2.13.1: parashara 1.2688 In the Satya Yuga one sins merely by conversing with a sinner, in the Treta Yuga by looking at a sinner, in the Dvapara Yuga by eating the food of a sinner, and in the Kali Yuga by performing actions that produce sin; which is to say sin does not inhere in such faults as association, etc. Later, in the twelfth chapter it is written:

sanskrit passage 2.13.2: parashara 12.78 Just as a drop of oil, when placed in water, spreads everywhere, so too will the sins of a sinner spread to another person by sitting together, sleeping together, traveling together, conversing, and eating together. If you say that the twelfth chapter of the Parashara Samhita only teaches the duties of the Kali Yuga, then in light of the passage just cited, you will have to agree that during the Kali Yuga one can sin by association with sinners. But in the first chapter it is written that during the Kali Yuga it is not possible to sin by associating with, or seeing, sinners, etc. Due to the

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conflict between the two verses, you will either have to agree that Parashara Samhita speaks of the duties of the four yugas or you will have to say that Parashara has committed a ridiculous error.36

My respected opponents fail to properly consider the purport of the text. They attempt to find a conflict between the passage from the first chapter and the passage from the twelfth chapter. The purport of the passage from the first chapter is that during the Satya and other yugas one became outcast by speaking with an outcast person, and so on, whereas during the Kali Yuga one is not outcast for speaking (or otherwise) with an outcast. However, if one were to perform a grievous action such as killing a Brahman, one would become an outcast. In other words, during the Kali Yuga one is not outcast for faults like association as one would be during the Satya and other yugas. The purport of the passage from the twelfth chapter is that while it is true that one is not outcast during the Kali Yuga by virtue of association, nevertheless if one associates with an outcast some sin is generally produced. This being the case, how can my respected opponents say that there is a conflict between these two passages? Instead of clearly and carefully considering the particular textual reading they adopt for the first passage, they attempt to cause a conflict between the aforementioned passages. If we follow their textual reading and their explanation, one is outcast in the Satya Yuga for speaking with an outcast, in the Treta Yuga for looking at an outcast, in the Dvapara Yuga for eating with an outcast, and in the Kali Yuga for things like killing a Brahman. If this is so, I would like to ask my respected opponents why it is that one is outcast in the Treta Yuga for looking at an outcast. It seems to me that there is no yuga in which one is outcast for looking at an outcast. It is clear from the intention of the passage that in each successive yuga increasingly grievous consequences follow from increasingly weighty types of association. But if we follow the textual reading adopted by my respected opponents, one is outcast during the Satya Yuga for speaking with an outcast and during the Treta Yuga for looking at an outcast. I would simply ask my readers to consider whether looking at an outcast is a weightier association than speaking with an outcast. I do not know what my respected opponents would say, but my sense is that it is not. One cannot be outcast in the Treta Yuga for an association that is less weighty than the kind of association that leads one to be outcast in the 36. Quoting the view of the members of the assembly of Raja Kamalakrishna Deb Bahadur.

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Satya Yuga. I am astonished that my respected opponents cannot see that this is not fitting. They adopt as the correct textual reading one that can be found in a book published by the Chandrika Press.89 The correct reading of that passage should be:

Sanskrit passage 2.13.3: Parashara 1.2637 During the Satya Yuga one is outcast for speaking with an outcast; during the Treta Yuga, one is outcast for touching an outcast; during the Dvapara Yuga one is outcast if one accepts the food of an outcast; in the Kali Yuga one is outcast for performing actions such as killing a Brahman.

Now I ask my readers: Is it not the case that in each successive yuga the reason for being outcast is a weightier form of association? To touch an outcast is a weightier association than to speak with one; to accept food from an outcast is a weightier association than to touch one. As such, I ask everyone to consider whether my respected opponents ought to have adopted this textual reading and explanation without first giving it careful consideration. In some cases my respected opponents quote particular passages from the commentary on Parashara. This means they clearly had access to the commentary on Parashara when they were writing. Before quoting the aforementioned two passages in an attempt to create conflict between them, they ought to have consulted the commentary on each.90 Had they done so, they would have discovered the correct reading of this passage and would not have attempted to create conflict for no good reason. The commentator provides the following explanation of the passage from the first chapter:

Sanskrit passage 2.13.4: Madhava on Parashara 1.26 Unlike in the Satya Yuga and other three yugas, during the Kali Yuga one is not outcast for conversing, etc., but rather for performing such actions as murder.

Later, he provides the following gloss for the passage from the twelfth chapter: 37. This reading is both approved by the commentary and entirely fitting. Pitambar Sen Kaviratna [Trans.: see footnote 35] quotes this passage in his own book. Unlike my respected opponents, he adopts the correct reading approved by the commentary rather than providing the reading quoted earlier.

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Sanskrit passage 2.13.5: Madhava on Parashara 12.78 Anyone who spends a year associating with outcast individuals like the killers of Brahmans becomes outcast himself. Manu prescribes penance for him: Anyone who associates with such outcast individuals should undertake penance for the purpose of erasing the sin of association. But the master (Parashara) prescribes no penance for the sin of association, since there is no such sin in the Kali Yuga. But even though one cannot be outcast for the sin of association, nevertheless because it is generally considered sinful, he [Parashara] says: By sitting, lying, going about, speaking, and eating with an outcast, the sin increases for the sinner, just as a drop of oil [spreads out] in water.91

topic 14: the passage from parashara stating that “[t]he duties compiled by parashara are the duties for the kali yuga” is not a credible passage92 Some say, What Parashara has said (i.e., kalau parasharah smritah, or “The duties compiled by Parashara are the duties for the Kali Yuga”) is not credible. On this point almost every author is abundantly clear. Thus:

sanskrit passage 2.14.1: attributed to an “agama”; exact source unknown During the Satya Yuga duties were enunciated by the Vedas, in the Treta Yuga by the Smritis, in the Dvapara Yuga by the Puranas; the Agamas were created for the Kali Yuga. If this saying is credited, then no Smriti should be accepted for the Kali age other than the Agamas spoken by Shiva. If by some trickery you say that the passage [from Parashara] is authoritative for duties during the Kali age, this [other passage from the Agamas] nevertheless confirms the sayings of the Agamas. Those who oppose it will be powerless since we cannot accept the words of the Smritis during the Kali age due to the supremacy of the words of Shiva.38 38. Quoting Nandakumar Kaviratna and his followers. Govindakanta Vidyabhushana of Murshidabad and others have also raised this objection. [Trans.: I have not been able to locate this particular passage in Kaviratna and Vidyaratna, Vaidhavya dharmodaya, book 2, but it could well be taken from book 1, which I have not been able to locate. As for Govindakanta, he is one of two pandits from Sayadabad listed in Book Two, footnote 1.]

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My respected opponents have decided that the aforementioned passage from the Agamas is credible. Viewing the Agamas as credible, they attempt to determine whether the passage from Parashara is credible (i.e., kalau parasharah smritah, or “The duties compiled by Parashara are the duties for the Kali Yuga”). But if they took care to consider the purpose of the authoritative treatises known as the Agamas they would not interpret the above passage from the Agamas as credible. The authoritative treatises known as the Agamas are based on delusion. Shiva and Vishnu created the authoritative treatises known as the Agamas in order to delude people.93 Thus:

Sanskrit passage 2.14.2: Attributed to the Kurma Purana; exact source not verified 94 Vishnu and Shiva created thousands of authoritative treatises based on delusion, such as the Kapala, Nakula, Vama, Purvabhairava, Pashchimbhairava, Pancharatra, and Pashupata.

Sanskrit passage 2.14.3: Padma-Purana, Uttarakhanda, 6.236.2–4 Listen, O goddess, as I list all the authoritative treatises based on delusion. Merely hearing these authoritative treatises based on delusion causes even wise men to become outcast. These authoritative treatises based on delusion, such as the Shaiva and Pashupata, were first enunciated by me.

Sanskrit passage 2.14.4: Kurma Purana, quoted in Malamasatattva, section 71 All the various authoritative treatises that can be found in this world that are opposed to the Veda and to the Smritis lead to darkness; he who follows them will fall in the end. I have created all of these authoritative treatises based on delusion—such as the Karalabhairva, the Yamala, and the Vama—in order to delude people.

So we see that the authoritative treatises known as the Agamas are based on delusion; and we see that they are opposed to both Shruti and Smriti.

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Nevertheless, some parts of them can be accepted, due to differences among authorities. Hence,

Sanskrit passage 2.14.5: Attributed to Suta Samhita; exact source not verified95 Even so (that is, even though it is opposed to Shruti and Smriti), if any part of the path prescribed by the Agamas is not opposed to the Veda, among some authorities this part is a source of proof.

We also find a description of those who are entitled to the authoritative treatises known as the Agamas:

Sanskrit passage 2.14.6: Attributed to Shamba Purana; exact source not verified96 A Brahman who has fallen from the Vedas and turned his back on the rites of atonement enunciated in the Smritis should resort to the authoritative treatises on Tantra in order to gradually promote the success of the Vedas. Vishnu has enunciated authoritative treatises like the Pancharatra, Bhagavata, and Vaikhanasa for those who have fallen from the Vedas.

Similarly, the purport behind the creation of the authoritative treatises based on delusion is explained in the Padma Purana.

Sanskrit passage 2.14.7: Padma Purana, Uttarakhanda 6.62.31 Vishnu said to Shiva: Using the authoritative treatises based on delusion that you fashioned, you should cause people to turn away from me. Keep me secret so that this creation will grow greater and greater.

Now let us consider the matter. First of all, both Vishnu and Shiva agreed to the creation of authoritative treatises based on delusion in order to delude people; secondly, in order to delude people more easily, they ruled that people of the Kali Yuga should only follow the Agamas, even though they had decided that in previous ages Shruti, Smriti, and Purana were considered to be authoritative treatises. In view of this, there is no way the passage from the

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Agamas that says, “[T]he Agamas were created for the Kali Yuga” [in Sanskrit passage 2.14.1] can be credible. Indeed, the idea that only the Agamas are to be followed in the Kali Yuga is precisely the meaning and purport of the Agamas, which are intended to delude. And if the Agamas were created solely to delude people, it is impossible to use the aforementioned passage from the Agamas to conclude that the authoritative treatises known as Smriti are not authoritative for the Kali age. The Agamas are authoritative treatises based on delusion that are opposed to the Veda; Smriti are authoritative treatises on duty that follow the Veda. It is unreasonable, therefore, to conclude that the aforementioned passage from the Agamas provides a reliable source by which to determine the credibility of Parashara’s statement that “[t]he duties compiled by Parashara are the duties for the Kali Yuga.” topic 15: the manu samhita does not provide a description of the different duties for the four different yugas97 In defining the meaning of dharmashastra, or “authoritative treatise on duty,” I have followed Yajnavalkya’s description.98 I must now consider whether or not all the duties described in the many authoritative treatises on duty are to be followed in all the yugas. In the first chapter of the authoritative treatise on duty compiled by Manu a determination is made on this topic:

Sanskrit passage 2.15.1: Manu 1.85; see Sanskrit passage 1.2 Because the energies of human beings decline in sequence with the ages, all the duties of the Satya Yuga are one thing, all the duties of the Treta Yuga are another, all the duties of the Dvapara Yuga are another, and all the duties of the Kali Yuga are another still.99

At this point one could ask, if this is the case, then what duties should people follow during the Kali Yuga? The authoritative treatise on duty compiled by Manu indicates that the duties for each yuga are different, but it does not describe what the different duties are for each yuga. Only the authoritative treatise on duty compiled by Parashara describes which duty to follow in which yuga. My respected opponents are not satisfied with this. They say, Relying on some sort of reasoning, he says confidently that the authoritative treatise on duty compiled by Manu does not demonstrate the different duties

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to be performed in different yugas from Satya to Kali. His stainless vision falls on but a single passage from the Samhita of Manu, which reads, “Because the energies of human beings decline, etc.” [Sanskrit passage 2.15.1]. He does not notice that after this Manu describes the duties of the four yugas:

sanskrit passage 2.15.2: manu 1.86; see sanskrit passage 2.12.1 The duty of the Satya Yuga is austerity, the duty of the Treta Yuga is knowledge, the duty of the Dvapara Yuga is sacrifice, and in the Kali Yuga the only duty is giving.39

The purport of my respected opponents is to show that in the passage “Because the energies of human beings decline, etc.” [Sanskrit passage 2.15.1] Lord Manu provides a ruling on the difference of duties according to the difference of yugas. But they add that in the succeeding passage Manu describes these different duties when he says, “The duty of the Satya Yuga is austerity, etc.” [Sanskrit passage 2.15.2]. They say it is completely improper for me to argue that the Manu Samhita does not describe the different duties of the different yugas. In reply I say that the determination made by my respected opponents is completely improper. Were they to carefully consider the matter they would see that while we can establish that the prior passage indicates there are different duties for different yugas, it is not the case that the subsequent passage describes the different duties for the different yugas. Most importantly, the meaning my respected opponents read into the latter passage is not the actual meaning. Let my readers examine these two passages in sequence, just as they are written, and they will easily be able to decide whether the determination of my respected opponents is fitting or not.

Sanskrit passage 2.15.3: Manu 1.85; see Sanskrit passages 1.2 and 2.15.1 Because the powers of men decrease in keeping with the yugas, all the duties of the Satya Yuga are one thing, all the duties of the Treta Yuga are another, all the duties of the Dvapara Yuga are another, and all the duties of the Kali Yuga are another still. 39. Once again quoting Nandakumar Kaviratna and his supporters. [Trans.: I have not been able to locate a printed source containing this objection.]

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Sanskrit passage 2.15.4: Manu 1.86 The chief duty of the Satya Yuga is austerity, the chief duty of the Treta Yuga is knowledge, the chief duty of the Dvapara Yuga is sacrifice, and the chief duty of the Kali Yuga is giving alone.100

My readers will notice that in the first passage Lord Manu enjoins there are different duties for the different yugas. He says, “The duties of the Satya Yuga are one thing, etc.” But is it true that in the second passage Manu describes the different duties of the different yugas when he says, “The chief duty of the Satya Yuga is austerity, etc.”? In the first passage he indicates that the duties of each yuga are completely different, while in the second passage he describes the chief duty of each yuga. There is no real congruence between the first and second passages. How can one describe the different duties of the different yugas by specifying the chief duty of a particular yuga? Furthermore, the first passage indicates that all the duties are different. To say “all the duties” is to suggest there are many duties for a yuga.101 But since the second passage indicates only one particular duty for each of the yugas, this scarcely specifies the many duties of each yuga. If the first passage mentions the complete range of duties of a particular yuga when it says “all the duties,” and if the second passage mentions only a single duty for each of the yugas—and that, too, only the chief duty—then how can it be proper to say that the first passage indicates there are different duties for the different yugas and the second passage then describes these different duties for the different yugas? My respected opponents explain the passage “The chief duty of the Satya Yuga is austerity, etc.” [Sanskrit passage 2.15.4] to mean that austerity is the duty of the Satya Yuga, knowledge the duty of the Treta Yuga, sacrifice the duty of the Dvapara Yuga, and giving alone the duty of the Kali Yuga. This is all they say about the duties of the Satya, Treta, and Dvapara Yugas; they don’t explain that these are the “chief” duties. As for the duty of the Kali Yuga, they say it is giving alone. Here, too, they omit the word “chief” and speak only of “duty.”102 Were we to accept this as an accurate explanation, we could establish that during the Satya, Treta, and Dvapara Yugas there were no other duties than austerity, knowledge, and sacrifice, respectively. And for the Kali age, we could say there was no other duty beyond giving. But I ask my readers to consider whether the explanation offered by my respected

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opponents is fitting. In their opinion, giving alone is the duty for the Kali Yuga; there is no other duty. That is, vows, fasting, silent prayer, fire offerings, worship of the deities, pilgrimage to sacred places, etc., are not duties for the Kali Yuga. In fact, austerity and the rest are duties for every yuga. The meaning and purport of Manu is simply that austerity and the rest are each respectively the “chief” duty of a particular yuga. In this passage the [Sanskrit] words para [preeminent] and eka [single] are used as adjectives for words like tapasya [austerity].103 For words like para and eka we may understand meanings such as “chief” as well as “only.” Because my respected opponents understand both words to mean “only,” they arrive at the opposite explanation. In his explanation of this passage Kullukabhatta establishes the meaning of the words para and eka to be “chief” and not “only.” He writes:

Sanskrit passage 2.15.5: Kullukabhatta on Manu 1.86 Even though austerity and the rest should be performed in all yugas, in Satya Yuga austerity is chief, meaning the greatest merit comes from austerity. It is the same for self-knowledge in Treta, sacrifice in Dvapara, and giving in Kali.

topic 16: in the parashara samhita there is a prohibition on abandoning an outcast wife, but there is no prohibition on neglecting an outcast husband104 Some say that: 1. In the Parashara Samhita there is a prohibition on abandoning an outcast wife. For this reason it would not be proper to have an injunction to remarry after abandoning an outcast husband. 2. In the Parashara Samhita there is a prohibition on neglecting a husband who is afflicted with leprosy; it therefore cannot be Parashara’s intention to allow a wife to abandon an outcast husband in order to marry another man.40 At this point I would like to say that the Parashara Samhita does not contain a prohibition on abandoning an outcast wife. I cannot determine what 40. Quoting Ramdayal Tarkaratna of Bhatpada.

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passage my respected opponent has looked at in raising this objection. Perhaps it is the following:

Sanskrit passage 2.16.1: Parashara 4.15105 A man who abandons a wife in childhood who is neither evil nor outcast will be born seven times as a woman and will experience widowhood again and again.

Perhaps my respected opponent read the prohibition contained in this passage as applying to an outcast wife rather than to a wife who has not been outcast.106 The purport of the second objection [above] is, on the one hand, that a man afflicted with leprosy or other similar diseases is said to be outcast; and on the other hand, that there is a prohibition on neglecting such an outcast husband. But if Parashara’s intention had been to show that a woman could abandon an outcast husband in order to remarry, then these two statements would appear to be contradictory. Following the explanation of my respected opponent, if there is a prohibition in the Parashara Samhita on neglecting a husband afflicted with leprosy, then it would not be proper to have an injunction allowing remarriage after abandoning an outcast husband. In the passage enjoining marriage [i.e., Parashara 4.28], there is an injunction to marry after abandoning an outcast husband. In the other passage there is a prohibition on neglecting a husband afflicted with leprosy or similar diseases, though the word “outcast” [patita] is not used [see Parashara 4.16, quoted in Sanskrit passage 2.16.2]. Bear in mind that whenever we encounter a ruling on two separate topics we should aim to avoid conflict. Seen in this light, if the husband afflicted with leprosy, etc., undergoes atonement for being an outcast, then there is a prohibition on neglecting him. After all, if he undergoes atonement he is no longer outcast. But if he does not undergo atonement he remains outcast. In that case, a wife may abandon him and marry. Hence there is no longer a conflict between the two passages. But in the passage that contains the prohibition on neglecting a husband, there is not even a word that means “outcast because of leprosy (or some other disease).” As a result, such an objection cannot be raised. The relevant passage reads:

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Sanskrit passage 2.16.2: Parashara 4.16107 After death, the woman who neglected her husband because he was poor, sickly, or foolish, is born as a snake and is widowed again and again.

Perhaps my respected opponent takes the word “sickly” [vyadhita] to mean “afflicted by leprosy (or some other disease).” But whenever the word “sickly” is used, it merely means “unwell.” It does not indicate affliction by diseases like leprosy, which would cause someone to be outcast. For instance, we read:

Sanskrit passage 2.16.3: Parashara 2.3 A Brahman must not harness a bull to a plow if it is missing a limb, sickly, or impotent.

In this context, “sickly” simply means “afflicted” [pidita]. It does not indicate leprosy or other such diseases. And so a Brahman should not plow using a bull that is afflicted.

Sanskrit passage 2.16.4: Narada 13.16108 A father who is sickly, angered, attached to wealth, or who misapplies the authoritative treatises is not master over the partition of his estate.

This means that if a father’s intellect is unstable due to affliction, or if he is angered at a particular son, or if he is excessively attached to wealth, or if he is one who misapplies the authoritative treatises (meaning he is unwilling to follow the authoritative treatises in partitioning his estate), then he is not master over the partition of his estate; in other words, his estate is invalid. In this context, the word “sickly” means “afflicted,” but not “outcast because of leprosy (or some other disease).”

Sanskrit passage 2.16.5: Hitopadesha 1.1.15 O son of Kunti, support the needy. Don’t give wealth to the wealthy. A sickly person needs medicine, but what need has a healthy man for medicine?

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In this context, “sickly” merely means “afflicted,” not “outcast because of leprosy (or some other disease).” Thus whenever the word “sickly” is used it always means “afflicted.” It never indicates someone suffering from leprosy and other diseases that lead to being outcast. And if one surveys the surrounding words in this passage [i.e., Parashara 4.16; Sanskrit passage 2.16.2], one finds that the word “sickly” in the phrase “poor, sickly, or foolish,” cannot mean something like leprosy, since it is ranked as a common illness alongside “poor” and “foolish.” It is simply not possible to consider this the same as being outcast due to leprosy, etc. For if one looks at the lists from the dictionary of Amarasimha it is quite clear that “sickly” denotes someone with a common illness, not someone with leprosy. Thus:

Sanskrit passage 2.16.6: Amarakosha 2.6.58 Ill, deformed, diseased, dull, afflicted, sick, pained.109

And in the context of the Manu Samhita “sickly” clearly does not mean “outcast because of leprosy (or some other disease).” Consider the following:

Sanskrit passage 2.16.7: Manu 9.78–79 A woman who neglects her husband because he is infatuated, intoxicated, or ill may have her possessions and jewelry seized and may be abandoned for three months. If a woman neglects her husband because he is crazy, outcast, impotent, unable to produce sons, or outcast due to leprosy (or some other disease), she should not be abandoned nor should her wealth be seized.

In the first part of the passage Manu provides an injunction to punish a woman for neglecting a husband who is ill [rogarta], while in the second part he writes that there is no punishment for neglecting a husband who has been outcast or who suffers from leprosy (or some other disease). Therefore, “sickly” does not mean “outcast because of leprosy (or some other disease).” If the objection raised by my respected opponent depends upon asserting an erroneous meaning in order to find a conflict with the passage enjoining marriage, how can it be proper?

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topic 17: interpretive passages found in the authoritative treatises on legal literature have validity 110 Someone has determined that: The reasoning by which Vidyasagar has attempted to show that remarriage of widows is authorized is simply unacceptable. He began by citing a passage showing that widow marriage was legal and then simply wrote what he thought was correct. In his book we find the following passage:

sanskrit passage 2.17.1: manu 1.85; see sanskrit passage 1.2 Because the energies of human beings decline in sequence with the ages, the duties of the Satya Yuga are one thing; the duties of the Treta Yuga are another; the duties of the Dvapara Yuga are another; and the duties of the Kali Yuga are another.111 This passage from Manu Samhita describes the differences in duties for the different yugas and shows which duty should be followed in which yuga. It is only in the first chapter of the authoritative treatise on duty compiled by Parashara that we find the following passage that describes all this:

sanskrit passage 2.17.2: parashara 1.24 The duties indicated by Manu apply to the Satya Yuga, the duties indicated by Gotama apply to the Treta Yuga, the duties indicated by Shankha and Likhita apply to the Dvapara Yuga, and the duties indicated by Parashara apply to the Kali Yuga.112 It is not proper to cite this verse in order to suggest that the duties compiled by Manu and the others are prohibited for the Kali Yuga. Nor is it proper to suggest that only the duties compiled by Parashara are to be performed during the Kali Yuga. When seeking the meaning of legal literature grounded in the Vedas, we should follow the method for determining the meaning as provided by the Vedic exegete, Lord Jaimini. In his authoritative treatise on exegesis, Lord Jaimini gives the following instruction:

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sanskrit passage 2.17.3: mimamsa sutra 1.2.1 The purpose of the Veda lying in the laying down of actions, those (parts of it) which do not serve that purpose are useless.113 The purport of this passage is that an injunction is conjoined to its verbal expression. This means that however an injunction is verbally expressed it is authoritative. In this way the futility of interpretive readings is established, lest there be accusations of interpreting sacred utterances. To prevent this, Lord Jaimini determined that

sanskrit passage 2.17.4: mimamsa sutra 1.2.7 They (interpretive passages would be) (authoritative), by reason of their serving the purpose of praising what has been enjoined.114 The purport of this is to explain that interpretive (arthavada) passages are linked to injunctions (vidhi) through the act of extolling. There are no verbal suffixes marking the precative or imperative in the passage “The duties indicated by Manu apply to the Satya Yuga, etc.” As such there is no word that communicates the sense of injunction. Therefore, we must conclude that this passage is linked to the act of extolling. That being the case, the meaning of the passage, “The duties indicated by Manu apply to the Satya Yuga, etc.,” is not that Lord Parashara is the only one to proclaim the duties of the Kali Yuga. Such an interpretive reading has no authority, as I have shown. I need say no more.41

My respected opponent intends to say that since the phrase “the duties indicated by Parashara apply to the Kali Yuga” [i.e., the conclusion of Parashara 1.24, quoted above], contains no word communicating an injunction, it must therefore be an interpretive reading.115 If that were so, the passage would not be authoritative. And if the passage “The duties indicated by Manu apply to the Satya Yuga” [i.e., first part of Parashara 1.24] were not authoritative, there would be no authority for saying that the duty proclaimed by Parashara is to be accepted for the Kali Yuga. My respected opponent has selected a pair of aphorisms from Lord Jaimini. But he has not provided any proof that this framework for Vedic exegesis should be applied to the exegesis of authoritative treatises on legal literature that flow from the Vedas. Just because he so zealously advances this 41. Quoting Shivnath Ray of Kashthashali.

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conclusion, we cannot discount the authority of the sage’s words that “the duties indicated by Parashara apply to the Kali Yuga.” Rather, we have very clear evidence that the framework for Vedic exegesis established by the two aphorisms uttered by Lord Jaimini should not be applied to the exegesis of legal and other literature. Consider the following:

Sanskrit passage 2.17.5: Madhava introducing Parashara 1.1–2 You say that all legal literature can be considered an authoritative treatise on duty, and as such the framework for the exegesis of duty as instructed by Lord Jaimini should be applied to the exegesis of legal literature. According to the framework for the exegesis of duty proclaimed by Jaimini, interpretive readings have no authority. As such, there can be no authority granted to interpretive readings in the exegesis of legal literature. But if you say this, both the devotees of legal literature and the masters of exegesis raise concerns. One thinks of the example of a person who burns down his house out of fear of a mouse. If you refuse to grant authority to all interpretive readings because you fear that at some times and in some cases unacceptable interpretive readings will gain authority, then you also have to deny that the creators of legal literature like Manu, as well as the creator of the authoritative treatise on exegesis, Jaimini, ever existed. Because if it were not for interpretive readings, there would be no proof that they existed. And you would have to get rid of each and every authoritative treatise on history. This being so, you have to accept that interpretive readings necessarily have authority.

In view of this comment, my respected opponent’s determination that interpretive readings have no authority when applied to legal literature is completely unreasonable. So is his claim that the saying “the duties indicated by Parashara apply to the Kali Yuga” has no validity. My respected opponent endeavors to deny authority to an interpretive reading of the saying “the duties indicated by Parashara apply to the Kali Yuga,” but elsewhere he accepts the authority of interpretive readings:

Sanskrit passage 2.17.6: Kullukabhatta on Manu 1.1; see Sanskrit passage 2.3.2 Furthermore, in the Chandogya Brahmana it is said that whatever has been given by Manu is salutary on account of its wholesomeness.

This is a Vedic source of proof. Furthermore:

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Sanskrit passage 2.17.7: Brihaspati, Samskarakanda 1.13116 The legal code of Manu is preeminent because it comprehends the meaning of the Vedas. Whatever legal code is opposed to Manu is not recommended.

This means that because Manu collected the meaning of the Vedas, his legal code is preeminent among all legal literature. Any legal literature that opposes Manu should not be followed. In other words, if the literal meaning of a passage from another Samhita is opposed to a passage from Manu, then the true meaning of the former passage must be recovered so that it will agree with the meaning of the passage from Manu. My respected opponent’s opinion is that an interpretive reading of the passage “the duties indicated by Parashara apply to the Kali Yuga” holds no authority. Well, if this is true, then an interpretive reading of “the legal code of Manu is preeminent” would likewise not be authoritative.117 If there is no word in the phrase “the duties indicated by Parashara apply to the Kali Yuga” to indicate it is an injunction, then the same is true in the other case as well. My respected opponent accepts that the meaning of “the legal code of Manu is preeminent” is that Manu Smriti is supreme among all legal literature. If that is so, then what is to prevent him from accepting an interpretive reading of “the duties indicated by Parashara apply to the Kali Yuga,” which states that during the Kali Yuga one should follow Parashara Smriti? I can see no real difference between these two interpretive readings. Topic 18: There is no prohibition on giving away a virgin a second time after betrothal if the groom is missing118 Some people have said: “If the groom dies after betrothal or if he is missing, a virgin who has been betrothed to him may not marry. If this is the case, then how can it be possible for a woman to remarry if she is widowed after marriage?”42 Those who have raised this objection have not considered the purport of what I have written in my earlier book [i.e., Hindu Widow Marriage, Book One]. At no point in my work did I intend to say that a virgin should not marry again after betrothal if the groom went missing. All I said was that ac42. I refer to Ramdayal Tarkaratna of Bhatpada and others.

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cording to a passage in the Brihannaradiya Purana, there was a prohibition on the practice (allowed during other yugas) whereby one could betroth a virgin to one groom and then, when a more desirable groom appeared, give her to the second man. The purport of this is that a virgin is to be given to the man to whom she has been betrothed. If later on a more desirable groom were to be found, it would be improper to give her to him. In other words, she must be given to the man to whom she has been promised. She may not break her vow by claiming to have found a more desirable groom. This is why Lord Manu the Self-Created has said,

Sanskrit passage 2.18.1: Manu 9.99 A good man never promises her to one man and then gives her to another.

I have clearly enunciated this intention in my own writings. I never expressed the intention that a virgin cannot be given in marriage a second time if the groom should die or be missing. topic 19: the injunction of parashara regarding marriage is not restricted to the lower castes119 There are some who have started out by trying to establish that the passage from Parashara applies to betrothal, but who end up saying things like: “But Madhavacharya, who commented on Parashara, has written that another husband may be found if the first husband is from a lower caste.”43 Let me just say that at no point in his commentary on Parashara does Madhavacharya rule that the passage enjoining marriage applies in the case of lower castes. No doubt my respected opponent wrote this without having read the commentary on Parashara. My respected opponent is a celebrated scholar of logic in our region. But it is utterly unjust for a celebrated scholar like him to casually state—on the basis of inference alone—that such a passage exists in the commentary on Parashara when he has never looked at that commentary. Put plainly, we should rely on perception as a source of proof before turning to inference.120 43. I refer to Maheshchandra Chudamani of Agadapada.

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topic 20: a father may give a widowed virgin again in marriage Many have raised the following objection: “Who exactly is entitled to give away a virgin? If a father has given his daughter to a groom, he loses his possession of her. If he no longer retains possession of her, how can he give the virgin again to another man?”121 These days there are just two types of marriage performed in our region, the Brahma and the Asura: marriage by gift of the virgin and by sale of the virgin, respectively. The use of the words “gift” [dana] and “sale” [vikraya] is not synonymous with the use of these words in other contexts. In other contexts where “gift” and “sale” are used, we find that a person who owns something can give it away or sell it. Once he has given something away or sold it, a person loses ownership over it.122 In other words, he is no longer entitled to give it away or sell it again. This rule generally applies to the giving or selling of such things as land, houses, cattle, horses, and buffalo. But there is no equivalence between this sort of giving and selling and the giving and selling that applies to virgins. When someone has ownership of land or cattle, he may give them away or sell them. Where he does not have ownership, he may not. If he did give something away that he did not own, then such a gift would be considered illegitimate precisely because he lacked possession. But in the case of the giving of virgins, this kind of rule does not apply. In the case of marriage, giving is verbal. The creators of the authoritative treatises have indicated that giving is the special characteristic of marriage. Anyone who makes such a marriage gift completes a marriage. Anyone who has ownership over a virgin may complete a marriage by giving her away. And someone who has no conceivable ownership over a virgin may also complete a marriage by giving her away. In cases [other than marriage] there is no entitlement to giving if there is no ownership. But in the case of marriage, anyone of the same caste is entitled to give away virgins. Thus,

Sanskrit passage 2.20.1: Narada 12.20, quoted in Udvahatattva A father may give away his own virgin daughter, or a brother may give her away with his father’s consent; and a maternal grandfather, maternal uncle, agnate, or

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relation may give a virgin away. In lieu of all these, a mother, if she is healthy, may give away a virgin; if she is not, then someone of the same caste may give the virgin away.

Now, if the creators of the authoritative treatises had intended to say that rules applying to the giving of land, cattle, and so on also apply to the giving of virgins—namely, one who owns something may give it away, but one who does not may not give it away—then how could people like agnates, relations, or members of the same caste be authorized to give the virgin away? In that case only the father and mother would have ownership over the virgin; it would be impossible for a grandfather, uncle, agnate, relation, or member of the same caste to have ownership. If the giving of virgins was like the giving of land or cattle, in the sense that the one who has ownership may give, then the creators of the authoritative treatises would not have indicated that grandfathers and others are entitled to give away the virgin. When it comes down to it, even the mother should not really be reckoned as being entitled to give away the virgin. Her entitlement is second to that of the father. But the kind of ownership that applies to land and cattle does not apply in the case of virgins. If that kind of ownership applied, any gift of the virgin by another party that was not approved by the father would be illegitimate, since the giver had no possession. Now it does sometimes happen that a virgin is given to someone else without the father knowing and without his approval. How can such a marriage be legitimate? Could the father not file a complaint with the ruler saying that the gift was illegitimate? Could he not say that the virgin—who constitutes his property—was given away by someone who did not have ownership? After all, the giving away of someone else’s land or cattle is never legitimate. If one filed a complaint with the ruler, such a gift would be judged to be invalid due to lack of ownership. But this is why I say that giving in the case of the giving of virgins is always a verbal matter. It is not a gift made on the basis of ownership, as in the case of land or cattle. And if the gift of a virgin is not made on the basis of ownership, but is a verbal component of marriage, should it not be possible for a father to first give his daughter to one groom and subsequently—if the groom should die or prove defective in some other way—give her to another groom? Concerning a virgin’s first marriage, there are passages with injunctions like pita dadyat svayam kanyam [a father should give away his own virgin]. But in other passages there

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are clear injunctions about the giving of a married virgin to another groom. So we find, for instance:

Sanskrit passage 2.20.2: Katyayana, quoted in Madhava’s appendix to Parashara, chap. 2 123 If a virgin is given in marriage to a man who is from another caste, who has been outcast, who is impotent, who is immoral, who is of the same clan, who is a servant, or who is sickly, then even though she is married she should be given again to another groom along with her clothing and jewelry.

Here we have a clear injunction to legally give a married virgin to another groom. If the father was not initially entitled to give the virgin away and then subsequently, for whatever reason, to bestow her on another groom, the great sage Katyayana would not have provided this unambiguous injunction. He says that a married virgin may be given to another groom if her husband is outcast, impotent, sickly, etc. And we find more than just injunctions when it comes to this matter. A clear example of a father giving away his widowed daughter to another groom can be found in the following passage:

Sanskrit passage 2.20.3: Mahabharata, Bhishma Parvan, 6.90.7–9a; see Sanskrit passage 2.3.25 The Naga king’s virgin daughter bore Arjuna a glorious, heroic son named Iravan. Suparna had slain the virgin’s husband and the great-souled Naga king Airavata gave his sorrowful, distraught, and sonless daughter to Arjuna.

If the gift of a virgin is not based on ownership but is merely a verbal component of marriage; and if there is a clear injunction in the authoritative treatises on the legal gift of a married virgin to another groom; and if a clear authority can be found for a father to give a widowed virgin to another groom; then it is entirely unreasonable to say that a father loses his ownership when he gives a virgin away and that he cannot therefore give that virgin to another groom.

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topic 21: at the marriage of a widow, the gift should be made with reference to the father’s clan 124 We must now consider which clan should be mentioned when a virgin is given away in a widow marriage. If we are to make a determination in this matter we must first determine the meaning of the word “clan” [gotra]. The meaning of the word “clan” is:

Sanskrit passage 2.21.1: Attributed to Baudhayana125 “Clan” refers to the male descendants of the eight sages, Vishvamitra, Jamadagni, Bharadvaja, Gautama, Atri, Vashishtha, Kashyapa, and Agastya.

Sanskrit passage 2.21.2: A Smriti text quoted by Madhava in his commentary126 The sages Jamadagni, Bharadvaja, Vishvamitra, Atri, Gautama, Vashishtha, Kashyapa, and Agastya are the creators of the clans. “Clan” refers to their male descendants.44

According to these two authoritative treatises, the name for the male descendants of the eight sages, Jamadagni and the rest, is “clan.” In other words, the meaning of the word “clan” is “lineage.” To say that someone is from such and such a clan is to say he is born into the lineage of such and such a sage. This is to say such and such a sage is his primordial ancestor. Now we must consider which clan is to be mentioned at the time of marriage. Rishyashringa has said:

Sanskrit passage 2.21.3: Udvahatattva The groom’s clan and name should be pronounced after naming his paternal great-grandfather. Then the same should be done for the virgin.

44.

sanskrit passage 2.21.8: from madhava’s commentary on parashara, chap. 2

There are thousands of secondary differences among all these clans.

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In other words, the groom’s clan and name should be mentioned after naming his paternal great-grandfather, paternal grandfather, and father. As with the groom, after pronouncing the names of the virgin’s paternal great-grandfather, etc., her clan and name should be pronounced. That is, the virgin is to be given only after first fully identifying her paternal great-grandfather, paternal grandfather, and father and then identifying her clan and name. This clearly reveals whose great-granddaughter she is, whose granddaughter, and whose daughter, as well as the lineage into which she was born. She is introduced at the time of the marriage by making this full identification. Thus the purpose of pronouncing the names of the paternal great-grandfather, etc., and of mentioning her clan at the time of the marriage, is to provide an introduction to her paternal great-grandfather, paternal grandfather, father, and the primordial ancestor of her lineage. If the purpose of mentioning the clan at the time of the marriage is solely to provide an introduction to the primordial ancestor of her lineage, then likewise at the time of a second marriage her father’s clan should be mentioned, just as at the first marriage. There can be no objection to mentioning her father’s clan at the time of a second marriage on the grounds that she had married into another clan. Under no circumstances can one change the lineage into which one is born, nor one’s primordial ancestor. Imagine that a virgin born to the lineage of the sage Kashyapa is married to a man of the Shandilya lineage. Does this virgin somehow lose her status as a member of the Kashyapa lineage? Getting married does not change one’s father, nor one’s paternal grandfather, nor one’s paternal greatgrandfather. Nor does it change the primordial ancestor of one’s lineage. If that is so, then why not mention the father’s clan during the marriage when the time comes to mention the clan? In a word, it is simply not possible for a woman to change her clan by marrying a man from another clan. This is not a determination reached through mere reason. The great sage Katyayana has said:

Sanskrit passage 2.21.4: Exact source not verified127 After her marriage, a woman remains in her father’s clan until the postmortem rites. After the postmortem rites, she joins the clan of her father-in-law.

This clearly shows that a woman remains in her father’s clan until the postmortem rites. If she remains in her father’s clan until that time, and if by

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chance she marries again, what other option is there but to mention her father’s clan? The purport of saying that after the postmortem rites she joins her husband’s clan is to suggest that postmortem union depends upon achieving unity of clan. If the woman did not share her husband’s clan, then she could not attain union with her husband. This is the only reason the creators of the authoritative treatises devised the idea of a woman sharing her husband’s clan at the time of postmortem union. They never intended to say that after the postmortem rites a woman’s lineage or the clan of her primordial ancestor’s lineage changed. After all, the postmortem rites cannot possibly change the lineage of a woman, whether before or after marriage. Nor can they change the identity of the primordial ancestor of her lineage. [By way of objection,] you might wish to quote the following:

Sanskrit passage 2.21.5: Laghuharita, quoted in Udvahatattva With the seven steps of the marriage rite, a woman falls from her father’s clan. Her husband’s clan should be mentioned at the time of the funeral offerings and funeral libations.

And to this you might then add:

Sanskrit passage 2.21.6: Brihaspati, quoted in Udvahatattva A woman is carried away from her father’s clan by the sacred utterances that accompany the clasping of her husband’s hand. Her husband’s clan should be mentioned at the time of the funeral offerings and funeral libations.

According to these two passages, a woman falls from her father’s clan when she takes the seven steps or clasps her husband’s hand. As such, how could her father’s clan be mentioned at the time of a second marriage? But this objection, too, is unreasonable. The passage from Katyayana [i.e., Sanskrit passage 2.21.4] states in clear terms that a woman remains in her father’s clan until the postmortem rites. It would not be proper to say she loses her father’s clan when she takes the seven steps or when she clasps her husband’s hand. When Harita and Brihaspati say [as in Sanskrit passages 2.21.5 and 2.21.6, respectively] that a woman falls from her father’s clan when she takes the

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seven steps or clasps her husband’s hand, the purport is that she ceases to be connected to her father’s family and joins her husband’s family. The kinds of connection she has to her father’s family regarding matters of impurity, for instance, cease after her marriage. This is the purport of saying she falls from her father’s clan immediately upon marriage. The purport was never to say that through marriage a woman’s lineage or the primordial ancestor of her lineage changes. As we have already seen, it is absolutely impossible for her to change her lineage or the primordial ancestor of her lineage in this fashion. This explanation of the purport fits perfectly with the latter half of both the passages from Harita and Brihaspati [quoted above], which provides an injunction that the husband’s clan should be mentioned at the time of the offerings of rice and water (i.e., the funeral offerings). If the purport of the first half of these passages had been to show that the woman joins her husband’s clan after marriage, why would it have been necessary to provide an independent injunction regarding the mention of her husband’s clan at the time of the offerings of rice and water? After all, it should have been established that the husband’s clan should be mentioned at the time of the offerings of rice and water, since the injunction states that a woman joins her husband’s clan after marriage. Therefore, if the latter half of both passages provides an injunction regarding mentioning the husband’s name at the time of the offerings of rice and water—and if the passage from Katyayana clearly states that a woman remains in her father’s clan until the postmortem rites—it cannot have been the intention of the first half of both passages to say that a woman joins her husband’s clan immediately upon marrying. Indeed, the actual purport of the latter half of the passages from Harita and Brihaspati is that at the time of the [funeral] offerings of rice and water a woman joins her husband’s clan. In keeping with what we have already seen, it is impossible for the primordial ancestor of a woman’s clan to change; but it is also necessary for a woman to join her husband’s clan at the time of the postmortem rites in order to achieve postmortem union, even if it is not generally noticed that a woman must join her husband’s clan at the time of the offerings of rice and water. In view of all this, there can be no doubt that the phrase “offerings of rice and water” in Harita and Brihaspati means [the same thing as] “postmortem rites.”128 If we interpret the phrase “postmortem rites” as “offerings of rice and water,” we can achieve congruence with the passage from Katyayana. And it will be perfectly reasonable as well. Furthermore, in the context of specifying which virgins are suitable for marriage, there is an injunction to avoid [virgins] who

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share their clan with the [groom’s] mother or father. But after marriage a mother assumes the clan of her husband, so simply by avoiding a [virgin] of the same clan as the [groom’s] father, one would also successfully avoid a woman of the same clan as the [groom’s] mother. There is no need to indicate separately the matter of not sharing clan with the mother. In this connection, some compilers of collections, when considering the stipulation to avoid a [virgin] who shares her clan with the mother actually endeavor to understand the word “mother” to mean “maternal grandfather.” This interpretation, too, should be rejected. At this point it might be objected that if a woman remains in her father’s clan until the postmortem rites, why does a living woman mention her husband’s clan when she undertakes something like a religious vow [vrata]?129 It is true that a woman mentions her husband’s clan when she undertakes things like vows. But no injunction can be found requiring her to mention her husband’s clan in the context of a vow. Having noted the injunction regarding mention of the clan in the context of funeral offerings, some people have begun mentioning the clan in the context of vows.45 In other words, mentioning the name of the clan in the context of a vow is based solely on customary practice. We have already seen that the woman remains in her father’s clan until the postmortem rites. As such, if a clan is to be mentioned in the context of a vow, it should be her father’s clan. But the practice of mentioning the husband’s clan has been promoted by those who understand the meaning of the aforementioned passages from Harita and Brihaspati to be that once she marries, a woman falls from her father’s clan and joins her husband’s clan. You may ask, does that mean there has been no reward for all those women who have undertaken vows while mentioning their husband’s clan? Just consider the matter and you will see that there is no need for such concern. Since the authoritative treatises do not indicate the necessity of mentioning the clan in the context of a vow, there can be no harm if the clan is not mentioned. And even if she did mention her husband’s clan, there would be no need for concern. But if the authoritative treatises had indicated that mention of the clan was a part of the vow, then not mentioning the clan would certainly lead to a loss of reward.130

45.

sanskrit passage 2.21.9: udvahatattva

Having noticed the injunction to mention the clan, etc., among those wishing to reap the benefits of the funeral offerings, etc., it has become customary to mention the clan, etc., in other contexts also.

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In keeping with what we have seen thus far, it can be established that a woman remains in her father’s clan until the postmortem rites. The concept of her joining her husband’s clan at the time of the postmortem rites arises in connection with the goal of postmortem union. This suggests that at the time of a second marriage the father’s clan should be mentioned. However, Smarta Bhattacharya Raghunandan, out of deference to local custom, overlooks the lucid passage from Katyayana and delivers a ruling based on the unclear passages from Harita and Brihaspati, which state that immediately after marriage a woman joins her husband’s clan.46 Were we to rely on this ruling, we would have to acknowledge that a woman joins her husband’s clan immediately after marriage. Even so, this does not rule out the view that on the occasion of her second marriage a virgin should be given away while mentioning her father’s clan. As we have seen, the intention of mentioning the clan at the time of marriage is to provide an introduction to the lineage into which the woman was born. Even if we say that a woman joins her husband’s clan after marriage, it cannot have been intended that her husband’s clan should be mentioned at the time the virgin is given away. Hence, it is completely proper that the father’s clan be mentioned. This is not just a determination I have cooked up on my own. There is clear evidence for it in the authoritative treatises, such as the following passage:

Sanskrit passage 2.21.7: Attributed to Brihatvashishtha Samhita, chap. 4; source not verified In front of all the invited guests, the father of the virgin should say, “Please listen: We present to the groom this virgin, who is the granddaughter of so-and-so, daughter of so-and-so, and who was born into such-and-such a clan.” 46.

sanskrit passage 2.21.10: udvahatattva

The Laghuharita says that with the seven steps of the marriage rite, a woman falls from her father’s clan. Her husband’s clan should be mentioned at the time of the funeral offerings and funeral libations. In a passage from the Shraddhaviveka, Brihaspati says that a woman is carried away from her father’s clan by the sacred utterances that accompany the clasping of her husband’s hand. Her husband’s clan should be mentioned at the time of the funeral offerings and funeral libations. [In this context, Brihaspati also says that] in the act of clasping her husband’s hand her clan is taken away. When Katyayana says that a woman remains in her father’s clan after marriage until the postmortem rites, after which she joins the clan of her husband, he means it is the postmortem rites that take away her clan. But this is the opinion of those who follow another branch of law, since it is not the custom of the educated. Therefore, in the Gobhila Sutra, where there is an injunction on mentioning the clan, after the seven steps have been taken and the bride bows to her husband, Bhattanarayana explains that the word “clan” refers to the husband’s clan. Hence, we cannot accept the explanation given by Sarala and Bhavadevabhatta that the word “clan” refers to the father’s clan.

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Notice that in this case the words “We present to the groom this virgin . . . who was born into such-and-such a clan” clearly indicate that at the time of marriage it is accepted that one should mention the clan into which the virgin was born. Even if the words “born into such-and-such a clan” were missing and there was only the vague indication “such-and-such a clan,” there would still be no way to establish that after marriage a woman falls from her father’s clan and joins her husband’s clan. Nor could it be established that at the time of a second marriage one should mention the husband’s clan. As the aforementioned passage from Vashishtha clearly states [i.e., Sanskrit passage 2.21.7], the virgin should be given away after announcing to all the invited guests the clan into which she was born. When the virgin is given away, she does not abandon her father’s clan. Therefore one absolutely should not mention the husband’s clan at the time of a second marriage. topic 22: the sacred utterances used for the first marriage should be used for the second Some have raised the objection that there are no sacred utterances to be used for a woman’s second marriage. This objection is utterly baseless. Nowhere in the discussion of the sacred utterances used to complete a marriage is it stated that these sacred utterances do not apply at the time of a second marriage. Hence, all the Vedic sacred utterances that complete the first marriage will complete a second marriage too. We have already established without question that Manu, Vishnu, Yajnavalkya, Parashara, Narada, and Katyayana consent to the remarriage of women in certain circumstances. But while all these sages have given injunctions on remarriage, they have not indicated separate sacred utterances. If the sacred utterances from the first marriage do not apply to this marriage, then the sages have approved such marriage in a fit of madness. After all, if a man and a woman are not legally joined through the use of these sacred utterances, the word “marriage” [vivaha] does not apply. The rite of marriage does not apply to the unsanctioned union of a man and a woman out of mere willfulness. If the remarriage of women is nothing more than a willful union, the sages would not have used the word “rite” [samskara] to describe it. Manu says:

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Sanskrit passage 2.22.1: Manu 9.175–176; see Sanskrit passage 2.3.13 A woman who has been abandoned by her husband or who has been left a widow may by her own volition become a Remarried Woman; that is, she may marry another man. The son born to her is called a Son of a Remarried Woman. If that woman is a virgin or has gone and come back to her husband—meaning she has abandoned her husband to take refuge with another [man] and has then returned to her husband’s house—she may undergo the rite of marriage.

Vashishtha says:

Sanskrit passage 2.22.2: Vashishtha 17.74 A virgin woman may undergo the rite of marriage again if her husband has died.

Vishnu says:

Sanskrit passage 2.22.3: Vishnu Smriti 15.8; see Sanskrit passage 2.3.14 A virgin woman who undergoes the rite of marriage again is called a Remarried Woman.

Yajnavalkya says:

Sanskrit passage 2.22.4: Yajnavalkya 1.67; see Sanskrit passages 2.3.15 and 2.7.2 Whether a virgin or not, a woman who undergoes the rite of marriage again is called a Remarried Woman.

Therefore, since such sages as Manu, Vishnu, Vashishtha, and Yajnavalkya consent to the remarriage of women in certain circumstances; since they refer to such marriage as a “rite” just like the first marriage; since the union of man and woman made illegally in the absence of the sacred utterances cannot be called a “rite”; since the sages do not indicate different sacred utterances for the purpose of the second marriage; and since there is no indication that the

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sacred utterances from the first marriage do not apply to the second; [for all these reasons,] there is absolutely no doubt that the sacred utterances from the first marriage are also the sacred utterances for the second. Some say:

Sanskrit passage 2.22.5: Manu 8.226 The sacred utterances for marriage apply in the case of virgins, not in the case of non-virgins, and so the latter lose their entitlement to the rituals prescribed by duty.

Relying on this passage from Manu, such people say that the sacred utterances for the marriage of prepubescent girls do not apply to the marriage of widows. In this context I would like to say that the word “non-virgins” [akanya] in the passage from Manu does not mean “widow.” We call someone a “non-virgin” who has had union with a man before being married. In the case of such a non-virgin, the sacred utterances of marriage should not be used, because by illegally uniting with a man she loses her entitlement to the rituals prescribed by duty. If “non-virgin” meant “widow,” how could it be proper to say that she had lost her entitlement to the religious rites? No one can establish that in becoming a widow a woman loses her entitlement to the religious rites. When Manu writes that the sacred utterances for marriage do not apply to non-virgins (because they have lost their entitlement to the rites prescribed by religion) the word “non-virgin” does not mean “widow.” There really can be no uncertainty in this matter. Widows do not lose their entitlement to the religious rites. Rather, in the case of widows who do not marry but adopt a life of celibacy, there is an injunction to live the remainder of their lives in the performance of the rituals prescribed by duty. topic 23: marriage to a married woman is no more commended than is marriage to a married man 131 We must now consider the following:

Sanskrit passage 2.23.1: Yajnavalkya 1.52 After living as a student, a man should marry an unmarried, younger woman, who is not kin, and who is both attractive and pleasant.

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In passages like this we find an injunction to marry unmarried virgins. From such injunctions it can be concluded that one should not marry married virgins. [My opponents would say] that it must therefore be prohibited to marry a married woman. And if it is prohibited, then how can it be proper to promote it? In order to make a determination in this matter, we must consider why the qualifier “unmarried” [avivahita] is used when listing those virgins suitable for marriage. It is not proper to explain that the purport of the qualifier [“unmarried”] is to suggest that one should never marry a married virgin. After all, Manu, Yajnavalkya, Vishnu, Vashishtha, Parashara, and the other Samhita authors have each in their respective Samhitas permitted a married woman to marry for a second time. Now, we could accept the interpretation initially provided for the qualifier “unmarried,” and simply rule that marriage to a married woman is completely prohibited. But in doing so we would make a travesty of the permission granted by the Samhita authors for marriage to married women. In point of fact, the actual purport of the qualifier “unmarried” (as it appears in the list of virgins who are suitable for marriage) is that marriage to an unmarried virgin is recommended; conversely, marriage to a married virgin is not recommended. Similarly, it is recommended that a virgin be given to a man who has not already married, while giving her to a married man is not recommended. Even if the aforementioned passage from Yajnavalkya contains an injunction to marry an unmarried virgin, we also read:

Sanskrit passage 2.23.2: Baudhayana, quoted in Udvahatattva132 One should give a virgin to an unmarried suitor who has studied the Veda, and who is virtuous and wise.

This passage from Baudhayana contains an injunction to give a virgin to a man who has not already married. It does not follow from this that one is absolutely prohibited from giving a virgin to a man who has already married. There is an injunction in the authoritative treatises that if a man’s wife should die or become barren he may take another wife. The way to arrive at a determination that reconciles the two injunctions is by speaking of two options, one recommended and one not. Similarly, in the case of unmarried and married women we may also determine that one is recommended and

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the other not. There really is no difference between saying that marriage to a married man is not recommended and saying that marriage to a married woman is not recommended. Smarta Raghunandan himself determined that giving a virgin to an unmarried man is recommended over giving her to a married man. Thus,

Sanskrit passage 2.23.3: Baudhayana, quoted in Udvahatattva Baudhayana says: One should give a virgin to an unmarried suitor who has studied the Veda, and who is virtuous and wise. If we follow this passage, then a virgin should only be given to an unmarried man and marriage to a married man falls outside the eight types of marriage, like Brahma, etc. Therefore, from Baudhayana’s use of the qualification “unmarried” this much only is clear, namely that giving the virgin to an unmarried man is recommended.133

If we consider this a bit further, it becomes clear that the creators of the authoritative treatises have promulgated exactly the same rule for all cases regarding women and men. Consider, first, that when it comes to the time for entering into a marriage arrangement, there is an injunction calling for an investigation of the virgin’s family and conduct; and that there is a similar injunction calling for an investigation of the groom’s family and conduct.47 After marriage, a woman is instructed to seek the happiness of her husband, and a man is likewise instructed to seek the happiness of his wife.48 Just as it is said to be a great sin for a wife to approach another man, it is also 47.

sanskrit passage 2.23.5: yajnavalkya 1.52–55

After living as a student, a man should marry an unmarried, younger girl, who is not kin, who is both attractive and pleasant, who is free of any incurable disease, who has a brother, who is not born into the same lineage or the same clan, who is five generations removed on the mother’s side, and seven generations on the father’s side. He should not marry a virgin from a lineage that carries an infectious disease or is evil, even if it is an eminent lineage, famous for ten generations, dedicated to Vedic study and rich with wealth and grain. The groom, too, should possess all these qualities, and also be of the same caste and dedicated to Vedic study. Furthermore, care should be taken to determine whether or not the groom is virile. He should also be young, intelligent, and kind to all. 48. sanskrit passage 2.23.6: manu 3.60 That family is always blessed in which the wife seeks the happiness of her husband and the husband seeks the happiness of his wife. sanskrit passage 2.23.7: yajnavalkya 1.74 That family in which the husband and wife seek each other’s happiness and treat one another well experiences growth in righteousness, profit, and material pleasure.

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said to be a great sin for a man to approach another woman.49 Just as it is permitted for a man to remarry if his wife should die or become barren, so it is likewise permitted for a woman to remarry if her husband should die or become impotent. Just as it is not recommended for a woman to marry an already married man, it is likewise not recommended for a man to marry a married woman. In all these instances the creators of the authoritative treatises have given equivalent rulings for men and women. Unfortunately, the misconduct of men has led to the ruination of women. It is heartbreaking to consider the plight of women in India today. The custom of ensuring the happiness and affection of women has nearly disappeared. Gradually things have come to such a pass that many wise men think it folly to seek the happiness and contentment of women. Pursue the matter carefully and you will see that the present condition of women is more deplorable than that of slaves. Manu says,

Sanskrit passage 2.23.4: Manu 3.55–58 All fathers, brothers, husbands, and brothers-in-law who desire well-being should ensure the affection of their women and adorn them with ornaments. The gods take delight in the family wherein women are treated with affection, whereas if a family does not ensure the affection of its women, all its sacrifices and gifts will be fruitless. The family in which women suffer will quickly suffer ruin, whereas the family in which women are content will experience only greater and greater happiness. Women treated without affection curse the entire family and bring ruin on it just as surely as if it were cursed.

When you investigate this matter, you find that men today fail to behave toward women as they have been instructed. And since they do not behave in this fashion, they nearly always suffer precisely the dire consequences that have been indicated.

49.

sanskrit passage 2.23.8: mahabharata 1.122.17c–d–19a–b

Thereafter, the woman who forsakes her husband incurs horrendous sin equivalent to that of abortion. And the man who forsakes a wife who has been virtuous and devoted to him since childhood also incurs these sins on earth.

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topic 24: local custom is not a greater source of proof than the authoritative treatises In attempting to refute the claim that the marriage of widows is in keeping with the authoritative treatises, my respected opponents have selected a number of passages from the authoritative treatises. I have demonstrated the true meaning and actual purport of all these passages. Now I must make my best effort to arrive at a determination on one final objection they raise against the promotion of widow marriage. My respected opponents say that even if widow marriage is in keeping with the authoritative treatises, it cannot be promoted because it is opposed to local custom. I had in fact feared that some would raise this objection; that they would say even if it were determined that widow marriage during the Kali Yuga was in keeping with the authoritative treatises, it is nevertheless contrary to local custom. This is why, in my first book [Hindu Widow Marriage, Book One], I provided proof to demonstrate that only in the absence of injunctions from the authoritative treatises should we rely on local custom.50 On the basis of a single passage [i.e., Sanskrit passage 1.15], I argued in my first book that local custom was weaker than the authoritative treatises. Perhaps this has not satisfied my respected opponents. If that is the case, I now provide a further source of proof:

Sanskrit passage 2.24.1: Attributed to Mahabharata, Anushasana Parvan; exact source not verified134 Among those who desire to know duty, the Veda is the highest source of proof; the second are the authoritative treatises on duty; and the third is local custom.

From this we can see that local custom is the weakest of all sources of proof. The Veda and Smriti are stronger sources of proof than local custom. It is therefore unreasonable to rely on local custom while showing no faith in the rulings of the Smriti, which are more authoritative.

50. See the conclusion of Book One.

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Sanskrit passage 2.24.2: Attributed to Skanda Purana; exact source not verified In those cases where there is neither a clear injunction nor a clear prohibition in the Veda or the Smriti, duty may be determined by consulting local custom and the custom of the lineage.

You will notice it is clearly indicated that in cases where there is no injunction or prohibition in the authoritative treatises, local custom is a source of proof. However, it makes no sense to abandon faith in the injunctions of the authoritative treatises in favor of local custom.

Sanskrit passage 2.24.3: Chaturvimshatimata in Prayogaparijata, section on SHRUTI and SMRITI Just as Smriti cannot be accepted if it competes with the Veda, so too local custom is not acceptable if it contradicts Smriti.

Here there is a clear injunction that if Smriti and local custom come into conflict, local custom cannot be accepted. There is a clear injunction in the authoritative treatises on Smriti regarding widow marriage in the Kali Yuga. Therefore to attempt to rule that [the practice] is prohibited on the grounds that it is opposed to local custom is to contradict the opinion of the creators of the authoritative treatises.51 51. No sooner was my aforementioned book finished than I came into possession of a reply written by Padmalochan Nyayaratna. [Trans.: See Vidhava vivaha prachalita haoya atyanta anuchita etadvishayaka pramanasamuha.] Reading carefully, I saw that it added nothing new to all the objections raised by my other respected opponents who attempt to show that widow marriage is not in keeping with the authoritative treatises. As such, it required no further effort from me. Nyayaratna had two principal objections. The first was that Parashara Samhita was not an authoritative treatise for Kali Yuga. The second was that: sanskrit passage 2.24.4: manu 9.65 Among the sacred utterances pertaining to marriage, there is not a single mention of the levirate and in the case of the injunctions for marriage there is no mention of the acceptance of widows. If we follow this passage from Manu, widow marriage is opposed to the Vedas. I believe I have already provided an adequate response to both of these points. While it is true that there is nothing new in the book promulgated by Nyayaratna in response to my book, his book demonstrates such remarkable cleverness that he deserves immense praise for his intellect. I have a feeling opponents of widow marriage will be delighted by his book. And yet, all his cleverness is devoted to using the aforementioned passage from Manu to say that widow marriage is opposed to the Veda. However, this passage from Manu cannot be used to show that widow marriage is opposed to the Veda. As such, all his cleverness is undermined. I wonder how brilliantly Nyayaratna might have displayed his noteworthy intellect if he had employed it to demonstrate a valid position.

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topic 25: conclusion I think anyone with eyes and ears will acknowledge the unbearable sufferings of those who unfortunately become widows at a tender age, not to mention the swelling tide of evils—like prostitution and abortion—that sweep them away as long as the custom of widow marriage is not promoted. My respected readers! In closing, I ask you to take a few moments to calmly consider whether, in such a situation, it is right to prevent the promotion of widow marriage out of slavery to local custom and at the expense of the injunctions of the authoritative treatises—while all along our unfortunate widows are consumed in the painful fires of unbearable widowhood and swept away in a tide of evils like prostitution and abortion. Or whether, by refusing to obey local custom, and relying instead on the injunctions of the authoritative treatises, we should promote the custom of widow marriage. We might thereby save our unfortunate widows from the unbearable pains of widowhood and also stem the tide of evils like prostitution and abortion. Please consider calmly which of these two options is preferable and then make your own determination. Please consider, too, whether the customs of our land are completely immune to change. One cannot say that the customs of our land have never changed since the time of creation. Every custom is historical. If you investigate things, you will see that the customs of our land have changed, bit by bit. If you compare the customs of the four classes that used to prevail in this land with present custom, you will see that the people of present-day India constitute a new people. In fact, customs have changed over time to such a degree that it is nearly impossible to see how the people of present-day India are the offspring of earlier generations. There is no need to belabor this; one example will suffice to demonstrate how much the customs of our land have changed. In prior ages, if a Shudra were seated beside a Brahman on the same seat, the Shudra’s offense would have been immeasurable. Today, that same Shudra may be seated on a higher seat, while the Brahman attends him like a servant and sits on a lower seat beneath him.52 We 52. Such a custom is opposed to the authoritative treatises. And do not think that this custom is adopted only by Shudras and Brahmans who are ignorant of the authoritative treatises. Even those Shudras and Brahmans who are renowned for their knowledge of the authoritative treatises follow this custom without the least compunction or discomfort. Manu says, sanskrit passage 2.25.1: manu 8.281 If a Shudra sits on the same seat with a Brahman, his loins should be branded (with a heated iron bar) and he should be banished from the land or his loins should be severed.

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also notice that even more recently local custom has changed in many ways. For instance, beginning during the time of Raja Rajvallabh, members of the Vaidya caste began to wear the sacred thread and to observe the fifteen days of impurity. Before that time the Vaidya caste used to observe a full month of impurity and would not wear the sacred thread; even today some Vaidyas continue to follow the earlier custom. Yet we don’t say that those who have begun to follow the new custom have abandoned local custom and fallen away from orthodoxy. Since the days of the Dattakachandrika53 it has been the case that an Adopted son is considered valid for Brahmans and the other twiceborn classes as long as he is adopted before the thread ceremony or, for Shudras, before the age of marriage. But before that time, it was the case among all the classes that if the rite of first tonsure was not performed within five years, then an Adopted son was not considered valid. All these local customs have come down to us by virtue of being based on the authoritative treatises. Subsequently, in light

53. I should inform my readers that the book known as the Dattakachandrika is generally thought to have been composed by an ancient author named Kubera. Kubera was the compiler of a well-known digest known as the Smritichandrika. If the Dattakachandrika was indeed composed by Kubera, it could be accepted as a very ancient book. However, this is not in fact the case. The Dattakachandrika is no older than 100 years. It was composed by the famous scholar Raghumani Vidyabhushan Bhattacharya, who promulgated it under Kubera’s name. The purport of his promulgating it under Kubera’s name instead of his own was probably that if he had used his own name the Dattakachandrika would have been labeled a new work and would not have been respected. As such, his attempt to compile some new rulings would not have been successful. In the opening of the Dattakachandrika we read: sanskrit passage 2.25.2: dattakachandrika, topic 1, verse 2 In the Smritichandrika I described eighteen topics of law using the authority of Manu and others, but I did not consider the injunctions regarding Adopted sons that apply to the Kali Yuga. These are all described in detail in this book. And at the end we find: sanskrit passage 2.25.3: dattakachandrika, topic 6 This completes the Dattakachandrika of Kubera. If you look at the beginning and end of the book, it thus appears as if the Dattakachandrika was compiled by Kubera. But at the end of the book, Vidyabhushana Bhattacharya cleverly embedded his own name within a single verse. Thus: sanskrit passage 2.25.4: dattakachandrika, topic 6 This delightful moon lighting up the path of the Adopted Son, so elegantly composed, is a veritable boat for crossing the river of duty. The first and last syllables of the first half line of this verse make “Raghu,” while the first and last syllables of the second half line make “Mani.” In this fashion, the composer accomplished two of his goals. First, he got the book into circulation; second, he became famous as its author. The Dattakachandrika easily gained circulation as an ancient book by being promulgated as the work of Kubera; and by his clever final verse, he did not fail to reveal that he was himself its author. [Trans.: The verse in question reads, with the relevant syllables emphasized: “Ramyaisha chandrika dattapaddhaterdarshika laghu / Manorama sanniveshairanginam dharmataranih.”]

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of another authoritative treatise or some other interpretation of the authoritative treatises, they were changed and new customs began to be promulgated. You are willing to consent when all these older customs are changed and are promulgated as new customs in light of a new authoritative treatise [see footnote 53] or a new interpretation of the authoritative treatises. Why, then, are you so cowardly and niggardly about consenting in the proposed matter concerning the sad fate of these unfortunate widows? When you think about it, the proposed matter is a thousand times more serious than those previously mentioned. Bear in mind there is absolutely no chance society will be harmed if members of the Vaidya caste don’t wear the sacred thread and happen to observe fifteen days of impurity; or if a boy is not considered a valid Adopted son because he was not adopted before the age of five. And yet if the proposed matter does not come to pass, you will be able to observe daily the hundreds of awful consequences that will follow. In former times, with only the authoritative treatises to guide you, you gave your consent to new customs when prior customs had changed. Now, when you not only have the authoritative treatises but can clearly understand that by following these authoritative treatises you can rescue widows and open a path to removing countless terrible evils, how is it right for you to refuse to consent to the current proposal? The sooner you consent, the better it will be. It is wrong for you to resist this proposal in the name of local custom. However, I fear there are many among you who even now, when they hear the words “local custom,” think it is sinful merely to investigate whether or not the proposal should be promoted. And there are many others who, though they agree in their hearts that the proposal should be promoted, do not have the courage to say so. They fear they will be labeled opponents of local custom. Ah, what a sad affair it is that local custom should be the sole ruler of this land; that local custom should be our highest teacher; that the rule of local custom should be supreme, its teachings the preeminent teachings. Blessed be local custom! Your glory is beyond words!135 What uncontested rule you claim over your devoted disciples, whom you bind with unbearable chains of slavery. Step by step you expand your rule, crushing the authoritative treatises beneath your feet. You pierce the very heart of righteousness. You paralyze knowledge of good and evil and block the path to discerning right from wrong. Through your might, the authoritative treatises themselves are reckoned to be unauthoritative while that which is unauthoritative is revered as authoritative; righteousness is reckoned to be unrighteousness and

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unrighteousness is revered as righteousness. Your disciples have forsaken all duties and have willfully promoted evil customs. And yet they are everywhere counted among the virtuous; they are respected because of their commitment to preserving what is popular. And the truly virtuous ones, who are without fault, will not follow you. They refuse to protect what is popular and for this they are scorned as the worst of atheists, the worst of the unrighteous, and the most blameworthy of all. Thanks to your privileged status, there is no sin in eating, associating, or exchanging gifts with those who are destroyers of caste and who spend their time performing actions that degrade righteousness— all because they are diligent in their defense of what is popular. No matter how consistently someone might perform good deeds, if he does not show the same care for what is popular, then forget about eating, associating, or exchanging gifts with him; if one merely speaks to him, he abandons all righteousness in that very instant. Alas, righteousness. How hard it is to know your essence!136 Only you really know who protects you and who degrades you!137 Alas, authoritative treatises! How sad is your plight! Again and again you indicate all the duties that degrade righteousness and destroy caste. And yet people who are devoted to those very duties are everywhere respected as virtuous and righteous. Never mind trying to perform our enjoined duties according to your instruction; if one even mentions such a thing, one is immediately labeled the worst of atheists, the most unrighteous, and the most vile. Verily the root cause of the great tide of evil that flows over this blessed land of India in countless irrepressible waves is nothing other than a lack of respect for you and an excessive concern to protect what is popular. Alas, India! How unfortunate you are! You were once known far and wide as a blessed land because of the virtuous conduct of your children, but now your children do as they please. One’s blood runs dry to think of how you were once a blessed land. Looking at your present condition, I cannot imagine how long it will take to release you from this plight. Alas, people of India! For how much longer will you lay prostrate on a bed of delusion? Open your eyes just once so you can see how this blessed land of India is carried away by an evil tide of prostitution and abortion. You need only ask why. Then, focus your mind and apply yourself to considering the true meaning and purport of the authoritative treatises. If you begin to act accordingly, you will be able to release your homeland from its shame. Sadly, you are overwhelmed by the accumulation of vile customs, enslaved to local

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custom, and consecrated by your firmly held vow to protect what is popular. It is too much to hope that you might suddenly cast away vile customs, renounce your slavery to local custom, abandon your vow to protect what is popular, and thereby put yourself on the correct path. Your intellect and your sense of duty are both vitiated and subdued by errors of habit; your longdessicated heart feels no surge of compassion at the sight of the poor widow’s plight; and there is no way to create revulsion in your heart toward the evil tide of prostitution and abortion that flows over this land. You allow your cherished virgins and others to burn in the unbearable fires of widowhood; you consent to support them even when irrepressible passion leads them into the error of prostitution; and throwing the very fear of righteousness aside, you willingly bring shame on yourself and your family by assisting them with abortion. All this because you fear most what people might say. How astounding it is that you will not agree to follow the authoritative treatises and give these women again in marriage. You could rescue them from the unbearable pains of widowhood and release yourself from every distress! You think that when a woman loses her husband, she turns to stone. You think suffering no longer means suffering, pain no longer means pain. You think the mighty passions are instantly uprooted. And yet at every turn you see just how mistaken such thinking is. Imagine what poisonous fruits you eat from the tree of life because of your failure to confront this. Alas, how lamentable it all is! If only no unfortunate woman would ever be born in a land where men have no mercy, where there is no righteousness, no discerning right from wrong, no knowledge of good and evil, no discriminating between virtue and vice, where the only duty and the highest duty is to protect what is popular. Alas, woman! I know not what sin has caused you to be born in a land like India!138 Calcutta. Sanskrit College October 1855139 Shri Ishvarchandra Sharma

Notes 1. Compare Vidyasagar’s comments in Topic 11 of Book Two. The reader may appreciate the irony of his chastising opponents on this score, since in later years he would go on to write some notorious satirical tracts (under pseudonyms) poking fun at pandits who opposed his reform measures. See Hatcher, Idioms of Improvement, chap. 10.

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207 Book Two 2. The work in question would appear to be the twenty-one-page Shriyuta Ishvarachandra Vidyasagara ghataka viracita vidhava vivaha vidhayaka kulapanjikar kono vara pradatta bhramoddharaka pratyuttara. 3. For a reply to Vidyasagar’s characterization of his opponents’ tactics, see Kaviratna and Vidyaratna, Vaidhavya dharmodaya, book 2:4–8. 4. This section is addressed to the arguments advanced in Dinabandhu Nyayaratna, Vidhavavivahavada. 5. As in Book One, when Vidyasagar translates the central verse from Parashara, he does not render the crucial phrase “in five dire situations” (panchasvaptsu), even though he subsequently refers to the “five dire situations” in the running narrative of his prose argument. 6. Here Vidyasagar employs categories like “discrepancy” (better, “contradiction” [vipratipatti]) and “confusion” (apratipatti), which are taken from logic, or nyaya. Some of his critics would allege he had no special training in nyaya. See Smritiratna, conclusion to Vidhava-vivaha prativada. 7. In connection with the argument here, Shyamapad Bhattacharya accuses Vidyasagar of being amazingly clever (chamatkara catura), but then says, “We shall see how far such cleverness takes us” (Vidhava Vivaha Nishedha, 19). 8. Shyamacharan Sarkar, Vyavastha-Darpana, xiv. 9. As Vidyasagar notes in his preface to the fourth edition of Vidhava-vivaha, this verse does not appear in the Adi Purana. 10. Four sentences prior to this, Vidyasagar employs the word pratiprasava, meaning “exception” (see the glossary). Here he seems to paraphrase a well-known maxim that “a general rule [utsarga] is applicable and is supreme in all cases except where an exception [apavada] clearly covers the matter (apavadavishayapariharena utsargasya vyavasthitih)” (Kane, History of Dharmasastra, 3:796n.1545). 11. Bhattacharya commented that Vidyasagar’s argument here would be valid if it were true that Parashara legislated only for Kali Yuga (Vidhava Vivaha Nishedha, 62–63). Under Topic 2, Vidyasagar will reject the claim that Parashara enjoined duties for the other yugas as well. 12. Here we see why Vidyasagar speaks of Parashara’s injunction as an exception to an exception. See the glossary for “exception.” There is first a general rule allowing widow marriage, then an exception disallowing the practice for the Kali Yuga, and finally an exception to that exception, allowing the practice in five special circumstances. 13. On the twiceborn duty to perform the daily worship known as Sandhya, see Vishnu Smriti 28.1–3. Nanda Pandit quotes the same injunction in Vishnusmriti with the Commentary Keshavavaijayanti of Nandapandita, 524. See also Manu 2.69, 4.93. For background, see Cakravarti, Hindur achara-anushthana, 34–35; and Stevenson, Rites of the Twiceborn, 215. 14. For a response to Vidyasagar’s argument here, see Tarkapanchanan, Vidhava vedana nishedhaka pustaka, 123. 15. In translating the Sanskrit into Bengali, Vidyasagar interprets pakshayor ante as the full moon and new moon days, but does not mention the twelfth day of each fortnight (dvadashi) mentioned in the Sanskrit. He corrects this in his English translation: “On the day of the passage of the sun to a new zodiacal sign, on the last day of either half of the lunar month, on the twelfth as well as the twenty-seventh day of the moon, and on the day of the celebration of a Shraddha, the Sandhya is not to be performed in the evening; by doing so the sin of parricide is incurred” (Marriage of Hindu Widows, 32). 16. Although attributed to the Vedas, this phrase is often cited without a precise textual reference. I would like to thank Tim Lubin, who tracked down one reference for me in Shankara, who cites this as an example of a prohibition in his commentary to Brahmasutra 2.3.48. See Brahmasutra Shankarabhashya, 610.

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208 Hindu Widow Marriage 17. Vidyasagar omits the final half line, ityabravinmanuh, “so Manu has said.” He restores it in his English translation (Marriage of Hindu Widows, 33). 18. Several of the Sanskrit sources quoted under this topic were provided to Vidyasagar by Bharatchandra Shiromani of the Sanskrit College, as Vidyasagar tells us in the preface to the fourth edition of Vidhavavivaha. 19. In his English translation, Vidyasagar omits the preceding two quotations from Parashara and Madhavacharya regarding atonement (Marriage of Hindu Widows, 39). He may have felt that they tended to distract from the central focus of his investigation. 20. This is the same argument Vidyasagar had made in Book One. 21. I have numbered the three statements to help clarify the argument here. 22. Kamalakar Bhatta and Smarta Raghunandan are the authors of the Nirnayasindhu and Tithitattva, respectively, the two sources that Vidyasagar has just used to demonstrate Madhavacharya’s fallibility. 23. Vidyasagar’s English translation of the Sanskrit reads somewhat differently. He writes: “Damsels of eight, nine, and ten years are respectively named Gauri, Rohini, and Kanya; and all girls above ten are called Rajaswala or women in their catamenia: when therefore a girl has reached her tenth year, she is to be immediately disposed of in marriage, and such marriage, even though celebrated in an interdicted nuptial season, will not be held culpable” (Marriage of Hindu Widows, 48). 24. In his English translation Vidyasagar has a note, “Quoted in the Dayabhaga” (ibid., 50). See Dayabhaga 10.13, in Jimutavahana’s Dayabhaga, 338. 25. In Marriage of Hindu Widows, this passage reads: The damsel, whose husband dies after troth verbally plighted but before consummation, his brother shall take for the purpose of begetting a son on her according to this rule. Having taken such a girl for the above purpose in due form of law, she being clad in a white robe and pure in her moral conduct, let him approach her once in due season, and until issue be had. Let no sensible man, who has once given his daughter to a suitor, give her again (in the event of his death before consummation) to another; for he who gives away his daughter, whom he had before given, incurs the guilt of stealing a girl. (51) 26. Vidyasagar does not translate into Bengali the two adjectives applied by Manu to the widow (“clad in white” [shuklavastra] and “of pure conduct” [shuchivrata]), although he does reincorporate them in his subsequent English translation. 27. Sanskrit passages 2.3.9 and 2.3.10 separate and invert the two lines found in Sanskrit passage 2.3.1. Readers may also notice a slight variation in the wording of Vidyasagar’s Bengali translations here. 28. In the Bengali text, Vidyasagar compresses these two quotations into a single line. It is worth noting that in his English translation he omits from the main text all the material from the paragraph beginning “Some say that when Manu lists” to the line ending “there would be no way that Yajnavalkya would list him in seventh place nor Vishnu and Vashishtha in fourth place.” 29. Sanskrit passage 2.3.24 repeats Sanskrit passage 2.1.4. While Vidyasagar’s Bengali translations are virtually identical in these two cases, I offer a slightly different English rendering here to communicate different points of emphasis. Additionally, I retain the Sanskrit terms for the seven types of “remarried” virgins, since this makes Vidyasagar’s discussion in the following paragraph easier to follow.

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209 Book Two 30. This and subsequent citations have been identified using an edition of the Mahabharata with Nilakantha’s commentary. See Shriman Mahabharata, 3:116. 31. For what it is worth, Bhattacharya accused Vidyasagar of playing fast and loose with the meaning of terms like “Natural” (aurasa) and “Son of a Remarried Woman” (paunarbhava), in Vidhava Vivaha Nishedha, 21–22. See also Tarkapanchanan, Vidhava vedana nishedhaka pustaka, 55. 32. See, for instance, Kaviratna and Vidyaratna, Vaidhavya dharmodaya, book 2:31–33. 33. Here Vidyasagar translates the second half of Manu 9.65 as vivahavidhisthale vidhavar vedaner ullekha nai, as opposed to his earlier rendering: punarbar vivaha ukta nai. In so doing he focuses attention on what he takes to be the key question, which is how to interpret the word vedana. Does it mean “accepting a woman for marriage” or “accepting a woman for the purpose of bestowing a son by the levirate”? See the glossary for “accept, acceptance.” 34. Here Vidyasagar’s English version is worth citing: “The verbal radix Vid (to accept), from which the word Vedana is derived, means to ACCEPT the hand of a woman, either in marriage or for the purpose of procreating on her a Ksetraja son; Vedana therefore, signifies marriage or taking for the above purpose according as it is used in a passage relating to nuptial matters or to the practice of Niyoga or appointment” (Marriage of Hindu Widows, 64). 35. As Vidyasagar puts it in his English translation, “vindeta, shall take for the purpose of begetting a son on her” (ibid.). 36. Vidyasagar here translates Manu 9.65 as his opponents would prefer, but only by way of confirming that it is not a valid reading of the passage. 37. Despite Vidyasagar’s reasoning here, many do interpret the passage to be a prohibition on widow marriage. Kullukabhatta clearly glosses vidhavavedana as punarvivaha, or “remarriage,” in Manusmriti, 356. See also Laws of Manu, trans. Doniger and Smith, 205. Nevertheless, commentators remain aware of the apparent contradiction. Of Manu 9.64–68, Bühler writes: “These verses flatly contradict the rules given in the preceding ones.” He then adds: “But it by no means follows that they are a modern addition” (Laws of Manu, 338–339). Lingat similarly notes that “Manu prohibits [niyoga] after having seemed to admit it” (Classical Law of India, 84). Lingat sees Manu’s apparently contradictory statements as proof that he felt the “force of custom.” That is, while Manu did not always agree with practices like niyoga, they were “too deeply rooted for prohibition to be efficacious” (Classical Law of India, 182). Ludo Rocher takes the view that Manu is “a depository of what was dharma, and dharma was different in different Indian communities (castes, etc.).” In some communities, niyoga was thought to accord with dharma, while in others it was not. Since both opinions were valid within particular communities, Manu included both in his “general treatise on dharma.” As Rocher also points out, there is further uncertainty as to precisely who should be appointed to perform niyoga (personal communication, July 29, 2009). For more on this, see Kane, History of Dharmasastra, 2:599–602. 38. On traditions regarding the origin of Manu Samhita in relation to Narada, see Manu’s Code of Law, 18–19. 39. The Sanskrit text quoted by Vidyasagar differs from that found in both Lariviere’s edition of Naradasmriti, 49, and in Heramba Chatterjee Shastri’s Narada-Smriti, part 1:1. 40. This is the same passage that Vidyasagar cited in Book One when refuting the authority of the Brihannaradiya and Aditya Puranas. See Sanskrit passage 1.14. 41. Vidyasagar refers to arguments advanced in Kaviratna and Vidyaratna, Vaidhavya dharmodaya, book 2:42–43. 42. This comment may reflect the fact that among the many criticisms that Kaviratna and Vidyaratna level at Vidyasagar is that when he is unable to understand certain scriptural passages, he simply makes something up (Vaidhavya dharmodaya, book 2:3).

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210 Hindu Widow Marriage 43. This topic does not appear in Vidyasagar’s English translation. 44. Vidyasagar appears to quote from a book published by Krishnakishor Niyogi, who in turn relies on the opinions of Bhavashankar Vidyaratna. While I have not been able to locate Niyogi’s book, we do know that Bhavashankar Vidyaratna of Calcutta was one of nine scholars who supported arguments against widow marriage advanced at a meeting of the Boyaliya Dharma Sabha in the fall of 1865. See the foreword to Tarkapanchanan, Vidhava vedana nishedhaka pustaka. But Bhavashankar had apparently changed his opinion on the matter. On this, see the introduction. 45. In the Bengali selection just quoted by Vidyasagar, the opponent (presumably Niyogi) translates the Sanskrit phrase shankhasya vachanam yatha as “as shown in the entire passage from Shankha.” After the quotation, Vidyasagar paraphrases his opponent; but for the phrase shankhasya vachanam yatha, he writes “as the passage from Shankha says.” Subsequent discussion will reveal that Vidyasagar’s goal is to establish the correct way to interpret Sanskrit phrases like shankhasya vachanam yatha. Put simply, his opponent thinks that such phrases serve to introduce a subsequent passage: “As the passage from Shankha says . . .” By contrast, Vidyasagar thinks that such phrases refer to an opinion previously expressed: “This [preceding passage] is Shankha’s opinion.” 46. This topic does not appear in Vidyasagar’s English translation, which is unfortunate because his English-language readers would no doubt have been moved by his compassionate (if to our eyes gendered) account of marital affection and the grief experienced at the loss of a spouse. 47. The passage can be found in some editions of Parashara. See Parashara-smritih or Parashara Dharma-shastra, 29. 48. Book One (Sanskrit passage 1.16), footnote 3. While Parashara uses the word kshetraja in his list of sons, Vidyasagar follows Nanda Pandit in construing this as an adjective describing the Natural son, which allows him to claim that there is no separate recognition of the Kshetraja son in Parashara. 49. This topic does not appear in Vidyasagar’s English translation. One wonders whether Vidyasagar decided that between its discussion of grammatical rules and the highly dubious nature of his opponent’s argument there was little need to reproduce this topic for English readers. 50. Parashara 4.28 also appears in the Narada-smriti (12.97), where it is followed by the verse to which Vidyasagar refers in the following sentence. 51. According to the grammarian Panini, the affix nan (which yields the prefix a-) cannot be used on akhyatika pada, or “inflected words” (e.g., verbs). 52. Vidyasagar refers to Panini 6.1.109: enah padandadati. See Panini’s Grammatik, 297. My thanks to Jim Benson for helping me with this rule. 53. The grammatical terms used here are lopa, dirgha, and akaravyatyaya. 54. Grammar aside, this passage provides a wonderful illustration of Vidyasagar’s penchant for sarcasm. 55. Even Nyayaratna acknowledged that one could not refute widow marriage by appealing to akara prashlesha, or the “presence of the letter ‘a’” (Vidhavavivahavada, 26). A later commentator noted that Maitra’s argument was both ungrammatical and silly. See Vidhava vivaher shastriyata o yauktikata, 45–46. 56. This lengthy Sanskrit passage does not appear in Vidyasagar’s English translation. 57. Vidyasagar appears to backpedal a bit here. He just finished saying that Dirghatamas’s rule was not a prohibition on remarriage. Now he concedes that it is. As I understand it, he settles for showing that even if Dirghatamas was opposed to the idea of a woman marrying another man, this can still be harmonized with Parashara’s special ruling for the Kali Yuga. As he notes, Dirghatamas’s rule can be treated as a general injunction that is overturned by the special injunction delivered by Parashara.

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211 Book Two 58. This topic does not appear in Vidyasagar’s English translation. 59. Vidyasagar tells us that this is a saying of Angiras taken from the Prayashchittaviveka, but I have not been able to verify this. 60. Vidyasagar will provide a variant reading of this passage in Sanskrit passage 2.9.7 and unpack its technical terminology. 61. Here the lack of diacritical marks makes it hard to see Vidyasagar’s point. It would be clearer (though less elegant) if we were to write the two forms as parapuurvaapatih and jaataah, where the duplicated vowels indicate vowel lengthening. The point is that in the original Sanskrit -patih is masculine singular, whereas -jaataah is masculine plural. As such, they are not in agreement. 62. I forgo translating these terms here, as their definitions (and that of the Upapati) are considered in the passages that follow. For the two passages quoted from Manu, see Laws of Manu, trans. Doniger and Smith, 60–61. 63. This verse appears in some editions of Parashara. See Parashara-smritih or Parashara Dharma-shastra, 18. 64. The first line appears at 6.13 in Brihatparasharasmriti, 45; the entire verse can be found in Dharmashastrasamgraha, part 2:184. 65. This passage marks the last verse in chapter 2 of Parashara, although Madhava’s commentary carries on for more than 130 pages, addressing concerns having to do with the various life-cycle rites, or samskaras. 66. This passing observation regarding historical sources (or the lack thereof) for the study of dharmashashtra in India reveals something about Vidyasagar’s critical historical awareness. 67. For the passages articulating such prohibited practices, see Sanskrit passages 1.11, 1.13, and 2.1.5. 68. The following examples cited by Vidyasagar are rejected in Bhattacharya, Vidhava Vivaha Nishedha, 76–86. 69. Vidyasagar gives the date as Samvat Era 1018. 70. Vidyasagar quotes this passage in Book One (Sanskrit passage 1.16), footnote 4, but he does not translate it. Readers will note how my translation of the Sanskrit there differs from Vidyasagar’s translation here, just as both differ from Vidyasagar’s alternative translation when he cites the same passage again in Sanskrit passage 2.11.2. 71. The Drupad formula refers to the Gayatri prayer offered by all Brahmans as part of their daily prayers. 72. This topic does not appear in Vidyasagar’s English translation. 73. Compare Sanskrit passages 1.16 and 2.10.12. 74. As will become clear from Vidyasagar’s discussion, in this passage his opponents have conflated two individual half lines from separate passages in Parashara. 75. I suspect that this quotation is taken from Kaviratna and Vidyaratna, Vaidhavya dharmodaya, book 1, but I have not been able to locate a copy of this book. 76. This is a repetition of his opponent’s translation of Sanskrit passage 2.11.5. 77. Vidyasagar begins quoting Madhava immediately after the latter has invoked the god Ganesha and provided a brief segue from the first chapter into the second. Although Vidyasagar says that he will cite the entirety of Parashara with Madhava’s commentary, he in fact quotes selectively, omitting occasional passages from Parashara (like 2.5) and passing over some of Madhava’s glosses and citations from other sources. See Parashara-smrti. Parashara Madhava, 1:424–426. 78. This verse does not appear in some editions of the text. See Parashara-smritih or Parashara Dharma-shastra, 14. 79. See Sanskrit passage 2.11.7.

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212 Hindu Widow Marriage 80. Here Vidyasagar quotes once again his opponent’s translation of Sanskrit passage 2.11.5. In the original text, the passage is not indented. I have made this change to facilitate reading. 81. Quoting once again from his opponent’s translation of Sanskrit passage 2.11.5. 82. This topic does not appear in Vidyasagar’s English translation. 83. Vidyasagar does not translate this passage in the original tract. See Sanskrit passages 2.12.5 and 2.15.4. 84. The verse cited here differs from the one quoted by the opponent cited at the beginning of this section. 85. Referring back to Sanskrit passage 2.12.1. 86. For a critique of Vidyasagar’s interpretation of Parashara and the four yugas, see Bhattacharya, Vidhava Vivaha Nishedha, 33–37. 87. This topic does not appear in Vidyasagar’s English translation. 88. The opponent follows a variant reading not accepted by Vidyasagar. For the verse Vidyasagar endorses (Sanskrit passage 2.13.3) and critical notes on manuscript variants, see Parasharasmrti. Parashara Madhava, 1:112. 89. The reference is to the Samachar Chandrika Press, run by Bhavanicharan Bandyopadhyay. The press published the major Samhitas, beginning with Angiras in 1830. In a note on the verso of the title page of the first edition of Book One, Vidyasagar tells us that he consulted these editions. As his discussion here suggests, he obviously questioned the reliability of the Chandrika editions. 90. Since the Chandrika editions mentioned in the previous note provide root texts without commentary, Vidyasagar seems to imply that his opponents are strategically selective in the sources they cite. If elsewhere they consult Madhavacharya’s commentary on Parashara, then why do they not follow it when quoting the passage in Sanskrit passage 2.13.1? 91. Vidyasagar omits a sentence from Madhava’s commentary that appears immediately after the words “no such sin in the Kali Yuga.” It reads, “Therefore in the Smrityarthasara the evil of association is mentioned among the sins in the list of duties to be avoided in the Kali Yuga.” Regarding this section of Madhava’s commentary, Bhattojidikshita writes, “Madhava’s comment on this passage from Parashara is clear” (Chaturvimshatimatasamgraha, 53). 92. This topic does not appear in Vidyasagar’s English translation. He tells us in the preface to the fourth edition that several of the Sanskrit sources quoted under this topic were provided to him by Taranatha Tarkavachaspati. 93. “Agama” here refers to a broad category of texts that represent the views of particular non-orthodox sectarian movements (like the Pashupatas). Agama may also broadly be understood as equivalent to Tantra, a body of texts that claim greater authority than the orthodox texts on Hindu law. Agama are sometimes referred to as mohashastra, or “authoritative treatises based on delusion.” According to some sectarian movements, the Agamas were created by Shiva at Vishnu’s request in order to lead astray non-believers (like Buddhists) who would accept their teachings. See Padma-Purana, part 9:3193–3195. Because they are accorded the status of shastra, the question of how something false could claim authority is resolved by the myth of Vishnu recruiting Shiva to help confuse people. For one Vaishnava interpretation of the Agamas, see Sarma, Introduction to Madhva Vedanta, 41–42, 98. In the following paragraphs, Vidyasagar looks to Nagojibhatta’s commentary on the Durga Saptashati (an agamic text with Tantric associations) for passages to refute his opponents’ contention that the authority of the Agama for the Kali Yuga overrules that of Parashara Samhita. 94. Vidyasagar claims that this is a passage from Kurma Purana cited by Nagojibhatta in his commentary on the Saptashati. I have not been able to confirm this.

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213 Book Two 95. Vidyasagar claims that this is a passage from Suta Samhita cited by Nagojibhatta in his commentary on the Saptashati. I have not been able to confirm this. 96. Vidyasagar claims that this is a passage from Shamba Purana cited by Nagojibhatta in his commentary on the Saptashati. I have not been able to confirm this. 97. This topic appears in Vidyasagar’s 1856 translation, but not in the 1864 edition. 98. See the opening of Book One and Sanskrit passage 1.1. 99. This is the same as Sanskrit passage 1.2. However, in this case Vidyasagar noticeably adds the Bengali word “all” (sakala) after the word for “duty” (dharma) in his translation. The importance of this slight change in emphasis soon becomes clear. See note 101. 100. Vidyasagar emphasizes the idea of “chief duty” (pradhana dharma) in order to suggest that there are other duties that remain unspecified. It is worth noting that the Sanskrit provided by Vidyasagar here does not match that given for the same couplet as found in Sanskrit passage 2.12.1. 101. This explains Vidyasagar’s strategic introduction of the word “all” (sakala) in his Bengali translation of Manu 1.85. See note 99. 102. See Sanskrit passage 2.15.2. 103. In this sentence, Vidyasagar does not in fact define the Sanskrit terms para and eka for his readers. I provide these equivalents so readers can better appreciate his argument. In the next sentence, he suggests what meanings his Bengali readers should understand. Clearly in his opinion, both words communicate the idea of preeminence that is associated with a word like “chief.” 104. This topic does not appear in Vidyasagar’s English translation. 105. This passage does not appear in all recensions of the text. Compare Parashara-smrti. Parashara Madhava, 2:28, with Parashara-smritih or Parashara Dharma-shastra, 29. Vidyasagar seems to suggest there is some reason to doubt the appropriateness of citing this passage here. 106. Vidyasagar suggests here that his opponent has misread the compound adushtapatita as signifying an “outcast wife who is not evil” (adushta-patita) instead of a “wife who is neither evil nor outcast” (adushta-apatita). 107. This passage does not appear in all recensions of the text. Compare Parashara-smritih or Parashara Dharma-shastra, 29, and Parashara-smrti. Parashara Madhava, 2:28. 108. This passage does not appear in the critical edition by Lariviere, Naradasmriti, 206; it can be found in Shastri, Narada-Smriti, part 1:23, and is translated in Jolly, Naradiya Dharmasastra, 96. 109. Vidyasagar does not translate this Sanskrit passage from the Amarakosha. The translation is mine. 110. This topic does not appear in Vidyasagar’s English translation. 111. In reproducing Manu 1.85 (Sanskrit passage 1.2), Vidyasagar does not translate it, no doubt because his opponent did not do so. However, for the reader’s benefit I reproduce the translation Vidyasagar provided for Sanskrit passage 1.2. Readers will recall that he slightly revised this translation when discussing the same passage in Topic 15. See Sanskrit passage 2.15.1. 112. Once again, Vidyasagar does not translate this passage from Parashara, so I follow his earlier translation. See Sanskrit passages 1.3 and 2.12.4. 113. Here, too, Vidyasagar does not translate the passage from Jaimini. I use the translation made by Jha in Purva Mimamsa Sutras of Jaimini, 22. 114. Ibid., 26, substituting “interpretive” for arthavada. 115. The discussion here turns on how to interpret the purport of Parashara 1.24 (Sanskrit passage 2.17.2). In good commentarial fashion, his opponents refer to the passage under consideration using the shorthand form krite tu manavo dharmah (The duties indicated by Manu

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214 Hindu Widow Marriage apply to the Satya Yuga). Vidyasagar uses the same shorthand to refer to Parashara 1.24, as well as the other operative phrase, kalau parasharah smritah (the duties indicated by Parashara apply to the Kali Yuga). 116. Somewhat uncharacteristically, Vidyasagar here simply incorporates two Sanskrit passages (from the Chandogya Brahmana and Brihaspati) into the flow of his Bengali sentence. I have broken them out and given them numbered rubrics to assist readers. The former he does not bother to translate, though he had done so earlier. See Sanskrit passage 2.3.2. As for the latter, he glosses it in Bengali differently than when he had cited it earlier. See Sanskrit passages 2.3.1, 2.3.9, and 2.3.10. 117. Vidyasagar refers to Brihaspati’s phrase pradhanyam hi manoh smritam, which appears in Sanskrit passage 2.17.7. 118. This topic does not appear in Vidyasagar’s English translation. 119. This topic does not appear in Vidyasagar’s English translation. 120. Vidyasagar takes a jab at his logician interlocutor, invoking two categories of “valid knowledge” according to logic: perception (pratyaksha) and inference (anumana). In Vidhavavivaha prativada, Smritiratna would rise to the defense of logicians, questioning Vidyasagar’s own training in this area and reminding him that without a mastery of reasoning (tarka), one could not understand shastra. 121. Vidyasagar does not identify any opponents by name, perhaps because he felt the objection was ubiquitous. 122. Compare the ancient definition of ownership provided by Gautama: “Ownership is established by inheritance, purchase, partition, possession, and discovery” (Dharmasutras, 95). On ownership as it relates to differing Hindu views of inheritance, see Jimutavahana’s Dayabhaga, 25. 123. See Sanskrit passage 2.1.10. 124. This topic does not appear in Vidyasagar’s English translation. 125. Vidyasagar identifies this as a passage from Baudhayana that was quoted by Madhava in his commentary on Parashara. It may be that he has this confused with Sanskrit passage 2.21.2, which Madhava does cite in his appendix to chapter 2 of Parashara Samhita. See Parashara-smrti. Parashara Madhava, 1:476. 126. Vidyasagar has a note here that says that this is a Smriti text quoted both by Madhava in his commentary on Parashara and by Raghunandan in his Udvahatattva. For the former, see Parashara-smrti. Parashara Madhava, 1:476. 127. Vidyasagar tells us this passage is quoted in the Udvahatattva, but I have not been able to verify this. 128. Vidyasagar is looking for a way to equate the phrase pindodakadana (offerings of rice and water) in Harita and Brihaspati with the phrase sapindikarana (postmortem rites) in Katyayana. 129. When speaking of vows, Vidyasagar has in mind the many ritual observances, like periodic fasting or pilgrimage, that women perform for the benefit of their husbands and families. 130. Vidyasagar uses the phrase gotrollekha, which does not indicate whether the clan being mentioned is the father’s or the husband’s. He argues that if one is not required to mention the father’s clan when performing a vow, the fact that one mentions the husband’s clan should bring no harm. However, as he notes, if one had been required to mention the father’s clan in the context of a vow but had mentioned the husband’s clan instead, this would render the vow inefficacious. 131. It is difficult to render this topic heading in English and stay close to the original Bengali. In his translation, Vidyasagar adopts the heading “In matrimonial alliances unmarried damsels are preferable to married ones in the same way as unmarried men are to married ones” (Marriage of Hindu Widows, 99).

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215 Book Two 132. In a footnote to this passage, Vidyasagar says that this passage from Baudhayana is quoted in both the Udvahatattva and the Yajnavalkya-dipakalika. The latter, also known simply as the Dipakalika, is a commentary written by Shulapani on Yajnavalkya Smriti. See Dipakalika, 9. I would like to thank Ludo Rocher for pointing this out to me. 133. In his English translation, Vidyasagar rephrases Raghunandan’s “if we follow this passage” as “from a too literal interpretation of this” (Marriage of Hindu Widows, 100). He seems anxious lest this passage be taken by some to mean that Raghunandan views only marriage to an unmarried man as acceptable. 134. The first line of the Sanskrit text appears at Manu 2.13. See Manusmriti, 33. 135. Throughout this paragraph, Vidyasagar addresses “local custom” using the most familiar pronoun, tui, which in this case suggests a tone of disrespect. 136. When Vidyasagar shifts, in this paragraph and the following, to speak of “righteousness” (dharma), the “authoritative treatises” (shastra), India (bharatavarsha), the “people of India” (bharatavarshiya manavagana), and “woman” (abala), he employs the pronoun tumi, which, while not formal, connotes a respectful familiarity, as among friends. 137. This three-sentence paragraph does not appear in Vidyasagar’s English translation (Marriage of Hindu Widows, 108). 138. For a spirited theological response to Vidyasagar’s pleas, see the concluding pages of Tarkapanchanan, Vidhava vedana nishedhaka pustaka. 139. Book Two is dated 4 Kartika, 1912 Samvat.

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GLOSSARY

In providing translation equivalents for the most important Sanskrit and Bengali terminology employed by Vidyasagar, I have attempted to mirror the usage of scholars working on Hindu law (dharmashastra). For what I consider to be the most important terms, I provide brief descriptive entries, along with references to relevant literature. Readers who seek further help with technical vocabulary may consult the glossary created by Ludo Rocher for his translation of Vyavaharacintamani: A Digest on Hindu Legal Procedure, 406–414. abortion bhrunahatya. In Marriage of Hindu Widows, Vidyasagar renders this as “foeticide.” accept, acceptance vedana. I follow Vidyasagar, for reasons that are made clear in his discussion of Manu 9.65 in Topic 3 of Book Two (Marriage of Hindu Widows, 63). In that context, readers learn that vedana can also mean “marriage,” hence the particular care Vidyasagar takes in discussing Manu 9.65. act karma actual prakrita adopted (son) dattaka (putra) adultery vyabhichara. The term commonly connotes “adultery.” However, I try to follow Vidyasagar’s choices in Marriage of Hindu Widows. Translating Topic 8 of Book Two, he prefers “adultery.” Translating Topic 25 of Book Two, he prefers “prostitution.” See also prostitution afflicted pidita age kala. Vidyasagar presumes the framework of four mythical eons, or yugas, of cosmic history. In the body of the translation, I leave “yuga” untranslated and reserve “age” for the more generic word kala. See also eon alternative kalpa. See also matter ancestral rites paitrya karma aphorism sutra artificial (son ) kritrima (putra) assertion (v. assert ) pratijna (kara) atheist nastika atonement prayashchitta. See also penance authoritative pramanika authoritative treatise shastra. Lingat notes that the term can mean both “science” and “an authoritative treatise in a science” (Classical Law of India, 284). blessed land punya bhumi bridegroom vara

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218 Glossary brother-in-law devara. The Nirukta glosses devara as dvitiya vara, or “second groom” (Krishna Nath Chatterjee, Hindu Marriage, 277). See also levirate caste jati. See also people celibacy brahmacharya circumstance sthala. In Marriage of Hindu Widows, Vidyasagar translates this as “contingency.” clan gotra class varna collection samhita commentary vyakhya, bhashya. See also explanation commentator bhashyakara common sadharana condition of widowhood vaidhavyadasha conduct achara congruence samsrava court scholar sabha pandita credible prashamsapara custom pratha, achara, vyavahara. In the shastras and in the classical texts on dharma, the most common term for “custom” is achara. This is the word that Vidyasagar uses. However, he also refers to widow marriage as vyavahara and pratha. On the former usage, see Datta, “Controversy over a Verse on the Remarriage of Hindu Women,” 10. As for the latter term, though it is not used in the shastras, it connotes something that has achieved widespread status (as suggested by its root, prath, meaning “to extend”). See also practice debate ( v. consider) vichara (kara). Vichara carries a range of meanings, including “reflection,” “deliberation,” “examination,” “investigation,” and “trial.” degrade lopa kara determination (v. determine) mimamsa (kara). In a narrow sense, mimamsa refers to exegesis of sacred Vedic texts (vedavakyavichara; Mitakshara on Yajnavalkya 1.3). The rules of exegesis were fully developed in the school of Purva-mimamsa. But the principles of mimamsa also provide “the logic of the law” (Henry Thomas Colebrooke, quoted in Jimutavahana’s Dayabhaga, 41n.21). For a discussion of mimamsa in the context of the dharmashastras, see Lingat, Classical Law of India, 148–157. See also exegesis dire circumstance apat (kala) dubious kalpita duty dharma eligible male patra. See also groom energy shakti eon yuga. I leave “yuga” untranslated in the body of the translation. See also age era kalpa establish pratipanna kara evil dosha exception pratiprasava. A pratiprasava is an exception to a prior exception. A “counterorder, suspension of a general prohibition in a particular case” (Monier-Williams, Sanskrit-English Dictionary, 668). Vidyasagar translates the term as “special case,” but this obscures its technical nature (Marriage of Hindu Widows, 28). Readers of Book Two will note how Vidyasagar’s argument presumes a framework of general rule (utsarga), exception (apavada), and exception to the exception (pratiprasava).

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219 Glossary exegesis mimamsa. See also determination explanation (v. explain ) vyakhya (kara) faith astha, shraddha family kula fashion pranali. See also framework; method fitting samlagna forbidden performance akartavya karma framework pranali. See also fashion; method friends and relations atmiya funeral libations tarpana funeral offerings shraddha general samanya gloss abhasa great-souled mahatma groom patra. See also eligible male heart antahkarana holy men sadhu homeland svadesha human beings manushya immolation sahamarana, sati india bharatavarsha inheritance paitrika dhana injunction vidhi, vidhana. According to the rules of Mimamsa, a vidhi “contains a command imposing an obligation” (Kisori Lal Sarkar, Mimamsa Rules of Interpretation, 37). The classic definition of such a command is: “A Vidhi is that which puts one in a position which he is not apt to get into” (ibid., 39). An archetypal injunction is: “One who desires heaven should sacrifice” (svargakamo yajeta). While a vidhi is a positive command, or injunction, a nishedha has been called “a vidhi in disguise” (Vidhiswarup Vichar, x). It is a negative command, translated here as a “prohibition.” See also prohibition inquiry akanksha instruction shasana intention (v. intend ) abhipraya (bala) interpretation artha. See also meaning interpretive reading arthavada. One of five types of Vedic utterance alongside injunction (vidhi), hymn (mantra), name (namadheya), and prohibition (nishedha). An alternative translation might be “explanatory passage” (Vidhiswarup Vichar, x). investigation nirnaya, anusandhana. Nirnaya is technically the “decision” arrived at in a legal dispute (Kane, History of Dharmasastra, 3:260, 379). Secondarily, it connotes a process of inference, demonstration, or investigation. This is how Vidyasagar uses it, as when he speaks of “investigating the truth” (tattva nirnaya) in the first paragraph of Book One, where he also speaks of tattvanusandhana, or “investigation of the truth.” kin sapinda learned (people) shishta (loka) legal vaidha. From vidhi, or “injunction.” See also injunction legal literature, legal codes smriti. I adopt a narrow meaning of smriti, which broadly refers to a wide range of what might be called “traditional lore” (Jimutavahana’s Dayabhaga, 3). legitimate siddha, as in a “legitimate marriage”

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220 Glossary levirate niyoga. Often translated as “appointment.” At times Manu appears to contradict himself, since he enjoins the brother-in-law (devara) to sire a son for his deceased brother’s wife and then immediately prohibits the same practice (Manu 9.58–70; Laws of Manu, trans. Doniger and Smith, 203–205). See also brother-in-law lineage vamsha, pravara local custom deshachara lord bhagavan lover upapati marriage vivaha master svami matter vishaya, kalpa meaning artha. See also interpretation method riti, pranali. See also fashion ; framework misfortune anishta mythology purana natural (son ) aurasa (putra). Ludo Rocher renders this as “full-fledged” (Jimutavahana’s Dayabhaga, 415). The basic requirements are (1) that such a son be sired by his father and (2) that his mother be his father’s wife. However, the treatises raise further qualifications. See Ludo Rocher, “Aurasa Son”; and Kane, History of Dharmasastra, 3:647. offerings of rice and water pindodakadana opinion mata opponent prativadi orthodoxy sadachara passage vachana penance prayashchitta. See also atonement people jati, loka performance (v. perform ) anushthana (kara) popular laukika postmortem rites sapindikarana. I adopt a very broad definition, since the particular details of Hindu mortuary rites are not central to the text. Technically, sapindikarana refers to the particular shraddha ceremony through which the deceased male is integrated into the larger ancestral lineage. postmortem union pindasamanvaya power kshamata practice vyavahara. Understood broadly as “legal procedure,” in contrast to the specific topics of “substantive law,” or vivada (Jimutavahana’s Dayabhaga, 4). Lingat translates vyavahara as “administration of justice, the judicial process, especially judicial procedure (viewed practically)” (Classical Law of India, 285; see also Kane, History of Dharmasatra, 3:245–247). All these meanings inform Vidyasagar’s usage, but as the first paragraph of Book One makes clear, he also uses the term as synonymous with pratha, or “custom.” Outside the realm of the dharma literature, vyavahara can mean simply “conduct, behavior, action,” and the like. This is how I have rendered the word at the end of Topic 23 of Book Two. See also custom prepubescent girl kumari probative pramanika prohibition nishedha. The opposite of an injunction. The classical Mimamsa definition of a nishedha is a “prohibition of what one is apt to do by the impulse of some particular

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221 Glossary passion” (Kisori Lal Sarkar, Mimamsa Rules of Interpretation, 40). A good example of a Vedic prohibition is: “One should not eat kalanja” (na kalanjam bhakshayet; see Vidhiswarup Vichar, xii). See also injunction proper sangata prostitution vyabhichara. See also adultery purport tatparya purpose uddeshya reason, reasoning yukti reasonable yuktisiddha, vicharasiddha reasonably vicharasaha recommended prashasta religious dharmaparayana. See also righteous religious rites daiva karma, dharmakriya, dvijakarma remarried woman punarbhu remedy pratikara respectable (people) sadhu (loka) respected (people) mahashaya (loka) restriction maryada righteous dharmaparayana. See also religious righteousness dharma. See also duty rites samskara rule niyama, sutra. A niyama implies less obligation than an injunction. On this, see Kisori Lal Sarkar, Mimamsa Rules of Interpretation, 41–45. I translate sutra as “rule” in the context of Vidyasagar’s discussion of Sanskrit grammar and Panini in Topic 7 of Book Two. See also injunction ruling vyavastha. Apte defines this as “a settled rule, law, statute, decree, decision, legal opinion, written declaration of the law (especially on doubtful points or where contradictory texts have to be properly adjusted)” (Practical Sanskrit–English Dictionary). sacred performance kartavya karma sacred utterance mantra sacrifice of the threshing floor khalayajna sage muni, rishi sanctioned yathavidhana. I also sometimes translate as “rightly” or “legally.” scholar pandita shame kalanka sickly vyadhita sin papa son of a remarried woman paunarbhava. Kane defines paunarbhava as “the son of a remarried woman [i.e., punarbhu]” and defines this further as the “one to whom a woman, being abandoned by her husband or being a widow, gives birth after she contracts a marriage of her own accord” (History of Dharmasastra, 3:648; see also 2:608–610). son of the wife kshetraja putra. A son born to the wife by someone other than the husband. Lingat gives the more literal “field-born son” (Classical Law of India, 182). I leave kshetraja untranslated throughout. source of proof, evidence pramana speaker vadi. Technically the “plaintiff” or the one bringing a case in a lawsuit (vyavahara). Here vadi may be understood as a claimant or an interlocutor. spurious kritrima. See also artificial (son)

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222 Glossary statement vakya straightforward sahaja technical definition paribhashika artha textual reading patha topic prakarana topic of law vivadapada tradition parampara treatise See authoritative treatise truth tattva unattested amulaka unjust anyaya unrighteous adharmagrasta, adharmika unwell rogi valid (authority) pramana. Literally, a “valid means of knowing” something. In this case, one is interested in the valid sources for knowing duty. See also duty validity pramanya vedic exegete vedarthamimamsaka verbal expression vakya vernacular bhasha verse shloka vile custom kusamskara virgin kanya wealth dhana wise, wise man pandita. Vidyasagar occasionally also uses jnani, or “one who knows.” See also scholar woman stri word shabda worldly (people) vishayi (loka)

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226 Bibliography Yajnavalkya-smriti. With the Commentary Mitakshara of Vijnaneshvara. Edited by Narayan Rama Acarya Kavyatirtha. Delhi: Nag, 1985.

Bengali Texts on Widow Marriage Bhattacharya, Shyamapad. Vidhava Vivaha Nishedha. Serampore: Alfred Press, 1874. Bridegroom [pseud.]. Shriyuta Ishvarachandra Vidyasagara ghataka virachita vidhava vivaha vidhayaka kulapanjikar kono vara pradatta bhramoddharaka pratyuttara. Calcutta: Paunarbhavyabhanjaka Press, 1855. Datta, Akshaykumar. “Vidhavavivaha.” Tattvabodhini Patrika [Third kalpa], part 4, no. 140 (Chaitra 1776 Shaka) [February 1855]: 180–187. Reprinted in Shreshtha prabandha: Akshaykumar Datta, 29–38. Dhaka: Vishvasahitya Kendra, 2005. Dharma Sabha. Vidhava vivaha nishedha vishayaka vyavastha evam tadiya bhashartha samgrihita haiya dharma sabhar anumatyanusare mudrita haila. Calcutta, 1846. Kaviratna, Nandakumar, and Haradhan Vidyaratna. Vaidhavya dharmodaya. Book 2. Calcutta: Nityadharmanuranjika Press, 1857. Maitra, Kalidas. Paunarbhava khandanam arthat shrimadishvara vidyasagarena kalau vidhavavivaha prachalitartha nirmitta nibandhasya pratyuttaram. Serampore: Tamohar Press, 1855. Nyayaratna, Dinabandhu. Vidhavavivahavada. Serampore: Tamohar Press, 1855. Nyayaratna, Padmalochan. Vidhava vivaha prachalita haoya atyanta anuchita etadvishayaka pramana-samuha. Calcutta, 1856. Smritiratna, Madhusudan. Vidhava-vivaha prativada. Calcutta: Ramayan Press, 1885. Tarkapanchanan, Ramdhan. Vidhava vedana nishedhaka pustaka. Calcutta: Boyaliya Dharma Sabha, 1867. “Vidhava Vivaha.” Tattvabodhini Patrika [Fourth kalpa], part 2, no. 161 (Pousha 1778 Shaka) [December 1856]: 129–132. Vidhava vivaher shastriyata o yauktikata. Calcutta: Bharatamihir yantra, 1890. Vidyasagar, Ishvarchandra. Ratna-pariksha. Shriyuta Bhuvanmohan Vidyaratna, Prasannachandra Nyayaratna, Madhusudan Smritiratna, ei tin panditaratner prakrita parichaya pradana. Calcutta: Sanskrit Press, 1886. ———. Vidhavavivaha prachalita haoya uchita ki na etadvishayaka prastava. Calcutta, 1855; 2nd ed., 1857; 3rd ed., 1862; 4th ed., 1872. 4th ed. Reprinted in Vidyasagar-granthavali, edited by Sunitikumara Chattopadhyay, Brajendranath Bandyopadhyay, and Sajanikanta Das, 2:12–187. Calcutta: Ranjan, 1939. ———. “Vidhavavivaha prachalita haoya uchita ki na etadvishayaka prastava.” Tattvabodhini Patrika [Third kalpa], part 4, no. 139 (Phalguna 1776 Shaka) [January 1855]. Reprinted in Samayikapatre bamlar samajachitra, part 4, Tattvabodhini Patrika, edited by Benoy Ghosh, 145–147. Calcutta: Papyrus, 1980. ———. “Vidhavavivaha vishayaka dvitiya pustaker upakrama bhaga o upasamhara bhaga.” Tattvabodhini Patrika [Fourth kalpa], part 1, no. 148 (Agrahayana 1777 Shaka) [November 1856]: 104–110. ———. Vinaya-patrika. Vidhava-vivaha o Yashohara Hindudharma rakshini Sabha visayini. Calcutta: Sanskrit Press, 1884. ———. Vraja-vilasa, yatkinchit apurva mahakavya. Calcutta: Sanskrit Press,1884.

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227 Bibliography

English and Bengali Sources Agnes, Flavia, Sudhir Chandra, and Monmayee Basu. Women and Law in India: An Omnibus. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004. Apte, Vaman Shivaram. The Practical Sanskrit–English Dictionary. Rev. and enlarged ed. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2003. Bandyopadhyay, Asitkumar. Banglar Sahitye Vidyasagar. New rev. ed. Calcutta: De’s Publishing, 1991. Bandyopadhyay, Brajendranath. Sambad patre sekaler katha. Vol. 2, 1830–1840. Calcutta: Bangiya Sahitya Parishad, 1970. Bandyopadhyay, Chandicharan. Vidyasagar. Calcutta: De’s Book Store, 1987. Bandyopadhyay, Sekhar. Caste, Culture, and Hegemony: Social Domination in Colonial Bengal. New Delhi: Sage, 2004. ———. “Caste, Widow Marriage, and the Reform of Popular Culture in Colonial Bengal.” In From the Seams of History: Essays on Indian Women, edited by Bharati Ray, 8–36. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995. Reprinted in Women and Social Reform in Modern India: A Reader, edited by Sumit Sarkar and Tanika Sarkar, 100–117. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008. Banerji, Sures Chandra. A Glossary of Smriti Literature. Calcutta: Punthi Pustak, 1963. Basu, Monmayee. Hindu Women and Marriage Law: From Sacrament to Contract. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001. Bayly, C. A. “Rammohan Roy and the Advent of Constitutional Liberalism in India, 1800– 30.” Modern Intellectual History 4, no. 1 (2007): 25–41. Bhattacharya, Batuknath. The “Kalivarjyas” or Prohibitions in the “Kali” Age: Their Origin and Evolution and Their Present Legal Bearing. Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1943. Bose, Nemai Sadhan. Indian Awakening and Bengal. 3rd ed. Calcutta: Firma KLM, 1979. Brockhaus, F. A. “Bengalische Literatur: Die Werke des Iswarachandra Vidyasagar.” ZDMG 18 (1865): 642–647. Carroll, Lucy. “Law, Custom, and Statutory Reform: The Hindu Widow’s Remarriage Act of 1856.” Indian Economic and Social History Review 20, no. 4 (1983): 363–388. Reprinted in Women and Social Reform in Modern India: A Reader, edited by Sumit Sarkar and Tanika Sarkar, 78–99. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008. Chakraborty, Uma. “Whatever Happened to the Vedic Dasi? Orientalism, Nationalism, and a Script for the Past.” In Recasting Women: Essays in Indian Colonial History, edited by Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid, 27–87. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1990. Chakravarti, Chintaharana. Hindur achara-anushthana. Calcutta: Papyrus, 2001. Chakravarti, Haripada. Dasharathi Rayer pamchali. Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1962. Chatterjee, Bankimchandra. Bankim rachanavali. Edited by Jogeshchandra Bagal. 2 vols. Calcutta: Sahitya Samsad, 1986. Chatterjee, Heramba Nath. Studies in the Social Background of the Forms of Marriage in Ancient India. Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 1974. Chatterjee, Krishna Nath. Hindu Marriage—Past and Present. Calcutta: Tara, 1972. Chatterjee, Partha. The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993.

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228 Bibliography ———. “The Nationalist Resolution of the Women’s Question.” In Recasting Women: Essays in Indian Colonial History, edited by Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid, 233–253. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1990. Cornish, H. D. Handbooks of Hindu Law. Part 1, The Hindu Joint Family. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1915. Dalrymple, William. The Last Mughal: The Fall of a Dynasty: Delhi, 1857. New York: Vintage Books, 2006. Datta, Akshaykumar. Shreshtha prabandha: Akshaykumar Datta. Dhaka: Vishvasahitya Kendra, 2005. Datta, Krishna. “A Controversy over a Verse on the Remarriage of Hindu Women.” In Faces of the Feminine in Ancient, Medieval, and Modern India, edited by Mandakranta Bose, 7–20. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Davis, Donald R., Jr. “Hinduism as a Legal Tradition.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 75, no. 2 (2007): 241–267. ———. “A Realist View of Hindu Law.” Ratio Juris 19, no. 3 (2006): 287–313. Derrett, J. Duncan M. The Death of a Marriage Law: Epitaph for the Rishis. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1978. ———. History of Indian Law (Dharmasastra). Handbuch der Orientalistik, sec. 2, vol. 3. Leiden: Brill, 1973 ———. Religion, Law, and the State in India. Reprint, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999. Dhavan, Rajeev. “Dharmasastra and Modern Indian Society: A Preliminary Exploration.” Journal of the Indian Law Institute 34, no. 4 (1992): 515–540. Dimock, Edward C. Caitanya-Caritamrita of Krishnadasa Kaviraja. Harvard Oriental Series, vol. 56. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999. Dodson, Michael S. Orientalism, Empire, and National Culture: India, 1770–1880. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Dutta, Krishna, and Andrew Robinson. Rabindranath Tagore: Myriad-Minded Man. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996. Forbes, Geraldine. Women in Modern India. New Cambridge History of India, vol. 4, part 2. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Fruzzetti, Lina. The Gift of a Virgin: Women, Marriage, and Ritual in Bengali Society. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990. Ghosh, Benoy. Ishwara Chandra Vidyasagar. Builders of Modern India. New Delhi: Government of India Publications Division, 1965. ———, ed. Samayikapatre banglar samajachitra. Part 4, Tattvabodhini Patrika, 1. Calcutta: Papyrus, 1980. ———, comp. Selections from English Periodicals of 19th Century Bengal. Vol. 3, 1849–56. Calcutta: Papyrus, 1980. ———. Vidyasagar o Bangali Samaj. Reprint, Calcutta: Orient Longman, 1984. Ghosh, J. C. Bengali Literature. London: Curzon Press, 1979. Gopalakrishnan, T. P., and R. B. Sethi. Codified Hindu Laws. Allahabad: Law Book, 1960. Government of India. The Eighty-first Report of the Indian Law Commission. New Delhi: Government of India Ministry of Law, 1979. Gupte, S. V. Hindu Law of Marriage. Bombay: Tripathi, 1976. Haldar, Gopal. Vidyasagar: A Reassessment. New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1972. Hatcher, Brian A. Bourgeois Hinduism, or the Faith of the Modern Vedantists: Rare Discourses from Early Colonial Bengal. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

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229 Bibliography ———. Idioms of Improvement: Vidyasagar and Cultural Encounter in Bengal. Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1996. ———. “No Slave to Custom.” In The Golden Book of Vidyasagar, edited by Manik Mukhopadhyay et al., 127–134. Calcutta: All Bengal Vidyasagar Death Centenary Committee, 1993. ———. “Sanskrit and the Morning After: The Metaphorics and Theory of Intellectual Change.” Indian Economic and Social History Review 44, no. 3 (2007): 333–361. ———. “Sastric Modernity: Mediating Sanskrit Knowledge in Colonial Bengal.” In Modernities in Asian Perspective, edited by Kausik Bandyopadhyay. Calcutta: Setu Prakashani, 2010. ———. “What’s Become of the Pandit? Rethinking the History of Sanskrit Scholars in Colonial Bengal.” Modern Asian Studies 39, no. 3 (2005): 683–723. Heimsath, Charles. Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964. Hunter, William Wilson. A Statistical Account of Bengal. Vol. 5, Districts of Dacca, Bakarganj, Faridpur, and Maimansinh. Reprint, Delhi: DK Publishing, 1973. “In Memoriam: Pundit Iswara Chandra Vidyasagar.” Indian Nation August 3, 1891, 363–365. Jha, Ganganath. Studies in Hindu Law. Edited by Gaurinatha Shastri. Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit University Press, 1992. Kane, Pandurang Vaman. History of Dharmasastra (Ancient and Medieval Religious and Civil Law). 4 vols. Government Oriental Series, class B, no. 6. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1930. Killingley, Dermot. Rammohun Roy in Hindu and Christian Tradition: The Teape Lectures, 1990. Newcastle upon Tyne: Grevatt and Grevatt, 1993. Lal, Ruby. “Recasting the Women’s Question: The Girl-Child / Woman in the Colonial Encounter.” Interventions 10, no. 3 (2008): 321–339. Lingat, Robert. The Classical Law of India. Translated by J. Duncan M. Derrett. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973. Lopez, Donald. Elaborations on Emptiness: Uses of the Heart Sutra. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. Majumdar, J. K., ed. Raja Rammohun Roy and Progressive Movements in India: A Selection from Records, 1775–1845. Reprint, Calcutta: Sadharan Brahmo Samaj, 1983. Maloni, Ruby. “Iswarchandra Vidyasagar and the Changing Status of Women in Bengal.” In The Golden Book of Vidyasagar, edited by Manik Mukhopadhyay et al., 119–126. Calcutta: All Bengal Vidyasagar Death Centenary Committee, 1993. Mani, Lata. “Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India.” In Recasting Women: Essays in Indian Colonial History, edited by Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid, 88–126. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1990. ———. “Production of an Official Discourse on Sati in Early-Nineteenth-Century Bengal.” Economic and Political Weekly 21, no. 17 (1986): 32–40. Reprinted in Women and Social Reform in Modern India: A Reader, edited by Sumit Sarkar and Tanika Sarkar, 38–57. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008. Metcalf, Thomas. Ideologies of the Raj. New Cambridge History of India, vol. 3, part 4. Reprint, New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Mill, W. H. “Restitution and Translation of the Inscription Found in the Ruins of the Mountain-Temple of Shekavati.” Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal 4, no. 43 (1835): 367–400.

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230 Bibliography Mitra, Indra. Karunasagar Vidyasagar. Calcutta: Ananda, 2000. Mitra, Peary Chand. “Marriage of Hindu Widows.” Calcutta Review 25 (1855): 351–368. Mitra, Subal Chandra. Isvar Chandra Vidyasagar: A Story of His Life and Work. Reprint, Delhi: Ashis, 1975. Monier-Williams, Monier. A Sanskrit–English Dictionary. New ed. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1988. Muir, Ramsay. The Making of British India, 1756–1858. Reprint, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1969. O’Hanlon, Rosalind. “Issues of Widowhood: Gender and Resistance in Colonial Western India.” In Contesting Power: Resistance and Everyday Social Relations in South Asia, edited by Douglas Haynes and Gyan Prakash, 62–108. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. Pennington, Brian. Was Hinduism Invented? Britons, Indians, and the Colonial Construction of Religion. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Pollock, Sheldon. “The Death of Sanskrit.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 43, no. 2 (2001): 392–426. ———. “The New Intellectuals in Seventeenth-Century India.” Indian Economic and Social History Review 38, no. 1 (2001): 3–31. Prinsep, James. “Facsimiles of Various Ancient Inscriptions, Lithographed: Stone Slabs in the Society’s Museum.” Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal 5, no. 44 (1836): 724–731. Radhi, Kantichandra. Navadvipa-Mahima, arthat navadviper prachina o adhunika vivarana. Edited by Jitendriya Datta and Phanibhushan Datta. 2nd ed. Calcutta: Book Company, 1937. Ray, Bharati, ed. From the Seams of History: Essays on Indian Women. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995. Rocher, Ludo. “The Aurasa Son.” In Makaranda (Madhukar Anant Mehendale Festschrift), edited by M. A. Dhaky and J. B. Shah, 127–138. Ahmedabad: Sharadaben Chimanbai Educational Research Group, 2000. ———. “Law Books in an Oral Culture: The Indian Dharmashastras.” Proceedings of the American Philological Society 137, no. 2 (1993): 254–267. ———. “Schools of Hindu Law.” In India Maior: Congratulatory Volume Presented to J. Gonda, edited by J. Ensink and P. Gaeffke, 167–176. Leiden: Brill, 1972. Rocher, Rosane. “Henry Thomas Colebrooke and the Marginalization of Indian Pandits.” In Pramanakirtih: Papers Dedicated to Ernst Steinkellner on the Occasion of His 70th Birthday, edited by Birgit Kellner, Helmut Krasser, Horst Lasic, Michael Torsten Much, and Helmut Tauscher, 2:735–756. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien, 2007. Ross, Fiona G. E. The Printed Bengali Character and Its Evolution. London: Curzon Press, 1999. Row, R. Ragoonath. Hindu Law on Marriage. Reprint, Varanasi: Krishnadas Academy, 1986. Roy, Rammohun. The English Works of Raja Rammohun Roy with an English Translation of “Tuhfatul muwahhiddin.” Allahabad: Panini Office, 1906. Sarkar, Biharilal. Vidyasagar: Ishvarchandra Vidyasagarer jivani. Edited and annotated after the 4th ed. by Prahladakumara Pramanika. Calcutta: Orient Book, 1986. Sarkar, Kisori Lal. The Mimamsa Rules of Interpretation as Applied to Hindu Law. Tagore Law Lectures, 1905. Calcutta: Thacker and Spink, 1909.

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231 Bibliography Sarkar, Pulkesh De. Pathaka Vidyasagar. Calcutta: Author, 1986. Sarkar, Shyamacharan. Vyavastha-Darpana, a Digest of Hindu Law, as Current in Bengal, comprising vyavasthas or principles deduced from Sanskrit Books of paramount authority, viz.: —the Daya-Bhaga, Daya-Tattwa, Daya-Krama-Sangraha, &c. 3rd ed., enlarged and improved. Calcutta: Stanhope Press, 1883. Sarkar, Sumit. Modern India, 1885–1947. Delhi: Macmillan India, 1983. Sarkar, Sumit, and Tanika Sarkar, eds. Women and Social Reform in Modern India: A Reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008. Sarkar, Tanika. “Wicked Widows: Law and Faith in Nineteenth-Century Public Sphere Debates.” In Behind the Veil: Resistance, Women, and the Everyday in Colonial South Asia, edited by Anindita Ghosh, 83–115. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Sarma, Deepak. An Introduction to Madhva Vedanta. Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2003. Sartori, Andrew. Bengal in Global Concept History: Culturalism in the Age of Capitalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008. Sen, Asok. Vidyasagar and His Elusive Milestones. Calcutta: Riddhi India, 1977. Sen, Sukumar, ed. Shrishrichaitanyacharitamrita. Calcutta: Ananda, 1988. Sen Gupta, Subodh Chandra. “Vidyasagar: An Appraisal.” In The Golden Book of Vidyasagar, edited by Manik Mukhopadhyay et al., 135–139. Calcutta: All Bengal Vidyasagar Death Centenary Committee, 1993. Shastri, Haraprasad. “Vidyasagar prasanga.” In Haraprasada rachanavali, edited by S. K. Cattopadhyaya. Vol. 2. Calcutta: Eastern Trading, 1959. Shastri, Heramba Chatterjee. Studies in the Puranas and the Smritis. Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series, no. 126. Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 1986. Shastri, Pashupatinath. Introduction to the Purva Mimamsa. Chaukhambha Oriental Research Series, no. 19. 2nd ed. Delhi: Chaukhambha Orientalia, 1980. Shastri, Shivnath. “Panditavar Ishvarchandra Vidyasagar.” In Prabandhavali, part 1. Calcutta: Antahpur Press, 1904. Singh, Sarva Daman. Polyandry in Ancient India. Delhi: Vikas, 1978. Sinha, Samita. Pandits in a Changing Environment: Centres of Sanskrit Learning in Nineteenth Century Bengal. Calcutta: Sarat Book House, 1993. Sternbach, Ludwik. Review of Vishnusmriti with the Commentary Keshavavaijayanti of Nandapandita, edited by Pandit V. Krishnamacharya. Journal of the American Oriental Society 85, no. 4 (1965): 596–597. Stevenson, Mrs. Sinclair. Rites of the Twiceborn. Reprint, New Delhi: Oriental Books, 1971. Tarkaratna, Ramadayala. Ekadashir upavaser tattva. Calcutta: Sil, 1862. Tripathi, Amales. Vidyasagar: The Traditional Moderniser. Calcutta: Orient Longman, 1974. Tubb, Gary A., and Emery R. Boose. Scholastic Sanskrit: A Handbook for Students. New York: American Institute for Buddhist Studies, 2007. Vaidya, N. K., ed. A Collection Containing the Proceedings which led to the passing of Act XV of 1856. Bombay, 1885. Vidyaratna, Shambhuchandra. Vidyasagar-jivanacharita. Calcutta: English-Sanskrit Press, 1891. Vidyasagar, Ishvarchandra. “The Evils of Child Marriage: Ishvarchandra Vidyasagar.” Translated by Brian A. Hatcher. Critical Asian Studies 35, no. 3 (2003): 476–484. ———. Marriage of Hindu Widows. Reprint, Calcutta: Bagchi, 1976. ———. Vidyasagar-granthavali. Edited by Sunitikumar Chattopadhyay, Brajendranath Bandyopadhyay, and Sajanikanta Das. 3 vols. Calcutta: Ranjan, 1937–1939.

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232 Bibliography ———. Vidyasagar rachana-samgraha. Edited by Gopal Haldar. 3 vols. Calcutta: Pashchim Banga Niraksharata Durikarana Samiti, 1972. Vivekananda, Swami. The Life of Swami Vivekananda by His Eastern and Western Disciples. Vol. 2. Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1981. Wilson, Jon. “Anxieties of Distance: Codification in Early Colonial Bengal.” Modern Intellectual History 4, no. 1 (2007): 7–23. Wolpert, Stanley. A New History of India. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.

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INDEX OF SANSKRIT PASSAGES

Numbers in parentheses refer to the “Sanskrit passage” rubric used throughout the translation; the numbers following the entries are page references. For additional references to Sanskrit texts and authors, see the Index of Names and Terms. Adi Purana quoted by Madhava at Parashara 1.16 (2.2.11), 88–89 quoted by Madhava at Parashara 4.28 (2.1.5, 2.1.13), 78–79, 81–82, 85–86, 93 unnumbered, 93–94 Aditya Purana quoted in Udvahatattva (2.1.8, 2.1.16, 2.10.10–11), 78, 81, 148–149 unnumbered (1.13), 64–65, 67 “Agama” attributed to (2.14.1), 170, 173, 212n.93 Ahnikatattvam section 77 (2.10.18), 151 Aitareya Brahmana 3.23.1 (2.4.3), 116 Amarakosha 2.6.58 (2.16.6), 179, 213n.109 Angiras quoted in Udvahatattva (2.3.4), 97 Atri Samhita 109–110 (2.5.3), 119 259–260 (2.5.4), 119 275–279 (2.5.5), 119–120 Baudhayana attributed to (2.21.1), 188 quoted in Udvahatattva (2.23.2–3), 197–198

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Brihannaradiya Purana 22.13–16, quoted in Udvahatattva (1.11), 64–65, 67, 184 22.15 (2.1.7, 2.1.15, 2.1.17), 78, 81 unnumbered, 64–65, 67 Brihaspati Smriti 25.16–17, quoted by Kullukabhatta on Manu 9.68 (2.3.36), 113 quoted in Udvahatattva (2.21.6), 190–193 Samskarakanda 1.13 (2.3.1, 2.3.9, 2.3.10, 2.17.7), 96, 99, 101, 183, 208n.27, 213n.117, 214n.116 Brihat Parashara Samhita 1.62–63 (2.9.11–12), 139 5.56, 5.67c–d–68a–b (2.9.1, 2.9.7), 135 6.34 (2.9.14), 141 unnumbered (2.9.16), 141 Brihatvashishtha Samhita chap. 4, attributed to (2.21.7), 193 Chandogya Brahmana quoted by Kullukabhatta on Manu 1.1 (2.3.2, 2.17.6), 96, 182, 214n.116 Chaturvimshatimatasamgraha in Prayogaparijata, section on Shruti and Smriti (2.24.3), 201 section on marriage (2.11.3), 153–154 unnumbered (2.2.15), 92

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234 Index of Sanskrit Passages Dattakachandrika topics 1 and 6 (2.25.2–4), 203n.53 Dattakamimamsa on Parashara 4.22 (1.16, 2.10.12, 2.11.2), 62n.3, 149, 153, 210n.48, 211n.70 Hitopadesha 1.1.15 (2.16.5), 178–179 Jabali quoted in Shuddhitattva, section 89 (2.1.19), 83 Jaimini. See Mimamsa Sutra of Jaimini Kashyapa quoted in Udvahatattva (2.1.4, 2.3.24), 77, 106–107, 208n.29 Katyayana Smriti quoted by Madhava in appendix to Parashara, chap. 2 (2.1.10, 2.20.2), 79–80, 82, 187 quoted in Dayabhaga (2.3.6), 98–99 unnumbered (2.21.4), 189 Kratu quoted by Madhava at Parashara 1.34 (2.1.6, 2.1.14), 78, 81 Kullukabhatta on Manusmriti 1.1 (2.17.6), 182 on Manusmriti 1.86 (2.15.5), 176 Kurma Purana attributed to (2.14.2), 171 quoted in Malamasatattva, section 71 (2.14.4), 171 Laghuharita quoted in Udvahatattva (2.21.5), 190–193 Madhavacharya, Parashara Madhava introduction to Parashara 1.1–2 (2.17.5), 182 introduction to Parashara, chap. 1 (2.3.11–12), 101–102 on Parashara 1.1–2 (2.2.3–4), 85 on Parashara 1.3–4 (2.2.6–7), 87 on Parashara 1.13–16 (2.2.9–11), 88 on Parashara 1.26 (2.13.4), 169

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on Parashara 1.34 (2.2.14, 2.11.1), 89, 153 on Parashara, chap. 2 (2.21.8), 188n.44 on Parashara 2.1–4, 2.6 (2.11.12–16), 158–159 on Parashara 2.6–9 (2.11.17–20), 160 on Parashara 2.10–14 (2.11.21–25), 160–161 on Parashara 2.15 (2.9.19, 2.11.7–8, 2.11.26–27), 142, 156–157, 162 on Parashara 4.28 (2.2.1, 2.3.38), 85, 115, 125 on Parashara 4.28–30 (2.1.2), 74–75, 78, 90–93 on Parashara 12.11 (2.11.22), 154 on Parashara 12.78 (2.11.4, 2.13.5), 154, 170 quoting “Smriti” (2.21.2), 188, 214nn.125–126 Mahabharata Adi 1.104.34–40 (2.8.1, 2.8.3), 129–131 Adi 1.104.41–45 (2.8.4), 132 Adi 1.122.4–21a (2.8.5), 133 Adi 1.122.17c–d–19a–b (2.23.8), 199n.49 Adi 1.122.25b–27a (2.8.2), 130–131 Adi 1.195.27 (2.4.4), Nilakantha on, 116 Anushasana, attributed to (2.24.1), 200 Bhishma 6.90.7–9a (2.3.25, 2.20.3), 108, 187 Bhishma 6.90.82 (2.3.26), 108 Manusmriti 1.1, Kullukabhatta on (2.17.6), 182 1.85 (1.2, 2.15.1, 2.15.3, 2.17.1), 59, 173–174, 180, 213nn.99,101,111 1.86 (2.15.2, 2.15.4), 174–176; Kullukabhatta on (2.15.5), 176 2.130 (2.1.20), 83–84 3.55–58 (2.23.4), 44, 199 3.60 (2.22.6), 198n.48 3.166 (2.9.4), 136 3.173 (2.9.5), 137 5.41 (2.1.27), 85 5.158, 13 5.160–162 (2.3.27–28), 108–109 5.163 (2.9.6), 137 8.226 (2.22.5), 196

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235 Index of Sanskrit Passages 8.281 (2.25.1), 202n.52 9.59–68 (2.3.31), 110–111 9.65 (2.3.30, 2.3.34–35, 2.24.4), 110, 112–113, 201, 209n.33,36–37 9.69–71 (2.3.7, 2.3.33), 99, 111–112 9.78–79 (2.16.7), 179 9.94 (2.3.3), 96–97 9.99 (2.18.1), 184 9.141 (2.3.39), 99n.6 9.163–165 (2.3.5), 98 9.166 (1.10), 63 9.168–169 (1.8–9), 63 9.175–176 (2.3.13, 2.22.1), 103, 195 9.180, 9.184 (2.3.17–18), 104 11.182 (2.11.4), 154 Mimamsa Sutra of Jaimini 1.2.1, 1.2.7 (2.17.3–4), 181–182, 213n.113 miscellaneous Sanskrit passages aphorisms (2.1.22), 84 inscriptions (2.10.2–3, 2.10.8–9), 146–148 unidentified (2.1.18, 2.3.21, 2.5.6–7, 2.9.3, 2.9.8, 2.10.21, 2.21.4), 83, 105, 120, 136–138, 151, 189 Mricchakatika introduction to (2.10.1), 145 Narada Samhita 12.20, quoted in Udvahatattva (2.20.1), 185–186 12.97–101 (2.1.3, 2.1.12), 75–76, 80, 126 13.16 (2.16.4), 178 introduction to chapter on vyavahara (2.3.37), 114–115 Nilakantha on Mahabharata Adi 1.195.27 (2.4.4), 116 Nirnayasindhu 1–2 (2.2.16–20), 94–95 Padma Purana, Uttarakhanda 6.62.31 (2.14.7), 172 6.236.2–4 (2.14.3), 171 Parashara Smriti. See also Madhavacharya, Parashara Madhava 1.1–2 (2.2.2), 86 1.1–18 (1.4), 60 1.3–4 (2.2.5), 87 1.11 (2.2.8), 88

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1.18 (2.2.12, 2.9.9), 89, 139 1.19 (2.9.10), 139 1.22 (2.12.2), 163 1.23 (2.12.3), 164 1.24 (1.3, 2.12.4, 2.17.2), 59–60, 164, 180–181, 213nn.112,115 1.25 (2.12.5), 164–165 1.25–26, 1.23 (2.12.1), 163, 213n.100 1.26 (2.12.6–7, 2.13.1, 2.13.3), 165–167, 169, 212n.88 1.28 (2.12.8), 165–166 1.32 (2.12.9), 166 1.34 (2.2.13), 89 2.1 (1.5), 61 2.15 (2.11.5, 2.11.9, 2.11.11), 156–157, 212nn.80–81 3.5 (2.10.13), 149 3.6 (2.9.13), 140 3.29 (2.9.17), 141 4.12 (2.6.2), 123 4.14 (2.6.1), 123 4.15 (2.16.1), 177 4.16 (2.16.2), 177–179 4.22 (1.7), 62, 70n.12. See also Dattakamimamsa 4.27–28 (2.5.1–2), 117–118 4.28 (2.1.1, 2.1.9, 2.1.17), xxiii, 14, 29, 34–35, 39–40, 52n.101, 61–62, 69n.9, 74–81, 85, 90–91, 96, 115, 118–119, 121, 125–126, 135, 153–154, 177, 210n.50 5.25 (2.11.5–6, 2.11.10–11), 156–157 11.18–20 (2.10.14–16), 150–151 12.78 (2.13.2), 167 unnumbered (2.6.3, 2.9.15), 123, 141 Rajatarangini 1.294–297 (2.10.5), 146 1.309 (2.10.4), 146 3.320 (2.10.7), 147 4.504 (2.10.6), 147 Shamba Purana attributed to (2.14.6), 172, 213n.96 Skanda Purana 1.2.40.249–253 (2.10.20), 145n.25 attributed to (2.24.2), 201

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236 Index of Sanskrit Passages Suta Samhita attributed to (2.14.5), 172, 213n.95 Taittiriya Samhita 2.1.1.1 (2.1.26), 84 3.3.9.2 (2.1.24), 84 5.3.12.1 (2.1.23), 84 6.1.11.6 (2.1.25), 84 6.6.4.3 (2.4.2), 116 Tithitattva section 114 (2.2.21), 95 section 160, Durgapujatattva (2.10.17), 151 section 239, quoting Vyasa (2.1.21), 83 Udvahatattva quoting Aditya Purana (2.1.8, 2.1.16, 2.10.10–11), 78, 81, 148–149 quoting Angiras (2.3.4), 97 quoting Baudhayana (2.23.2–3), 197–198 quoting Brihannaradiya Purana 22.13–16 (1.11), 64 quoting Brihaspati Smriti (2.21.6), 190–193 quoting Kashyapa (2.1.4, 2.3.24), 77, 106–107, 208n.29 quoting Laghuharita (2.21.5), 190–193 quoting Narada Samhita 12.20 (2.20.1), 185–186 quoting Vashishtha (2.1.11), 80

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unnumbered (2.21.3, 2.21.9–10), 188, 192n.45, 193n.46 Vashishtha Samhita 1.3–4 (1.15), 68, 70n.19 chap. 17 (2.3.8, 2.3.16, 2.3.20), 100, 103, 105 17.2 (2.3.29), 109 17.74 (2.22.2), 195 quoted in Udvahatattva (2.1.11), 80 Vedavyasa-smriti 1.4 (1.14, 2.4.1), 67, 116 Vishnu Purana quoted by Madhava at Parashara 1.16 (2.2.11), 88 Vishnu Smriti 15.7, 15.18 (2.3.22), 105 15.8 (2.3.14, 2.22.3), 103, 195 15.28–30 (2.3.23), 105 24.9 (2.3.32), 111 Vyasa quoted in Tithitattva, section 239 (2.1.21), 83 Yajnavalkya Smriti 1.4–5 (1.1), 58 1.52 (2.23.1), 196–197 1.52–55 (2.23.5), 198n.47 1.65 (1.12), 65 1.67 (2.3.15, 2.7.2, 2.22.4), 103, 129, 195 1.74 (2.23.7), 198n.48 2.132 (2.3.19), 104

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INDEX OF NAMES AND TERMS

This index does not cover the material treated in the glossary. Readers should consult the glossary for additional information on Sanskrit and Bengali terminology. abortion, 42, 54n.126, 68, 134, 199n.49, 202, 205–206 Adopted sons, 65–66, 203n.53 adoption, xxi, 62–63, 144, 148, 153, 203 adultery, 11, 42, 54n.126, 130–133, 217. See also prostitution Anti-Suttee Regulation. See suttee: AntiSuttee Regulation Arjuna, 108, 132–133, 145, 187 ashrama (stage of life), xix–xx, 61, 118, 139, 142, 158 authoritative treatises, xvii–xxiii, 5, 9, 11, 13–16, 20–21, 24–26, 28–32, 34, 35, 38, 40, 44–45, 52n.104, 57–69, 69n.3, 71–81, 85, 87, 91, 93–96, 102–110, 113–115, 117–118, 125, 131–134, 139, 143–145, 148, 151, 153, 158, 164, 171–173, 178, 180–182, 185–188, 190, 192–193, 197–206, 212n.93. See also customs: legal codes and; debates: on authoritative treatises; inheritance: authoritative treatises on; Manu; Narada Samhita; Parashara Samhita; Yajnavalkya; individual texts in Index of Sanskrit Passages authority: of interpretative reading, 182– 183; scripture trumps custom, xviii, 42, 45, 58, 200–202; sources of, xvii–xviii; types of scriptural, xvii–xviii, 45, 58, 67, 170–172, 200–201

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Bali (king), 132 Bandyopadhyay, Sekhar, xxiii, 43–44, 48n.11 Banerjee, Surendranath, 10 Basu, Monmayee, 42 Bentham, Jeremy, 12 Bentinck, William, xxv, 12, 16–17 Bodhoday (Dawn of Knowledge), 5 Boose, Emery, 36 Bose, Nemai Sadhan, 18 Brahmo Samaj. See Roy, Rammohan Brihat Parashara Samhita, authorship of, 138–143 caste or class, xviii–xix, xxiii, 79, 120, 139, 158; customs and, 202–204; destroyers of, 46, 205; duties of, 60–61, 88, 142, 156–162; food and, 65, 143, 145, 150–151; marriage between different, 64, 79–82, 98, 111, 144, 187; marriage within same, 63, 98, 185–186, 198n.47; polygamy and, 8; reform movements and, 42–43; remarriage restricted by, xviii, 2, 6–7, 25, 42–43, 184. See also Shudras; twiceborn cattle, 15, 64, 78, 81, 84, 86, 119–120, 133, 136, 141–142, 144, 159, 178, 185–186 Chatterjee, Bankimchandra, 32 child marriage, 6, 11, 20, 48n.25, 128–129, 177. See also Consent Bill; virgins

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238 Index of Names and Terms Christianity, 1, 6, 12, 18 clans, 188–194, 214n.130 Colebrooke, Henry Thomas, 42 commentaries, 35–38, 52n.118 Consent Bill, Age of, 11, 42 cosmology, xxii cows. See cattle customs: legal codes and, xviii, xxiii, 11, 15–17, 25–27, 32, 39, 43–45, 68, 200–206; new or changing, 45–46, 57, 131–133, 150, 202–204; widow marriage and, xviii, 2, 6–7, 26–27, 32, 43–45, 57, 67–68, 200–206 Das, Shyamcharan, 28 Datta, Akshaykumar, 22 Datta, Narendranath, 10 Deb, Radhakant, 19–20, 51n.89 debates: on authoritative treatises, 72–73, 154, 158; formal or scholarly, 6, 22, 28–29, 38, 51n.89, 57, 72; popular or public, xxi, 2, 6, 18–19, 22, 25, 29, 46. See also widow marriage: debates or controversy about deshachara. See customs Devannabhatta, 45, 54n.135 Dharma Sabha, 19–20 dharmashastra. See authoritative treatises; individual texts in Index of Sanskrit Passages Dhavan, Rajeev, xxiv Didhishupati, 136–138 Dirghatamas, 129–134 Doniger, Wendy, xxiii exceptions, 79, 82, 90, 207nn.10,12 food: life-breath and, 166; Shudras or outcasts and, 46, 65, 143–145, 150–152, 155, 161, 163, 165, 167, 169–170, 205; widows and, 13, 135–136. See also meat footnotes, xiv, 36, 38 Fruzzetti, Lina, xxiv Ghosh, Benoy, 18, 22 Gotama, 58–60, 88, 102, 180 Grant, J. P., 18

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Haldar, Rakhaldas, 22, 51n.76 Hastings, Warren, 16–17 Heimsath, Charles, 7, 47n.4 Hemachandra, 36 Hemadri, 95, 143 Hindu Widow Marriage (Vidhava-vivaha): audience of, 2–3, 50n.57, 142; bilingualism of, xiii–xiv, 29, 33, 38, 40, 52n.119, 158; contemporary sources in, 35; English title and translations of, xiv–xv, 2, 23–25, 27, 30, 47n.5, 51n.79, 52n.99, 53n.124, 54n.126, 69nn.3–4, 70nn.11,14, 115n.10, 207n.15, 208nn.17,19, 23–26,28, 209nn.34–35, 210nn.43,46,49, 56, 211nn.58,72, 212nn.82,87,92, 213nn.97,104,110, 214nn.118–119,124, 215nn.133,137; English versus Bengali in, 2–3, 23, 57; history of, xiii–xiv, xxv, 2–3, 6, 11, 21, 23, 35, 71, 121, 125, 144, 182, 202; importance of, xvii, xxi, 1–2, 30, 41–42, 46–47, 48n.16; irony and sarcasm in, xi, 41, 45–46, 201n.51, 204–206, 210n.54; Parashara’s role in, 34–35, 59–60; reformism and (see Vidyasagar, Ishvarchandra: as social reformer); Sanskrit quotations in, xiv, 23, 30–31, 33–34, 37, 52n.119 husbands: abandoned or neglected, 24, 103, 121, 131–134, 137–138, 176–179, 195, 199n.49; impotent, xx, xxii, 14, 74–75, 79–82, 103, 115, 118, 121, 124, 159, 178, 187, 199; insane, xx, xxii, 103, 179; leprous or sickly, 79–82, 122–123, 125, 176–179, 187; missing, 14, 25, 61, 74–76, 79–82, 85, 90, 92, 96, 115, 118–119, 121, 126, 135, 153, 183–184, 194; outcast, 14, 24, 61, 69n.8, 74–75, 79–82, 103, 115, 118, 176–179, 187; renunciant, 14, 61, 74–75, 79–81, 115; stupid, 122–123, 178 impurity, 65, 83, 141–145, 149–150, 155, 191, 203–204 India, in colonial era, xx–xxi, 1–2, 4–5, 7, 9–16, 22, 29–33, 37, 40–43, 46–47 inheritance: authoritative treatises on, xxi, 39, 69n.8, 98–99, 104–105, 107, 110,

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239 Index of Names and Terms 178, 214n.122; colonial laws or debates on, xxi, 17; widows and, 17 injunctions (vidhi), xxi, 39, 77, 79, 82, 126, 134, 181, 201 itihasa (epic), xviii jati (caste, birth group). See caste or class Jayapida (king), 147 Jha, Ganganath, xxiii Jones, William, 42 Kali Yuga, xxii–xxiii; duties or prohibitions for, xxii–xxiii, 59–61, 64–66, 70n.16, 78, 81, 86–92, 100, 113–114, 143–176, 180–183; giving as a duty during, xxii, 163–164, 166, 174–176; human capabilities during, xxii, 92, 113, 164–166; kinds of sons and, 62–64, 66, 106–108, 125, 149, 153, 203n.53; lifespan and livelihood in, xxii, 156–162, 166; Parashara and (see Parashara Samhita: treatise for Kali Yuga); widow marriage during (see widow marriage arguments: appropriate to this eon) Kamalakar Bhatta, 95, 208n.22 kanya-dana (gift of a virgin, marriage). See marriage: as gift of a virgin; virgins Katyayana Smriti, 58, 88, 189–191, 193–194, 214n.128. See also Index of Sanskrit Passages Kaviratna, Nandakumar, 28–29, 115n.10, 152n.31, 170n.38, 174n.39, 209nn.41–42 Krishnachandra, Raja, 15, 28 Kshetraja sons, 53n.119, 62n.3, 72n.12, 98, 104, 111–113, 121, 124–125, 132–133, 210n.48 Kubera, 140, 143, 203n.53 laws, British, Hindu norms and, xxi, 1, 17. See also Consent Bill; Remarriage Act; suttee leprosy, 176–179 levirate, xxi–xxiii, 65, 99, 110–113, 132, 137–138, 144, 201n.51, 208n.25, 209nn.33–34,36–37 Likhita, 58–60, 88, 102, 164, 180

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Madhavacharya, xiii, 34–35, 52n.101, 90–94, 125, 140, 184, 211nn.65,77, 212nn.90–91. See also Index of Sanskrit Passages Madhusudan Dutt, Michael, 1, 8, 47n.2 Maitra, Kalidas, 27, 103n.8, 126n.14 Mani, Lata, 42–44 Manu, xiii, 34, 87, 95–115, 164, 199, 202n.52; on food, 150; importance or authority of, xviii, 58, 96–102, 138, 182–183; on marriage, xx, 44, 96–97, 99–100, 102–103, 106, 108–112, 115, 136–138, 179, 184, 194–198, 201n.51, 209n.37; Parashara and, xxiii, 24, 34, 40, 87, 95–96, 101–102, 115, 180–181; on penances, 154, 170; on sons or inheritance, 62–63, 98–99, 104–105, 111–112, 136–137, 203n.53; Vidyasagar and, 34, 37, 40, 44; on widows, 13, 95–96, 99–100, 106, 108–112, 115, 184, 194–197, 201n.51, 208n.26, 209nn.33,37 (see also levirate); yugas and, 59–60, 87–96, 100, 102, 105–106, 113–114, 164, 173–176, 180–181. See also Index of Sanskrit Passages marriage: as gift of a virgin, xx, 80, 97, 185–189; Hindu view of, xx–xxi; intercaste (see caste or class: marriage between different; marriage within same; remarriage restricted by); as samskara, xx, 194–195. See also child marriage; husbands; Manu: on marriage; rites and rituals: marriage; widow marriage; wives Matrigupta (king), 147 meat, 15, 64, 144 menstruation, 119–120, 128–129 Mihirakula (king), 146–147 mimamsa (investigation), 39, 53n.117 Mitra, Indra, 20 Mitra, Peary Chand, 21–22, 25–27 Mukhopadhyaya, Prasannakumar, 22, 51n.75, 121 Mutiny of 1857, 1, 8–9 Nanda Pandit, 62n.3, 70n.12, 125, 149, 153, 210n.48

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240 Index of Names and Terms Narada Samhita, xviii, 34, 58n.1, 75–76, 80, 114–115, 126, 129, 178, 185, 194, 209n.38, 210n.50. See also Index of Sanskrit Passages nationalism, Indian, 9, 26–27 Natural sons, 65–66, 107, 148 nibandha (digests), xviii, 34–35 nirnaya (determination), 39, 53n.118, 94–95 niyoga. See levirate Niyogi, Krishnakishor, 117n, 210nn.44–45 Nyayapanchanan, Gopal, 15, 49n.42 Nyayaratna, Dinabandhu, 29, 51n.91, 53n.114, 69n.2, 74n.1, 80n.3, 207n.4 Nyayaratna, Padmalochan, 201n.51 ocean travel, 144–148 Orientalism, tropes of: “effeminate East,” 11; hidebound pandits, 31; oppressed females, 11–12; textualized Hinduism, 42–43 pandits: in colonial era, 4, 33, 39–40; patrons of, 6, 16, 20, 29, 48n.11; representations of, 31; on widow marriage, 5–7, 9, 14–16, 19–20, 22, 27–31, 37, 45, 117, 143n.21, 206n1. See also Vidyasagar, Ishvarchandra: as pandit Parapurvapati, 136–138 Parashara Samhita, xviii, xxiii, 26, 138–139; importance of, for Vidyasagar, 33–34, 50n.67; as treatise for Kali Yuga, xxiii, 24, 35, 67, 70n.15, 86–93, 100, 102, 143–144, 149, 152–158, 162–167, 170–173, 181–183, 207n.11, 214n.115. See also Index of Sanskrit Passages paunarbhava (son of a remarried woman). See sons periodicals, 6, 18, 20, 25; Eastern Star, 26–27; Hindoo Patriot, 7, 21; Hindu Intelligencer, 26; Masik Patrika, 25; Sambad Bhaskar, 20, 25; Tattvabodhini Patrika, 5, 21, 25 polygamy, 5, 8–9, 116 pramana (valid means of knowing), 33 Pravarasena (king), 145–146 print media, 29, 35–37, 40 prohibitions (nishedha), xxi, 39, 77, 79, 82, 126, 144, 201

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prostitution, 11, 42, 54n.126, 68, 109, 202, 205–206 public sphere, in colonial era, 29, 33, 47 purana (myth), xviii, 67; other scriptures and, 67, 93–94, 116. See also individual Puranas in Index of Sanskrit Passages purity. See impurity purvapaksha (objection), 37, 39 Raghunandan Bhattacharya, Smarta, xviii, 64, 95, 140, 143, 151, 198, 208n.22 Rajvallabh, Raja, 14–16, 19, 203 Ramakrishna, Sri, 10 Ramayana, xviii Ray, Dasharathi, 21 Rebellion of 1857. See Mutiny of 1858 reform(er)s: biographies or histories of, 13–14; British and, 1, 7, 9, 11–13, 16– 17, 19; custom and, xviii , 27, 43–45; education and, 4; Hindu movements for, 6, 42–43 (see also Roy, Rammohan); legislation and, 2, 7, 11, 17, 50n.52; opponents of, 26–29; revival or traditionalism, 9, 11–12, 43, 48n.20; scripture and, xxiii, 17, 26–27, 30, 32, 43, 54n.137. See also caste or class: reform movements and; Sanskrit: reformism or change and; Vidyasagar, Ishvarchandra: as social reformer; women: reform and Remarriage Act (XV) of 1856, Hindu Widow’s, xxi, 1–2, 7, 42 rites and rituals: ancestral, 135–138; as atonement, 172; of life cycle, 140, 203; Madhuparka, 64–65, 144; marriage as, xx, 80, 100, 103, 106, 109, 129, 190, 193n.46, 194–196; postmortem, 104–105, 107, 110, 119, 144, 189–193; twilight, 83–84, 159 Roy, Rammohan, 11–12, 14, 15, 17–18, 21, 42 sacred utterances, 25, 100, 110, 112–113, 181, 190, 193n.46, 194–196, 201n.51 sacrifice, 64, 84–85, 143–150, 152, 159, 161 samhita, 33. See also individual texts in Index of Sanskrit Passages samshaya (doubt), 39–40

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241 Index of Names and Terms samskara (life cycle rite), xx, 194 Sanskrit: in colonial India, 30–31, 47, 51n.93; grammar of, 36–37, 126–128, 136, 210n.46, 210nn.51–53,55, 213n.106; intellectual models in, 35; reformism or change and, 2, 31, 46, 53n.137; vernacular languages and, 36, 38, 40 Sarkar, Sumit and Tanika, xxiv Sen, Asok, 31 Shakuntala, 5 Shankha, 60, 117–118, 210n.45 Shrishchandra, Raja, 15–16 shruti (revelation), xvii. See also Vedas Shudraka, 145–146 Shudras, xix, 83, 120, 156–157, 159, 161, 202–203; food and, 65, 143–145, 150– 152, 155, 161, 163, 165, 167, 169–170, 205; marriage and, 75, 129 Shulapani, 140, 143, 211n.60, 215n.132 Shvetaketu, 133–134 siddhanta (conclusion), 37 Sitar Vanavas, 5 smriti (tradition), xviii, 87; other scriptures and, 67, 93–94, 100–102, 116. See also individual texts in Index of Sanskrit Passages society, Hindu, xviii–xix. See also caste or class; widow marriage arguments: prevents social problems sons: acquisition of, xxi–xxii; importance of, xx, 109; in Kali Yuga (see Kali Yuga: kinds of sons and); Manu on (see Manu: on sons and inheritance); of remarried woman or widow, 62–66, 70n.11, 103– 110, 124–125, 195, 209n.31; types of, 62–63, 98, 148–149. See also Adopted sons; Kshetraja sons; Natural sons suttee, 10, 11, 49n.27, 50n.52, 61, 75, 90–91; Anti-Suttee Regulation (XVII), 12–13, 17, 50n.52, 61; public controversy over, 10–11 Suvastu (king), 147 Tagore, Rabindranath, 10, 48n.21 Tarkavachaspati, Taranath, 45 Tattvabodhini Sabha, 5, 19, 21 Theobold, William, 19 treatises, authoritative. See authoritative treatises

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Tubb, Gary, 36 twiceborn, xix, 64–65, 110, 119, 129, 144, 151, 156, 157, 161, 203, 207n.13 Udvahatattva. See Index of Sanskrit Passages uttara (answer), 39 Vachaspatimishra, 139, 143 varna. See caste or class varnashrama-dharma (duties of class and stage of life), xix–xx, 158 vedana (acceptance), 111–113, 209nn.33–34 Vedas, 24, 34, 83–84, 109, 117, 207n.16; other sources of authority and, xvii, 24, 39, 45, 67, 94, 96, 101–102, 115–116, 148, 170–173, 183, 200–201; study of, 119, 145, 148–149, 197–198; widow marriage and, 24, 115–117, 201n.51 Vidyaratna, Bhavashankar, 28–29, 117–118, 210n.44 Vidyaratna, Haradhan, 69n.2, 170n.38, 207n.3, 209nn.32,41–42, 211n.75 Vidyasagar, Ishvarchandra: academic career of, 4–5, 48n.6; biography of, 3–10, 13–14, 48n.6; contemporaries’ views of, 1, 5–8, 10, 21–22, 25–28; modern views or modernity of, 1–2, 10, 31–32, 35–36, 40, 42; oeuvre of, 3, 5, 8; as pandit, xi, 4–5, 9, 27, 31–33, 35–36, 41, 45; Rammohan Roy and, 13–14, 21; as social reformer, ix, xi, 1–2, 5, 7–10, 13, 20–21, 40–41, 46, 47n.4; Tattvabodhini Sabha and, 5–6, 21, 48n.9; use of scriptures by, xvii, 21, 31–34, 42, 51nn.95–97; Western influences on, 1, 5, 27 Vidyavagisha, Ramachandra, 19 Vijnaneshvara, 139, 142 virgins: age of marriage of, 97, 128–129, 208n.23; betrothed, 24–25, 39–40, 73, 76–78, 80n.3, 81, 99–100, 106–107, 111–112, 183–189, 208n.25; giving or marriage of, xx, 64–65, 77–81, 97, 99–100, 111, 144, 165, 183–198; remarried or punarbhu, 77, 103, 106–107, 209n.31; widowed, 25, 68, 99, 103, 108, 128, 132–133, 135, 185, 187–188, 195, 206

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242 Index of Names and Terms vishaya (subject matter), 39–40 Vivekananda, Swami. See Datta, Narendranath vows, 20, 91, 176, 192, 214nn.129–130 Vyasa, 58, 60, 67, 83–84, 86–89, 94, 102, 115–116, 120, 139–140, 142 widow marriage: colonial laws on (see Remarriage Act); debates or controversy about, 6, 18–19, 22, 25, 28–29, 38, 51n.89, 57, 72, 154, 158; disapproval of (see customs: widow marriage and); inheritance and, xxi, 17; pre-Vidyasagar movements for, 14–16, 18–19 widow marriage arguments: appropriate to this eon, 39, 59, 61–68, 70n.15, 76–82, 85–86, 90–93, 96, 99–100, 102, 106–108, 117, 121, 125, 134–135, 143–145, 148, 153–154, 200–201, 207n.12, 210n.57; Hindu custom (see customs); moral or humanitarian, 18, 27, 41–42, 68, 122; prevents social problems, 41–42, 204; reason

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or rationality, 11–12, 20–21, 58; scriptural, 26–28, 31–32, 58–59, 64, 67, 91, 115–117, 134. See also Parashara Samhita widows: austere life of, 6, 13, 20, 26, 48n.34, 68; celibacy of, 61, 75, 90–92, 109, 135–136; child, 6, 9, 11, 13, 20, 42, 68, 136; grief or suffering of, 20, 108, 122, 202, 206, 210n.46; rebirth of, 123–124; rituals of, 196 wives: abandoned, xx, 24, 103, 123, 134, 176–177, 179, 195, 199n.49, 221; barren, xx, 197, 199; outcast, 24, 123, 130–132, 176–177, 213n.106 women: reform and, xxi, 1–2, 7, 10–13, 20, 42–44, 47, 48nn.24–25; Vidyasagar on state of, 1, 13, 44, 199, 206 Yajnavalkya, xviii, 34. See also Index of Sanskrit Passages yugas (eons), xxii–xxiii. See also Kali Yuga; Manu: yugas and; widow marriage arguments: appropriate to this eon

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