Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity 9789461660886, 9789058675378

Table of contents :
Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity
Preface
Contents
Introduction
I—Henry and the Tradition of Trinitarian Theology
II—Henry on Theology and Philosophy
III—The Trinity and Henry’s Thought
Chapter 1: The Trinity in Itself
1A—Henry’s Basic Approach to the Trinity
1B—The Trinity as Activity
1C—The Emanation According to Intellect: The Father and The Son
1D—The Mode of Spiration
1E—The Will as a Natural Principle
1F—The Order of Nature
1G—Henry’s Latin View of Active Spiration
1H—The Spirating Force
1I—The Person of the Holy Spirit
1J—The Trinity as Emanated by Intellect and Will
Chapter 2: The Trinity and Creation
2A—The Trinity’s Notional Necessity
2B—Emanation and Creation: Henry vs. some Philosophers and Theologians
2C—The Role of Intellect in Free Creation
Chapter 3: The Trinity and Metaphysical Categories
3A—Persona as Suppositum
3B—Intentionality, Analogy and Supposition of Persona
3C—The Meaning of Property
3D—Relation in God and Creatures
3E—Relations and Reality
3F—Res as Relational
3G—Reality in Henry’s System
Conclusion
I—Recapitulation
II—The Creature as Symbol of the Trinity
III—Existence and Essence
IV—Henry’s Approach and Synthesis
Appendix
Manuscripts
Critical Study
Selected Bibliography
I—Bibliographies
II—Editions and Translations of Henry’s Works
III—Primary Texts
IV—Secondary Texts
Indices
Index Auctorum
Index Locorum Henrici

Citation preview

HENRY OF GHENT: METAPHYSICS AND THE TRINITY (with a critical edition of question six of article fifty-five of the Summa Quaestionum Ordinariarum)

BY Juan Carlos FLORES

a mis padres a mis hijos

Nada se produce a si mismo

PREFACE The second half of the thirteenth century is one of the most accomplished periods in the history of philosophy and theology. In this period, Henry of Ghent stands out, along with Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure, as a leading thinker. A secular master of theology at Paris, he produced an original synthesis that served as the chief alternative to Thomism both during his life and in the years following his death. Opponents, followers and adapters alike treated his positions as starting points. John Duns Scotus is one of several who developed doctrines in response to Henry. Henry’s rich and multifaceted thought, as evidenced by his influence on different traditions, helps explain why some influential scholars have seen him as an eclectic who in important respects sacrificed the unity requisite for a coherent system. The work that follows assesses Henry’s view of reality on its own terms, from the standpoint of what it deems first: the Trinity. In this light, Henry’s system certainly appears coherent, with all its complex and sophisticated depth. Henry’s Trinitarian writings are vast, occupying a large portion of his literary corpus, and governing a good deal of the rest. Because of Henry’s commitment to clarify the Trinity as the basis for an Augustinian project that addressed Aristotelianism adequately, these writings are also quite complex. These facts, perhaps combined with a modern prejudice that Trinitarian issues are specifically theological, having no significant connection to philosophy, may account for the surprising neglect by modern scholars of this central subject in this major thinker. On the other hand, these same facts rather warrant a serious investigation of this subject on its own terms. The very lack of research into this enormous, complex and important area demands a focused study that discusses its basic features in detail, a study that enhances our knowledge of the genuine outlook of this great thinker. The following work seeks to do this. The initial stage of this research was first presented publicly as the defense of a doctoral dissertation (Henry of Ghent on Substance and Relation as Modes of Uncreated Being), at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, in May of 1999. That dissertation sought chiefly to gather and explicate the central texts of Henry’s Trinitarian writings. In order to more fully bring out the significance of Henry’s Trinitarian thought, however, much further research as well as thorough revision and reorganization were necessary. The organization of the present book more clearly conveys the systematic character of Henry’s doctrine. The formulations in this

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book elaborate the sources and content of Henry’s ideas more completely and at the same time more directly. This work more adequately elucidates Henry’s thought in reference to other thinkers. Finally, the following study more definitively assesses the significance of the Trinity in Henry’s thought as a whole. It is only because of the advice, example, encouragement and assistance of a small group of very special people that I was able to complete this work. It was above all my family, especially my wife Celeste and my sons Nicolás and Alex Andrés, who constantly renewed and inspired the motivating energy behind this book, in the midst of challenging and changing times. They felt and made possible every hour that went into this work. In truth, this book is for them and because of them. Even though I could never sufficiently acknowledge my parents, Ulises and Leonor, I still would like to recognize their deep imprint on my work. Special thanks are due to the Boston College Institute of Medieval Philosophy and Theology for the fellowship that supported this research through a significant period. I am profoundly grateful to Stephen Brown, not only for his guidance and support throughout the years, but also for his example as a scholar and friend. This work owes much to the valuable advice of my former dissertation director, Jos Decorte (†), who introduced me to Henry of Ghent’s thought. I also appreciate Carlos Steel’s support during the final editing of the text, as well as Russ Friedman’s careful proof-reading of the Introduction, Conclusion and Bibliography. Concerning the Appendix, I would like to thank Guy Guldentops for his useful comments. Moreover, Fernand Bossier deserves recognition; he generously spent free time introducing me to the editing of Latin texts, when he also helped me with the first stages of the Appendix. I am also grateful to Diane Smith-Wilks and Laura Landen for helping me format this work in the computer. Finally, I will always be thankful to my old friend Edward Hanker for introducing me to medieval thought, and for continuously helping me learn to approach this field in meaningful ways.

Juan Carlos Flores Department of Philosophy Providence College

CONTENTS v. Preface 1. Introduction 6. I—Henry and the Tradition of Trinitarian Theology 13. II—Henry on Theology and Philosophy 36. III—The Trinity and Henry’s Thought 55. Chapter 1: The Trinity in Itself 56. 1A—Henry’s Basic Approach to the Trinity 61. 1B—The Trinity as Activity 65. 1C—The Emanation According to Intellect: The Father and the Son 76. 1D—The Mode of Spiration 81. 1E—The Will as a Natural Principle 89. 1F—The Order of Nature 95. 1G—Henry’s Latin View of Active Spiration 103. 1H—The Spirating Force 106. 1I—The Person of the Holy Spirit 111. 1J—The Trinity as Emanated by Intellect and Will 119. Chapter 2: The Trinity and Creation 120. 2A—The Trinity’s Notional Necessity 124. 2B—Emanation and Creation: Henry vs. some philosophers and theologians 138. 2C—The Role of Intellect in Free Creation 149. Chapter 3: The Trinity and Metaphysical Categories 150. 3A—Persona as Suppositum 154. 3B—Intentionality, Analogy, and Supposition of Persona 161. 3C—The Meaning of Property 164. 3D—Relation in God and Creatures 173. 3E—Relations and Reality 181. 3F—Res as Relational 184. 3G—Reality in Henry’s System

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187. Conclusion 187. I—Recapitulation 189. II—The Creature as Symbol of the Trinity 192. III—Existence and Essence 198. IV—Henry’s Approach and Synthesis 203. Appendix: Critical Edition of Summa, art. LV, q. VI 219. Selected Bibliography 237. Indices

INTRODUCTION The philosophical and theological vision of Henry of Ghent 1, regent master in theology at the University of Paris from 1276 until his death in 12932, was a dominant one in Europe during his career and beyond. This vision, a comprehensive and original synthesis, was also seminal. Quickly, it impacted a tradition then recently informed by two other masters from the same Paris faculty, Bonaventure (d. 1274) and Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274). Significantly, it fed different and important currents, such as Scotism, Mysticism and Nominalism.3 “Those who taught with Henry during his long stint at the University of Paris and in the generation after his death at Paris and Oxford considered his teaching as something to be reckoned with comprehensively and systematically. . . . His work was the starting point of philosophical and theological debate for nearly half a century, and

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A comprehensive bibliography of works on Henry is that of P. Porro, “Bibliography,” in: W. Vanhamel (ed.), Henry of Ghent. Proceedings of the Interth national Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700 Anniversary of his Death (1293), Leuven, 1996, pp. 405-434. A supplement to this bibliography, “Bibliography on Henry of Ghent (1994-2002),” appears in: G. Guldentops - C. Steel (eds.), Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought, Leuven, 2003, pp. 409-426. 2 Henry, known in the Scholastic tradition as the Solemn Doctor (Doctor Solemnis), also held the title of Archdeacon of Tournai. His date of birth is uncertain. On his life, see: P. Porro, “A Historiographical Image of Henry of Ghent,” in: W. Vanhamel (ed.), Henry of Ghent. Proceedings, pp. 373-403; R. Macken, Henri de Gand (†1293) maître en théologie à l’Université de Paris, archidiacre de l’évêché de Tournai. Dates et documents, Leuven, 2002. 3 Henry’s influence will be discussed below when appropriate. For now, these examples suffice. For Henry’s influence on mystical theologians, see K. Emery, Jr., “The Image of God Deep in the Mind: The Continuity of Cognition according to Henry of Ghent,” in: J. Aertsen - K. Emery, Jr. - A. Speer (eds.), Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte, Berlin – New York, 2001, sections IV, VI, and XIII. That Henry is essential for Duns Scotus is well-known and well-documented. For an indication of Henry’s role in Nominalism and Conceptualism, see note 103 below.

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like his contemporaries, Scotus approached the problems of theology through the medium of Henry of Ghent’s ideas.” 4 Henry developed his thought with a deep concern shared by Christian theologians of the latter half of the thirteenth century: to address in a manner congenial to reason and revelation the non-Christian philosophy, particularly Aristotle and his commentators, which had just recently been received in its totality in the Latin West. The synthesis of Thomas Aquinas was far from universally accepted as the final answer to the question of the right relation between revealed and philosophic truth. The question still generated much controversy, as evidenced by Bishop Étienne Tempier’s famous Condemnation5 at Paris, March 7 of 1277, of 219 philosophical and theological propositions then being debated at the University. Most of these propositions were associated with the Faculty of Arts, especially its Averroist interpreters of Aristotle. However, the Condemnation also had repercussions in the Faculty of Theology itself. For Giles of Rome, a student

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K. Emery, Jr. - Andreas Speer, “After the Condemnation of 1277: New Evidence, New Perspectives, and Grounds for New Interpretations,” in: J. Aertsen - K. Emery, Jr. - A. Speer (eds.), Nach der Verurteilung von 1277, p. 15. 5 On the Condemnation, see K. Emery, Jr. - A. Speer, “After the Condemnation of 1277: New Evidence, New Perspectives, and Grounds for New Interpretations,” in: J. Aertsen - K. Emery, Jr. - A. Speer (eds.), Nach der Verurteilung von 1277, pp. 3-19; R. Hissette, Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277, Louvain - Paris, 1977; Id., “Étienne Tempier et les menaces contre l’éthique chrétienne,” in: Bulletin de philosophie médiévale, 21 (1979), pp. 68-72; Id., “Étienne Tempier et ses condamnations,” in: Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale, 47 (1980), pp. 231-270; R. Wielockx (ed.), Apologia, Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia, III, 1, Firenze, 1985, pp. 67-227; J. F. Wippel, “The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 at Paris,” in: The Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 7 (1977), pp. 169-201.

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of Thomas Aquinas6, the Condemnation meant an eight-year suspension from the University.7 Henry, one of the theologians who assisted Tempier in formulating his condemnation, developed his own careful synthesis of reason and revelation. His major work or Summa Quaestionum Ordinariarum is such a synthesis, one analogous in comprehensiveness to the Summa Theologiae of Thomas Aquinas. Many of the themes of the Summa are also developed in Henry’s 15 Quodlibets. Henry’s thought is inspired primarily by Augustine and Bonaventure, and is in many ways a response to Aristotelianism, particularly that of Thomas Aquinas. Henry reveals his orientation at the very beginning of his Summa, where he gives a brief history of philosophy in order to highlight the strength of his own approach. 8 This introduction to the Summa stresses the truth of Augustine’s Platonism, interpreted in the spirit of Bonaventure, and contains implicit criticisms of Thomas Aquinas. 9 Throughout his career, Henry developed his distinctive Augustinian vision and formulated it thoroughly. However, partly due to the great controversy generated by Aristotelianism during his time, Henry also (unlike most of his Platonic predecessors) studied Aristotle and his commentators intensely, and used them in innovative and important ways. In providing an alternative to Thomism that ad6

Thomas Aquinas himself seems to have been an ‘indirect’ object of the Condemnation, as R. Hissette argues in “Saint Thomas et l’intervention épiscopale du 7 mars 1277,” in: Studi, 2 (1995), pp. 204-258; Id., “Philosophie et théologie en conflit: saint Thomas a-t-il été condamné par les maîtres parisiens en 1277?,” in: Revue théologique de Louvain, 28 (1997), pp. 216-226; Id., “L’implication de Thomas d’Aquin dans les censures parisiennes de 1277,” in: Recherches de théologie médiévale, 54 (1997), pp. 3-31. 7 After the great Condemnation, between March 7th and March 28th of 1277, the commission of theologians assisting Tempier examined some of Giles’ theses in his first book on the Sentences. Despite his Apologia, Giles was suspended (and thereafter wrote his Contra Gradus), and was only allowed to return in 1285 to receive, after a public retraction of some of his previous theses, his licentiate in theology. See the comments by R. Wielockx in his edition of Giles’ Apologia, pp. 67-179. 8 See Summa, art. 1, q. 1 (ed. G. Wilson, Opera Omnia, XXI, Leuven, 2005). Henry continues developing this discussion in this article, mainly in questions 2-4. 9 See C. Steel, “Henricus Gandavensis Platonicus,” in: G. Guldentops - C. Steel (eds.), Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought, Leuven, 2003, pp. 25-27.

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dressed and criticized Aristotelianism thoroughly 10, Henry’s synthesis became a watershed in the development of both Platonism and Aristotelianism. A central concern in Henry’s writings is the Trinity, the first principle of his system. However, this fundamental, vast11 and complex area of Henry’s corpus has remained relatively unexplored.12 Accordingly, the primary aim of this book is to provide a detailed 10

For example, “most historians of medieval philosophy would agree that Henry of Ghent (d. 1293), in response to Aristotelian noetic theory and criteria for scientific knowledge, achieved the most technically sophisticated expression of an ancient doctrine that had long been traditional among Latin philosophers and theologians: the role of divine illumination in both natural and supernatural cognition” (K. Emery, Jr., “The Image of God Deep in the Mind: The Continuity of Cognition according to Henry of Ghent,” in: J. Aertsen - K. Emery - A. Speer (eds), Nach der Verurteilung von 1277, p. 59). 11 The texts which contain the central discussion on the Trinity in the Summa, namely articles 53 to 61, are the longest, and amount to slightly more than one-fifth, of this rather extensive work. The Summa has 75 articles and is planned to occupy 16 volumes of the critical edition being published by Leuven University Press. Moreover, Henry deals with this topic in many other places in the Summa and Quodlibeta. 12 Specifically on Henry’s Trinitarian thought, see J. C. Flores, “Intellect and Will as Natural Principles: Connecting Theology, Metaphysics and Psychology in Henry of Ghent,” in: G. Guldentops - C. Steel (eds.), Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought, pp. 277-305 (material in sections A, C, E, G, and J of chapter 1 of this study is presented in a more abbreviated form in this article); R. L. Friedman, “Relations, Emanations, and Henry of Ghent’s Use of the «Verbum» Mentis in Trinitarian Theology: the Background in Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure,” in: Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale, 7 (1996), pp. 131-182. Other studies which touch upon Henry’s Trinitarian thought or help us assess Henry’s Trinitarian tradition are: J. Decorte, “Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent on the Reality of a Real Relation,” in: Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale, 7 (1996), pp. 183-211; R. Cross, Duns Scotus on God, Aldershot Burlington, 2005, part II; B. Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jacob von Metz, Münster, 1967, esp. pp. 355-381; M. Schmaus, Der Liber Propugnatorius des Thomas Anglicus und die Lehrunterschiede zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus, teil 2: Die trinitarischen Lehrdifferenzen, Münster, 1930 (see esp. pp. 137-138, 479-480, 592-593, for Henry’s doctrine, and pp. 385-569 for the discussion of this topic in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries); and the other studies in the Bibliography by R. L. Friedman, R. Cross, M. Schmaus, R. Schinzer, F. Wetter, A. Stohr, J. Slipyi, and T. de Regnon.

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analysis of Henry’s conception of the Trinity.13 This analysis is divided into three chapters: 1) the Trinity in itself, 2) the Trinity and creation, and 3) the Trinity and metaphysical categories. These chapters are meant to correspond to the central tasks assigned by Henry himself to theology in his Summa. Theology considers: 1) God himself, especially his triune nature, 2) God as a principle of creatures and 3) creatures inasmuch as they reflect God.14 Without pretending to provide a full account of Henry’s theology—this would be basically an account of his entire thought—this book will address these three areas by developing central issues belonging to each of them. The first chapter shall focus on Henry’s account of God’s triune nature. The second chapter shall concentrate, not on actual creation or on divine intervention in creation, but on how for Henry God’s function as creator depends on his triune nature.15 Finally, the third chapter develops Henry’s conception of categories common to the Trinity and creatures. The Appendix, a critical edition of the question “Whether all properties in God are real relations” (Summa, art. 55, q. 6), shall be referred to when appropriate. As will be shown, Henry’s account of the Trinity is fundamental for his system of thought as a whole, for this is his account of God’s proper nature and of God as the ground of reality. Even though this study presupposes, to some extent, topics such as Henry’s proofs 13

When available, this study uses the critical edition of Henry’s works: Henrici de Gandavo Opera Omnia, Leuven. Otherwise, for the Summa, the text used is the reprint (New York, 1953) of the Badius edition, 2 vols. (Paris, 1520), and for a Quodlibet (Quodl.), the edition of Badius, 2 vols. (Paris, 1518). The citation of an article (art.) refers to the Summa, since only this work is divided according to articles, each of which is divided by questions. The Quodlibeta are divided by questions only. 14 Summa, art. 7, q. 6 (ed. Badius, fol. 56 rR): “Ista scientia [i.e. theologia] primo considerat de Deo rationes quae conveniunt ipsi absque omni respectu ad creaturas, ut sunt maxime ea quae pertinent ad trinitatem personarum. Secundo vero considerat in eo rationes secundum quas procedunt creaturae in esse ab ipso. Tertio vero et ultimo considerat de ipsis creaturis inquantum scilicet manet in ipsis impressum divini esse vestigium.” 15 Here we follow Henry’s approach according to which in theology “Deum autem esse cognoscitur secundum id quod est in se, et secundum rationem qua est causativum omnium, etiam antequam creaturam produxerit” (ibid., [ed. Badius, fol. 56 vT]). References to Henry’s doctrine of creation, and the essence/existence issue which accompanies it, are given below.

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for the existence of God16, and his discussion of divine attributes, these topics will be alluded to only when necessary. But first some remarks by way of introduction are in order. I—Henry and the Tradition of Trinitarian Theology Surely the manifest motion, contingency and finitude of experienced reality have led various philosophers to posit a first, uncaused cause often referred to as God. Many have conceived of this cause not only as active, since it causes all, but as essentially active. Being wholly uncaused and the ultimate cause of all, it alone lacks any potency and is act by essence. Its activity cannot be for the sake of a further external end, but must be somehow pure activity itself. This active being is also seen as one and transcendent in being the only uncaused cause, and simple in lacking the composition implied by potency. Moreover, it exists by necessity eternally, having no potency to not be or to change. Most medieval thinkers, whether Christian, Jewish or Islamic, agree that uncausability, eternity, necessity, oneness, simplicity and transcendence are attributes belonging to the divine nature. Nevertheless, aside from the obvious theological differences among distinct revealed religions, there are in the medieval tradition fundamentally different conceptions of the divine nature even within a single religion. Medieval Christian thinkers generally agree with Aristotle’s view that God is essentially mind, thought thinking itself, and they stress that God’s thinking also includes willing or love.17 However, 16

For this topic, see, e.g., Summa, art. 21-22, as well as the excellent discussion by J. Gómez Caffarena, Ser Participado y Ser Subsistente en la Metafísica de Enrique de Gante, Roma, 1958, pp. 215-245. See also Paulus, Henri de Gand, pp. 310-315; R. Wielockx, “Henry of Ghent,” in: J. Gracia T. Noone (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, Oxford, 2003, pp. 299-300; A. Pegis (his articles cited in the Bibliography of the present book). 17 Aristotle’s classic definition of God as thought thinking itself (in Metaph., XII, 7, 1072b10-31) already makes the point that God’s contemplation also entails (the highest and best) enjoyment and, to this extent one could say, some type of desire or will. It is only later, however, in the Judaeo-Christian context, that the divine nature is conceived as love and free will. In fact, for Henry, all theologians and philosophers have understood separate intelligences, especially God, as including will. What differs, of course, making all the difference in their conceptions of God (and even creation), is precisely how

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they disagree with Aristotle because for them the First Cause is not the final cause of an eternal world, but rather the efficient and final cause of a temporally originated world. In turn, they agree with the opinion of Plotinus, the great source of Neoplatonism: God is the One from which all emanates. However, they disagree with Plotinus because for them 1) the One does not emanate its effects necessarily in any fundamental sense, 2) the One is not beyond being but rather is the highest and transcendent being, and 3) the One is not absolutely one, because the first emanations of the One, namely the Son and the Holy Spirit, are not transitive but immanent to the One. These disagreements with Aristotle and Plotinus are not surprising considering that, for the Christian, God is the free omnipotent Trinity.18 Despite these disagreements with Plotinus, most Christian thinkers, some to a larger extent than others, have derived inspiration from the Neoplatonic tradition when speculating about the Trinity. In regard to its stress on the loving dynamism of the divine act, Henry’s account generally places him in the Neoplatonic tradition of Dionysius, Saint Bonaventure and Richard of St. Victor. These thinkers, drawing from, yet going further than, Plato’s Timaeus which describes the Good as diffusive of itself unto the created world, understand the Good as an essentially self-diffusive Love.19 Since love or charity is the most perfect goodness, and love is by nature diffusive of itself, then God, who is the most perfect Love, must be essentially selfthey understand divine intellect and will. See his remarks in Quodl. VI, q. 1-2, as well as chapter 2 of this study. 18 On the history of the Trinitarian dogma and the heresies (especially Arianism and Sabellianism), see J. Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine, vol. 1, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600), Chicago, 1971, pp. 172-225; H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, vol. 1, Faith, Trinity and Incarnation, Cambridge, Mass., 1956, pp. 141-359. 19 With regard to the emanation of the will, Henry, like Richard of St. Victor and others, appropriates the biblical understanding of God as love (or charity) to argue that the most perfect charity or dilectio is one which requires a consubstantial plurality (i.e. an equal condilectio). A helpful treatment of the notion of the Good’s self-communication in the tradition of Trinitarian theology, especially in Bonaventure, is the introduction by Zachary Hayes to Saint Bonaventure’s Disputed Questions on the Mystery of the Trinity, New York, 1979. For Bonaventure’s view of the Trinity as the Good, see chapter VI of his Itinerarium Mentis in Deum.

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diffusive. His first act of diffusion cannot be transitive or creative, which would be an imperfect diffusion, created goodness being less perfect than Love or God Himself. Nor should it be conceived as a transitive re-production of God, since anything produced can no longer be God, whose essence is unique. Rather, God’s first selfdiffusion, as most perfect, must be constitutive of and identical with Himself: a most perfect self-communication in one singularity of essence, whereby that which receives what is given and that which gives it share the same singular nature. This, and not that God is a static act, is what it means to say that God is an activity that finds its end in itself. Thus, perhaps a conception of God which stresses his love expresses his nature more adequately than a conception of God which stresses his thought. For thought understood as perfect contemplation bespeaks rest (even if an enjoyment or will is included in this contemplation), while love (which includes thought) understood as an eternal and perfectly mutual giving and receiving bespeaks dynamic activity. And God, according to the Christian Faith, is the Trinity—selfdiffusive or self-emanating activity.20 However, since God is mind, rationally distinguished into intellect and will, there are two emanations within the Godhead and three con-substantial persons. Thus the Son is the Word generated by divine intellect or Father, and the Holy Spirit is the love between the Father and Son. Through these emanations, God communicates himself to himself, by knowing and loving himself. But how can these tenets be understood in a way that elucidates God’s triune nature? Aristotle, through his categories of substance and relation, is also present in medieval speculation on the Trinity. Relation, which is not an absolute thing but a circumstance of an absolute thing, can explain how God is one substance in three distinct persons, the official Christian position. For example, the Father is the divine substance as related to and distinct from the Son, who is this same substance as related to and distinct from the Father. Thus, there is substantial unity and relative or personal plurality in God: the heresies of Sabellius (the divine persons are distinct only nominally), and of Arius (the Son and 20

Summa, art. 54, q. 3 (ed. Badius, fol. 79 vP): “[Divina natura] est summe activa, et ideo suiipsius summe diffusiva. Summa autem diffusio non est nisi per emanationem communicando alteri suam naturam in diversitate personae.”

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the Holy Spirit are creatures because they are not substantially one with the Father) can be avoided. Medieval Christian theologians, whether of a more Aristotelian or Neoplatonic inspiration, generally grant the two immanent emanations, as well as the relations, of the Trinity. However, even though they see the Trinity in itself as eternal and necessary, the question for them still is: what is the right conception of the ultimate reason for God being triune. Is it emanation or is it relation? For example, one may ask of the Father: Is he the Father because he generates or does he generate because he is the Father? These are two chief Latin accounts of the Trinity received by Henry of Ghent in the latter half of the thirteenth century: the relations account originated by Augustine and Boethius, and represented by Thomas Aquinas, and the emanation account originated by Richard of St. Victor, and represented by Bonaventure. For Aquinas, the Father generates because he is Father; relation accounts for the subsistence of the Father, which relative subsistence is presupposed by the Father’s proper activity of generating. For Bonaventure, the Father is Father because he generates: generation accounts for, and thus is rationally prior to, the Father’s relative subsistence as Father. 21 In turn, Giles of Rome’s account 22 modifies St. Thomas’. Finally Henry identifies the ultimate reason for the Trinity neither with emanation nor with relation (though he grants the reality of both), but rather with the divine nature—with divine intellect and will as natural fecundities. 23 In so do21

For an account of these two traditions as they bear upon Henry, see R. Friedman, “Relations, Emanations,” pp. 133-158; J. Decorte, “Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent,” pp. 184-189. 22 For Giles’ position, see C. Luna, “Essenza divina e relazioni trinitarie nella critica di Egidio Romano a Tommaso d’Aquino,” in: Medioevo, 14 (1988), pp. 3-69; J. Decorte, “Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent,” pp. 190-202. 23 The work of Henry’s near contemporaries, particularly Bonaventure’s, Aquinas’s, and Giles’ respective commentaries on the first book of Peter Lombard’s Sentences, provided the general background from which Henry began to develop his own account of personal distinctions in God, and so helps us contextualize Henry’s doctrine. Henry’s remarks on the subject at the earlier stages of his career can be found in Quodlibet III, held shortly before Easter of 1278, the year after the Condemnation of 219 heterodox propositions mentioned earlier. As noted, the temporary suspension of Giles’ career at Paris was due precisely to some of the theses in his commentary on the first book of the Sentences. For the dates of Henry’s works, see J. Gómez Caf-

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ing, Henry draws from Augustine most of all: Augustine’s psychological elucidations of the Trinity contained for Henry, whether explicitly or implicitly, the most important insights into how God is really triune, into both the actual emanations and relations of the Trinity.24 Since Henry places the sources of the emanations first, the emanations themselves second, and the relations third, he is closer to those stressing emanations than to those stressing relations. However, although both Henry and Bonaventure would say that different modes of origin bring about personal distinctions, Bonaventure never takes the position, like Henry does, that divine intellect and will are the ultimate cause both of a real, disparate relation and distinction between the emanations and, thereby, of the real distinction among the persons according to relative opposition. For Bonaventure according to our understanding, the emanations, although distinct in virtue of themselves (as two differentiae, e.g., rational and irrational), cannot themselves be distinguished through the simple divine nature (intellect and will). Aquinas, for his part, considers that the rational distinction between intellect and will cannot serve as the ground for the real distinction between the persons.25 Interestingly, many (including Aquinas, Bonaventure and Giles) argued in their own ways that the divine persons are three and only three through divine intellect and will: there is one person (the Father) that is the origin and is thus not produced at all, another produced by intellect and a third and last produced by farena’s “Cronología de la ‘Suma’ de Enrique de Gante por relación a sus ‘Quodlibetos’,” in: Gregorianum, 38 (1957), p. 133, and in Ser Participado, p. 270. 24 As will be seen, Henry’s Trinitarian thought relies on many sources. Augustine (whose De Trinitate is perhaps the most quoted work in Henry of Ghent’s writings), Richard of St. Victor, and Bonaventure, in being major influences upon Henry’s thought as a whole, are among the thinkers whom Henry emulates in giving his Trinitarian speculation a central place. For explanations of the primary importance of, and basic views on, the Trinity in Augustine, Richard of St. Victor, and Bonaventure, see the introductions in: Augustine, The Trinity, introduction, translation, and notes by Edmund Hill, O.P., New York, 1990; Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate. Text-critique avec introduction, notes et tables, by J. Ribaillier, Paris, 1959; Bonaventure, Disputed Questions on the Mystery of the Trinity, introduction and translation by Z. Hayes, New York, 1979. 25 Cf. R. Friedman, “Emanations, Relations,” pp. 154-157.

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will.26 Only Henry, however, uses these same tenets—the divine fecundities—not only to show how the emanations and, thereby, the persons are really distinct, but also to show how creation depends on the emanations of the Trinity. As chapter 2 explains, this fact significantly elucidates Henry’s general theological outlook. For Henry, the divine persons are relatively distinct by origin because of the nature of divine intellect and will: the Father generates first in the mode of intellect and is thus ungenerated, while the Son proceeds as the Word of the intellect and the Holy Spirit as Love out of the will. Put simply, God subsists as the Trinity by nature. Each person subsists or is founded in the divine substance according to a unique mode of origin. With respect to their subjective source, however, the persons can only be identical, as God is one. The reality of personal distinctions rather results from the objective relations which the persons have in reference to each other. The (real) distinction between generation and spiration is the proximate cause of these relations which constitute the persons as distinct supposites. But the nature of the rationally distinct principles (intellect and will), out of which the persons emanate, causes, in its self-communication, a real, disparate distinction between the stages (i.e. between generation and spiration) of this communication, and is thus the remote, ultimate cause of the distinguishing, personal relations. Henry thus agrees, in his own way, with the widely held view that the persons are identical to their simple substance or foundation, but distinct in reference to one another. This is the way in which he avoids the Arian and Sabellian heresies. For Henry, God’s intellect, through its autonomous reflexivity, produces a perfect concept of itself, thus constituting itself in full actuality as a self-relation of knowing whose terms are the Father and Son. The Father and Son are distinct inasmuch as they are irreducible, relatively opposed terms of a relation. The will, in turn, also reflects on itself, wills itself to will or love itself once it knows itself through the Father and Son, the relative terms through which the divine intellect perfectly knows itself. With perfect self-knowledge, the will can pour forth the love out of itself toward itself as known in the persons of the Father and Son. Thus love proceeds subjectively out of the will 26

Cf. R. Friedman, ibid.. C. Luna (in “Essenza divina”) shows how Giles’ argumentation is in this case (cf. pp. 37-38) and in others more technical than Aquinas’s, though in substance his position is often quite similar.

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and through the extremes of God’s relation of self-knowledge, namely from the Father into the Son, the relative term to which the Father is directed, and from the Son into the Father, the relative term to which the Son is directed. And there is a real, relative distinction between the Love or Holy Spirit, on the one hand, and the Father and the Son, on the other, inasmuch as they are irreducible, relatively opposed extremes of a relation of self-love. The passive relation on the part of the Holy Spirit toward its origin, namely toward Father and Son who spirate, constitutes the Spirit as a person. The relation of both the Father and Son toward the Holy Spirit, though real, does not constitute them as persons, for it is consequent to their personal constitution through their respective properties in the emanation of the intellect. For there is a disparate order of nature between intellect and will; the act and product of the intellect are different from, and naturally prior to, those of the will. The productive act of the intellect must be terminated at a stage logically prior to the point at which the act of the will is initiated. Though they are always interdependent modes of a simple mind or spirit, knowing is not loving; moreover, we can know something and not love it, while we cannot love something that we do not in any way know, as Augustine’s De Trinitate would have it. (Henry, as explained in the first chapter, argues that both emanations are necessary, though in different ways.) In this manner, Henry combines Bonaventure’s and Richard’s view, that personal distinctions result from different ways of emanating within the Godhead, with Augustine’s and Boethius’ view that relation distinguishes the persons. Basing his account on his tenets that relation is a mode of being identical to its foundation (see chapter 3), and that intellect and will are capable of autonomously originating perfect self-knowledge and perfect self-love respectively, Henry’s position, in a nutshell, is that the divine persons are distinct, relative modes assumed by the divine substance, precisely because this substance is a spiritual activity that communicates itself to itself, that relates itself to itself through reflection, immanently by both intellect and will. Ultimately, therefore, it is the rationally distinct fecundities by which the divine essence self-communicates which makes this essence or subjective foundation be the origin of its own personal modes which are distinct in relatively opposed, objective orders. The divine persons are subsistent and relatively distinct inasmuch as the divine essence really knows and loves itself. In this discussion of the Trinity in psychological terms—the most adequate terms, since God

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really is supremely perfect mind for Henry—Henry uses Augustine thoroughly, seeing himself in agreement with the Bishop of Hippo. Henry’s original synthesis became a focal point in subsequent thirteenth and fourteenth century developments in Trinitarian theology (including central philosophical issues), which increasingly became polarized into two chief opposing traditions, the one represented overwhelmingly by Dominicans, and the other overwhelmingly by Franciscans. Though Henry was a secular master, his theology, itself deeply influenced by the Franciscan Bonaventure, became intimately imbedded in the latter tradition. Dominicans continued to defend the relations account, while Franciscans continued to defend the emanations account, though as already linked by Henry with a psychology of intellect and will.27 John Duns Scotus and Peter Auriol, for example, were important Franciscan figures that developed this tradition sharply impacted by Henry, and transmitted it to William of Ockham and others. Henry’s doctrine of the Trinity, as will be shown, grounds to a large extent both his theology and philosophy, his seminal system as a whole.28 To begin to appreciate the significance of the Trinity in Henry’s thought, a statement in this introduction on Henry’s view of theology’s relation to philosophy (section II), as well as on general principles of his system (section III), is necessary. II—Henry on Theology and Philosophy The agreement among medieval Christian thinkers, as to the factuality of the Trinity, is analogous to the agreement among medieval philosophers as to the factuality of some of the essential attributes of God. There are still in the tradition fundamentally different theo27

“[...] neither Marston, nor for that matter anyone else in the Franciscan trinitarian tradition up until Henry of Ghent, had taken steps to combine their emanation trinitarian theology with the psychological model of the trinity. This Henry did: in fact, it is through Henry of Ghent that philosophical psychology became an integral part of Franciscan trinitarian theology” (R. L. Friedman, “Divergent Traditions in Later-Medieval Trinitarian Theology,” in: Studia Theologica, 53 (1999), p. 20). 28 There are already published indications of this, such as: J. Decorte, “Relatio as Modus Essendi: The Origins of Henry of Ghent’s Definition of Relation,” in: International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 10(3) (2002), pp. 309-336.

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retical approaches which yield very different conceptions of the Trinity. And, in part due to these differences of approach, reflection on the Trinity has had for a given thinker a more direct impact on his general view of reality than for another thinker. To better contextualize Henry’s approach to theology and philosophy, we shall first present a brief summary of the two dominant approaches that served as Henry’s immediate background at the University of Paris, namely those of Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure. 29 Thomas Aquinas, continuing the work of his teacher Albert the Great, adopts Aristotelian principles to make a clear distinction between metaphysics or first philosophy and theology understood as the science of revelation. 30 No science proves the existence of its subject matter, just as biology does not prove that there is life. Rather, a science begins by assuming the reality of its generic subject. This it assumes either 1) through induction, as in the empirical sciences, 2) as a conclusion established by a higher science in the way that optics proceeds from geometry, 3) through hypothesis as in mathematics, or 4) through an indirect, transcendental judgment, as in metaphysics. The science ends, if it ever does, when it fully accounts for its subject through a knowledge of its causes. Metaphysics begins with its subject, namely being as being, and ends when it accounts for all being and its properties through the first cause.31 Yet metaphysics ends by knowing of the first cause only that it is but not what it is.32 Metaphysical knowledge of God is mainly negative: one negates the imperfections of contingent, limited being, and applies this negation to a necessary, purely actual being. Thus, God is in-finite or not finite, and un-caused or not caused, etc. We do obtain an analogous and properly 29

A treatment of other competing (thirteenth and fourteenth century) approaches at Paris, including that of Henry’s contemporary and critic Godfrey of Fontaines, may be found in the Introduction to: S. F. Brown - J. C. Flores, Historical Dictionary of Medieval Philosophy and Theology, Lanham, Md. London, forthcoming. See also the relevant (alphabetized) entries in this Dictionary. 30 For Aquinas’s view of theology as a science, see Summa Theologiae, I, q. 1. 31 A helpful overview of Aquinas’s conception of the sciences and their methods is A. Maurer’s introduction to: Thomas Aquinas. The division and methods of the sciences, Questions V and VI of his Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius, Toronto, 1986. 32 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, art. 1-2.

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metaphysical knowledge of the transcendental properties of all being, and thus of God inasmuch as He is, such as unity, truth and goodness. But this does not entail any positive knowledge of God’s essence. For God is not an object proportionate to our natural intellect. As Aristotle rightly taught, our intellectual soul, being the form of its body, has as its proper object the quiddity of a material thing, which it abstracts from perceptible things.33 Since this is the starting point of all science, and scientific knowledge is of causes, the transcendent cause(s) are known only negatively or through their effects. It is rather theology, assuming the existence of its subject (God), either from faith or metaphysics or both, which can know something about God’s essence. This it knows only inasmuch as God reveals part of the knowledge that He has of Himself in the Scriptures and to the blessed. And part of this knowledge is His triune nature and everything pertaining to that nature. The Trinity falls outside the scope of natural reason and philosophy, even though philosophy may be of some help in clarifying this tenet of the Christian Faith. Truths like the Trinity and the Incarnation are available as principles to theology because theology borrows them from the higher science of God and the blessed. Accordingly, theology as a science is subalternate to this higher science, just as optics is subalternate to geometry because it borrows its principles from geometry.34 Not only, therefore, are theological principles such as the Trinity beyond philosophy, but also in some sense beyond the human discipline of theology, as they are borrowed from a higher, supernatural science. The theologian accepts these principles on faith, and draws appropriate conclusions through them with the help of reason. But the theologian as such does not have any direct or immediate insight beyond faith into the truth of these principles. It is Aquinas’s Aristotelian approach which governs his distinction between (first) philosophy and theology, between reason and revelation. This is so despite the adjustments Aquinas made to Aristotle and despite having some important Neoplatonic elements in his thought. Not only did Aquinas feel that Aristotle’s philosophy was by and large the true philosophy, but that it provided a solid basis for faith as it served as the starting point of theology. For Aquinas, the 33

Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 75 and q. 85. In the Conclusion, basic positions of Thomas Aquinas (section III) are discussed further. 34 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 1, art. 2.

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Christian should not try to demonstrate philosophically what should be taken on faith, like the Trinity or the beginning of the world, as natural reason, proceeding fundamentally from effects to causes, can only go so far. Should the Christian do this, he would be making Christianity an object of ridicule, giving the impression that Christians maintain what they do solely because they have been convinced by insufficient reasoning.35 Other thinkers of a more Platonic inspiration would also say that reason is distinct from faith, for knowing is not believing. They too would say that reason alone cannot demonstrate that God is triune or know God’s essence directly, that our knowledge of God in this life can never be perfect. Yet the Trinity still permeates their philosophies and theologies. Such is the case of Bonaventure36, who was well aware of the position of his contemporary Thomas Aquinas. For Bonaventure, as for Aquinas, philosophy is distinct from the science of revelation. The philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, developed without revelation, are proof of this. Accordingly, one may say that philosophy is based on what natural reason can acquire by itself, while the premises of theology are accepted on faith. However, for Bonaventure, philosophy should not only help clarify theological truths, but should be inspired and purified by revelation as well. This is not to say that natural reason, and philosophy as founded on it, are not inherently sound. On the contrary, natural reason provides us with the experience of absolute, immutable certitude, as when we consider first principles. This immutability of our rational knowledge, as Augustine rightly saw, cannot be accounted for strictly in terms of the world of our experience, which is changing. Natural reason, therefore, shares in a higher, eternal truth, even though it possesses only a confused idea of what is eternal. Its light is not only natural as implanted in each rational being, but divine as grounded in the immutable. Yet natural reason, certain in itself, may be used mistakenly. Reason may become subservient to vain curiosity or to a licentious will, taking material objects as its end, turning its back on its source and light. An understanding of any finite thing as absolute in itself is not only incomplete but in error, for it fails to understand the object in 35

Ibid., q. 46, art. 2, solutio. A helpful presentation of Bonaventure’s approach to philosophy and theology is E. Gilson’s The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure, London, 1940, especially the first two chapters. 36

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reference to the immutable. True philosophy is essentially Godward, and God as he truly is exceeds our natural capacity. As seekers of an end above our natural capacities taken on their own, we need the strength of revelation and faith to reach this end. And since the proper end of philosophy is knowing God as he truly is, and God is truly the personal triune God of the New Testament, the end of philosophy is not merely theoretical but also practical. Its end is the saving knowledge that culminates in the beatific vision in the next life. Philosophy also needs revelation to discover the ultimate truth of lived experience, a truth symbolic of its source, which is God as revealed in the Scriptures. Plato is proof of the intrinsic dignity of natural reason, positing eternal ideas as exemplary causes of which sensibles are images. True wisdom, however, is to be found in Augustine who, aided by revelation, saw the source of the ideas in God, and the manifestation of the Trinity in creation. Therefore, true philosophy is fundamentally about creatures and their creator, not merely about substances and their causes. According to this perspective, Aristotelianism remains inadequate precisely because it sees a science as true in its own selfcontained domain. Philosophical knowledge can be true about a given domain to the extent that it understands this domain in reference to its ultimate principle, which is God, not as known by Aristotelian philosophy, but by revelation and grace. Accordingly, when Bonaventure wrote that “the created world is like a book which reflects, represents, and describes the creative Trinity,”37 he was speaking not just as a theologian, but also as a philosopher. To say that philosophy wholly without revelation can know God truly, though in part, is ultimately false. For example, affirming that aspects of the unity of God can be known truly through natural reason and independently of the revealed Trinity is ultimately false, for this would be to misunderstand His real kind of unity altogether.38 This position sharply differs from that of Aquinas, for whom God’s existence and (negative) essential attributes fall within the legitimate cognitive domain of natural reason and philosophy, while revealed truth like the Trinity is the proper domain of theology. Accordingly, when Aquinas argues that the Trinity cannot be demonstrated philosophically he is assuming a different scientific perspec37 38

Breviloquium 2, 12 (Opera Omnia, V, p. 230). Cf., e.g., Gilson, The Philosophy of Bonaventure, p. 107.

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tive than when he describes how all reflects the Trinity. Thomas Aquinas claims: Man through natural reason cannot arrive at the cognition of God except through creatures. Creatures, however, lead into the cognition of God, just as the effect [leads] into the cause. Only this, therefore, can be known about God by natural reason, which necessarily befits Him according as He is the principle of all beings . . . However, the creative power of God is common to the whole Trinity: whence it pertains to the unity of the essence, not to the distinction of the persons. Therefore, through natural reason those things which pertain to the unity of the essence can be known about God, but not those things which pertain to the distinction of the Persons.39

According to Aquinas, philosophy as grounded in natural reason can know about God only those aspects pertaining to the unity of the divine essence (insofar as this common essence is the cause of creatures). For, concerning God, creatures reveal to natural reason only this unified aspect, and the knowledge of God by natural reason or philosophy is obtained only through creatures. Accordingly, keeping this in mind, Aquinas’s positive answer to the question “Whether it is necessary that a vestige of the Trinity be found in creatures” (Summa Theologiae, I, q. 45, art. 7) is necessarily and properly a theological answer, falling outside the domain of natural reason and philosophy as demarcated by Aquinas himself. For Bonaventure, on the other hand, “the first principle sought by philosophy is identical, in the final analysis, with the trinitarian God of the New Testament revelation. If all finite reality emanates from the first principle, this can be understood in a fuller sense only when we perceive that the limited emanation of the created world is grounded in the prior and perfect emanations of goodness in the first principle itself. Hence the entire theological endeavor of Bonaventure 39

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 32, art. 1, solutio (ed. Leon., Opera Omnia, IV, Romae, 1888, pp. 349-350): “[…] homo per rationem naturalem in cognitionem Dei pervenire non potest nisi ex creaturis. Creaturae autem ducunt in Dei cognitionem, sicut effectus in causam. Hoc igitur solum ratione naturali de Deo cognosci potest, quod competere ei necesse est secundum quod est omnium entium principium [...]. Virtus autem creativa Dei est communis toti Trinitati: unde pertinet ad unitatem essentiae, non ad distinctionem personarum. Per rationem igitur naturalem cognosci possunt de Deo ea quae pertinent ad unitatem essentiae, non autem ea quae pertinent ad distinctionem Personarum.”

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is inspired by the contemplation of the Trinity.”40 It is the unity of Christian wisdom, whose first truth is the Trinty, which holds and governs every part of Bonaventure’s system. Henry of Ghent is deeply influenced by Augustine and Bonaventure. Aristotelianism, by stressing that we know philosophically the first cause only through its effects, fails to account fully for the symbolic or higher-pointing character of created reality. Rather God is the ultimate source of all light and all seeing.41 The knowledge which the soul derives purely naturally from the senses is true, in regard to objects, to the extent that it captures common features really belonging to physical things. Moreover it is certain, in regard to the subject, to the extent that it is grounded in the knowledge of selfevident, first principles. However, this purely natural knowledge does not reach what Henry calls the sincere, fixed and infallible truth of a thing, since it is derived from changing things, resides in a changing soul susceptible to error, and depends on the imagination (which can deceive).42 40

Z. Hayes (in Introduction), Saint Bonaventure’s Disputed Questions on the Mystery of the Trinity, New York, 1979, p. 30. 41 S. Marrone, after tracing the evolution of Henry’s thoughts on truth and scientific knowledge, concludes in his important book: “In knowing essence the mind, in a real sense, fell back on God. Here lies the significance of Henry’s final explanation of the business of knowing truth” (Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent, Cambridge, Mass., 1985, p. 146). Of Henry’s writings, his statements on cognition and divine illumination have received by far the most attention from modern scholars. 42 Summa, art. 1, q. 2 (ed. G. Wilson, Opera Omnia, XXI, Leuven, 2005, pp. 43-45, ll. 282-289, 300-306, 316-326): “Sed quod per tale exemplar acquisitum in nobis habeatur a nobis certa omnino et infallibilis notitia veritatis, hoc omnino est impossibile triplici ratione, quarum prima sumitur ex parte rei de qua exemplar huiusmodi abstractum est, secunda ex parte animae in qua huiusmodi exemplar susceptum est, tertia ex parte ipsius exemplaris quod a re in anima susceptum est. Prima ratio est quod exemplar tale, eo quod abstractum est a re transmutabili, necesse habet aliquam rationem transmutabilis. [...] Secunda ratio est quod anima humana, quia mutabilis est et erroris passiva, per nihil quod mutabilitatis aequalis vel maioris est cum ipsa, potest rectificari ne obliquetur per errorem et in rectitudine veritatis persistat. Ibi exemplar omne quod recipit a rebus naturalibus, cum sit inferioris gradus naturae quam ipsa, necessario aequalis vel maioris mutabilitatis est cum ipsa. Non ergo potest eam rectificare ut persistat in infallibili veritate. [...] Tertia ratio est

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The fixed truth, rather, can only be obtained through the ratification of abstracted universals by the platonic ideas which Augustine had already placed in the intellect of God.43 Only by comparing the universal to its divine exemplar can the universal be known in its essential truth. In this life, this knowledge can only be partial, as a perfect comparison of the created to the eternal exemplar would require the open (beatific) vision of the exemplars in the divine essence, which vision can only be had in the next life. Accordingly, in this life, this knowledge is not a direct knowledge of God or of the idea as known by God, but only a knowledge of the essence of a created thing in the light of the idea. True knowledge can only be had through divine illumination which perfects abstraction. Any essence as truly known and loved is constituted in the soul only in the light of the supreme Truth and Good. An essence is therefore present to the soul as an intentional participation of essential being as such. This is the being that God eternally gives to all possible creatures when, in knowing himself through the Word, He knows himself as imitable in mutifarious ways. Actual existence is in turn given to the creature through a free action of divine will, which will can be a totally free choice in regard to creatures because prior to its creative action it is perfected in the divine nature in the person of the Holy Spirit. A more perfect image of the divine spirit than physical entities, the soul can find in itself a more explicit analogical knowledge of God. Though he rejects the doctrine of innate ideas, Henry holds that the concept of being, understood as an absolutely prior criterion for judgment, is virtually innate to the soul.44 This concept includes the quod huiusmodi exemplar, cum sit intentio et species sensibilis rei abstracta a phantasmate, similitudinem habet cum falso sicut cum vero [...].” 43 See Ser Participado (section 1, chapter 1) by J. Gómez Caffarena, where he discusses Henry’s view of divine illumination as the guarantee for any absolutely valid knowledge. For a discussion of the history of the Christian interpretation of the Platonic ideas as it bears upon Henry’s thought, see J. Paulus, Henri de Gand, pp. 106-118. Henry’s Platonic (or Augustinian) spirit and his attitude towards Aristotle (and Aquinas), specifically concerning the ideas and knowledge, have been well summarized in a recent article: C. Steel, “Henricus Gandavensis Platonicus,” in: Guldentops – Steel (eds.), Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought, pp. 15-39. 44 “El entendimiento humano aparece así sellado constitucionalmente por el ser: la prima impressio in anima es en realidad el naturale iudicatorum. No es

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concept of God or supreme being, though only vaguely or confusedly, inasmuch as the soul’s judgments about finite, contingent being presupposes some implicit notion of unlimited, necessary being. And this notion of divine being may be made more explicit in this life, according to the degree of divine illumination available to the wayfarer through God’s will.45 Therefore, if any insight into the Trinity is available to us at all, it is to be found above all by examining our knowing and loving operations, as Augustine and Bonaventure rightly saw. Thus it is not surprising that Henry’s psychology is quite extensive, intricate and rich, having fundamental theological and metaphysical implications. The ultimate basis for his conception of the Trinity in itself and as a source of creatures is a psychology of divine intellect and will, inspired first and foremost by Augustine, though informed by the philosophical tradition. In turn, Henry’s understanding of the Trinity in terms of Aristotelian categories applicable to God and creatures depends on his understanding of the Trinity according to itself, and as a cause of creatures, in terms of intellect and will. Interestingly this means for Henry’s view of reality a revised and original understanding of substance and relation which is applied pervasively and profoundly in his system. First, however, we must state how Henry conceives of theology, the domain within which he investigates the Trinity. Henry acun contenido más que se obtenga de la experiencia como la última y la más tenue de las abstracciones; sino la forma de toda afirmación, y así de todo verdadero conocimiento” (J. Gómez Caffarena, Ser Participado, p. 43). See Henry’s discussion in Summa, art. 1, q. 12. 45 Henry is categorical in affirming that any sincere knowledge of the truth ultimately depends on God’s free will: “Absolute ergo dicendum quod homo sinceram veritatem de nulla re habere potest ex puris naturalibus eius notitiam acquirendo, sed solum illustratione luminis divini [...] sed libera voluntate quibus vult se ipsum (i.e. Deus) offert” (Summa, art. 1, q. 2 [ed. G. Wilson, Opera Omnia, XXI, Leuven, 2005, p. 63, ll. 662-666]). This position depends ultimately on, and is thus best appraised in the context of, Henry’s view of all creation and divine intervention as wholly contingent on God’s free choice, which depends on the necessary emanations of the Trinity. For Henry, however, to say that all divine action in regard to creatures depends on God’s free choice means that it also depends on God’s infinite wisdom and justice (see chapter 2, sections B and C, below).

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counts for the scientific status of theology, as well as for the relation between theology and the other sciences in article 7 of his Summa.46 Henry does not subalternate theology to the science of God and the blessed, as Aquinas does, and this makes his own conception of theology very different from Aquinas’s.47 However, like Aquinas, Henry uses Aristotelian criteria to distinguish theology—the sacred science of revelation—as a wisdom beyond Aristotle’s highest wisdom or first philosophy. Stressing the centrality of the Trinity within theology, and the primacy of the science of theology, Henry illustrates the centrality of the Trinity in his system of thought as a whole. Theology is not a distinct science because its subject is wholly separate from the subjects of the other sciences, as mathematics is distinct from ethics because their subjects are totally unrelated. Rather all other sciences are related to theology, since every being exists on account of God. 48 That is why other sciences furnish knowledge that theology uses and/or depend on theology as subalternate sciences.49 Now theology considers God and creatures; but the other sciences also consider these things: metaphysics, considering being as being, also considers God, while the rest investigate things that are not God. However, theology considers its subject in a proper way, and this in three senses: 1) the other sciences investigate beings in order to know their essences as such; theology considers these same beings inasmuch as they have a divine aspect by which they refer to God; 2) the other sciences consider their subjects through proper and proximate causes; theology considers everything, through the first cause(s), particularly God’s will; 3) the philosopher proceeds from creatures to God, considering God only through creatures; the theologian considers God first and, through God, creatures. 50 Because of this third reason, the philosopher considers God only through the common 46

Summa, art. 7: De Theologia in comparatione ad alias scientias On this topic, see S. F. Brown, “Henry of Ghent’s Critique of Aquinas’ Subalternation Theory and the Early Thomistic Response”, in: R. Työrinoja A. I. Lehtinen - D. Føllesdal (eds.), Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy, Helsinki, 1990, pp. 337-345; Id., “The Medieval Background to the Abstractive vs. Intuitive Cognition Distinction,” in: J. Aertsen - A. Speer (eds.), Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert, Berlin – New York, 2000, pp. 79-90. 48 Cf. Summa, art. 7, q. 1, ed. Badius, fol. 47 rB. 49 For more details, see ibid., ed. Badius, fol. 47 rB-vB. 50 For these three points, see ibid., ed. Badius, fol. 48 rD-vE. 47

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attributes which creatures reveal about Him. The theologian considers what is proper to God Himself—His triune nature, which is not knowable through creatures alone—and on this basis considers what is common to God and creatures. For the philosopher considers reality only as understood through the light of natural reason, while the theologian considers things first as believed through the light of faith and secondly as understood through a light over and above the light of natural reason.51 This last claim is one which thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas, Godfrey of Fontaines, and Duns Scotus would not make. Henry’s view of a divinely infused intellectual light or lumen medium, granted by God according to His will, and available to theologians such as Augustine and Richard of St. Victor, generated quite a bit of controversy and criticism. 52 It is difficult to evaluate this doctrine fairly without examining it in detail across the relevant texts and placing it in the appropriate context of Henry’s thought as a whole. 53 This would go beyond the scope of this study, and is perhaps not even necessary for the present purpose. For Henry’s intense investigation into the Trinity, and not his description of the properties of theological wisdom, is perhaps the best illustration of what Henry means by a theological understanding of the realities of the faith, as it is in this discussion especially that Henry actually endeavors to understand the nature of God as far as is possible for him.

51

Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 48 vE): “Theologus vero considerat de Deo secundum propria personarum, quibus habet cognosci in se, et in quibus non potest cognosci ex creaturis. Adhuc philosophus considerat quaecumque considerat, ut percepta et intellecta solo lumine naturalis rationis. Theologus vero considerat singula, ut primo credita lumine fidei, et secundo intellecta lumine ulteriori super lumen naturalis rationis infusum.” 52 Henry’s extensive exposition of this doctrine is to be found in Quodlibet XII. For a clear and concise treatment of Henry’s view of this intellectual light proper to theology, and the positions of Aquinas, Godfrey and Scotus, see S. F. Brown, “The Medieval Background to the Abstractive vs. Intuitive Cognition Distinction,” in: J. Aertsen - A. Speer (eds), Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert, Berlin – New York, 2000, pp. 79-90. See also the useful remarks by P. Porro, “Metaphysics and Theology in the Last Quarter of the Thirteenth Century: Henry of Ghent Reconsidered,” in: J. Aertsen - A. Speer (eds.), Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert, esp. pp. 278-281. 53 However, the comments in note 45 also apply here.

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It is worth mentioning, however, that Henry’s lumen medium “is not used to debase the scientific character of theology, but rather to strengthen it in that it allows a deeper and clearer knowledge of those terms that can be reached through the lumen naturale (and thus through philosophy) and a more adequate understanding of those articles considered to be true only in virtue of the lumen fidei.”54 This deeper and clearer knowledge cannot be demonstrative in the classic sense, since demonstration is always through what is prior, and there is nothing prior to God Himself. It is also worth mentioning that this theological light should be seen in the context of two aspects of Henry’s thought: 1) Henry’s view of the Trinity’s totally free (and thereby wise and just) relation to creatures (discussed in chapter 2), and 2) Henry’s theory of divine illumination, which permits a continuity of cognition from sense perception to the beatific vision. Concerning the second point, Henry holds that God, through His image deep in the mind, is the ultimate source of all degrees of cognition, and that, accordingly, although knowledge of God is never fully clear or explicit in this life, some spiritual individuals in this life approach the perfect knowledge of God more than others, to the degree that they may be said to intimately understand, to savour—as Augustine liked to say—the truths of faith. 55 In this context and in spirit, Henry’s intermediate theological light is perhaps not so distant from Bonaventure’s conception of theological wisdom. For Bonaventure “the beatitudes can consist in naught save the graces of vision, which set the soul face to face with its object and enable it to seize its object, in so far of course as a finite nature can apprehend the infinite. The gifts of the Holy Spirit then must necessarily find their place between the virtues—faith without understanding—and the beatitudes—understanding freed from the obscurity of faith: that is why they may be rightly considered as destined to bring us to a comprehension of what we believe. Their intermediate rôle—which is to assure the passage from faith alone to mystical vision—bears an exact analogy to the transient and intermediate nature assigned by St. Bonaventure to theology. If this is so, the origin of 54

P. Porro, “Metaphysics and Theology,” in: J. Aertsen - A. Speer (eds.), Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert, pp. 279-280. 55 On this topic, see K. Emery, Jr., “The Image of God Deep in the Mind: The Continuity of Cognition according to Henry of Ghent,” in: J. Aertsen - K. Emery, Jr. - A. Speer (eds.), Nach der Verurteilung von 1277, pp. 59-124.

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theology is to be sought in a liberality of grace and a special gift of the Holy Ghost: the gift of understanding which comes to raise us from our poverty. This gift it is which stirs our intelligence to explore the content of our faith and brings us to some comprehension of the object which as yet we do not see: it is the supernatural foundation of fides quaerens intellectum.” 56 Henry is more explicit about the theological light when explaining how theology is the most certain of all sciences. Truth is the proper object of any science, and the more certain a thing is in its truth the more can it be known with certainty. Since truth is an adequation between thing and intellect57 , the certitude of a science can be judged either on the part of the thing known or on the part of the knower. On the part of what is known, the certitude of theology is greatest because what is known in theology—God—is the most firm and certain in its truth, for it is the first cause by which all else is certain. On the part of the knower, however, certitude is twofold: certitude is either 1) the secure confidence in the truths of a science or 2) the evidence which the knower obtains in knowing the truths of the science. The first certitude, though it lacks clear and evident knowledge, may be completely secure: this is how the faithful adhere to divine truths and are free from error. Even the adherence to opinion can be as secure as the adherence to knowledge. This is all the more true of the adherence to truths of the Faith, which is totally free from error.58 Now the certitude of evidence in theology is itself twofold, since theology is about what is believed, and what is believed may be 1) simply an object of belief or 2) already understood to some de-

56

E. Gilson, The Philosophy of St Bonaventure, pp. 110-111. In its details, as is to be expected, and especially with respect to their uses of Aristotle, there are differences between the two masters. For differences and similarities between Henry and Bonaventure (and Augustine) on certitude, illumination and theological knowledge, see A. Speer, “Certitude and Wisdom in Bonaventure and Henry of Ghent” in: G. Guldentops - C. Steel (eds.), Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought, pp. 75-100. 57 On this topic, see J. Decorte, “Henri de Gand et la Définition Classique de la Vérité,” in: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales, 68/1 (2001), pp. 34-74. 58 Henry calls this type of security a certitudo adhesionis (cf. Summa, art. 7, q. 2 [ed. Badius, fol. 49 rN]).

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gree.59 Accordingly, in terms of evidence of what is known, theology is not the most certain science when it only believes its truths, for what is believed always seems enveloped in mystery and darkness. With respect to the knower and on the grounds of epistemic evidence, mathematical truths known evidently through the light of natural reason are more certain than theological truths merely believed. However, this obtains only because of an indisposition in the knower. “For just as the first principles of speculative sciences, which are most certain in their truth, may be doubtful to someone ill-disposed intellectually, so too those truths belonging to this science, which with faith and with the illustration of a superior light can be evident to all faithful, may be doubtful to an infidel lacking the light of faith.”60 Theological truth, such as that God is one and three, can be understood by someone purified by faith, assisted by reason, and (in addition to these conditions) illustrated by a gift of intellectual light, as a truth more evident and certain than any other truth.61 In this case, not only is theology most certain because it is of things most certain in their own 59

Summa, art. 7, q. 2 (ed. Badius, fol. 49 rN): “Cum ista scientia sit scientia credibilium, et credibile uno modo consideratur ut est sub forma credibilis, alio modo ut est sub specie intelligibilis, inquantum credibile iam factum est intelligibile. Aut ergo possumus loqui de certitudine huius scientiae inquantum scitur ex ea credibilis sub forma credibilis, aut sub forma intelligibilis.” 60 Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 49 rO): “Sicut enim prima principia scientiarum speculativarum quae sunt certissima in sua veritate, alicui male disposito penes intellectum possunt esse dubia, sic infideli propter defectum luminis fidei possunt esse dubia ea quae sunt huius scientiae et cum fide et illustratione luminis superioris possunt omni fideli esse in evidentia.” 61 Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 49 rQ): “Loquendo ergo de certitudine ex rei evidentia in se, dicendum quod ista scientia intellectui depurato a peccatorum maculis et nebulis phantasmatum per lumen fidei, et super hoc illustrato dono et lumine intellectus quo credibilia fiunt ei intelligibilia cum manuductione fidei et rationum adiutorio ex rebus naturalibus, bene contingit quod homini sic disposito in vita ista sit certissima, et certior quam sit aliqua alia scientia, ut quod ex rei evidentia absoluta clarius intelligat quia Deus est trinus et unus, quam plurimas alias veritates de rebus naturalibus.” The ethical dimension of the highest speculative wisdom according to Henry is here clearly suggested: theological wisdom befits only those whom God’s (inscrutable) will deems worthy. Determining exactly Henry’s conception of the relation between the good life and theological wisdom would certainly contribute a great deal to the understanding of Henry’s thought as a whole. This is clearly a separate study.

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truth, but is also, “on the part of the knower, most certain and most evident to a spiritual person illustrated by an intellectual light, according as it is possible to man in this life.”62 This theological evidence, being evidence of what is simply first, cannot be obtained through any prior means. As such, theological evidence is sui generis and seems always accompanied and even assisted, to the degree that knowledge of God remains always imperfect in this life, by both natural reason and faith, unlike other kinds of scientific evidence which by definition exclude belief. 63 This does not make it less certain than other types of knowledge, as even the faithful’s certitudo adhesionis can be as secure as the certitude of evidence, nor less evident than the evidence of other sciences, as the evidence of God, even if imperfect in this life, surpasses any evidence of objects less true and less real in themselves. Theology is not subalternate to the science of God and the blessed as Aquinas would have it, even though this latter science is superior since it discerns divine truths perfectly, which is not possible for man in this life. However, theology does not borrow its principles from a higher science, for theology does attain some primary evidence of divine principles and truths. Theology simply does not fit Aristotle’s model of subalternation; those who want to make it fit ignore Aristotle’s own principles.64 For subalternation, put simply, is when a science knows the why (propter quid) about which another science merely knows the how (quia). 65 But the principles of theology con62

Summa, art. 7, q. 2 (ed. Badius, fol. 49 vR): “[...] ex parte scientis securissima et evidentissima viro spirituali lumine intellectuali illustrato, prout homini in vita ista est possibile.” 63 Consider carefully the “super hoc” and the “cum manuductione fidei et rationum adiutorio ex rebus naturalibus” from the note next to last (ed. Badius, fol. 49 rQ). Recalling Bonaventure on this point may be helpful. Bonaventure seems to have understood any intellectual insight into God, as an insight into a wholly transcendent object, as requiring both understanding and faith. See Gilson, The Philosophy of Bonaventure, pp. 105-106. 64 Cf. Summa, ibid., (ed. Badius, fol. 54rG). 65 This is so only with some qualifications: “licet consideratio quia et propter quid distinguunt, ut dictum est, scientiam subalternantem et subalternatam, non tamen semper scientia dicens quia de aliquo principio quod sumit ab alia, subalternatur illi a qua sumit, quae de eodem dicit propter quid. Sed tres conditiones cum hoc requiruntur. Prima quod illud tanquam principium descendat in totam scientiam quae sumit illud ab alia. Secunda quod ipsa assumat illud

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cern what is absolutely first, and the propter quid can only be known through what is prior; therefore theology cannot be subalternate to any science. This is so even if God and the blessed know clearly and by vision what theology knows more obscurely and with faith. There is in this regard a distinction of degrees of cognitive clarity, but not the subalternation that Aristotle has in mind.66 In fact, human theological wisdom, in so far as it grounds the truth of subalternate sciences through a discursive knowledge of what is prior to them, may be said to approach the definition of propter quid more than the divine science.67 Thus Henry’s strict adherence to Aristotle’s text permits him to distinguish theology as a wisdom beyond any wisdom Aristotle had in mind, while at the same time showing how all other sciences are subordinate to theology. In question 10 of article 7 of the Summa, Henry argues that since the ultimate end of speculative sciences is the saving vision of God, all speculative sciences should be learned for the sake of theological wisdom. Otherwise they are in vain; Aristotle’s view of human beatitude in the Ethics as the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake is not to be accepted. Only practical sciences which are ordered to their proper end, like medicine for the sake of health, may mendicando propter suam indigentiam, non autem principiando propter suum usum (and this exempts theology from being subalternate when it uses what other sciences prepare). Tertia quod illud assumat quia subiectum scientiae a quo assumit accipit tanquam principale suae considerationis” (Summa, art. 7, q. 5, ad 3 [ed. Badius, fol. 54 rI]). Henry proceeds in the same place to give examples. 66 In question 4 of article 7 of his Summa, Henry discusses Aristotle’s theory of subalternation in depth, and argues that for the Philosopher there are four and only four types of subalternation. He concludes that all sciences, practical and theoretical, are subalternate to theology. 67 Summa, art. 7, q. 5 (ed. Badius, fol. 53 vE): “Licet ergo principia theologiae sciantur clarius in scientia superiori, propter quid tamen non plus sciuntur in illa scientia quam in ista; immo multo minus quia scientia Dei et beatorum discursiva non est a primo in postremum per medium sicut et nostra [...] non est autem scientia propter quid nisi per medium discursus. Notum ergo et non notum non faciunt distinctionem scientiae a scientia, ut subalternantis a subalternata, sed quod id quod solum notum est quia est in una scientia notum est propter quid in alia. Sed illud dictum eorum de comparatione notitiae principiorum in hac scientia et in illa superiori bene facit quod una scientia sit principalis super aliam et regula illius. Est enim divina et beatorum maxime sapientia et regula prima omnium humanarum scientiarum.”

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well be learned not for the sake of theology, for through their proper end they are ordered for sake of the good life. Theology is the supreme science, for it regulates all sciences, practical and theoretical. It regulates all the practical sciences, as the ultimate end and happiness is God. Now the highest speculative science is the one that considers the ultimate, first cause(s), while the others consider just secondary causes, which are governed by the first. Even though Aristotle calls metaphysics wisdom and first philosophy, theology considers what is even higher and exceeds the domain of natural reason. What is first in being is also first in truth and in cognition, and as first it regulates what is posterior: theology is the most universal science.68 Put simply, theology is the most authoritative and universal speculative science because it considers what is truly first— the Trinity in itself and as a principle of creatures.69 Even though metaphysics also considers God, theology penetrates more deeply into God’s nature as well as into the nature of being in general. For metaphysics only considers the common attributes and properties of (caused and uncaused) being that are knowable through creatures. Theology above all considers the divine being itself 68

Summa, art. 7, q. 8 (ed. Badius, fol. 58 vK): “Scientiae speculativae ordinantur ad istam eo quod principalis est ad illas, quia scilicet considerat prima principia altissima, sub quibus omnia alia continentur quae considerantur in aliis scientiis, quae perfectam notitiam non habent in sua veritate, nisi in quantum ordinantur in principia prima simpliciter. Conclusiones enim scientiae in fine non cognoscuntur perfecte per principia illius scientiae. Non enim illa principia perfecte cognoscuntur nisi reducantur in principia superioris scientiae, et sic per ordinem usque ad principia prima primae scientiae et supremae.” 69 Summa, art 7, q. 6 (ed. Badius, fol. 55 rN): “Quia igitur de Deo considerat theologia illa quae ipsi soli sunt naturaliter cognita, sed creaturae rationali supernaturaliter revelata, et quae naturali ratione non est possibile perscrutari, secundum quae Deus est principium omnium et origo, ut sunt regulae artis divinae in Verbo, et voluntatis in Spiritu Sancto, et cetera huiusmodi quae extendunt se ad particularia rerum, haec scientia sequitur modum divinae sapientiae, ut poterit attingere particularia aliarum scientiarum, secundum quod rationem subiecti huius scientiae induunt, et cognoscere ea, ut sic ratione virtutis principiorum et subiecti huius scientiae, licet sit simplicissimum et minime commune in se, ista scientia universalior dicatur omnibus etiam metaphysica. Et secundum hoc ipsa certissime regulare habet omnes scientias considerantes causata ab istis primis principiis quae de Deo considerat ista scientia, et hoc approbando bene dicta et condemnando errata in eis.”

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and the rest of being inasmuch as it reflects it. Accordingly, as will be seen below in chapter 3, theology obtains a better understanding than metaphysics even in regard to what is common to God and creatures. This is not to say that metaphysics is by definition in error; it would err only if it would judge about what falls outside of its epistemic domain, or if it would assume that its domain is sovereign and absolute. The formal perspective of metaphysics in knowing its subject is legitimate in its own right, even though the very matter of its subject— the real—is known more deeply and more completely by theology, even though the truth of metaphysics ultimately is grounded in theology outside of metaphysics itself. For only theology considers reality, as far as is possible in this life, from the standpoint of what is truly first, which is God, not as known only through the common, metaphysical attributes that creatures reveal about Him, but as known in Himself or as the Trinity.70 Philosophy begins with creatures and considers God last, inasmuch as creatures reveal the cause which produces, orders and governs them. Philosophy proceeds according to natural reason, which first discursively derives a general concept of being from creatures. From this concept, natural reason conceives subsequently the distinction between the originated and its origin, since it concludes that what is mutable and produced must ultimately owe its being to what is immutable. Through a consideration of being as being, Aristotle arrives finally at the cognition of God, not of His intrinsic nature, but only as made manifest through the effects or creatures which depend on Him. Thus God is part of the subject of metaphysics according as the intention of being as being is prior for natural reason to the intention of caused and uncaused being, even though absolutely speaking the concept of divine being is first—the ultimate criterion for any concept and judgment.71 70

God may be considered scientifically in a twofold way: “1) secundum id quod est in se cognoscibile de ipso, non ex comparatione ad creaturam; 2) secundum id quod cognoscibile est de eo in comparatione ad creaturam. Utroque modo consideratio de Deo cadit sub hac scientia. Secundo modo solum sub scientiis philosophicis” (Summa, art. 7, q. 6 [ed. Badius, fol. 56 rR]). 71 Summa, art. 7, q. 6 (ed. Badius, fol. 56 rR): “Primus conceptus discretivus naturalis cognitionis ex creaturis est ratio entis simpliciter, sub quo concipit secundario rationem entis principiati et principiantis, considerando enim id quod est creatum, quia mobile et transmutabile est, non potest habere esse a

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Unlike philosophy which knows God only as a principle of creatures and a posteriori, theology knows God in himself and as a principle of creatures a priori. God as considered by theology cannot be part of the subject of metaphysics, for theology considers God in Himself or as prior to any commonality with or relation to actual creatures.72 That is why theology discerns God and His creatures more deeply and more adequately than metaphysics does: the Trinity’s nature and will is the ultimate reason why creatures fall into metaphysical categories, and into the categories considered by the particular sciences. Accordingly, all philosophic sciences have a limited perspective with respect to theology; they all isolate an aspect of creatures, considering the given aspect absolutely. Only theology considers all under the aspect of the divine, which aspect is the ground for all other sciences, even metaphysics. Hence, just as particular sciences presuppose being as being—the subject of metaphys-

se, sed necessario recipit ipsum ab ente aliquo immutabili .” This is the first concept of discursive reasoning, the starting point of metaphysical reasoning. However, this concept depends on a prior, albeit only implicit, concept of God or divine being: “non est Deus id quod primo mens in rebus concipit, dico conceptione discretiva discernendo ipsum ab aliis, conceptione enim absoluta est id quod etiam in naturali notitia mens primo concipit, ut infra ostendetur” (ibid.) (italics mine). For Henry the mind discovers that its concept of being, which at first seems absolutely unified because of its indeterminacy, is in fact two distinct concepts—indeterminate determinable being and indeterminate indeterminable being (God)—the latter being the ground and criterion for the first. In other words, the first is an analytical (discretivus) concept while the latter is the ultimate criterion for cognition and judgment. On this topic, see, e.g., Summa, art. 21, q. 2, as well as the excellent article by J. Decorte, “Henry of Ghent on Analogy. Critical Reflexions on Jean Paulus’ Interpretation,” in: W. Vanhamel (ed.), Henry of Ghent. Proceedings, pp. 71105. 72 Summa, art. 7, q. 6 (ed. Badius, fol. 56 rS): “Isto modo cognoscendi Deum, Deus nequaquam cadit sub ente simpliciter quod est subiectum metaphysicae. Immo praeterit totam rationem et communitatem illius entis.” Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 56 vT): “Deum esse inquantum habet rationem causae ut a quo iam aliquid est causatum in effecto, hoc modo probatur Deum esse in metaphysica et secundum istam rationem cadit Deus sub scientia philosophica sicut pars subiecti, et secundum istam rationem praecisam non cadit ut subiectum sub ista scientia.”

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ics—this latter subject presupposes the subject of theology. 73 Metaphysics, reasoning from effect to cause, can only discern what the effect reveals of the cause, what the effect receives and has in common with the cause: being as being. Because effects are lower than the first cause, effects in themselves cannot reveal what is proper to this cause, except negatively by saying that it is not caused, not finite, etc. Perhaps that is why Aristotle understood this cause only as a final cause of an eternal world, and thereby misunderstood it and the world altogether. Even philosophers such as Avicenna who grant creation, but ignore the emanations of the Trinity as prior to creation, misunderstand creation altogether, and see it as a necessary emanation, rather than as a free act of divine will. This is not all: Christians who misunderstand the Trinity also err about creation.74 As Bonaventure would also say, the danger of assuming that natural reason, solely through effects, can reach a true though partial 73

Summa, art. 7, q. 6 (ed. Badius, fol. 56 vT): “[…] prima philosophia et omnis philosophica scientia potius suum subiectum sumit et supponit ab ista scientia. Ista enim scientia […] considerat de Deo secundum id quod est in se, et omnium est causativum etiam antequam fierent. Considerat omnia causata ab ipso inquantum in se habent effigiem quandam divini esse. Aliae vero scientiae considerant res causatas a Deo secundum quiditates et essentias earum, in quibus effigies divini esse fundatur, et ipsum Deum inquantum actu est causa illorum. Et ideo sicut a metaphysica omnes aliae scientiae philosophicae sumunt et supponunt sua subiecta, quia ipsa considerat ut subiectum suum ens simpliciter secundum communem rationem entis, quaelibet autem alia scientia considerat aliquod particulare ens secundum aliquam particularem rationem entis, sub ratione entis simpliciter contentam, ut dicitur quarto Metaphysicae; consimiliter quia ista scientia considerat ut subiectum suum Deum ipsum secundum se, et omnia alia inquantum habent in se divini esse effigiem, ex qua habent rationem entis quod sunt quiditas et natura alicuius praedicamenti […] quae omnis scientia philosophica considerat secundum suas quiditates, naturas et essentias, quae sunt sicut particularis ratio in ipsis sub ratione divini esse in ipsis, omnis alia scientia competenter dicenda est sumere et supponere subiectum suum ab ista” (italics mine). 74 Henry is categorical about the correct understanding of the Trinity being necessary for a correct understanding of creation: “Errantes enim circa divinarum personarum productionem necesse habent errare circa productionem creaturarum” (Quodl. VI, q. 2 (Utrum personarum productio in Deo praesupponitur causaliter ante productionem creaturarum), ed. G. Wilson, Opera Omnia, X, Leuven, 1987, p. 33, ll. 34-35). For more details, see questions 1-2 of Quodl. VI, and chapter 2 of this study.

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knowledge of God lies in the very likely confusion of judging God—a single, unique, transcendent entity: an infinitely rich whole without any part—through what appears to be a part (the being that He seems to share with His effects) and so misjudge Him and His works. God, however, even if he can be considered in metaphysics as being, is wholly different from any other (created) being; in fact, he is manifest to the intellect as the one indeterminable criterion by which to judge all other (determinable) being. Accordingly, the commonality between God and creatures is intentional, not real. 75 Metaphysics would err, about all being, if it lost sight of this. It turns out, therefore, that only theology discerns the true relation between caused and uncaused being, as this relation is truly one between created and uncreated being: the ontological categories and properties considered absolutely in metaphysics are at heart foundations of their constitutive relations toward the Trinity’s intellect and will. According to the Christian faith, the first cause is a free, omnipotent Creator personally related to His creatures, possessing and preserving all of them individually through His intellect and will. Accordingly, the theological knowledge of God himself not only goes farther than any knowledge of God gained purely through His effects, but discloses the (created) nature of effects themselves more adequately than any knowledge grounded purely in these effects. Theology, in considering the unique ground of reality, comes closer to seeing beings for what they ultimately and fundamentally are: unique symbols of the Trinity. Metaphysics, considering beings only as beings, can only see them under a general aspect or as substances. Yet substances are at heart unique creatures, related personally to and intentionally constituted by the triune God. Even though the truths of theology exceed natural reason, theological and philosophical truths agree, the latter assisting and being elevated by the former. The Incarnation and the Resurrection, for instance, cannot be understood purely through natural reason, as natural reason only judges through its experience. Nevertheless, these truths can never be deemed false if natural reason judges correctly, if it has been elevated to understand them: natural reason is not left behind in theological wisdom, but is rather, as Bonaventure would also say, made closer to its supernatural ground as far as is possible for it

75

See section III of this introduction and chapter 3.

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in this life.76 Conversely, the truths of the different sciences can never be deemed false by theology, if the theologian judges correctly. What is true seems false only to an ill-disposed judge; supernatural truths may seem false or impossible to a person unable to see beyond sensible reality, but not to a truly spiritual one. 77 Conclusions which contradict theological truth are by definition either false philosophy or inappropriate applications of philosophical principles beyond their proper domain. For example, a philosopher, even if he grants that God is infinite, may falsely deny that God can do immediately anything that He does through intermediate causes. This philosopher should rather admit that his knowledge of God, though it assents to divine infinity, does not extend to seeing how God actually manifests His infinite power.78 Accordingly this philosopher should not apply philosophical principles beyond their proper domain and rather admit that, since he does not know how God exists and acts infinitely, it is not correct to deny that God can do immediately what He does through intermediate causes. Similarly, a philosopher may deny the Trinity or the Incarnation on the grounds that these articles of faith contradict reason, because he fails to see how one substance can be three persons in the first case, or how the supernatural may intervene in nature in the second case. On the other hand, a heedless theologian may also misjudge true principles of philosophy as false, and this either because of ignorance of philosophy or theology or both. However, all philosophical errors may be dissolved by a true philosophy grounded in theological wisdom.79 76

Summa, art. 7, q. 13 (ed. Badius, fol. 62 rR): “Nihil enim aestimat posse fieri, nisi quod novit quomodo fiat. […] Et quamvis ita sit, quaecunque tamen vera sunt iudicio huius scientia, falsa non possunt in recto iudicio naturalis rationis, si ad ea capienda posset naturalis ratio elevari, sicut econverso quaecunque vera sunt iudicio vero rationalis in alia scientia, in recto iudicio huius scientiae falsa esse non possunt.” 77 Summa, art. 7, q. 13 (ed. Badius, fol. 62 rR-vR): “[...] sic hominem in puris naturalibus constitutum, qui naturaliter caecus est quo ad spiritualia et supernaturalia, licet per gratiam natus sit illuminari ad aspiciendum illa, impossibile est cognoscere vel iudicare in eis quae sunt supernaturalia et propria huic scientiae, quid verum et quid falsum, quae bene cognoscit et iudicat homo spiritualis per lumen fidei et intellectus, lumen superiori illustratus [...].” 78 Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 62 vS). 79 Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 62 vR): “[philosophia est] manuductiva ad veritatem theologicam et gradus ad illam. Unde rationes quae videntur ex principiis phi-

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Philosophy can help us clarify the truths of faith, even though philosophy by itself cannot demonstrate these truths. Thus Henry exemplifies Anselm’s intellectual project of faith seeking understanding (fides quaerens intellectum). However, with respect to his extensive use of philosophy to reach some insight into the Trinity, and of creatures in relation to the Trinity, he may be contrasted to his critic Godfrey of Fontaines80, for whom there is a more sharp separation between the truths of philosophy and those of Scripture, in a way that the former cannot be employed too greatly in clarifying the truths of the latter. For Henry, on the other hand, the central truths of theology are indeed taken on faith, but philosophy and spiritual living can help human beings better understand the objects of faith. Finally, as Bonaventure would also insist, philosophy itself should be purified and oriented by theology. For the end of philosophy, the ultimate divine ground and truth of all, surpasses human reason. Christian truth is there to direct and enhance the gaze of philosophy so that it may be elevated to be part of a theological wisdom that understands everything as grounded in the triune God.

losophiae constructae contrariae veritati fidei et theologiae, non ex veris principiis philosophiae, sed solum per errorem humanae industriae sunt constructae […] et ideo quia non sunt constructae ex principiis philosophiae omnes vere dissolubiles sunt. Et sicut per errorem naturalis rationis sunt constructae, vel circa vera principia philosophiae, vel male extendendo principia philosophiae ultra id quod extendi deberent, sic per directionem naturalis rationis vel ex se vel adiutorio supernaturalis illustrationis qua supernaturalia cognoscuntur, omnes possunt dissolvi.” 80 Cf., e.g., Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet IV, q. 10. See also the remarks on Godfrey in the Introduction, as well as in the entry entitled Godfrey of Fontaines, in: S. F. Brown - J. C. Flores, Historical Dictionary of Medieval Philosophy and Theology, Lanham, Md. - London, forthcoming. On Godfrey’s philosophy, see J. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines. A Study In Late Thirteenth Century Philosophy, Washington D.C., 1981.

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III—The Trinity and Henry’s Thought A glance at chief principles of Henry’s Trinitarian thought illustrates not only the intimate relation between his view of the Trinity and his view of reality, but also in some important instances the dependence of the latter on the former. The causes of creation are divine intellect and will. Prior to being causes of creation, however, divine intellect and will are the ground of the emanations by which God is constituted immanently as the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. It is, properly speaking, the intellect and will of the Trinity which cause the transitive emanations by which creatures are produced. The fundamental difference between the immanent and the creative emanations is that the products of the former assimilate the divine nature (intellect and will) perfectly in the sense that they are this nature, while the products of the latter— creatures—only imitate it.81 For the immanent fecundity by which God is necessarily what He is—the Trinity—is totally exhausted by the generation of the Son and the spiration of the Holy Spirit. Any other productions by God are by definition creative: though initiated by God, they end in what is extrinsic to God, in what only imitates or participates in the First Cause. Not only are the immanent emanations prior to the creative ones; they also are their causes. 82 For the intellect by which God knows what He creates is the intellect that is eternally perfected through the production of the Son, and the will by which God decides to create is the will that is eternally perfected through the production of the Holy Spirit. Understanding the Platonic ideas as in the intellect of God, as Augustine did, Henry accounts for the essential or quidditative features of all of reality through the exemplary causality of the divine intellect. For, in knowing himself essentially, God also knows himself as imitable in multifarious ways, thus knowing all that can be created. In knowing himself, He also knows the essences of all possible creatures, and so gives possible creatures an eternal and necessary 81

A discussion of the development in Judaeo-Christian intellectual history of the concept of God as begetter or producer of persons consubstantial with Him, and of the distinction as it unfolds historically between the conception of God as ‘creator’ and God as ‘begetter’, can be found in H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, vol. 1, Faith, Trinity and Incarnation, especially part 2. 82 See Appendix, ll. 259-260.

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being of essence (esse essentiae)83 as part of his immutable knowledge. The creature is necessarily possible, possessing an immutable certitude84 grounded in His knowledge, as Avicenna maintains.85 In 83

God’s knowledge is the reason (ratio) for creatures since God not only knows himself perfectly, but also all creatures as creatures different from him. See Quodl. IX, q. 2 (ed. Macken, Opera Omnia, XIII, Leuven, 1983, pp. 27-31), and J. Gómez Caffarena (Ser Participado, pp. 30-32). As Caffarena points out, for most other Christian thinkers the ideas are simply the divine essence inasmuch as it is able to be imitated. Henry, on the other hand, subtly distinguishes this essence as imitable and the essences that imitate, essences which, though without any proper existence, possess a certain consistency which permits their being distinguished from the divine essence which gives them being. The essence as imitable is thus the ratio idealis, while the essences are ideata—and this is still within the Christian correction of the Platonic ideas which places these ideas in the intellect of God. Finally, and on the basis of Henry’s text referenced above, Caffarena seems right when noting that Paulus (Henri de Gand, pp. 89-91) “al distinguir como dos ‘seres’ distintos en el conocimiento de las esencias por Dios, un esse rationis, correspondiente al que el entendimiento nuestro da a sus objetos, y el esse essentiae; y situar el uno más bien de la parte del sujeto (correspondiente pues a la idea, a la ratio idealis), y el otro de parte del objeto conocido (ideatum) [...] hace más insólita la naturaleza del ser de esencia, y por lo mismo más expuesta a serias objectiones. Pero creo que [...] el ser de esencia es el mismo esse rationis proprio de todo ser conocido en cuanto tal; pero de una especial consistencia por ser Dios quien lo forma” (ibid. pp. 32-33). 84 This is already res a ratitudine, i.e. already corroborated by the divine intellect as really possible, and not merely a name, which is res a reor, reris. For the different meanings of res in Henry, see, e.g., Quodlibet VII, q. 1-2 (ed. Wilson, Opera Omnia, XI, Leuven, 1991, pp. 27-28). For Henry’s theory of knowledge and truth, see Marrone, Truth and Scientific Knowledge; Paulus, Henri de Gand, pp. 1-10; Gómez Caffarena, Ser Participado, pp. 11-65. 85 Quodl. III, q. 9 (ed. Badius, fol. 61 rO-vO): “Iuxta illud quod dicit Avicenna in octavo Metaph.: Necesse esse cum sua certitudine est semper, et cum sua sempiternitate est per seipsum, et non per aliud a se. Caeterarum vero rerum quiditates non merentur esse, sed prout sunt in seipsis, non considerata relatione earum ad necesse esse, merentur privationem, et ob hoc sunt omnes, prout sunt in seipsis, falsae. Sed propter ipsum est certitudo earum, et respectu faciei sequentis sunt acquisita; et ob hoc omnis res perit nisi secundum id quod est versus faciem eius.” Moreover, “cum illud quod habet exemplar in Deo non potest ipsum non habere, quidquid in certitudine sua essentia est et res aliqua necesse est ipsum esse tale, et non potest non esse tale” (ibid. [ed. Badius, fol. 62 rS]).

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constituting the essential possibility of the creature, His knowledge is the exemplary cause of created being. 86 On the other hand, the concrete actualization of the possible creature, the giving of being of existence (esse existentiae) to the creature which at first has only mental being in God, is decreed exclusively by the free, efficient causality of the divine will.87 (Here Henry disagrees with Avicenna and with other Neoplatonists positing necessary creation, as explained in chapter 2.) This will only relies on the exemplary causality of the intellect as a necessary condition (causa sine qua non), since the will can only will what it knows, and never as a practical knowledge that determines the action of the will.88 Rather, the will is the cause of the divine intellect’s practical knowledge. For, the intellect knows actual created things, and so has knowledge of particulars, because from eternity it knows what the will does or does not, shall or shall not, create.89

86

Wherefore, “scientia aequivoce dicitur de scientia sua et nostra: sua enim scientia est causa entis; ens autem est causa scientiae nostrae” (Quodl. IX, q. 2, ed. R. Macken, Opera Omnia, XIII, Leuven, 1983, p. 28, ll. 69-71). 87 Thus creatures, as caused by God, firstly “ab huiusmodi scientia habent esse id quod sunt per essentiam, in cognitione interiori, ut a causa exemplari, et deinde per voluntatem per efficientiam, ut a causa efficiente, in existentia exteriori” (ibid. [ed. Macken, p. 34, ll. 29-31]). On the topic of creation in the history of Christian philosophy, and its background in Greek and Arabic philosophy, see Paulus, Henri de Gand, pp. 108-117. 88 Whence the constitution of the creature’s being of essence in God’s intellect is (intentionally) prior to its constitution in actual being through the creative act of divine will: “ex perfectione divina provenit quod a ratione ideali in Deo fluit in esse essentiae primo essentia creaturae, et secundo mediante dispositione divinae voluntatis in esse existentiae” (Summa, art. 68, q. 5 [ed. Badius, fol. 230 vV]). For an explanation of how the divine will relies on the divine intellect in creating, see chapter 2, section C. 89 Summa, art. 36, q. 5 (ed. G. Wilson, Opera Omnia, XXVIII, Leuven, 1994, pp. 124-126, ll. 48-52, 80-84, 95-98): “Duo sunt genera intelligibilium a divino intellectu. Quaedam quae naturaliter ei insunt, ut sunt ipsa eius essentia, et eius attributa, et proprietates, et cetera huiusmodi. Quaedam vero quae determinationi liberae voluntatis suae subsunt, ut sunt omnia quae nata sunt fieri circa creaturas. [...] Circa intelligibilia secundo modo, intelligendum quod dupliciter possunt considerari. Uno modo absolute, ratione quidditatis suae et essentiae, quae in certitudine sua sunt res aliquae, vel ratione suae existentiae, qua in effectu sunt effectus divinae volutatis. [...] Secundo autem modo non est per se et immediate ipsa divina essentia ratio intelligendi talia, sed medi-

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The being of essence and the being of existence, which (intentionally) compose the creature,90 are thus grounded respectively on the exemplary causality of divine intellect and on the efficient causality of divine will. This transitive, divine causality of intellect and will is derived from the immanent, natural order between generation and spiration which forms the Trinity, which order is itself derived from the rationally distinct fecundities (intellect and will) by which the emanations, and the persons emanated, proceed. Since the intrinsic constitution of the Trinity ultimately explains and is the cause of what extrinsically flows from the Trinity, Henry’s view of this constitution is axiomatic with respect to his view of the rest of being—created being. The creature reflects 91 the Trinity as an effect does its cause, beante divina voluntate, quae circa iam dicto modo cognita et intellecta determinat opus et productionem eorum in esse” (italics mine). 90 On this topic, see: E. Hocedez, “Gilles de Rome et Henri de Gand sur la distinction réele, 1276-1287,” in: Gregorianum, 8 (1927), pp. 358-385; Id., “Le premier Quodlibet d’Henri de Gand,” in: Gregorianum, 9 (1928), pp. 92117; Id. “Deux questions touchant la distinction réele de l’essence et de l’existence,” in: Gregorianum, 10 (1929), pp. 365-386; J. Paulus, Henri de Gand, chap. 5; Id., “Les Disputes d’Henri de Gand et Gilles de Rome sur la distinction de l’essence et de l’existence,” in: Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age, 13 (1942), pp. 323-358; P. Nash, “Giles of Rome on Boethius’ ‘Diversum est esse et id quod est’,” in: Medieval Studies, 12 (1950), pp. 59-71; A. Pattin, “Gilles de Rome O.E.S.A (ca. 1243-1316) et la distinction réelle de l’essence et de l’existence,” in: Revue de l’ Université d’ Ottawa, 23 (1953), pp. 80-116; J. Gómez Caffarena, Ser Participado, pp. 65146; P. Mazzarella, Controversie medievali. Unità e pluralità delle forme, Napoli, 1978; J. F. Wippel, “Godfrey of Fontaines and Henry of Ghent’s Theory of Intentional Distinction between Essence and Existence,” in: T. W. Köhler (ed.), Sapientiae procerum amore – Mélanges médiévistes offerts à dom J. P. Müller o.s.b. à l’occasion de son 70ème anniversaire, Roma, 1974, pp. 289-321; Id., “The Relationship between Essence and Existence in Late Thirteenth Century Thought: Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, James of Viterbo,” in: P. Morewedge (ed.), Philosophies of Existence: Ancient and Medieval, New York, 1982, pp. 131-164. 91 There is not true similarity between God and creatures, as God transcends created being, but only an imitation according to causal dependence: “Cum Deus sit causa effectiva omnium creaturarum, licet quorundam mediantibus aliis causis quarum quo ad hoc est primum principium remotissimum, necessario omnis creatura cum Deo secundum formam aliquam habet convenientiam, saltem secundum imitationem formae ad formam. Quare cum forma divina sit ipsum esse [...] necesse est dicere quod saltem in esse convenientia

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ing its image or symbol according to essence and existence. It is in this sense that Henry’s conception of reality is properly Christian. As J. Paulus has rightly pointed out, Henry almost invariably deals with the categories when dealing with theological issues, namely the application of our concepts to God and the role of relation in the constitution of the divine persons.92 As Paulus also comments, this does not mean that Henry does not have any peculiarly philosophical interest in the categories, as the sheer length of his writings on these subjects indicates.93 Regardless of what one may mean by pure philosophy or pure theology, however, when it comes to the thought of Henry of Ghent one ought to be careful not to make too much of an artificial distinction between these two realms. For it may lead us to disassociate elements which, though perhaps distinct and entailing different ranges of application, are articulated alongside one another as related parts of a coherent whole. This is especially true when appraising the nature and significance of fundamental principles articulated by Henry when accounting for the reality of the Trinity. In this context, issues which may be aligned, in other contexts, with either metaphysics or theology are neatly interwoven in one systematic fabric. What is certain, at any rate, is that these so-called theological subjects are of first importance to Henry and, thus, to his thought in general. Hence, when dealing with them, he draws thoroughly from imitationis communicet creatura cum creatore. Et ita quamvis in nulla convenientia realis similitudinis in aliqua forma significata nomine entis communicet, conveniunt tamen in ente convenientia imitationis formae ad formam, quarum unam significat ens inquantum convenit Deo, aliam vero inquantum convenit creaturae. Non ergo esse convenit Deo et creaturis univoce [...] nec tamen pure aequivoce [...] sed medio modo, scilicet analogice” (Summa, art. 21, q. 2 [ed. Badius, fol. 124 rH-I]) (italics mine). Creatures only “attribuuntur Deo ut uni fini et uni formae et uni efficienti. Ut fini, a quo perficiuntur quo ad bene esse, ut formae, a qua participant quod dicantur habere esse essentiae, ut efficienti, a quo habent quod eis conveniat simpliciter esse actualis existentiae” (Summa, art. 21, q. 2 [ed. Badius, fol. 124 vI]). 92 “Il semble justement qu’Henri n’aborde le problème des catégories qu’à l’occasion des thèmes théologiques agités par Boèce: application possible de nos concepts à l’Etre divin, rôle de la relation dans la constitution des Personnes. Et la solution présentée s’inspire certainement du souci de résoudre, de façon satisfaisante, ces questions de théologie” (Henri de Gand, pp. 152). 93 Ibid.

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the wealth of his learning, thereby showing with particular clarity his relation to his sources and tradition. Moreover, Henry’s articulation, in the Trinitarian context, of metaphysical principles which may and often do apply to other ‘non-theological’ areas is frequently, considering the causal priority of what is intrinsic over what is extrinsic to the Trinity, the model and rule through which to discern his application of these same principles to what in his eyes is posterior in being. Insofar as for Henry the realities which we denote through our metaphysical concepts are found in their highest possible perfection as belonging to the Trinity, his understanding of these realities in the Trinity94 provides us with the proper measure by which to appraise his conception of the Trinity’s imitative effects. Yet the two main works on Henry’s metaphysics, J. Paulus’ and J. Gómez Caffarena’s95 , do not investigate to any significant degree Henry’s account of the Trinity, even though it is in the context of such theological discussions, as Paulus himself admits, that Henry’s metaphysical positions and assumptions emerge most clearly and frequently. Even though, as shown, Henry does grant a proper domain to metaphysics, he nevertheless maintains that the ultimate truth of this domain should be appraised from the standpoint of theology. 94

For an explanation of how our categories should be transferred to God, see chapter 3 of this study, as well as Summa, art. 32, q. 5. Relevant to this discussion is Henry’s understanding of the analogy between uncreated (inderminate, indeterminable) being and created (indeterminate, determinable) being. For his notion of determination, see, e.g., Quodl. XV, q. 9 (ed. Badius, fol. 581 rV). Also relevant is Henry’s understanding of God as the measure of all things (see note 114 below). Concerning the theme of analogy in Henry, see the interpretations of J. Paulus (Henri de Gand, pp. 52-67), J. Gómez Caffarena (Ser Participado, chap. 7), and J. Decorte (“Henry of Ghent on Analogy”). Gómez Caffarena’s definition of Henry’s notion of analogy as a “unidad subjetiva en un concepto confuso, al que responden realidades diversas pero ontológicamente vinculadas, cognoscibles como diversas en una ulterior distinción del concepto” (ibid., p. 191), seem especially accurate. On the other hand, considering the causal link between creature and creator on which Henry’s notion of analogy seems to be largely based (see above), the remark that for Henry “l’analogie n’a plus vraiment de valeur noétique ou métaphysique, mais simplement psychologique” (Paulus, Henri de Gand, p. 63) seems misleading. 95 Cf. Paulus, Henri de Gand; Gómez Caffarena, Ser Participado. At one point at least (p. 56), the latter acknowledges the importance of the Trinitarian discussion for Henry’s epistemology and metaphysics.

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Certainly an analysis of the application of each and every metaphysical principle present in Henry’s account of the Trinity within the rest of his writings is outside of the scope of this study, and certainly beyond the limits of this Introduction. However, a few words in this section on substance and relation, the only categories having real being in God, illustrates the metaphysical relevance of Henry’s Trinitarian discussion. Considering that the Trinity, put simply, is the divine substance (intellect and will) constituted through relations of selfknowledge and self-love, it is not surprising that in Henry’s analysis of reality relation, traditionally the weakest Aristotelian category 96, plays a primordial role.97 In the First Cause, substance and relation are one and the same.98 Substance in God is intellect and will; relations in God are the respects by which intellect and will distinguish 96

See Appendix, ll. 102-121. Already in the 1930’s J. Paulus had noted that relation in Henry, understood in its general sense as relatedness or respect (respectus: esse ad aliud), namely as “cet être ordonné à autre chose, répond selon Henri à une notion non moins générale et première que le être pur et simple. Il est, avec l’essence et l’existence absolue, l’un des éléments de la représentation qui servent au philosophe belge à reconstruire le réel” (Henri de Gand, p. 181). On the importance of this category in Henry, see also J. Decorte, “Studies on Henry of Ghent. The Relevance of Henry’s Concept of Relation,” in: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales, 64/1 (1997), pp. 230-238. For a treatment of the category of relation in Scholasticism, including Henry’s distinctive position on the issue (in chapter 3), see M. Henninger, Relations. Medieval Theories 1250-1325, Oxford, 1989. On Henry’s theory of relations, see also R. Schönberger, Relation als Vergleich. Die Relationstheorie des Johannes Buridan im Kontext seines Denkens und der Scholastik, Leiden - New York, 1994, pp. 87-102; J. Decorte, “Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent on the Reality of a Real Relation,” in: Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale, 7 (1996), pp. 183-211; Id., “Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent on God’s Relation to the World,” in: Mediaevalia, 3 (1993), pp. 91-106; Id., “Creatio and conservatio as relatio,” in: E. P. Bos (ed.), John Duns Scotus (1265/6-1308). Renewal of Philosophy, Amsterdam, 1998, pp. 27-49; Id., “Modus or Res: Scotus’ Criticism of Henry of Ghent’s Conception of the Reality of a Real Relation,” in: L. Sileo (ed.), Via Scoti: Methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti, Rome, 1995, pp. 407-429. 98 Summa, art. 55, q. 5 (ed. Badius, fol. 109 vD): “In divinis non magis debilis est modus relationis quam substantiae, nec res relationis quam substantiae, quia est una et eadem.” 97

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themselves from themselves when knowing and loving themselves. Accordingly, substance and relation are one and the same in God, because the relations implied in self-knowledge and self-love distinguish themselves only in reference to each other, remaining identical to the singular, simple nature or substance which assumes these relations. However, that the divine nature constitutes itself in act as the Trinity through these relations, rather than diminishing the reality of divine relations to mere circumstances of substance, raises the ontological status of these relations to that of substance. At this level, substance is to relation as natural fecundity (intellect and will) is to its immanent or notional perfection (the Trinity), as (actualized) potency is to its actuality, as essence is to its existence; in Aristotelian terms, as second substance (substantial form) is to first substance (supposite), or, more precisely, as second substance is to that by which it is first substance. In turn, the creature is a symbol of God’s self-relational, triune nature. The creature’s being of essence is its relation to the divine intellect, founded in this intellect as an essence that imitates God’s essence. The creature’s being of existence is the relation of the created essence, itself a relation according to essence, to the divine will, founded in this will as actualized and preserved by it. 99 Moreover, relation is the principle of order among created beings.100 Through his 99

Quodlibet X, q. 7 (ed. R. Macken, Opera Omnia, XIV, Leuven, 1981, p. 154, ll. 25-29): “Re vera existere creaturae non est existere simpliciter et absolute, sed solius esse creatoris est tale, sed esse creaturae non est existere nisi sub quadam dependentia ad manutenentiam creatoris, et ita in quodam respectu quem creatura habet ad Deum, primo ex actu creationis, secundo ex actu conservationis” (italics mine). For Henry’s view of the relation Godcreatures, see J. Decorte, “Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent on God’s Relation to the World”; Id., “Creatio and conservatio as relatio”; J. Paulus, Henri de Gand, pp. 184-185; J. Gómez Caffarena, Ser Participado, pp. 109132, 146-156. 100 Relation and order not only spring from the same source, but are the same thing: “relatio per se et secundum esse nihil aliud est quam quidam ordo essentialis unius ad alterum, fundatus in natura et essentia eorum. Quae ex hoc habet quod sit res et realis relatio, quia scilicet in aliqua reali natura et essentia fundatur. Et similiter ipse ordo ab eodem habet quod sit res et ordo realis, quia idem sunt ordo et relatio” (Quodl. III, q. 4 [ed. Badius, fol. 53 rV]). And it is when speaking of relatio, that we obtain Henry’s notion of ordo. For more details, see J. Decorte, “Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent,” pp. 207209. On Henry’s notion of relation as a (formal) principle of order, one can discern the influence of Simplicius. On Simplicius’ view of relation, see C.

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own conception and use of relations, Henry shares in his own way in the spirit of Bonaventure’s interpretation of creation as a symbol of the Trinity. When arguing for the real distinction between the persons, Henry develops a highly sophisticated and rather innovative 101 theory of relation, which he consistently applies throughout his writings. In brief, relation is a mode of being identical to its foundation. A relation is nothing else than an absolute thing (res) or foundation in a relation to another—a relative mode of the foundation. Relation is identical to its foundation subjectively, while in an order to its term or object it is distinct from this term, even if this term is its own foundation in a different respect. In Henry’s technical language, the divine persons are relative modes assumed by the divine substance, inasmuch as this simple substance both knows and loves itself perfectly. In God, relation stands for the formal modes by which the divine substance, the material principle, as it were, of the Trinity, is actual as three persons; in creatures relation stands for the formal aspects (rationes) through which the three absolute things (res), namely those proper to substance, quantity, and quality 102, result in Luna, “La relation chez Simplicius,” in: I. Hadot (ed.), Simplicius. Sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie, Berlin - New York, 1987, pp. 113-147. 101 Some of the major influences on Henry’s theory of relation are Boethius (e.g. in Summa, art. 55, q. 6; see Appendix), Avicenna (e.g. in Quodl. III, q. 4), and Simplicius (e.g. in Quodl. IX, questions 1-3). Henry also adopts, like most scholastics, basic Aristotelian presuppositions on relation (which can be found in the Categories, Physics, and Metaphysics), such as his position that a categorial relation is an accident. A helpful treatment of the medieval views on the category of relation, including Henry’s, and of the history of the problem, can be found in M. Henninger, Relations. Medieval Theories 1250-1325. 102 These res are called absolute because they are, according to their rationes, irreducible to each other. The same thing cannot be both in itself (substance) and in another (accident: quality or quantity); moreover, the same thing cannot both measure the subject (what quantity does) and inform it (what quality does). Substance, quantity, and quality are thus absolute categories in the sense that their modes of being are absolute: “Istorum autem trium modorum essendi duo primi ita sunt diversi, quod omnino repugnantes, nec possunt fieri circa eandem rem. Ei enim rei cui convenit esse in se, nullo modo potest convenire esse in alio dico «inhaerendo» [...] res cui convenit esse inhaerendo, pertinet ad duo praedicamenta quorum rationes diversae sunt et repugnantes, ut circa eandem rem esse non possint: inesse enim mensurando nullo modo convenire potest rei qualitatis, neque rei quantitatis inesse afficiendo” (Quodl.

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the ten categories of reality. For every category consists of thing (res) and formal aspect (ratio), its material and formal principles respectively. Yet there are only three things (res) in reality, that of substance whose formal aspect (ratio) is to subsist in itself, of quantity whose formal aspect (ratio) is to measure the subject, and of quality whose formal aspect (ratio) is to inform the subject. The other seven categories consist of the things (res) of these categories with distinct, relative formal aspects (rationes) or modes.103 While in God the divine substance simultaneously has both absolute and relative subsistence, for it is a substance in three relative persons, among creatures the same thing (res) may have at the same time both absolute and relative modes of being, in the way that the thing (res) of quality subsists both absolutely inasmuch as it informs its subject and relatively inasmuch as it is similar, and thus related, to another quality. In God relation is real insofar as it stands for the real modes assumed by the divine substance as the Trinity; among creatures it is also real as the formal respects by which absolute things are VII, q. 1-2 [ed. G. Wilson, Opera Omnia, XI, Leuven, 1991, pp. 28-29, ll. 9700, 18-21]). Yet these absolute res are compatible with, and may assume, relative modes of being. On the difference between substance, quantity and quality, on the one hand, and relations, on the other, see chapter 3. 103 Quodl. VII, q. 1-2 [ed. G. Wilson, Opera Omnia, XI, Leuven, 1991, pp. 34-35, ll. 61-66): “In tota enim universitate creaturarum non sunt nisi tres res trium primorum praedicamentorum, substantiae scilicet, et quantitatis et qualitatis: cetera autem omnia [praedicamenta] sunt rationes atque intentiones intellectus circa illas tres res, non habentes aliquid propriae realitatis nisi quia fundantur in rebus illorum praedicamentorum.” Moreover, these rationes which, together with the three absolute res, constitute the other seven categories of reality are relative: “Esse [...] ad aliud distinguitur secundum diversos modos essendi ad aliud in septem praedicamenta” (ibid., p. 29, ll. 22-23). Since there are only three res in the universe, relation stands for a real thing and is a name of first imposition when it denotes a res in a relation, while it is a name of second imposition when it stands for the formal, relative mode itself (i.e. the respect or relatedness) by which the res is related. (Relation is discussed further in chapter 3.) Henry’s reduction of categorial res to substance, quanity and quality appears as an important step towards the (nominalist and conceptualist) theories of fourteenth-century thinkers, such as William of Ockham, Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, and Peter Auriol (cf. Paulus, Henri de Gand, pp. 197-198). Nevertheless there is a fundamental sense in which for Henry the other (relative) categories are also real, which would explain his influence on realist conceptions of the categories, such as that of Duns Scotus.

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really related to other things. However, in God there is only a rational distinction104 between relation and essence, for the divine essence necessarily and eternally subsists in a Trinity of self-relations, while in creatures there is an intentional distinction105 between a relation and the absolute thing which serves as its foundation. For among creatures an absolute thing may cease or begin to assume a given relative mode of being (as when the similarity between two things is destroyed with the destruction of one of the two things). 106 Yet, when a created thing is related to another, the thing and its relative mode are identical (just as the divine essence is identical with the persons), and only intentionally distinct, in the way that a quality and this same quality as similar are identical and only intentionally distinct. Yet relation is real as a real mode of its foundation; the relations assumed by the things (res) of the three absolute categories diversifies them into the ten categories. And the relations among absolute things order these same things. Relations order things in the world in a fashion analogous to the way in which the Trinity possesses a definite and necessary structure through its self-relations. However, not only is relation a pervasive, ordering principle among creatures; it is the constitutive principle of the very being of the creature, which Henry defines as being towards another (esse ad aliud).107 While the divine persons are constituted in actual being in104

For the meaning of ‘rational distinction’ in Henry, see Paulus, Henri de Gand, pp. 237-242. 105 For the meaning of ‘intentional distinction’ in Henry, see Paulus, Henri de Gand, pp. 220-237. 106 The same applies with respect to the distinction between essence and existence, which in creatures is intentional while in God it is rational. This is not surprising if we consider that actual existence in God, i.e. that of the divine persons, is a relation of the divine essence, while in creatures existence is also a relation of the created essence, i.e. founded in this essence, to God as efficient cause. For the essence (proper to creatures), in and of itself, is only possible. Existence entails an added relation of this possible essence, a relation which makes the essence actual and an individual due to the creative causality of divine will. 107 Summa, art 35, q. 8 (ed. Wilson, Opera Omnia, XXVIII, Leuven, 1994, p. 82, ll. 75-79): “Esse creaturae relatio vera realis est, secundum scilicet generalem usum relationis. Est enim verus respectus ad Creatorem, et per ipsum omnis essentia creaturae relationem et respectum habet secundum dependentiam quandam ad Deum.” Moreover, the creature is a being towards another

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asmuch as their essential foundation assumes personal relations, every creature has both essential and existential being through a twofold relation of dependence, according to exemplarity and efficiency, to God as to its ontological ground. 108 Now the divine essence is an actual and necessary Trinity through relations according to origin: the Father generates first and is thus ungenerated, the Son is generated by intellect and the Holy Spirit is spirated by will. Within God, relations produce only the numerically same nature, distinguished as persons inasmuch as this nature knows and loves itself. The creature, on the other hand, though constituted through its relation of dependence to its origin, is a numerically different nature which only imitates its cause. For the creature does not receive the divine essence itself, as the Son and the Holy Spirit do, but only a particular essence and existence through the creative act of God. The creature is an absolute nature only as a discrete individual, unlike the divine nature which is absolute in being wholly uncaused and transcendent.109 In both God and creatures there is a certain priority, according to our mode of understanding, of essence over existence inasmuch as in both cases actual existence is a relation of essence. That relation is founded in, and a mode of, an absolute thing, and not conversely, means that the absolute foundation is intelligible without its relations while the reverse is not true—quality does not presuppose the accident of similarity while the accident of similarity always presupposes quality. The divine essence may be considered absolutely as God without reference to any one of its relative modes or persons, while the intelligibility of a person necessarily includes the essence, for a according to both essence and existence, according to its constitutive metaphysical principles: “[...] tale esse [essentiae] non convenit alicui nisi cuius ratio exemplaris est in intellectu divino, per quam natum est fieri in rebus extra. Ita quod sicut ex relatione et respectu ad ipsam ut ad causam efficientem, habet quod sit ens in effectu, sic ex relatione quadam et respectu ad ipsam ut ad formam extra rem, habet quod sit ens aliquod per essentiam” (Quodl. III, q. 9 [ed. Badius, fol. 61 rO]). 108 Quodl. VIII, q. 8 (ed. Badius, fol. 312 vD): “Sciendum [...] quod creaturae ad Deum dupliciter habent comparationem. Uno modo secundum suas essentias, ut secundum rationes ideales speculativas sunt quaedam exemplata ipsius. Alio modo secundum suas existentias, ut secundum rationes ideales practicas sint quaedam operata sive operanda ab ipso.” 109 This is clarified in chapter 3 of this study, when contrasting divine and human persons.

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person is the essence in a given respect. Hence, just as a relation necessarily presupposes its foundation, and not conversely, existence necessarily presupposes essence, while the reverse is not true, since the essence is a specific quidditative content in the divine intellect which may or may not be actualized by divine will. Existence presupposes essence as a relation does its foundation and as willing does knowing as a necessary condition. In both God and creatures, actual existence and individuality are inseparable; the existence of God is that of the three, really distinct, persons, while the actual existence of a creature determines an essence into being something singular, undivided in itself though divided from every other singular.110 In creatures, existence is always that of a concrete and individuated essence, while the possible essence is in itself absolute with respect to the many singulars to which it is in potency. For, together with existence, the created substance receives individual subsistence.111 Even though the creature as a creature is always an existing and individuated essence, a twofold effect of divine intellect and will, its essence (which is itself related to the divine intellect according to participation) serves as the intentional foundation of the relation of actual existence to the divine will. Existence is an intention added to that of the absolute essence when this essence is actualized and individualized.112 Thus the essence is independent of, and distinct from, 110

For his theory of individuation and his criticisms of Aquinas and Aristotle, see chapter 3, sections A and B. 111 Henry reserves the term ‘subsistence’ to denote the mode of existence peculiar to substances which exist in themselves. Existence, in a broad sense, applies to absolute accidents, form, and matter, which only exist as part of something and not in themselves, as well as to substances. Thus, using the term existence in a broad sense, substances both subsist and exist, while accidents, precisely speaking, only exist. In other words, that which “dicitur esse rei verum, ut est esse existentiae in re extra animam […] est duplex; quoddam enim est esse existentiae simpliciter dictum, quod est esse rei extra animam, sed in alio, ut sunt esse materiae et formae in composito, quoddam vero est esse subsistentiae, quod est esse suppositi rei in se subsistentis” (Summa, art. 27, q. 1 [ed. Badius, fol. 163 rT-V]). 112 For the essence in itself is only possible, having no actuality of its own which would make it really distinct from existence. It only has mental being—being of essence—which is naturally suited to exist actually by a determination of divine will. The essence only has ‘true’ being when it is made into

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existence only intentionally: the absolute, possible essence may be understood independently of any of its particular instantiations wherein it is concretely actualized, but it is not really separable from existence.113 God’s knowledge of the possible essence as already actualized in existence involves the added intention of actual existence over and above that of the possible essence as absolute (i.e. without reference to any existing singular). Wherefore, existence is properly an intentional accident of essence. Our intellect finds the intentional order and distinction between essence and existence in the creature resulting from the conjoined causality of divine intellect and will. Just as the divine persons are identical to their foundation, as any relation is, the creature is not really distinct from its constitutive relation to its ontological ground. Whence every creature is properly a being towards another (esse ad aliud), a participated being which imitates its cause according to essence and existence. 114 Its being is like an existing, individual thing. Thus, arguing against a real distinction between essence and existence (especially Giles of Rome’s), Henry is explicit in affirming that “esse [...] simpliciter et absolute non dicitur res aliqua nisi ab eo quod est ens existens in effectu in rerum natura” (Summa, art. 21, q. 4 [ed. Badius, fol. 127 rM]) (italics mine). Existence, therefore, in the scientific plane on which the metaphysician operates, only adds an intention to the absolute, possible essence by which this essence is understood as an individualized effect of, and thus related to, divine will, even though essence and existence are never separable in reality. Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 128 rS): “Licet enim ipsum esse eius [creaturae] non sit res alia essentiae addita, ut supra ostensum est, alia tamen est intentio essentiae et esse in creatura, ut sit alia ratio et intentio creaturae ut res et essentia est, alia vero ratio eius ut ens et in effectu est.” For Henry’s conception of the intentional aspect of metaphysics, one influenced by Avicenna, see Paulus, Henri de Gand, pp. 10-18, and Gómez Caffarena, Ser Participado, pp. 11-65. 113 Summa, art. 27, q. 1 (ed. Badius, fol. 162 rN): “[...] esse [existentiae] creaturae respectu esse creatoris comparatum vera relatio est realis et essentialis secundum rem fundata in essentia rei productae.” 114 Henry’s view of the creature as an imitation of God comes out with particular clarity when he develops his theory of God as the measure of being and knowing (see Quodl. IX, q. 2; XI, q. 11, and the excellent discussion by Gómez Caffarena, Ser Participado, pp. 147-156). God, as the Measure, is the principle of knowing the degrees of perfection of being, which Measure by definition transcends what is measured. In short, the creature is a reflection or imitation of the First Cause because it participates, in a limited way and according to its particular composition of essence and existence, in God’s infi-

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that of a reflection, consisting in a complete relativity in regard to what causes it and is reflected—Subsistent Being.115 The creature’s limited and finite perfections reflect God’s unlimited and infinite perfection. Unlike God who is being itself, the creature has being,116 or is participated being, as J. Gómez Caffarena explains in detail. 117 For the being of the creature entails a double, intentional composition, 1) a composition constitutive of essence—between a) the element (aliquitas)118 that determines the being of essence into being something by essence, and b) the being of essence itself 119 (in which the nite perfection which lies in His being an identity of essence and existence. “Et sic mensura dicitur [Deus] hic propriissime, quia naturam continet puram esse, et secundum veritatem simplicitatis; et essentia creata dicitur mensurata, quia continet esse et aliquitatem, ut participatam per quandam imitationem ad esse et aliquitatem Dei, et per quandam compositionem” (Quodl. XI, q. 11 [ed. Badius, fol. 466 rO]) (italics mine). Thus, the higher the degree of perfection of a creature, the more it approximates (i.e. the better it imitates) God’s, who is the measure of all perfections: “Quaelibet res creata tanto est perfectior in natura et essentia sua, quanto plus appropinquat in natura essendi Deo, qui est ipsum esse” (Summa, art. 42, q. 2 [ed. L. Hödl, Opera Omnia, XXIX, Leuven, 1998, p. 36, ll. 21-23]). 115 Summa, art. 27, q. 1 (ed. Badius, fols. 161 vN-162 rN): “[...] ad modum quo imago resplendens in speculo ad rectam oppositionem obiecti in nihilum cedit obiecto a recta oppositione recedente, et ita ad modum esse verorum relativorum, quorum esse est ad aliud quodam modo, hoc est per quandam dependentiam essentialem se habere; sic se habet esse creaturae, quia nisi se haberet ad ipsum per dependentiam essentialem ut causatum ad causam, aut creatura non haberet esse omnino, aut si aliquod haberet illud esset esse absolutum omnino independens, non egens causante aut conservante, quod impossibile est poni in creatura.” 116 Quodl. V, q. 6 (ed. Badius, fol. 161 vO): “[Res creaturarum] in hoc inter se conveniunt, quod significant rem quae est natura et essentia aliqua cui convenit esse; et differunt a re increata quod illa est natura et essentia quae est ipsum esse.” 117 Ser Participado, pp. 65-156. 118 This is a term used in Henry’s mature articulation of this view (e.g., Quodl. XI, q. 4) to denote the element which opposes itself to, and determines, esse in the constitution of the finite essence. See Gómez Caffarena, Ser Participado, pp. 111-112. 119 Quodl. V, q. 2 (ed. Badius, fol. 154 rD-vE): “[...] res creata in simplicitate essentiae suae absque existentia actuali considerata, rationem compositionis habet ex quod est et quo est, sive ex essentia inquantum est ipsa realitas dicta,

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essence participates without exhausting it), and 2) another between essence and existence. This double composition is due to a twofold potentiality of essence. The essence participates in essential being (produced by God’s knowledge of himself as imitable) since it is only something according to essence and not the plenitude of essential being. Whence, even though in the creature essential being and being something by essence are identical, they differ intentionally: the creature has essential being unqualifiedly in being a similitude of God, while it is something by essence in virtue of its specific essence which founds the creature’s participative relation to God according to similitude.120 The essential being, absolutely considered, is potential with respect to these specific determinations not in a passive sense, but rather in being a transcendent, fontal source, a virtually inclusive, inner richness out of which essential specifications proceed.121 The paret ipso esse participato; ut secundum hoc omnis essentia creaturae recedit a divina simplicitate in qua essentia est ipsum esse.” On the evolution of Henry’s view of the intentional composition of essence, see Gómez Caffarena, Ser Participado, pp. 94-108. 120 Quodl. X, q. 7 (ed. R. Macken, Opera Omnia, XIV, Leuven, 1981, pp. 169-170, ll. 74-85, 88-99): “[...] licet res sive essentia creaturae ab eodem secundum rem habet esse essentiae et esse aliquid per essentiam, inter se tamen differunt intentione, quemadmodum animal et rationale inter se differunt intentione, ut dictum est, quia quod est aliquid generis alicuius secundum se, esse participat ut est similitudo quaedam divinae essentiae secundum rationem causae formalis, praeter hoc quod animal simpliciter est genus ad hominem simpliciter, de cuius ratione sunt animal et rationale, esse autem essentiae [ed.: existentiae] simpliciter, quod consequitur decem praedicamenta, non est genus omnino [...] sed solummodo rationem generis habet, hoc scilicet aliquid cui convenit esse. Nec tamen aliquid cui convenit esse, habet rationem unius generis ad substantiam et accidens, quia non eadem ratione eis convenit esse [...]. Licet ergo res sive essentia creaturae ab eodem secundum rem habet esse et esse aliquid, quia tamen differunt inter se intentione, ab alio secundum intentionem habet esse et ab alio habet esse aliquid. Esse enim habet eo quod est divina similitudo, esse vero aliquid habet ratione eius in quo fundatur respectus similitudinis illius. [...] Unde esse aliquid dicitur quadam ratione sui generis, esse autem divina quadam participatione.” (Mss. CHOSU i. m. T in the apparatus of the Leuven edition, i.e. all except A, as well as in Badius [fol. 418 vS], read ‘essentiae’ for line 81, which reading fits the context.) 121 In this, Gómez Caffarena has clarified the influence of the Liber De Causis, and of the neoplatonic tradition in general, in Henry’s metaphysics. See the important discussion in Ser Participado, pp. 119-123.

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ticular essence which participates in, and entails a composition with, essential being, is also potential with respect to actual existence.122 But neither is its potentiality merely passive, since it consists of an indefinite capacity to be multiplied into individuals of a determinate species in actual existence. The composition internal to the essence makes the created essence finite, while the composition between essence and existence makes the creature contingent. This double composition corresponds to a double identity of infinity and necessity in God.123 For the being of God, unlike that of the creature, has no quiddity which limits the plenitude of His essential being, nor is his essence in potency to actual existence. God is rather the identity of infinite essential content and the actuality of this content. He is being (Esse) by essence, subsistent being which, as such, cannot be from another.124 More precisely, God is the Trinity, whose constitutive emanations are the ultimate cause of all essential and existential being. The Subsistent Being that Caffarena competently analyses is, properly speaking, subsistent intellect and will, constituted through a twofold self-relation of knowledge and love, which self-relation grounds created being in its essential and existential being respectively. Participated being is, properly speaking, creatures—reflections of the Trinity. Like any reflection, the creature has being and true intelligibility only in regard to what causes it, in regard to the Creator that is itself reflected. In such a conception of reality, the intrinsic, triune nature of the Creator is primordial.

122

Since the essence as possible is intentionally composed of essential being simply and aliquitas, its potency to existence must also consists of a twofold intentional potentiality (which is nevertheless one in reality) to existence, which corresponds to its composition as essential possible. That is, the essence is fundamentally in potency to existence simply, inasmuch as it participates in the being of essence. Secondly, the essence is in potency to determinate existence, inasmuch as it is limited or specified by the aliquitas. Whence any existing determinate being is reducible to being simply, for all beings are created out of the plenitude of essential being, in which they participate in limited ways. See the crucial passage in Quodl. X, q. 7 (ed. Macken, p. 171, ll. 99-21), where Henry quotes the Liber De Causis. 123 Cf. Gómez Caffarena, Ser Participado, p. 157. 124 Summa, art. 21, q. 4 (ed. Badius, fol. 127 vR): “Ipse esse suum habet a se formaliter, effective autem a nullo [...].”

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This study, focused primarily on Henry’s conception of the Trinity, seeks not only to add substantive material to the already published research on Henry of Ghent, but also to help provide a fresh perspective through which to appraise his system in light of truths which he considered fundamental and pervasive. As shown, his understanding of intellect and will as intrinsic principles of the Trinity, and of substance and relation as its constitutive categories, illuminates his conception and application of these themes in other areas of his thought. By developing the Trinity and its general role in Henry’s thought, this book intends also to encourage future investigation into Henry’s Trinitarian thought and into the concrete manifestations of this fundamental topic in other aspects of his work.

CHAPTER 1: THE TRINITY IN ITSELF Henry’s account of the Trinity is motivated and inspired by faith. (In turn, his account of creation as a free act of God is based on the Trinity, and to this extent it also relies on faith.) This he intimates when speaking about the difficulty in understanding the real, divine relations according to origin, “which preoccupies us exceedingly in regard to divine matters, where we must posit according to the Faith and the sayings of the Saints that among the divine persons there exists real relation, lest we posit that the persons are distinguished only by reason.”1 Moreover, specifying what is at stake in question 3 of Article 54, he claims: “This question only investigates if in God there is some emanation that is a divine action remaining immanently, whereby a person is apt to proceed from another, taking ‘procession’ broadly as referring to generation and spiration in common. And it must be said that the Catholic Faith necessarily affirms that this is so, even though it may be difficult for it to understand this mystery.”2 However, Henry also considers his account to be a rational proof of what is believed: “from faith we posit these emanations in God, while through the direction of reason we can prove their intrinsic necessity.”3 Accordingly, Henry’s starting point is that there exist two emanations constitutive of the Trinity, one by intellect and one by will.4 And he uses philosophy to inform his premise. However, in God an immanent act does not exist, nor can exist, except the act of the will and that of the intellect. For in God there cannot exist more or less. Not more, because in the whole nature of things containing the Creator and 1

See Appendix, ll. 93-95. Summa, art. 54, q. 3 (ed. Badius, fol. 79 rO): “Quaestio ista non quaerit nisi utrum in divinis sit aliqua emanatio quae est actio divina manens intra, qua persona nata est procedere ab alia, large sumendo processionem ut communis est ad generationem et spirationem. Et est dicendum quod sic necesse habet ponere fides catholica, quamquam sit difficile eam hoc mysterium capere [...].” 3 Quodl. VI, q. 2 (ed. G. Wilson, Opera Omnia, X, Leuven, 1987, p. 36, ll. 97-98): “[...] ex fide tenemus istas emanationes in Deo, ipsarum necessitatem in se manuductione rationis possumus probare [...].” 4 Summa, art 53, q. 9 (ed. Badius, fol. 72 vC): “In Deo sunt tantum duo modi emanandi personam a persona, scilicet per modum naturae [i.e. intellectus] unius, et per modum voluntatis alius.” 2

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creatures, there cannot be more principles that act through themselves than nature and will, according to all the philosophers and theologians that discuss the principles that act through themselves. Not less, because there is no intellect without will, nor conversely [is there will without intellect], as Damascene says in book II, chapter 17. Nor can the cognitive [power] exist without appetite, even at the merely sensible [level of life], as the Philosopher determines in De Anima, II. And every substance separate from matter, of which kind God is above all, is necessarily an intelligence. 5

On the basis that God is, and acts by, intellect and will, Henry proceeds to establish how the two immanent divine emanations constitute the Trinity. This he does primarily through an analysis of intellect and will as natural fecundities. Henry’s analysis of the revealed Trinity is a classic example of faith seeking understanding, of reason seeking some comprehension of what is truly transcendent and can therefore initially only be sought through the guidance of belief.6 This analysis, however, entails a thorough use of philosophy. 1A—Henry’s Basic Approach to the Trinity In question 1 of article 60 of his Summa, Henry of Ghent informs us of finding, in a section of Augustine’s lengthy Trinitarian reflections, what he considers to be the key to the solution to the question of the distinction between the emanations (generation and spiration), as well as the persons, of the Trinity. The key to the solution is the observation that the mind’s intellectual act of saying a word, and its subsequent willing act of enjoying what it knows in this word, differ because the word proceeds as a cognitive image, while

5

Quodl. VI, q. 1 (ed. G. Wilson, Opera Omnia, X, Leuven, 1987, pp. 11-12, ll. 30-40): “Actus autem in Deo manens intra non est, neque potest esse, nisi actus voluntatis et intellectus. Plures enim in Deo non possunt, nec pauciores. Non plures, quia in tota rerum natura continente Creatorem et creaturam, non possunt esse plura principia agentia per se nisi natura et voluntas, secundum omnes philosophos et theologos loquentes de principiis agentibus per se. Non pauciores, quia non est intellectus sine voluntate, nec e converso, ut dicit Damascenus libro II, cap. 17. Neque cognitivum potest esse sine appetito, etiam in sensibili tantum, ut determinat Philosophus in II De Anima. Omnis autem substantia separata a materia, qualis maxime Deus est, necessario intelligentia est […].” 6 See also his remarks in art. 22, q. 4, ad 3.

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the enjoyment or love does not.7 This is true, even though love always proceeds from cognition, in the sense that it presupposes it, and even though love and the word are always joined in the willing and knowing mind. 8 Accordingly Henry, seeing himself in agreement with Augustine, derives his own solution “from the difference of ways of emanating through the diverse eliciting principles [i.e. intellect and will]”9 of the divine nature. God is really triune by nature, because His nature is intellect and will. Intellect and will are rationally distinct, “for willing is not a type of understanding, nor conversely [is understanding a type of willing] . . . We can understand those things we do not will, but we cannot will those things we do not understand or know, according to

7

After discussing at length passages of Augustine’s De Trinitate, relevant to the distinction between the emanations (which distinction is for Henry also the basis of the distinction among the persons, as explained in this chapter), Henry pauses to clarify what to his mind is the true solution of Augustine, only hinted at by the latter briefly in a key passage: “Unde quia per praedicta non sufficienter distinguit [Augustinus] generationem et spirationem, in fine capituli [i.e., lib. XV, cap. XXVII] breviter innuit veram distinctionem inter illa ex differentia modorum emanandi secundum principia elicitiva diversa, ut supra determinatum est, dicens, ‘Quando quod scimus dicimus, ex illo quod novimus cognitio nostra formatur. Fitque in acie cogitantis imago simillima cognitioni eius quam memoria continebat, ista duo scilicet velut parentem et prolem tertia voluntate sive dilectione iungente. Quam quidem voluntatem de cognitione procedere dicimus, nemo enim vult quod omnino quid vel quale sit nescit, non tamen esse cognitionis imaginem, et ideo quandam in hac re intelligibili nativitatis et processionis [i.e., generationis et spirationis] insinuari distantiam’” (Summa, art. 60, q. 1 [ed. Badius, fol. 156 vC]). In the passage immediately after this text, Henry explains further how what is implicit and explicit in Augustine, concerning the emanations, is to be understood. This interpretation of Augustine agrees with Henry’s own premises on the actual constitution of the Trinity, which in fact are operative from the very beginning (art. 53) of his formal Trinitarian discussion in the Summa, as well as in other texts, such as Quodl. VI, q. 1 (“Utrum sint tantum tres personae in divinis, nec plures nec pauciores”). 8 Augustine comments: “Cum mens se novit et amat, iungitur ei amore verbum eius, et quoniam amat notitiam et novit amorem, et verbum in amore est et amor in verbo, et utrunque in amante atque dicente” (Summa, art. 60, q. 1 [ed. Badius, fol. 154 rP]). 9 Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 156 vC).

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Augustine.”10 Therefore, even though these faculties always co-exist in and as the mind (and hence are not distinct as separate things), each communicates its shared nature in its own way. Accordingly, as Augustine rightly understood, an analysis of our incidental and limited mental productions gives us some insight into the truly natural and necessary productions constitutive of the Trinity: We must understand that all those things which are found in us regarding intellect and will through a temporal sequence, are found correspondingly in God in the permanence of eternity. For there is in God a certain essential knowledge in the Father, like there is in us a first incomplete knowledge of a thing which precedes all desire and love, and in a first instance excites love’s desire to seek about what is known a perfect knowledge. “For no one,” as [Augustine] says in [On the Trinity] book 15, chapter 27, “wills that of which he altogether ignores what or which kind of thing it is.” To this love in us corresponds in the Father an essential love delighted in the Word conceived from the paternal mind informed, as it were, by an actual essential knowledge; and this delight corresponds in us to the desire seeking a perfect knowledge which, once obtained, that will is perfected and love out of the one that enjoys comes to be, proceeding both out of the generating mind and from the generated knowledge, to which corresponds in God the proceeding love which is the Holy Spirit. 11

10

Summa, art. 54, q. 6 (ed. Badius, fol. 93 rN): “[…] non enim velle est intelligere quoddam nec econverso […] Intelligere enim possumus quae non volumus, sed velle non possumus quae non intelligimus sive cognoscimus, secundum Augustinum.” See also the similar discussion in Quodl. VI, q. 1 (ed. G. Wilson, Opera Omnia, X, pp. 4-7). 11 Summa, art. 54, q. 6 (ed. Badius, fol. 98 vG): “Intelligendum quod omnibus illis quae inveniuntur in nobis ex parte intellectus et voluntatis et per discursum temporis, in Deo inveniuntur correspondentia in permanentia aeternitatis. Est enim in Deo quaedam notitia essentialis in Patre, quemadmodum in nobis est prima notitia rei incompleta quae omnem appetitum et amorem praecedit, et primo excitat appetitum amoris ad inquirendum de cognito notitiam perfectam. ‘Nemo enim,’ ut dicit [Augustinus] lib. 15, cap. 27, ‘vult quod omnino quid vel quale sit nescit.’ Isti amori in nobis respondet in Patre amor essentialis cui complacet in verbi conceptu de mente paterna quasi informata actuali notitia essentiali, et respondet ista complacentia appetitui in nobis inquirenti notitiam perfectam, qua habita voluntas illa perficitur et fit amor fruentis, et de gignente mente et genita notitia procedens, cui respondet in divinis amor procedens qui est Spiritus Sanctus.”

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Intellect and will are the two essential principles of operation of every intellectual nature. However, they produce supposites or persons only in God, whose very nature is subsistent intellect and will, unlike creatures. The productive (eternal) actualization of divine intellect and will in their products (the Son and the Holy Spirit) is what Henry calls notional acts.12 As will be shown, for Henry divine intellect and will have a twofold perfection, an essential and a personal or notional perfection, the latter of which is the productive perfection of the former. Analogously to how man generates man—an unique individual of the same nature13—the intellect produces an impression similar to it in nature which in God is the Son, and the will an expression 12

Summa, art. 60, q. 1 (ed. Badius, fol. 157 vI): “Dicendum quod neque intellectus neque voluntas, ratione qua sunt simpliciter intellectus aut voluntas, sunt principia elicitiva actuum notionalium per quos producuntur similes in forma naturali ipsi producenti. Quia tunc in quibuscumque essent, essent principia elicitiva actuum quibus produceretur simile in forma, quod falsum est in creaturis. Sunt enim solummodo principia elicitiva actuum naturalium ut sunt in natura divina, et sic ut per illam habent in se naturalitatem quandam ad productiones notionales [...] intellectus et voluntas, ut sunt simpliciter intellectus et voluntas, modo scilicet intellectuali et voluntario agentes, tantum sunt principia actuum essentialium quae sunt intelligere et velle, licet hoc sit passive ex parte intellectus, active vero ex parte voluntatis. Ut autem sunt natura et principia activa naturaliter actus elicientia [i.e., in Deo], sunt principia activa elicitiva actuum notionalium quae sunt generare et spirare, et hoc necessitate naturalitatis qua impossibile est Deum per principia quae sunt natura in ipso huiusmodi actus non elicere.” 13 As G. Wilson explains, “Henry states that in an existing thing, such as human, humanity and ‘homo,’ nature and suppositum, are the same—these differ only because the former is an abstraction and the latter is concrete, although nature, as humanity, is not, properly speaking, this supposite. In spiritual creatures, argues Henry, it is much clearer that nature and supposite are really the same, because the supposite really is nothing else but the subsisting form having quiddity insofar as it actually is something in existence” (“Supposite in the Philosophy of Henry of Ghent,” in: W. Vanhamel (ed.), Henry of Ghent. Proceedings, pp. 353-354). Even though Wilson does not treat the natural productions of the Trinity in this essay, this chapter will show not only how Henry understands the divine nature as identical with the three distinct persons or supposita, but also how the intellect as the suppositum Father produces another similar to it in nature—the suppositum Son, while the divine will as the supposita Father and Son produces another similar to it in nature— the suppositum Holy Spirit.

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similar to it in nature which in God is the Holy Spirit.14 Henry, holding this position, differs from and criticizes those who do not understand (adequately or at all) intellect or will, or both, as principles able to communicate their nature in properly distinct spiritual ways. In general, Henry criticizes philosophers, such as Aristotle and Averroes, who posit the generation they observe in nature as the only true communication of nature. 15 He also criticizes theologians who do not find in our mental productions the means by which to understand generation and spiration as productions which yield distinct persons similar in nature, who, in short, do not find in our mental productions the best analogy for the actual, relative constitution of the Trinity. Henry is quite original, in that his conception unifies intellect and will with substance and relation in the Trinity, making his conception of (divine) intellect and will and his conception of (divine) substance and relation distinctive: Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Richard of St. Victor, and even Augustine, do not explicitly marry ontologically the categories of substance and relation with intellect and will in the Trinity. For this reason, Henry differs even from the emanationists who most inspired him: from Richard, who did not distinguish explicitly the emanations in terms of intellect and will, but rather only in terms of principality of procession, 16 and from Bonaventure, who, in spite of his significant incorporation of emanations in his Trinitarian thought, in the end still relied on the traditional relation account to explain real unity and distinctions in the Trinity, disregarding the emanations. Through his doctrine of intellect and will as natural principles, Henry argues originally for the actual emanations of the Trinity, for the real distinctions and substantial unity of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, for the truth of the Filioque, and for substance and relation as the only metaphysical categories having real being in God. As will be shown in chapter 3, this fact helps explain the originality of Henry’s theory of relations, including its peculiar centrality in his metaphysics. Moreover, as will be shown in chapter 2, Henry’s view 14

In, e. g., Summa, art. 60, q. 1, ad 1, Henry explains how generation and spiration are natural productions according to intellect and will respectively, in the sense of producing equally similar products. 15 Cf. Summa, art. 60, q. 1, ad 6. 16 Cf. Summa, art. 60, q. 1, ad 7 in oppositum; for Henry’s criticism of Richard, see the very end of section E below.

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of intellect and will as natural principles serves as a basis for his account of free creation. This chapter, however, is limited to the analysis of Henry’s conception of the (relative) constitution of the Trinity in terms of intellect and will. 17 1B—The Trinity as Activity Not all thinkers who have conceived of God as one simple activity have understood this activity as compatible with some form of intrinsic plurality. And surely few have understood this active unity as requiring intrinsic plurality. In Trinitarian discussions, however, the identification of one simple God with a plurality of persons is commonplace. Yet the way in which this identification is formulated can take different forms. Henry of Ghent’s theory of relation, applicable to both God and creatures (as explained in chapter 3), makes unity and real multiplicity compatible intrinsically in God: a distinction of relations need not bespeak a plurality of foundations, since a foundation may assume a diversity of relative modes which are subjectively identical to it. However, Henry’s conception of God as willing and intellectual activity, the concrete embodiment of his understanding of divine relations, since Trinitarian relations are self-relations of divine intellect and will, requires a subsistent, relative plurality in the Godhead, and is not merely compatible with it. For an act presupposes its terms. If the essence of God is one pure act or activity, the very unicity of this activity presupposes the multiplicity of the terms which constitute the intensive perfection of this activity. For, if God’s activity would not somehow be its own initiator and end, it would not be intrinsically perfect or necessarily actual, as it would be extrinsically caused. Since God is absolutely uncaused, the intrinsic perfection of his activity must be somehow self-perpetuating or, as will be seen, self-communicating; thus, some type of intrinsic plurality is presupposed by his unity, for his unity is one of the terms that perfect his self-communication. What constitutes the Father is the relative property of active generation (generare), in the very first act of origination (in God and thus in all of existence), whereby he generates the Son as his perfect knowledge, word or image. The absolute priority of the relative property of the Father presupposes that only he is absolutely uncaused, for 17

Thus the main focus here will not be other themes pertaining to intellect and will, such as epistemology and human freedom.

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only he, as the simply first producer, is absolutely first. Further, only he possesses the fecundity to generate first because only he is absolutely first or uncaused. Without developing the nature of the paternal property here, we must note that God, defined as perfect activity, is more than the uncaused term that marks the origin of and that initiates this very activity, for God is the activity that unifies and that is perfected by its own terms or persons. “For the terms of the emanations are the very persons constituted by relations.”18 Therefore, the Father, as constituted by the property of generating, is not an absolute person but only a relative person, even if only he is uncaused and the cause of all. The Father is the divine essence in the respect that initiates its own self-perpetuating and self-communicating activity, the uncaused, original term of the first emanation. Needless to say, neither can the other terms or persons that constitute God’s activity be God absolutely. With an understanding of God as activity, Henry can make real, relative, personal distinctions between that which originates and that which is originated within God, without this vitiating divine simplicity and unicity. For a person is constituted in God, not absolutely, but through its relative property—as a distinct relative term that is constitutive of, and subjectively identical to, the activity which God is. The relative property distinguishes and thus constitutes its person according to the unique place the persons holds in the order of origin or emanation in God.19 Henry’s justification of immanent divine emanations is expressed in question 3 of article 54 of his Summa. There he asks whether any divine person emanates from the person who is absolutely first in God and in the order of the universe, and who is ultimately the cause of everything. 20 To ask if any person(s) emanate(s) from the Father is to ask whether there truly is emanation within God

18

Summa, art. 53, q. 9 (ed. Badius, fol. 72 vC): “Emanationum enim termini sunt ipsae personae relationibus constitutae.” 19 Ibid. (fol. 72 vC): “In Deo non accipitur persona penes relativam proprietatem quamcumque, sed penes illam solam quae pertinet ad rationem originis et emanationis unius personae ab altera.” 20 Summa, art. 54, q. 3: “Utrum ab illa persona in divinis quae non emanat ab alia, emanet aliqua alia”

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or not.21 Thus this question is not about whether there is creation proceeding out of God, but whether there is an immanent emanation in God through which the persons are by nature constituted in and as God. For creation is a divine action producing something extrinsic to God. The Catholic faith upholds this mysterious dogma—there is indeed a divine, immanent activity whereby generation and spiration take place, thus constituting the Trinity. Now one may begin to understand this mystery through the definition (ratio) of the divine essence, which is pure act or activity.22 This definition bespeaks its perfectly self-diffusive and selfcommunicating nature. For the highest form of diffusion or communication of this highest act can only be self-diffusion or selfcommunication, one in which this act is shared both by that which communicates it and by that to whom it is communicated within its very identity. Thus, we may also grasp divine emanation through the concept (ratio) of person: this is the divine essence assuming a respect (property) by which it is one of the terms constituted by and constitutive of the immanent divine activity according to an order of origin.23 For the origin of everything is a relative and not an absolute person, as constituted in his relation to what he produces first—another consubstantial person. 24 And there must be a simply first origin, lest we 21

Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 79 rO): “Quaestio ista non quaerit nisi utrum in divinis sit aliqua emanatio quae est actio divina manens intra, qua una persona nata est procedere ab alia, large sumendo processionem ut communis est ad generationem et spirationem.” 22 Summa, art. 54, q. 3 (ed. Badius, fol. 79 vP): “[Divina natura] est summe activa, et ideo suiipsius summe diffusiva. Summa autem diffusio non est nisi per emanationem communicando alteri suam naturam in diversitate personae.” 23 Ibid.: “[...] ratione accepta ex ratione personae.” 24 Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 79 rO-vO): “Persona quae in divinis non est ab alia, non est constituta in sua personalitate nisi ex respectu ad aliam a qua distinguitur, quarum alietas non potest sumi nisi penes rationem originis unius ab alia secundum praedeterminata. Origo autem unius ab alia non est nisi per actum emanandi unam ab alia non extra transeuntem, quia hoc est proprium emanationis creaturae. Oportet igitur ponere in divinis actum emanationis, et hoc unius personae ab alia manentem intra, et hoc ab illa quae non emanat ab aliqua, ne sit processus in infinitum […] Si enim in divinis sit actus emanationis, illud quod per ipsum emanat intra, necessario est persona subsistens,

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posit an infinite causal regress.25 Thus the Father is constituted as the first origin (and hence un-originated), by his relation to, and distinction from, the Son who proceeds first in an absolute sense. Emanation in God must then be an immanent activity of the divine essence (or which the divine essence is), of which the persons are relational terms. Moreover, this activity must be simple. Henry argues in response to the fifth argument of question 8, in article 53 of his Summa, that the highest simplicity (i.e. God’s) requires a multiplicity of persons. For the highest simplicity subsists as an activity that unifies a plurality of persons, while an absolutely unified, discrete monad can only be a relatively static entity, as its mode of unity excludes the plurality of terms proper to a unified activity. Indeed the unity of God is that of the highest degree of simplicity, for it is the unity of the First Act. But the highest degree of unity of discreteness is not found in God, as this monadic unity would contradict His (the highest) mode of simplicity. For His simplicity is that of an activity perfected by a plurality of terms. Whence, the simplicity of God requires a plurality of persons or terms and not an absolute unity of them. Thus, part of God’s necessity is that He necessarily subsists in distinct modes of relational being. A plurality of respects, rather than vitiating divine simplicity, are necessary, perfecting modes of God’s simple nature. The divine nature is most perfectly self-communicating, for the terms of its communication are not only essentially the same, but the same singular essence, distinguished only relatively. The terminus ad quem is equally necessary as the terminus a quo in delimiting and perfecting an act. The relative subsistence of the persons thus prevents any one of them from being God absolutely. Yet each is foundationally God and all of them together are the Trinity. Their necessity is thus formal or essential, even though some may subsist as passive, and thus originated, terms of emanating acts. 26 For the essence itself is ab-

quia in divina essentia nihil potest esse productum inhaerens, et propter divinae emanationis perfectionem oportet esse simillimum producenti.” 25 Henry applies Aristotle’s argument for the unmoved mover to the emanations of the Trinity; he also relies on causal arguments from Richard to posit a simply first origin in the Trinity. See Summa, art. 54, q. 1, responsio. 26 Summa, art. 54, q. 3 (ed. Badius, fol. 79 vR): “Filius et Spiritus Sanctus habent necesse esse ex se formaliter, licet ab alio principiative.”

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solutely one, though it assumes different subsistent respects27 through a natural necessity to self-communicate by intellect and will. Its perfection is a complete self-communication according to its only two spiritual fecundities. This is a twofold self-relation of knowledge and love: a fully actual Trinity. 1C—The Emanation According to Intellect: The Father and The Son Generation in God is an emanation according to intellect elicited by the Father, whereby the Father produces his perfect word or self-knowledge. As Damascene says, the difficulty in understanding divine generation is that the only generation human beings experience is that among creatures, which is most dissimilar to God’s.28 Moreover, Scripture’s way of speaking of divine generation is not to be taken literally, as Ambrose says. When human terms are applied to God, one must understand them as signifying a most eminent and perfect nature, one without the imperfections of the things usually denoted by our terms, i.e. creatures. 29 In divine generation, unlike substantial and accidental created generation, the form or essence out of which there is generation is in potency not because through generation something comes to be from pre-existing potency, but because the numerically same thing (idipsum numero) comes to be shared both by the one generating and the one generated through the same act of form. This generation has no motion or mutation; it only consists in the active respect of the generator in relation to the generated and in the passive respect of the generated in relation to the generator. These respects are founded in the essence itself, out of which there is generation, and are constitutive of the Father and of the Son. We thus ought to understand divine generation in a spiritual or intellectual mode, only analogously resembling corporeal generation. The emanation by intellect is truly a generation because the active supposite (the divine essence as Father) acts through the form whereby it exists, im27

Ibid. (fol. 79 vQ): “Esse essentiae in Deo non potest esse nisi unius rationis, sicut neque ipsa essentia. Esse autem personae non loquendo de esse essentiae vel existentiae, sed de esse subsistentiae, potest esse plurium rationum […] non secundum unam rationem personae, ut sint plures innascibiles aut plures nati, sed secundum plures rationes personales.” 28 Summa, art 58, q. 1 (ed. Badius, fol. 123 vG). 29 Ibid.

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pressing this form in a subject that is passive in this act. Through this impression of form, the agent produces one similar to itself in nature and form, in the way analogous to how fire generates fire, and man generates man.30 However, the created agent impresses its form in a matter extrinsic to and numerically different from its own, making this matter formally similar to it. This agent thus produces another absolute thing in reality (aliud re absoluta). In God, the first person communicates to another the numerically same form whereby it acts, and likewise the same ‘subject’ in which it acts, producing, in an absolute sense, only the same thing (producit re absoluta non nisi idem). Yet a distinction is obtained from this production between that which has being from another and that from which another has being. In an intellectual sense, this distinction is one between knowledge simply (simpliciter) and declarative (declarative) knowledge, which are just modes of possessing the same knowledge in the divine mind. Henry argues that the Father’s intellectual production of the Word is properly called a generation, because generation, absolutely speaking, consists in this: that the one generated is like (assimilat) the generator. Among creatures, the one generating makes the one generated like itself as much as possible, unless there is a defect of matter or active power. For Aristotle, all likeness (similitudo) is founded upon identity in form.31 Thus, the greater the formal identity between generator and generated, the greater the assimilation of the generated to the generator. This is so to the highest degree in God because what generates and what is generated are one and the same form, for they are relative persons founded in the form of deity. 32 Wherefore, the Father’s generation of the Son is the truest and most perfect form of generation, as both terms of this generation are not only similar or merely the same in form, but rather founded in a numerically singular form. All other species of generation have only partial perfection in comparison to that of God. 30

Summa, art. 54, q. 1 (ed. Badius, fol. 124 vN): “Emanatio dicitur vera generatio quod agens est in actu secundum formam qua agit, et hoc imprimendo formam eius in subiecto passibili materiali, et per hoc producendo sibi simile in natura et forma, quemadmodum ignis generat ignem ex materia, et homo hominem.” 31 Summa, art. 58, q. 1 (ed. Badius, fol. 125 rS). 32 Ibid.

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Creatures need to generate one another to perpetuate the actuality of their form, for any individual creature is only a contingent, finite, manifestation of its substantial form. Generation is thus given to creatures in order for them to make up for (supplendam) what is imperfect in them. In this sense, generation as such entails perfection, for it is a mode of perfecting the ontological status of any given individual.33 Thus, the most perfect generation (i.e. God’s) does not contradict, but is rather proper to, God’s most perfect mode of essence or substance, as it is one in which the same simple and necessary essence by nature communicates itself through a relative distinction, without any motion or mutation. 34 Generation is an act of saying.35 For, by saying its word or by generating a knowledge of itself, an intellectual nature truly communicates itself to itself, namely by self-consciously knowing itself (perfectly, in the case of God). Now, prior to its first notional act the divine essence is already pure act, for it is pure, uncaused intellectual actuality—the Father’s natural or essential understanding. Due to its primordial uncausability, this act is fecund to communicate itself, first by intellect and secondly by will. This first act is called by Henry the understanding of simple knowledge, which is fecund to produce its word—an analytical and declarative knowledge of this simple knowledge. Through this production, the divine intellect is eternally perfected in self-knowing: this act of generation is not temporal; its terms are only distinguished by origin in a relation of self-knowing. Thus, the upcoming delineation of how this act unfolds does not imply that in God potency really moves toward its actualization. As Aristotle rightly noted, a passive and an active principle should be posited in regard to the intellect.36 For every movement 33

Ibid., ad 1. Ibid., ad 2. 35 See Summa, art. 58, q. 2 (‘Utrum generare sit idem quod dicere’). There Henry gives a very detailed epistemological account, beginning with the nature of perception. We shall discuss his account only insofar as it bears upon his understanding of the production of the word. 36 Henry quotes from Aristotle: “Necesse est quod in anima has esse differentias, et est hic quidem intellectus in quo omnia fiunt, ille vero quo omnia est facere” (Summa, art. 58, q. 2 [ed. Badius, fol. 129 vD]). Henry approaches the distinction between the active and passive intellects thus: “alia est distinc34

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from potency to act, in this case from not understanding to understanding, can only be in virtue of an act prior in nature and duration.37 The passive intellect requires the active one in order to understand universals, in the way that sight requires light to see colors.38 The phantasms in the imagination are individual images only in potency to move the possible intellect to an act of understanding. But the light of the agent intellect shining on these phantasms separates them from their particular conditions and proposes them to the possible intellect as universal objects. Through these, this intellect actually understands universal realities, and can then preserve this understanding in the memory.39 Since this intellectual light is to some degree mixed with the possible intellect as its active principle, when the possible intellect understands, this intellect itself is reduced from potency to act through this admixture. The possible intellect is a principle in potency to understand different intelligible forms. Thus it is an immaterial principle, since having a determinate nature would prevent its true assimilation of different forms.40 Hence, when knowing, the possible tio in anima humana per potentias, alia autem per vires. Per potentias enim sit distinctio secundum rationes formales obiectorum diversas, secundum quas solummodo in anima ut propria est homini est distinctio penes intellectum et voluntatem, ut per duas diversas potentias secundum rationes obiectorum quae sunt verum et bonum. Per vires autem sit distinctio secundum diversos modos se habendi ad obiecta, secundum quod voluntas humana distinguitur per concupiscibile et irascibile […] et secundum quod intellectus distinguitur per speculativum et practicum. Speculativus enim dicitur ut respicit verum absolute, practicus vero ut respicit verum sub ratione boni operabilis et extensione ad operari illud. Similiter distinctione famosa distinguitur speculativus in agentem et passibilem” (ibid.) (italics mine). 37 Metaph. IX, 1049 b17-1050 a3. 38 Summa, art. 58, q. 2 (ed. Badius, fol. 129 vD). 39 Cf. ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 129 vE-130 rG). 40 As Aristotle notes, the intellect in itself is a potency and not a determinate nature. For the intellect, when knowing, takes the form of what it knows, being capable of knowing a variety of distinct forms of things. If its nature would be a determinate thing in act, its nature would interfere with its knowing, and render it unable to know the forms of different things. In act, however, the intellect is the form of what it knows, formally identical with what it knows. Knowing is this actual identity between the intellect and the form of what it knows (De An., III 5, 429 b30-430 a10). Aquinas makes a similar point in arguing for the immateriality of the intellect (Summa Theologiae, I, q.

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intellect becomes the form of what it knows, a form constituted by two principles which are actually one, namely the given universal known and the intellectual light, mixed with and delimited by this universal. At this stage, the possible intellect is informed with simple or confused knowledge, since the universal is still only known generally and not analytically. The intellect which possesses this knowledge Henry calls the intellect of simple intelligence. 41 Its knowledge is not a word that is an essential definition, though it is a potential word, that is one that can produce it. For Henry, this intellectual ground is analogous to the intellect of God the Father, which eternally generates out of itself the Word or Son, whereby the whole divine intellect knows and actualizes itself perfectly. Moreover, in both God and humans, this intellectual ground is a unity of intellect and will that is fecund to communicate itself first according to intellect, and secondly according to will. The possible intellect is passive in the attaining of simple universals, for knowledge is impressed on it through the action of the object and agent intellect. Yet, as already informed by the universal, this possible intellect is an act that can autonomously reflect on itself. When attributing a proper activity to the possible intellect, Henry draws from Averroes, Proclus, and Augustine. “The Commentator, when expounding on the unity and incorruptibility of the intellect, posits a threefold intellect: the material which he posits as purely passive, the agent which he posits as purely active, both of which he posits as incorruptible and ungenerable, and the speculative intellect which he posits in a state between the previous two and as generable and corruptible, just as the imagination by which it is formed.”42 For the purely material principle and the purely active principle are in themselves ungenerated and incorruptible. It is rather the composite, in this case the (human) speculative intellect, which is corruptible and generable due to its acquisition and loss of form in becoming. This speculative intellect, a composite of actuality and potentiality, is 75, art. 2). An intellect that is fully actualized, in the sense of being fully informed with knowledge and exhausting all of its fecundity for knowing, i.e. God’s intellect, is formally or actually identical with its knowledge in an absolute sense. 41 Summa, art. 58, q. 2 (ed. Badius, fol. 130 vH). 42 Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 131 rL).

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somehow (quodammodo) active, not only as actual through its subjection to form, but also as capable of reflecting upon itself. However, we posit this latter [speculative intellect] as somehow active because we posit it to be capable of converting itself upon itself, upon its act, and upon the object it knows in simple knowledge. For the aforementioned propositions of Proclus are convertible. Just as everything that is convertible to itself is incorporeal, likewise conversely what is incorporeal is convertible to itself, and similarly just as all that is convertible to itself has a substance separable from all body, likewise conversely all having a separable substance from all body is convertible to itself. Whence, in the Commentary on proposition 20 it is said that the intellect “understands itself and operates upon itself,” and this with regard to what is present (praesens) to its act of understanding, both in regard to the understanding of incomplex and complex things. With regard to the understanding of incomplex things: it deals with incomplex things confusedly understood in order to explicate in them the distinction of essential parts, inasmuch as it has the aspect (ratio) of intellect or of intelligence simply. Inasmuch, however, as it works on itself as intellect or intelligence simply, it has the aspect (ratio) of memory; from knowledge which exists in the memory it generates declarative knowledge so that this latter knowledge itself becomes declarative intelligence . . . For in this generation the agent is not only the knowledge existing in the memory, or its object, but also the very intellect having in itself the aforesaid knowledge under the aspect (ratio) of memory. As Augustine says, in 9 De Trinitate, “Clearly it must be held that whatever thing we know co-generates in us its knowledge. For from both sides knowledge is born, namely from the knower and the known. Thus, since the mind,” namely through the memory in the present, “knows itself,” namely confusedly, “it is the sole parent of its knowledge,” namely of the analytical one (discretivae) which it generates in the intelligence. “For it itself is both the known and the knower.” 43

In its actual possession of the simple universal or in being simple intelligence, the intellect no longer depends on sensible objects, or on the imagination which still relies on the senses. The intellect can then retrieve its knowledge from the memory and consider it, that is itself as knowledge, through its reflective action. Through a penetrating, defining act made possible by this reflection, the word comes to exist actually when the essential parts of the simple universal are understood analytically by the possible intellect.44 43

Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 131 rL-vL). Cf. ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 130 vI-131 vM). As S. Marrone has pointed out, in attributing this autonomous reflection to the possible intellect as informed 44

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As Augustine notes: “The keenness of the mind thus intent conceives that which can be the word, though not yet worthy of the name of word, as something able to be formed from our knowledge in the memory, though only formed when the intellect will have penetrated its interior parts that were confusedly known, and by means of them knowledge will be informed.”45 This, then, is the stage of discursive thought at which the human intellect reflects upon its own simple knowledge that it possesses in the memory seeking to know it perfectly in its integrative parts, but not yet fully doing so, not yet fully producing its word. Thence, the rational soul penetrates the interior, integrative elements of what is first apprehended confusedly as a simple universal. It does so, as Avicenna says, through a certain discourse (discursum). 46 In this discourse, Augustine says, the intellect is thrown into a certain rolling motion, whereby something is thought now as ‘this’ and then as ‘that’, as though it would be discovered or hastily encountered. 47 The word comes to exist as the final stage of the discourse of the possible intellect, when the essential parts of the simple universal are made intelligible in act as distinctly proposed to the possible intellect, whose cognitive keenness (acies) is directed with simple knowledge, which yields the definition, Henry was going beyond Aristotle, for whom there was no action on the part of the possible intellect (see Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent, Cambridge, Mass., 1985, p. 83). For this reason, Henry still locates this word (the definition) at the level of simple cognition (even though it is initially gained in humans through a discursive process of composition and division), strictly in the sense that even though this word represents a higher cognitive level than the simple universal, it is nevertheless this very universal understood analytically. A definition, e.g. rational animal, is the universal “man” understood analytically. And it is still simple and not complex cognition, since it strictly does not involve the copula “to be” of a judgment, which the proposition “man is a rational animal” does involve. Therefore, for Henry this word functions as the basis for Aristotelian science, upon which complex cognition, both the propositional and syllogistic kinds, are based. See Marrone (o.c.), pp. 85-92. 45 Summa, art 58, q. 2 (ed. Badius, fol. 130 vI): “Et est illa acies intellectus sic intenta […] concipiens quiddam quod potest esse verbum, et non iam dignum est verbi nomine, formabile de nostra scientia, quae est in memoria, nondum formatum quousque intellectus penetraverit interiora eius quod cognitum est confuse, et illis fuerit informata.” 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid.

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(directa) to these interior parts. Such a penetrating cognitive act is to know declaratively or to generate the word—a declarative knowledge of simple knowledge. This is a true and perfect knowledge of what is incomplex, one that discovers the integrative parts of the simple knowledge, i.e. the essential definition in Aristotelian terminology, that was hidden (latebat) in the memory. In this intellectual generation, the will assists. For the will is delighted with what it knows in the simple knowledge. Yet the will is not entirely fulfilled in this simple knowledge, since this knowledge still can be known more perfectly. For the will finds perfect delight in that which is perfectly known. The will, therefore, prompts the simple intellect that only knows confusedly to know analytically or perfectly. Thus the will makes that which is produced by the intellect to be the will’s secondary product and thus a partaker of the will. Not only does the will motivate the intellect to know more fully, but also, the generation of this perfect knowledge having been completed, rejoices in the generated product. Though generation is elicited by the principle of intellect, the will is annexed to this emanation as an assisting principle. (In spiration, as will be shown, intellect assists while will elicits.)48 48

Intellect and will assist each other in the emanations, even though each elicits its act in its own right: “Emanatio quae est ad terminum secundum unam rationem, ut ad productum sub ratione filiationis, principaliter procedit a principio quod est intellectus sive natura, ex adiuncto autem a principio quod est voluntas, et non econverso. Econverso autem emanatio quae est ad terminum secundum rationem spirationis principaliter procedit a principio quod est voluntas, ex adiuncto solum a principio quod est natura, et non e converso” (Summa, art. 54, q. 4, ad 2 [ed. Badius, fol. 88 rD]). With respect to how intellect and will assist each other in the emanations, Henry uses what he calls a paramount (magistralis) distinction between the will as antecedent (voluntas antecedens) and the will as concomitant (voluntas concomitans). The first applies to spiration, the second to generation (cf. Summa, art. 54, q. 3 [ed. Badius, fol. 83 vD]). Accordingly, Henry maintains that with regard to the antecedent will (de voluntate antecedente) the Father does not generate the Son as someone willing or not willing (volens neque nolens). For He properly generates in the mode of intellect; intellect or nature is the eliciting principle of generation, not will. The will can only assist generation as a principle that is consequent to the intellect. For it is only after the simple or essential knowledge is had in the intellect that the will prompts the intellect to know more fully in order to rejoice in what is perfectly known. And it is only after generation is terminated that the will of the Father rejoices in the gener-

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In reflection, the intellect considers not only its simple knowledge but also itself as knower of the simple knowledge, since the intellect that knows the simple knowledge is also this very simple knowledge. The possible intellect knows itself, for what it knows is a knowledge that is formally identical with it. The word is thus the product of a truly autonomous act of the intellect, that is, the very analytical knowledge 49 that the simple knowledge generates about itself.50 Knowledge knows itself as knowledge in an analytical or declarative way. In God, generation proceeds, not temporally but eternally, from an intellect which is fully actualized as simple knowledge. 51 The divine word is a knowledge that is the entire divine ated product. Therefore, with regard to the consequent will and its act that is terminated at the Son, the Father generates as someone willing, because with essential and notional knowledge there is pleasure for Him in the generated offspring (quia et amore essentiali et amore notionali complacet ei in prole genita) (Summa, art. 61, q. 6 [ed. Badius, fol. 179 rL]). 49 Summa, art. 58, q. 2 [ed. Badius, fol. 131 vM]): “Et quamquam verbum, ut dictum est, comprehendat actum notitiae quae est actualis intellectio in intelligentia et ipsum obiectum, propriissime tamen ratio verbi consistit in ipsa notitia discretiva ut comprehendit ipsum intellectum sive cognoscentem cum sua notitia eidem inhaerente de ipso intelligente, ut de potentiali educto quod erat notitia et verbum in potentia, formabile non formatum cum volubiliter inquaerendo iactabatur” (italics mine). 50 Summa, art. 58, q. 1 (ed. Badius, fol. 124 vL): “[...] sed solummodo illud intellectum quod est in intelligente per actum intellectus qui est dicere verbum eius est. […] quoniam talem intellectum non agit res intellecta ut est res secundum se, sed ut iam est intellecta et forma intellectus per actionem intelligendi simplicis notitiae qua intellectus sic informatus est intelligere quoddam in actu, ita quod totus intellectus ut sic informatus est et intelligere quoddam in actu est quoddam intelligibile, quod quemadmodum quoddam obiectum natum est quasi reflecti in ipsum intellectum eundem, ut intellectus est purus, movendo ipsum ad actum intelligendi seipsum iam informatum actu intelligendi simplicis notitiae. […] et ab intellectu informato notitia simplicis intelligentiae qua intelligit rem intellectam generatur in eodem notitia declarativa qua intelligit se intelligere rem intellectam” (italics mine). 51 Henry specifies, however, that “in non habentibus definitionem discreta cognitio in intelligentia generata a cognitione confusa in memoria proprie verbum est. Unde in beatis licet non sit verbum secundum definitivam rationem de Deo [...] quia simplicia illam non habent, est tamen in eis de Deo verbum discretivae cognitionis, natum de cognitione confusa in memoria praecedente vel natura vel duratione. Naturaliter enim etsi non semper duratione, omnis creatura intellectualis prius apprehendit confuse de quocunque

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intellect understanding itself perfectly, including itself as imitable in regard to creatures, and that perfectly understands its own selfunderstanding. In such an intellectual generation, the possible intellect has the definition (ratio) of parent or memory. However, this same intellect, as reflected upon itself after the aforesaid discourse, generated out of and penetrating into the simple knowledge when knowing this knowledge distinctly, is informed by a knowledge that is declarative, analytical, and terminated at its own definitive quiddity (quod quid est). The same intellect considered in this respect has the definition of offspring (prolis) or word52—a knowledge born from knowledge. The same divine intellect as it is 1) a seeing (aspectus), always and immutably converted toward itself as informed by 2) simple or essential knowledge, is always, as it were, informed with 3) declarative knowledge from the simple knowledge. These elements are rationally distinct in a subjective order to the intellect with which they are identical. However, this divine, intellectual act entails ‘originated existence (esse ab)’ in reality (secundum rem). 53 In other words, the Father and Son, simple and declarative knowledge respectively, are two sides of one and the same intellectual reflection. The intellect knows itself: its self-relation is constituted and perfected by both of its respective terms, which are irreducible to each other.54 This presupposes a real distinction of relative opposition quod quid sit quam quod quid sit determinate. [...] Solus autem Deus perfectam notitiam habet sui et aliorum absque omni cognitione confusa praecedente natura vel duratione” (ibid., q. 2 [ed. Badius, fol. 131 vM]). The word, then, referring irrespectively to any intellectual nature, is simply the declarative knowledge that is actively generated immanently by the intellect about itself qua simple knowledge that is preserved in the memory. 52 Thus Henry is inspired by what Augustine calls “the birth of the mind” (partum mentis). See Summa, art. 58, q. 2 (ed. Badius, fol. 130 vK-131 rK). 53 Cf. Summa, art. 59, q. 2 (ed. Badius, fol. 140 rB-vC). 54 Henry makes this mutual relation explicit when specifying in what sense the categories of action and passion are applicable to divine generation. He claims: “Productio enim secundum quod est eius a quo est, est actio, quae in divinis dicitur generatio activa, secundum vero quod est eius qui ab alio producitur, est passio, quae est generatio passiva in divinis. Et pertinent in divinis ambo ad praedicamentum relationis, omisso quod erat materiale in praedicamentis actionis et passionis circa creaturas, scilicet motu per quem distinguebantur communiter contra alia praedicamenta, sed inter se distinguebantur

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between these terms. Since the simple knowledge produces its word through its reflection, for in seeing itself the intellect is impressed with an analytical knowledge of itself, there is a real distinction between generating and generated knowledge. Indeed, Henry argues, quoting from Proclus, wherever there is a conversion (conversio) of something upon something, there necessarily is a real distinction between that which is converted and that upon which it is converted.55 This is so even in God where knowledge is never really ‘formed’ but is rather always perfected, where the conversion is an eternal and simultaneous self-relation.56 And the terms of this relation, which in God are the Father and Son, are con-substantial. Though distinct as two sides of the selfrelation of the intellect, they are substantially one, for the knowledge that knows itself is one and the same. It is in this sense that substance and relation have real being in regard to the divine intellect. For Henry, an understanding of the production of the human word helps one discern what divine generation might entail. Unlike the human word, divine generation is the perfect and eternal actualization of the entire intellect in its self-knowledge; this Word is not gained through a discursive process, but is a passive term of an eternal relation of self-knowing. “Therefore, only in God is the perfect word not first formable in nature or duration before it is formed. . . . Whence in God the word is not called a declarative knowledge because it is clearer and more perfect than that knowledge which belongs to the memory from which it is formed, just as it happens with regard to the word of an intellectual creature, but only because by penes dictos respectus, ut dictum est. Propter quod quia in divinis formale manet per quod erat praedicamentum actionis et passionis circa creaturas, scilicet respectus ut erat productionis terminus non ut erat motus, sicut neque manet materiale per quod erant praedicamenta simpliciter, scilicet motus, licet non per illud diversa praedicamenta, sed tantum per respectus [...] propter quod nec ista praedicamenta manent in divinis, generatio ergo in divinis activa vera actio debet dici, ut falsum sit dicere quod non sit vera actio sed relatio, immo vera actio debet dici, sed relativa. Et eadem ratione generatio passiva deberet dici vera passio, sed relativa” (Summa, art. 59, q. 2 [ed. Badius, fol. 142 vL]). 55 Summa, art. 59, q. 2 (ed. Badius, fol. 140 vC): “Ubi enim est conversio alicuius super aliquid oportet quod sint distincta secundum rem quoquo modo, et quod convertitur et supra quod convertitur” (italics mine). 56 Ibid.

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means of saying, and in a declarative or manifesting way, it proceeds from this knowledge.”57 However, the human word, like God’s, is the product of an autonomous act of the intellect. The object as known is included in the definition (ratio) of the word only inasmuch as the intellect is itself the form of the object when it is simple knowledge and knows itself declaratively. Despite the shortcomings of the analogy between the human and the divine generation of the word, this analogy reveals the epistemological framework through which Henry approaches the Father’s generation of the Son. First, Henry understands the possible intellect as separate from matter in its formal actualization. Second, he sees this intellect as autonomously active with respect to its movement from simple to declarative knowledge. Third, this movement presupposes the reflexivity of the intellect which enables it, with the assistance of the will, to actualize its fecund, simple content in a declarative, notional act. Fourth, Henry capitalizes on the nature of this very reflexivity to make a real, relative distinction between the terms of the intellect’s act of self-knowing, which terms are nevertheless subjectively identical to the intellect itself. To say that the mind generates a knowledge of itself, thus knowing itself, is to say that in this act there is a real, relative distinction between that which knows and that which is known. Thus Henry uses his own original conception of the word to account for the generation of the Son, as well as to establish the real, relative distinction and substantial unity between the Father and the Son. In addition, this emanation of the intellect serves as an important basis for the emanation of the will. 1D—The Mode of Spiration A most important feature of this second and last emanation is that it presupposes and requires the constitution of the Father and Son though generation. For, unlike the Son who is generated by the Father alone, the Holy Spirit is produced by the common, active spiration of 57

Summa, art. 58, q. 2 (ed. Badius, fol. 131 vM): “Propter quod in solo Deo est verbum perfectum non formabile prius natura vel duratione quam formatum. [...] Unde in Deo non dicitur verbum notitia declarativa quia clarior et perfectior est illa quae est memoriae de qua formatur, sicut contingit de verbo creaturae intellectualis, sed quia tantum dicendo, et modo declarativo sive manifestativo ex hoc procedit” (i. e. according to origin, as a passive, respective term of an act).

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both the Father and Son. This active spiration proceeds remotely out of the divine essence as will in which the Father and Son are founded through the Father and Son as the proximate causes that actively spirate the person of the Holy Spirit. This means that, unlike the Father, who is constituted as Father through the property (generare) whereby He elicits the Son, the Father and Son are not themselves constituted as persons through active spiration, the common property whereby they elicit the Holy Spirit and are together the terminus a quo of spiration. Only the Holy Spirit (the terminus ad quem of spiration) is constituted as a person in spiration by his property of being spirated (spirari). For the Father and the Son are already constituted as persons prior to spiration in generation. With the Father and Son already constituted, the will is fecund to produce the Holy Spirit through their spiration. This leads us to consider an important difference between intellect and will as principles in God. The intellect of the Father alone can have perfect fecundity to produce the word. On the other hand, the divine will cannot have perfect fecundity to produce the Holy Spirit unless it unites and is the concord of two conjoined persons.58 The fecundity of the intellect can be in one person, namely in the uncaused Father, while the fecundity of the will requires two persons. For, Henry firmly holds following Richard of St. Victor, perfect love—divine charity—needs to be mutual. Thus the will informed with essential love is fecund to spirate notional love only when it is the concord of the Father and Son. 59 Moreover, it is not sufficient that the Father and Son be subjectively one will, as founded in the same will, for this will to be fecund to spirate the Holy Spirit. The divine will must also unite the Father and Son as subsistent, distinct relata bonded through mutual love,60 unite them as foundationally identical and relatively distinct. 58

Summa, art 54, q. 6 (ed. Badius, fol. 95 rE): “Sed in hoc interest ex parte intellectus ut sit foecundus ad dicendum verbum, et ex parte voluntatis ut sit foecunda ad spirandum Spiritum Sanctum, quoniam intellectus perfectam foecunditatem habere potest ad verbi productionem ut existit in una sola persona. Voluntas autem perfectam foecunditatem habere non potest ad Spiritus Sancti productionem nisi existat in gemina persona.” 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 95 rE): “[...] ad hoc quod communis voluntas Patris et Filii sit foecunda ad spirandum Spiritum Sanctum, non sufficit quod sit una communis ambobus, et amor essentialis in ipsa communis, qua ambo simul

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This can only be so if we consider, as is explained more fully below, that spiration only proceeds out of the divine essence as already notionally perfected by intellect through the constitution of both the Father and Son. Therefore, insofar as this second emanation presupposes the notional or personal perfection of the first, it cannot proceed solely out of a foundational unity in the way that the first emanation proceeded out of a foundational unity of nature through the uncaused and fecund Father. Rather, it must proceed out of the divine essence as notionally perfected according to intellect, out of an essence which has already assumed the relative modes of the Father and Son. Inasmuch as generation is necessary for spiration, the real distinction between the Father and Son is also somehow an element of the principle of spiration. For, the paternal property excepted, the entirety of the essence, including the will which is the principle of spiration, is communicated to the Son through generation. Accordingly, the Holy Spirit proceeds out of the divine essence as a shared will, from an essential unity which holds together and preserves the distinction between the relata (the Father and Son) which it foundationally unifies, and which are its (notional) intellectual perfection, by spirating through both of these relata.61 Therefore, Henry argues, the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father and Son in the sense of their being essentially one absolutely, since as essentially one they are not distinct. Nor does he proceed from them purely as a relative common notion (notio communis relativa), since a pure relation (pura relatio) cannot be a principle that elicits an emanation. For, as explained in the chapter 3, the purely objective relations (e.g., paternity and filiation) among the persons, result from and are rationally posterior to the emanations which provolunt et amant, sed oportet quod sit voluntas concors et mutua duorum, qua unus summum amorem alteri impendit, et ille viceversa eundem rependit, quo existente foecunda est, ut ex ipsa necesse est emanare amorem qui est Spiritus Sanctus.” 61 Summa, art. 54, q. 6 (ed. Badius, fol. 94 vA): “Nec etiam sufficit actio intellectus quae est intelligere essentiale ad producendum actionem voluntatis notionalem, quoniam sicut ad actionem voluntatis simpliciter essentialem praexigitur actus intellectus essentialis, sic ad completam actionem voluntatis quae consistit in actione emanationis Spiritus Sancti requiritur completa actio intellectus, quae consistit in actione emanationis verbi. Et sic [...] vim productivam actionis notionalis voluntatis necesse est ordine naturae quasi prius communicari Filio, et sic ab ipso simul cum Patre produci Spiritum Sanctum.”

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duce the persons having these relations. Rather, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son insofar as they are united in a mode that is intermediate between the divine essence itself and a pure relation (medio modo inter utrumque).62 The Father and Son spirate namely as they are one essence, not according to the definition (ratio) of essence, but as it is the will, nor as it is the will absolutely, but as it is the will according to the definition (ratio) of a relative, notional, common property. But still it is not wholly one as it is the essence according to such a definition (ratio), because then the Father and Son would not have the definition (ratio) of bond or of being connected in spirating the Holy Spirit . . . rather as the will itself is one connoting a distinction of many, namely of the Father and Son, with respect to that unity, so that the Father and Son thus are said to spirate the Holy Spirit as they are one in essence considered according to the definition (ratio) of a common, relative property, and as they themselves are connoted as many with respect to that one [act], though not as they themselves are primarily many that are distinct eliciting the act . . . And according to this, although they do not spirate as many that are primarily distinct eliciting the act on account of the aforesaid definition, nevertheless they spirate as they are connoted as many who are distinct with respect to that in which they are one, which is the cause (ratio) of eliciting the act, and thus as many united in one spirating cause (ratio). I understand them as united through a connotation with respect to one cause (ratio) of acting, on account of which connotation they necessarily concur in one cause (ratio) in that one action. 63

62

Ibid., ad 8. Ibid., ad 8 (ed Badius, fol. 94 vE-95 rE): “scilicet ut sunt una essentia non modo sub ratione essentiae, sed ut ipsa est voluntas, nec ut est absolute voluntas, sed ut est voluntas sub ratione proprietatis relativae notionalis communis. Sed adhuc non ut est essentia sub tali ratione penitus est una, quia tunc non haberent rationem nexus aut connexorum Pater et Filius in spirando Spiritum Sanctum [...] immo ut ipsa voluntas est una connotans distinctionem plurium, Patris scilicet et Filii, circa illam unitatem, ut sic dicantur Pater et Filius spirare Spiritum Sanctum ut sunt unum in essentia sub ratione communis proprietatis relativae considerata, et ut ipsi sunt tanquam plures circa illud unum connotati, licet non ut ipsi sunt principaliter plures distincti actum elicientes [...] Et secundum hoc licet non spirant ut plures sunt distincti principaliter et elicientes actum propter rationem praedictam, spirant tamen ut sunt connotati plures distincti circa id in quo sunt unum, quod est ratio eliciendi actum, et sic ut plures uniti in una spirativa ratione. Uniti intelligo per connotationem circa unam rationem agendi, propter quam quidem connotationem in una ratione necessario concurrunt in illam unam actionem.” 63

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The one principle of spiration which the Father and Son constitute as will is a unity of two distinct persons, which by definition does not fuse these persons absolutely together but rather preserves their distinct personality in their very unity. Active spiration is not an absolute identity between the Father and Son of the type they do have in a subjective order, but a common property which is shared by the Father and Son as the Father and Son. Whence, even though the Father and Son spirate as one (will), there are many who spirate, since their distinction is presupposed in the action whereby they are one. Although they do not spirate as many, they spirate as one in a way in which many are connoted as distinct with respect to the one act whereby they elicit spiration. Even though indeed they are many (plures) who spirate, they do not do so primarily on account of their plurality even if this plurality is presupposed in their one act of spiration. Rather they concur in the one cause (ratio) by which the act is elicited. The active cause (ratio) of spiration is fundamentally the divine will that elicits spiration through the Father and Son by being concordant (concordando) of the Father and Son, thus making their essential love mutual (mutuando) and fecund to spirate.64 The common will and love by which the Father and Son spirate is strictly not the full immanent perfection of divine willing. This full perfection can only be reached in the notional product of mutual love between the Father and Son. For, as will be shown, the Father spirates the Love into the Son who receives this Love, and the Son does the same with respect to the Father. This notional, mutual Love is the Holy Spirit, a love which properly bonds the Father and Son. And the distinction between the Father and Son in their unity of love is preserved, since a unity that is a reciprocity or mutuality, as opposed to a mere commonality or absolute identity, preserves the very terms of the reciprocity or mutuality. Moreover, the bond (nexus) of Love between the Father and Son is itself a person or notional product, for it is a subsisting Love or passive term produced out of the divine will. This love is relatively distinct or unique, for it is irreducible to the active spiration of the Father and Son, being constituted in a relation of origin as the passive term of spiration. The Holy Spirit is thus constituted as passively related to the Father and Son as active spirators. In other words, the Holy Spirit is the divine essence itself

64

Ibid.

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assuming the property of being spirated (spirari).65 Understanding this more fully requires an analysis of the will in the divine nature. 1E—The Will as a Natural Principle Nature (natura) in God is said in a fourfold way, 1) as the divine essence in which the three persons subsist, 2) as the principle which produces similar from similar, which principle elicits the first production, namely generare—the property of the Father, 3) as the free force of the will which naturally exists in the divine nature, and 4) as an immutable (incommutabilis) necessity with regard to some act.66 The will can only love what it knows at some level. Thus, the will that coexisted with simple knowledge could only be informed and be in act with simple love for this knowledge. But, with generation completed, the will obtains the perfect knowledge necessary for it to be fecund and elicit perfect love or the Holy Spirit. After generation, the fecund will can then reflect on itself, will itself to will the Love that derives from itself for itself. For the will like the intellect can reflect on itself.67 65

Cf. Summa, art. 54, q. 6, fol. 95 vF. Summa, art. 60, q. 1 (ed. Badius, fol. 154 vT): “Natura in divinis quadrupliciter dicitur. Uno modo appellatur natura ipsa divina essentia in qua tres personae consistunt, et dicitur pure essentialiter. Secundo modo dicitur natura principium activum naturale, et sic natura est vis productiva similis ex simili, et sic potentia generandi active est natura. Et sic est essentiale contractum ad notionale, quia est ipsa natura dicta primo modo. Natura enim quae est ipsa divina essentia ut est sub proprietate paterna determinata ad actum generandi est potentia generandi active in solo Patre existens […] Tertio modo dicitur natura quaelibet vis naturaliter existens in natura primo modo, etiam etsi sit libera illa vis, et sic voluntas in Deo dicitur natura, quia scilicet est naturalis potentia existens naturaliter in divina natura. Quarto modo dicitur natura incommutabilis necessitas circa aliquem actum.” 67 Summa, art. 60, q. 1 (ed. Badius, fol. 155 rX): “Sciendum est quod tam intellectus quam voluntas in quocunque habent esse propter separationem illius a materia, postquam habuerint esse in actu suo primo simplicis intelligentiae, aut volitionis naturae, sunt conversive super se et super actus suos simplices et eorum obiecta per actus conversivos intelligendi et volendi. Quia intellectus non solum intelligit verum simplici intelligentia, sed etiam intelligentia conversiva intelligendo se esse intelligere, et convertendo se super obiectum intellectum, et super actum intelligendi simplicem, et super se intelligentem per actum intelligendi conversivum. Similiter voluntas non solum vult bonum 66

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Now, when the intellect sees itself as object it is passive with respect to itself as object. It is rather this object which actively impresses itself as a declarative knowledge on the converted intellect. Once the intellect is converted, looking at itself as simple knowledge, it cannot but receive the impression of declarative knowledge through the active generation of the Father. Thus the necessity proper to the intellect does govern its eliciting principle; its act of reception is by nature passive and therefore not free.68 On the other hand, the reflected will that apprehends itself as the End or Good is not passive with respect to itself as end. For then it actively extracts a love from itself, and expresses this love toward itself. The reflexive will of the Father and Son, as it were, separates itself from itself as informed by simple love, and posits itself opposite to that love (separat se a seipsa ut est informata simplici amore et ponit se ex opposito illi). Thereafter it produces the inciting (incentivum) love out of the simple love through active spiration, which can be described as a spiritual burning. It thus releases an intense love from what might be imagined as a somewhat less fervent, simple love through a certain spiritual intensification (per exsufflationem).69 The essential will originally informed with simple love, through its reflection, returns to itself with an inciting love, emanating a notional love toward itself. From the essential will informed with simple love, then, notional love is extracted and redirected toward the will itself.70 Thus the passive principle in willing is simply the essential love out of which the notional love is produced—the essential love as a material principle, as it were (quasi), out of which notional willing proceeds. And the active principle is the very converted will. The will, therefore, elicits purely actively and spontaneously out of itself. It is free by nature, for it is never made passive through the action of ansimplici volitione, sed etiam volitione conversiva volendo se velle, convertendo se super obiectum volitum, et super actum volendi simplicem, et super se volentem per actum volendi conversivum.” 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid., ad ultimum. 70 Summa, art. 60, q. 1 (ed. Badius, fol. 162 rX-vX): “Voluntas divina Patris et Filii per spirationem […] non producit amorem incentivum qui est Spiritus Sanctus quasi flatu aestus illius amplius inflammando amorem essentialem propter se ut in illo amore incentivo stetur, sed per illum fertur in amatum prius amore simplici quasi ardentius se in illud immergendo et maiore flamma amoris.”

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other. In this sense, the will wills itself to will. Its pure activity and uncaused nature is its pure freedom, for it wills spontaneously through its own force. As an eliciting principle, therefore, the will is free by nature. Moreover, every action elicited by the will is necessarily performed freely precisely because its nature is a purely active, spontaneous, uncaused and, by implication, free force. 71 This necessity, whereby every thing the will does is necessarily free because the will acts by nature freely, reconciles freedom and necessity as different aspects of willing. In this sense, freedom can well be a mode of action belonging to the immutably necessary, divine essence; everything willed by a necessary nature endowed with free will is by definition or necessarily willed freely. And inasmuch as the divine will is wholly uncaused, its will is the freest, freely acting whenever it acts. Nevertheless, generation is a necessary condition for spiration, for the will only loves what it knows beforehand. Henry’s understanding of intellect and will in regard to spiration reveals more specifically the sense in which he sees spiration as both necessary and free, as will be shown below. The production of intense love out of simple love is parallel to generation, in which a perfectly clear, declarative knowledge is made from a simple knowledge that is, as it were, less clear (quasi minus clara). Yet both ‘types’ of knowledge are only different respects (according to origin) of one and the same knowledge. Similarly the producing and produced love are only different respects of one act of self-loving. The simple love exists in the inciting love, and simple knowledge in the declarative knowledge, both, as it were, like the less intense in the more intense. There is then no real plurality in terms of love or knowledge except a relative plurality. The same knowledge really exists in ‘that which proceeds’ and in ‘that from which it proceeds’, but in ‘that from which’ it proceeds it does so only in the mode of simple knowledge, while in ‘that which proceeds’ it does so in the mode of declarative knowledge. Similarly one ought to understand the twofold love in spiration, namely as passive and active respects of one and the same love. 72 Thus God communicates His nature both by impression and expression, producing equally perfect and

71 72

Summa, art. 60, q. 3 (ed. Badius, fol. 165 vY). Summa, art. 60, q. 1, ad ultimum (ed. Badius, fol. 162 rV-rX).

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similar products: the perfect expression and the perfect impression of a thing are equally similar to the thing.73 The term or end of the action of the will is twofold. One end is that toward which the action is ordained per se. Carpentry is ordained per se toward the product. But the carpenter himself works and makes the house for the sake of inhabitation. This latter end is that of the agent.74 Now just as the will of creatures is ordered to ends which exist in matter separate from the creature itself, the will in God is ordered to an end within the divine nature.75 For the ‘internal’ or per se end of the notional action of the divine will is the proceeding love, namely the Holy Spirit, who is the actual product of spiration. And what in God corresponds to the ‘external’ end of spiration is the mutual giving and union between the Father and Son in the Love they produce.76 Both emanations, proceeding out of the necessary essence 77, are necessary and natural, though in different ways.78 Since the will, being wholly active, elicits freely by nature79, its necessity cannot govern its eliciting principle, unlike generation which is necessary on the part of its eliciting principle. 80 Therefore, Henry understands the 73

Cf. Summa, art. 60, q. 1, ad primum principale (ed. Badius, fol. 157 rF). Ibid., ad ultimum (ed. Badius, fol. 162 rV). 75 Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 162 vZ): “Licet non producit voluntas terminum actionis sed supponit qui est ut finis extra, bene tamen in divinis producit terminum qui est ut finis intra ordinatus in finem extra.” 76 Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 162 vY): “Cum autem illud primo amatum essentialiter cognitum est a notitia declarativa, statim voluntas in id quod iam quasi cognitum est amore personali incentivo fertur in illud, et respondet amor notitiae et in illo per talem amorem ut in finem extra; volens per huiusmodi amorem ut ipsius flagrationis et spirationis per se terminus sit amor flagrans, ipsius vero spirantis proprie sit finis quies in illo tanquam in illo in quo est terminus intentionis agentis, et propter quem expressit amoris flagrantiam in illud, ut ille illi intimissime et ardentissime uniretur. Et ideo spirans voluntas non stat in spirato sed spiratum dirigit in amatum.” 77 Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 159 rV): “Quia in ea [divina essentia] nihil potest esse aliter quam sit.” 78 Cf. Summa, art. 60, q. 1 (ed. Badius, fol. 155 vY-vZ). 79 Cf. Summa, art. 60, q. 3 (ed. Badius, fol. 165 vY). 80 Summa, art. 60, q. 4, ad 1 (ed. Badius, fol. 167 vM): “Voluntas non est passiva ab alio et agit non passa ab alio ad praesentiam solam obiecti,” unlike the intellect which is “vis passiva et nihil agit nisi passa prius.” The will needs 74

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necessity proper to spiration in terms of the natural end of the will. This is the highest Good, a good so lovable that the will by nature finds its rest in it, though actively—and thus freely—moving itself toward it.81 Henry’s position is that the emanation of the will is freely elicited, yet terminated at the notional product necessarily.82 When the will posits itself as object, the Father and Son freely elicit the love to give it to one another as objects, each being the good for the other, to which they are mutually directed. On the part of the eliciting principle of the will, therefore, spiration is freely elicited in order to be given.83 However, spiration is necessary since it necessarily ends in the product that must be produced if it is to be freely given and received as a mutual love that unites the will to the highest Good. Similarly, even though the act of heating may proceed freely out of the subject that heats, the very act of heating necessarily ends in heat being produced. On the part of the product of the act itself, there is no freedom. Likewise, even though someone may freely throw himself (praecipitat) down into some abyss, the free act of throwing oneself down naturally and necessarily ends by one falling downwards. The free giving of mutual love, then, necessarily results in the production of Love itself.84 only the assisting presence of the knowledge or object as a necessary condition for its action. It is in this sense that the intellect assists the will in spiration. Cf. ibid.. Although intellect and will are equally natural principles in God, Henry discusses the question of whether there is a superior faculty among intellect and will, in both God and humans, in question 4 (“Utrum generatio sit principalior productio quam spiratio”) of article 60. 81 Cf. Summa, art. 60, q. 1 (ed. Badius, fol. 157 vL); q. 3 (ed. Badius, fol. 165 vY). 82 Ibid., q. 1 (ed. Badius, fol. 162 vT). 83 Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 159 rV): “Voluntas [...] libere spirat ipsum [Spiritum Sanctum] et hoc aspiciendo ad actum spirationis in ordine ad spirantem, ut ab eo elicitur” (italics mine). However, the very product of spiration, namely the Love or Holy Spirit, gains existence necessarily, for it must be produced in order to be freely given, in order to complete the self-communication of the divine nature. In fact, this person has a purely passive existence in the Trinity, since he subsists strictly as being given, in itself producing nothing actively, unlike the Father who both generates and spirates, and the Son who spirates. The reason is that this product of spiration marks the total completion of the entire fecundity of the divine nature. 84 Cf. ibid. On the difference between this necessary, divine willing and creative willing, which is a free choice, see, e.g., Summa, art. 60, q. 1. In a pas-

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Generation is said to proceed principally according to the mode of nature because natural necessity both elicits and determines the act of generation.85 The act of spiration, though it proceeds naturally or from the divine nature, is not elicited by natural necessity but only determined by it. In this sense, aside from the fact that generation is the first emanation of nature, generation (and not spiration) is said to occur according to the principal mode of nature in God. As shown, Henry deals thoroughly with the details of intellectual emanation and the mode of spiration. It is also very important to him, probably aware of the significance of his original synthesis of emanation with a psychology of intellect and will, to articulate fully the distinctively free aspect of the (necessary) emanation of the Holy Spirit, as well as the spiritual order of nature described in the following section and developed in the rest of the chapter. Henry’s successors will find these treatments provocative. If God is will (and intellect) by nature, there has to be a sense of freedom at the most fundamental level of the (necessary) Trinity. Showing this is also important, since Henry’s account of divine will as a nature becomes a basis for his account of divine will as a wholly free choice in regard to creatures. The freedom linked with necessity in the Trinity’s nature entails a total freedom in regards to creation, as will be shown in chapter 2. At this point, however, it is worth mentioning that for Henry the relation between freedom and necessity in spiration does not apply in creation. In spiration, freedom lies in the eliciting principle, while necessity belongs to the product or divine person. In free creation, there is no necessity either in the act of creation or in the creature. Freedom and necessity, one may say, are only compatible in creation sage of this text (ed. Badius, fol. 157 vL), Henry speaks of the various kinds of human willing, including a necessary kind, analogous to spiration, which takes place when the highest good is openly seen. In this case, as in spiration, the will freely elicits, though its action ends necessarily. 85 In response to the seventh argument of article 60, question 1 (ed. Badius, fol. 159 rT), Henry clarifies that something is a natural product a) because it is a natural thing, b) because it is produced according to the mode of nature, or c) because it is elicited by nature as a principle. This distinctions do not apply to creatures as the three elements concur in natural things. But it does apply to God because the Son is natural in these three ways; the Holy Spirit is produced according to the mode of nature (in the fourth sense), though not elicited by the principle of nature, but by will.

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in the sense that the creature is necessarily contingent and necessarily produced contingently, since (as will be shown in chapter 2) creation depends on emanation. Analogously, the Holy Spirit is necessarily produced freely since he is produced by will. Unlike the creature, however, he is a necessary product or person as constitutive of the necessary divine essence. These doctrines of Henry became a focal point in Duns Scotus, who criticizes Henry. 86 Not surprisingly, however, since Scotus develops many of his positions in response to Henry, Scotus also at points seems to emulate his predecessor.87 86

Duns Scotus rejects Henry’s understanding of freedom and necessity of nature in spiration. See his discussion of Henry’s position and his argument against it in: Lect. 1, dist. 10, q. unica (ed. Balić , Opera Omnia, XVII, Vatican, 1966, pp. 117-121). One of chief difficulties Scotus has with Henry’s position is the sense in which necessity of nature accompanies or assists the freedom of the will in spiration. The difficulty presents itself to Scotus as a dilemma: if necessity of nature assists free will, it does so in a way that excludes freedom; if necessity of nature does not assist in this way, free will alone suffices (cf. ibid., p. 120, l. 15). In direct response to Henry’s position that spiration is free in terms of the eliciting principle, though necessary in terms of the product, Scotus argues that this cannot be, “quia inclinatio naturae repugnat libertati, et ubi est necessitas naturae ibi non est libertas” (ibid., p. 121, l. 17). Scotus gives his own explanation of how spiration can be both willed and necessary in terms of the infinity of the divine will. Immediately after discussing Henry’s position, Scotus begins: “Ideo dico quod voluntas in divinis non tantum est voluntas sed est infinita, sicut intellectus et aliae perfectiones in divinis. Hoc autem supposito, satis manifestum est quomodo voluntas potest communicare naturam, et quomodo necessario producere” (ibid., p. 121, l. 18). The divine will is infinite and, therefore, produces infinite love (the Holy Spirit) for its known infinite object of love, the divine essence or First Good. The infinite love of the will for its infinite object implies necessity in spiration (cf. ibid., p. 124, l. 26). Thus spiration is both according to will (namely free in the sense of spontaneous love) and necessary, according to Scotus. As is well-known, Scotus also uses his conception of the infinity of the divine will to account for the contingency of creation (see, e.g., F. Copleston, History of Philosophy, vol. II (Augustine to Scotus), London, 1950, p. 532). Like Henry, Scotus uses consistent principles in regard to the Trinity and creation. 87 One of Scotus’ well-known elucidations of the free and necessary divine self-love bears a striking resemblance to the analogy of his Ghentian predecessor mentioned above in this section: “If someone voluntarily hurls himself over a precipice (voluntarie se praecipitat) and, while falling, always continues to will it, he falls indeed necessarily by the necessity of natural gravity, and yet he freely wills that fall. So God, although He necessarily lives by His

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This section will conclude by pointing out that Henry’s understanding of the priority of the first emanation with respect to the second contains a criticism of at least the explicit meaning of some of Richard of St. Victor’s statements on the order between the emanations. For, Richard does not distinguish the emanations at their root in the divine nature—according to the distinct fecundities of this nature—but rather only in terms of priority of procession. At some points, he uses the term generation generically to refer to both emanations and describes the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father as one of a grandson from a grandfather, giving the impression that its emanation does not proceed immediately out of the divine nature like the Son’s, but rather that it is mediated through the Son’s. This may natural life, and that with a necessity which excludes all liberty, wills none the less freely that He should live by that life. Therefore, we do not place the life of God under necessity (i.e. we do not attribute necessity to God’s life) if we understand by “life” life as loved by God by free will” (Duns Scotus, Quodlibet, 16, 9; trans. Copleston, ibid., p. 532). Perhaps in the final analysis Scotus’ reconciliation of divine freedom and necessity is closer to Henry’s than he is prepared to admit. Nevertheless, Scotus’s objections to Henry reflect his different approach to the Trinity at a more fundamental level. Even though Scotus learns a great deal from Henry, Scotus’ analysis of the Trinity in terms of intellect and will differs. For example, Scotus argues against central tenets in Henry’s view of the word, including the role of the intellect’s reflection in generation, as well as Henry’s definition of the word as declarative intelligence proceeding from simple intelligence. See Ord. I, dist. 2, pars 2, q. 1-4 (ed. Balić , Opera Omnia, II, Vatican, 1950, pp. 294-305). Moreover, and in relation to his critique of Henry’s view of the word, Scotus rejects Henry’s understanding of the principle of spiration in terms of the concord will of the Father and Son. See Lect. I, dist. 12, q. unica (ed Balić, Opera Omnia, XVII, Vatican, 1966, pp. 153-159). These facts reveal different principles and consequences in Scotus, since, as mentioned, Henry’s conception of the Trinity is grounded in his own application of intellect and will. Henry’s account of spiration flows coherently, as shall be shown more fully below, from his account of generation and the principles operative therein; in turn, he grounds creation in emanation (chapter 2). Henry sees the will as the free eliciting principle of spiration, assisted by natural necessity, precisely because through generation the will, as belonging to the Father and Son, is made fecund to spirate freely the necessary Love of the Trinity, as will be more fully explained. Thus, the real import of Scotus’ arguments against Henry can be fully measured only through a detailed assessment of their fundamental principles and consequences (including their respective approaches to philosophy and theology), in all the relevant writings. This certainly goes beyond the scope of this book.

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be construed as approaching Arianism: the Holy Spirit might seem to share in the substance of the Father to a lesser extent than the Son. Naturally Henry does his best to avoid interpreting Richard in this way through his four meanings of nature in God, and openly says so. Even though Henry thoroughly incorporates Richard’s emphasis on emanation and mutual love into his account of the actual constitution of the Trinity, he incorporates Richard into his fundamental Augustinian plane: Richard’s loving emanations should be understood as flowing from a nature that possesses a twofold immanent fecundity, each fecundity eliciting in its own right, though with the assistance of the other, a subsistent, distinct and consubstantial product immediately from this nature. 88 This is one more instance showing the very basic and pervasive influence of the text of Augustine in Henry’s thought. Even though Henry creatively capitalizes on implicit elements in Augustine’s text, systematizing them and giving them new ranges of application, Augustine is almost always the starting point for Henry’s Trinitarian speculation. 1F—The Order of Nature Although the will is a natural principle in its own right just as the intellect, its natural condition makes its notional action posterior to that of the intellect, for knowledge is presupposed by loving and not conversely. However in God, though there is an order of nature, knowing does result in loving, for the knowledge of the highest Good makes the will fecund to spirate and thus actually spirates, as in God 88

After explaining in article 60, question 1, the context of this issue in Richard through a discussion of texts from Richard and other authorities of the tradition, Henry notes some of the possible interpretations of Richard’s words: “Et esset distinctio divinarum productionum in solo modo procedendi primo vel secundo, mediate vel immediate, nullo autem modo ex parte radicis et virtutis elicitivae. In quo mihi videtur Ricardus valde inconvenienter sensisse si sic sensit. Propter quod non mihi videtur in hoc aliquatenus sustinendus nisi exponendo ipsum quod intelligat operationem naturae a natura quarto modo dicta, quando operatio est secundum incommutabilem necessitatem. Ut secundum hoc generatio large accepta nihil aliud sit quam productio existentis de existente secundum naturae operationem, in quo conveniunt generatio et spiratio, ut dictum est, et praeter hoc generatio stricte accepta sit illa in qua principium elicitivum est natura secundo modo accepta, quae omnino differt a spiratione, nec spiratio ullo modo potest dici generatio talis, ut patet ex praedictis” (ed. Badius, fol. 156 rA).

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potency and act do not differ. The following passage should be considered carefully. Always the act of the intellect is first and the act of the will second, and this either according to reason and an order of reason or according to the thing and nature and an order of nature; so if an essential act of understanding exists in some first instant, in a, the act of willing will be in some other second instant, say b, but this in a certain order of reason between the essential acts of intellect and will. Now, however, it is the case that the intellect as it is natural or as it is nature, when it is in its essential act of understanding which is to understand, in instant a, immediately converts itself on itself, and this not in that instant which is a, but in another, namely in b, so that simultaneously in that instant, namely b, which according to reason is second to a, the will elicits its essential act of willing, and the intellect existing in its essential act of understanding converts itself on itself—inasmuch as it is informed with essential knowledge it is fecund to elicit actively its notional act which is to generate or to say. Inasmuch as it is pure, converted intellect, it is fecund in a passive way in order for the Son or word to be produced out of itself through the notional act. And then in a third instant, say in c, the intellect elicits its notional act of generating or saying and produces the word or Son. Also simultaneously in the same instant, the paternal will as belonging only to Him, existing in its act of willing essentially converts itself on itself, and thus converted it is communicated through the act of generation to the Son. However, in a fourth instant, say d, [the Holy Spirit] is produced by the converted will. So that although all these [i.e. a, b, c, d] exist in the same instant of eternity, nevertheless they exist in diverse points of the same, related through an order by the consideration of our intellect. And although there is only an order of reason between a, b, and c, nevertheless there is an order of nature between c and d, due to the fact that, according to the aforesaid, the notional act of the intellect is previous, as it were, to the notional act of the will somehow as a cause on account of which it exists. Because without the notional act of the intellect, by which the declarative knowledge, which is the word, is produced from the intellect, the will is not fecund existing in its essential act of willing, even as converted on itself. For it cannot elicit the inciting love unless it knows in a declarative way, just as it cannot [elicit] the love simply unless it knows simply. This is all the more true when positing that the notional act of the will does not proceed from it as it is will simply, but only as it is the concord of two, namely of the Father and Son (italics mine).89 89

Summa, art. 60, q. 5, ad 2 (ed. Badius, fol. 173 rR-S): “Semper actus intellectus sit primus et actus voluntatis secundus, et hoc vel secundum rationem et ordinem rationis vel secundum rem et naturam atque ordinem naturae; ut si actus intelligendi essentialis sit in primo signo aliquo, in a., actus volendi erit in secundo aliquo signo alio, puta in b., sed hoc ordine quodam rationis inter

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An act of essential understanding takes place at a given point, say at instant A. If this is so, the essential act of willing will occur at another instant, namely at B. For once the intellect knows its object essentially the will wills this same object essentially as well. There is an order of reason between the essential acts of intellect and will, namely between A and B; for, though both acts in God are identical to the divine essence, there is a disparate, rational distinction between them, whereby the willing act is rationally posterior to the intellectual one. Now, when the intellect has attained its essential act of understanding, after it is made active by the object through the information of simple knowledge, it achieves a state of autonomous subsistence.90 actus intellectus et voluntatis essentiales. Nunc autem ita est quod intellectus ut naturalis est sive ut est natura, cum est in suo actu intelligendi essentiali qui est intelligere in signo a., statim convertit se supra se, et hoc non in eo signo quod est a., sed in alio scilicet in b., ut simul in eo signo, scilicet b., quod secundum rationem est secundum ab a., voluntas elicit suum actum volendi essentialem, et intellectus existens in suo actu intelligendi essentiali convertit se supra se, inquantum est informatus notitia essentiali est foecundus active ad eliciendum actum suum notionalem qui est generare sive dicere. Inquantum est intellectus purus conversus, est foecundus passive ut de ipso producatur Filius sive verbum per actum notionalem. Et tunc in tertio signo, puta in c., intellectus elicit suum actum generandi sive dicendi notionalem et producit verbum sive Filium. In eodem etiam signo simul voluntas paterna ut solius est, existens in suo actu volendi essentialiter convertit se supra se, et sic conversa communicatur per actum generationis Filio. In quarto autem signo, puta d., voluntate conversa producitur [Spiritus Sanctus]. Ita quod licet haec omnia sint in eodem instanti aeternitatis sunt tamen in diversis signis eiusdem per ordinem se habentibus consideratione intellectus nostri. Et licet ordo rationis tantum sit inter a. b. c., est tamen ordo naturae inter c. d. eo quod secundum praedicta actus intellectus notionalis est quasi praevius ad actum voluntatis notionalem quodammodo ut causa propter quam sit. Quia sine actu intellectus notionali, quo intellectu producitur notitia declarativa quae verbum, est non est foecunda voluntas existens in suo actu volendi essentiali, etiam conversa supra se. Non enim potest elicere amorem incentivum nisi cognoscens declarative, sicut neque amorem simpliciter nisi cognoscens simpliciter. Et hoc maxime ponendo quod actus notionalis voluntatis non procedit ab illa ut est voluntas simpliciter, sed solummodo ut est concors, et duorum, scilicet Patris et Filii.” 90 In God, of course, this is never the case. The essential acts of intellect and will are wholly uncaused, in that they are the divine essence or foundational mode of being in God which by itself is fecund to communicate itself as a na-

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Thus subsisting essentially or as informed by simple knowledge, namely at instant A in this scheme, the intellect immediately (statim) reflects upon itself. Now this conversion does not occur at instant A, which is the instant of the essential act, but rather the conversion takes place at a rationally posterior instant, namely at B. This means, Henry continues, that simultaneously at B both the intellect reflects upon itself and the will wills essentially. With the intellect thus reflecting on itself at instant B, as it is informed by essential knowledge, the intellect of simple intelligence is actively fecund to generate, to impress the declarative knowledge on the reflected intellect. Thus, still at instant B, the pure, converted intellect (purus conversus) is passively fecund to accept the informing of the word. At this moment, the state of fecundity of the essential intellect that reflects upon itself at instant B presupposes, and is assisted by, the essential act of willing that takes place also at instant B, since the will assists the intellect in generating. Thus the intellect moves from its state of fecundity at instant B, aided by the essential will also subsisting at instant B, to the moment where it actually generates the word in a notional act. Therefore, the actual production of the word which comes ‘after’ the state whereat the intellect is fecund for, yet not actually eliciting, this notional act though its reflection and the assistance of the will, namely at B, cannot not occur at the same instant B, but at a subsequent moment, namely at instant C. Therefore, at instant C the intellect actually produces the word and generation is terminated. It is therefore at this instant that one should grasp the mode of constitution of the Father as Father, for it is actually at this point that He actually generates, that He is constituted as a person through generating (generare). This, of course, is not to say that the Father is himself caused by some truly pre-existent intellect. This is not true of any of the other persons either, since they are necessary and eternal, only caused relatively by origin. Rather, this is to point out the mode of constitution of the Father through His personal property by stressing that the Father, the simply first, uncaused respect of the essence, subsists as a person that actually (and eternally) generates the Word, never as some pre-existent intellect with an absolute and not a relative mode of subsistence. The presentature through intellect and will, which does not occur in creatures. This allusion to the human mind, therefore, and its mode of subsistence is strictly to illustrate the steps in the self-communication of the divine nature.

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tion of the constitution of the Trinity in a sequential order is necessary due to the human mode of understanding, to its temporal way of conceiving modes in which intellect and will produce their notional acts. What in God is a simultaneous order of relative terms must be explained by human beings in a sequential, discursive way. Now, once the intellect knows itself declaratively at C, the will is made fecund to spirate. For, with the termination of generation the will knows its object declaratively and becomes the concord of the Father and Son. Now, the fecundity of the will must consist in both the will’s self-reflection, for only then does the will autonomously elicit notional love out of itself, and the communication of the reflected will to the Son, for the will is only fecund as the concord of the two. Henry’s position, as will be explained further, is that even if the will of the Father would self-reflect, will itself to will that which is known declaratively through the Word, His reflected will would not be fecund to spirate if it was not communicated to the Son through generation. For now, one ought to note that since the intellect knows itself notionally at instant C, through the termination of generation, the will both self-reflects and becomes fecund to spirate also at instant C. For, immediately with the production of declarative knowledge, the will apprehends the highest Good notionally and thus wills itself to will or elicit its notional act. But even though the self-reflection of the will takes place immediately with the termination of generation, with its perfected vision of the good, one must note that the termination of generation is a necessary condition for, and thus prior to, the selfreflection and fecundity of the will. Therefore, Henry notes, simultaneously at the same instant C, whereat the Son is generated, the essential will of the Father both essentially (essentialiter) converts itself on itself, and thus converted (sic conversa) this will is communicated, also at instant C, through generation to the Son. Thus the converted will of the Father is made fecund to spirate with the generation of declarative knowledge, when His will both self-reflects and is communicated to the Son. That is, the Father’s will both self-reflects and is communicated to the Son at the very moment in which the Son is generated. Simultaneously with the termination of generation, the will apprehends the highest good as known, thereby willing itself to will this good actively. It is at this moment, both as self-reflected and communicated to the Son, that the will is properly fecund to spirate; for it both possesses declarative knowledge and belongs to both the Father and Son. In sum, at one and

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the same instant C, the Son is generated, the Father’s essential will converts upon itself, and this same converted, essential will of the Father is communicated to the Son through the very act of generation. At this same moment, then, the will, as converted and having perfect, declarative knowledge, is fecund to be the active term of spiration. Finally, at a fourth instant, namely at D, the fecund will of the Father and Son actually spirates the Zeal, the subsistent, passive, relative term of spiration, out of its simple love.91 Surely in God to be fecund to spirate is to spirate, for He is pure act (of intellect and will). Yet the eternal act of spiration must consist of two distinct terms, that from which the act proceeds and that at which the act is terminated. Thus the active term of spiration stands at instant C in this scheme and the passive term at instant D. These instants (A, B, C, D) really denote one and the same instant of eternity; they are conceptual devices to grasp the order of origin among the persons of the eternal Trinity. Now, considering that intellect and will are the two fecundities of the divine nature, there is an order of reason between A, B, and C, and order of nature between C and D. For A, B, and C, really denote elements of one eternal act of generation, an act which also makes the will fecund to spirate and properly be the active term of spiration. C and D, on the other hand, denote generation and spiration respectively, the distinct, ordered acts by which divine nature communicates itself. The notional act of the intellect is previous by nature to that of the will, the former being not only a necessary condition (causa sine qua non) but also somehow a cause on account of which the later takes place (quodammodo ut causa propter quam sit). Without the 91

In note 89 above, one reads: “[...] sic conversa [voluntas] communicatur per actum generationis Filio. In quarto autem signo, puta d., voluntate conversa producitur.” ‘Producitur’ cannot refer to the Son at stage D. Although there is a rational distinction between the generation of the Son and the communication of the converted will from the Father to the Son, this distinction is marked at the same instant C. Moreover, there is an order of nature between C and D, so that if ‘producitur’ would refer to the Son at instant D, meaning that the Son is ‘produced with the converted will (voluntate conversa producitur)’ at stage D, this would imply a real distinction of stages between the generation of the Son and his production together with the converted will, thus positing an order of stages within the very person of the Son, which cannot be the case. Furthermore, Henry just said that simultaneously at C the paternal will is converted and communicated to the Son.

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production of declarative knowledge, the will is not fecund to spirate. Conversely, through generation, God’s will becomes fecund to spirate and, thereby, actually spirates. Through generation, the will obtains the two vital conditions for its becoming fecund, declarative knowledge and its being shared by the Father and Son. The reflected will of the Father is communicated to the Son through generation, thereby becoming a concord will of two subsistent persons that possesses declarative knowledge—a fecund will. Even if the will possesses declarative knowledge, Henry argues, it is not fecund if it is not the concord of two; for perfect, notional love must be mutual. The reason for Henry’s defense of the Filioque, as is more fully examined in the next section, is that the perfect, notional knowledge which is required for spiration is a self-relation of the intellect among two subsistent persons that are founded in the essence (intellect and will). Generation entails both the perfection of this knowledge and the communication of the Father’s reflected will to the Son, i.e. the concordance between the Father and Son through the will as founded in a fecund will. For the will, the assisting principle of generation, is communicated to the Son through generation, since the Son receives the entirety of the essence from the Father, except for the property by which the Father is distinct from the Son. 1G—Henry’s Latin View of Active Spiration Through generation the will of the Father and Son apprehends with full knowledge the most lovable object. And, with a full apprehension of the most lovable object, this concord will necessarily actualizes its fecundity in the free production of notional Love, thus acquiescing in its natural end. It is in this positive sense that generation makes the divine will fecund to spirate the Holy Spirit. Not only is generation a causa sine qua non of spiration due to the disparate, rational order between intellect and will, whereby willing presupposes knowing, but also a causa propter quam of spiration, insofar as the self-communication of the divine nature by intellect entails, by making the will fecund, its self-communication by will.92 The will elicits Zeal or inciting love only when the divine mind or nature knows in a declarative way. Similarly it only elicits the 92

In article 61, question 1, Henry further clarifies how generation is a cause of spiration, in explaining how spiration proceeds from or follows upon generation.

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simple love when it knows simply. 93 This is due to the natural order between intellect and will in the (divine) mind. But this is especially true, Henry argues, when we posit according to the Latin tradition that the notional act of the will does not proceed from the will absolutely (simpliciter) or as belonging only to the Father (according to the Greek tradition), but rather only from the concordant will of two, namely the Father and Son.94 Since the Holy Spirit can only be spirated, according to Henry, by both the Father and Son, generation makes the will fecund to spirate not only because generation produces the perfect knowledge required for spiration, but also because the converted will of the Father is communicated to the Son, thus becoming a concord will that is fecund to love notionally what it knows through the generated, declarative knowledge. Even if the will would possess declarative knowledge, Henry argues, it is not fecund if it is not the concord of two; for perfect, notional love must be mutual. The reason is that the perfect knowledge required for spiration is a selfrelation of the intellect among two subsistent persons founded in the essence (intellect and will). There is an order of nature, whereby the Father and Son constitute the first element of this order and the Holy Spirit the second. The Father and Son are actually constituted at one and the same instant of nature,95 as (active and passive) relative terms of generation. Thus, the terminus ad quem of spiration (where the Holy Spirit is produced) cannot stand at the same instant of nature at which the Father and Son are constituted, and at which their will, immediately through the termination of generation, is made fecund to spirate, but rather at a posterior instant of nature. Therefore, active spiration is, as it were (quasi), incidental (adventitia) to these persons, for they are already constituted in existence through generation.96 Only passive spiration, the relation that the product of spiration (the Holy Spirit) has toward its spirators, is constitutive of a (third and final) person, for it is irreducible to active spiration just as passive generation is irreducible to active generation. Even if the Holy Spirit would be spirated by the Fa-

93

Cf. Summa, art. 60, q. 5, ad 2. See the last sentence of note 89 above, as well as note 105 below. 95 Cf. Summa, art. 60, q. 5, ad 2. 96 Cf. Summa, art. 60, q. 5, responsio. 94

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ther alone—the position of the Greek Church 97—one still would have to maintain that active spiration is an incidental, non-constitutive property of the Father. Now to say, according to the Greek tradition, that only the Father spirates presupposes some significant assumptions with regard to intellect and will in God. First, the Greek view assumes that generation is in no way a causa propter quam of spiration. In this view, the production of the word does not make the will fecund to spirate. Accordingly, the Father, solely by his own will, can spirate. The concordant will of the Father and Son is not necessary for spiration, and generation is previous to spiration only as a causa sine qua non. In this view, the will of the Father is fecund to spirate the Holy Spirit before the generation of the Son. Generation is merely a necessary condition for the actualization of this fecundity. 98 Otherwise, if the Greek position would hold that generation is previous to the very fertilization (foecundatio) of the will, it would have to maintain, like the Latin tradition, that the will is not fecund as belonging only to the Father, but only as already communicated to the Son by the Father. Henry estimates that the representatives of the Greek view think that only the Father spirates because “they think it is impossible for the conversion of the will to take place simultaneously with the very communication of the converted will at one and the same instant C, in the way that it seems impossible for the same thing at the same point to be made to go both upwards and also downwards simultaneously.”99 Indeed, nothing is communicated to the Son except at instant C at which He is generated. For passive generation is the communication of the divine essence as a whole; it is the constitution of the Son as a person of the Trinity through generari, the Son being 97

On the debate between Greeks and Latins regarding active spiration, see J. Pelikan, The History of Christian Doctrine, vol. 2, The Spirit of Eastern Christendom (600-1700), Chicago, 1975, pp. 183-198. 98 Summa, art. 60, q. 5, ad 2 (ed. Badius, fol. 173 rT): “Secundum Graecos [...] sola voluntas paterna, ut solius Patris est, per solam conversionem supra se est foecunda ad actum spirandi et active et passive; et si sit praevius quoquo modo actus dicendi hoc solum est ut causa sine qua non et nullo modo ut quo foecundatur voluntas ad actum spirandi.” 99 Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 173 rV): “Quod putant non posse in eodem signo, scilicet c., esse voluntatis conversionem supra se et ipsius conversae communicationem, quemadmodum impossibile videtur quod grave in aliquo signo generetur sursum et in eodem factum sit per descensum deorsum [...].”

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identical with the divine essence as founded in it relatively. Since at the same instant C, at which the generation of the Son takes place, the conversion of the Father’s will also occurs (since only then is the Good known declaratively, and the will can, then, will itself to will this good qua perfectly known), it seems impossible to the Greeks that the will is communicated to the Son as converted, even if the (converted) will that is communicated is said to be the essential will informed with simple love. Hence, they view the converted will as proper only to the Father. Since the spirating force exists only in the converted will, i.e. in the will that knows its object thus willing itself to will and love it through its own active power (a tenet which both Greeks and Latins hold), and the converted will belongs only to the Father for the Greeks, they deny that the potency to spirate through the converted will is communicated to the Son and deny, therefore, the Son also spirates the Holy Spirit with the Father. Although the Greeks deny the communication of the fecund will to the Son through generation, they do, of course, hold that the essential non-converted will is communicated to the Son. For the Son, also according to them, must be con-substantial with the Father who is intellect and will by essence. “Whence since he is spirated by the converted will, as it is bare from itself, as it is essential and informed with essential love . . . the will (as essential and informed) is communicated by the Father to the Son through generation. However, through the production he who is produced exists in him [i.e. the Son], in whom exists that out of which he is produced. Thus, although for the Greeks the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, nevertheless, he proceeds from the Father in the Son and rests in the Son, as Damascene says.”100 Surely, Henry argues, the conversion of the Father’s will and its very communication as converted take place at the same instant (C above). However, this is so in a certain order. “[The case of active spiration] is not similar with that of the heavy thing, for it is impossible for something both to be made to go upwards and be carried downwards at the same instant. This obtains because the terms upwards and 100

Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 173 vV-X): “Quia cum spiratur voluntate conversa ut nuda est de ipsa ut est essentialis, et informata amore essentiali [...] voluntas ut sic est essentialis et informata communicata est a Patre Filio per generationem. In eo autem est per productionem is qui producitur in quo est id de quo producitur. Et ideo licet secundum Graecos Spiritus Sanctus non procedat a Filio, secundum eosdem tamen a Patre procedit in Filio et requiescit in ipso, sicut dicit Damascenus [...].”

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downwards are outside the essence of the heavy thing, and are different in re from it.”101 With respect to active spiration, the case is different. For the term of the act of conversion of the will is the very will informed with simple love, upon which the bare will converts itself essentially. In other words, the term of the act of conversion of the will is part of the essence of the will, since the will acts upon and by itself, actively eliciting a further act from itself. However, the term of the act of communication of the converted will is the Son, to whom the essential will, that is informed with simple love and also converted, is communicated by the Father through the generation which gives the Son existence.102 That is, the term of communication of the converted will is not the same term of the act of conversion itself. This means that these two different terms, inasmuch as they belong to two different acts (i.e. the self-reflection of the will and the generation through which this will is communicated as the assisting principle that concurs with generation), are not contradictory terms that by definition could not coincide. For this reason, Henry argues, the conversion of the will and its communication as converted can well take place in the same instant, a possibility which Henry thinks the Greeks do not grant and which leads them to deny common spiration on the part of the Father and Son. “This is so in the manner that in the same instant of time light can be generated in some middle point and from that same light another light is generated in another point.”103 The term of the conversion of the will and that of the will’s communication to the Son may well coincide in one and the same instant, for they are terms of two different acts which occur simultaneously: an act of will termi101

Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 173 vX-Y): “Nec est simile de gravi, quod enim impossibile est illud in eodem signo sursum generari et deorsum ferri, hoc contingit quia illi termini sursum et deorsum sunt extra essentiam gravis et re differentes ab ipso.” 102 Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 173 vY): “In proposito autem non sic est, quia terminus conversionis voluntatis est ipsa voluntas informata amore simplici supra quem ipsa nuda se convertit. Terminus autem communicationis est ipse Filius, cui communicatur ipsa voluntas essentialis informata et etiam conversa. Propter quod bene in eodem signo possunt esse et conversio voluntatis et eiusdem communicatio.” 103 Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 173 vY-Z): “Quemadmodum in eodem signo temporis potest esse lux generata in aliquo puncto medii, et ab illa eadem altera lux generata in alio puncto.”

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nated in the will itself and another of intellect (i.e. generation) terminated in the person of the Son, by which the entirety of the essence (including the reflected will) is communicated. Henry’s position is that the communication of the will to the Son through generation by the Father and the conversion of the essential will by the essential will itself that is informed with simple love take place at the same instant or point, even though they are different terms. That is, in the act of generation the Father produces the Son, communicating to the Son everything that the Father possesses essentially except his personal property. Since the Father possesses a reflected will when generating and giving his essence to the Son, for the Father knows the good in generation and thus loves it, the Father communicates this will to the Son who also knows and loves similarly. Through the generation of the Son, the converted will of both the Father and Son becomes fecund to spirate due to its apprehending the divine essence with declarative knowledge. For this will, Henry argues, becomes fecund to spirate only when it is concordant of two, since the perfect love spirated in God must be mutual. Conversely, mutual love presupposes a plurality that is united in love. Whence, the distinction between two is necessary for the will to spirate mutual love, since by definition a will that is concordant of two who mutually love each other is one that unites two that are somehow distinct. Henry holds that “the will is not made fecund to spirate by any action other than that by which the Son is generated.”104 For the will to be fecund to spirate, it needs to apprehend its object declaratively. This, for Henry, also means that it needs to be mutual or concordant of two to be fecund.105 This view fundamentally disagrees with the Greek view in a way that makes Henry’s agreement with the Greeks as to the non-constitutive nature of active spiration superficial. For, according to Henry’s understanding of the will, the Greeks cannot even hold consistently that active spiration really flows only from the Father, and, by implication, that it is a real non-constitutive prop104

Summa, art. 60, q. 3 (ed. Badius, fol. 166 vE): “[...] nec alia actione foecundatur voluntas ad actum spirandi quam qua generatur Filius.” 105 Summa, art. 61, q. 6 (ed. Badius, fol. 178 vH): “Est autem notitia essentialis quasi praevia ad productionem Spiritus Sancti, quia sine hac nec esset amor essentialis in Patre per generationem a Patre communicandus Filio, super quem voluntas concors utriusque se convertit ut de ipso quasi materialiter spiretur Spiritus Sanctus” (italics mine).

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erty of the Father as the active term of spiration.106 For Henry’s view is that spiration must be common in order for it to occur at all107 , and this grounds his theory of active spiration. Since spiration proceeds out of the will after generation, and the will through generation becomes the foundation of both the Father and Son, who are already constituted as terms of generation, the will that elicits spiration necessarily unites, or is the concord of, the Father and Son. Moreover, the notional love elicited by a concord will that founds mutual relata (the Father and Son) will necessarily be mutual. For this will subjectively spirates out of itself through the relata which it founds, relata which subsist in a real mutual relation (of knowledge) and which, therefore, by nature spirate the Love to one another. The conditions for this perfect mutuality or reciprocity are only obtained when the Father and Son are constituted in a real, mutual relation whereby both partake (at the point at which they are both founded in the essence that is notionally perfected according to intellect and fecund to communicate itself according to will) of a will that, as shared and having perfect knowledge, will elicit an inciting Love out of itself as essential will. Henry’s Latin position is, therefore, that in one and the same instant (‘C’ in the scheme above) the following four things take place: 1) the conversion of the paternal will, 2) the generation of the Son, 3) the communication of the converted will to the Son, and 4) the fertilization of the very converted will as belonging to the Father and Son. Henry remarks that the principle of spiration—the fecund will—must be a unity subsisting as a ‘two-pronged fork’ (sub ratione quodammodo bifurcata), as a unity that conjoins a plurality of persons that are really distinct.108 And, at the point at which active spiration takes place, the Father and Son are founded in a unity of intellect and will that is notionally perfected according to intellect but (rationally) not yet notionally perfected according to will. At this point they are founded in a fecund will, the principle of spiration. Since the knowledge required for spiration is a selfknowledge, necessarily distinguished into knower and known, and this self-knowledge is founded in the essential will in that willing is a 106

He thus rejects the Greek view of active spiration “per impossibile, immo per incompossibile” (Summa, art. 60, q. 5, ad 2 [ed. Badius, fol. 173 rT). 107 See, e. g., Summa, art. 60, q. 6, responsio. 108 Summa, art. 60, q. 6, ad 2 (ed. Badius).

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principle of self-knowing, the will that elicits the Holy Spirit, which is perfect self-love on the part of that which perfectly knows itself, must be shared by the constitutive terms of the self-knowing relation. For both extremes of self-knowing are constitutive of self-knowing. Therefore, the will of the mind that knows itself perfectly, so that it spirates and thereby loves itself perfectly, must be shared by the relata of self-knowing, precisely because these relata are necessarily constitutive of the knowledge required for spiration. In other words, the relative distinction in self-knowledge is also required for spiration. Thus, when both relata of self-knowing are founded in the essential will through generation, the will becomes fecund to spirate, uniting these distinct relata subjectively. For only then and according to such a mode does the will belong to what perfectly knows itself, thereby becoming fecund to love itself perfectly as perfectly known. In Henry’s terms, perfect love can only be elicited when the will is concordant of two, because God’s perfect knowledge is necessarily constituted by two. The will that elicits spiration, therefore, conjoins the relata of self-knowledge subjectively, but preserves in its union of them their distinct relative constitution, because these relata are the terms of the notional act of the intellect which must be perfected prior to active spiration. Keeping in mind Henry’s understanding of the mutual relation between the Father and Son, his description of the cause of spiration as a ‘two-pronged’ unity makes perfect sense. For the Father and Son are the cause of spiration as a unity, namely inasmuch as they are founded in the same fecund will. Yet since this fecund will founds the distinct relata of generation, whose distinction is necessary for perfect self-knowledge (i.e. the distinction between knower and known), necessary for the perfect self-knowledge of the (intellect and) will that founds this self-knowledge in the persons of the Father and of the Son, the fecund will must be the concord of these two persons. If the will would not concord the relata of self-knowing, the will would not be essentially united with the constitutive, distinct elements necessary for its having perfect self-knowledge and, thus, fecundity to spirate. Inasmuch as the will directs its love toward what is perfectly known, and what is perfectly known is known through a self-relation among distinct relata, the love that the will produces is necessarily mutual, directed toward both relata which constitute the perfect knowledge by which the will knows the good declaratively. For Henry, to say that the will spirates through the Father and Son is to

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say that the Father and Son produce a mutual love; for the Father and Son properly exist in a mutual relation of origin. God’s self-love is mutual since it depends on his self-knowledge, since it is this very self-knowledge that has been transformed also into a self-love. His self-love can only proceed in and toward this full self-knowing awareness, out of the unity—essence qua will—that concords and founds the distinction—essence qua Father and Son—by which He is perfectly known. Joined in a unity which preserves their distinction, the Father and Son are the cause of spiration after the manner of a ‘two-pronged fork’. It is only ‘after’ the notional production of the Holy Spirit that the Trinity assumes the mode of a three-pronged fork, a Trinity of relative persons founded in the same subjective source. It is in this sense that substance and relation have real being in regard to the divine will. In sum, Henry’s position is that the Father and Son necessarily share the will in this way because their constitution is both a conditio sine qua non of spiration (for the will can only love perfectly what it already knows perfectly), and a conditio propter quam (since the will is only fecund as concordant of many, for God’s most perfect love must be perfectly mutual). And in God being fecund to spirate is to actually spirate. This position is consistent with Henry’s account of the spirating force shared by the Father and Son. 1H—The Spirating Force Even though the Son receives existence from the Father through generation, the Son does not, strictly speaking, receive the spirating force (vis spirativa) from the Father in an absolute sense. One can understand the Son’s reception of his existence from the Father in a twofold way, namely either as generated by the Father or as resulting through the generation by the Father. In the first sense, the Son is generated from the action of the Father. In the second sense, the Son gets whatever exists in his person (quicquid est in persona eius) because of the generation by the Father. In the first sense, the Son receives an essence that is communicated (ut quid communicatum) to the Son by the Father through generation. In the second sense, the Son receives something that is, as it were, left or ‘abandoned (derelictum)’ through the generation by the Father. This is a relation toward the Fa-

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ther, namely filiation.109 This relation is in a sense ‘left’ or ‘abandoned’ because it is somewhat of a by-product of generation, for this relation that the Son has toward the Father is properly not contained by the Father. This relation rather results from generation, since generation not only produces a similar person essentially but also a distinct person relatively. For filiation is irreducible to paternity or to be the Father, since it is opposed to these in a relative objective order. “For, with regard to the divine productions, whatever belongs to the one producing (producentis) belongs to the product through production, with the exception of that by which the one producing is distinguished from the product.”110 Therefore, conversely, the distinction on the part of the product in regard to what produced it is also not truly communicated. Since the distinction between the Father and Son is necessary for the will to be concordant (i.e. of many), and only as concordant of many can the will be fecund, the Son’s relative distinction through filiation in regard to the Father, something he does not properly receive from the Father, is constitutive of the will’s fecundity. In this sense, namely insofar as the plurality between the supposites which are the proximate cause of spiration is necessary for this act, the Son does not receive the spirating force from the Father. What the Son receives from the Father is the will but not the will as concordant of many, for this concordance presupposes that by which the Son is distinguished, and this he does not properly receive from the Father. The spirating power (vis spirativa) is one and the same in reality (in re), though it can be considered either as a remote or as a proximate principle. In the first way, the spirating force is communicated to the Son by the Father, namely the will absolutely (simpliciter) which the Father has essentially from himself, and the Son receives this from the Father in receiving the essence. But with respect to the spirating force considered in the second sense, one ought not to hold that the spirating force is communicated to the Son by the Father, because this proximate power is not the will absolutely, but the will as concordant of the Father and Son.111 Rather one only ought to hold 109

Summa, art. 60, q. 8, responsio (ed. Badius). Ibid.: “Sic enim est circa divinas produtiones quod quicquid est producentis per productionem sit ipsius producti, excepto eo quo producens distinguitur a producto.” 111 Whence only in the sense that the Son gets the remote potency of spirating from the Father who has it from Himself, is the Father said to spirate more 110

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that the spirating force of the Son is something that is abandoned or left (quid derelictum) in the Son through generation, namely that by which the Son is distinguished from the Father. This element that is ‘abandoned’ or ‘left’ is not, strictly speaking, the constitutive property of the Son (generari), but rather the distinction that the Son has with respect to the Father in an objective order through his relation of filiation. This relation as such does not constitute the person of the Son just as paternity is not constitutive of the Father. For, as explained in chapter 3, objective relations like paternity and filiation simply bespeak the distinction that constituted subsistents have between them insofar as they exist simultaneously and their objective relations both presuppose one another and are irreducible to one another. On the other hand, the constitutive property, properly understood, is the foundation’s mode of being directed toward another, the foundation itself as directed, presupposing the term of its directedness only as a necessary condition (causa sine qua non) of its reality. Moreover, the Father himself attains the actual fact that he is Father or paternity through the Son, for paternity is simply the relation of the Father toward the Son. In other words, due to the termination of generation, both the Father and Son obtain their mutual, objective distinction. In this sense, as proximate causes of spiration or as constituted supposites which spirate, the Father and Son mutually and simultaneously obtain the spirating force, their very concordance as a unity of distinct terms through the two-pronged will. For their distinction is constitutive of active spiration itself insofar as the will is fecund only as concordant of two. In this sense, the spirating power, as a proximate potency, is ‘abandoned’ or ‘left’ when generation takes place, and this holds with respect to both the Father and Son. Thus the Father and Son spirate together, yet with their distinction presupposed by their unity as will. The proximate spirating force is then peculiar to the Son together with Father (ut proprium eius cum Patre), for it is a common, notional property whereby both spirate, a common property which preserves their distinction. Therefore, “although the Son has the principle of spi-

principally. With respect to the actual act of spiration, they both spirate equally, for they do so as equally proximate causes conjoined by the will (cf. Summa, art. 60, q. 9: ‘Utrum unus spirantium, scilicet Pater, principalius spiret quam alter, puta Filius’).

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rating, which is the will, from the Father, he does not get with this a concordant will from the Father, because the will is only concordant through the fact that it is the same will and that it remains in the Father.”112 Whence one must also hold that the Father gets the proximate principle of spirating through the Son, because if the Son would not get from the Father that will which the Father has, the will of the Father would not be concordant or, therefore, a fecund spirating principle.113 The Father gets the proximate principle of spirating through the Son in that he is distinctly the Father through his relation of paternity to the Son who exists simultaneously with him. Therefore, the Father and Son get the proximate spirating force from one another, and each’s possession of the spirating force is a necessary condition of the spirating force of the other (et hoc utrobique ut per causam sine qua non).114 For the Father and Son obtain the spirating force inasmuch as they are distinguished from one another after generation, and are founded in an essential will that unites them in a mode that preserves their distinction, thereby becoming fecund. 1I—The Person of the Holy Spirit The Holy Spirit is constituted through a relation whereby he is passively related to his origin, namely to the Father and Son who spirate. For in spiration, the passive term is irreducible to the active term, and so this passive term possesses a relative or personal subsistence in God. Thus, being spirated (spirari) is fitting to the Holy Spirit according to a relation of origin just like being generated (generari) is fitting to the Son. 115 In a subjective order, of course, the Holy Spirit is identical to the divine essence, since he is founded in it. For the Holy Spirit is the divine essence assuming the relative mode 112

Summa, art. 60, q. 8, responsio (ed. Badius, fol. 171 rN): “Licet enim Filius habeat principium spirandi quod est voluntas a Patre, non tamen ex hoc habet quod habeat concordem voluntatem a Patre, quia non est concors nisi per hoc quod eadem voluntas est, et manet in Patre.” 113 Ibid. 114 Ibid. 115 Summa, art. 61, q. 2, responsio (ed. Badius, fol. 174 rS-vS): “Illa enim quae superius exposita sunt circa proprietatem Filii quae est generari, hic intelligenda sunt circa proprietatem Spiritus Sancti quae est spirari.” The difference, of course, is that the Son proceeds through impression according to the mode of intellect and the Holy Spirit through expulsion according to the mode of will.

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whereby he is related to the Father and Son by origin, whereby this essence produces a notional product that is a constitutive term of one of its two notional acts. For, “the Holy Spirit is produced from the Father and Son through their concordant will as bare and converted upon itself as informed with simple and essential love, having existence from both, being a third person in God, and being of their substance, as the substance itself is the will informed by simple and essential love.”116 Holy Spirit is constituted as the terminus ad quem of spiration, whereat he is produced, since through this term the divine essence assumes the property whereby this essence is passively directed towards the Father and Son, with which property (spirari) the divine essence is the person of the Holy Spirit. However, since the Holy Spirit proceeds according to the mode of an expression of mutual love out of free will, the termination of this act can be understood to stand in something (sistere in aliquo) in a twofold way. For, the act whereby love is expressed can be understood to be terminated at the instant at which the expressed love gains notional and actual existence, or at the instant whereat this love is received by him to whom it is expressed. Thus, Henry writes, the moment at which the spiration stands can be understood as terminated 1) in the subsisting product (ut in producto subsistente), or 2) in the one receiving the product into himself (ut in recipiente in seipsum productum). 117 In regard to the first term of this emanation, one unique person is the term whereat the notional product (the Holy Spirit) is produced in spiration. For the notional term of spiration is the Holy Spirit, namely that which the will expresses or produces. However, the act of spiration, inasmuch as it is an expression of mutual love, entails not only the term whereat the product gains existence, but also the receptive term, inasmuch as the love that is produced is given to another. For this love proceeds out of the liberality of free will so that it may be given to another and received by this other. Thus spiration entails two termini ad quem, though only one of them is notional and 116

Summa, art. 61, q. 2, ad 2 (ed. Badius, fol. 175 rY): “Spiritus Sanctus spiratione producitur a Patre et Filio per voluntatem eorum concordem ut est nuda et conversa super seipsam informatam amore simplici et essentiali, et habet esse ab utroque et est tertia persona in divinis et de substantia ipsorum ut ipsa est voluntas informata amore simplici et essentiali.” 117 Summa, art. 61, q. 4 (ed. Badius, fol. 176 vN).

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constitutive of the person produced. “For the definition of the term whereby someone is the term of production as product is different from that by which someone is the term of production as receptive of the one produced, just as the term of the generation of a heavy thing, namely the heavy thing itself, is different from the place itself of the heavy thing, which is downwards.”118 Now, this twofold distinction regarding the spiritual locus at which the emanation by will is terminated is not applicable to generation. For the word proceeds as a declarative knowledge that is impressed on the intellect due to its reflection on itself as simple knowledge. Its procession is, as it were, a motion that is terminated in the paternal intellect, and stands in the intellect out of which the word is produced (sistens in illo ut de quo producitur). 119 That is, because the word proceeds as an intellectual impression on the intellect that reflects upon itself, the termination of generation stands whereat its product is produced. In generation, the place at which the product is produced and the place at which the production is terminated coincide in every possible way. The Son, therefore, necessarily remains, so to speak, whereat he is both produced and impressed, for impression is the mode in which the Son attains necessary subsistence. If the Son would not always subsist within the necessary Trinity whereat he is impressed, but would somehow disassociate himself from the intellect into which he is impressed, he would no longer be properly an impression of knowledge or the word of the divine intellect. The natural or necessary intellectual mode, by which the Son proceeds, determines that the term whereat the Son is produced and the term at which the act of generation itself stands are necessarily one and the same. In spiration this is not the case. For the term of spiration can be considered in a twofold way, as was seen, and the act of spiration entails both terms insofar as this act proceeds from a concordant free will as a mutual love, even though only the term whereat the product gets notional existence is constitutive of the Holy Spirit. “The procession or production of the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as he is love, is a mo118

Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 176 vN-O): “Alia enim est ratio termini qua aliquis est terminus productionis ut ipsum productum, et alia qua aliquis est terminus productionis ut receptivum in se ipsius producti, quemadmodum alius est terminus generationis gravis, scilicet ipsum grave, alius vero est ipse locus gravis deorsum.” 119 Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 177 rP).

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tion, as it were, into the loved object that is not terminated and does not stand in the will informed by simple love out of which the love is produced, but, as it were, further proceeds into the object loved with the very product, namely with the inciting love that proceeds, which is the Holy Spirit.”120 Therefore, the mutual love or Holy Spirit is not only spirated so that it gains existence as a third person in God, but also so that this love may be received by the object of such love. Since the principle of spiration is the concordant will of the Father and Son, who subsist as mutual relata, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father into the Son and from the Son into the Father. Through the perfection of the selfrelation of knowledge which is consummated in the generation of the Son, this same self-relation is necessarily fecund to become also one of love, and thereby actually becomes also one of self-love. Once the divine essence knows itself perfectly through the Father and Son, it can then love itself perfectly through the Father and Son. Then the will produces a more intense form of love elicited on the part of the Father and Son, out of the simple love of the essential will. Since this notional love is really produced out of the divine essence as will through the Father and Son, this love is a third person in God. And it is one love, not two, proceeding from one and the same divine will, albeit through two distinct persons; proceeding out of one, subsistent self-distinguishing will toward this same will, it is the most perfectly mutual love. Since the divine essence assumes the notional mode of intense love between its intellectual relata in a passive order of origin toward both of these relata, which in turn are actively ordered toward what they produce, the Holy Spirit is a person constituted by a passive relation of origin in God. For the Holy Spirit is indeed subjectively produced out of the divine will through the active spiration of the Father and Son, and really related through his constitutive passive respect (spirari) to the Father and Son. The very notional perfection of the will, namely the exhaustion of the immanent fecundity of the will, takes place when the two extremes of the relation according to intel120

Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 177 rP-Q): “Spiritus autem inquantum est amor eius processio sive productio est quasi motio in obiectum amatum non terminata aut sistens in voluntate informata amore simplici de qua producitur, sed ipso producto quasi ulterius procedit in obiectum amatum, et hoc ipso amore incentivo procedente qui est Spiritus Sanctus.”

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lect become notionally related mutually also by will. This occurs when they produce a notional love towards one another that is received by each. Thus, the will’s fecundity is its concordance, and its perfection is the consummation of such a concordance—mutual love. Since the constitutive order between the Father and Son rationally precedes this second emanation in which they are together the active term, only the passive term of this procession is constitutive of a person. This passive term marks the perfection of the divine fecundity according to will and, consequently, the total perfection of immanent fecundity of a simple unity of intellect and will. Due the differences between intellect and will, the relation obtained between the terms of the divine intellectual act is different from the relation between the terms of the willing act. For the relation according to intellect is mutually constitutive of both extremes, namely the Father and Son. The relation according to will is a relation of mutual love between the Father and Son that is constitutive of the Love itself, since the notional love produced by the Father and Son exists in a real relation of origin. Since the Holy Spirit is the product of, or mutual love between, the Father and Son, the emanation of the will does not only terminate at the production of the Holy Spirit, but proceeds further into the loved object with the produced Love itself. Thus the Holy Spirit is not only produced but received by the Father from the Son and received by the Son from the Father. Self-knowledge thus results in the mutual love between the constitutive terms of the relation of self-knowledge. With such inciting (incentivum) love, therefore, not only does the Father love himself in the Holy Spirit but also loves the Son. Similarly the Son not only loves himself in this way, but also loves the Father. For the inciting love is never contained (contentus) in the one that elicits as though it were some narcissistic love, but necessarily, as proceeding out of free will, also tends into the other where it finds its end.121 The Holy Spirit is given by each of the persons to the other, and, therefore, received by each from the other. 122 Thus Henry writes 121

Henry quotes from Richard of Saint Victor: “the love of the heart is never found as singular (cordialis amor numquam singularis invenitur)” (ibid. [ed. Badius, fol. 177 rQ]). 122 Ibid.: “[Spirans] non solum spirat ipsum ut in semetipsum tendentem et manentem in ipso [...] sed etiam spirat ipsum ut tendentem in [Patrem et Filium].”

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that the Holy Spirit not only proceeds from the Father and Son as love simply (simpliciter), but as uniting (unitivus) love, and by implication as the nexus or bond123 of both. Surely insofar as this love is spirated by each it remains in and is possessed by each, since subjectively the persons are one substance. Yet the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Father unto the Son and vice-versa, thereby being both given and received objectively, that is subjectively out of the will, though ordered through the Father and Son towards one another. The Father and Son contain the Holy Spirit in the sense that they produce it for the other, as well as in the sense that they receive it from the other.124 1J—The Trinity as Emanated by Intellect and Will The previous sections of this chapter developed in order generation and spiration, as well as the constitution of the divine persons in these emanations. This section will add to this presentation by considering further the relation among the emanations themselves. One can know what one does not will but one cannot will what one does not (in any way) know.125 Yet, intellect and will coexist in the mind, each assisting the other, albeit unequally, in their acts. Due to the non-uniform order or relation between intellect and will, Henry calls these principles disparate (disparatae)126 , producing disparate emanations. 127 Since, as we read, the will is not fertilized (foecundatur) toward the act of spirating by any action other than that by which the Son is generated, generation is the origin of spiration.128 This is so 123

‘Bond’ is a proper name of the Holy Spirit because he unites the Father and Son in love. He is also called ‘gift’ in that he proceeds from the pure liberality of free will. 124 Cf. Summa, art. 61, q. 4. 125 In God this disparate distinction is in fact mutual in the sense that generation, being a causa propter quam of spiration, does have a respect towards spiration; so it is disparate in being unequal and in terms of priority of nature. For details, see A. 60, q. 3, responsio (ed. Badius). 126 Summa, art. 60, q. 3, fol. 164 rL: “[Generatio et spiratio] distinctionem habent disparationis quia a disparatis principiis oriuntur et eliciuntur, cuiuismodi sunt natura [i.e. intellectus] et voluntas.” 127 Ibid. 128 In response to the first argument of question 3, article 60, Henry remarks that although Augustine talked about an order of nature only in terms of the persons, without touching upon the order of the emanations, nevertheless the

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only in an improper sense, for it is only a requirement for, and not the principle of, spiration; only the will (of the Father and Son) is such a principle. Properly, it is the person or suppositum who is the principle: the Father in generation and the Father and the Son in spiration.129 Yet “spiration as such draws its origin from generation as such,”130 because the terminus ad quem of generation is itself the terminus a quo of spiration, since the will is made fecund to spirate with generation, at the point at which Father and Son share the will. This means that there is a real, disparate, relative distinction among the emanations themselves, just as there is a real distinction according to relative opposition among the persons. Inasmuch as it is the simple divine essence itself which assumes relative modes according to acts of intellect and will, the distinction of relative opposition between active and passive generation, constitutive of the Father and Son respectively, can be reduced subjectively to the act of intellectual generation itself, for the pure act of generation is the foundation of its relatively opposed extremes. Similarly the distinction of relative opposition between active and passive spiration, constitutive of the Holy Spirit, can be reduced to the act of spiration itself, since the pure act of spiration is the foundation of its relatively opposed extremes. Thus, the relative distinctions entailed in each of the emanations are reduced to a distinction among the emanations themselves. For spiration draws its origin from, and is thus related to, generation, although spiration is not elicited by it. This distinction between the emanations can be then reduced subjectively to the rational distinction between the potencies of intellect and will, and, in turn, this rational distinction is reduced to the simple, subjective fundamental unity of the divine nature itself,

persons are only ordered according to origin through the emanations themselves, by which the persons subsist in God. It would be impossible for an order to exist among the persons unless there is also order among the emanations. Although Augustine did not expressly say this, he assumed it. Properly there is an order of nature between the persons; commonly and, as it were, improperly there is one between the emanations. See Summa, art. 60, q. 3, ad 1. 129 Summa, art. 60, q. 3 (ed. Badius, fol. 164 vQ): “[...] eo quod omnis actio notionalis in divinis procedit a persona et terminatur in personam.” 130 Ibid., q. 2 (ed. Badius, fol. 163 rE): “Quia generatio simpliciter originem trahit a generatione simpliciter.”

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the fundamental principle of the emanations and, thereby, of the persons. 131 Henry takes the disparate distinction among the emanations themselves to be a real one: they are distinct acts with respect to each other or in an objective order, inasmuch as spiration draws its origin from generation. Surely, in a subjective order, all real relations in God are identical with the essential foundation. However, relation is a real mode of being in God not only due to the relative opposition between the terms of generation, and the relative opposition between terms of spiration. There is also a real relation between generation and spiration, inasmuch as they are distinct acts related according to origin. On this basis, Henry gives his answer to a traditional scholastic question: “even if the Holy Spirit would proceed from the Father alone just as the Son is generated . . . by reason of one thing originating from another, active generation would [still] be distinguished from active spiration, and similarly the Son from the Holy Spirit.”132 Inasmuch as the Holy Spirit still would proceed by will, whose act is disparately distinct from that of the intellect, he still would be distinct from the Son who is produced by intellect. For Henry, however, this hypothesis is actually impossible, since for him the Holy Spirit needs to proceed also from the Son in order to proceed at all. Since the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son as well, he proceeds from (active and passive) generation as such. Spiration as such takes its origin from, and is thus really distinguished by disparate relations from, generation as such. 131

Summa, art. 60, q. 3 (ed. Badius, fol. 164 rL): “Distinctionem enim omnem realem in divinis secundum relativam oppositionem oportet reduci ad distinctionem realem disparatam. Oppositionem relativam inter generare et generari, similiter inter spirare et spirari, oportet reducere ad oppositionem disparationis inter generare et spirare, et hanc oportet reducere ad distinctionem rationis inter intellectum et voluntatem. Et sic per ordinem omnem distinctionem maiorem oportet reducere ad minorem, quousque tota reducatur, sicut et omnis pluralitas in divinis ad unitatem simplicissimam re et ratione simul, cuiusmodi est esse primum divinorum, simplicissimum scilicet esse, ad quod omnia alia se habent quasi per quandam attributionem et additionem, secundum superius diffusius expositum est.” 132 Ibid., q. 2 (ed. Badius, fol. 163 rE): “[...] etsi Spiritus Sanctus procederet a solo Patre sicut et generatur Filius [...] secundum rationem originandi hoc ab hoc, generatio activa distingueretur a spiratione activa et similiter Filius a Spiritu Sancto [...].”

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It is worth noting that, after Henry, the answer to this hypothetical and intensely debated question among Latin adherents to the Filioque (If the Holy Spirit would proceed only from the Father, would he still be distinct from the Son?) became a defining mark of allegiance to one of the two chief theological outlooks dominating Trinitarian theology during the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Those who answered in the negative were generally Dominicans who accounted for personal distinctions through relative opposition. Those who answered in the affirmative were generally Franciscans who, influenced by Henry, accounted for personal distinctions through emanations of intellect and will. 133 Unlike thinkers such as Giles of Rome and Thomas Aquinas, Henry maintains that relative opposition is not the only basis for real distinctions in the Trinity. 134 Generally speaking Giles and Thomas argue for the Filioque thus: only relative opposition yields real distinctions in God (a disparate distinction would vitiate divine simplicity and unicity), and so the Holy Spirit must proceed also from the Son; otherwise the Holy Spirit and the Son would be the same person, having the same relation of opposition to the Father. The implicit assumption here is that intellect and will, being only rationally distinct, cannot be in themselves the basis for the real distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit. For Henry, real divine relations are knowing 133

On the significance of this hypothetical question during this period, see R. L. Friedman, “Trinitarian Theology and Philosophical Issues: Trinitarian Texts from the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries,” in: CIMAGL, 72 (2001), pp. 89-168. 134 On this issue in Giles and Thomas, see C. Luna “Essenza divina,” pp. 4162. For Giles, who develops Aquinas’s tenet that the persons are distinguished only by relative opposition, a distinction between disparate relations presupposes a distinction of foundations according to existence, which is not the case in God who is one and simple (see ibid., pp. 46-47). Through relative opposition, however, real distinctions agree with God’s simplicity and unicity because “le relazioni opposte distinguono secondo l’essenza stessa della relazione, nel senso che uno degli estremi si distingue dall’altro proprio in virtú di questa relazione. Per questo motivo, un estremo può essere definito in funzione dell’altro. Il figlio si distingue dal padre, perché la relazione figlio — padre è intrinsecamente, essenzialmente diversa dalla relazione padre — figlio. La loro differenza è tale da essere un’opposizione e da rendere queste relazioni incompatibili. Nel caso delle relazioni opposte, il criterio di distinzione è dunque l’essenza stessa della relazione (ratio quidditatis relationis)” (ibid., p. 46).

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and loving modes of the actuality of the divine essence. The Trinity can be shown to be really constituted relatively through an analysis of intellect and will as fecundities—the most adequate analysis to reach some insight into the wholly spiritual divine nature. This analysis, though assuming an analogy between the human and the divine mind, is not merely a rhetorical metaphor without any argumentative force, as Giles seems inclined to think at some points.135 On the contrary, in being for human beings the best available image of the divine nature, human intellect and will should be made to constitute the best argumentative basis for the Trinity, as Augustine’s extensive psychological exploration of the Trinity indicates. The distinction between the emanations which Bonaventure insists upon (according to human understanding), whose rational explanation Henry finds implicit in Augustine, has been transformed by Henry into a fundamental basis for God’s actual triune nature that is consistent with his metaphysics and theory of relations. Needless to say this position sharply distinguishes Henry’s theology, not only in regard to the Trinity in itself, but also in regard to creatures (chapter 2) and his metaphysics (chapter 3). Accordingly Henry criticizes the argument of Giles and Thomas denying the real, disparate distinction between the emanations, and this he does both theologically and philosophically: To the fourth [argument], that generating and spirating are not distinguished naturally, and therefore do not have an order of nature because both exist in the same thing and thus are really the same, I say that this argument is conclusive according to those who posit that the quiddity and distinction of relation exists only in an order and from an order to another to which it refers relatively. They also say that there is no distinction between disparate relations, but only between relatively opposed ones, so that if the relation is not considered in an order toward one thing, but rather [is considered] toward another, [then] the relation is not distinguished from the first thing through its own reality and property, which is the case of active spiration with respect to generation, because they exist in the same thing. But by positing that relation has quiddity from its foundation without the operation of reason, though not without opposition and respect towards the given thing, the argument is not conclusive. For relations toward diverse opposites, solely from the fact that they are founded in the same thing in different ways, just as paternity and mastery are founded in the same thing in orders to diverse opposites, may well be distinguished in regard to each other as disparate because one comparison does 135

Cf. C. Luna, “Essenza divina,” p. 38.

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not remove the other. And thus, although generation and spiration exist in the same thing and [exist] toward diverse opposites among [each of] them, nevertheless they can be really distinct naturally as well as be really distinct disparately, and due to this there can be an order of nature between them. But this obtains not because they are disparate referring to diverse opposites, but because one of them has existence from the other in some way, and on account of this they have in some way a relation between them, albeit unnamed, which nevertheless is not distinguished, on the one hand, from the relation which exists between generating and being generated and, on the other hand, from that between spirating and being spirated, as was said.136

As presented in more detail in the third chapter, a real relation is nothing else than a foundation directed to a term or object, through a respect identical to the foundation subjectively: it is a foundation in a respect towards an objective term. Hence, the relation derives all of its reality from its foundation as it is itself the foundation as related, the term being only a causa sine qua non of its reality. Since a relation is identical with its foundation, generare and generari are identical with the act itself of generation, in which they are founded as relatively opposed terms. Similarly, spirare and spirari are identical with the act itself of spiration, in which they are founded 136

Summa, art. 60, q. 3, ad 4 (ed. Badius, fol. 167 rF): “Ad quartum, quod generare et spirare non distinguuntur naturaliter, et ideo nec habent ordinem naturae, quia ambo sunt in eodem et ita idem re, dico quod argumentum hoc procedit secundum illos qui ponunt quod quiditas relationis et distinctio non est nisi in ordine et ex ordine ad alterum ad quod relative dicitur. Qui etiam dicunt quod non est distinctio inter relationes disparatas, sed solum inter relative oppositas, ita quod si non consideretur relatio in ordine ad illud sed ad aliud, non distinguitur ab illo secundum rem et proprietatem suam, qualis est consideratio spirationis activae ad generationem, quia sunt in eodem. Sed ponendo quod relatio quiditatem habet a fundamento absque operatione rationis, licet non sine opposito et respectu ad illud, non procedit argumentum. Quia relationes ad diversa opposita ex hoc solo quod in eodem fundantur diversimode, sicut dominium et paternitas fundantur in eodem in ordine ad diversa opposita, bene distinguuntur inter se ut disparata, quia una comparatio non aufert aliam. Et sic licet in eodem sint generatio et spiratio et ad diversa opposita inter se, tamen bene possunt esse re distincta naturaliter et realiter ut disparata et per hoc esse ordo naturae inter illa, sed non ex hoc quia sunt disparata et ad diversa opposita, sed quia unum eorum quoquo modo habet esse ab altero, et per hoc habent quoquo modo relationem licet innominata inter se, quae tamen non distinguitur ex una parte a relatione quae est inter generare et generari, et ex alia parte quae est inter spirare et spirari, sicut dictum est.”

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as relatively opposed terms. For generare and generari are relative modes of being of the divine essence, which self-relates according to intellect through these two respects. Similarly spirare and spirari are relative modes by which the divine essence self-relates according to will. As founded in these acts, the relatively opposed relations in each act of emanation are identical with the act itself. If we consider the acts as such, therefore, there are really two distinct and simple spiritual acts in God, one of intellect and one of will. And, since generation and spiration are themselves ordered according to origin, there is a real, relative, disparate distinction between the two emanations. The real distinction of relative opposition among the terms of generation, on the one hand, and the real distinction of relative opposition among the terms of spiration, on the other, do not exclude a real, relative distinction between the emanations themselves. Similarly a father’s real relation to his son does not exclude his real relation of master to his subjects. Paternity and mastery (the diverse respects by which the same foundation or substance is related to two different terms) can be two real, relative modes of the same foundation, and therefore they can be really distinct disparately. In God, the real distinctions of relative opposition and the real distinction of disparate relations are two modes of comparison that yield two modes of real, relative distinction. It is in this sense that substance and relation have real being in regard to both emanations. With respect to each other, generation and spiration are distinct, relative modes of being which are founded in a simple unity of intellect and will. In a subjective order, generation and spiration are identical as founded in the divine nature, just as the persons are fundamentally identical with their emanating acts and, by implication, with the essence or nature. Generation and spiration are respective acts that the divine essence assumes with respect to itself in an objective order, according to perfect, disparate, related acts of intellect and will. Thus the divine nature communicates itself to itself through its principles of intellect and will: it constitutes itself as the Trinity through the emanations or disparate relations and the persons or relatively opposed relations, the latter being founded in the former, and the former in the simple nature or intellect and will.

CHAPTER 2: THE TRINITY AND CREATION Henry devotes the second question of his sixth series of quodlibetal disputations specifically to the question of “whether the production of the persons in God is presupposed by the production of creatures in a causal sense.”1 He begins in the first sentence of his solution by claiming that this question altogether (omnino) depends on the previous one of the same Quodlibet (q. 1: “Whether there are only three persons in God, and no more or less”), where he relies on his basic tenets, developed later in greater detail in his Summa articles2 treated in the previous chapter. He solves this first question, as is to be expected, through his understanding of intellect and will as natural principles. Even though all philosophers and theologians understand substances separate from matter, and in particular God, as essentially minds which think and will, many have failed to make the distinction in God between intellect and will as essential acts and intellect and will as notional acts. For this reason they have also failed to understand the Trinity. Through this distinction primarily, as explained in chapter 1, Henry accounts for God being really triune: from the essential intellect of simple knowledge, notional generation is elicited and distinguishes the Father and Son; from the essential will of simple love, notional spiration is elicited and distinguishes the Holy Spirit in regard to the Father and the Son. Since intellect and will are the only two fecundities of the divine nature, and in generation the entire intellectual fecundity is perfected while in spiration the entire willing fecundity is perfected, there must be three and only three divine persons: one who is not from another and from whom all others proceed, one who is from another and from whom another proceeds, and one who is from the other two but from whom none proceeds. No person proceeds from the third person as his production entails the total perfection according to will, and by implication, the perfection of the entire fecundity of the divine nature. No fecundity is communicated to the Holy Spirit in the way that the Father communicates the spirating

1

Quodl. VI, q. 2: “Utrum personarum productio in Deo praesupponitur causaliter ante productionem creaturarum” 2 See the chronology by J. Gómez Caffarena in Ser Participado, p. 270.

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force to the Son through the first notional act. 3 And all divine fecundity must be perfected; otherwise, as Richard of St. Victor points out, the divine emanations would not have a final terminus and there would be an infinite regress of emanations in God—essential potency would never be notionally perfected. Accordingly, 1) the intellectual and willing dimensions of the divine nature, rightly understood, together with 2) this nature’s pure actuality, assures us that the persons are three and only three. These two points also help explain how creation depends on the Trinity. To elucidate this dependence, the following section shall treat the second point, while the rest of the chapter shall elaborate on the first. 2A—The Trinity’s Notional Necessity God’s complete freedom in regard to creatures is grounded in the necessity by which He is the Trinity. The nature of this necessity is best appraised through Henry’s account of how the notional acts of generating and spirating, and the persons they produce, are unique because they are founded in the essential acts of thinking and willing respectively. As productive perfections, the notional acts are founded in the essential acts. These notional acts subsist in the divine essence as in their unique subject or, as it were (quasi), ungenerated matter, which nevertheless only and always has a notional or personal actuality. The persons are derived from this primal foundation and their constitutive relations are founded in it. The divine notional acts are unique because it is impossible for many divine persons of the same species, say two sons, to emanate. For two sons cannot proceed through a single act of generation, as a single action is related to a single term only.4 This is shown in a 3

Quodl. VI, q. 1 (ed. G. Wilson, Opera Omnia, X, Leuven, 1987, p. 2, ll. 3642): “Propterea vero quod sunt tantum duae rationes principiandi actiones emanationum in Deo, quarum tota fecunditas in singulis emanationibus suis et personis productis ex eis effusa est et exhausta, ut nec in producente nec in producto restat fecunditas aliqua ad aliquam aliam emanationem productivam personae, idcirco non possunt esse in Deo plures productae quam illae duae, quae cum unica non producta sunt tres, ut sint tres et tantum tres, nec plures nec pauciores.” 4 See Summa, article 54, q. 8 (‘Utrum a qualibet dictarum triarum personarum emanet aliqua alia’) (ed. Badius, fol. 101 rD). This question, Henry notes, like q. 1 of Quodl. VI, also demands an explanation of why there are three and only three divine persons.

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twofold way. First, we consider the subject or foundation of the emanations, and secondly the eliciting principles of the notional acts. Consider, Henry argues, a white thing (album) which comes to be white from that which is not white through an act of whitewashing (actus dealbationis). What is founded in something cannot be diversified in number simultaneously, and according to the same species, unless the foundation itself is diversified, as happens in creatures.5 Since an act of white-washing is exerted on a body, and the body is unique in number, there can only be one unique whitewashing in the same instant of time in the given body. Thus, since the non-white subject is one in number, in the same instant of time only one white thing can come to be from it through only one act of whitening. Moreover, whiteness (albedo) is founded in a body and similitude (similitudo) according to whiteness is founded in whiteness. Therefore, since the body in which whiteness and similitude are founded is one in number, its whiteness cannot be many in number, but is necessarily one, and by implication the similitude founded in the unique whiteness must also be one, even if it is related to several things, in the way that a father, by a unique paternity, is related to his sons. 6 Similarly “since an act of seeing a color is founded upon the act by which sight is altered by the color, if the alteration is unique and simple, there cannot be but one simple vision simultaneously in the same instant.”7 Therefore, generating and spirating are unique as founded in unique, simple and eternal acts of intellect and will, which acts constitute together one simple foundation or essence. Also, the persons proceeding through the notional acts, from this unique essence, must also be unique as founded in the notional acts and, thereby, in this essence. For it is not more possible for there to be in God many generations, sons or filiations, than for there to be in the numerically self -same matter different transmutations according to the same species in the same instant of time, or for one man to have many filiations (i.e. be 5

Summa, art 54, q. 8 (ed. Badius, fol. 101 rD): “Quare cum illud quod fundatur in aliquo, aut habet esse circa aliquid, aut produci ex eo, non potest plurificari secundum numerum simul et in eodem instanti sub eadem specie, nisi plurificato illo in quo fundatur et circa quod et ex quo habet esse.” 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid.: “Cum enim actus videndi colorem fundatur super actum immutandi visum a colore, si unica et simplex est immutatio, simul in eodem instanti non potest esse nisi unica simplex visio.”

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many sons). This is most evidently impossible in one and the same instant of eternity, which is how all divine things exist.8 Since the notional acts proceed from unique, essential acts existing in, and identical with, the unique, simple essence, they and the persons they produce are singular and unique. This unicity can also be shown if we consider the principles that elicit these acts. For the fecundity of that which elicits an emanation is altogether exhausted in the production of a unique person. Neither in the producer nor in the product is there any fecundity remaining for another emanation. Otherwise, the persons would be produced without the full fecundity of their principles, which is unfitting, for then God would not be pure act. For the notional acts and their products are eternal like the very essence in which they are founded. Therefore that which produces is always related to its production and product in a wholly uniform way (semper uniformiter se habet). In the product itself there cannot remain any fecundity toward another similar product, because it is eternally and perfectly produced by one and the same act. 9 Otherwise there would be two productions of the same definition (ratio) existing wholly and simultaneously in the same way, emanating from the numerically same principle. But this is impossible. There cannot be many productions of the same definition (ratio) in God, since the divine foundation, its essential principles, and the notional acts that these principles elicit, are unique, perfect and eternally actual. The unicity of each of the emanations does not stem from a restriction of potency, but rather from the perfection of the potency of that which emanates, whereby it immediately pours itself (statim diffundit se) in a perfect and permanent act. That from one and the same potency acts be done again and again occurs only because of a defect of potency, since there is not a simultaneous and perfect diffusion of the potency into act. Products of the same nature are multiplied because they are incomplete: they do not contain fully (plene) the actuality of their specific nature and definition (ratio).10 On the other hand, 8

Ibid. Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 101 rF). See also similar statements in Quodl. VI, q. 1 (ed. Wilson, Opera Omnia, X, pp. 22-24). For Henry the best verbal expression to convey these eternally perfected productions is “Deus semper productus est a Deo” (Summa, art. 54, q. 3 [ed. Badius, fol. 84 vP]). 10 Cf. Summa, art. 54, q. 8, ad 4. 9

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as happens with divine emanations, when the potency perfectly diffuses itself at once in a perfect act, producing something absolutely perfect, the action must be unique according to a unique definition (ratio) and, by implication, the product is also unique, containing the full actuality of its definition (ratio).11 The absolute perfection of intellectual fecundity can only be a unique act resulting in the unique Son; so too is the case with the will and its product, the Holy Spirit. The essential acts can be considered either according to themselves and absolutely, or as they have existence in the persons according to relative properties. Obviously essential acts do not exist absolutely, but only as belonging to the persons who are concretely God. If the notional acts were founded in essential acts absolutely, they would be, like the essence, common to the persons and any personal distinction would evaporate. Thus, notional acts are founded in the essential ones according to the way that these latter acts are possessed by the persons.12 Generation is founded in essential understanding only as existing in the Father. Only the innascible Father has fecundity to generate by intellect. In this act, the entire essential intellect is perfected both in itself and as belonging to the three persons, for the persons are only founded in this perfected intellect. Through this act, the Father is constituted by his property of active generation (generare), and the Son by passive generation (generari). Due to the perfection of essential thinking in the person of the Son, there can be only one unique notional act of generating. Similarly, spirating is founded in essential willing only insofar as essential willing exists commonly in the Father and in the Son. As constituted in the first emanation according to the divine order of nature, the Father and Son are unable to be spirated—their actual constitution is rationally prior to the active spiration which they themselves perform and to the product of this spiration. For the Father and Son are constituted at a point (according to human understanding) at which intellectual fecundity has been perfected, while willing fecundity remains to be notionally reduced to act. Whence, due to their inability to be spirated (ratione inspirabilitatis), they are fecund as the 11

Ibid. See also Quodl. VI, q. 1 (ed. Wilson, Opera Omnia, X, pp. 22-24). Summa, art. 54, q. 10, ad 1 (ed. Badius, fol. 105 vI): “Dicendum est quod actus notionales generandi et spirandi non fundantur in actibus essentialibus intelligendi et volendi, ut simpliciter considerantur, sed solum secundum quod habent esse in determinata persona.” 12

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active term of spiration to emanate by will. 13 Thus, in the essential willing of the Father and Son there is fecundity to produce the Holy Spirit, who is the immanent or notional perfection of this fecundity. Through this notional act, the whole essential will is perfected both in itself and in all of the three persons, for the persons are only founded in this perfected will. Therefore, it is only proper to the Father and Son to spirate the unique, perfect love of the whole Trinity, for only they possess the active respect or fecundity for this act. Due to this perfection of willing fecundity, it is impossible for there to be another act of spiration in God.14 The notional acts are really identical to the essential ones; they are founded in the essential acts because the essential acts are their subjective principles. Since these notional productions, which are relative persons, are subjectively identical to their ground or foundation, one may say that the plurality that springs forth from this ground or foundation has this ground or foundation ‘in common’. It would be perhaps better to say that this plurality is simply a diversity of modes of being of the same thing. The ground is the plurality, for the plurality is the intrinsic, necessary perfection of the ground. 2B—Emanation and Creation: Henry vs. some philosophers and theologians In question 2 of Quodlibet VI, Henry categorically maintains that a proper understanding of the Trinity is necessary for a proper understanding of creation: creation depends on the Trinity, so that, “those who err about the production of the persons necessarily err about the production of creatures.”15 And erring about the production of the persons can be either ignoring divine productions altogether or failing to understand them properly. An example of the first case is Aristotle’s consistent philosophical system without revelation: God is only the final cause of an eternal world, and is not intrinsically or extrinsically productive. The second case applies to those who want to grant creation without the emanations of the Trinity, ignoring divine intellect and will as necessary, notional perfections of essential intel13

See Summa, art. 54, q. 8, ad 5 (ed. Badius, fol. 103 vT). However, ‘inspirability’ is not posited as a notion or property of a divine person, while ingenitum is a property of the Father, albeit a non-constitutive one. 14 Ibid. 15 Quodl. VI, q. 2 (ed. G. Wilson, Opera Omnia, X, p. 33, ll. 34-35).

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lect and will. These inevitably confuse emanation with creation, interpreting creation as a necessary emanation, rather than for what it is: God’s free choice. Whence, because the philosophers denied or rather, as is more the case, ignored the production of the divine persons, they posited that God produces creatures from the necessity of his essence, not from the freedom of his will. For indeed they only posited in God the understanding of simple intelligence, whereby He understands himself and everything else, and similarly the simple will, by which all is pleasing to him, according to which all is good in his essence, and they posited these [principles] to differ only by reason. However, such an intelligence, being itself natural, by the fact that it relates naturally to the things understood that are to be produced by it, necessarily relates to those things in order to produce [them] according to one determinate way, and likewise is the case with the simple will that accompanies such an intelligence. For that reason they were forced to posit that God, through his essence and by the necessity of his nature, produced things according to the best way of producing, so that [things] could not be produced in a different way, and that intellect and will behaved in this regard as a nature, not as a cause that can dispose and elect . . . But this position of these [thinkers] could not suffice in order to maintain that there is a production of creatures, nor can the production of creatures be held from this fact alone, that in God there is only simple intelligence and simple will. And this is because they did not posit in the divine intelligence some knowledge functioning as an art that is manifestative and declarative of those things which [the divine intelligence] knows in the simple intelligence, and that disposes and orders those things, which also knows how things other than itself are to be produced, which is not determined to one way of producing things, but which disposes according to which way, out of many possible ways of occurring, it is fitting for things to be produced in accordance with the order of eternal justice. Likewise [this is so] because they did not posit in the divine will some love that functions as inciting and affectionate toward those things willed by the simple will, and that can elect among those things which please it so that things other than itself be produced—which knowledge and which love are not had in God without the production of the Word and Love over and above simple knowledge and love. 16 16

Quodl. VI, q. 2 (ed. G. Wilson, Opera Omnia, X, pp. 33-36, ll. 35-50, 7185): “Unde philosophi quia negabant, immo potius ignorabant, divinarum personarum productionem, ponebant Deum producere creaturas de necessitate suae essentiae, non voluntatis libertate. Quia enim in Deo non ponebant nisi intellectum simplicis intelligentiae, qua intelligit se et omnia alia, et similiter simplicem voluntatem, qua placent ei omnia, secundum quod sunt bona in sua essentia, et ponebant ista differre sola ratione. Talis autem intelligentia cum

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This view of creation as necessary is proper to many Neoplatonic philosophers, notably Avicenna 17, one of Henry’s chief sources. Seeing the divine nature only as essential intellect and will, these philosophers inevitably understand it as wholly determined, not as free. For essential intellect and will are altogether identical, and only rationally distinct, in the divine nature: whatever is known through simple knowledge is also necessarily willed through simple love. If this is all the divine nature is, then it is just a natural potency, albeit intellectual, analogous to the principle of natural reproduction of a creature, producing only in a determined way. Accordingly, God would create in a necessary way from eternity, his will automatically willing whatever is known by his intellect, and howsoever it may be known. This would be a God, one could say, who is only conscious and not selfconscious. Or, to put it in another way: this would be a God who, because he is only self-conscious, in the sense of being determined only to know and will whatever is contained in his essence (as known in his essence and because it is so known), is not self-conscious in the hoc, quod, in se naturalis, modo naturali se habet ad intellecta producenda ab ipsa, necessario se habet ad eas ad producendum secundum unum determinatum modum, et similiter est de voluntate simplici concomitante talem intelligentiam. Idcirco necesse habebant ponere quod Deus per essentiam suam et necessitate suae naturae res produceret secundum optimum modum producendi, ita quod alio modo produci non possent, et quod voluntas et intellectus se haberent in hoc ut natura, non ut dispositiva et electiva ratio [...]. Sed haec ipsorum positio non potuit sufficere ad ponendum productionem creaturarum, immo nec productio creaturarum posset poni ex hoc solo, quod in Deo non esset nisi simplex intelligentia et simplex voluntas. Et hoc ideo, quia non ponebant in divina intelligentia notitiam aliquam se habentem ut artem manifestativam et declarativam eorum quae cognoscit in simplici intelligentia, neque ut dispositivam eorum et ordinativam quae cognoscit ut producenda et alia a se, quae non est determinata ad unum modum producendi res, sed disponit secundum quem modum ex pluribus possibilibus fieri conveniens est iuxta ordinem aeternae iustitiae res produci. Similiter quia non ponebant in divina voluntate amorem aliquem se habentem ut incentivum et affectativum in illa quae vult simplici voluntate, neque ut electivum eorum quae ei placent ut producenda et alia a se, quae notitia et qui amor non habentur in Deo sine productione Verbi et Amoris super notitiam et amorem simplicem.” 17 Ibid. (ed. Wilson, pp. 34-35). In his own tradition, Avicenna was criticized (chiefly by Al-Ghazali), as his view of creation was perceived by some as a restriction of Allah’s will.

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sense of being conscious of himself as himself and as the origin of what is both similar to himself because it comes from himself, and different from himself because it is caused and thus not himself. Put simply, this would not be a personal God. This misunderstanding of the divine nature is due to a misapprehension of God’s necessity. God is necessary, properly speaking, because he is necessarily triune. The generation of the Son and the spiration of the Holy Spirit make God necessary because they are the perfection or pure actuality of all immanent fecundity of the divine essence. Essential intellect and will are necessary, not in the Avicennian sense of being the divine nature absolutely speaking, but in being necessarily reduced to notional acts. This complete reduction to act of all immanent divine fecundity is the necessity proper to the Trinity, as well as the ground for God’s complete freedom in regard to what is not himself and, by definition, not necessary: no other potency immanent to God needs to be actualized further after generation and spiration, since these are the total perfection of the divine nature. By definition, therefore, all other acts on the part of God are both free and creative: 1) they need not happen, and if they do they, in not contributing to God’s intrinsic perfection, 2) must terminate in what is not God, in what is caused and thus a creature. It is true that divine, essential intellect and will are somehow natural and necessary potencies. But they are not such potencies with respect to creatures, precisely because they are only such potencies as constitutive of the divine persons. Just as a human being’s free choice and action necessarily depend on the prior, natural perfection of his substance, God’s free creative role depends on His necessarily triune nature. Similarly “just as a natural form is not the principle of action in so far as it is the perfection of that in which it exists, but only [is such a principle] according as it possesses a relation to an effect, similarly wisdom or love, according as it is the form of intellect or will, is not a principle of action, but only [is such a principle] according as it possesses a relation to an effect; however, the wisdom that disposes and the love that is affectionate, which are related to an act, are only the proceeding wisdom and the proceeding love.”18 Here lies that widespread 18

Quodl. VI, q. 2 (ed. Wilson, p. 37, ll. 28-34): “Quemadmodum enim forma naturalis non est principium actionis secundum quod est perfectio eius in quo est, sed solummodo secundum quod habet respectum ad effectum, similiter sapientia aut amor secundum quod est forma intellectus aut voluntatis, non est

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mistake exemplified by Avicenna: interpreting creation—what is posterior—without a proper notion of what is fundamentally prior— personal productions. Through generation and spiration, God not only necessarily constitutes himself in and for himself, as explained in chapter 1; his knowledge and freedom in regard to creatures as creatures is also a result of the emanations. How? The Word is knowledge by essence: a subsistent understanding. This divine understanding, as most perfect, must include the knowledge 1) of self, 2) of self as self-understanding, 3) of self as imitable in a speculative way, and 4) of self as imitable in a practical way. (The sense in which this “practical” knowledge relates to the will in creation is clarified in the next section.) Without any one of these components, the Word would not be a perfect knowledge, as it would be lacking either in self-consciousness or in content. The total intellectual reflection entailed by the Word assures its complete self-consciousness, the first two components. The wholly analytical or specified aspect of the Word assures the complete knowledge of the infinity of what it contains, including its imitability in a speculative and practical sense. Through the Word, the divine intellect knows itself as the truth in itself and as the truth that contains and that can create all (possible and actual) created truth, down to the minutest particularity. Through the Word, the divine intellect penetrates its entire simple content, seeing it explicitly and at once, as a whole and (in and through) each and every one of its specifications— the entire map of all (actual and possible) reality both as a whole and (in and through) each and every one of its points, regions, relations, features, and possibilities. A less explicit expression of the divine knowledge would make it less than infinitely perfect.19 actionis principium, sed solummodo secundum quod habet respectum ad effectum; sapientia autem disponens et amor affectans, qui respiciunt actum, non sunt nisi sapientia et amor procedens.” 19 God’s knowledge of what flows from him and is thus other than him is infinitely perfect. Accordingly this knowledge is 1) not just universal but also fully particular. See Henry’s detailed discussion in Quodl. IX, q. 2 (ed. Macken, Opera Omnia, XIII, pp. 27-29, ll. 45-64, 72-88). Henry ends the discussion by stating the reason for the divine intellect’s complete knowledge of particulars: “Intellectus enim divinus, quia perspicacitatis est infinitae, totam virtutem suae essentiae in intelligendo penetrat [...]” (ibid., ll. 87-88). For the same reason, 2) God’s creative knowledge (and love) must include a perfect practical dimension. See the discussion in Quodl. VI, q. 2 (ed. Wilson, Opera

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The divine will, in seeing this highest truth and truth of all— its own essence—necessarily loves it. The Truth takes on the aspect of the Good—the proper object of the will, which in the case of God is the divine essence itself. Through its Love for the Good, namely itself, the will is made notional, fully actualized, and so the divine nature is properly subsistent (notional) intellect and will. However, the divine will that is so actualized creates totally freely; it does not need to create at all or create in any given way: the Trinity is omnipotent in regard to all that is not itself—creatures.20 Creation is properly a choice, not a love that is an actualization of divine will itself, as this would mean that the Trinity is not fully actualized through the second and last emanation. Creation may be understood as a love only in the sense that it is a free choice to actualize an element of what is already eternally known and loved through the Word and the Love. Creation cannot be necessary, as in this act the will only actualizes what is lower than it: one of the many finite possibles by which the infinite essence may be imitated. Two kinds of objects of the divine will distinguish the two modes of action of this will, its natural spiration and its free choice. One object, the Supreme Good, which the will is by essence, actualizes this will by making it pour all its natural loving fecundity toward the Good in the person of the Holy Spirit. The total actualization of this fecundity makes this will be fully notional as a subsistent nature, makes this will be, together with the intellect actualized through the Word, the Trinity. The objects of free Omnia, X, p. 37, ll. 16-28). In the same question, Henry illustrates this practical aspect by making an analogy between the Creator and an artist. Both know their art not only universally but also effectively, since both know how to make a particular work. And both love their art not only universally but also effectively, since both desire to make a particular work. See ibid. (ed. Wilson, pp. 37-39). 20 Quodl. VI, q. 2 (ed. Wilson, Opera Omnia, X, pp. 39-40, ll. 92-2): “[...] post ordinem autem huius hierarchiae [i.e. the order of nature in the Trinity] nihil restat nisi ordo hierarchiae caelestis et ecclesiasticae, qui incipit a creaturis, quae in summa differentia emanant a Trinitate personarum divinarum ut uniuntur in divina essentia, quae sub ratione qua est voluntas arbitrio libera, est principalis ratio productionis omnium creaturarum, quae quoad actum producendi a Deo nullum inter se habent ordinem respectu Dei. Forte enim Deus creando omnia simul produxit, aut, si non fecit, sed primo produxit angelicam naturam, deinde alias secundum ordinem sex dierum, potuit tamen simul omnia producere, et illam creaturam prius, quam forte produxit posterius.”

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choice as such, of creation itself, do not entail such necessity as they are by definition both lower than the Supreme Good, as imitations of this Good, and posterior to the Love of this Good by the divine will, posterior to constitution of the Trinity in itself—the only Necessity. This distinction between natural willing and free choice in God is analogous to the willing by the creature in the beatific vision and the creature’s free choice. If one could see the divine essence itself, one’s will would be drawn to this Supreme Good necessarily and be perfected, as this Good is the true and proper end of every will. On the other hand, the will of the creature is properly a free choice when it decides among objects that are not its (super)natural end. 21 Accordingly, creation is an inscrutable and contingent act of divine will, possessing absolutely no necessity (except in the sense that every creative act is, proceeding from a wholly uncaused will, necessarily free). As explained below, the creative will is free even with respect to the knowledge by which the will knows what to create. In fact, as already mentioned, it is the will which causes the intellect’s knowledge of creation, for the intellect knows from eternity the deliberations of the will. It would be a mistake to interpret God’s complete freedom in regard to creation as arbitrariness and/or indifference. For Henry, it is precisely this freedom that assures the infinite wisdom and justice of God’s creation: creation proceeds freely—fully intentionally and without any determination—because it proceeds as posterior causally 21

Free choice is an action that “est elicita a voluntate ut est voluntas simpliciter absque omni naturalitate et necessitate, ut est illa quae procedit a libertatis arbitrio sive in Deo sive in creatura intellectuali et in nobis, et tendit solummodo in bonum amatum quod est citra summum bonum” (Summa, art. 60, q. 1, ad 4 [ed. Badius, fol. 157 vL]) (italics mine). On the other hand, spiration “est elicita a voluntate non ut est voluntas simpliciter, sed ut est natura, naturalitate sibi annexa dicto modo ut est illa quae procedit a voluntatis libertate in solo Deo, et tendit non solum in summum bonum amatum et visum, sed etiam in ipsum amorem procedentem quo incentive amatur” (ibid.) (italics mine). This necessary willing is proper to God alone though it may be compared to the creature’s only form of willing that is necessary—the love in the open vision of God. In this case, the created will, in seeing the Good itself, is necessarily drawn to it and made perfect, in a way analogous to spiration. This action “est elicita a voluntate, ut similiter voluntas est simpliciter et hoc cum sola naturalitate necessitatis immutabilis annexa ipsi actioni, ut est illa quae procedit a libertatis arbitrio et tendit in summum bonum amatum et aperte visum” (ibid.).

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to the intrinsic perfection of the only necessary, subsistent Truth and Good. Because of this, God is perfectly aware and desiring of each and every one of his creative acts, infinitely responsible and totally undivided with respect to creation. Creation—the totally free choice of infinite wisdom and goodness—is by definition wise, good and just. God creates freely and gratuitously wholly out of his wisdom and goodness. Put simply, that creation depends on emanation causally means that God is absolutely and perfectly personal—always related through intellect and will to each and every one of His creatures.22 The Word as art is like justice as law, in the sense that both are, in being speculative, also practical. The Word is speculative as Truth itself and practical as knowledge of all possible works; justice is speculative as based on ethical and metaphysical premises and practical as the legal criterion for the implementation of justice in particular circumstances. Moreover, the divine will’s Love of the divine art is not just love of this art under a universal aspect, but also a love that, being pleased by the goodness of the truth of this art, can further desire to create actually any good known through this art. 23 However, unlike human law which through its rules determines deliberation of particular cases, the Word as creative art simply proposes a variety of fitting courses of action for the will, which itself deliberates as to creation. Unlike human speculative justice, which considers general principles in abstraction from particular cases, the Word, precisely in being speculative knowledge of the Truth itself, contains in itself explicitly and eternally all possible and actual manifestations of this Truth in creation. Finally, unlike human justice which through observation receives general principles, the Word together with divine will is altogether active as the ultimate cause of all being. Naturally no analogy with human life truly corresponds to the speculative and practical dimensions of the Trinity’s intellect and will. For what the Trinity knows is the Supreme Truth that, because it is also the Supreme Good, must have both infinite speculative and practical dimensions which are in accord with this Truth and Good, which are therefore wise, just and good. 22

Accordingly, what may seem in Henry to be voluntarism, whatever one may mean by the term, should take into account the causal priority of emanation with respect to creation. A comprehensive evaluation of the role of divine will in Henry’s doctrines is, needless to say, outside of the scope of this study. 23 Cf. Quodl. VI, q. 2 (ed. Wilson, Opera Omnia, X, p. 38).

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As we noted, in Quodlibet VI, question 2, Henry explicitly criticizes the philosophers (philosophi), Avicenna being the only one he quotes from and mentions by name. Nevertheless, the block quotation above contains a far ranging criticism, for it is against anyone who errs about the emanations (whether by ignoring or misunderstanding them). Moreover, it is intended as a devastating criticism: those who err about the emanations also err about creation—their view of reality is fundamentally unsound. In order to appraise the content and significance of Henry’s criticism it is crucial to keep in mind that it is predicated on the limitation he finds in any conception of God that corresponds to, and does not go beyond, what he calls simple intellect and will. Such a conception misunderstands the Trinity and creation. For, as we read above, simple intellect and will are a natural (naturalis) or necessary thing; distinguished only by reason, they are identical, so that whatever is understood necessarily is also willed. This limitation is, as he notes, proper to the philosophers 24: working, as they do, solely from what they find in nature, they are unable to arrive at a notion (with the help of revelation) of God Himself, thus misunderstanding Him, His works, and even themselves to the degree that human intellect and will give us some insight into the emanations of the Trinity, some insight into what is highest in human beings. However, this limitation can also be found even among some (Christian) theologians who have not gone far enough to show adequately how human intellect and will 24

For example, in the Summa (art. 60, q. 1, ad 6 [ed. Badius, fol. 158 rN-159 rS]), Henry criticizes the philosophers, explicitly Aristotle and Averroes. These thinkers ground their conclusions in their observation of nature. Accordingly, they envision generation solely in terms of natural change and the will solely as a principle of acting and making. Thus they failed to see how there can be a communication of nature by intellect and will. Bodily creatures, as limited by matter, can communicate their natures only through natural generation, whereby they inform matter, which is the principle in potency to the substantial form or species. In things separate from matter, yet limited in essence (i.e. intellectual substances which are created as one of a kind), Henry argues, there is simply no principle of communicating nature, though there is another principle of acting aside from nature (intellect), namely will. Finally, in that which is both separated from matter and unlimited in essence (i.e. God alone), nature can, due to this total lack of limitation, communicate itself immanently according to both nature and will.

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reflect the productions of the Trinity. Even with revelation some have not understood properly how the soul is made in the image of God, thus not adequately understanding the soul, God and creation. Not surprisingly they have not gone far enough to show how revealed truths, such as the Trinity’s notional acts, can be understood by reason, at least to the extent that one can have a consistent view of reality grounded in these truths as principles. As mentioned, Henry claims that question 2 of Quodlibet 6, where he treats of the causal priority of emanation with respect to creation, depends altogether on question 1 of the same Quodlibet, where he treats of God’s triune nature. In question 1, Henry criticizes those who understand the (divine) word as simple intelligence, rather than as the declarative knowledge of this simple intelligence generated by the intellect informed by this very simple intelligence.25 The implication, therefore, is that to err about the divine word in this way is to also err about creation. In the Summa, article 58, question 1 (Whether generating is a property of the Father), we find the same criticism, though in more detail, against theologians who understand the divine word as simple intelligence (and by implication the divine love only as simple love). In this question, Henry clearly distinguishes between two types of word in the knower, and adopts one type as more adequately analogous to the divine word. In the knower, the word may be understood to be made in a twofold way. One word is made by the object or thing understood (ex actione rei intellectae), the intellect being informed merely in a passive and natural way. This word is proper only to creatures, who do not understand by essence. This word corresponds to the simple intelligence and thus, Henry also emphasizes here, it is purely natural—produced after the manner that heat is produced by heating. The other word is made by the intellect as already informed and actualized through the first word, whereby the intellect as simple knowledge autonomously generates an analytical or declarative knowledge of itself through its reflection. This latter 25

After giving some textual evidence of Augustine’s conception of the word Henry claims: “Unde multum deficiunt a ratione verbi, qui dicunt quod prima notitia simplex concepta in intellectu de re intellecta verbum est. Ista enim notitia non est discursu et cogitatione intellectus formata de alia. Et est ista notitia quaedam simplex rei manifestatio. Verbum autem est quiddam declarativum et manifestativum eius tamquam praebens in se ampliorem rei manifestationem. Et est in prima notitia operatio intellectualis incompleta, et in verbo completa” (Quodl. VI, q. 1 [ed. Wilson, p. 16, ll. 25-31]).

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word is truly like the divine word, for it is generated by nature or intellect as the divine word.26 The first word, on the other hand, only represents divine intellect and will as merely essential, simple or natural, and not as notional according to Henry’s understanding. This is a criticism of a view of the divine word and love held by Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas writes that “the procession of the word in God possesses the definition of generation. For it proceeds . . . according to the definition of similitude, because the concept of the intellect is a similitude of the thing understood.”27 In addition: 26

Summa, art. 58, q. 1 (ed. Badius, fol. 124 rL-vL): “In intelligente potest esse intellectum operatum dupliciter. Uno modo ab aliquo obiecto agente in intellectum, ut per actum intelligendi quem format in intellectu habeat esse intelligens secundum actum, et ipsum obiectum intellectum in intelligente. Sed non ut verbum intellectus in huiusmodi intellectu habent esse actus intelligendi aut ipsum obiectum, quia non est ab ipso intellectu actus intelligendi in intellectu formatus, sed ab obiecto. Propter quod si verbum diceretur, potius diceretur verbum obiecti quam intellectus. Hoc modo intellectum esse in intelligente contingit in solis creaturis, quia non intelligunt se et alia per suam essentiam, sicut solus Deus. [...] Alio autem modo potest aliquid in intellectu esse operatum ab ipso intelligente inquantum est intelligens in actu, et sic ab opere intellectus secundum quod est actus intelligens et informatus intellectione actuali qua agit in seipsum inquantum est intellectus purus et quasi materialis. [...] Unde quia non est verbum aliquod nisi ab opere intellectus conceptum in ipso intellectu per actum suum qui est dicere, illud ergo intellectum quod est in intelligente non per actum intellectus qui est dicere, sed ex sola actione rei intellectae in intellectum, ut quo ad ipsum actum intellectus sit pure passivus et nullo modo activus, nullo modo est verbum. Et tale est omne quod dicimus intelligi intellectu simplici, quoniam talem intellectum non agit nisi res intellecta, ut secundum se est quoddam intelligibile, cuius actio pure naturalis est, non per cognitionem, quemadmodum calidum agit calefactionem. Propter quod talis actio nullo modo est dicere, quia dicere est actio quae fit per cognitionem. Unde isto modo ponere generationem in divinis non est ponere ipsam modo intellectualis operationis, sed praecise naturalis, nec est generatio notitiae de notitia, sed de re cognita [...]. Licet ergo aliquid sit in seipso, non solum ut idem per essentiam, sed ut comprehensum a se in intelligendo, non ex hoc verbum est ipsum comprehensum aut intellectio, sed solummodo illud intellectum quod est in intelligente per actum intellectus qui est dicere verbum eius est” (italics mine). 27 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 27, art. 2, solutio (ed. Leon., Opera Omnia, IV, Romae, 1888, p. 309): “[...] processio verbi in divinis habet rationem generationis. Procedit enim [...] secundum rationem similitudinis, quia conceptio intellectus est similitudo rei intellectae.”

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It must be said that understanding in us is not the very substance of the intellect: whence the word that proceeds in us according to intelligible operation is not of the same nature as that from which it proceeds. Whence the definition of generation is not fitting to it properly and completely. But divine understanding is the very substance of the one who understands . . . And because of this it is properly called generated and Son . . . But in regard to our intellect we use the word conception, as in the word of our intellect a similitude of the thing understood is found, even though an identity of nature is not found.28

Accordingly, for Aquinas, God’s word differs from the human word because His intellect or essence is His act of understanding, while human understanding is distinct from the principle of intellect (albeit not in act), for this understanding is limited and moves from potency to act. Human understanding is not a similitude of the intellect itself, but of the thing understood, and therefore the production of the human word is not truly a generation. The human word, then, is only like the divine word in that it is a similitude, a conception which in human beings is of the thing understood while in God it is of the intellect itself, in the sense that it is conceived by and in the intellect, which is the principle of such a ‘generation’.29 This view of the word or Son is consistent with Aquinas’s view of the love or Spirit, which corresponds to Henry’s definition of simple or essential love. Illustrating how Love is the proper name of the Spirit, Aquinas claims: “For just as from the fact that someone understands some thing, some intellectual conception of the thing understood comes forth in the one who 28

Ibid., ad 2 (ed. Leon., p. 309-310): “[...] dicendum quod intelligere in nobis non est ipsa substantia intellectus: unde verbum quod secundum intelligibilem operationem procedit in nobis, non est eiusdem naturae cum eo a quo procedit. Unde non proprie et complete competit sibi ratio generationis. Sed intelligere divinum est ipsa substantia intelligentis [...]. Et propter hoc proprie dicitur genitum et Filius [...]. Sed in intellectu nostro utimur nomine conceptionis, secundum quod in verbo nostri intellectus invenitur similitudo rei intellectae, licet non inveniatur naturae indentitas.” 29 R. Friedman also brings to our attention a passage from Aquinas (Sent., I, d. 10, q. 1, art. 5, solutio), where “it appears that the procession of nature and of intellect are applicable as descriptions of the Son’s generation because generation and intelligible procession resemble each other insofar as both are of one from one. It is not the case, however, that the Son’s generation is an actual intelligible procession as Word” (“Relations, Emanations,” p. 157; see also his additional explanation in note 68 of the same page).

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understands, which is called the word; so too from the fact that someone loves some thing, some impression (so to speak) of the thing loved comes forth in the affection of the lover, according to which what is loved is said to exist in the lover, just as what is understood is in the knower.”30 For Henry, on the other hand, this ‘word’ and this ‘love’ (the simple intelligence and will in his terminology) are not truly analogous to the divine Word and Love. For they are not, properly speaking, autonomous products of the mind, but rather of the object known and loved. The object or thing is, properly speaking, the active principle in the production of such simple knowledge and love, in the sense that the thing in both cases impresses itself essentially in the soul, albeit with the cognitive and loving powers of the mind. 31 Moreover, only in creatures is such a word formed; God’s intellect is never passive with respect to another, but is rather eternally actual. This is a tenet that Aquinas himself holds when noting that, since God understands by essence, the human word is like the Word only in that both are similitudes, not in that the human word entails a generation: for Aquinas there is divine generation simply because, the divine intellect being fully actual, the Word is identical in substance to the principle of intellect. On the other hand, for Henry the human word, like God’s, is truly generated, since it is a knowledge born from knowledge (and so it is for him more like the divine word than Aquinas’s word). This is the declarative knowledge that the intellect, as simple knowledge, generates out of itself autonomously, being passive only in regard to

30

Summa Theologiae, I, q. 37, art. 1, solutio (ed. Leon., Opera Omnia, IV, p. 387): “Sicut enim ex hoc quod aliquis rem aliquam intelligit, provenit quaedam intellectualis conceptio rei intellectae in intelligente, quae dicitur verbum; ita ex hoc quod aliquis rem aliquam amat, provenit quaedam impressio, ut ita loquar, rei amatae in affectu amantis, secundum quam amatum dicitur esse in amante, sicut et intellectum in intelligente.” 31 Aquinas does stress the activity of the intellect in producing the word: “Quicumque enim intelligit, ex hoc ipso quod intelligit, procedit aliquid intra ipsum, quod est conceptio rei intellectae, ex vi intellectiva proveniens, et ex eius notitia procedens” (Summa Theologiae, I, q. 27, art. 1 [ed. Leon., Opera Omnia, IV, p. 305]) (italics mine).

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itself as object or active principle.32 Moreover, as explained, the will can also be understood to produce a proper product autonomously. In order to fully evaluate the significance of this difference between Henry and Aquinas in regard to the Trinity’s word and love would require a thorough exploration, not only of their Trinitarian writings, but also of the precise ways in which their Trinitarian theologies inform and are informed by the rest of their writings. Needless to say, that falls outside the scope of this book. What we can say at this point is that Henry’s position on this issue is fundamental for his thought, for his view of the Word and Love not only accounts for God’s triune nature, but also is a basis for his account of creation. Moreover, Henry’s criticism of the conception of divine knowledge and love as merely simple reveals the serious misgivings Henry has about any theology which holds this view. Henry rejects this view—which seems to correspond to Aquinas’ understanding— largely on the grounds that such a view of divine intellect and will may (at the very least) question God’s supremely perfect consciousness of himself and creatures, as well as imply a view of creation as necessary. Obviously the Christian Aquinas does not hold that creation is necessary. As is well known, Aquinas tries to show at various points that arguments against the truths of Christianity (such as the temporal creation of the world) are inconclusive, that the central tenets of the Faith are precisely that—matters of faith—both indemonstrable and irrefutable purely on rational grounds.33 Nevertheless, Henry’s criticisms, in the context of debates among Christian theologians, target what he perceives to be a fundamental theological inconsistency: the view of the divine word and love as merely simple, in his terminology, not only is not the most adequate interpretation based on human intellect and will—which should be understood at some level as autonomous fecundities—but also per se seems more consonant with a view of creation as necessary rather than as free. As an inadequate interpretation of the Trinity, this view is for Henry symptomatic of an inadequate interpretation of reality. 32

For Henry and Aquinas on the word, see G. Pini, “Henry of Ghent’s Doctrine of the Verbum in its Theological Context,” in: G. Guldentops - C. Steel (eds.), Henry of Ghent and the Transformation, pp. 307-326. 33 See how Aquinas argues in Summa Theologiae, I, q. 46, art. 1 and 2, in regard to the question of whether the world is eternal or created in time.

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Scholars have already considered Henry’s vigorous attack of key points of Aquinas’s doctrine of creation, on the grounds that it implies creation as conceived by the philosophers. A focal point of Henry’s criticism is that Aquinas’s notion of creation is too close to his notion of emanation: both are “atemporal and, apparently, noncontingent actions.”34 From our analysis above and considering the ontological supremacy accorded by Henry to emanation, it becomes more evident that Henry’s criticisms of Aquinas on emanation and on creation are two sides of the same coin, though the former criticism is the ultimate basis of the latter: only through notional intellect and will can the Trinity be understood as necessary in itself and as totally free in regard to (contingent and temporal) creatures. For Henry it is the central task of the theologian to discover in the human spirit the image of the Trinity; this is the theologian’s best access to God, and his creation. It is primarily in the Platonic tradition of Augustine, Richard, and Bonaventure, which tries to understand God’s triunity through spiritual emanations, that Henry finds insights into the God of revelation, into the supremely self-conscious and essentially self-diffusive wisdom and charity that is the personal and free origin of all reality. 2C—The Role of Intellect in Free Creation The previous section developed the dependence of creation upon emanation. The chief purpose of this section is to clarify how the divine intellect assists the divine will in creation. However, first it is necessary to elucidate how Henry understands God as a creator. We predicate ‘creator’ of the Trinity in the singular (in singulari); “even though the persons are diverse, nevertheless they do not altogether elicit the act [of creation] by the fact that they are diverse, but rather only because the definition of person is fitting to them, and

34

G. Pini, “Being and Creation in Giles of Rome,” in: J. Aertsen - K. Emery, Jr. - A. Speer (eds.), Nach der Verurteilung von 1277, p. 397. Pini shows in this article how Giles of Rome develops Aquinas’ doctrine of creation, particularly through the real distinction between essence and existence which Henry criticizes, to try to free it from some of Henry’s initial criticisms. For Henry’s criticisms of Aquinas on creation see, e.g., Quodlibet I, qq. 7-9 (ed. R Macken, Opera Omnia, V, Leuven, 1979). See also R. Macken, “La temporalité radicale de la créature selon Henri de Gand,” in: Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale, 38 (1971), pp. 211-272.

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they possess a unity in the active [creative] force.”35 The term creator, then, as a substantive formed from a verb (nomen verbale), refers to the creative force existing equally in the three persons, which is their essence with respect to creatures. ‘Creator’, applied to the Trinity in the singular, denotes the unity of the divine persons with respect to creatures, just as the term God denotes their intrinsic unity.36 Thus we say that there is ‘one creator,’ though many spirators.37 Unlike spiration, which connotes and presupposes a distinction of the supposites in the very act, creation does not, for in the act the actors or persons are entirely one. “The specific cause (ratio) of creating is the essence itself, inasmuch as this essence is the will that is free by choice (voluntas arbitrio libera), without any connotation of distinction and plurality of persons, which has existence uniformly in each of the three persons.”38 The Trinity, as a free choice made possible by the prior personal emanations, is the efficient cause of creation, though with the assistance of the intellect, since the will can only create what it knows. However, this does not mean that the divine essence as free choice creates by itself, independently of the persons: the principle (ratio) of creation (the divine essence), though one, only exists in the three persons who are both diverse and identical. Accordingly, “to create is not fitting to a divine person because he is one or many, but

35

Summa, art 54, q. 6 (ed. Badius, fol. 97 rY): “Licet personae illae sint diversae, non tamen omnino eliciunt actum eo quod sunt diversae, sed tantummodo eo quod convenit eis ratio personae, et habent unitatem in vi activa.” 36 Summa, art 54, q. 6, ad 11 (ed. Badius, fol. 97 vY): “[Creator] vim creativam, quae est divina essentia sub ratione respectus ad creaturas, respicit in diversis suppositis, ut in qua sunt omnia unum, et penitus secundum eundem modum ipsa est ratio elicitiva actus ut est in uno et ut est in altero, absque omni connotatione distinctionis suppositorum circa eam, et diversitatis sive difformitatis eorum in modo agendi per illam. Propter quod praedicatur de illis non nisi in singulari dicendo quod sunt unus creator, ad modum quo dicitur quod sunt unus Deus.” 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid.: “Ratio creandi praecisa est ipsa essentia ut est voluntas arbitrio libera absque omni connotatione distinctionis et pluralitatis personarum, quae uniformiter habet esse in singulis personis et in tribus.”

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rather [this is fitting] because he is a divine person without qualification.”39 For it is always the supposite or person(s) who properly acts through the essence in and as God. The Father produces the unique Son, who shares his numerically same essence. The Father and Son produce the unique Holy Spirit, who shares their numerically same essence. God is a singular essence that subsists only as three persons that are both diverse and identical. Hence the persons create as one in the sense that the three create through their shared essence (which is notionally actualized in the three persons to begin with), through their essential principle whereby they are numerically one. Thus creation is still an action elicited in the mode of the supposite, that is supposites in God, though wholly as one in the act itself. The three persons are the proximate cause of creation, while their essence by which they elicit creation—the remote cause—is equally one in the three. (Analogously, in creatures the proximate cause of generation is always a unique supposite, although this supposite does not generate on account of its very uniqueness, but rather on account of its essence, which essence nevertheless exists only in and as this or that supposite. The essence is the principle or remote cause of generation in creatures, and is shared equally by the individual members of the species.) Thus, creation proceeds from the three persons as one, not in the sense that it proceeds from what is one absolutely, but rather from a unity belonging wholly equally to the three divine persons.40 That creation proceeds from a unity that is personal and not absolute is significant. For the mode by which the Trinity creates to 39

Summa, art. 54, q. 6, ad 11, fo. 97 vZ-A): “Creare non convenit personae divinae ratione qua una vel plures, sed ratione qua est persona divina simpliciter.” 40 Summa, art. 54, q. 6 (ed. Badius, fol. 96 vV): “Manifestum est ex supra determinantis circa divinas actiones in generali, quod principium divinae actionis ut agens a qua emanat non potest esse divina essentia, licet sit ratio eliciendi omnes, sed solum suppositum subsistens. Forma enim rei non agit, sed habens formam agit per formam. [...] Etsi ergo plures ut plures non creant, vel spirant, sed solum secundum quod uniuntur in uno, scilicet in deitate, non tamen [...] ut in penitus absoluta, sed sub ratione alicuius respectus. Non plus tamen actus creandi poterit attribui essentiae divinae, dicendo quod essentia creat quam actus spirandi dicendo quod essentia spirat, licet de creare validior sit apparentia, eo quod essentia est ratio creandi in tribus personis, non autem ratio spirandi nisi in duabus.”

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some extent elucidates creatures themselves as products of the Trinity. If God creates as a personal nature or as a personal unity, i.e. as the Trinity simply, creatures are bound to reflect God’s personal unity in some way. On the other hand, if one conceives of God’s aspect in creation as an absolute unity, whether one believes in the Trinity or not, one is bound to discern in creatures themselves, and in the Creator as revealed by creatures, primarily discreteness and absoluteness. This would be, for Henry, another way in which misunderstanding the Trinity leads to a misunderstanding of creation and creatures. As the next chapter shows by analyzing metaphysical categories common to the Trinity and creatures, for Henry there is a sense in which all creatures reflect God’s personal nature, his triunity as such, inasmuch as all creatures subsist both absolutely and relatively, just as the Trinity does. Before the instant of creation, the creature exists in the divine intellect only as the known in the knower, having only being of essence and not being of actual existence.41 Creation is the free giving of being of existence to what has only mental or essential being. But what is the role of knowledge in creation? Henry considers the divine intellect with respect to creatures in determining whether in any sense the word is practical knowledge or not.42 The word, Henry notes, can be considered either as a subsistent person, passively directed to the Father who says the word, or as the very perfection of the essential intellect of the Trinity in which every (possible) thing is known. As subsistent and constitutive of the Trinity, the person of the Word is purely speculative, without any order or respect to creatures. ‘Practical’, however, is fitting to God only with respect to creatures.43 As the perfection of the divine intellect, the word can be considered in a twofold way. First, it declares to the intellect the knowledge of everything, including that of all possible creatures, thus having an indirect relation to them. Secondly, the word is somehow a 41

Summa, art 59, q. 2 (ed. Badius, fol. 138 vR): “Ante instans suae creationis solum est in intellectu ut cognitum in cognoscente et sub non esse actualis existentiae.” 42 Cf. Summa, art. 59, q. 6. (‘Utrum Filius sit verbum practicum an speculativum’). 43 Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 151 rB).

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cause of producing creatures in a proper order. 44 In the first sense, the word is purely speculative, for it simply has a declarative function as the speculative knowledge of everything; and speculative knowledge per se does not relate to actual creation. Rather, the word, as the perfection of the intellect, is ‘practical’ as a wisdom that orders or arranges what is to be performed (sapientia operandorum dispositiva). It is therefore a certain potency, by which the divine persons create. The ‘builder’ is said to be able to build (potens aedificare) because he or she possesses a potency that can elicit and order the act of building. This knowledge of building is properly practical: it is a habitual knowledge enacted as determined by the ‘rules’ of building.45 To Henry, however, even though the persons create through their knowledge, they do so in a way that is more speculative than practical. Creating is a type of action, and action is twofold, immanent or transitive. Speculative habits, such as logical reasoning, are purely immanent. Moreover, such habits are speculative whether they consider theoretical or practical matters. For in either case they are concerned purely with knowing, not with the execution of deeds. Whether in metaphysics or in theoretical ethics, then, an intellectual habit is speculative and not properly practical if it does not somehow concern itself with the actual performance of deeds. Perhaps the latter science may be said to be more practical than the former, in that it may consider particulars and given modes of acting, but both are speculative habits insofar as they are concerned primarily with knowing and not with acting. Thus knowledge is defined as practical if its end is action. Otherwise it is speculative46 : “For, if a habit is not at all for the sake of executing actions, it is not properly practical.”47 Practical habits like the moral virtues are concerned with performance; they must entail, at least in part, transitive activity.48 Since 44

Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 151 rC): “Uno modo [verbum] [...] est ratio actus dicendi essentialis quo ad manifestationem et declarationem notitiae creaturarum. Alio modo ut est ratio eius quo ad actum producendi ipsas creaturas dispositive.” 45 Ibid. 46 See Henry’s discussion on the speculative and practical dimensions of the science of ethics in Summa, art. 60, q. 1, ad assumptum (ed. Badius). 47 Summa, art. 59, q. 6 (ed. Badius, fol. 151 vF): “Absque omni enim ordine ad operis executionem non est aliquis habitus proprie practicus.” 48 Summa, art. 59, q. 6 (ed. Badius, fol. 151 vF): “Sed cum duplex sit opus, unum quod operans omnino operatur in seipso, aliud vero quod operatur in

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a practical habit is concerned with actions, and an action is always particular, involving a unique set of circumstances, the more a habit ‘descends’ to the particular, the more does it approach the notion of ‘practical (praxis)’. This is truest of the knowledge acquired from experience, for experience is always of particulars.49 In fact, human practical knowledge, as concerned with performance, requires experience. As Aristotle says in the first book of the Ethics, the artist really cannot be said to know an art if he or she only possesses theoretical knowledge and no experience.50 For only those with experience possess the habit in a way that can be enacted; only they possess the art in the sense of know-how (techne). The same applies to moral virtue, a habit developed through repeated actions. Divine knowledge cannot be practical in this sense, for as universal and eternal it is not gained from experience. Yet it is still somehow a cause of creation. In determining how this is so, Henry considers how (human) knowledge regulates action. This can happen in two ways. In one way, the intellect simply proposes modes of action to the will, modes which may differ in terms of appropriateness and possibility. In another way, the intellect determines for the will what appears to the intellect as the best possible course of action, ex-

alio et circa aliud extra se; potentia qua quis operatur opus primum est etiam quicunque habitus pure speculativus. Hoc enim modo peritia syllogizandi potentia est qua quis potest expedite syllogizare, et universaliter quilibet habitus cognitivus potentia est qua quis potest considerare secundum illum si velit. Et est ista potentia in tali operatione non practica sed pure speculativa, sive fuerit operans in pure speculativis, sive fuerit operans in pure practicis, quia non considerat practica sive operanda ut operanda, scilicet ad ipsorum executionem in opus, sed potius ut speculanda, scilicet ad ipsorum notitiam inspiciendam, etiam licet sit consideratio circa modos operandi et exequendi operabilia in opus, licet forte sit verius speculativa ut est in pure speculativis, quam ut est in pure practicis, maxime quo ad modos operandi et exequendi operabilia in opus, circa quos magis est practica quia respicit particularia, quam ut est circa universalia operandorum, ut circa virtutis divisionem et definitionem et caeterorum huiusmodi.” 49 In the Summa, article 60, question 1, Henry expounds on various ways in which one may gain knowledge of what can be done or made, as well as on the different ways experience of particulars is obtained, in order to specify further the nature of practical knowledge. 50 See Summa, art. 60, q. 1.

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cluding others as less fitting.51 Only in this latter sense is the intellect a proximate potency for action, namely a sufficient reason for deeds, provided that the agent’s free will chooses the determination of the intellect. Henry makes the fundamental claim that, when the intellect only proposes and does not determine, the intellectual habit or potency is not truly practical. For it is not, in and of itself, the principle of following a given task or course of action. In this sense, the intellect only informs the agent with possibilities. If the agent does act in these circumstances, it is the agent’s free will itself that determines the mode of action. In this scenario, the intellect remains only a remote cause of action, while the will is the proximate cause, wholly free from the influence of the intellect.52 The intellect, in this case, is merely a necessary condition of action, as the will can only choose a known possibility.53 In a similar way, the divine intellect functions in terms of creating. For in God the will is on a par with the intellect, not only as a natural fecundity in its own right, but even with respect to all “practical” action.54 The divine intellect only proposes an array of possibilities to the will, which freely creates.55 The divine will does not create like an artist who produces a work, as in this case the intellect deter51

Summa, art. 59, q. 6 (fol. 152 rG): “Ulterius est autem advertendum quod talis potentia per operis executionem atque experientiam acquisita potest dupliciter considerari. Uno modo ut secundum ipsam intellectus informatus proponit voluntati modos operandi particulares possibiles et convenientes, atque impossibiles et inconvenientes, aut magis convenientes et minus convenientes per indifferentiam. Alio modo ut secundum ipsam unum possibilium et convenientium determinat voluntati, et illum praefert aliis, dicendo sic esse operandum et non aliter tanquam modo convenientiori.” For more details, see A. 60, q. 1 (ed. Badius, fol. 158 vQ). 52 See Summa, art. 59, q. 6 (ed. Badius, fol. 152 rG). 53 For Henry’s discussion of Aristotle and Averroes on this issue, see Summa, art. 60, q. 1 (ed. Badius, fols. 161 vO-162 rQ). 54 In Summa, art. 60, q. 4, ad 2, Henry distinguishes the various senses in which the intellect or the will, in God and humans, may be seen as the nobler power. He concludes that in God, with some qualifications, they are equally noble powers. In humans, however, the will is the nobler power, as it can command the intellect, making the intellect pull back from its act. 55 Summa, art. 59, q. 6 (ed. Badius, fol. 152 rG): “Ipsa enim divina voluntas sola seipsam circa operanda determinat.”

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mines alternatives for the will, which only happens with finite minds. The plenitude of God’s knowledge, however, enables His will to produce in multifarious ways, without ever contradicting the intellect.56 The human practical intellect, Henry remarks drawing from Aristotle, is a potency that relates to contrary alternatives. According to Aristotle, when practical reason determines for the will one of these contraries, the will necessarily chooses it if there is no impediment to the will57; analogously, in speculative science a demonstrative argument makes the intellect accept the truth of the conclusion. In Quodlibet 9 (questions 5 and 6), for example, Henry argues for the inherent freedom of the will: the (human) will may still, on its own account, refuse the determination of the (human) intellect, since the will is a selfmoving principle. For Henry, the intellect may be said to determine in regard to the will when the intellect finds for the will what appears to the intellect as the best course of action, excluding others, as happens in production according to art or in habitual action. Henry does grant that when reason determines in this sense, reason is properly practical—the proximate potency for action. However, for Henry, when reason does not function as a proximate potency, it is only a remote and therefore speculative potency.58 For then reason only considers and does not, in Henry’s sense, determine. And when the intellect does not determine in regard to contraries, as is the case with the omnipotent divine intellect, the will itself determines what is to be done and does whatever it chooses. 59 This is all the more true of the divine will, which is totally uncaused as to efficiency and infinitely informed with knowledge. Accordingly, for Henry, in action the will is free in regard to the intellect chiefly on account of having two capacities. First, even though the intellect may determine for the will what seems as the best 56

See Summa, art. 60, q. 1, ad 6. Summa, art. 60, q. 1 (ed. Badius, fol. 158 vS): “Cum vero ratio determinat alterum contrariorum tunc vere practica est ratio [...] et secundum Philosophum voluntas necessario exequitur in opus quod determinatum est, si non fuerit impedimentum secundum eam.” 58 Henry uses the text of Aristotle, and of his Commentator Averroes, to make the point that reason, to be a proximate potency of action, needs to determine an alternative. Henry stresses that without this determination, reason is only in remote potency. In other words, with determination reason is practical, without it speculative. See Summa, art. 60, q. 1, ad 6. 59 Ibid. 57

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alternative and incline the will to choose the alternative, the will still retains its freedom to favor or refuse the determination of the intellect. Secondly, when the intellect does not determine an alternative for the will, the will both determines and elicits the course of action (Duns Scotus will draw much from Henry in this regard). In holding these tenets on the will, Henry disagrees with Aristotle and others who subordinate the will to the intellect.60 Divine knowledge cannot be determined, nor is it determining of the will, for it is infinite.61 If anyone wishes to call God’s knowledge ‘practical’ with respect to creatures, without considering the aforementioned distinctions, Henry refuses to dispute about mere

60

Summa, art. 60, q. 1 (ed. Badius, fol. 158 vS): “Sed in hoc quod sic necessitetur voluntas, non sequimur Philosophum ut in 9 Quolibet declaravimus. Et est intellectus sic determinans vere practicus, etsi voluntas nolit exequi opus, primo modo vere speculativus etiam considerans operanda.” It should be noted, however, that what Henry means by (human) will is not exactly Aristotle’s meaning. Thus, this disagreement with Aristotle is a reflection of Henry’s fundamentally different conception of the will. Henry shares the general view, common among medieval Christian thinkers, that the will is a distinct spiritual faculty, rather than a practical dimension of the intellect together with appetite, as Aristotle seems to understand it (for example, in Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 2, 1139a21-1139b5). Naturally, this general approach to the will, with its heavy reliance on Augustine, only partially conditions Henry’s full account of human and divine will. Clearly, a comprehensive treatment of the development of the concept of the will, from classical antiquity to Henry’s time, falls outside the scope of this study. A helpful treatment of Henry’s positions on human will, freedom and action, in light of other positions (such as that of Thomas Aquinas) is M. Stone, “Henry of Ghent on Freedom and Human Action,” in: G. Guldentops - C. Steel (eds.), Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought. 61 It is worth noting, however, that for Henry the infinity of God’s knowledge does not imply the infinity of His ideas of creatures themselves. This is evident, for example, from Quodlibet V, q. 3: “For Henry, the impossibility of an infinite number of ideas does not constitute a limit in God’s knowledge. It is the metaphysical contingency and finitude of all created essences, both in their number and in their degrees of perfection, which dictates the limit of the number of God’s ideas of them, since, as relations of imitability, ideas refer primarily and really to creatures, and only secondarily and notionally to the divine essence. God possesses infinite knowledge, in every sense of the word [...]” (R. Plevano, “Divine Ideas and Infinity,” in: Guldentops – Steel (eds.), Henry of Ghent and the Transformation, pp. 196-197).

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words (nolo litigare de verbis). 62 The speculative knowledge by which the Trinity creates Henry calls, as Augustine did, an art full of the reasons of living things (ars plena rationum viventium). These are ideal or exemplary causes (rationes ideales) which somehow guide given acts of creation.63 As universal knowledge, they are more speculative than practical. However, as related to the performance of particular works, this knowledge approaches a more practical aspect, though still functioning only as a remote potency. 64 Total freedom of choice, made possible by the total perfection of immanent divine fecundity, creates by itself as informed by perfect knowledge, made possible by generation. This chapter explained how for Henry God’s function as creator depends on His triune nature. The next chapter shall show how Henry’s metaphysical thought, encompassing created and uncreated being, also has a strong basis in his Trinitarian doctrines.

62

Cf. Summa, art. 60, q. 1, ad 6 (ed. Badius, fol. 159 rS). Summa, art. 59, q. 6 (ed. Badius, fol. 152 rH): “Sunt autem illae rationes ideales, non ut sunt absolute rationes cognoscendi declarative operanda et operandi modos. Sic enim [...] potius sunt rationes speculativae quam practicae, sed hoc ut sunt rationes dirigendi operantem in operis executione, et hoc quo ad particularia operandorum. Quia ut solum sunt rationes dirigendi circa universalia operandorum potius sunt speculativae quam practicae [...] et quanto magis descendunt ad particularium cognitionem, tanto magis habent rationem praxis.” 64 Ibid. 63

CHAPTER 3: THE TRINITY AND METAPHYSICAL CATEGORIES As explained in the third paragraph of the Introduction to this book, the three chapters in this book correspond to Henry’s three chief areas of theological investigation, namely 1) God himself, 2) God as a principle of creatures, and 3) creatures insofar as they reflect God. After tracing Henry’s view of the Trinity in itself and of creation as based on the Trinity in the previous two chapters, this third and last chapter will assess the role of the Trinity in Henry’s metaphysics of uncreated and created being. One of the central tasks of Henry’s overall project is to show how “the ten categories of philosophical science are reduced to the two of theological wisdom, namely substance and relation.”1 As will be shown, while achieving this task in the context of the Trinity, Henry takes fundamental positions concerning his view of reality. Part of Henry’s account of the Trinity is his discussion of terms which apply to the divine persons in general, to God’s triunity as such. The fact that these terms establish an analogical commonality between God’s triunity and creatures make them metaphysically more adequate than those which establish an analogical commonality between God and creatures on the basis of a conception of God’s absolute unity. For the conception of God’s triunity, even if it is a general conception of the divine persons as such, is more adequate than that of His unity apprehended absolutely, and the conception of beings in the universe as created by the Trinity is more adequate than the conception of them as substances simply. Since the terms which refer to the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit in particular already indicate what is concretely peculiar for each of them and, thus, for the Trinity, the terms which refer to the Trinity in general, i.e. to the divine persons as such, are among the most specific ones by which Henry indicates what is common between God and creatures, among the most adequate ones by which to refer to being as being in the thought of Henry of Ghent.

1

Summa, art. 32, q. 5 (ed. Macken, Opera Omnia, XXVII, Leuven, 1991, p. 92, ll. 73-74): “Decem ergo praedicamenta philosophicae disciplinae ad duo sapientiae theologicae reducuntur, scilicet ad substantiam et relationem.”

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This chapter shall analyze Henry’s conception of the three basic terms which refer to the Trinity in general, namely person (persona), property (proprietas) and essence (essentia), which are in fact, in Trinitarian language, Henry’s categories of relation (relatio), respect (respectus) and substance (substantia) respectively. As will be shown, essence and property—the material and formal principles, as it were, of persona respectively—correspond in the thought of Henry of Ghent to res and ratio, the material and formal principles of each of the categories of reality.2 More specifically, persona in God is, metaphysically speaking, a type of relation, a category which for Henry is constituted, whether in God or in creatures, by 1) its material principle (res) or foundation (i.e. substance or essence in God) and by 2) its formal principle (ratio) or respectus (i.e. property in God). These terms will be developed only inasmuch as they signify general or metaphysical principles, whether these principles are of individuality or commonality. 3A—Persona as Suppositum For Henry, the communication of an essence necessarily involves both assimilation and distinction. In substantial change, for example, the one that generates and the one that is generated must both share the same essential form and be distinct supposites (supposita), for nothing produces itself from non-being into being. Part of the perfection, therefore, of that which is generated is not only that it possesses the same essential form as the generating agent, but also that it possesses this essential form in a unique way. 3 In fact, it is the principle of distinction, more so than the essential principle of commonality, that properly perfects the act of essential communication; for the act ends in that which is distinct and not in what is absolutely identical, even though the distinct product always shares the essence of the producer.4 In actual existence, the individuating principle of distinc2

Henry’s treatment of the categories is found, e.g., in Summa, art. 32, q. 5; Quodl. V, q. 2; Quodl. VII, q. 1-2. 3 Quodl. III, q. 3 (ed. Badius, fol. 50 vK): “Oportet igitur quod ex parte generantis in eo quo generat, quod est ratio generandi, duo concurrant, et ratio qua assimilat genitum generanti, et ratio qua distinguit unum ab alio, ita quod principalior sit ratio generandi ex parte eius qua distinguit quam qua assimilat. Illa enim est perfectiva et completiva et includit in se aliam, et appropriata est generanti in quantum generans est.” 4 Ibid.

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tion determines and encompasses the essential principle of commonality, inasmuch as only the unique supposite (suppositum) actually exists, possessing its essential form solely as belonging to it. For the common essence or form is only actualized as individuated into this or that supposite (suppositum). Since only the supposite is the efficient cause of another sharing its essential form, and the principle of distinction actualizes the common essence by individuating it as belonging to the supposite, the principle of distinction is the primary cause by which the supposite communicates its essence, even though its distinction is never communicated to the product. And since the unique supposite only produces another unique supposite of its same essence, the producing supposite, by giving actual existence, is the primary cause of the product’s distinction. “The individuation [of the form or essence] comes to be in the subjective part, as humanity in this humanity, or rather in this human being through production, only through the agent giving the form existence, not through matter even if it may have matter, nor through some inhering accident, but rather first and foremost through the signification and determination which it receives from the one that produces it.”5 Thus Henry takes issue with Aristotle and Aquinas, for whom the principle of individuation is potential matter 6 and the principle of specific identity is form. Matter for them limits the specific form to be that of an individual. If matter individuates and forms are by nature specific, displaying a unique identity of their own, intellectual substances without any matter (angels in an Aristotelian-Christian framework) are necessarily and by their very nature one of a kind, precisely due to the absence of matter in their formal constitution. To Henry, this influential account of individuation is a theological as well as a philosophical mistake. For, this account implies that (created) immaterial substances are in a sense necessary in virtue of themselves, rather than what they truly are—contingent products of the will of God, the only necessary 5

Summa, art. 53, q. 3 (ed. Badius, fol. 63 rS): “Fit autem illa eius [formae] individuatio in parte subjectiva, ut humanitas in hac humanitate, immo in hoc homine effective, non nisi per agens dans ei esse, nec per materiam etsi habeat materiam, nec per aliquod accidens ei inhaerens, sed primo per suam significationem et determinationem quam habet ab agente illam.” 6 Cf. Metaph., VII, 8, 1034 a6-8; XII, 1074 a33-35.

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being. Rather, Henry argues, individuality primarily results from the action of the efficient cause of the essence produced, whether the essence has matter or not (in material substances matter is only a secondary cause). 7 Also drawing from Aristotelian principles, he insists that what actually exists, whether in God or creatures, is the unique supposite (supposita in God). Individuality cannot be caused only by the potential principle (such as matter), since individuality is the actualized mode of being of essences, but rather chiefly by a principle of actuality: the actual individual(s) that produces another individual, whether in substantial change, in the Trinity’s acts of creation, or in the divine processions. Accordingly, Henry ties individuation with existence and the cause of individuation with the cause of existence, and thus holds a theory of individuation applicable to all reality, to the divine persons and to creatures. Individuality is not something positive added to the essence; it is simply the way in which the essence exists actually, for what exists is the singular. Individuation is understood as a division or negation of the essence whereby it becomes indivisible in itself, yet divisible from others of its species. Accordingly, the essence individuated through receiving existence has a material or potential function, as it were, with respect to its individuality, in so far as individuality is its mode of actual existence. For the essence is by nature apt to be multiplied into distinct existents. This aptitude also applies to immaterial forms: they are created and contingent, since God could freely destroy them as well as create others of the same species.8

7

Summa, art. 53, q. 3 (ed. Badius, fol. 63 rS): “Secundum Philosophum non fit [individuatio] nisi per subiectam materiam in qua primo ex se est partibilitas, ut quod humanitas non est haec nisi quia in hac parte, nec illa nisi quia in illa parte materiae, quemadmodum albedo non est haec nisi quia est in hoc subiecto. Unde et formas immateriales omnes posuit ex se esse singulares, quemadmodum nos ponimus deitatem esse ex se quandam singularitatem, quod non est ponendum; immo quod quaelibet forma creaturae specifica est et materialis et individualis in plures partes subiectivas, etiam licet in se absque omni subiecto et materia nata sit subsistere” (italics mine). 8 For Henry’s theory of individuation in both material and immaterial beings and on important theological elements linked to his theory, see S. Brown’s contribution in: J. Gracia (ed.), Individuation in Scholasticism, Albany, 1994, chapter 9. See also G. Wilson, “Supposite in the Philosophy of Henry of Ghent,” in: W. Vanhamel (ed.), Henry of Ghent. Proceedings, pp. 243-272.

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This account of individuation is consistent with the Trinity. For the mode of actuality of the divine essence is that of the supposite (the persons). The divine essence is unique not only in terms of having no limitation by potency. Fundamentally, the essence is uniquely triune, which also means that it is the only completely uncaused nature. The individuality of the persons is also explained through efficient causality or by origin (chapter 1). In turn, the three divine supposites are responsible for the production of any individual creature (chapter 2, C). Distinction and commonality are thus necessary, interdependent principles, the former being the constitutive and perfecting principle of the latter, of any and every act by which an essence is communicated among supposita. The two are never divorced in concrete actuality, inasmuch as individuality is always the mode of actuality of essence. For there is always a distinction between that which communicates the essence and that to which the essence is communicated. Even in God, where this communication happens within a numerically single nature, the person that communicates the divine essence does not communicate the entirety of its being, for it does not communicate its distinction from what it produces. Insofar as an act of essential communication presupposes the terms ‘from which’ and ‘to which’ the essence proceeds, it presupposes the incommunicable distinction of the (essentially similar) terms. With respect to God, Henry calls this very distinction a personal property.9 The incommunicable individuality (property 10) and the communicable essence are thus metaphysical principles which constitute a person, whether in God or creatures.11

9

Summa, art. 53, q.1 (ed. Badius, fol. 60 vA): “Aliquid invenitur in divina existentia incommunicabile, quia aut nihil est communicabile in Deo, aut si aliquid communicatur, proprietas communicantis inquantum communicat non potest communicari ei cui communicatur, quemadmodum proprietas generationis a proprietate Patris qua Filio communicat suam essentiam nulli potest communicari ab ipso, ut infra declarabitur.” 10 Property thus means here strictly uniqueness, individuality or peculiarity, and not the other things associated with this term, like fittingness or propriety. 11 Summa, art. 56, q. 4 (ed. Badius, fol. 116 rB): “In omni persona et supposito singulari oportet esse duo, quorum unum est natura quae ex se communis est qua aliquid existit, et proprietas secundum quam subsistit, qua ipsum subsistens determinatur ut modo singulari determinato et incommunicabili

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3B—Intentionality, Analogy and Supposition of Persona12 Individual (individuum), this something (hoc aliquid), singular (singulare), thing of nature (res naturae), subsistence (subsistentia), substance (substantia), supposite (suppositum), and person (persona) signify the same regarding the nature and essence of a natural thing, if we consider the nature broadly (largissime accepta natura).13 What distinguishes persona from other terms denoting subsistence is that it applies only to rational and intellectual beings, created and divine persons respectively, unlike individual or supposite which denote rational or irrational beings irrespectively. Persona bespeaks a higher dignity than these other metaphysical terms, and is thus the most appropriate name to denote plurality (distinctions or individual subsistence) in God, the most dignified of beings. 14 A person in creatures bespeaks one substance while in God the three persons share one substance in number. Naturally, persona when referring to God stands for a more eminent thing than it does in creatures. Yet persona does retain some unity of signification with respect to God and creatures. Henry insists that person as such is something singular existing according to itself. Person is neither an accident, nor an abstracted universal, nor a soul which is the act of a body, nor is it the form of deity which exists in the divine persons. The definition (ratio) of person does not add anything to that of the independent singular (except its rational or intellectual disposition).15 Now, one may understand by the term ‘singular’ either an intention regarding, on the one hand, a thing’s own self-identity and, on the other, this thing’s distinction from other things. Or, one may understand by the ‘singular’ the thing itself about which such an inten-

subsistit, quae necesse est simul includi in significato personae seu suppositi singularis.” 12 The locus classicus of the comments on persona in the later middle ages is Peter Lombard’s Sentences, I, dist. 25, 1. 13 Cf. Summa, art. 53, q. 1, responsio. 14 As Richard of St. Victor states, “apud latinos puto nullum nomen inveniri posse, quod possit melius aptari pluralitati divinae, quam nomen personae” (Summa, art. 53, q. 1 [ed. Badius, fol. 61 vG]). 15 Ibid., q. 3 (ed. Badius, fol. 62 vR): “Super rationem enim talis singularis nihil addit ratio personae, licet persona suo nomine non nominat huiusmodi singulare nisi circa determinatam materiam, intellectualem scilicet.”

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tion is conceived.16 In creatures, only an individual of some form has singular existence. However, the form as such is understood as an absolute essence, since its definition includes neither singularity nor universality. Otherwise, either mode would exclude the other: if essence would be by definition singular, it could not be universal, and if it would be by definition universal, it could not be singular. However, if, conceivably, all but one member of a species would perish, the essence would still subsist in that individual, just as it previously did in the others, among which it had, when abstracted by the intellect from those individuals, universality.17 Henry’s metaphysics of essence departs from this basic insight of the great adapter of Aristotle, Avicenna.18 The specific form or essence of a creature is by nature (ex natura sua) divisible into subjective parts to which the whole integrity (integritas) of the form is in potency,19 so that the whole form is in this or that being, as humanity in this humanity which is Peter’s and in that humanity which is Paul’s. Of course, Peter does not exhaust the entire potency of humanity, but neither is he ‘half-human’ by nature. That is why form itself is neither purely singular nor purely universal, for it only actually exists in unique singulars which nevertheless possess the whole integrity of the form. The form somehow possesses a 16

Ibid., q. 3 (ed. Badius, fol. 62 vS): “Sciendum quod nomine singularis duo intelliguntur, et intentio quaedam indistinctionis rei in se et distinctionis eius ab aliis, et ipsa res circa quam intelligitur huiusmodi intentio.” 17 See Summa, art. 53, q. 3 (ed. Badius, fol. 63 rS). 18 Concerning his notion of essence as absolute, as Gómez Caffarena (Ser Participado, pp. 24-35) explains, Henry was influenced chiefly by Avicenna. Avicenna’s famous example in his Metaphysics is that ‘horseness (equinitas)’ is neither one nor many, since its definition includes neither universality nor singularity. See S. Van Riet (ed.), Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina, V-X, Louvain – Leiden, 1980, pp. 228-229, ll. 29-42. Henry’s great contemporary, Thomas Aquinas, as well as his chief successor Duns Scotus, also owe much to Avicenna concerning metaphysics, as seen, e.g., in Aquinas’ De Ente et Essentia, and in Scotus’ De Primo Principio. Thomas, Henry and Scotus generally follow Avicenna’s emphasis on metaphysics as the science of being as being, and (within metaphysics) they also grant (in their own ways) the distinction between essence and existence, rejecting Averroes’ approach to these matters. However, the three develop the Avicennian orientation in seminal ways distinct from Avicenna himself and from one another. See the Conclusion (section III) for a contrast between Aquinas and Henry. 19 Summa, art. 53, q. 3 (ed. Badius, fol. 63 rS).

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common existence in the singulars without itself being wholly singular or wholly universal. Humanity taken absolutely has a wider latitude according to its own essential concept (ratio) than ‘this’ humanity does. Thus, in contrast to the former, the latter is determinate, limited and distinctly indicated.20 The distinct indication or signification of the latter consists first in the singular subjective form, as well as in the determinate individuation of the very common form. This means, Henry argues, that an individuated form is understood through a double negation, namely as separated from that which is ‘under’ and ‘next’ to it, so to speak. For it is considered as separated from the subjective part ‘under’ it, in which it is determinately received in an actual existence, and, as already determined, from other determined or individuated forms that are collateral or ‘next to it’.21 For humanity as such is divided into this or that subjective humanity, and this and that humanity are separated from one another. Thus form itself, or absolutely considered, is understood in its intentional separation from the subject under it and from collateral, determined forms next to it. On the other hand, ‘this’ humanity, from the fact that it is ‘this’ one, neither is divided nor is it by nature divisible into something under it. Therefore, ‘this’ form relates itself negatively (negative se habet) to those things which can be imagined under it, and also to other individual subsistents which are next to it, as divided through the form or species, for it is neither of these. For the singularity or ‘thisness’ of form is not communicable, since it is a unique determination of form. Wherefore, the creature is truly a this something (hoc aliquid), something one in itself: an essence in actuality different from others of its species.22 As a singular subject (singulare suppositum), it is negatively related to those next to it. If this subject happens to be intellectual or rational it is called per20

Ibid.: “Et ideo haec humanitas respectu humanitatis simpliciter est determinata, limitata et significata, in qua significatione consistit primo ratio singularis formae subiectivae, sicut et individuatio ipsius formae communis. Ex consequenti autem fit untrunque eorum per negationem consequentem illam determinationem et annexam ei non per unicam, sed per duplicem, per quam scilicet separatur ab eo quod est sub se, et ab eo quod est iuxta se.” 21 Ibid. Similar remarks concerning the double negation which individuation entails can be found, e. g., in Quodl. V, q. 8 (ed. Badius, fol. 166 rM), and in Summa, art. 39, q. 3, ad 2. 22 Summa, art. 53, q. 3 (ed. Badius, fol. 63 rS).

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son. Thus the definition (ratio) of the supposite or person in creatures is that which exists according to itself in an incommunicable nature, a nature that as individuated cannot be communicated. This is due to the twofold negation pertaining to the form and nature of a determinate thing. 23 Now the singularity of the divine persons is different from that of creatures because in God the form of deity, considered simply or absolutely, is a singular, in no way by nature apt to be divided (like in creatures) into a subject ‘under’ it in order to receive determination. Rather, only through relative properties is the divine essence naturally fit (nata est) to be communicated while remaining in the same singularity of essence. But the notion of persona in God also involves a twofold negation. The first negation is due to the personal property, since it is incommunicable. 24 In God, there is no plurality of persons with the same respect, such as many fathers, sons or holy spirits. Thus, the negation is the removal of any plurality of property that could occur by communicating the personal property to another within the divine nature. The second negation is due to the opposition among the supposites distinguished relatively.25 For, in a relative opposition, the extremes of the relation both exclude and presuppose each other. A father is by definition both a father of a son and distinct from his son, and vice versa. In God, like in creatures, persona signifies an incommunicable individual. Intentionally, or according to the double negation performed by the intellect when apprehending persona, persona is a univocal notion with respect to both God and creatures. 26 Strictly as the incommunicable nature of a supposite, persona is univocal in both 23

Ibid.: “Ratio enim suppositi vel personae in creatura ex hoc habetur quod ipsa sit existens in se, et secundum se in natura incommunicabili, quod necessario habetur in creaturis ex illa duplici negatione circa formam et naturam rei determinatam.” 24 Summa, art. 53, q. 3 (ed. Badius, fol. 63 rT): “Ex quo sequitur duplex negatio. Una ratione cuiuslibet proprietatis personalis, quia enim ipsa ex se incommunicabilis est. Ex hoc habetur negatio removens pluralitatem communicandi alteri suam proprietatem in eadem natura [...].” 25 Ibid.: “[Alia negatio est] ratione oppositionis distinguentis, per quam habetur negatio removens quamlibet personam a sua correlativa.” 26 Ibid.: “[...] completur ratio distinctionis divinarum personarum et singularitas earum per negationem, sicut et creaturarum, et quo ad hoc univoce et secundum eandem rationem habet esse persona in Deo et in creaturis.”

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cases. Just as the individuality of a human person cannot be communicated, neither can the divine property, for it is relatively opposed to and distinguished from its correlative. However, regarding the things themselves to which the negations that constitute the intention of persona correspond, determined and discrete essences in the case of creatures and relative persons in God, ‘person’ has clearly equivocal being in God and creatures. 27 The divine persons are distinguished relatively through negation within the same essence, while in creatures the essence itself is contracted into individual supposites, and thus here the negation refers to other individuated essences, albeit of the same absolute form. Finally, specifically on the part of what is negated next to it (iuxta se), persona is in a certain sense univocal and in another sense equivocal in God and creatures. For the notion of ‘this’ person implicitly negates other persons both in God and creatures. But in creatures, unlike in God, this negation of what is proximate is also a negation of essence, namely this and that essence. The relative univocity or equivocity of persona with respect to God and creatures depends on whether the term stands for the intention or for the thing itself. As a name of an intention it is univocal, but as one of a thing it is equivocal. In a general sense that includes these two modes of supposition, we can say that the term is analogous, one between univocity and equivocity (est media analogia).28 In establishing the mode of supposition of the term persona, Henry notes that a name can signify a pure thing (rem puram), a pure intention (intentionem puram), or it can signify in a mediate way (me27

Ibid.: “Inquantum tamen huiusmodi negationes concomitantur in divinis relativas proprietates, quae in essentia communi personas constituunt principaliter atque distinguunt, licet non sine virtute negationum annexarum, in creaturis vero concomitantur ipsius naturae et essentiae determinationem, quae ipsam essentiam contrahit in suppositum et personam, licet non sine virtute negationum annexarum, ut dictum est supra. Et secundum hoc licet ratione negationum univoce, et secundum eandem rationem habet esse et constitui persona in Deo et in creaturis, ratione tamen illorum quibus dictae negationes sunt annexae hincinde, quod illic est ipsa essentia vel natura determinata, hic vero proprietatum relatio, multum aequivoce et alia atque alia ratione habet esse persona in Deo et in creaturis, inquantum altera est ratio et aequivoca constituendi personam, in creatura essentiae creatae determinatio, et in Deo proprietatum relatio.” 28 Ibid. (ed. Badius, fol. 63 vY).

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dio modo) what is in a certain way a thing and in another way an intention. Names of singular things signify pure things, not intentions, for these things exist by nature and not by the consideration of the intellect, such as this man or this stone. Hence words like Peter, Paul, as imposed to particular men, are called absolutely (simpliciter) names of things. Now the universals belonging to singulars things are in a certain sense things and in another sense intentions. They are things inasmuch as they are natures having common existence in singulars, and intentions inasmuch as they are considered by the intellect as abstracted from singulars. Thus the names that are imposed on such universals are in one way of things and in another of intentions, though in the latter case they are of first intentions. Names can also be imposed on pure or second intentions, which are of two kinds. The first kind are logical intentions such as the concepts (rationes) of genus and species which refer to the universality of things, or the concept (ratio) of individual which refers to the singularity of things. These names signify respects or modes of relatedness (respecus sive habitudines) which the intellect finds between things when it compares them, though independently of things these modes of comparison have no extra-mental reality. The second type are properties of names of things, and these are the grammatical intentions (i.e. ‘verb’ or ‘adjective’), which are really names of names.29 Individual (individuum), which is to substances, whether intellectual or not, what persona is to intellectual or rational substances, is not a name of a thing (res), but a name of second intention (nomen intentionis secundae). For it is only a mode (modus) by which the intellect conceives the thing as determinate in respect to what is somehow above it (i.e. the absolute form) and collateral to it—as neither divisible into anything under it nor as communicable to anything next to it. Like ‘individual’, therefore, persona does not strictly signify the thing to which the individuation occurs (accidit) but rather the intention of individuality of this thing.30 When persona is taken only as a name of an intention, excluding the thing corresponding to the intention, the univocal commonality among persons is only intentionally real. The intellect conceives person as such indifferently, whether in comparison to the common essence or in comparison to other persons that are really distinct. Since this univocity is obtained through a cer29 30

Cf. Summa, art. 53, q. 5 (ed. Badius, fol. 64 vI-K). Cf. Summa, art. 53, q. 5 (ed. Badius, fol. 66 rT-vT).

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tain comparison, Henry calls this a community of proportion, one that only exists in the intellect.31 Persona, strictly speaking, stands for an intention of a thing, meaning the same as ‘incommunicable (rational or intellectual) supposite’. As such, the term is univocal in God and creatures. But, just as ‘snub-nosedness’, which strictly stands for the intention of the curvature of a nose, includes the nose itself in its meaning or intention, since the intention is about a thing, persona includes substance itself in its meaning, broadly speaking. For example, the name ‘Father’ primarily signifies the individuality of the Father, even though the remainder or what is not directly signified (i.e. the common essence) is signified materially or secondarily (etiam si reliquum significetur quasi materialiter in nomine). 32 With respect to the things signified, persona is an equivocal name since in creatures it refers to what subsists absolutely (absolute) while in God it refers to what subsists relatively (relative).33 The real difference between God and creatures in 31

Summa, art. 53, q. 7 (ed. Badius, fol. 70 rG): “Dico secundum quod sumatur ista communitas, quia ex parte essentiae communis [...] sumi non potest. Et sic esset sola communitas aequivocationis, quod non apparet esse concedendum. Unde videtur esse recurrendum ad positionem dicentem quod persona de significato suo absoluto nomen est intentionis secundae secundum praedictum modum, quamvis non supponat nisi rem quae est suppositum singulare, sub illa indifferentia quam ponit Ricardus, ut dictum est. Et est illa intentio ratio qua intellectus concipit suppositum reale quod est hypostasis, significatum nomine rei, ut est Pater et Filius in divinis, Petrus et Paulus in creaturis, concipit inquam ut distinctum per se a quolibet. Et consistit ista intentio in respectu quodam et modo se habendi huiusmodi rei in comparatione et respectu ad essentiam communem et ad quodlibet aliud quod consimilem habet distinctionem, sive in una essentia singulari, ut contingit in divinis, sive in una essentia specifica, ut contingit in hominibus, sive in pluribus essentiis specificis, ut contingit in hominibus et angelis. In omnibus enim istis nomen personae quasi eiusdem intentionis est, nisi quod ab absoluto sumitur in creaturis, et a respectivo in divinis. Unde quia ratio talis intentionis consistit in quadam comparatione, sicut et aliarum intentionum generis et speciei, ideo communitas intentionis quodammodo est communitas proportionis.” 32 Summa, art. 53, q. 4, responsio. 33 Summa, art. 53, q. 5, ad 1 (ed. Badius, fol. 67 rY): “In Deo autem suppositum fit incommunicabile per determinationem proprietatis, ut licet in Deo non possint plures esse patres, vel plures filii, vel plures spiritus sancti [...] non tamen deitas in persona ullo modo est incommunicabilis facta per aliquam determinationem, licet habet etiam ex se et natura sua quod non sit plurificabilis,

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terms of persona comes down to the concrete relationship between the incommunicable property the name ‘person’ primarily signifies and the essence wherein the incommunicable individuality is found. The rest of this chapter shall focus on what the name persona primarily signifies—the incommunicable property—the principle of distinction of persons. This analysis includes what persona signifies secondarily—substance or essence—the principle of commonality among persons. 3C—The Meaning of Property34 Property, more so than persona, is the term Henry uses to refer to the very uniqueness of persons, and so he uses this term univocally for God and creatures. Properties, Henry states, whether in God or creatures belong to the genus of ‘qualities’. Qualities in God such as goodness and truth are called attributes. Attributes refer to what is essential in God, common to the three persons, while ‘qualities’ which denote supposites (supposita) are called properties.35 In God, then, both properties and attributes are posited. However, only the former refer, albeit generally, to real distinctions in God, i.e. to God as the Trinity. And they do so insofar as properties and the personal supnon enim possunt esse plures deitates. Unde et per esse suum in supposito uno, non habet quin possit alteri communicari. Quia ergo persona in Deo rationem suae singularitatis secundum quam plurificatur, non habet ex parte essentiae sicut in creaturis, sed solum ex parte suppositi et proprietatis relativae determinantis suppositum. Idcirco quamquam persona significet essentiam in Deo, plurificata tamen non plurificat essentiam.” 34 Summa, art. 55, q. 3, responsio (ed. Badius, fol. 105 rH): “Proprietas quadrupliciter dicitur in divinis, largissime, large, stricte, et strictissime.” In the first way, whatever things should be considered about the persons are called properties, just as whatever is attributed to the divine essence is called an attribute. In the second way, there are only two properties in the Father (paternity and innascibility), one in the Son (filiation), one in the Holy Spirit (passive spiration), and one which is common to the Father and Son (active spiration). In third way, only four properties obtain because active spiration, as common, is not a personal property, not a property which constitutes a person as a unique supposite. In the fourth way, there are three personal properties, active and passive generation and passive spiration, as only these constitute and distinguish the three divine persons (cf. ibid.). The present discussion focuses on divine properties inasmuch as they are real relations. 35 Cf. Summa, art. 55, q. 1, responsio.

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posites (supposita) they constitute have a relative mode of being in God. Surely in God there is no difference between what is concrete and abstract except in the mode of signifying, just as there is no real difference in creatures between a white thing (album) and whiteness (albedine). It thus seems that since the divine person is simple, as founded in and identical with the simple essence, no real difference obtains between the Father and paternity, for example, except in the mode of signifying. Thus the difference between the property and the person to which the property belongs is not at all real, but rather exists only in terms of the mode of signifying.36 Yet the Father cannot be exactly the same as paternity as such, since it is true to say that the Father is the same as the Son (as persona includes secondarily in its signification the shared essence in which the Father and Son are one), while it seems contradictory to say that paternity is identical to filiation, except if what we mean by paternity is ‘father’ and by filiation ‘son’. Whence the very property, expressed as an abstract notion (notio) like ‘paternity’, seems to denote the distinct relatedness or respect of the divine persons in a more strict way than persona does. ‘Father’ as a relative term denotes the supposite in a relation, while ‘paternity’ denotes the distinctive property of the relative supposite Father, or that by which the Father is Father. This distinction between terms denoting persons and terms denoting properties in God corresponds to Henry’s metaphysical distinction between relation (relatio) and respect (respectus). In God relation denotes the supposite in a relation while respect denotes the relative property by which the person is a person, and so persona is to proprietas what relatio is to respectus. Strictly speaking, the person is not the property even though he is one with the property, for the property is only that by which the person is a person. And strictly speaking, relatio is not respectus even though a relation is one with its respect, as the respect is that by which the foundation relates to another and is a relation. This means that every relation is a respect but the converse is not true. ‘Father’ is both relatio and respectus, while ‘paternity’ is purely respectus.

36

Cf. Summa, art. 55, q. 1, ad 3.

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Since terms of properties or notions (notiones37 ) supposit differently from those of persons, the mode of being denoted by property must be somehow different from the one denoted by person. For, even though both relation and respect signify ‘being towards another’ (ad aliud esse), the relative name ‘father’ can be predicated of that to which it is related, while the respective name ‘paternity’ cannot be predicated of that to which it is related. A father is the father of the son, but his paternity is not the paternity of the filiation. Thus respectus signifies, strictly speaking, relatedness toward something, regardless of whether the name bespeaks the foundation as well (as some names of respectus do). Only if the respectus is also a name of the foundation related as well as of its relatedness can the respectus be called relatio. Accordingly, strictly speaking, relation signifies the thing or foundation as related, not its very relatedness. 38 God is one and simple. Yet His triune nature requires a diverse supposition among the terms that signify and denote such simplicity. Some names refer to God’s simplicity only by signifying unity, as the names ‘wisdom’ and ‘God’. Other names like ‘person’ or ‘father’ signify plurality in God without contradicting His essential simplicity. With regard to these latter names, it is not true that the abstract differs from the concrete only in the mode of signifying, as Praepositinus is inclined to think, because the abstract name signifies something belonging to that which the concrete name signifies.39 It signifies formally, as it were (quasi), that by which the concrete name is imposed, namely its formal notion (notio) or property (proprietas). The concrete name denoting a person, like ‘father’, denotes the property as including the common substance, the individuality of a supposite, while the abstract name, like ‘paternity’, denotes only the

37

In this context, Henry uses, to a large extent, notio as a synonym for proprietas. For a complete explication of the meaning(s) of notio, see Summa, art. 55, q. 1. 38 For Henry’s fine distinctions between relation and respect, see Summa, art. 35, q. 8 (ed. G. Wilson, Opera Omnia, XXVIII, Leuven, 1994, pp. 81-82, ll. 34-61). 39 Summa, art. 55, q. 1 (ed. Badius, fol. 107 rZ): “Abstractum significat aliquid eius quod significat concretum.” Praepositinus, holding that the persons and the properties are the same, differing only in terms of modes of signification, should be refuted in this regard (ibid., rA). Henry also discusses Praepositinus’ view in Summa, art. 54, q. 3.

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property or formal aspect of the concrete name.40 In general, ‘paternity’ signifies in the abstract the property or respect through which a father is and is called father. Persona refers both to what is distinct and common in God, to substance together with property or respect (respectus). Person and property denote a relative mode of subsistence, since the person is itself a relative mode of being of the divine essence through a given relative property. But property denotes the abstract formal aspect (ratio) of a particular mode of relative subsistence by which a person is unique in God. Property refers to the respect with which the essence finds itself in being a persona, to the respect by which a person (essence with respect) is a person.41 Finally, attributes refer to the essence (quid) in God, to all that is essentially common to the three persons on account of their shared essence. 3D—Relation in God and Creatures Although divine properties are the substance or essence in reality (in re), as properties of substance they have a different definition (ratio) from that of substance. Further, their definition (ratio) cannot correspond to something absolute,42 as this would posit in God an absolute thing aside from the substance in which the properties subsist, and bespeak real composition in God.43 Henry thus assigns a relative 40

Summa, art. 55, q. 1 (ed. Badius, fol. 107 rA): “Proprietates sunt personarum, ut constituentes et distinguentes eas, et sunt nominum ut a quibus nomina quasi formaliter imponuntur, quas tamen solas non significant nomina, sed cum substantia communi, quae ambo includuntur in significato personae.” Properties are also called notions (notiones), since they signify in the abstract the very concept (ratio) of individuality whereby a given person becomes known. For the name notio is related to the verb noscere (to be acquainted with). 41 Summa, art. 56, q. 4 (ed. Badius, fol. 116 vF-G): “Et sic dicimus quod in divinis suppositum constituitur ex essentia et relatione, sive magis proprie loquendo et evitando suspitionem compositionis, essentia et relatio sive essentia cum ratione respectus constituunt suppositum divinum, ut ambo cadant in natura et significato eius.” 42 For more details, see Summa, art. 55, q. 2. 43 Summa, art. 55, q. 5 (ed. Badius, fol. 109 rB): “[...] alia est ratio ipsarum [proprietatum] alia substantiae, quae non potest esse ratio aliqua absoluta, quia necessario poneret praeter substantiam aliquam rem absolutam in qua fundaretur et esset in Deo compositio.”

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nature (ratio) to properties, one which only requires an absolute thing as their foundation. Now to say that property has a relative nature (ratio) means that property signifies respect (respectus). That is, property signifies the real relatedness that an absolute thing has towards another. Now the category of relation is transferred from creatures to God inasmuch as the divine persons are relative modes of being of the divine essence. Henry writes that the attribution of a thing (res 44) from creatures to God can be understood either through similitude or

44

Here we use the term res in the sense Henry uses it when referring to real, extramental being, and not in its most general senses (that which is opposed to the pure nothing, or that which includes purely intramental or even fictive being). Now real being or res is divided into uncreated and created being, Subsistent, necessary being and participated being, respectively (1. res quae ipsa est esse, 2. res quae habet esse). Created being is further divided into the res of the categories of substance, and absolute accidents (quality and quantity), whose rationes are esse in se and esse in alio, respectively. (There is no proper res of relation; only the ratio of relation applies to real res, whether to substance or absolute accidents.) (For the various meanings of res, see Quodlibet VII, q. 1-2, ed. G. Wilson, Opera Omnia, XI, Leuven, 1991, pp. 27-28). Real res for Henry is extramental being that is a real nature or absolute essence, whether this be substance or absolute accidents (quantity and quality). And real res includes what exists extramentally (both necessary being and contingent being), as well as possible being. Now quantity and quality are called ‘absolute’ (unlike the other accidents) not because they can subsist without inhering in a subject—only substances do not inhere in a subject. Rather quantity and quality are called (like substance) ‘absolute’ insofar as they are res that are absolute natures or essences: quality is the res which informs the subject and quantity is the res which measures the subject. (See the explanation of the absolute character of quantity and quality in note 102 of the Introduction.) Moreover, quantity and quality, as absolute accidents, can serve as foundations for other accidents, since all other accidents are relative and thus require an absolute foundation. For example, quality is the foundation of the relation of similarity and quantity is the foundation of the relation of equality. Unlike quantity and quality, all the other accidents subsist through certain respects to other res (aside from the dependence that they, like all accidents, have upon substance). On this last point, see note 103 of the Introduction, as well as note 61 below. For a concise treatment of the various senses and applications of res in the philosophy of Henry of Ghent, see also M. Henninger, Relations. Medieval Theories, pp. 43-44; 48-52.

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through property (vel per similitudinem, vel per proprietatem).45 Attribution through similitude takes place when the thing attributed to God cannot exist in God according to its proper nature. This is an improper mode of attribution, as when God is called ‘lion’ or ‘lamb’ according to some improper similitude to creatures. Attribution through property or proper attribution is one in which that which is attributed is understood to exist in God according to its nature or substance, though in a more eminent way, as when we call God ‘good’ or ‘wise’.46 The proper attribution of a thing (res) to God can be understood either univocally, understanding the thing attributed as having univocal being in God and creatures, or equivocally, understanding the thing attributed as having a most eminent mode of being in God. Univocally, however, no created thing can be attributed to God because God is necessary, transcendent being, differing in kind from creatures which are contingent beings. Thus “no created thing (res) of any category can be attributed to God.”47 For whatever thing in God, denoted by a given category or term, has in reality a different and most eminent mode of being in comparison to the being expressed by the same category or term in creatures. Nevertheless, although the thing itself that is contained in a given category cannot be attributed to God univocally, the formal aspect (ratio) of the categories of substance48 and relation49 can be attributed to God univocally. Henry specifies that the formal aspect of a category (ratio praedicamenti) is the proper mode of being of those things which are contained in a category, while the thing of a category (res praedicamenti) is the entity contained according to its essence in the given category. Since the divine thing (res) is simple, necessary being, unlike created things which are composed and contingent, all categories from creatures in God are subsumed into the divine substance which is His own necessary existence. 50 Now, even though the 45

Cf. Summa, art. 32, q. 2 (ed. R. Macken, Opera Omnia, XXVII, Leuven, 1991, p. 37, l. 54). 46 Ibid. (ed. Macken, p. 37, ll. 55-67). 47 Ibid. (ed. Macken, p. 40, ll. 48-49): “[...] nulla res creata cuiuscumque praedicamenti Deo potest attribui.” 48 Summa, art. 32, q. 5 (ed. Macken, Opera Omnia, XXVII, p. 81, ll. 74-76). 49 Ibid. (ed. Macken, p. 89, ll. 77-89). 50 Ibid. (ed. Macken, p. 79-80, ll. 30-43).

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thing (res) belonging to the category of substance is different in the case of God and creatures, the formal aspect (ratio) of substance, which is being according to itself (secundum se esse), is univocal in God and creatures strictly as a mode of a thing (res). For just as created substances exist according to themselves and are not predicated of another, the divine substance is Subsistent Being itself. According to its formal aspect (ratio), then, the category of substance is transferred univocally from creatures to God. 51 Now neither the formal aspect (ratio) of (absolute) accidents, which is to exist in another (esse in alio) nor, of course, their entities or things (res) are attributed to God, for divine simplicity and unicity exclude any form of inherence and composition. But the divine reality does not exclude the formal aspect (ratio) of the category of relation. This formal aspect, which is to be towards another (ad aliud esse), is not incompatible with the formal aspect (ratio) of substance, which is to subsist according to itself. In fact, God has more respects than any other being inasmuch as all flows from God.52 Moreover, as that which exists toward another (ad aliud esse), relation does not signify in any way a thing but only the respect that a given accident or subject has towards another. Accordingly, there is no thing (res) proper to the formal aspect (ratio) of relation in the way that there are proper things (res) belonging to the formal aspect (ratio) of substance and absolute accidents (quantity and quality).53 “In its thing, the category of relation is not distinguished from the things belonging to the categories in which relation is founded, but rather [is distinguished] only through its mode and by the formal aspect of the category.”54 Relation mainly signifies the respect (respectus) of something (substance or accidents) to another. Thus, strictly as the respect of a thing, the formal aspect (ratio) of relation is fitting to God inas-

51

Of course, the respect that created substance has toward the accidents that subsist in it is not transferred to God, as nothing inheres in His simplicity. Only the absolute ratio of substance, secundum se esse, is transferred to God. See ibid., p. 81. 52 Ibid. (ed. Macken, p. 89, ll. 79-81). 53 Ibid. (ed. Macken, pp. 89-90, ll. 87-4). 54 Summa, art. 55, q. 5 (ed. Badius, fol. 109 vC): “Praedicamentum enim relationis in realitate a realitatibus praedicamentorum super quas fundatur non distinguitur, sed solum in modo et ratione praedicamenti.”

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much as God has a respect to what flows from Him, either intrinsically as the Trinity or extrinsically with respect to creatures. Quantity and quality inhere in substance as in their subject; they are real absolute things (res), but of a kind which can only exist in substance.55 With regard to accidents and substance the distinction is made between the thing (res) on which the category is imposed, and the formal aspect (ratio) of the genus of the category, precisely because substance and accidents are names imposed on real absolute things (res). Unlike these categories, however, relation does not signify in its meaning both thing and formal aspect in different ways, but rather only the formal aspect (ratio) of its genus, because there simply is no subsisting thing (res) of relation like there are things (res) of accidents subsisting in substance or the thing (res) of substance which subsists according to itself. The respect (respectus) of a relation is rather founded in accidents or substance as a mode by which these things relate to other things. Relation, therefore, understood as a category of being— including both thing and formal aspect—is an absolute foundation having a respect towards another. No thing, however, belonging exclusively to the respect as respect, distinct from the things (res) of substance or accidents, itself relates. Only accidents or substances find themselves in given respects towards those things to which they relate. Unlike accidents, the formal aspect (ratio) of relation does not consist in real inherence, but only in the comparison of the foundation to another to which it relates.56 However, even though there is no 55

The absolute character of quantity and quality is explained in note 102 of the Introduction. 56 Summa, art. 56, q. 1 (ed. Badius, fol. 113 rB): “Cum enim in quolibet praedicamento est duo considerare, et rem ipsius praedicamenti, et rationem generis praedicamenti [...] alia tria praedicamenta propriam rem habent sui generis, et ad illam significandam imponuntur, non autem ad significandum modum sive rationem sui generis quae convenit suae rei. Substantia enim imponitur ad significandum rem cui convenit esse secundum se. Quantitas vero imponitur ad significandum unam rem, qualitas vero ad significandum aliam rem, quibus tamen communiter convenit esse in alio, licet diversimode. Relatio vero ad significandum propriam rationem sui generis imponitur, et non ad aliquam rem propriam sui generis, quia illam non habet ad quam significandam possit imponi, sed solum habet res aliorum praedicamentorum super quas fundatur [...] sed aliter quam accidens, quantitas scilicet vel qualitas, fundatur super substantiam, quia illa fundantur super substantiam ut res super rem cui

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proper res of relation, relation does refer to things, namely to substance and accidents in their various respects. 57 Relation has been traditionally classified as an accident, according to the tenfold Aristotelian division of being into substance and the nine accidents. 58 In itself or as pure respect (respectus), however, relation is not an accident for it does not have the formal aspect (ratio) of being in another, but only that of being toward another ( ad aliud).59 If relation obtains the character (ratio) of accident, it does so not through itself but from something else: from its foundation. In creatures, relation does not obtain the character (ratio) of accident from the subject in which it exists, as one and the same subject is a substance and may be also called lord or servant.60 If relation obtains the character of accident, it must do so from the absolute accidents which properly exist in a subject, namely from quality which informs the subject or from quantity which measures the subject.61 If these acinhaeret, cum in se non possit esse. Relationis vero respectus fundatur super rem ut modus quo alter respicitur, nihil autem in se ex hoc respectu recipit. Et sic propria ratio quantitatis et qualitatis est secundum comparationem eius ad suum fundamentum ut ad subiectum cui inhaeret, sed propria ratio relationis non est omnino secundum comparationem eius ad fundamentum suum ut in quo sit, sed potius ut ab ipso, et secundum comparationem ad id quod respicit.” 57 Ibid. 58 See M. Henninger, Relations. Medieval Theories, pp. 4-5. 59 Cf. Summa, art. 32, q. 5 (ed. Macken, Opera Omnia, XXVII, p. 88, ll. 4953). 60 Ibid. (ed. Macken, p. 88, l. 61). 61 As noted, for Henry only quantity and quality are absolute accidents, while the other accidents do not signify things but only circumstances or respects of these absolute accidents. Thus ‘actio’, ‘passio’, ‘quando’, ‘ubi’, ‘situs’ and ‘habitus’ are relative accidents that are certain respects that absolute accidents have. Relatio is also an accident that does not apply to a proper thing under the category. Relation is just the common name for all respective accidents which are modes of absolute accidents. As a common category signifying respect, the ratio of relation is simply ad aliud esse. The ratio of the other respective accidents is to be toward another in a given respect, like ‘quando’ which is a relative accident according to how something is related to another in the respect of time. In fact, relation in creatures that is an accident is obtained through motion, as are the various respects in terms of time, place, act and potency. But since in God there is no motion or potency, relation in God signifies pure respect and in no way motion or mutation. It signifies eternal,

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cidents are related to other things according to different respects, the relations which these accidents have are accidents as founded in, and thus identical with, them. Accordingly, the relation whereby Socrates is similar to Plato because both are white inheres in and is an accident of these subjects because whiteness (a quality) inheres in both of them, their whitenesses being mutually related according to similarity.62 Therefore, the relation of similarity is truly an accident inhering in a subject, for it is a respect of an accident inhering in a subject. However, the relation does not itself inhere in the accident, but rather belongs to the subject when it relates to another through an accident. For example, there is no inherence of similarity in whiteness for it is the white thing itself which is similar to another according to whiteness. There is no real distinction between the white thing and the white similar thing. If every white thing but one is destroyed, we destroy all similarity in the remaining white thing, but this thing is exactly as white as when it was compared to others in terms of whiteness. This indicates that relation is not an added reality to the accident, and that it does not, when removed, destroy any reality of the accident itself.63 intrinsic relations assumed by the divine essence. Thus only as the very ratio of relation, as ad aliud esse or as relation simply, does respect or relation properly belong in God, and not as the respect belonging to any created thing. Cf. ibid. (ed. Macken, Opera Omnia, XXVII, pp. 87-107). 62 Ibid. (ed. Macken, p. 88, ll. 66-67). 63 In this argument, Henry is generally in line with Thomas Aquinas, who gathers this tenet on categorial relations from Aristotle. Aristotle argues that there is no “motion in respect of relation: for it may happen that when one correlative changes, the other, although this does not itself change, is no longer applicable, so that in these cases the motion is accidental” (Physics, V, 2, 225b11-13, in: R. McKeon (ed.), The Basic Works of Aristotle, New York, 2001, p. 303). That is, the accidental change in this case is not a motion or change in the thing properly speaking, but simply a change in terms of reference. Aquinas analyzes this passage from Aristotle, and specifies that what Aristotle says holds because the reality of categorial relations depends on their root (radix), namely their foundation. Thomas Aquinas, In Octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis, Lib. V, cap. II., Lect. III (ed. Leon., Opera Omnia, II, 1884, Romae, p. 237, n. 8): “Unde dicendum est quod si aliquis per suam mutationem efficiatur mihi aequalis, me non mutato, ista aequalitas primo erat in me quodammodo, sicut in sua radice, ex qua habet esse reale: ex hoc enim quod habeo talem quantitatem, competit mihi quod sim aequalis omnibus illis,

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Therefore, relation is only a mode of being of its foundation, a mode whereby the foundation is related to another in a certain respect. The relation is indeed real inasmuch as the foundation itself relates to another. But the relatedness of the foundation is purely the formal respect by which it relates, not an absolute thing. For, if this respect would be an absolute thing, then we would have to say that the given respect that it has toward another would require a proper thing (res) (i.e. be founded in this res), and we would then again have to say that the respect which this latter thing has to another itself requires a proper thing, and so on into infinity. 64 Accordingly a respect cannot be founded in another respect, but rather must be founded in something absolute, in something that itself subsists non-relatively. As a mode which a thing may or may not have in relation to another, relation itself cannot be a thing. Yet, as a mode of being relation is real. Now relation can be transferred to God only according to its formal aspect (ratio), and in no sense as an accident. Only inasmuch as the divine essence itself assumes respects or relative modes of being can relation be said to exist in God, for God does not have accidents which assume relations. The formal aspect (ratio) of relation applies to God only because divine relations are immediately founded in the divine substance itself. Relation in God passes over, so to speak, into the reality of the divine substance, which triune substance is by nature relational.

qui eandem quantitatem habent. Cum ergo aliquis de novo accipit illam quantitatem, ista communis radix aequalitatis determinatur ad istum: et ideo nihil advenit mihi de novo per hoc quod incipio esse alteri aequalis per eius mutationem.” In this same passage, Aquinas gives the example of a purely rational relation (i.e., identity), and the example of a relation that is real on one extreme and only rational in the other extreme (i.e., an animal really related through its left or right side to a column that is only rationally related to the animal through left or right). These are the same examples Henry gives for these types of relations (see Appendix, ll. 44-57). However, as noted in chapter 1 (section J), Henry’s overall theory of relations differs in important ways from that of Aquinas. Finally, it is worth mentioning that Duns Scotus argues, against Henry and Aquinas, for a view that attributes to relations more intrinsic reality. For Scotus’ position on relations, developed against Henry’s, see J. Decorte, “‘Modus’ or ‘Res’: Scotus’ Criticism of Henry of Ghent’s Conception of the Reality of a Real Relation.” 64 Summa, art. 32, q. 5 (ed. Macken, Opera Omnia, XXVII, p. 88, ll. 61-64). See also Appendix, ll. 281-283.

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Even though the Father is God and the Son is God, both being identical by essence, the Father is distinguished from the Son due to their relative opposition according to paternity and filiation, their respective relations. This relative opposition necessitates an irreducible, mutual distinction between the Father and Son since they, as the two extremes of a relative opposition, both exclude one another (to be father to a son excludes being son with respect to the same son), and imply one another (to be father is to be father of an offspring, and vice versa). There is a real distinction between the Father and Son according to paternity and filiation respectively, even though they are identical substantially. For these relative modes are fitting to their simple foundation. Relation in God, the supreme being, is a truly perfect mode of being. For here relation is identical to substance. Among creatures, relation considered as pure respectus has less reality than substance and absolute accidents. (The creature’s relation to God, of course, gives the creature its reality to begin with.) For, among creatures, relations depend on their foundations as well as on their objects or terms; they are always founded in discrete subjects, as paternity in the substance of a father and similitude in two whitenesses. Therefore, if the object of the relation is destroyed, the relation is destroyed in both extremes of the relation. 65 On the other hand, the respects in God do not subsist in an extreme through any dependence, but only through an order of nature. Relation according to itself (secundum se), i.e. pure respect, exists naturally (naturaliter) as a mode of being in God. The divine essence cannot exist without its mode of being according to substance any more than it can exist without its mode of being according to relation, for this essence is by nature triune.

65

Summa, art. 55, q. 5 (ed. Badius, fol. 109 vD): “Ita quod si realitas destruatur in obiecto, etiam deficit relatio in utroque extremo.”

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3E—Relations and Reality Even though divine relations are ontologically different from real categorial relations just as the divine persons are different in nature from human persons, Henry’s basic tenets on relations apply to both God and creatures. Real relations are those that exist independently of the activity of the intellect: they obtain their reality from the nature of things (ex natura rei). Order is founded in relation, and relation is founded in the nature of the things. When two things are said to be related or ordered, this may mean one of three things. If their relation stems from both of their natures, the relation is real, while if it stems from neither, it is purely rational.66 If it stems from only one of the natures but not from the other, the relation is on one extreme rational and on the other real. Accordingly, any real order among things is grounded in relation, which is the very mutual relatedness of the natures ordered. 67 Relation, grounded in the nature of things themselves, is the ontological basis for order, the principle of order. Giles of Rome, explaining relation through order, is “explaining a definiendum (relation) by means of a definiens (order) that is identical with it.”68 Relation, as Avicenna would say,69 refers to no thing ‘between’ the relata, to no interval between the relata, but only to each of the relata.70 And since it only denotes the relata, a relation can be real on the part of only one of the relata. We may thus speak of ‘a real relation’ as a relation that consists of two things that are really related mutually, or as the real relation of one thing towards another thing. In this sense, a real relation presupposes two things, the thing that relates and its object, while a real mutual relation consists of two things mutually related as objects. In the former case, since the relation of one thing always presupposes an object, even though this object may not 66

The relation of identity, for example, is purely rational, as the intellect doubles the same thing and then relates it to itself (cf. Appendix, ll. 54-57). 67 See Appendix, ll. 37-43. 68 J. Decorte, “Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent on the Reality of a Real Relation,” p. 209. 69 See Henry’s discussion in Quodlibet V, q. 2. 70 The term Henry uses to denote this purely intramental interval or sheer mutual relatedness between things is habitudo. Habitudo, strictly as referring to neither one of the relata, but only to what is somehow between the relata, can exist only in the mind. See J. Decorte, “‘Modus’ or ‘Res’: Scotus’ Cricitism,” p. 416.

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be really related to it, we can speak of a relation that is partly real and partly rational. But it is ‘partly real and partly rational’ because on one extreme it is completely real and on the other purely rational.71 For the reality of a relation is nothing else than the real relatedness grounded in the extremes. However, even though a relation is identical to its foundation, a foundation may assume or cease to be in a given relation, and so relation is intentionally distinguished from the foundation.72 In God the distinction between the relation and essence is only rational, as there relations are necessary. Divine relations are real, Henry argues, because like categorial relations they draw their reality from the nature of their foundation (ex natura rei), not merely mentally. In the form of Deity, which is by definition not originated, respects are founded according to an (non-temporal) order of emanation. The very first respect of the essence (i.e. the essence as ‘generare’ or as the Father) is ordered toward the Son who is originated absolutely first. The Father (essence as active generation) is constituted through this simply first respect. The Son (essence as passive generation) is in turn constituted through the passive respect (generari) whereby he is originated first. The Father, as the essence in its simply first respect, is absolutely unoriginated, having existence from no one, though He is constituted through this first respect toward the Son. According to intellectual emanation, the respects or properties constitutive of the Father and Son (generare and generari respectively) are founded in Deity. The divine essence as active generation (generare)—the Father—has a real respect towards itself as passive generation (generari)—the Son, and vice versa. Accordingly, there is a mutual distinction of relative opposition among the Father and Son, as well as substantial unity, both of them being the same essence in different respects. These two persons together, in turn, produce the Holy Spirit, who is the divine essence as originated through spiration. The Holy Spirit (the essence as passive spiration: spirari) is passively related by origin to the Father and Son who actively spirate. Accordingly, there is a mutual distinction of relative opposition between the Holy Spirit, on the one hand, and the Father and Son, on the other, as 71

See Henry’s example of a man really related to a column that is only rationally related to him, in Appendix, ll. 47-53. 72 See the discussion by M. Henninger (in Relations. Medieval Theories, pp. 54-55), based on Quodl. V, q. 6 (ed. Badius, fol. 162 S).

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well as substantial unity, the three persons being the same essence in different respects. In this manner, the persons are really related through respects or properties that constitute them as distinct supposites. These respects are founded in the divine essence in a way similar to how real categorial relations are founded amongst creatures independently of the activity of intellect.73 However, even though these divine relations are real modes of the essence, and distinct through relative opposition, they and the persons they constitute should not be called things (res) without qualification. They may be called things (res) because their reality is that of their foundation or essence. Accordingly, they are only one thing, because they are all founded in a singular essence. In fact, Boethius applied relation to the Trinity since relation does not really alter the thing of which it is predicated, and thus the Father and the Son can be distinguished through relation without making them into two separate things. For no intrinsic reality seems to belong to what is expressed by this category as such, as Boethius maintained.74 In and of itself, considered as the very relatedness of a thing, relation is only a circumstance or a mode. 75 It may be called a thing in a qualified way, since after all it is a mode of a thing. But relation as such, namely as ‘being towards another’, cannot be one thing or reality, since it would be multiplied according to the number of terms to which it relates. If relation, strictly as being towards another (ad aliud esse), would be a thing, there could not be one relation in reality (secundum rem) whereby one is equal to two, nor one paternity whereby one person is the father of two sons (among creatures), since there would be two terms ‘to which (ad quos)’ multiplying the one relation, which evidently is not the case. 76 Since a relation in its definition only includes the foundation and its object,77 it is called a thing (res) from its foundation, not from its object. In reference to the object alone, strictly as ad aliud esse, relation is only a mere mode and not in any way a thing (res).78 And 73

See Appendix, ll. 155-166. See Appendix, ll. 114-121. 75 Appendix, ll. 128-129. 76 Appendix, ll. 134-137. 77 Appendix, ll. 141-143. 78 In this we need to keep in mind that being (ens) for Henry, e.g. a category, consists of both thing (res) and formal aspect (ratio). Therefore, when we say 74

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there are as many modes of being towards another as there are objects to which the foundation relates. Since relation in God does not have a reality separate from that of substance, it is there a relative mode of substance and is no more of a thing (res) than in creatures. Otherwise something would exist in God aside from the essence, and aside from this essence’s modes of being towards another, which cannot be due to God’s simplicity. If someone wishes to call this very mode a thing, purely in an order toward the object, by arguing that it is a mode of a thing, it is beside the point, because ultimately there is no real distinction between the mode of being of a thing and the thing itself. The general principles of Henry’s theory of relations apply to both God and creatures. If real categorial relations are different from divine relations, it is because one is considering different things in each case. The formal aspect (ratio) of relation (to be towards another) is the same in God and creatures, just as the formal aspect (ratio) of substance (to be according to itself) is the same in each case. In both cases, “it is because respects are things from an order to the foundation that they are also things in an order to the object and also really relate to the object.”79 The multiplication of a relation in reference to various objects does not obtain because the objects give ‘some’ reality to the relation. This is Henry’s criticism of Giles and others, who reify relation in comparison to its object.80 Failing to understand the connection between a relation and its object is also the reason for the famous error of Gilbertus Porretanus who, misinterpreting Boethius, sees relations as extrinsically attached to the divine persons.81 It is the foundation that relation is res strictly from the foundation, this does not mean that it is only real with respect to the foundation. For, the rationes by which the foundation is related stem from the nature of the foundation itself and, together with the foundation as their res, these rationes constitute real relations toward other things. 79 Appendix, ll. 201-202. 80 Cf. Decorte, “Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent,” pp. 202-211. 81 Gilbertus Porretanus interprets Boethius’ famous saying that “sola relatio multiplicat Trinitatem” (Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 55, q. 6: in Appendix, l. 16) in the sense that the relative properties are different from the persons and the divine essence: they are conditions or circumstances (habitudines) extrinsically attached to the persons (affixae et assistentes), having no reality in the persons or in the divine essence (see Appendix). As Thomas Aquinas tells us (Summa Theologiae, I, q. 28, art. 2, solutio), this position was generally seen

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that is really related to various objects in diverse modes. Therefore, in both God and creatures, this multiplication obtains only because the object toward which the foundation relates is necessarily presupposed when the foundation relates. However, it is presupposed only as a necessary condition (causa sine qua non), never as a constitutive cause (causa propter quam), of the relation. 82 As Aristotle rightly maintained, relative things (relativa) are simultaneous in nature, though none causes the other to exist.83 Indeed, sometimes various respects really exist toward the same object, as those of two sons toward the same father. Whence, the cause (ratio) by which the two sons are in two respects or filiations toward the same father is not the object (their father) toward which they relate. Rather the cause(s) by which the two sons relate through their filiations is the potency of passive generation which is founded in each of their diverse matters. The two sons are generated from their passive potencies, founded in diverse matters, in which their diverse

as erroneous, if not heretical. For Henry, Porretanus misinterprets Boethius. Boethius’ position is that the relative properties are nothing different in re from the persons and the essence. Rather they are only circumstances and modes of subsistence (solum modum se habendi et circumstantiam). In this Boethian sense, properties are fitting to the persons from the nature of the person itself, as the person has a circumstance and respect to another not only because the other is directed to the person, but also because on its own the person is in a respect to the other when the other is in relation to it: “circumstantiam et respectum ad alium habet persona non solum quia alius quodammodo se habet ad ipsam, sed ex seipsa respicit alium cum alius respicit ipsam” (Summa, art. 56, q. 1 [ed. Badius, fol. 113 rB]). Porretanus misinterprets Boethius’s claim that such circumstances (relations) are not to be considered without the ‘arriving’ or presence of the other, by interpreting it in the sense that they are only to be considered from such exterior presence: “dixit Boethius huiusmodi circumstantiam considerari ex adventu alterius, non dixit hoc quia ex solo adventu alterius, quod intelligit Gilbertus, sed quia non sine adventu alterius” (ibid.). If properties are considered only from the presence of the other, then they appear to be extrinsically attached, which Porretanus wrongly supposed. On Porretanus’ position, see L. O. Nielsen, Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century: A Study of Gilbert Porreta’s Thinking and the Theological Expositions of the Doctrine of the Incarnation during the period 1130-1180, Leiden, 1982, pp. 149-163. 82 See Appendix, ll. 204-205. 83 Appendix, l. 216.

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filiations are founded.84 In reality, a unique paternity corresponds to the two filiations, as the object toward which they relate. In turn, paternity is founded in the active generative potency in the substantial form of the father. There are not two fathers because there are two sons or objects corresponding to his paternity, but rather one and the same foundation corresponds to the two objects, for it is one and the same foundation which makes one subject to be father to two sons by generating two sons. In God, the divine essence or foundation is that in which all divine properties are founded, and that which gives them their reality, presupposing only as a necessary condition (causa sine qua non) their corresponding objects. Even though the divine essence is really unique and absolute, due to its infinite and unlimited nature it is through itself what causes diverse respects in the mode of action and passion corresponding to one another to flow (as it were) from itself, and further diverse products, in the mode of action in terms of generating and spirating in order to produce actively the Son and the Holy Spirit, and in the mode of passion in terms being generated and being spirated in order to produce passively the Son and the Holy Spirit. Thus, the very simple, unique essence is through itself the perfect cause of the fact that the respects are diverse, not only of the fact that they are respects as such, [namely] generating, spirating, being generated, and being spirated, and through this that the very products are distinct or diverse, and not the other way around. The diversity of the products is the cause of that diversity [of respects] between generating and being generated, spirating and being spirated.85

It is the divine essence which causes things to be produced intrinsically (persons) and extrinsically (creatures). These intrinsic products (persons) are in themselves diverse, and through this diversity they obtain mutual objective relations among each other. But the diverse products are caused by the respects which flow from the divine essence, through which respects the persons are constituted together with the essence. The persons (the essence with properties) are really founded immediately in the divine essence, and the respects that the persons have in reference to their objects is derived from the diversity which they intrinsically have as founded in the essence in diverse ways. In 84 85

Appendix, ll. 207-213. Appendix, ll. 218-227.

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this sense, the divine essence is the proximate cause of its own personal respects which it assumes and flow from it. In turn, the divine essence is the remote cause of the diversity of respects that the persons have in reference to each other. The diversity of objective respects is derived from the diversity of subjective respects assumed by the essence.86 This is how the persons are identical with their essence but distinct in reference to each other; for in a relation there is always a distinction between that which relates to a term and the term. They are distinct because each, through its relative property, is irreducible to the other.87 86

In this vein, Henry clarifies that the productive and constitutive respects (e.g. generare) by which the acts of production flow must be rationally prior to the relatively opposed relations or properties (e.g. paternity) by which the already constituted persons refer to each other. The Father is the Father only because he generates, and the Son is the Son only because he is generated. The respect that constitutes the Father as a supposite (suppositum)—which supposite is prior to any act which flows from it, to the product of the act, and to the objective relations which it may have with what it produces—is generare, not paternitas. Summa, art. 56, q. 3, ad 4 (ed. Badius, fol. 115 vY): “Unde quia rationes istarum proprietatum, paternitas, filiatio, quasi praecedunt actus originales generare et generari, eo quod fundantur super ipsos. Non enim est Pater nisi quia generat, nec Filius nisi quia generatur, ideo saltem ex parte Patris paternitas non potest dici in Patre proprietas constitutiva [...].” See also Appendix, ll. 236-240. 87 Summa, art. 56, q. 4, ad 2 (ed. Badius, fol. 117 rI): “Realitas relationis ut respicit essentiam differens est sola ratione ab illa, et ideo ambo simul stant in aequali rei simplicitate, ut non sit simplicior essentia quam persona, nec differt persona ab essentia re, sed ratione tantum. Inquantum tamen relatio comparatur ad relationem oppositam, diversitatem rei relationis ponit [...] non tamen rei substantiae, sic enim una est distinctiva suppositi sui a supposito alterius et econverso, et per hoc constitutiva, et sunt in persona ut persona est, id est quid relatum ad oppositum, ambo, scilicet essentia et relatio, ut duae res, essentia ut res absoluta qua non distinguitur, relatio vero ut res respectus qua distinguitur. Et sic licet essentia et relatio ut considerantur inter se comparata non differunt nisi ratione tantum, inquantum tamen considerantur ut comparata ad oppositum differunt re, non simpliciter, sed re substantiae et relationis, quasi cum determinatione, non absolute explicando illam differentiam, ut propter istam differentiam vere possit dici essentiam et relationem personam constituere, vel persona constitui ex essentia et relatione absque omni compositione in persona, quia non est ista differentia constituentium personam inter se comparatorum, sed ad aliud solum. [...] res quae sunt personae in se et in suo significato includunt rem quae est essentia [...] res quae

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In God, like in creatures, a real diversity of relations is not obtained from their order toward the objects, but from the foundation. “The fact that the properties obtained by the emanating activity of the divine essence are mutually distinguished is not because one exists towards another, or one is from another, or because they exist toward diverse products or exist from diverse producers, but rather because they flow in different ways or, better, are diverse as having flowed differently, as it were, from the same substance”88 (though simultaneously from eternity). Strictly speaking, the persons are intrinsically different not because one proceeds from or refers relatively to another, but because they proceed or emanate in different (necessary) ways from the same thing. Strictly, the Father is different from the Son not because the Son proceeds from Him, but because He is constituted by the property whereby the Son proceeds from Him. The persons are distinct according to how they proceed in unique ways. Real divine relations are one as in the foundation, and diverse as flowing from it toward different objects. It is in this sense that substance and relation are identical in God. When we predicate these two categories with respect to God, we are referring to the same thing considered in different ways or modes. If the category of relation denotes a created foundation, it denotes one thing, the foundation in a relation. However, it connotes two modes of being, the absolute foundation and its given relative mode of being. Similarly in God relation denotes substance as related. In God, substance and relation cannot but denote the same thing in both modes of being, since God is always the Trinity. Yet in God substance and relation connote two different modes of being of the essence, insofar as these modes are distinguishable, insofar as there are (real) relative distinctions between the persons and a (rational) subjective order between them and their essential foundation. In God, as in creatures, the categories of substance and relation signify two modes of being, even though created things are really different from the Uncreated Reality.89 In regard to divine relations, as in regard to categorial relations, it may be said with qualification, that they are things. However, it is better to refer to their reality as res relationis (the reality or thing besunt proprietates, in essentia fundantur, et ab ea realitatem suam habent” (italics mine). 88 See Appendix, ll. 230-233. 89 Appendix, ll. 264-289.

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longing to relation), in order to clarify that relation is a mode of a thing rather than a thing absolutely speaking.90 3F—Res as Relational Unlike Gilbertus Porretanus, for whom relations are, as it were (quasi), fastened (affixae) to things, and extrinsically ‘assist them’ (assistentes), Henry claims that although the proper formal aspect (ratio) of relation does not arise from any inherence in a subject, it does refer to the subject insofar as relation is ‘supported’ by the subject.91 This applies to it not as a thing different from the subject, but under the formal aspect (ratio) of mode whereby it relates to another (alterum respicit). In God, relation does this by constituting the personal supposite in a distinct relation to another. But “the same thing, absolutely considered, is something in itself absolutely, and under a certain comparison it has the mode of respect to another, and it is one thing indifferently as foundation toward both modes, namely of substance and relation.”92 In a way, then, Henry takes the opposite view of Porretanus based upon the same observation that there is no subsisting thing (res) independently of substance and accidents corresponding to the formal aspect (ratio) of relation; there is no proper thing of relation as there is of quality. For Porretanus, this means that relations are things that are purely extrinsic to substance or accidents. For Henry, it means the opposite—relation is a res, whether substance or accident, strictly in the sense that it signifies substance and accidents as related to other things. For Henry, to call relation a mode does not diminish its ontological status. In God, in fact, substance is a mode of res, just as relation is. For the divine res, absolutely considered, exists as a foundation that subsists according to both modes, that of substance and that of relation. Similarly, created res belonging to the absolute categories, when related to other things, assume on their own account 90 See

Appendix, ll. 245-247. Summa, art. 56, q. 1 (ed. Badius, fol. 113 rB): “Licet propria ratio relationis non est omnino ad subiectum ut eidem inhaerens, est tamen ad subiectum ut eidem innitens [...].” 92 Summa, art. 56, q. 1 (ed. Badius, fol. 113 rB): “Res enim eadem absolutissime considerata, absolute est aliquid in se, et sub comparatione quadam habet modum respectus ad alterum, et est una indifferens sicut fundamentum ad duos modos, substantiae scilicet et relationis.” 91

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relative modes on top of their absolute modes, and nevertheless both their relative and absolute modes remain identical subjectively. Divine or created res possess, at the heart of their natures and in having absolute subsistence, the tendency toward other res. Which created thing is not related to the Creator and to other created things? Through his conception of res as the foundation of both absolute and relative modes of being, Henry of Ghent attributes to created and uncreated being a relational nature: creatures tend toward one another and, necessarily, toward God in virtue of themselves, just as uncreated being tends, by necessity and fully actualizing this tendency, toward its own relational triunity. Moreover, creatures and the Trinity are constituted in being through relations, the former in regard to their Creator and the latter in regard to itself. Significantly, this conception of res provides a basis for a metaphysical system of Creator and creatures in terms of relations. Thus res, absolutely considered, can be a res of substance or relation in God, or a res of substance, quantity or quality in creatures. “But in another mode it is a foundational res of relation.”93 And this foundational res of relation can be signified by the names ‘substance’, ‘quantity’, ‘quality’, or ‘relation’ according to the diverse respects assumed by the different absolute res. “Hence, in creatures, relation founded in quantity or quality is an accident, and [it is] the same accident in terms of res under the diverse formal aspects of the categories, so that the same entity in terms of res can be signified by quantity and equality [on the one hand], and quality and similitude [on the other hand].”94 For equality simply denotes the relatedness or respect of quantity, and similitude that of quality. Similarly the divine reality is one and the same under the different formal aspects (rationes) of the categories of substance and relation. God is a Res subsisting according to both substance (deity) and relation (deity as Trinity). For this reason, Porretanus, Alexander of Hales and others must be corrected: properties (relations) are not to be understood in any sense as external to the essence or the persons. Rather they are constitutive because 93

Summa, art. 56, q. 1 (ed. Badius, fol. 113 rB): “[...] sub alio vero modo est res fundamentalis relationis.” 94 Summa, art. 56, q. 1 (ed. Badius, fol. 113 rB-vB): “Et ideo in creaturis relatio fundata super quantitatem aut qualitatem, accidens est, et idem accidens re sub diversis rationibus praedicamentorum, ut idem re significent quantitas et aequalitas, et qualitas et similitudo.”

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they are at the heart of the nature which serves as foundation—the foundation by nature assumes its own constitutive relations.95 Accordingly, in God substance and relation are identical as two real modes of the divine res. For Henry, as for Aristotle, everything that is real and that is not substance is founded in substance. Unlike Aristotle and many Aristotelians, however, Henry transforms relation, traditionally the weakest ontological category, into the strongest by identifying it with substance in God. Instead of diminishing the reality of relation by reducing it to substance, Henry, by stressing the very relatedness of substance, whereby substance itself relates or tends towards another, augments the reality of relation to that of substance. The relations actively and really spring forth (pullulant) from the divine nature itself 96, and so this nature never exists without its relative modes any more than without its substantial mode. Moreover the mode whereby the divine essence is actualized immanently is relation. The divine essence can be understood as a common principle or potency, albeit always reduced to act, which is truly common to the three persons insofar as it itself assumes personal respects. In its full actuality this essence is eternally perfected through its immanent relations. Concretely, the mode of substance in God is always in diverse relations. This is not to diminish the reality of substance in God, for it is substance itself which is related and which is the common mode of being in God—without the common mode of substance, each of the three persons would be a discrete absolute god. But this is to say that the divine reality, in being substantial, is by nature relational, both in 95

Summa, art. 56, q. 1 (ed. Badius, fol. 113 vB): “[...] relatio sive proprietas in divinis non est affixa et assistens, sed potius insistens essentiae ut fundamento personae ut constituto per ipsam [...].” Summarizing various opinions concerning this matter, Henry adds that in them “nihil ergo est dictu quod persona seipsa sive respectu quem includit, respiciat personam, sed quod respectus consequens est et assistens, ut dixit Gilbertus, aut quod hypostasis seipsa significat rem respectu proprietatis quae est extra suum intellectum, ut dicit Alexander. Immo ille respectus quem ambo ponunt extra intellectum personae et hypostasis, necessario intra ponendus est, et ille est quem vocamus proprietatem constitutivam personae, ut in divinis omnino non differant persona et hypostasis nisi ratione [...] ut secundum hoc dicere quod subtractis proprietatibus a personis manent hypostases, simile sit ei quod est dicere hominem remanere hominem subtracto rationali” (Summa, art. 56, q. 3 [ed. Badius, fol. 114 vP-115 rQ]). 96 Cf. Summa, art. 56, q. 1, ad 2.

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constituting itself as the Trinity, and in grounding creatures through a twofold participative relation toward itself according to essence and existence. The only sense in which substance has priority over relation as a mode of res in God is that, insofar as each of the real divine relations is identical with the essence, the mode of relation presupposes that of substance. Even if God is eternally the Trinity, according to our understanding the real multiplicity of the mode of relation presupposes the unicity and singularity of the mode of substance, and not conversely. Thus, the divine persons always bespeak their one essence or substance, while God’s essential attributes may be considered without explicit reference to the persons. In other words, the only priority that substance as a mode of res has over relation as a mode of res is simply that relation is founded in substance, and not the other way around. So, there is one God and not three. For, if substance would be founded in relation, and each of the persons is constituted by a relative property, then each of the persons would be one discrete subsistent ‘relatedness’, each would be paradoxically one absolute relation—an impossibility within Henry’s ontology. In a parallel way with respect to created being, relative modes of res presuppose absolute modes of res, the former always being founded in the latter. 3G—Reality in Henry’s System From the aforementioned, one may gather that Henry’s conception of terms which apply to God’s triunity as well as to creatures is fundamental within his system. For these terms are not merely conceptual devices necessary to salvage the dogma of the Trinity, but rather categories which bespeak fundamental principles of both created and uncreated being. For Henry (created or uncreated) being is a reality (res) expressing itself in absolute and relative modes (substance and relation in God; substance, quantity, quality and relation in creatures), whereby res as absolute is the foundation of res as relative. Naturally, the uncreated and created realities differ wholly in kind, the former being necessary, infinite and subsistent intellect and will, the latter a finite, contingent imitation of the former according to essence and existence. Both these realities, however, in being absolute—the uncreated reality because it is uncaused and transcendent; the created one because it is discrete—are also relational by nature. This relational character of absolute res, according to Henry, explains God’s

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real triunity, the ten categories of created reality, and the subsistence of creatures in relation to their Creator. The reason for this relational/absolute character of all being is that the ultimate foundation of all being is the divine mind or spirit: the primary analogate of being in Henry’s view of reality is the Trinity, divine (notional) intellect and will. The divine reality or intellect and will by nature relates to itself, and is thus the Trinity, while remaining absolute, and the created reality, being an existing essence produced as the term of divine knowledge and will, by nature reflects its spiritual source while being discrete. It is not surprising, therefore, that one encounters Henry’s characterization of created and uncreated being in terms of metaphysical categories in his discussion of terms applicable both to creatures and the divine persons. There we see that persona in God is a type of relation; and relation is constituted, whether in God or creatures, by its material principle (res) or absolute foundation and its formal aspect (ratio) or property (respectus). Finally, the distinction between the absolute and relational character of res, whereby the former may be considered without the latter even though both are identical in reality, is the ontological crux of the distinction and relation between philosophy and theology in Henry’s system, as well as the basis of the cognitive superiority of the latter in regard to the former. All reality may be considered in an absolute way, without reference to the Trinity. This is how metaphysics considers being absolutely, and the particular sciences consider the essences proper to their subjects. These sciences, in grasping the quiddities and properties of reality, do discern truly essential features of their matters. Properly speaking, however, only theology discerns the relational character constitutive of the absolute natures which the other sciences study; only theology sees that the fundamental truth of all absolute natures is their tendency toward God and that this tendency is their ontological core, that they are absolute only because of their constitutive relations to the Trinity. In brief, one may say that the intentional distinction between a relation and its foundation means for Henry’s system an intentional distinction between two ontological aspects of the matter that philosophy and theology share: both consider res, though philosophy only absolutely, while theology both absolutely and relatively, knowing that the latter aspect is the ultimate truth of the former at all levels of reality. Accordingly, the philosophic sciences depend on theology, lest they mistakenly think that the

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intentionally absolute aspect of what they consider is the ultimate and only truth, lest they misinterpret reality altogether.

CONCLUSION Henry of Ghent’s account of the Trinity contains a thoroughly developed conception of divine being. This conception sheds light on Henry’s system as a whole, as it develops the proper nature of the Creator, whom all reflect. The conception of the Trinity is more adequate than the conception of God’s unity apprehended absolutely. The former conception elucidates, albeit analogically, the mode in which (the simple unity of) God actually subsists, namely as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. This is a conception of God as subsistent intellect and will, whose intrinsic perfection consists in his selfcommunicating, thus distinguishing himself from himself in three personal ways, through a twofold self-relation according to knowing and loving. In knowing himself through the Father and Son, he knows, and is the exemplary cause of, all (possible) creatures; in loving himself through the Holy Spirit, he loves, and is the voluntary efficient cause of, all (possible) creatures. In brief, this is a conception, inspired by faith and informed by philosophy, of God as the Trinity, or, in philosophic terms, of substance and relation as modes of uncreated being. The following statement is divided into four sections. Section I recapitulates briefly the essentials of Henry’s conception of the Trinity. Then, sections II and III draw general conclusions concerning Henry’s view of reality. Finally, section IV provides a final assessment of Henry of Ghent’s thought in light of his doctrine of the Trinity. I—Recapitulation Henry’s widely applied conception of the nature of a relation, namely that a relation is identical to, and a formal mode of, its foundation appeared with particular clarity when accounting for the real Trinitarian relations constitutive of an utterly simple God. In this discussion, we noted how in both God and creatures 1) a relation is real as a real way through which its foundation relates to another (in God it relates to itself through diverse respects), 2) relation is the formal principle or ratio of its material res or foundation, 3) relations flow from, and due to, the nature of their foundation, and 4) individual and actual subsistence is a relation of essence. Inasmuch as the divine persons are constituted through productive relations or according to origin, and for Henry the cause of ac-

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tual existence also causes individual subsistence (individuality being the actualized mode of essence), relations give individual subsistence to the persons: the Father generates first and is thus ungenerated, the Son is generated by intellect, and the Holy Spirit is spirated by will. Analogously, the created essence receives subsistence through its relation to the divine will as its efficient cause. The difference is that in God a person gains subsistence in and as the singular, divine essence, while a creature receives subsistence as a discrete, finite, and contingent essence. Since a relation (i.e. a mode of being) is caused by the nature of its foundation, and the nature of the divine foundation or substance is intellect and will, divine relations are modes of intellect and will: Henry’s conception of substance and relation in the Trinity is, concretely, one of intellect and will. The co-existence of intellect and will—the two rationally distinct, yet interdependent, spiritual fecundities of the divine nature—governs the relative formation of the Trinity. The mutually constitutive relation between the Father and the Son is the consummation of God’s immanent, intellectual fecundity through his perfect self-knowledge, an act which requires the distinction between the Father and the Son as its terms. The mutual relation between the Father and the Son, on the one hand, and the Holy Spirit, on the other, is the consummation of God’s immanent, willing fecundity through his perfect self-love, an act which requires the distinction between its terms (though only the Holy Spirit is constituted through this distinction). Since generation is necessary for spiration, the relative distinction between the terms of generation is constitutive of the very fecundity of the spirating will. For the will loves what it knows through generation, namely itself as the Father and Son, who are subjectively identical yet relatively distinct. Divine love is thus mutual, proceeding subjectively out of the will and directed to the constitutive terms or relata of God’s self-knowledge, namely from the Father into the Son, and from the Son into the Father. Together the intellectual emanation (with the assisting presence of the will) and the voluntary emanation (with the assisting presence of the intellect) constitute the persons as terms of these acts according to relative opposition. These constitutive relations are grounded in the real, disparate relation and distinction between generation and spiration, which is itself grounded in the rational distinction between intellect and will. The divine nature or intellect and will

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is thus the remote cause of personal distinctions, while the active supposites or relata which, acting by nature, produce the emanations (the Father in generation, and the Father and Son in spiration) are the proximate causes. The disparate order between intellect and will makes that 1) generation be terminated, yielding a subsistent product (i.e. the Son), prior to spiration and, thus, 2) that the active spiration by the Father and Son, being consequent to their constitution in generation, be a non-constitutive, though real, property, and finally 3) that the will of the Father and Son become fecund to spirate, thereby actually spirating (as in God potency and act do not differ), with the generation of the Son. Thus, generation is not only a causa sine qua non of spiration, but also a causa propter quam: unlike the human mind (which may know and not love, but cannot love without knowing), God’s intellect has a natural respect toward his will, just as his will does so toward his intellect—though different operations, knowing bespeaks loving and loving bespeaks knowing. Due to the divine nature’s immanent and infinite perfection, its fecundities are eternally and necessarily reduced to act. And, insofar as this perfection consists in its total self-communication, the way in which the divine Act subsists is as the Trinity. According to its intellectual and voluntary nature, it necessarily perfects itself by assuming or founding the relations of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Put simply, God subsists as the Trinity by nature. Through this nature, God is then a free Creator, infinitely wise and just. II—The Creature as Symbol of the Trinity Not surprisingly, creatures reflect the Trinity by nature: their essences bespeak their ground in the divine intellect perfected by the Word, their existences bespeak their ground in the divine will perfected by the Holy Sprit, and their relations depend on their absolute/relational character imitative of God’s triunity. Even though the created reality (res) differs radically from the uncreated reality (res), the former reflects the latter: in fact, the created reality subsists only insofar as it reflects the uncreated reality. The created reality does this in a way that can be described at two levels, 1) a spiritual or psychological one and 2) a metaphysical or categorial one. At the first level, the creature subsists as a term of divine knowledge and will, as an existing essence. At the second level, creatures subsist according to the ten Aristotelian categories. Since the

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first level is the ground of the second, Henry revises the Aristotelian categories to describe his fundamentally spiritual conception of all reality as grounded in the Trinity. This is especially apparent in his treatment of relation, traditionally the weakest ontological category. Of the categories it is relation, understood as that immanent tendency toward another at the very heart of an absolute nature, which most aptly describes the dynamic spirit of God’s intrinsic nature, as well as the fundamentally spiritual and, thus, relative reality of the creature— a term of the divine knowledge and love which it by nature reflects. Relation in Henry’s Trinitarian theology is associated with actuality: the divine nature is constituted actually as the Trinity through its self-relations. Relation in Henry’s view of the creature bespeaks the creature’s very being. The creature’s being of essence is a relation of participation to divine knowledge. This essential being has content of its own only as a finite reflection of God’s infinite knowledge; its being is being related, just as a sign has a reality of its own only in reference to the signified. The absolute mode of res, which in God bespeaks the dynamic ground or foundation of the persons, is reduced in the case of creatures to its least substantial form: the symbol. Nevertheless it still retains the independence required for it not to evaporate into a relation without a foundation, i.e. into a discrete relatedness, which, as shown, in Henry’s system is nothing. Thus in the creature the mode of relation, which in God is already primary as the actuality of essential or substantial fecundity, takes over even the essential sphere as much as is possible for it, transforming this sphere into one of symbols or reflections. The potential essence, however, before receiving actual existence has reality in the divine intellect only as something known in the knower, as one of the ways by which this immutable, infinite knower knows himself as imitable. At this level, the possible essence still reflects and is a symbol of the divine essence, for it is a possible imitation of the divine essence, though the possible essence as merely possible is not yet an expressed or created symbol. This is all the more true because for Henry the divine will is the cause of the divine intellect’s practical knowledge, the will being determined in no way by the intellect, but only informed by the intellect with a perfect plenitude of fitting possibilities: the intellect has knowledge of created particulars even prior to their actual creation, since this intellect knows from eternity what the will shall or shall not create. Accordingly, the possibility to be created is known eternally by the divine intellect with the added inten-

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tion of actual existence, as a concrete imitation or symbol of the divine essence, even prior to actual creation. Presumably, possibles not to be created are known by the intellect precisely as that, as possibles which reflect the divine essence only essentially but not existentially, as reflections which are merely apt to become actual but which for some inscrutable divine choice never will. Therefore, with respect to the metaphysical composition of the possible creature, whether the possible is to be created or not, absolute and relative modes of being are tied together intimately already at the level of ideal or essential reality: the potential essence, as a finite participation, is a reflection or symbol, having a reality of its own or so-called absolute subsistence only insofar as the symbol, which subsists only in relation to the symbolized, is still distinguished from the symbolized. Ironically, therefore, the Aristotelian category of relation becomes the tool to describe systematically that cornerstone of Christian Platonism: the doctrine of Platonic forms understood as God’s ideas of the universe, in which ideas all reality participates. What is also interesting in this system is that the Platonic idea, the unique, eternal model of its many copies in the world of opinion and becoming, becomes itself a copy or participation of the divine reality. As the finite image of the Trinity, this copy is through and through a relation, a foundation wholly constituted through its relation. The idea or essence as actually created and individualized is, in turn, not less of a relation but more so, as it consists of a further relation. The being of existence is a relation founded in the finite essence toward its efficient cause which is the divine will. This relation serves the function in regard to essence which the constitutive, personal relations serve in regard to the divine nature: relation gives actual and individual subsistence. The relation of existence expresses the essence into actuality, making what was only a finite symbol also into a contingent symbol. The potential essence, first residing in and as part of the Impression or Word by which the divine intellect is immanently perfected, as the known in the knower, receives contingent actuality through a particular expression of the divine will, which is already immanently perfected by the Expression or Love. Just as the Trinity is not fully actual until the relation of self-knowledge constitutive of the Father and the Son becomes also one of self-love through the procession of the Holy Spirit, the potential creature—a part of God’s knowledge of possibles—becomes actual only through the divine will, as free choice, expressing this possibility into actuality.

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As already explained, the being of essence and the being of existence are only intentionally distinct in the creature for Henry. This doctrine makes all the more sense considering that all potential being that will ever exist actually must be eternally known by the divine mind with the added intention of actual existence (otherwise God’s knowledge of his effects would be imperfect or mutable): no real distinction is to be allowed within God except the relations between the divine persons. The creature is a symbol, both finite and contingent according to essence and existence respectively, of the Trinity’s infinite and necessary subsistence. This becomes evident primarily through Henry’s conception of intellect and will as principles of the Trinity and as causes of creatures, and secondarily through his distinctive use of the categories, most notably relation, to describe in traditional metaphysical language his fundamentally spiritual conception of being as grounded in his view of the Trinity. III—Existence and Essence It is true, as has been pointed out by commentators, that Henry’s stress on existence as an intentional accident of essence bespeaks the priority of essential reality in his metaphysical thought.1 However, it is to be noted that in this thought existence is still the fullest perfection of being: only the actual creature fully reflects the Trinity, for only the actual creature reflects and is related positively to divine intellect and will (the possible not to be created may be said to relate to the will negatively since the will chooses not to create it). And this it does even prior to actual creation, as the possible creature 1

See, e.g., the conclusions in the two main works on Henry’s metaphysics, namely in Gómez Caffarena’s Ser Participado, pp. 251-252, and in Paulus’ Henri De Gand, pp. 385-386. The stress on essence that Paulus finds in Henry is judged by Paulus, in the context of his analysis of Henry’s thought in general, as one side of a problematic duality (the other being the concrete existents): “Mais voici que se rencontre alors le problème capital de toute philosophie de l’abstrait, qui est de rejoindre le concret. […] Il semble qu’il y ait là, se heurtant dans l’esprit du philosophe belge, deux systèmes de pensée antagonistes et peut-être incompatibles” (ibid., p. 386). Gómez Caffarena’s work did much after Paulus’ in terms of seeing the unity of Henry’s thought. Gómez Caffarena placed Henry’s metaphysical thought in the Neoplatonic tradition of participation, while competently delineating its consistent architecture. As shown, considering the Trinity in Henry contributes further to the discernment of the unity of his thought.

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to be created is known and willed eternally as such. The possible creature that is not to be created only reflects the divine essence according to intellect or ideally, not according to will or existentially. Even though existence adds contingency and individuality to the finite essence, and so may be seen as limiting it, this is not properly speaking a limitation but a positive expression of essence which of itself is purely potential. In other words, existence educes essence from a virtual to a perfect mode of being: existence gives birth to essence, even in God where the fecundities of the divine nature make their virtual content perfect only through generation and spiration. Essence in Henry of Ghent is indeed a principle of plenitude, in both God and creatures, but as a potential principle. With respect to creatures, the common essence is capable of many instantiations according to actual existence. However, the fact that essence never subsists in reality independently of the supposites it inhabits means that essence is never limited by existence but brought out or made perfect by existence, partially in the case of a creature, which never exhausts the potency of its essence through its existence, and absolutely in the case of the Trinity. Existence is rather the fruition of essence. Therefore, Henry’s philosophy of essence and existence, though very different from Thomas Aquinas’s, is not a neat reversal of that of the latter, for whom matter is the potential principle which limits form or essence, which in turn is a potential principle with respect to existence and thus limits existence, and existence without limitation is pure act or God. For Henry, it is not the case that existence limits the plenitude of essence in the same sense that for Thomas essence limits the plenitude of existence or act. The reason is that for Henry plenitude is associated with potency, while for Aquinas it is associated with act. Accordingly, for Henry limit is not associated with potency as it is for Aquinas, for whom potency individuates; for Henry it is rather existence which individuates, not in a limiting but in a productive way. Limit for Henry is simply associated with created being, with the created essence which is just a finite reflection of God’s essence, and with the created existent which, as contingent, can never fully educe the whole plenitude of its essence unto itself. However, individuality is not a restriction of act, but rather an expression of act or existence, as actuality always expresses itself through individuality, whether in God who is three unique persons, or in creatures which are individual subsistents. Neither is potency limiting of nor limited by act: potency as plenitude reaches a more perfect ontological status

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precisely by being determined by act. Essential potency is both drawn out into existence and thus elevated and determined in individual actuality at this very elevation. For Aquinas, on the other hand, potency, limit and individuality go hand in hand: matter individuates form precisely because it limits it; angels are one of a kind because, having no matter, their essences themselves limit and individuate existence.2 What about God? We can conceive of God by removing the limitations of the finite, contingent being we experience. Thus we see that since matter limits form and form limits act, God must be what act would be without any limitation. Accordingly, God is pure act, not finite or infinite, not contingent or necessary, simple, one, etc. But how does this philosophical scheme, which proceeds from effects to causes, removing the limitations of finite, contingent being, in order to arrive at the existence and negative attributes of the first, uncaused cause, reveal anything about God’s (triune) nature? It does not. Only theology does (as explained in section II of the Introduction). Metaphysics is, properly speaking, about substances and their causes, not about creatures and their Creator: philosophy is formally distinct from theology. And this may be seen as a strength of Thomistic metaphysics, remaining as it does in its own domain of natural reason. According to Aquinas’s approach, philosophy ends where theology begins, at the highest point available to natural reason, with the proof for the existence and negative attributes of God. For Aquinas, therefore, metaphysical knowledge grasps the being common to God and creatures only under the aspect of what God’s existence and negative attributes have in common analogically with God’s effects. Truths pertaining to God’s triune nature fall outside this common aspect, and thus cannot inform metaphysics. In other words, even though philosophy’s subordination to theology assures the undisputedly superior domain of the latter science, philosophy as such, namely as already separated from and ordered to theology within Aquinas’s system, is not illuminated by the highest science. But if philosophy grasps (caused and uncaused) being only under an aspect inferior to 2

For Aquinas, essence becomes a principle of plenitude with respect to matter which limits it, as well as a limiting principle of act, which is plenitude with respect to essence and of itself infinite. On Aquinas’ metaphysics of act, and its Neoplatonic elements, see the excellent article by N. W. Clarke, “The Limitation of Act by Potency: Aristotelianism or Neoplatonism,” in: The New Scholasticism, 26 (1952), pp. 167-194.

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theology’s truer view of (created and uncreated) being, is it possible that philosophy fails to grasp even the deeper truths of its own domain? Could it be that philosophy, thus conceived, is limited not only in terms of the degree of knowledge available to it, but also in terms of the kind of knowledge available to it at all levels of reality, not just at the level of God’s essence? Henry would say yes. This should be evident from this whole study, which shows the centrality of the Trinity in Henry’s philosophical and theological project. To Henry, Aquinas’s approach to philosophy and theology can limit the believer in his intellectual search for metaphysical continuity between the Trinity, God’s proper mode of being, and its effects. And if such a metaphysical continuity is discovered, this knowledge is not to be repudiated merely because the starting point was to some extent faith. In fact, this knowledge may be seen as the most adequate metaphysical knowledge, precisely because it is purified and oriented by faith and revelation. An indication of Henry’s attitude towards Thomism may be gathered from his own approach to philosophy and theology (summarized in the Introduction, section II), which directly relates to Henry’s view of reality, as was summarized in the last section (G) of the third and last chapter. Henry’s misgivings about Aquinas’s project are especially telling when he criticizes Aquinas’s account of emanation (in chapter 2, section B), which to Henry is consistent with necessary creation, and Aquinas’s view of individuation (in chapter 3, section A), which to Henry implies that all substances without matter are necessarily unique by essence. (This latter criticism presupposes Henry’s distinctive account of essence and existence.) In these cases, Henry sees remnants of pagan necessity, with Neoplatonic and Aristotelian dimensions, which must be addressed, philosophically, through proper grounding in revealed principles. At the same time, the full strength of pagan philosophy can only be gathered through this proper grounding. However, to assess adequately these issues in the thought of Thomas Aquinas would require a separate study. Suffice it to say that Aquinas’s distinctive conception of the human composite, enlightened by an agent intellect individuated according to the number of bodies as a participation of the uncreated light, would for him ground significantly the appropriateness of the knowledge available to natural reason.3 This knowledge is, of course, bound according to the nature of 3

See Summa Theologiae, I, q. 76, art. 1-2, and q. 84, art. 5.

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the knower, whose proper object, the quiddity of a material thing, corresponds to its composite nature. The intellect, immaterial in itself, as the unique substantial form or act of its material principle or body requires phantasms for its operation. 4 However, even though the intellect in this life cannot grasp objects not proportionate to it, like God, except indirectly or negatively, the intellect remains open to consider any and all being, its general object, and thus will be able to know God directly in the beatific vision. Philosophy, for Aquinas, is true in its own domain, this domain defined as the formality of its subject-matter, which is being as being considered by natural reason. A science deals not with objects, but with a given formal aspect of objects agreeing with the subjective epistemological perspective of the scientist in his or her investigation of reality. The truths of being as being discovered by metaphysics or first philosophy are therefore adequate for the domain of first philosophy. To ask of first philosophy to discern truths falling outside its subject matter would be to misunderstand what this, and any, science does. Asking a science to step outside of its subject matter would be like asking the ear to see, or the eye to hear. In fact, this would be to ignore the nature of the human constitution (caused by God in the first place): the dignity, legitimacy, distinction and extent of the human being’s proper, cognitive powers. Truths about the Creator and his creatures, depending ultimately on faith, belong to the realm of theology, whose unity of subject matter exists inasmuch as it considers all things in the light of revealed truth. It is not the present purpose to embark on an evaluative comparison of two of the greatest masters of medieval Scholasticism, but rather to try to capture the spirit of Henry of Ghent’s Trinitarian thought, primarily through an analysis of this thought on its own terms, and secondarily through some comparison, in this case with Thomas Aquinas. What is incumbent upon us, as manifested by this comparison, is to appreciate the unity of Henry’s systematic thought traversing both philosophy and theology, a kind of unity not possible in Aquinas due to Aquinas’s own distinction between theology and philosophy. For Henry, the metaphysical principles operative in the Trinity ultimately explain the metaphysical constitution of created reality. 4

See Summa Theologiae, I, q. 85, art. 1.

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Essence in God is a potential principle of plenitude made actual as three individual persons through constitutive relations identical to the essence subjectively. Through these constitutive relations, the divine essence not only is actual but also is the cause of creatures inasmuch as, through its self-knowledge and self-love, it also knows them and can thus will them freely into existence. The finite essence is a potential principle of plenitude with respect to creatures just as the divine essence is to the Trinity. The finite essence is the foundation of the creature just as the divine essence is the foundation of the persons. The difference is that the divine essence is a subsistent absolute foundation, while the finite essence is a reflection or symbol of the infinite essence. Actual existence in the case of God and creatures is also explained through similar metaphysical principles: actual existence is a relation of essence which gives individual subsistence to this essence, in both God and creatures. Existence is, properly speaking, neither a principle of plenitude nor a principle of limitation, but a positive, unique expression of the plenitude of essence. The created essence, therefore, reflects the Creator or Trinity: as a foundation of a twofold relation according to essence and existence, it manifests the supremely perfect intellect and will which is its cause. Henry is able to find this metaphysical continuity between the Trinity and its effects because his primary analogate of being is the divine mind, which is subsistent through its immanent selfcommunication. This mind in turn can create entities which act through proper principles, though they always remain subject to its all-knowing and omnipotent will. Henry’s hierarchy of being is then as follows: 1) emanation (generation and spiration), 2) creation and 3) the activities flowing from creatures. His understanding of the latter two is grounded in his understanding of the first, for it is divine emanation which ultimately grounds not only the divine reality but also the created reality. The ultimate truth of created reality, therefore, is to be sought in the emanations constitutive of the Trinity. To proceed otherwise, for the Christian theologian, would be to end up judging the higher by the lower. Emanation defines Henry’s thought as participation defines Plato’s and actualization Aristotle’s.5 Naturally, 5

A summary of Platonism and Aristotelianism and their role in medieval philosophy and theology is contained in: S. F. Brown - J. C. Flores, Historical Dictionary of Medieval Philosophy and Theology, Lanham, Md. - London, forthcoming. See the first part of the Introduction and the entries entitled Aristotelianism and Plato (in the Medieval World).

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Henry’s conception of emanation also governs to a large extent his incorporation of his philosophical tradition. Henry’s fundamental task is to understand (to some extent) the reality of the Trinity and, thereby, to understand created reality in relation to the Trinity and, as an effect of the Trinity, as manifesting the Trinity. This he does. IV—Henry’s Approach and Synthesis The title of this book is meant to convey two things. First, it is meant to indicate that the book will investigate Henry’s thought on the Trinity, including his use of philosophy. Secondly, it is meant to suggest that the Trinity is fundamental in Henry’s thought. The first purpose of the title requires no justification: the reader has only to glance at the book to see that in fact Henry of Ghent wrote on the Trinity and the philosophical issues associated with it, and that this book is about those writings. The second purpose of the title does in fact require justification, which justification presupposes two things. First, it presupposes an analysis of Henry’s thought on the Trinity and second, based on this analysis, evidence that the Trinity pervades his thought in significant ways. From this limited study, one may say that Henry’s conception of the Trinity informs his view of reality directly and profoundly. This becomes evident if we consider the architecture of Henry’s metaphysical hierarchy. At the summit of this hierarchy is God himself, who is triune according to an immanent order of causality or production, from eternity. This immanent dimension—emanation—is a most perfect (and therefore spiritual) production: a total selfcommunication which, as such, entails distinction and identity. At this level, distinction and identity are equally constitutive of absolute perfection. The divine nature self-communicates not due to a lack of perfection, but rather due to its total perfection, whereby it is three distinct persons. Henry conceives of the first cause concretely as an essential, self-differentiating dynamism eternally and completely reduced to act. Emanation is the immanent and autonomous reduction to act or existence of the infinite essence, the eternal concretion into (threefold) existence of infinite essential plenitude. It is the eternal second perfection of a nature that is already eternally and essentially intellect and will in complete, first actuality; this nature can in virtue of such a spiritual, first actuality autonomously reflect on itself, thereby communicating itself to itself perfectly by both intellect and

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will, thus eternally reducing itself or, better, eternally having reduced itself, to second or notional actuality, which is the Trinity. That it is fully actual does not make it static or one absolutely, for it is fully actual as living, self-conscious knowledge and love, which is eternally and infinitely aware of itself and its creatures. The Trinity is supreme life, totally self-sustaining wisdom and justice. Accordingly, the paragon of perfection in Henry’s metaphysics is emanation: pure act understood as pure living activity which entails (relative) distinctions in identity, as opposed to pure rest or totally discrete, unified substance. That is why, with respect to emanation, relation, the category expressing distinctions, is as important as substance, the category expressing identity. With regard to emanation and categorially speaking, relation expresses the tendency of the activity of substance, its mode of actual self-communication. Since evidently spiritual realities are ontologically higher than physical realities, the highest reality must be subsistent intellect and will, properly conceived without any of the imperfections manifest in creatures, as, for example, Augustine, Ambrose and Bonaventure, inspired by revelation, understood. This Henry does in his own way through a psychology of intellect and will expressed metaphysically through his categories of substance and relation. Consequently, in Henry’s system, all the lower levels of reality will possess partial perfection to the degree to which they emulate this pure activity in their own limited ways. In terms of the categories, they will emulate this pure activity by being related to God in different ways and degrees, by tending toward their source in a way analogous to how their source is essentially a fully actualized tendency toward itself. Emanation is the fullness of perfection out of which (Platonic) participation and (Aristotelian) actualization derive their partial perfections; participation is the given ontological status which each creature owes to the Creator, and actualization the proper activities of and among created beings. For emanation, the summit of perfection, is virtually inclusive and the cause of all lesser perfections. As such it may be described analogously as what the absolute perfection of substantial actualization (and production) would be, combined with what the absolute perfection of participation would be, the combination itself being a unity transcending both modes, but which is the ground of all (possible) modes of ontological perfection.

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The absolute perfection of participation would be where the participated and the participating, symbol and symbolized, would be, as distinct, the same thing, though retaining in the fullest possible way the representation by which ontological perfection is derived in participation-metaphysics. This would be when the ontological perfection—the essence, participated in by the symbol, would be wholly assimilated to the point that the symbol would no longer be participating in the essence symbolized, properly speaking, but be itself the very aspect by which this principle of ontological perfection represents itself to itself perfectly. In other words, the absolute perfection of participation would in fact transcend participation. This transcendent self-consciousness (the highest form of intellectual unity and perfection), the fullest possible perfection of ontological representation, is what Henry calls emanation. For in emanation the principle of representation is not an eternal idea, which gives being to many of a kind that partially share or part-icipate in its ontological perfection, but the divine mind, which is the principle of ideas. But emanation is not at its most primordial and fundamental plane the principle of ideas, in potency to be created; it is only such a principle at a moment posterior to, and as a by-product of, its own immanent perfection which consists in self-representation. In other words, emanation, proceeding from subsistent spiritual fecundities in a unity of nature, is a representation entailing no ontological deficiency whatsoever, and as such transcends participation traditionally understood, which entails the ontological superiority of the participated over the participating. Emanation is indeed a representation, but not strictly a participation, since through emanation the represented and the representing are mutually constitutive and equally necessary sides of the transcendent spiritual self-consciousness of the Trinity. That is, emanation is a representation that is a substantial communication, and thus may be also described analogously in terms of (Aristotelian) substantial actualization and production. Emanation is the most perfect or actualized communication of substance (form or nature), according to both impression and expression: a total selfcommunication of nature whereby the distinct supposites share a unique nature. However, since emanation is a substantial communication in a numerically single essence, emanation transcends all other modes of actualization. Emanation is the most perfect substantial communication and actualization, and all other communications and actualizations according to substance or form are less perfect species participating in emanation.

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Emanation is the cause of all metaphysical participation in Henry’s system, where participation is in fact a mode of ontological perfection itself participating in emanation as the most perfect mode. Through his triune self-consciousness, God can be a free creator. But his ideas of what is not himself only imitate his nature and thus are not the full representation of his nature—this full representation can only be the Trinity itself. The actual creature, in turn, participates in its own limited way in the totality of the divine, creative art (which includes God’s knowledge and choice of creatures), participates in what is already a participation of the Trinity. This it does through its relation of essence and existence toward God. Thus emanation, in constituting the Trinity, grounds the Creator’s art by which he knows and wills what is other than himself, which in turn grounds particular creatures. Emanation grounds participation, in all its forms, as the fully perfect grounds the partially perfect. Accordingly, Henry’s metaphysics of subsistent and participated being is placed in its fundamental light with respect to emanation as the ontological summit of perfection, in which the creative art and creatures participate in given degrees. And participated being participates by being related to its ultimate source, as the symbol is related to the symbolized, which is ultimately divine intellect and will eternally constituted as the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. The creature is an image of the Trinity, since its essence and existence are its tendency toward divine intellect and will, which in turn are intrinsically their tendency toward themselves, namely the Trinity. The created substance’s tendency toward its source, constitutive of its being (essence and existence), is a participation or reflection of the divine activity or substance which, in being the Trinity, essentially self-relates. The creature is not to be understood purely as a discrete, independent thing, but as a foundation that, in being absolute, by nature relates to God: its substance is being according to itself that is itself being towards another, a symbol having essence and existence in relation to the symbolized. This is not a metaphysical pessimism, stripping the creature of almost all its substance or intrinsic reality. On the contrary, it is through its relatedness that the creature touches and is touched by God, that its substance is ontologically elevated and made truly good. For the creature is fundamentally spiritual, a reflection derived from and intimately connected to the most perfect, spiritual self-representation, conscious both of itself and of what imitates it. The creature is by nature related

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to a living, personal God, who as three persons knows and loves himself and, thereby, each and all of his creatures, as shown by the Word who was made flesh. This is how the Trinity is stamped at the core of Henry of Ghent’s thought.

APPENDIX

HENRICI DE GANDAVO SUMMA (Quaestiones ordinariae)

art. LV, q. VI

«Utrum omnes proprietates in divinis sint relationes reales»

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Manuscripts 1. Brugge, Stadsbibliotheek, ms. 179. 2. Bruxelles, Bibliothèque royale, ms. IV. 1202. 3. London, British Museum, ms. Royal 10. D. VI. 4. Oxford, Balliol College, ms. 212. 5. Oxford, Merton College, ms. 108. 6. Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana, ms. Scaffale 8, N. 141. 7. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, ms. lat. 15356. 8. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, ms. lat. 15846. 9. Paris, Bibliothèque de l’Université, ms. 34. 10. Troyes, Bibliothèque municipale, ms. 493. 11. Biblioteca Vaticana, ms. Borgh. 17. 14. Biblioteca Vaticana, ms. Vat. lat. 854. 15. Biblioteca Vaticana, ms. Vat. lat. 855. 16. Biblioteca Vaticana, ms. Vat. lat. 856 17. Biblioteca Vaticana, ms. Vat. lat. 857. 18. Biblioteca Vaticana, ms. Vat. lat. 858. 19. Zwijnaarde (Gent), Comtesse Goethals de Mude. 20. Assisi, Biblioteca del Convento di san Francesco, 139. Critical Study Question six of article fifty-five of the Summa is found within pecia 83 of the first Parisian exemplar, and embodies approximately two-thirds of this pecia.1 In accordance with the editing principles followed in the Henrici de Gandavo Opera Omnia series2, according to which 150 lines of each pecia of the first exemplar are compared among all manuscripts as a general test collation, 100 lines of question six (two-thirds of pecia 83) in all manuscripts listed above were collated, and were the basis for selecting the manuscripts included in this edition. The Badius (Bad.) text was the basis for comparison in this general test collation. 1

In the Badius edition, question six begins at folio 110 rH and ends at folio 112 vZ. Corresponding to the Badius edition, pecia 83 begins at folio 109 vD (art. 55, q. 5, ad 2) and ends at folio 113 vE (art. 56, q. 1, ad 3). Cf. R. Macken, Bibliotheca Manuscripta II (Opera Omnia, II), p. 1056. For the place of this question in the second exemplar, see G. Wilson, “A Second Exemplar of Henry of Ghent’s Summa,” in: Manuscripta, 38 (1994), p. 47. 2 These principles have been described by, e.g., G. Wilson in his “Critical Study” introducing his edition of Summa, art. XXXV-XL (Opera Omnia, XXVIII).

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205

The editing principles of the Opera Omnia were also generally followed in regard to the selection of manuscripts. Manuscripts 1, 8, and 11 were chosen because in the general test collation they had the greatest number of common variants and a relatively small number of individual variants, and because they contain pecia indications which correspond to the first exemplar. 3 Manuscripts 10 and 19 were 4 selected because they correspond to the second exemplar. Manuscript 17 was included because in the general test collation it contained the least number of individual variants (i.e. one). The Badius text was also included in this critical edition. On principle, the reading of the first exemplar was followed unless the sense of the text required otherwise, in which case the second exemplar was generally followed. One last point must be mentioned. When preparing the text of this critical edition, it became apparent to the editor that in the manuscripts “h 9” does not always stand for “huius” and that “h’i” does not always stand for “huiusmodi”. When it was impossible to determine, strictly by paleographical analysis, whether “huius” or “huiusmodi” was meant, the sense of the text determined which of the two words was used.5

3

Cf. G. Wilson (ibid.). As Wilson points out (ibid., p. XXVIII, n. 34), manuscript 11 may contain the first exemplar for articles 53-75, q. 6. He makes similar remarks in his recent edition (2005) of Summa, art. I-V (Opera Omnia, XXI), p. XXV, n. 23. This manuscript is described by R. Macken in Bibliotheca Manuscripta II (Opera Omnia, II), pp. 732-736. 4 Manuscript 19 contains pecia indications corresponding to the second Parisian exemplar. See G. Wilson, Summa, art. XXXV-XL (Opera Omnia, XXVIII), p. XVIII and p. XXXI. On the second exemplar, see G. Wilson, “A Second Exemplar of Henry of Ghent’s Summa,” in: Manuscripta, 38 (1994), pp. 42-50. That manuscripts 10 and 19 follow the same tradition was determined in this edition on the basis of common variants. In a great number of cases, manuscripts 10 and 19 had common variants when all the other manuscripts had different readings. 5 Similar remarks have been made by editors of the Henrici de Gandavo Opera Omnia, not only about “huius/huiusmodi” but also about “cuius/cuiusmodi”. See, e.g., G. Wilson, Quodlibet VII, Opera Omnia, XI, p. LXXV (“technique of the edition”); and Summa, art. XXXV-XL, Opera Omnia, XXVIII, p. LXXIII (“technique of the edition”).

206

APPENDIX: SUMMA, art. LV, q. VI SYMBOLS

1. In the Text Itself

the addition of letters or words which, according to the editor, would have been wanted by the author. 2. In the Critical Apparatus (?) indicates a doubtful reading ] announces the variants; the manuscripts not mentioned after this sign have the same text as the edition. ... supply the words not repeated. exponents words which occur more than once in the same line are distinguished by exponents, for example, per¹, per². 1’, 8’, etc. numbers corresponding to the manuscripts mentioned above. ABBREVIATIONS 1. In the Critical Apparatus a.c. ante correctionem add. addidit Bad. edition of Badius, Paris, 1520 conf. confusum corr. correxit (correctio, etc.) exp. expunxit hom. homoeoteleuton homoeoceph. homoeocephalon i.m. in margine inv. invertit (ordo praeposterus, inversus, etc.) iter. iteravit (iteratum, etc.) lac. lacuna (id est spatium vacans in codice) om. omisit p.c. post correctionem scr. scripsit superscrips. superscripsit 2. In the Apparatus of Citations Bad. edition of Badius, Paris, 1520 c. capitulum CC lat. Corpus Christianorum, series latina, Turnholti cf. confer (conferas, conferatur, etc.,). At the beginning of a reference ‘cf.’ signifies that the reference is not a literal citation. col. columna d. distinctio ed. edidit (editio, etc.) l(l). linea(e) PG Patrologiae cursus completus, series graeca, accurante J. P. Migne, Paris, 1857ss. PL Patrologiae cursus completus, series latina, accurante J. P. Migne, Paris, 1844ss.

APPENDIX: SUMMA, art. LV, q. VI 207 UTRUM OMNES PROPRIETATES IN DIVINIS SINT RELATIONES REALES*

5

10

15

20

25

30

Circa sextum arguitur quod omnes proprietates in Deo sunt relationes reales, sic. Reale dicitur quid a re. Nihil autem rei absolutae est aut potest esse in divinis nisi ipsa essentia, a qua ortum habet omne respectivum quod ex se non est res, secundum BOETHIUM dicentem D e T r i n i t a t e, capitulo XIIº, quod tria praedicamenta, scilicet substantia, quantitas, et qualitas «rem monstrant, alia vero praedicamenta circumstantias rei». Nihil ergo in divinis habet esse reale quid nisi ab ipsa divina essentia. Sed proprietates quaecumque aequaliter realitatem habent ab ipsa essentia divina, quia ab ipsa non habent realitatem nisi quia in ipsa fundantur, et omnes aequaliter in ea fundantur, quia immediate. Ergo etc. Praeterea si relatio est realis a substantia in qua fundatur, cum non sit realis dicta nisi quia etiam res sit aliqua (aliter enim non constitueret personam quae res est; res autem esse non potest propter rem substantiae nisi quia ipsa esset substantia), qua ratione ergo relatio potest dici res, eadem ratione potest dici substantia. Consequens est falsum. Ergo etc. Quod autem aliquae sint reales, arguitur ‹sic›. BOETHIUS dicit libro D e T r i n i t a t e quod sola «relatio multiplicat Trinitatem». Quod autem aliquid multiplicat realiter non potest esse nisi reale. Multiplicatio autem Trinitatis personarum in Deo realis est, non secundum rationem tantum, dicente AUGUSTINO quod Pater, Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus sunt «tres res». Ergo etc. Quod autem nec istae sint reales, ergo multo fortius nec aliqua aliarum, arguitur sic. IOANNES DAMASCENUS dicit libro Iº, capitulo XIº: «Aliud est re considerare, aliud ratione et cognitione. In omnibus quidem creaturis hypostaseon divisio consideratur re, communitas autem earum ratione et cognitione consideratur. In substantia vero supersubstantiali econverso est. Illic enim commune et unum re consideratur, cognitione vero est secundum divisum». Sed istud divisum non est nisi secundum proprietates personales, dicente eodem: «Unum enim Deum cognoscimus; in solis vero proprietatibus et paternitatis et filiationis et processionis secundum existentiae modum differentiam intelligimus». Ergo secundum proprietates huiusmodi non differunt personae nisi cognitione seu ratione. Hoc autem non esset si essent relationes reales. Ergo etc. Item BOETHIUS D e T r i n i t a t e dicit quod «relatio Patris ad Filium in Trinitate et utriusque ad Spiritum Sanctum similis est relationi eiusdem ad seipsum». Illa autem est rationis tantum. Ergo etc. ———— 2 quid] aliquid 10’ 19’ 2 potest esse] inv. 10’ 19’ 3 omne] respectum add. 8’ 11’ 5 et] p.c. 11’ 5 qualitas] secundum add. 1’ 7 aequaliter] om. 8’ 8 fundantur¹] fundatur 19’ 10 fundatur] fundantur 1’ 10 non] om. 11’ 11 non] om. 11’ 12 esset] est Bad. 13 est falsum] inv. 10’ 19’ 15 sint] sunt 10’ 19’ 15 sic] supplevi: om. 1’ 8’ 10’ 11’ 17’ 19’ Bad. 15 dicit] in add. 10’ 19’ 17 realis est] inv. 1’ 18 Pater] et add. Bad. 20 sint] sunt 10’ 19’ 22 hypostaseon] hypostasion 10’ 22 divisio] divino 1’ 23 earum] eorum 8’ 11’ 24 supersubstantiali] sunt substantiali 1’ 8’ 11’ 24 econverso] autem add. 1’ 24 re] om. 10’ 25 vero] om. 10’ 25 istud] illud 8’ 25 secundum²] om. 8’ 26 vero proprietatibus] inv. 8’ 30-1 in Trinitate] om. Bad. 31 relationi] relationem 8’ ———— *Cf. Thomas de Aq., Super Sent., I, d. 26, q. 2, art. 1 (ed. P. Mandonnet, pp. 628-632); Bonaventure, Comm. in Sent., I, d. 26, art. un., q. 2 (ed. Quaracchi, pp. 455-456). 4-6 Cf. Boeth., De Trin., 4 (ed. C. Moreschini, p. 177, 269-271). 16 Boeth., De Trin., 6 (ed. C. Moreschini, p. 180, 340). 18-9 Cf. August., De Trin., V, 8-9 (CC lat. 50, p. 217, 47-51, 1-11); Contra Maximum, II, c. 22 (PL 42, col. 795). 21-5 Damasc., De fide orthod., I, 8 (ed. E. M. Buytaert, p. 42, 251-255; p. 43, 268-271; p. 44, 281). 26-8 Ibid., p. 44, 281-285. 30-1 Boeth., De Trin., 6 (ed. C. Moreschini, p. 180, 350-352).

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Dicendum ad hoc secundum supra determinata quod proprietates attributales relationes sive respectus reales non sunt, cuius tamen ratio iam videbitur. De aliis autem sciendum quod, cum relatio omnis consistit in quodam ordine et collatione quadam relatorum inter se, iste ordo variari habet secundum varietatem ordinatorum, et hoc tripliciter: quia aut consistit in ordine ordinatorum ex natura rei, ut ex utraque parte ratio ordinis sit ex natura rei, vel in ordine ordinatorum ex ratione intellectus, ut ex utraque parte ratio ordinis sit ex ratione intellectuum, vel partim in ordine ordinatorum ex natura rei, partim in ordine ordinatorum ex ratione intellectus, ut videlicet ex una parte sit ratio ordinis ex natura rei et ex alia ex ratione intellectus. Si in ordine ordinatorum ex natura rei, sic est relatio realis. Si in ordine ordinatorum ex ratione intellectus, sic est relatio rationis. Si partim uno modo et partim alio, sic est partim ex uno latere relatio rationis, partim vero et ex alio latere relatio rei. Exemplum de hoc tertio modo est si homo dextera sua comparatur ad columnam. Ista relatio quam homo habet ad columnam ut dexter ei, et columna ad hominem ut ei sinistra, quia sita est ad dexteram eius, ista inquam relatio hominis ad columnam realis est, quia dexterum super quod fundatur in homine secundum rem est in homine. Relatio vero columnae ad hominem solum rationis est, quia sinistrum super quod fundatur in columna non est in columna nisi secundum conceptum intellectus, scilicet ex respectu ad dexterum hominis. Exemplum de secundo est quando intellectus accipit unum ut duo, et per hoc intelligit illud sub quodam ordine et respectu ad seipsum, sicut cum dicitur aliquid esse idem sibi ipsi. Ibi enim est ex utraque parte relatio secundum rationem, quia duplicatio ista eiusdem non est nisi in conceptu intellectus. Vel cum dicitur in divinis «Pater est aequalis Filio», ex utraque parte est relatio secundum rationem, et hoc quia aequalitas aliquorum non est relatio nisi secundum magnitudines eorum commensuratas inter se, sive secundum quod habent magnitudines inter se commensuratas. Et ideo non est realis relatio aequalitas duorum aut plurium nisi secundum duas aut plures magnitudines commensuratas, secundum quas inter se commensurantur realiter abinvicem diversas, super quas fundantur respectus reales diversi. Magnitudo autem spiritualis Patris et Filii est ipsa divina essentia, quae una est in utroque secundum rem et nullo modo plurificata. Cum ergo secundum ipsam dicitur esse personarum aequalitas, oportet quod bis accipiatur secundum intellectum, semel ut habet esse in una persona et semel ut in alia, ———— 35 determinata] dicta 1’ 37 cum] non leg. i.m. 19’ 37 et] in 1’ 38] varietatem] veritatem 1’ 39 ut] aut 19’ 40. vel in] nostri(?) 17’ 41 ratio] ratione 8’ 41 ordinis] int a.c. 1’ 41 intellectuum] ordinis et add. sic ex ratione intellectuum 1’ 42 ordine] ratione a.c. 19’ 43 ex³] om. 10’ 11’ 44 si¹ in] sive 8’ 44-5 natura . . . ex] om. (homoeoceph.) 1’ 46 alio¹] modo add. 17’ Bad. 46 sic] sicut 11’ 46 partim¹] et add. 10’ 19’ Bad. 46 et] om. 17’ 46 rei] ei 8’ 48 homo] om. 8’ 48 habet] i.m. 10’ 48 dexter] dextra 17’ 48 sinistra] sinister 1’ 8’ 10’ 11’ 19’ 49 sita] ita 1’ 8’ 11’ 17’ 49 inquam] inquantum quam 8’ 11’ 49 est²] lac. 10’ 50 secundum . . . homine] om. 11’ 51 sinistrum] sinister 8 52 in] om. 8’ 55 ordine] p.c. 17’ 55 et] om. p.c. 17’ 56 est] p.c. 8’ 56 rationem] relationem 8’ 56 quia] qua 8’ 60 magnitudines p.c. 11’ 60-2 et . . . commensuratas] om. (hom.) 17’ 60-1 realis relatio] inv. 19’ 61 aequalitas] aequalis 10’ 19’ 64 est²] om. 17’ 19’ superscrips. 10’ 64 plurificata] plurificato 1’ 8’ 11’ 66 intellectum] conf. 19’ ———— 35-6 Cf. Henr. de Gand. Summa, art. 55, qq. 1, 3, 5; art. 32, qq. 2, 5. 25 (Transl. Vetus, ed. F. Bossier – J. Brams, pp. 136-137).

47 Cf. Arist., Phys., IV, 1, 208b14-

APPENDIX: SUMMA, art. LV, q. VI

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vel ter si trium personarum aequalitas secundum ipsam est accipienda, ut secundum hoc diversi respectus possint fundari in ea. Et ideo personarum aequalitas in divinis ex utraque parte est relatio secundum rationem. Et non est differentia in istis duobus exemplis nisi quod in illo duplicantur per intellectum ambo, scilicet et id super quod fundatur ordo et relatio ut est substantia, et ipse cuius est. Non enim est identitas nisi bis sumendo idem per intellectum, et similiter substantiam eandem; in isto vero exemplo duplicatur per intellectum alterum solum, scilicet illud super quod fundatur ordo relationis (personae enim divinae ex se, non ex opere intellectus, sunt plures), et essentia deitatis, quae unica est in eis, inquantum in ea fundatur aequalitas, accipitur penes intellectum ut plurificata inquantum est huius et inquantum est illius, et quoad hoc magis realitatis est in relatione aequalitatis huius quam identitatis. Exemplum de primo est in omnibus ordinatis secundum relationem consequentem quantitatem, qualitatem, aut actionem et passionem, dum tamen ex utraque parte correspondens ratio ordinis et respectus inveniatur. Sic enim referuntur adinvicem aequalia vel similia in creaturis, quia in utroque est quantitas vel qualitas secundum rem, quibus ordinem et respectum habent inter se, et similiter naturaliter activa et passiva, quia in utroque est id realiter super quo fundatur actio et passio. Et est semper illud reale in creaturis aliud et aliud re absoluta, ut alia et alia quantitas, vel alia et alia qualitas, vel alius et alius motus, aut aliquid aliud, secundum quod ipsa extrema relata necessario sunt alia et alia re absoluta. Si enim illud reale non fuerit in uno extremo unum re et in alio aliud re, non est in creaturis relatio realis ex utraque parte. Immo si fuerit unum re in utroque differens sola ratione, ex utraque parte est relatio et ordo secundum rationem tantum, ut dictum est de relatione identitatis. Similiter si fuerit aliquid reale in uno cui non respondet aliud reale in altero, ex una parte est relatio et ordo realis, ex altera vero rationis tantum, ut dictum est de homine et columna. Hoc est ergo quod summe disturbat nos in divinis, ubi necesse habemus ponere secundum fidem et dicta sanctorum quod inter divinas personas est relatio realis, ne sola ratione ponamus personas distingui. Quia enim nihil in divinis est absolutum reale nisi essentia deitatis, et ideo super ipsam oportet singulos respectus in singulis personis fundari, obscurum est valde quomodo est magis relatio realis inter divinas personas secundum rationes activas et passivas, quae sunt generare et generari, quam secundum rationes quantitatis et qualitatis, quae sunt aequale et simile, cum tamen omnes isti ———— 67 trium] trinum 8’ 67 secundum ipsam] om. 10’ 19’ 68 ea] eo 10’ 19’ 68 personarum] om. 1’ 70 differentia] conf. i.m. 19’ 70 quod] quia 10’ 71 id] illud 10’ 17’ 19’ Bad. 71 substantia] rei add. 19’ Bad. et rei add. 10’ 74 scilicet illud] si id 8’ 75 et] sed 10’ 19’ Bad. 75 ea] om. 8’ 75-6 ea fundatur] effundatur 1’ 76 plurificata] p.c. 19’ 76-7 huius . . . est¹] om. (hom.) 17’ 77 illius] istius 8’ 77 realitatis est] inv. 17’ 77 relatione] ratione a.c. 17’ 77 huius] om. 11’ 80 quantitatem] quantitate 11’ 80 et] superscrips. 10’ aut 1’ 82 in utroque] utraque 17’ 83 et²] etiam 1’ 8’ 17’ 84 id] illud 1’ 8’ 85 aliud²] alio 1’ 8’ 85 re] iter. 10’ 19’ 85 vel²] et 10’ 86 aut] vel 17’ 86 aliquid] conf. 17’ 86 necessario] necessaria 11’ 88 utraque] p.c. 8’ 89 sola ratione] inv. 10’ 19’ 90 in] uno add. 10’ 90 cui] tantum a.c. 1’ 91 aliud] aliquid 10’ 19’ 91 una] om. 10’ 19’ 92 est] om. 10’ 93 hoc] haec 8’ 93 ergo] om. 8’ 93 disturbat] discurabat 1’ 8’ 11’ disturbabat a.c. 17’ 95 in divinis est] est in divinis 1’ 96 deitatis] ideitatis a.c. 1’ 97 obscurum] abscurum 10’ 97 valde] vale a.c. 10’ 97 relatio realis] inv. 10’ 19’ Bad. 98 passivas] p.c. 11’ 98 sunt] simul 8’ ———— 90 Cf. supra, ll. 70-73.

92 Cf. supra, ll. 47-53.

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respectus fundentur in identitate divinae essentiae. Quod licet ratio ad plenum non possit comprehendere, tentandum tamen est aliquantulum attingere. Ad cuius intellectum sciendum est quod secundum praedicta «relatio est debilioris esse inter omnia praedicamenta», et hoc ideo maxime quia praedicamentum substantiae significat per modum entis (ratio enim substantiae est secundum se existere, praedicamenta autem accidentis absoluta, ut quantitas et qualitas, significant per modum inhaerentis; ratio enim accidentis est inesse); relatio vero significat per modum ad aliud se habentis, ratio enim relationis est ad aliud esse. Quasi nihil sit eius quod per ipsam refertur, dicente BOETHIUS capitulo XIIº D e T r i n i t a t e: «Haec omnis praedicatio exterioribus datur», et etiam dicit PHILOSOPHUS Vº M e t a p h y s i c a e quod scientia inquantum est relatio non est scientis sed scibilis. «Unde aliqui putaverunt relationem esse de secundis intentionibus», quae non sunt nisi res rationis non existentes extra intellectum, quales sunt intentio generis et speciei. Quod videtur sentire BOETHIUS, cum dixit in libro D e T r i n i t a t e loquens de differentia praedicationis substantiae, quantitatis, qualitatis, et relationis: «Patet ergo», inquit in capitulo XIIº, «quae sit differentia praedicationum, quod aliae quidem quasi rem monstrant, aliae vero quasi circumstantias rei, quodque illa ita praedicantur, ut esse aliquid rem ostendant, illa vero non esse sed potius extrinsecus aliquid quodammodo assignant. Non igitur», ut dicit in capitulo XIIº, «potest praedicatione relativa quicquam rei de qua dicitur secundum se addere vel minuere vel mutare, quae tota non in eo quod est esse consistit, sed in eo quod est in comparatione quodammodo se habere». Et in fine capituli dicit: «Quocirca si Pater et Filius ad aliquid dicuntur, nihil aliud differunt nisi sola relatione». Relatio vero non praedicatur ad id de quo praedicatur quasi ipsa res sit, et secundum rem non facit alteritatem rei de qua dicitur. Propter quod et GILBERTUS PORRETANUS in Commento super hunc passum relationes non inesse et insistentes personis sed affixas dicit, sic inquiens: «Theologicae personae quoniam essentiarum oppositione a se invicem aliae esse non possunt, harum quae dictae sunt extrinsecus affixarum rerum oppositione a se invicem aliae et probantur et sunt». ———— 100 fundentur] fundantur 1’ 10’ 19’ 102 est¹] om. 10’ 19’ 102 secundum] om. 1’ 8’ 11’ 17’ 103 inter] super 8’ 103 omnia praedicamenta] inv. 10’ 19’ 104 enim] vero 10’ 104 est] om. 1’ 8’ 11’ i.m. 17’ 105 ut quantitas] iter. 8’ 105 per modum] iter. 8’ 106 inhaerentis] inhaerentiae Bad. 106 inesse] in esse 8’ 10’ 17’ Bad. 108 omnis] enim 19’ 108 praedicatio] conf. 19’ 109 dicit] om. 1’ 110 putaverunt] putabant 19’ 112 sentire Boethius] inv. 10’ 19’ et scr. sensisse 10’ 19’ Bad. 114 in] om. 10’ 19’ 116 quodque] quodquia 10’ 19’ 116 esse aliquid] inv. 10’ 116 aliquid] quid 11’ 117 quodammodo] quod modo 1’ 117 in] om. 10’ 118 XII] XIII 10’ 19’ Bad. 118 praedicatione] praedicato est 1’ 8’ 11’ 118 relativa] relata 1’ 119 vel mutare] om. 11’ 119 est] superscrips. 17’ 120 in¹] om. 17’ 121 relatione] ratione a.c. 1’ 19’ 122 ad . . . praedicatur] om. (hom.) 10’ 122 id] illud 1’ 17’ 123 quod] intelligimus add. sed exp. 10’ 124 Porretanus] Poretanus 19’ 124 inesse] idem 10’ 126 esse non possunt] non possunt esse 19’ ———— 102 Cf. Henr. de Gand. Summa, art. 55, q. 5, ad 2 (ed. Badius, fol. 109 vD). 102-3 Averroes, Comm. in Metaph., XII, 19 (ed. Iunt., VIII, fol. 306rB). 106 Cf. Thomas de Aq., Metaph., V, lect. 9, § 894 (ed. M. R. Cathala, p. 286); Summa Theol., I-II, q. 110, art. 2, ad 3 (ed. Leon.). 108-9 Boeth., De Trin., 4 (ed. C. Moreschini, p. 176, 252). 109-10 Cf. Arist., Metaph., V, 15, 1021a30-33 (Transl. Anonyma sive ‘Media’, ed. G. Vuillemin-Diem, pp. 104-105); Thomas de Aq., Metaph., V, lect. 17, § 1028 (ed. M. R. Cathala, p. 321). 110-11 Averroes, Comm. in Metaph., XII, 19 (ed. Iunt., VIII, fol. 306rB). 114-21 Boeth., De Trin., 4-5 (ed. C. Moreschini, p. 177, 269-274; p. 178, 295-299, 310-312). 125-7 Gilb. Porr., In Boethii De Trin., I, 5 (ed. N. M. Häring, p. 148, 73-76; PL 64, 1295D).

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Quod non usquequaque falsum est. Relatio enim et res est et est modus. Sed ex se non est nisi circumstantia sive quidam modus, nisi aliquis sic velit extendere rem ut rem appellet etiam modum rei, maxime qui sequitur rem ex natura rei et non ex natura intellectus, qui etiam res rationis appellatur cum habet esse a solo intellectu, licet non appellatur res simpliciter. Quod, et si, respectus qui sequitur ex natura rei possit dici res vera aliquo modo, hoc non convenit ei ratione illa et comparatione qua est ad aliud, sive ex eo quod est respectus aut relatio. Aliter enim non esset una res sed plures, neque una realitas sed plures respectus ille qui esset ad plures terminos. Et sic non esset una relatio secundum rem qua unus est aequalis duobus, neque una paternitas qua unus est pater duorum filiorum in creaturis, cum sint duo termini ad quos, quod falsum est. Praeterea, si relatio ex se eo quod est respectus et ad aliud, esset res, tunc comparata ad substantiam non esset nisi modus tantum. Et sic uno modo esset res, alio modo tantum modus, quod est inconveniens, sicut est inconveniens quod aliquid uno modo sit accidens, alio modo substantia. Propter quod relatio, quod ipsa est res vera sive realis, hoc accipit ab alio ut a suo fundamento, quia ab alio habere hoc non potest, quia ad aliud comparationem non habet nisi ut ad fundamentum aut ut ad terminum. Specialiter autem de relationibus notionum in divinis, quod realitatem sumant a fundamento suo ut dicantur reales, patet inspiciendo iam dicta. Hoc enim necesse est propter hoc quod consistunt in ordine et collatione ordinatorum ex natura rei existentis in eis absque omni consideratione intellectus. Secundum enim supra determinata deitas seipsa formaliter habet esse, immo est ipsum esse, et secundum se a nullo habet esse principiative. Propter quod tamquam forma pura est prima ratio principiandi omnia, et fundatur in ipsa respectus et ordo ad principiata, et ordine quodam naturae primo ad primum principiatum. Qui quidem respectus ad primum principiatum cum ipsa forma deitatis constituit primam personam, quae ratione suae primitatis necessario innascibilis est, quae non habet esse ab alio sed ab ipso omnis alius et omne aliud, sed ordine quodam naturae primo primum principiatum. Per hoc enim quod deitas in hac prima persona est intelligere quoddam secundum actum, ipsa deitas fecunda est et ratio principiandi active modo naturae et intellectualis operationis, ut qua quis habet producere, et similiter passive ut ex qua quis habet produci. Et per hoc quod est ratio ex qua fundatur in ipsa respectus qui est ab alio produci, et constituit cum essentia secundam personam, et existens in utraque persona simul est fecunda ut sit ratio producendi active qua duo producunt modo voluntatis, et similiter ———— 128 usquequaque] usque quoque 8’ usquaque 10’ 128 est³] om. 10’ 19’ Bad. 129 se] seipso a.c. 8’ 129 aliquis] aliquid 11’ aliquid sunt sed exp. sunt 1’ 129 velit] velid 8’ 129 rem¹] iter. 11’ 129-30 ut rem] om. 8’ 130 rei¹] om. 19’ 130 natura²] p.c. 19’ 131 intellectus] p.c. 19’ 131 etiam] et 1’ 131 appellatur] appellantur a.c. 17’ 131 intellectu] intellectua(?) 17’ 132 et] etiam 17’ 133 hoc] conf. 1’ 133 non] om. 1’ 8’ i.m. 17’ 133 ei] rei 10’ 19’ 134-5 aliter . . . realitas] om. 19’ i.m. 10’ 134 esset] esse 8’ 135 esset²] pater add. sed exp. 1’ 136 est²] om. 10’ 19’ 138 est] om. 11’ 138 tunc] quae 10’ 19’ 140 tantum] om. 10’ 19’ 141 modo²] om. 10’ 19’ 142 habere hoc] inv. 19’ 143 ut²] aut 11’ 144 sumant] sumunt 19’ 146 ordine] ordinatione 17’ 146 ordinatorum] ordinatarum 19’ 148 est] om. 11’ 151 qui] om. 8’ 152 primam personam] inv. 19’ 155 enim] conf. i.m. 19’ 157 ex] om. 10’ 19’ Bad. 157 habet] conf. i.m. 19’ 158-61 et¹ . . . quis] iter et add. habet produci sed exp. 17’ ———— 145 Cf. Henr. de Gand. Summa, art. 53, qq. 8-9; art. 54. 147 Cf. Henr. de Gand. Summa, art. 54, q. 1.

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passive ut ex qua quis sic producitur. Et per hoc fundatur in ea respectus qui est ab alio produci modo voluntatis, et constituit cum ea tertiam personam. Et sic relationes notionales in divinis ex hoc reales sunt quod fundantur in ipsa deitatis essentia ex sola natura eius absque omni consideratione et collatione intellectus, quemadmodum et in creaturis relationes reales dicuntur quae fundantur in re ex sola natura rei absque consideratione intellectus. Sed dubium est utrum cum hoc quod sunt reales relationes, possint dici res. Et est verum proculdubio quod, inquantum includunt in se suum fundamentum, sicut reales dicuntur quia fundantur in re, sic et res sunt quia rem sui fundamenti in se includunt. Sed secundum hoc non sunt nisi una res, licet sint tres relationes vel quattuor. Aliis videtur quod sicut respectus fundatus in re ex consideratione intellectus dicitur ad minus res rationis, tam secundum ordinem quem habet ad fundamentum quam secundum ordinem quem habet ad obiectum, quia utrumque ordinem habet ex consideratione intellectus, sic respectus ille qui fundatur in re ex natura rei absolutae debeat dici res secundum utrumque ordinem, quia ex natura rei convenit ei uterque, scilicet quod fundatur in re absoluta, et quod respicit obiectum. Sed si hoc ponatur circa reales relationes in divinis eadem ratione et in creaturis, ut videlicet paternitas in creaturis non solum dicatur res et realis ex fundamento, quae est naturalis potentia generandi, sed etiam ex eo quod est ad obiectum, quod dicunt multi, et quod illa realitas ex ordine ad obiectum est propria praedicamento relationis. Sed tunc quaero, cum praedicamentum relationis transfertur secundum aliquid manens in divinis: aut ista res manet in divinis translato praedicamento relationis, aut non, sed transit in substantiam. Et sive sic dicatur sive sic, aut ista res est idem omnino cum modo praedicamenti qui est ad aliud esse, aut non. Si non, tunc si translata relatione ad divina non manet huiusmodi res, quia secundum aliquos est accidens in creaturis, sed transit in substantiam, tunc quod manet de relatione in divinis non est nisi modus tantum, et non res plus quam in creaturis. Si autem manet in divinis ut aliquid aliud ab illo modo, tunc res aliqua creaturae esset in divinis praeter rem deitatis et praeter modum essendi ad aliud, quod falsum est. Si autem res illa in creaturis sit ipse modus et transfertur ad divina, oportet quod maneat, quia aliter nihil de praedicamento relationis maneret in divinis. In divinis ergo realitas relationis ex ordine ad obiectum non est nisi ipse modus. Et sic secundum quod ———— 161 ab] eo add. 10’ 19’ 163 ex] conf i.m. 19’ 164 omni consideratione] inv. 19’ 165 et] om. 17’ 165 dicuntur] dicunt 17’ 165 quae] pue 19’ conf. 17’ 166 natura] materia 1’ 8’ 167 relationes] om. 11’ 167 possint] possunt 10’ 19’ 17’ Bad. 167 dici] conf. i.m. 19’ 168 est verum] inv. 10’ 19’ 168 inquantum] iter. 19’ 168 includunt] includit 1’ 8’ 11’ 168 se] in add. 1’ 8’ 11’ 17’ sed exp. 17 168 fundamentum] quod add. 1’ 8’ 11’ quia add. 10’ 19’ 169 sic] sicut 1’ 8’ 11’ 170 tres] conf. i.m. 19’ 171 sicut] sint 8’ 171 in re] om. 10’ 19’ 172-3 fundamentum . . . ad] om. (hom.) 1’ 174 sic] sicut 1’ 174 respectus ille] inv. 10’ 19’ 175 ei] rei 17’ Bad. 175 uterque] utrumque 10’ 19’ 177 hoc] superscrips. 11’ 178 dicatur] conf. i.m. 8’ 179 potentia] i.m. 17’ 179 etiam] superscrips. 1’ 179 ex eo] iter. 8’ 179 ad] om. 10’ 19’ Bad. 180 praedicamento] praedicatio 1’ 10’ 17’ 19’ 181 aliquid] quid 11’ 182 aut . . . aut] an . . . an Bad. 182 ista] est add. 10’ 182 res] p.c. 17’ 182 manet] maneat Bad. 183 et] om. 10’ 183 dicatur] om. 8’ 10’ 11’ 19’ sit 17’ 183 dicatur . . . sic²] sit 1’ 183 ista] istas 11’ 184 aliud] om. 1’ 8’ 11’ 17’ 184 relatione] ratione 17’ 185 res] respectus 10’ 19’ Bad. ros 17’ 187 non] est add. Bad. 187 ut] aut 10’ 19’ ———— 171 Cf. Giles of Rome, In primum Sent., d. 33, q. 3, Respondeo (ed. Venetiis, fol. 171 vM-172 vL). Cf. ibid. 185 Cf. M. Henninger, Relations. Medieval Theories, pp. 4-6.

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sunt diversi modi ad aliud essendi secundum quod sunt obiecta diversa, sic et diversae res. Sed tunc non est disputatio nisi de nomine, appellando extenso nomine rem quod alii appellant modum rei. Attamen, si sic respectus possint dici res, hoc non est nisi quia ex natura rei fundantur in vera re. Quia enim realiter et ex natura ipsius rei fundantur in re secundum dictum modum, ut dicantur res ex ordine ad fundamentum, ideo etiam realiter respiciunt obiectum, et dicuntur res in ordine ad obiectum, non autem ex ordine ad obiectum. Non enim respicere obiectum realiter dat eis quod sunt res etiam in comparatione ad obiectum. Immo econverso; quia enim sunt res ex ordine ad fundamentum, etiam sunt res in ordine ad obiectum et etiam realiter respiciunt obiectum. Bene tamen verum est, si respectus dicatur res, quod, sicut diversi sunt respectus ex comparatione ad diversa obiecta, sic et diversae sunt res. Sed hoc numquam provenit ut ex causa propter quam sit, sed solum sine qua non. Aliquando enim sunt diversi respectus ad idem obiectum, ut duorum filiorum ad eundem patrem, ut praedictum est. Unde quod duorum filiorum sunt duae filiationes ad eundem patrem, causa sive ratio quod sunt diversi respectus aut diversae res, non est obiectum unum, sed potius fundamenta quae sunt diversae potentiae generandi passivae in diversis materiis, ex quibus generantur duo filii, super quorum diversas potentias passivas fundantur diversae filiationes; cum tamen paternitas unica secundum rem respondet eis in obiecto, quia fundatur super unicam potentiam generandi activam quae est in forma substantiali generantis. Sic et in divinis, quod respectus sunt diversi ad diversa obiecta, non sunt causa aut ratio obiecta; licet non sunt sine illorum diversitate, quia secundum PHILOSOPHUM «relativa sunt simul natura», neutrum tamen est causa alterius ut sit. Sed causa et ratio per se est ipsa divina essentia, inquantum est fundamentum omnium divinarum proprietatum, secundum praetactum modum. Licet enim sit unica re absoluta, propter tamen eiusdem infinitatem et illimitatem ipsa est per se ratio ut quasi fluant ab ipsa diversi respectus modo actionis et passionis sibi respondentes, et ulterius diversa producta, ut modo actionis generare et spirare ad producendum active Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, et modo passionis generari et spirari ad producendum quasi passive Filium et Spiritum Sanctum; ut ipsa essentia simplex et unica sit per se perfecta ratio eius quod respectus diversi sunt, non solum quod sunt respectus simpliciter, generare, spirare, ———— 193 modi] ad add. sed exp. 19’ 193 ad aliud essendi] essendi ad aliud 19’ 193 sunt²] omnia add. 10’ diversa add. 11’ 196 attamen] actum 1’ 8’ 11’ 196 respectus] om. 1’ 196 possint] possunt 10’ 19’ possit 8’ 17’ 196 est] res add. 10’ 19’ 197 fundantur¹] fundatur 11’ 197 fundantur¹ . . . rei] om. (hom.) 1’ 198 etiam] et 10’ 19’ 201 sunt¹] tunc 1’ 8’ 11’ 203 tamen] conf. 8’ 203 quod . . . respectus] om. 1’ 204 ex] in 10’ 205 sit] sic 10’ 19’ Bad. 205 non] i.m. 10’, om. 19’ 206 ut¹] et 1’ 207 duae] duo 8’ 207 causa] superscrips. 11’ 207 sive] sine et add. qua non sed exp. qua non 11’ 208 sunt] sint 19’ 208 diversi] sunt add. 19’ 211 filiationes] p.c. 1’ 211 rem] i.m. 17’ 211 respondet] respondeat Bad. 214 diversi] p.c. 8’ 214 diversa] divisa 19’ 215 diversitate] diversae 1’ 8’ 11’ 216 sit] sic 1’ 217 divina] prima 10’ 219 ut] om. 17’ 220 actionis] om. 1’ 8’ 11’ 17’ 220 sibi] conf. 19’ 220 respondentes] p.c. 10’ 223 ut] unde 10’ 223 simplex . . . unica] inv. 17’ 224 generare] et add. Bad. 224 spirare] simpliciter 10’ ———— 206 Cf. supra, ll. 136-137. Cf. supra, ll. 147-162.

216 Arist., Cat., 7, 7b15 (Transl. Boethii, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, p. 21).

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generari, spirari, et per hoc quod sunt diversi sive distincti ipsi producti, non econverso. Diversitas productorum est ratio diversitatis eius quod est generare et generari, spirare et spirari. Ex quo patet quoddam suppositum superius, quod scilicet quidditas et realitas, secundum quam una relatio alia est ab altera, non sumitur ex ordine ad suum oppositum, sed potius ex suo fundamento. Unde, quod proprietates emanationum inter se distinguuntur, hoc non est quia una est ad aliam, aut una ab alia, neque quia sunt ad diversos productos vel a diversis producentibus, sed quia diversimode fluunt, vel potius sunt quasi diversi fluxus ab eadem substantia. Unde et personae inter se sunt diversae non tam quia una procedit ab altera, quam quia diversimode procedunt ab eadem, ut dictum est supra. Unde, cum una persona ab alia emanat, non tamen sunt diversae quia una ab altera est, sed quia constituuntur diversis proprietatibus emanationum. Pater enim est alius a Filio non tam quia ab ipso est Filius, quam quia constituitur proprietate qua active ab ipso est Filius, et Filius proprietate qua quasi passive est a Patre, ut constitutio in esse per talem proprietatem in Patre sit praevia secundum rationem rationi emanationis ipsius producti. Sed quod respectus appellentur res, istum modum loquendi non videtur admittere usus ecclesiae. Cum enim quattuor sunt relationes reales in divinis, tunc esset praeter rem essentiae quaternitas rerum in divinis, quod non videtur admittere usus loquendi, licet intellectus veritati non repugnaret. Propter quod, si omnino dicendum sit quod relationes sint diversae et plures res iam dicto modo, videtur mihi quod melius sit dicere cum determinatione quod sunt plures et diversae res relationis, quam quod sint plures et diversae res re simpliciter accepta. Quia si absque determinatione diceretur res—cum non sit res in se existens quia non substantia, neque in se subsistens quia non est persona, neque alteri inhaerens in divinis quia in divinis non est accidens, neque similiter in creaturis quia tunc non transferretur manens in divinis—, esset ergo necessario, secundum opinionem PORRETANI, res extrinsecus affixa; quemadmodum et ille modus videtur esse quiddam affixum substantiae inquantum res est, secundum dictam opinionem, quae non ponit quod istam realitatem habeat a subiecto sed potius ab obiecto, licet aliam realitatem habeat a ———— 225 generari] et add. Bad. 228 quidditas] quantitas 1’ 8’ 11’ 229 est] i.m. 17’ 230 fundamento] significato 1’ 8’ significato a.c. sed fundamento i.m. p.c. 11’ 230 quod] superscrips. 17’ 230 proprietates] proprietas a.c. et superscrips. 10’ proprietas a.c. et scr. i.m. p.c. 19’ 230 emanationum] multe add. 19’ 230-1 inter se distinguuntur] distinguuntur inter se et superscrips. inter 10’ p.c. 19’ 231 aut] vel 10’ 19’ 232 producentibus] producibilibus 1’ 11’ 17’ productibilibus 8’ 233 se] om. 1’ 234 quia¹] quod 1’ 8’ 10’ 17’ 19’ Bad. 234 altera] i.m. 17’ 234 procedunt] iter. 8’ 234 eadem] eodem 10’ 19’ 235 unde] ut 1’ 8’ 11’ 17’ 235 tamen] tam 10’ 19’ Bad. tantum 8’ 236 sed] quam Bad. 237 constituitur] conf. i.m. 11’ 237 proprietate qua] proprietatibus quibus 1’ 238 active . . . qua] om. (hom.) 10’ 19’ 238 et Filius] om. 17’ 238 qua quasi] quam qua 17’ 238 passive] p.c. 1’ 239 praevia] prima 1’ 8’ 11’ 239 rationem] p.c. 8’ 239 rationi] om. 1’ 8’ 11’ 17’ 239 emanationis] om. 8’ 241 appellentur] apelletur 10’ 19’ Bad. appellantur 1’ 241 videtur] habet 11’ 242 usus] loquendi add. 17’ 242 ecclesiae] active 11’ 243 videtur] habet 11’ 244 licet] sed 1’ 8’ 11’ 17’ 244 intellectus] conf. 17’ 244 sit] est sic 10’ 245 sint] sunt 17’ 246 determinatione] relationem a.c. 17’ 246 et diversae res] res et diversae 19’ 246 relationis] relationes 1’ 8’ 11’ 17’ a.c. 11’ 246-7 quam . . . res] om. 17’ 252 quiddam] quendam 11’ 252-3 quiddam affixum] inv. 17’ 253 ponit] potuit 10’ 11’ ———— 228 Cf. supra, ll. 196-205.

235 Cf. supra, ll. 147-162.

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fundamento; ut scilicet quod plures respectus habeant a fundamento quod sint res et una res, sed a diversis obiectis quod sint diversae res. Sed, ut iam dictum est, utrumque modum realitatis habent a fundamento: unum ut sunt unum in illo, alium ut diversimode quasi fluerent ab illo, multo fortius quam quod ab eo fluunt diversae creaturae. Emanationes enim interiores sunt rationes emanationum exteriorum. Praeterea, si quis velit dicere quod in creaturis alia res sit fundamentum relationis, alia vero ipsa relatio, et quod sit accidens inhaerens subiecto sicut alia praedicamenta accidentis, et quod cum hoc sit ibi modus proprius huius praedicamenti qui est modus purus et non res, et consimiliter in divinis, obviatur ei sic. Cum in divinis duo sunt praedicamenta translata a creaturis, substantia scilicet et relatio, ita quod, cum assumuntur in divina praedicatione, quicquid in ipsis rei est ut sunt circa creaturas non manet, sed totum transit in divinam substantiam, et manent solum duo modi et rationes illorum praedicamentorum, qui etiam sunt iidem in creaturis; si ergo in divinis essent diversae res, substantiae scilicet et relationis, ambae essent ibi ex natura deitatis, et uni responderet unus modus translatus a creaturis, et alteri alius. Quare, cum modus proprius solum fundatur immediate in re propria et non in alia nisi per rem propriam, quia scilicet habet esse una earum in alia, sicut ergo in divinis modus substantiae, qui est secundum se esse, per se et immediate habet esse circa rem substantiae et fundari in ipsa, sic et modus relationis, qui est ad aliquid esse, per se et immediate habet esse circa rem relationis et fundari in ipsa; ita quod in divinis modus relationis, qui est respectus quidam et ad aliquid esse, non habeat esse circa rem substantiae neque fundari in ipsa nisi per rem relationis existentem in substantia aut circa eam, sicut in creaturis respectus qui est esse ad formam non dicatur esse in essentia materiae nisi per rem aliam relationis existentem in ea. Ex quo necessario sequitur quod res illa relationis alia a re substantiae esset aliquid absolutum, quia respectus ille qui non est nisi modus ad aliquid esse non fundatur nisi in re absoluta, quia quicquid est praeter absolutum esse non est nisi modus eius, qui est vel secundum se esse vel ad aliquid esse. Modus autem non habet fundari in modo, quia qua ratione unus eorum fundatur in alio, eadem ratione et ille alius in tertio, et esset abire in infinitum. Standum est ergo in aliquo quod est res absoluta, in qua immediate fundatur omnis modus. ———— 255 sint] sunt 1’ 257 est] iter. 8’ 257 utrumque modum] modum quendam 17’ ut quemadmodum 1’ 8’ 11’ 258 diversimode quasi] inv. 19’ 258 fluerent] fluunt 10’ 19’ Bad. 258 quod] om. 11’ 259 interiores] superiores 19’ 262 relatio] relatione 1’ 263 ibi] p.c. 10’ 263 proprius . . . modus] om. (hom.) 17’ 263 huius] p.c. 1’ 264 et non res] iter. 1’ 264 consimiliter] similiter 8’ 264 obviatur] obviabitur 10’ 19’ Bad. 264 ei sic] iter. 10’ 264 cum] om. 1’ 266 creaturas] creatas 1’ 267 divinam substantiam] inv. 17’ 267 solum] om. 10’ 19’ 268 qui] quia 8’ 268 sunt] om. 10’ 17’ in add. 11’ 268 iidem] p.c. 1’ 268 essent] iter. 1’ 268 res] superscrips. 1’ 269 ambae] ambo 10’ 19’ Bad. 269 et²] om. 17’ 269 responderet] respondet 17’ 270 proprius] om. 17’ 271 nisi] essent add. 11’ 271 scilicet] secundum 11’ 272 est] substantiam add. sed exp. 11’ 273-4 sic . . . ipsa] om. 17’ 273 est] et add. 10’ 274 habet esse circa rem relationis] circa rem relationis habet esse 10’ 19’ 274 quod] exp. 17’ 275 aliquid] om. 1’ 276 eam] substantiam Bad. 276 sicut] si add. 8’ 10’ 17’ 19’ Bad. 277 qui] i.m. 17’ 277 per] om. 10’ 279 quia] quod 8’ 11’ 279 modus] et add. 10’ 19’ Bad. 280 fundatur] fundantur 1’ 281 ad] i.m. p.c. 1’ 282 fundatur] fundaretur 19’ 282-3 in tertio] om. 17’ ———— 257 Cf. supra, ll. 147-166, 214-240.

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Et sic in divinis non est simpliciter dicendum quod sit res praeter rem substantiae, ita quod cum determinatione dicatur in Deo praeter rem substantiae esse res relationis. Hoc est secundum iam dictum modum, appellando rem ipsum modum rei simpliciter dictae, cui non curamus obviare, quia non esset disputatio nisi de nomine, quae non prodest ubi certum est de re.

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Ad primum in oppositum—quod relatio non potest esse realis a substantia subiecta, quia tunc omnes relationes divinae essent res et respectus reales, quia omnes fundantur in substantia divina—dicendum quod fundari in substantia potest proprietas dupliciter. Uno modo ut perfecte habet esse in substantia fundata ex natura substantiae absque omni consideratione intellectus, et comparatione eius ad quodcumque reale alterius rationis, vel non absque consideratione intellectus et comparatione ad reale alterius rationis. Omnis proprietas primo fundata supra divinam substantiam realis est. Et tales sunt solummodo proprietates personales. Secundo autem modo nequaquam. Simile enim et aequale non sunt relationes reales in Deo, quia non fundantur in Deo super divinam essentiam absque consideratione intellectus, ut supra dictum est. Similiter neque respectus attributorum, quia non fundantur super divinam essentiam absque omni consideratione intellectus et comparatione ad reale. Secundum enim quod supra determinatum est, non habent esse in Deo nisi ex consideratione intellectus divini secundum se, aut etiam ex comparatione ad realem distinctionem personarum divinarum, aut ex consideratione intellectus divini sub comparatione ad distincta in creaturis, ut alii dicunt. Aliqui etiam ponunt quod non habent esse in Deo nisi ex consideratione intellectus nostri et comparatione ad correspondentia eis in creaturis. Ad secundum—quod relatio, si est realis, est res aliqua; ergo est substantia— dicendum est ad hoc quod verum est inquantum realis est, alias nequaquam. Quia hoc nomen ‘relatio’ uno modo significat respectum, ut est intentio pura et ratio praedicamenti. Et sic relatio non est res, neque substantia, neque accidens, nec est realis, sed modus ad aliud se habendi purus, nisi secundum modum praetactum, appellando rem modum rei, vel appellando modum realem, quia sequitur rem. Alio modo significat respectum ut est res praedicamenti absoluti super quem fundatur, sicut et significant omnia nomina specierum relationis, ut paternitas, filiatio, et huiusmodi. Et sic in divinis significat rem quae est substantia, et est substantia, sed sub ratione respectus significata. Est enim quoad hoc differentia inter significationem respectus in nominibus attributorum, quae sunt sapientia, bonitas, et in nominibus proprietatum, quae sunt paternitas, filiatio, et in ———— 285 et] lac. 8’ 285 praeter] propter 17’ 286 esse] om. 10’ 288 obviare] obvire 10’ 288 nomine] ratio a.c. 10’ 288 quae] qui 11’ 292 quod] quia 10’ 19’ 295 modo] om. 11’ 295 omni] p.c. 1’ 296 intellectus] om. 10’ 298 proprietas] conf. i.m. 19’ 299 personales] personarum 1’ 10’ 11’ 17’ 19’ 299 simile] lac. 10’ 299-300 non sunt] conf. i.m. 19’ 300 sunt] i.m. 10’ 300 reales] sunt add. 19’ 300 absque] omni add. 17’ 301 supra] om. 10’ 19’ 302 essentiam] p.c. 1’ 304 ex²] in 17’ om. 1’ 8’ 11’ 305 realem] conf. 8’ 305 aut ex] vel aut 1’ 8’ 10’ 11’ 19’ aut 17’ 306 alii] aliqui 1’ 306 etiam ponunt] dicunt etiam 1’ 310 est ad hoc] ad hoc 10’ 19’ om. Bad. 310 verum] rerum 19’ 313 se] om. 17’ 314 respectum] respectu 1’ 8’ 11’ rem 17’ 314 est res] inv. 17’ 315 praedicamenti p.c. 1’ 315 quem] quod 19’ 315 et significant] inv. 8’ inv. et suprascrips. et 1’ 316 paternitas] et add. 10’ 19’ 316 rem] om. 1’ 8’ 11’ i.m. 17’ 316 est] om. 8’ 317 et . . . substantia] om. 10’ ———— 287 Cf. supra, ll. 128-130, 191-195. 301 Cf. supra, ll. 57-69, 81-100. 303 Cf. Henr. de Gand. Summa, art. 51, q. 1; art. 32-33; cf. etiam Quodl. V, q. 1. 306 alii: cf. Thomas de Aq., Super Sent., I, d. 2, q. 1, art. 3 (ed. P. Mandonnet, pp. 63-72). 306 aliqui: cf. Moyses Maimonides, Dux neutrorum, I, c. 52 (ed. 1520, fol. 19v-20r); etiam cit. Henr. de Gand. Summa, art. 32, q. 4 (ed. R. Macken, p. 60, 95-99); Avicenna, Metaph., VIII, c. 7 (ed. S. Van Riet, pp. 429-431, 21-49); etiam cit. Henr. de Gand. Summa, art. 32, q. 4 (ed. R. Macken, p. 68, 33-39; p. 70, 97-00; p. 72, 53-56). 313 Cf. supra, ll. 241-256.

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345

217

nominibus personarum, quae sunt Pater, Filius, quoniam attributorum nomina significant substantiam sub ratione respectus rationalis, et non imponuntur ad significandum respectum, sed ipsam substantiam sub ratione respectus; nomina vero proprietatum imponuntur ad significandum respectum fundatum in substantia, et non substantiam sub ratione substantiae, sed solummodo includunt eam in sua significatione; nomina vero personarum imponuntur ad significandum substantiam sub ratione respectus, ita quod etiam significant ipsum realem respectum, et ab illo imponuntur principaliter. Ad aliud—‹quod› divisum in divinis consideratur ratione et cognitione—dicendum quod in divinis divisum duplicem habet comparationem, unam ad id quod commune est, aliam ad aliud condivisum. Primo quidem modo consideratur ratione et cognitione, quia differunt sola ratione substantia et proprietas, non autem secundo modo. Sed ista responsio est contraria dicto DAMASCENI, quia comparat contrario modo commune et divisum in creaturis. Dicit enim expresse quod «divisum consideratur re», ita quod divisa sub communi inter se differunt re. Ergo secundum mentem eius in divinis divisum consideratur ratione, idest quod distincta sub communi inter se sola ratione differunt. Ideo aliter dicendum quod, licet in Deo, ut dictum est, proprietas significat substantiam, non tamen est distinctiva personae ut est substantia, sed solum ut est respectus, ut sic sit alius modus substantiae ut est substantia, et alius ut est sub ratione respectus, ita quod divinarum personarum differentia penes huiusmodi modos rationis est respectu differentiae duarum personarum in divinis secundum substantias absolutas. Et ita quoad hoc secundum intentionem DAMASCENI «divisum consideratione sive ratione est». Et hoc modo ad modum respectus aspiciendo dicit BOETHIUS, secundum quod iam habitum est, quod «relatio non dicit rem sed modum solummodo». Ad ultimum, quod relatio personarum inter se similis sit relationi eiusdem ad se, quae non est nisi secundum rationem, dicendum quod verum est quoad hoc quod relatio ex utraque parte fundatur super idipsum re. Differt tamen quoad hoc quod ibi duplicatio relationis super idem et extremorum relatorum distinctio est ex sola ratione et consideratione intellectus, non sic in proposito, ut visum est. ———— 320 Pater] et add. 1’ 8’ 320 Filius] et Spiritus Sanctus add. 17’ 321 substantiam] om. 17’ 321 imponuntur] imponetur 1’ 11’ inponetur 8’ 322 vero] non 10’ 323 in ] p.c. 17’ 326 significant] significat 1’ 8’ 10’ 11’ Bad. 326 et . . . principaliter] iter. et scr. imponitur 11’ 326 imponuntur] imponitur 1’ 8’ 10’ 11’ 17’ 327 quod] supplevi: om. 1’ 8’ 10’ 11’ 17’ 19’ Bad. 327 cognitione] congregatione 8’ 11’ iter. sed corr. 1’ 329 aliud] suum 10’ 19’ Bad. 329 condivisum] est add. 8’ 329 modo] om. 19’ 331 Damasceni] modo a.c. 1’ 332 creaturis] divinis 17’ 333 communi inter] communiter 1’ 8’ 11’ 333 se] i.m. 17’ 333 in divinis] om. 1’ 8’ 11’ 17’ 335 tamen] tam 8’ 336 sic] om. 1’ 8’ 11’ 17’ 337 alius] p.c. 8’ 337 ut est²] om. 17’ 337 divinarum] duarum 1’ 8’ 11’ 17’ 338 personarum] differentiarum 8’ 338 differentia] per add. 8’ 11’ 338 huiusmodi] om. 1’ 8’ 11’ 17’ 339 personarum] om. 11’ 339 divinis] creaturis 1’ 8’ 11’ creaturis et 17’ 339 secundum¹] om. 8’ 339 quoad] quomodo ad 8’ 11’ 343 sit] est 10’ 19’ Bad. 344 non] suprascrips. 10’ 344 quoad] quomodo ad 11’ 345 quoad] in 17’ 346 et²] ex add. 1’ 347 est] supra add. Bad. ———— 332 Cf. supra, l. 22. 335 Cf. supra, ll. 264-289. 121. 347 Cf. supra, ll. 144-289.

340 Cf. supra, ll. 21-25.

341-2 Cf. supra, ll. 4-6, 112-

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INDICES INDEX AUCTORUM A Alexander of Hales 182, 183 Al-Ghazali 126 Ambrose 65 Anselm 35 Aristotle 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 15, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 48, 56, 60, 66, 67, 68, 124, 132, 143, 144, 145, 146, 151, 170, 177, 183, 197, 208, 210, 213 Augustine 3, 9, 10, 12, 13, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 24, 35, 57, 58, 60, 69, 70, 71, 89, 111, 112, 115, 147, 207 Auriol, P. 13, 45 Averroes 60, 69, 132, 144, 145, 155, 210 Avicenna, 32, 37, 38, 44, 49, 71, 126, 127, 128, 132, 155, 173, 216 B Boethius 9, 12, 44, 175, 176, 177, 207, 210, 217 Bonaventure 3, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 24, 32, 33, 35, 44, 60, 115, 207 Brown, S.F. 14, 22, 23, 35, 152, 197 C Clarke, N.W. 194 Copleston, F. 87, 88 D Damascene, J. 56, 65, 98, 207, 217 Decorte, J. 9, 13, 31, 41, 43, 171, 173, 176 Dionysius (Pseudo) 7 Duns Scotus, J. 2, 13, 23, 45, 87, 88, 146, 155, 171 Durandus of Saint-Pourçain 45 E Emery, K, Jr. 1, 2, 4, 24 F Flores, J.C. 4, 14, 35, 197

Friedman, R.L. 9, 10, 11, 13, 114, 135 G Gilbert of Poitiers (Porretanus) 176, 177, 181, 182, 183, 210, 214 Giles of Rome 2, 9, 49, 60, 114, 115, 138, 173, 176, 212 Gilson, E. 16, 17, 24, 25, 27 Godfrey of Fontaines 23, 35 Gómez Caffarena, J. 9, 10, 20, 21, 37, 41, 49, 50, 51, 52, 119, 155, 192 H Hayes, Z. 7, 10, 18, 19 Henninger, M. 44, 165 , 169, 174, 212 Hill, E. 10 Hissette, R. 3 L Luna, C. 9, 11, 44, 114, 115 M Macken, R. 204, 205 Maimonides, M. 216 Maurer, A. 14 Marrone, S. 19, 70, 71 O Ockham, W. 13, 45 P Paulus, J. 20, 37, 40, 41, 42, 46, 49, 192 Peter Lombard 154 Pini, G. 137, 138 Plato 7 , 17, 197 Plevano, R. 146 Plotinus 7 Porro, P. 1, 23, 24 Praepositinus 163 Proclus 69, 70, 75 R Ribaillier, J. 10 Richard of St. Victor 7, 9, 10, 12, 60, 64, 77, 88, 89, 110, 120, 154

238

INDICES

S Simplicius 43, 44 Speer, A. 2 Steel, C. 3, 20 Stone, M. 146 T Thomas Aquinas 2, 3, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 27, 48, 60,

68, 69, 114, 115, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 151, 155, 170, 171, 176, 193, 194, 195, 196, 207, 210, 216 W Wielockx, R. 3 Wilson, G. 59, 204, 205 Wolfson, H.A. 36

INDEX LOCORUM HENRICI Quodlibet III, q. 3 150 III, q. 4 43 III, q. 9 37, 47 V, q. 2 50-51, 173 V, q. 3 146 V, q. 6 50, 174 VI, q. 1 7, 55-56, 119-120, 122123, 133 VI, q. 2 7, 32, 55, 119, 124-129, 131-133 VII, q. 1-2 37, 44-45, 165 VIII, q. 8 47 IX, q. 2 37-38 , 49, 128 IX, q. 5 145 IX, q. 6 145 X, q. 7 43, 51-52 XI, q. 4 50 XI, q. 11 49-50 XV, q. 9 41 Summa Quaestionum Ordinariarum art. 1, q. 1 3 art. 1, q. 2 19, 21 art. 1, q. 12 21 art. 6, q. 4 28 art. 7, q. 1 22-23 art. 7, q. 2 25-27 art. 7, q. 5 27-28 art. 7, q. 6 5, 29, 30-32 art. 7, q. 8 29

art. 7, q. 10 28 art. 7, q. 13 34, 35 art. 21, q. 2 31, 39-40 art. 21, q. 4 49, 52 art. 22, q. 4 56 art. 27, q. 1 48-50 art. 32, q. 2 166 art. 32, q. 5 41, 149, 166-167, 169-171 art. 35, q. 8 46, 163 art. 36, q. 5 38-39 art. 42, q. 2 50 art. 53, q. 1 153-154 art. 53, q. 3 151-152, 154-158 art. 53, q. 4 160 art. 53, q. 5 159-161 art. 53, q. 7 160 art. 53, q. 8 64 art. 53, q. 9 55, 62 art. 54, q. 1 64, 66 art. 54, q. 3 8, 55, 62-65, 72, 122, 163 art. 54, q. 4 72 art. 54, q. 6 57-58, 77-81, 138140 art. 54, q. 8 120-124 art. 54, q. 10 123 art. 55, q. 1 161-164 art. 55, q. 2 164 art. 55, q. 3 161 art. 55, q. 5 42, 164, 167, 172 art. 55, q. 6 (Appendix) 5, 36, 42, 55, 173-181, 203-217

INDICES art. 56, q. 1 168-169, 177, 181183 art. 56, q. 3 179, 183 art. 56, q. 4 153, 164, 179-180 art. 58, q. 1 65-67, 73, 133-134 art. 58, q. 2 67-71, 73-76 art. 59, q. 2 74-75, 141 art. 59, q. 6 141-144, 147 art. 60, q. 1 56-57, 59-60, 81-86, 89, 130, 132, 142-147 art. 60, q. 2 112-113 art. 60, q. 3 83-85, 100, 111-113, 115-116

art. 60, q. 4 art. 60, q. 5 101 art. 60, q. 6 art. 60, q. 8 art. 60, q. 9 art. 61, q. 1 art. 61, q. 2 art. 61, q. 4 art. 61, q. 6 art. 68, q. 5

239 84-85, 144 90-91, 94, 96-99, 101 104-106 105 95 106-107 107-111 73, 100 38