Hellenistic Democracies: Freedom, Independence and Political Procedure in Some East Greek City-states 351509265X, 9783515092654

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HISTORIA

Susanne Carlsson

Zeitschrift fiir Alte Geschichte Revue d'histoire ancienne Journal of Ancient History Rivista di storia antica

Hellenistic Democracies Freedom, Independence and Political Procedure in Some East Greek City-States

EINZELSCHRIFTEN Herausgegeben van

Kai Brodersen/Erfurt Mortimer Chambers/Los Angeles Martin Jehne/Dresden Fram;ois Paschoud/Geneve Aloys Winterling/Berlin

HEFT206

@)

Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart 2010

CONTENTS Preface ............................................................................................................... . Abbreviations .................................................................................................... .

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen National~

1. 1.1 1.2 1.3

SETTING AND SOURCES .................................................................... . Hellenistic democracy- fact or fiction? .................................................. . The epigraphic sources ........................................................................... .. The layout .............................................................................................. .. Methods and hypotheses ......................................................................... .. Outline ..................................................................................................... .

13 13 17 20 20 23

2 2.1

DEMOCRACY THEN AND NOW ........................................................ . Thoughts on demokratia in antiquity .................................................... .. Democratic beginnings - a brief background ........................................ .. Ancient political theory .......................................................................... . Concepts of modern democracy ............................................................ .. Modern definitions of ancient Greek democracy .................................... . Modern theories on factors connected with the emergence of democracy .......................................................................................... .

25 25 25 29 45 51

AUTONOMY AND SOVEREIGNTY .................................................. .. The autonomous city-state - previous research ...................................... . The·concepts of autonomy and sovereignty- ancient and modern use ... Autonomia - its' origin and import .......................................................... .. Ancient definitions and ideas of autonomia ............................................ . Sovereignty - the modern discourse oh definitions ................................ .. Some modern notions of ancient sovereignty ........................................ .. The kyria-phrase - an ancient expression of sovereignty? ...................... . Conclusion ............................................................................................... .

61 61 66 66 68 70

2.2 2.3 2.4

bibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Oaten sind im Internet Uber

abrufbar.

3. 3.1 3.2

ISBN 978-3-515-09265-4

Jede Verwertung des Werkes auBerhalbder Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist unzulassig und strafbar. Dies gilt insbesondere fur Dbersetzung, Nachdruck, Mikroverfilmung oder vergleichbare Verfahren sowie fiir die Speicherung in Datenverarbeitungsanlagen. © 2010 Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart. Gedruckt auf siiurefreiem, alterungsbestiindigem Papier.

7 8

3.3 4. 4.1 4.2

Druck:AZ Druck und Datentechnik GmbH,Kempten Printed in Germany

4.3

AUTONOMIA IN PRACTICE ................................................................. . Prelude -Alexander and the liberation of the Greek cities .................... . Autonomia and eleutheria in hellenistic inscriptions .............................. . A- Poleis described as autonomos by themselves or by another city-state ........................................................................................... . B - Poleis addressed as autonomoi or granted autonomia by an external power ................................................................................. . C ~ Poleis addressed as eleutheroi (without autonomia) by an external power ................................................................................. . Conclusion .............................................................................................. ..

55

72

73 78 81 81 84 85 91 94 97

i

6

5. 5. I

5 .2

5.3

Contents

INTERNATIONALRELATIONS .......................................................... Interstate relations among Greek poleis .................................................. Interstate alliances and marks of friendship............................................. Mediation and arbitration - avoidance of conflicts ... .. ... .. .. ..... ... .. .. .. ........ The relations between the hegemonic powers and the Greek cities......... Civic built fortifications and defence systems.......................................... Greek arbitration in conflicts including a hegemonic power.................... The conflicts between Samos and Priene - a case study..........................

JOI 102 I 02 107 111 I II 129 136

6.

CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES - METHODS AND QUANDARIES . . I 49 Selections and limitations . .. ... .. .. .. ........... .. .. ..... .. .. .. ... ....... .. .. ... ... .. .. .. .. ... .. . I 49 The formulas and contents of polis-decrees ............................................. 151

7.

MODES OF GOVERNMENT-THE CASES ....................................... The layout................................................................................................. IASOS ...................................................................................................... KALYMNA .............................................................................................. KOS ......................................................................................................... MILETOS with Didyma ........................................................................... HELLENISTIC DEMOCRACIES - IASOS, KALYMNA, KOS AND MILETOS .............................................................................

277

EPILOGUE ...............................................................................................

287

7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5

8.

I 61 161 162 184 202 244

APPENDICES ................................................................................................... Appendix A: Chronological table of decrees..................................................... Appendix Al - IASOS ............................................................................. Appendix A2 - KALYMNA..................................................................... Appendix A3 - KOS................................................................................. Appendix A4 - MILETOS with Didyma . ....... .... ..... .. ... .. .. .. .......... .... ..... .. Appendix B: Titles of Greek officials ................................................................ Appendix C: Demokratia in hellenistic inscriptions.......................................... D -Demokratia attributed to poleis .........................................................

295 295 296 303 309 322 330 334 335

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..............................................................................................

345

Index Jocorum. .. ....... ....... .. .. ... ......... .. .... ....... .. .. .. .. ....... .. .. ..... .. .. ... .. ..... ..... .. .. .. ... .. A- Literary texts...................................................................................... B - Epigraphic sources............................................................................. General index.....................................................................................................

357 357 360 369

PREFACE The focus of this book, which is a slightly shortened and revised version of my Uppsala PhD thesis examined in May 2005, is on the existence and working of democracy in some Greek poleis of hellenistic western Asia Minor. Today democracy is a celebrated feature of society and this was valid also to these poleis. Democracy may be considered from many points of view, but the essence of it is expressed by the political scientist Yves Schemeil: "democracy is the art ofliving with people we dislike" (2000, 116). Freedom from external control is one prerequisite for democracy. In the hellenistic period the Greek city-states are thought to have lost their independence due to the establishment of the hellenistic hegemonies, and thereby also lost the possibility of democratic government and of pursuing a foreign policy of their own. This study shows that interstate relations among many of the Greek cities of coastal Asia Minor were active. Measures were taken to solve interstate conflicts and to strengthen ties of friendship among cities, but the cities did not refrain from claiming their rights vis-a-vis each other and even waging wars; this would not have been possible during severe control. In the power struggle between the changing hegemons, the individual poleis had possibilities to manoeuvre fairly independently. By systematizing and analyzing the frequency and contents of hellenistic decrees enacted by the council and the demos in four East Greek city-states, this study shows that they were democratically ruled, and the issues decided on foremost concerned foreign relations. The empirical investigation concludes with an application of the criteria for democracy set up by Aristotle and the political scientist Robert Dahl, and all four city-states are shown to comply with most of the criteria. However, in the second half of the second century polis decrees gradually decrease, to cease altogether towards the end of the first century BC, and foreign affairs also disappear from the agenda. A possible reason is the growing power of Rome and the establishment of the Roman province of Asia in 129 BC. Under a sole hegemon the poleis no longer had possibilities to set their own agenda. A note on transliteration and other conventions I have followed the Greek language as far as I have ventured, although I am not wholly consistent, especially not when rendering well-known historical persons such as Aristotle, Alexander and Polybios. As for Greek nouns and personal names I am more consistent in following the Greek language. Greek transliterated words are according to common practice scripted in italics, but the frequently occurring words 'polis', 'demos', 'boule' and 'ekklesia' are not. As for references to inscriptions, I give the number of each inscription in bold to distinguish it from pages. Thus, TCal 89 means inscription no. 89, whereas TCal 89 means page no. 89, where comments are to be found. My own numberings of inscriptions, presented in appendices Al-4, are referred to in block letters, e.g., IASOS 1, in order to visually distinguish them from inscriptional corpora, e.g., IK Iasos 1. - As a non-native speaker I have taken every effort to write in standard English, but ask readers to be indulgent with any minor inconsistencies.

Abbreviations

ClMed ClRhodos

ABBREVIATIONS AA

AW

Archaologischer Anzeiger. Jahrbuch des Deutschen Archaologischen lnstituts, Berlin. American Journal of Archaeology, Princeton. American Journal of Philology, Baltimore. Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archaologischen Instituts. Athenische Abteilung, Berlin. Annuario della Scuola archeologica di Atene e delle missione italiane in Oriente, Rome. The Ancient World, Chicago.

BCH BE BICS BSA BullMuslmp

Bulletin de correspondance hellenique, Paris. Bulletin epigraphique, Paris (in REG). Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, London. Annual of the British School at Athens, London. Bulletino de/ Museo dell'Impero Romano, Rome.

AJA AJP AM ASAtene

Chiron 28, 1-3

Chiron 28, 4-23

Chiron 28, 24-26

Chiron 29, 1-11 Chiron 30, 1

Chiron 31a, 2-6

Chiron 31b, 1-3

Chiron 33, 1-19 CIG

C. Crowther, C. Habicht, L. & K. Hallof, 'Aus der Arbeit der "Inscriptiones Graecae" I. Drei Dekrete aus Kos fiir litKacnayroyoi', Chiron 28, 1998, 87-100. L. & K. Hallof, C. Habicht, 'Aus der Arbeit der "Inscriptiones Graecae" II. Ehrendekrete aus dem Asklepieion von Kos', Chiron 28, 1998, 101-142. L. & K. Hallof, C. Habicht, 'Aus der Arbeit der "Inscriptiones Graecae" III. Unedierte koische Epidosis-Listen', Chiron 28, 1998, 143-162. C. Crowther, 'Aus der Arbeit der "Inscriptiones Graecae" IV. Koan decrees for foreign judges', Chiron 29, 1999, 251-319. R. Parker & D. Obbink, 'Aus der Arbeit der "Inscriptiones Graecae" VI. Sales of priesthoods on Cos I', Chiron 30, 1990, 415-449. R. Parker & D. Obbink, 'Aus der Arbeit der "Inscriptiones Graecae" VII. Sales of priesthoods on Cos II', Chiron 31, 1991, 229-252. R. Parker & D. Obbink, 'Aus der Arbeit der "Inscriptiones Graecae" VIII. Three further inscriptions concerning Coan cults', Chiron 31, 1991, 253-275. D. Bosnakis & K. Hallof, 'Alte und neue Inschriften aus Kos I', Chiron 33, 2003, 203-245. Corpus lnscriptionum Graecarum, Berlin 1828-.

CP CPCActs CPCPapers

CR CRAI

9

Classica et mediaevalia. Revue damoise de philology et d'historie, Copenhagen Clara Rhodos. Studi e materiali pubblicati a cura dell' Istituto Storico-Archeologico di Rodi, Rhodes. Classical Philology, Chicago. Acts of the Copenhagen Polis Centre (in HJM),Copenhagen. Papers of the Copenhagen Polis Centre (Historia Einzelschriften), Stuttgart. The Classical Review, Oxford.

Academie des inscriptions et belles-lettres. Comptes rendus des seances, Paris 1858-.

Didyma

T. Wiegand (ed.), Didyma 2. Die Inschriften van Albert Rehm, Berlin 1958.

EA

Epigraphica Anatolica. Zeitschrift fiir Epigraphik und historische Geographie Anatoliens, Bonn.

FD FGH

Fouilles de Delphes, Paris 1902-. F. Jacoby (ed.), Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker, Berlin 1923-.

GaR GIBM

Greece & Rome, Oxford. C.T. Newton et al. (eds.), The collection of ancient Greek Inscriptions in the British Museum, Oxford 1874-1916.

H/M HG

Historisk-jilosojiske Meddelser, Copenhagen. R, Herzog, Heilige Gestze van Kos, Berlin 1928.

ICosED;EV !Cret

M. Segre, lscrizioni di Cos, I: Testa, 2: Tavole, Rome 1993. M. Guarducci (ed.), Inscriptiones Creticae 4 vols., Rome 1935-1950.

IK lasos

Inscriptions de Delos. Academie des inscriptions et belles-lettres. Fonds d'epigraphie grecque, Paris 1926Inscriptiones Graecae, Berlin 1873-. Inschriften griechischer Stadte aus Kleinasien, Bonn 1972. C. Biirker et al. (eds.), Die Inschriften van Ephesos (JK 12:2, 101-599), Bonn 1979; H. Engelmann et al. (eds.), (JK 13:3, 600-1000), 1980; R. Merkelbach et al. (eds.), (JK I 6:6, 2001-2958), 1980. H. Engelmann & R. Merkelbach (eds.), Die Inschr(ften von Erythrai und Klazomenai (JK 1-2), Bonn 1972-1973. W. Bltimel (ed.), Die Inschriften van Iasos 2 vols. (/K 28:

IKilion

1-2), Bonn 1985. P. Frisch (ed.), Die Inschriften von Ilion (IK 3), Bonn 1975.

IG IK IKEphesos

JK Erythrai

10

IK Kios IK Knidos IK Lampsakos IK Magnesia IKMylasa IK Smyrna IK Stratonikeia ILabraunda

!Magnesia !Olympia IPergamon IPriene IstMitt

Abbreviations

T. Carsten (ed.), Die Inschriften von Kios (IK 29), Bonn 1985. W. Bliimel (ed.), Die Inschriften von Knidos ([K 41), Bonn 1992. P. Frisch (ed.), Die Inschr(ften von Lampsakos (IK 6), Bonn 1978. T. Inken (ed.), Die Inschriften vonMagnesia am Sipylos ([K 8), Bonn 1978. W. Bliimel (ed.), Die Inschriften von Mylasa 2 vols. (IK 34--35), Bonn 1987-1988. G. Petz! (ed.), Die [nschriften von Smyrna 2 (IK 24), Bonn 1987. M. ~ahin (ed.), Die Inschriften van Stratonikeia I: Panamara (IK 21), Bonn 1981. J. Crampa, Labraunda. Swedish excavations and researches III:!, The Greek inscriptions I:1-2 (Period of Olympichos), III:2, The Greek inscriptions II:13-133, Lund 1969. 0. Kern, Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Maeander, Berlin 1900. W. Dittenberger & K. Purgold, Olympia V. Die Inschriften van Olympia, Berlin 1896. M. Frankel (ed.), Die Inschriften von Pergamon 8:1-2, (Altertiimer von Pergamon), Berlin 1890-1895. H. von Gaertringen, Inschriften van Priene, Berlin 1906.

Istanbuler Mitteilungen. Deutsches archiiologisches Institut. Abt. Istanbul, Tiibingen.

Abbreviations

LSJ

H.G. Liddell & R. Scott, revised by H.S. Jones, A Greek-English lexicon. With a revised supplement, Oxford 1996.

MAMA

Monumenta Asiae Minoris Antiqua, 10 vols., Manchester

Michel

MiletI:2 Mi/et I:3 MiletI:7 Mi/et I:9 MiletVI:l

MiletVI:2

NS

OCD3 OGIS

The Journal of Hellenic Studies, London. Journal of Roman Studies, London. PHIC

Kernos Kernos 10, 1997, 298-306, 219. Liege. KFF R. Herzog, Koische Forschungen und Funde, Leipzig 1899. Klee, Gymn. Agone T. Klee, Zur Geschichte der gymnischenAgone an griechischen Festen, Leipzig & Berlin 1918.

PHI

pp

LGPNl

P.M. Fraser & E. Matthews (eds.), A lexicon of Greek personal names I. The Aegean islands, Cyprus, Cyrenaica, Oxford 1987.

LIMC

Lexicon iconographicum mythologiae classicae, Zurich 19921999.

Lindos LSAM LSCG

Lindos: Fouilles et recherches 1902-1942. 2, Inscriptions 1, nos. 1-281; 2, nos. 282-710, Berlin 1941 F. Sokolowski, Lois sacrees de l'Asie Mineure, Paris 1955. F. Sokolowski, Lois sacrees des cites grecques, Paris 1969.

1928-1993. C. Michel, Recueil d'inscriptions grecques, Brussels 1900. H. Knackfuss, Das Rathaus van Milet, Berlin 1908. G. Kawerau & A. Rehm, Das Delphinion in Mi/et, Berlin 1914. H. Knackfuss, Der Siidmarkt und die benachbarten Bauanlagen, Berlin 1924. A v. Gerkan & F. Krischen, Thermen und Palaestren, Berlin 1928. Inschriften von Mi/et I. A. Rehm & H. Dessau, A. Inschr(ften n. 187--406; P. Herrmann, B. Nachtriige und Ubersetzungen zu den Inschriften n. 1--406, Berlin & New York 1997. P. Herrmann, Inschriften von Milet 2. Inschr(ften n. 407-1019, Berlin & New York 1998.

A. Maiuri, Nuova silloge epigrafica di Rodi et Cos, Florence 1925.

The Oxford Classical Dictionary 3rd ed., S. Hornblower (ed.), Oxford 1996.

OMS JHS IRS

11

Orientis Graeci inscriptiones selectae 1-2, W. Dittenberger, Leipzig 1903. L. Robert, Opera minora selecta. Epigraphie et antiquites grecques, Amsterdam.

W.R. Paton & E.L. Hicks, The inscriptions of Cos, Oxford 1891 (reprinted Zurich & New York 1990) Packard Humanities Institutes, CD-ROM PHI#7, 'Greek documentary texts', 300 Second St. Suite 200, Los Altos, CA 94022, tel. (650) 948--0150, e-mail: [email protected]. La para/a de/ passato. Rivista di studi antichi, Naples.

REA REG RivFil RPhil

Revue des titudes anciennes, Bordeaux. Revue des etudes grecques, Paris.

SBBerl

Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen (Deutschen) Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Berlin. Supplementum epigraphicum Graecum.

SEG

Rivista di.filologia e d'istruzione classica, Torino. Revue de philologie de litterature et d'histoire anciennes, Paris.

I I

Staatsvertr/ige 2

Staatsvertriige 3

SVF Syl/3

H. Bengtson, Die Staatsvertriige des Altertums 3. Die Vertriige der griechisch-riimischen Welt van 700 bis 338 v.Chr., Munich & Berlin 1962. H.H. Schmitt, Die Staatsvertriige des Altertums 3. Die Vertriige der griechisch-riimischen Welt van 338 bis 200 v.Chr., Munich 1969. H. v. Arnim (ed.), Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, 4 vols., 1903-1924. W. Dittenberger (ed.), Sy/loge inscriptionum Graecarum, 3rd ed., Leipzig 1915-1921.

TLG

Tituli Asiae Minoris, Vienna 1901-. Transactions of the American Philological Association, Boston. M. Segre, Tituli Calymnii (ASAtene 22-23, NS 6--7, 1944-1945), Bergamo 1952. Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, http://www.tlg.uci.edu/.

ZPE

Zeitschrift far Epigraphik und Papyrologie, Bonn.

TAM

TAPA TCal

1. SETTING AND SOURCES 1

I !

Today democracy is a celebrated feature of society, which our Western world claims to be the instigator of. Attempts are currently made to export our model of democracy to other parts of the world, or impose it on them. In this context it is worth remembering that both a certain degree of freedom from external restraint and acertain degree of material welfare are agreed upon as essential prerequisites for the emergence of democracy. Another factor which promotes democratic development is a negotiated assumption of power and not violent political changes. These requirements were valid also for ancient societies. Democracy, however, is not a state which can be achieved once and for all or be taken for granted; even in countries like Sweden with a relatively long tradition of democratic government, democracy is a state which constantly must be fought for and recaptured. Worth considering is also that the Greeks participated actively in political life, whereas the ordinary modem citizen may confine his or her participation to going to the polls every fourth year. The time dimension also differs; the period in which democracy was practised in ancient Greece was far more prolonged than the period in which the modern world has hitherto practised popular government. The focus of this thesis is on the existence and working of democracy in hellenistic western Asia Minor and the nearby islands in general and in some of the Greek city-states within this area in particular. This has necessitated a closer look at the concepts of and factual existence of autonomy, autonomia, and freedom, eleutheria. The present study is mainly based on decrees cut in stone enacted by the councils and the assemblies of the city-states. These decrees opened with democratic formulas, commonly e.lio~E'tfj1j3ou1cfi1 Kat 0&1li11µro1, 'resolved by the council and the demos'. However, before presenting the nature of the sources, approaches to historical writing, methods, hypotheses and the outline of the thesis, something should be said about the scholarly outlook on the hellenistic period and hellenistic democracy.

1.1 HELLENISTIC DEMOCRACY -FACT OR FICTION? In his Geschichte des Hellenismus ( 1836-1843), Johan-Gustaf Droysen labelled the period between 323 and 30 BC 'Hellenismus'. 2 He saw this period as a Graeco-Oriental cultural fusion, which was a forerunner of and a requirement for the spread of Christianity, and he therefore viewed it in a positive light. Due to 'Hellenism' the

2

I am greatfu1to Prof. ChristianHabicht, Prof. Klaus Hallof and not the least to Prof. Peter J. Rhodes, who all generosusly have contributedwith comments on differentdetails. J.G. Droysen, Geschichte des Hellenismus, vol.!, 1836, vol. 2 1843, and a second edition including vol. 3 in 1877.

,-14

15

1. Setting and Sources

1.1 Hellenistic democracy -fact or fiction?

Greek language became the lingua franca, and the New Testament was written in koine in order to facilitate the spread of its religious message. Subsequent classical scholars, however, used the word 'Hellenismus' with another import. They considered the classical period as the Golden Age, and the period that followed was viewed as a period of decline. According to this reasoning, the conquest of the Greek world by Rome was a natural consequence of this decline. 3 Certainly, eventually the Romans did annex Asia Minor, but the 'conquest' was a matter of gradual, and in the beginning reluctant, involvement and expansion over a long period of time - the last two centuries BC. The negative view on the hellenistic period included also the opinions on political life. Traditionally, scholars have mainly associated ancient Greek democracy with Athens and the classical period (c. 480-330). Generally it is also assumed that the Greek city-states lost their independence and political importance in connection with, or even before, the Macedonian conquest in the 330s. Thereby one of the essential conditions for democracy was lost. This reasoning depends heavily on which outlook on the hellenistic period one has. Was the Greek world of city-states conquered and subordinated to the hellenistic kings? Or was self-government still within the range of possibility? As we shall see, opinions among scholars of Greek history differ. The literature dealing with Athenian democracy is plentiful, but literature that treats ancient Greek political systems outside Athens is scarce. This is partly due to a methodological problem. The sources concerning classical Athens are outstanding in their abundance, and Athens is the only city-state for which the sources are sufficient enough to allow us to make a more comprehensive (re)construction of the constitution. Roger Brock and Stephen Hodkinson call this wealth of material "the tyranny of the evidence" because it offers "a more secure niche for academic specialization".4 This is certainly true, but considering the concentration on the classical period it may also be a matter of attitude towards the different kinds of sources. It seems to me that we are more ready to accept the sources that treat the classical period, which are mostly literary, than-those concerning the hellenistic, which are dominated by the epigraphic material as evidence. The interest in ancient Athenian democracy is also due to the political and cultural discourse of the twentieth century when democratic Athens came to be regarded as an ancestor and a source of inspiration for modern political thought. During the early modern periods, however, the attitudes towards democratic government were negative. Even the democratic movements one hundred years ago were anxious to avoid the excess of direct democracy, and one may suppose that in this context representative bodies were constructed. 5 The height of tbe scholarly interest during the last decades was reached at

the beginning of the 1990s, when the 2500th anniversary of the supposed foundation of the Athenian demokratia was celebrated in Western Europe and North America.6 But to be fair, already in antiquity there was a great interest among authors, even from outside Athens, in Athens and Athenian matters. Except for scattered articles and brief treatments, there are only two monographs which are devoted to non-Athenian democracies and periods other than the classical: The Origins and Development of Ancient Greek Democracy by James O'Neil, 7 and The First Democracies. Early Popular Governme;,t Outside Athens by Eric Robinson. 8 O'Neil briefly examines the origins of democracy and its various forms in ancient Greece including Athens, and its development from the archaic to the hellenistic period. Robinson traces the earliest examples of democratic government. According to him, eighteen states with convincing evidence had popular government before 480, some of them antedating the Athenian demokratia. One important volume when studying Greek democracy is The Decrees of the Greek States by Peter Rhodes-(with the late David Lewis). 9 He has collected evidence for decreemaking language and procedures from all the Greek states, covering the period from the seventh century BC to the third century AD. In the third part of the book, which deals with the Greek world outside Athens, Rhodes summarizes and analyses the contents of the decrees from that vast area. It is true that Rhodes treats all sorts of constitutions, but as the main thread of the book he regards democracy as the norm for many of the Greek city-states. Besides presenting a generally Athenocentric view of ancient Greek democracy, many modern scholars also assert that Greek democracy began to decline with the beginning of the hellenistic period. 10 One representative of this opinion is

3

Cartledge et al. 1997, 2f., sets out this theme thoroughly in the 'Introduction' with valuable references. Chester Starr 1991, has in A history of the ancient world devoted a chapter to 'The end of the golden age', i. e., the end of the classical period. Striking is the title of the English

translationof ChristianMeier's book Athens. A portrait of the city in its Golden Age, Berlin & 4 5

London 2000, first published in 1993 as Ein Neubeginn der Weltgeschichte. Brock & Hodkinson 2000, 4. Brock & Hodkinson 2000, 6.

6

Brock & Hodkinson 2000, 6.

7

O'Neil 1995.

8

Robinsoll 1997.

9 Rhodes 1997. 10

E.g., de Ste. Croix 1981, 300-326, passim, althollgh he is not completely Athenocentric in his

approach; Jones, 1940, 168, 170; Finley 1985, 140; Gruen 1984, 132-142. According to Austin 1981 53, n. 1, and Burstein, 1985 16, n. 5, the word 'democracy' had lost its meaning in the hellenistic period; Green 1990, 632, on the late Hellenistic period: "Democracy once taken for granted as an inalienable civic right ... , now seemed little more than a quaint historical memory amid lhe universal bureaucratic rule Of autocratic monarch, oligarchic group, or business consortium." See page 746, n. 19 for references to a dissimilar view; Morris 1992, 148 " .. .in Athens by growing popular power, ... Such democratization may have been less important elsewhere."; O'Neil 1995, 103-12Q, t;.g., p.114: "Hellenistic politics were usually dominated by a small number well-to-dos families and their friends, a revision to the earliest pattern of democratic political life in the sixth century"; Hihm ·2000, 457, maintains that one of the changing political conditions in the hellenishc period was the disappearance of the distinction between democracy, aristocracy and oligarchy. He claims that democracy remained as a political institution in some city-states, which nevertheless was dominated by a rich elite. The positions on democracy presented in general encyclopaedias of ancient history have an impact on scholars within the academic field Who are not specialised in the hellenistic period, and should thus be mentioned: In The Oxford Classical Dictionary (1996), Hansen holds the opinion that Athenian democracy was almost forgotten between 322 BC and c. AD 1850. On non-Athenian and post-classical democracy, however, Hornblower & Spawforth writes in the same volume that:

16

1. Setting and Sources

1.2 The epigraphic sources

O'Neil. In his brief discussion on heJlenistic democracy, he claims that democracy did not survive in its proper sense after the death of Alexander. According to him, even if democracy was occasionally formally revived, popular participation was low and the politics were dominated by a rich elite. 11 One problem when we consider these claims by O'Neil is his unfortunate lack of references, above all to ancient sources. Another, general, question is how we define democracy. Is it possible to reach an agreement on this, when some people think that not even well-documented Athens was a real democracy, mainly because of the exclusion of the major part of the population, namely women, resident foreigners .and slaves, from political ~? .

early hellenistic period. According to them, the change in domestic politics came later, about 150, due to the expansion of the Romans. 14Christian Habicht puts the line of change even further ahead. He stresses that the difference between the classical and the late hellenistic period was not as clear-cut as is usually proposed. He claims that even in classical democracy, politics were dominated by an elite and that education and property played an important role in the opportunities for active participation.15 A similar approach was taken by the late David Lewis who discussed the epigraphic evidence for democracy in the hellenistic period. He agreed with the opinion that the Greek states in the heUenistic period maintained to be democratic and began their decrees with democratic formulas, but that these decrees were formulated by a limited number of persons to which the demos only gave its consent. Lewis admitted, however, that there had been no closer analysis of this matter. In his work he raised a very important question which I consider central to the issue of democracy iri hellenistic Greece: if the democratic formulas in the hellenistic period concealed the domination of the few, how can we know that this was not also the case in earlier periods? 16 It is, however, not an exceptional idea to imagine that people born into wealthy and influential families have much greater opportunities and capacity to reach important positions and convey issues in the political institutions. In my opinion this does not imply opposition to a democratic constitution per se. One can also turn the question the other way round: if the democratic formulas in the classical period revealed democratic government, how can we know that this was not also the case in later periods? My hypothesis is that democracy was a customary form of political organization in many of the Greek po leis of the hellenistic period. As for the cities in western Asia Minor, democracy seems both to have arisen and flourished particularly in this era.

Even though the traditional negative image of the hellenistic period is persistent, there is a wealth of old and new research that depicts a much more nuanced and different image. Various scholars on epigraphy have Jong since been conscious of the complex political institutions and processes in the hellenistic city-states, but their results are to a large extent directed to specialists and are difficult to grasp for people outside their profession. During the last fifteen years, however, increasing scholarly interest in the hellenistic period has resulted in a large amount of more easily comprehensible publications, presenting new research on various aspects of the period. 12 The allocation of historical time into specific periods is, needless to say, a modern invention. The limits between the periods are often attached to political events, such as change of power, which are considered decisive. As for the border between the classical and hellenistic periods, that is, the takeover by Alexander in the 330s, it may not necessarily have involved a radical change of life within the poleis. This is shown by Franz G. Maier, Philippe Gauthier, Leopold Migeotte and Peter Rhodes, each of whom has studied a special kind of topic from inscriptions. All four concluded that there was no break in the pattern of actions of the poleis between the two periods, but rather continuity. 13 Gauthier and Rhodes point out that there was no particular distinction in political life in Greece between the classical and the

"Democracy or people's power was not an Athenian monopoly or even invention .... Even Ill the HeJlenistic period ... there was .. more democratic life in Greece (Athens included) than often is realized."; Der Neue Pauly (3, 1997), shows a somewhat indecisive position: "In hell. Zeit behielt der Begriff d. zuweilen, aber nicht tmmer, seine eigentliche Bedeutung .... Einige Texte bezeichnen mit dem Wort d. einfach eine verfassungsrnaBige, nicht notwendigerweise demokratische Regierungsform ... ". Lately, some scholars have drawn attention to not only the Athenocentric view, but also the prevailing Hellenocentric view on the emergence and existence of democracy, see Hornblower 1993, 2; Robinson 1997, 16-25; Schemeil 1999, 2000.

11 O'Neil 1995, 103-120, e.g., 105,114,116,117. 12

Disregarding articles, some examples of new research are those presented in the two series Hellenistic culture and society, Berkeley & London 1990-, hitherto 45 volumes, and Studies in hellenistic civilization, Aarhus 1990-, hitherto nine volumes. Some other important contributions are Habicht 1995b; Ma 1999; Bremen 1996; Buraselis 2000; Bresson & Descat 2001;

13

Maier 1959-61, the evidence for the building of fortifications; Migeotte 1984, 1992, subscrip- , tions for common purposes; Gauthier 1985, the benefactors of the Greek cities; Rhodes 1997, the decrees of the Greek states.

Bosworth 2002; Ogden 2002;. Dignas 2002; Erskine 2003.

17

1.2 THE EPIGRAPHIC SOURCES

The criteria of selection and the methods I have used will be discussed continually throughout the thesis when called for, but something should be said in general about the nature of and the problems and advantages connected with this source material. In contrast to ancient literary sources which are often written many years after the course of events they describe and which are known only from medieval manuscripts, inscriptions are original texts and thus constitute not only sources, but also archaeological artefacts. Inscriptions reflect certain events or resolutions, usually recorded in direct connection. They may also constitute accounts, lists or dedications and the like, which for some reason were considered worth documenting on stone. and displaying in public. One disadvantage when depending heavily on epigraphic material is that decrees reflect only decisions that were agreed upon, seem14 Gauthier 1993, 211-231; Rhodes 1993, 173f.; Rhodes 1997, 533,542. 15 Habicht 1995a, 87-92. 16

Lewis 1997, 57f.; For a discussion concerning the existence of a ruling elite in Athens, see

Ober 1989, 14---17,334f,; Habicht 1995a, 87-92.

18

19

1. Setting and Sources

1.2 The epigraphic sources

ingly in consensus. Possible debates which preceded the passing of a decree or disagreement about the decision are not traceable, nor are issues brought to discussion which were not passed. Decrees and other documents were recorded on non-durable material in the first hand. A decree cut in stone is just a copy of an original document recorded on such a perishable medium. One may presuppose that all issues decided on by the polis were documented and filed. Some of those records were set up temporarily for public display and some were stored directly in the state archives. Peter Rhodes has studied epigraphic and literary evidence for archives, and found a number of media, some more perishable than others. He suggests that certain kinds of media were used for certain kinds of records. 17 Thus, there is great uncertainty as to how representative the preserved inscriptions are with regard to both the number of inscriptions produced and the number of decrees that were issued. Nevertheless, they provide almost the only information available on constitutional and political matters in the hellenistic poleis. As for the representativeness of different kinds of inscriptions, Angelos Chaniotis has made a survey of the epigraphic documents of Krete. From the late eighth to the late fifth century the inscriptions contain mainly texts of laws and decrees. During the subsequent period lasting to the end of the fourth century, the number of surviving inscriptions is extremely small. A totally different pattern is attested from around 300 and continues during the last three centuries BC. The number of inscriptions increases dramatically; the laws disappear and are replaced by treaties, both between Kretan cities and between Krete and other Greek states. 18 In the Kretan case a change in the epigraphic habit is beyond doubt. We do have enough inscriptions from both the period before the late fifth century and the period after 300 to be able to perceive a pattern, and the topics differ clearly. It is likely that in Krete the surviving record comes close to what was considered worth inscribing on stone in the different periods, namely, laws in the early time and treaties in the hellenistic period. The custom of the poleis to set up decrees cut in stone in public places such as in the agora and at the theatre is strongly connected with democratic government; oligarchic regimes are not presumed to have had this habit. 19 One may, however, question the usefulness of written records in a mainly oral society with a presumed

low degree of literacy. The degree of literacy has been disputed, but even if far from everyone could read, there were those who could mediate the contents to the illiterate. The existence of a decree set up in a public space had also significance in itself, not only concretely, but also from a psychological perspective: the visibility meant that decisions taken in the assembly were made common knowledge and thus the actions by the--statewere not concealed. In addition, this openness prevented violations of the laws. Some inscriptions were monumental in character, both with regard to their size and to their relievo ornamentation. The visible monuments contributed to the collective memory and identity of the polis and its members, and they sent messages to the inhabitants of the polis and to observers from outside. 20 Many inscriptions are incomplete and fragmentary, and they are also often difficult to date more than roughly. When approaching this source material the historian is usually dependent on the epigraphist, and the printed edition of an inscription as well as the commentary is crucial. In the schools of editing inscriptions there are two extremes. These are humorously labelled by Sterling Dow as 'The Kirchner Principle', which has small restorations of occasional letters without any need of defence, and the 'Principle of Extreme Freedom' where attention is focused not on the exact wording but on what one thought was the original substance. 21 I will stress the importance of distinguishing between what actually can be read on the stone and what someone has restored. Regardless of the problems, inscriptions are of great value. Inscriptions have some advantages over written sources since they usually are contemporaneous with the event they record and thus considerably more direct. When they can be firmly dated and the provenience is certain, the decrees give us, among other things, information on institutions, officials and procedures in the states, and they are sources for various cults and interstate relations. Moreover, personal names may provide information on the status and roles of individuals in society and genealogical relationships may be established. The most common form of inscription which will turn up in the present investigation is the honorific. This is not surprising as publicity was part of the honour. As a category it may seem unimportant, but the underlying reasons for granting the honours reveal the political praxis, the situation within a state, relations between states, and vis-a-vis hegemons. In this material a number of dichotomies are present - conflict-consensus, egoism-altruism, power-dependence - revealing the omnipresent tensions in human societies. Certain features, reflecting these tensions, turn out to be more typical for the hellenistic than for the earlier period and reflect the city-states' concern for the relations to their neighbours. One of these is the sending of judges to cities that were unable to settle pending law cases. Another important element was the institution of arbitration; citizens of a city were invited as judges to mediate and arbitrate between other cities in conflict, or between cities and hegem-

17 Rhodes, 2001. 18 Chaniotis 1999, 287-88. 19

See for instance Harvey 1966; Finley 1977; Thomas 1989; Hedrick, 1994, 1999, 2000. He has in one case study found that during the reign of Demetrios from Phaleron 317-307, there arc extremely few inscriptions from Athens preserved and that this should reflect the anti-democratic regime. Democracy was restored 307 and from that time and until 301 the assembly was

very active, and as much as one hundreddecrees arepreservedfrom the period;Tracy 2000, has studied the same phenomenon, but concludes that the lack of inscriptions from Demetrios' reign had economic and not ideological reasons. He points out that Demetrios even restricted private expensive funeral monuments. We know that decrees of democratic Athens were put down in connection with oligarchic rebellions, and thus 'oligargich' inscriptions may also have been exposed to some sort of damnatio memoriae by a subsequent democratic regime (proposed by Dr. H. Lejdegii.rd).

20

For other aspects of inscriptions on display other than the technical or literary see for instance Osborne 1999; Davies 2003.

21

Dow 1969.

20

21

1. Setting and Sources

1.3 The layout

ons. 22 The honouring of foreign judges or other foreigners who had assisted in different ways was often manifested in grants of proxenia or citizenship. Many cities tried also to ensure the inviolability of their sanctuaries or of their territories, socalled asylia. 23 Treaties between states, a common feature in the classical period, continued to be concluded in the hellenistic period. In these, exchange of collective citizenship between cities, isopoliteia, was frequently established, 24 and horrwnoia, concord between cities, or within a city, was another feature common to treaties and official oaths. 25 The most comprehensive of treaties between po leis concerns that of symmachia, an offensive and defensive alliance. The royal letter to the cities, and their answers, is another important category of inscriptions, which reflects the diplomatic language and the relation between the Greek cities and the kings. 26 It has been suggested that the increase in these different categories of decrees in the hellenistic period, was a consequence of the politically unsettled times, and an ambition for peace. 27 Certainly, the obvious actions taken to avoid and solve conflicts are in themselves an indication that it was called for. However, the state of war amongst the Greeks had 'always' been a normality, and measures taken to establish alliances and settle conflicts were certainly no new phenomena, although the evidence for them are mainly from the hellenistic period. 28

base of 'Greek documentary texts' on the CD-ROM PHI#?. 29 This edition from 1996 covers at least 75 percent of the recovered inscriptions. 30 The great advantage of this method is that it results in a good overview of a rather large area in a safe and relatively fast way. The electronic search has been supplemented by manually searching through foremost the more recent editions of the periodicals Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum (SEG), Chiron, Zeitschrift far Papyrologie und Epigraphik (ZPE), Bulletin Epigraphique (BE), and L'Annee Philologique. Checks against the catalogue in The Decrees by the Greek States have also been made. 31 Thus, even if not succeeding in finding all relevant inscriptions, I have tried to minimize the falling off. 32 I have refrained from using inscriptions which I find too fragmentary in the decisive parts. Some of these restored inscriptions, however, have been accepted by scholars as evidence for different phenomena. Many inscriptions are edited and re-edited in a large number of different publications, but for lucidity I have chosen to give references to regional corpora, to IG or to SEG. When appropriate, I occasionally also give the PHI reference. The selection of inscriptions in chapter 7 (appendices Al-4) has been given its own numbering system, referred to as IASOS 1-62, KALYMNA 1-42, KOS 1-90, MILETOS 1-46. To integrate empiricism and theory is crucial but difficult, and my point of departure and approach are different for different parts of the thesis. The present text begins with general issues and concluding with specific ones. The aim is to create a framework as well as a comprehension of the context and prerequisites for hellenistic democracy. To do so !·overhaul and examine certain central definitions, that is, those of democracy, independence and sovereignty, and how they were used in antiquity and today in general. Modern definitions of both ancient and modern democracy are variable and sometimes blurred. Thus, one aim is to make visible some of these definitions and to approach the most fundamental of them. Among the ancient authors Aristotle is our most important source for political thinking and theory. He discusses not only Athens but also many other Greek city-states and other forms of constitutions than democracy, and a considerable part is devoted to his political theories. A certain degree of freedom from external control is considered a prerequisite for democratic government, and the Greeks did in fact associate the concepts of freedom and democracy with each other. To establish the existence of the Greek nouns autonomia, 'independence' (in part eleutheria, 'freedom') and demokratia in the epigraphic material from the Greek cities of Asia Minor and the adjacent islands, I have collected and listed them separately in chronological order. Further, to

1.3 THE LAYOUT Methods and hypotheses This thesis, e){cept for chapter 2, is hard-core empirical in nature and heavily based on epigraphic material. The temporal focus is of course the hellenistic period; polis decrees of the classical and Roman imperial periods occur in a few cases, however, and since they are of interest for comparison I have included them as well. Inscriptions are selected on the basis of certain chosen criteria to establish both the presence of certain phenomena and to prove possible chronological changes (to be presented shortly in brief and more closely in the respective chapters). The method of systematically selecting relevant inscriptions, presented and discussed in above all chapters 3, 4, 5, and 7 (collected in appendices Al-4) and in appendix C, has primarily been performed by searching for certain keywords and formulas in the data-

22

23 24 25 26 27

28

Arbitrations collected by Piccirilli 1973; Ager 1996; Magnetto 1997. Earlier collections but with access to a poorer source material by Raeder 1912 and Tod 1913. For Greek arbitration in conflicts including a hegemon, see chapter 5.2. Collected by Rigsby 1996. See for instance Gawantka 1975. The widespread cult of Hornonia shows the Greeks' concern for this state, Th6riault 1996. Welles 1934. Giovannini1993, 256-286, who interprets these features as an expression of the social relations among the poleis, and that the dominant characteristic is solidarity and readiness to help each other. See eh. 5.1.

29

30 31 32

The CD-ROM PHI#? contains c.220,000 Greek inscriptions and papyri. Packard Humanities Institute (PHI), 300 Second St. Suite 200, Los Altos, CA 94022, tel. (650) 948-0150, e-mail: [email protected]. PC and Mac demand different kinds of software to read the PHI and TLG (Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, i. e., Greek literary texts), see http://www.tlg.uci.edu/~tlg/Software.html#Ibycus (accessed February 21, 2005). I have used Musaios 2002A, http://www.musaios.com/. Oral information at the International Summer School for Epigraphy, CSAD, Oxford July 2001. Rhodes 1997, although we are not wholly in agreement. Since this was written a number ofKoan inscriptions have been available, they m-enot included in my investigation.

23

1. Setting and Sources

1.3 The layout

evaluate the nature of interstate and international relations, certain actions by the Greek poleis in the same area will be examined as possible expressions of independence. My principal hypothesis is that democracy existed in the hellenistic period and that we can gain an understanding of it through the epigraphic material. To reiterate: democracy was a customary form of political organization in many of the Greek pole is of the hellenistic period. In the cities of western Asia Minor, democracy seems both to have arisen and flourished particularly in this era. To establish this, four city-states - Iasos, Kalymna, Kos and Miletos - have been chosen. A number of criteria, presented in chapter seven, have been applied to the epigraphic material of these city-states to evaluate the nature of their constitutions. The most important of these criteria is the enactment formula which indicates that what follows has been enacted as a decree and specifies the ratifying body. The enactment formula is essentially considered to represent a democratic procedure, and the most frequent is Moxi:: sijt ~otJ1cijtKa11rot &1\µrot,'resolved by the council and the demos'. Another important criterion is the motion formula which contains the wording of the resolution voted on by the council and the assembly, e. g., oi::Mxom sfit ~otJ1cijtKat s&t oiJµrot, Ks1c,'let it be resolved by the cmmcil and the assembly, that ... '. A third significant feature given in the decrees is information about the proposer or mover of the motion, which either is a board of officials or an individual. Decrees from the four city-states containing these and other criteria are collected and arranged chronologically. The respective account and analysis are made thematically, and will be concluded by a comparative discussion of all four city-states. Our varying outlook on different parts of history is essential, and in the initial section of this chapter I discussed the allocation of history into periods and our different evaluation of these periods. As mentioned earlier, democratic formulas of the classical period are genera1Jy considered to represent democratic government, but the same formulas of the hellenistic period are not. Certainly, a Greek city which issues democratically formulated decrees can be considered democratic in a formal sense, but if the pressure from an external power is too severe it has a limiting effect also on the democracy; if a polis is not free to decide on important questions, including foreign matters, the polis is only a nominal democracy. Therefore, it is important to consider the degree of independence for each polis as well as the contents of the decrees. Without anticipating the outcome of the case study, it should be mentioned that decrees of the poleis examined decrease considerably in number from around the middle of the second century and onwards. This fits the analysis made by Gauthier and others that there was a change in Greek political life in the middle of the second century. 33 The decrease in decrees corresponds chronologically with the growing power of Rome in Asia Minor. The province of Asia was established in 129, a matter which may have terminated the Greek cities' independence. During the constantly shifting hellenistic hegemonies, individual poleis had been able to manoeuvre fairly well - the kings certainly seized power by violence, but they were also

dependent on loyal allies among the Greek cities. A sole hegemon did not have the same need for local collaborators, and within the Roman province one can expect that the possibilities of self-governing were reduced. Besides the infrequency in decrees one may also expect a change of the topics that were treated. However, the lack of polis decrees from this period is not only significant in itself; it also implies that it becomamrccicmv6T]µoKpmiav· EA.£u0cpim;OEµEv -rOEv µEJ)c1&pxccr8m1ea't Opxciv. (1317a4O-13 l 7b3). 55 Transl. Simpson 1997. 6A1yapxiai;µEvollv c'iOT] wcra'U-ra Ka'tOT]µoKpmiai;· o'UOei OEAav00'.VELV On rcoAAaxo'll cruµ~E~T]KEV 00cr't"£ 'IT]v µEvrcoAt-rdav'tTlvKet't"O: wlli; v6µoui; µT\ 6T]µonKT\v

35

Table 1. Aristoteles' taxonomy of oligarchies and democracies in the Politics Oligarchy

Pol.

Democracy

Pol.

-

-

A first democracy in which equality is given to rich and poor alike.

129lb3O-38

1293al3-2O

Ancestral (patria), magistrates are chosen from those who have the highest census class (timema); the people are made up of farmers.

129lb39-41, 1292b22-33

2

Those who own propertyare 1293a22-26 fewer and the properties are greater.They claim to make aggrandisementfor themselves, but still law rules.

All citizens are eligible to hold office if they, through euthyne, are found to be qualified by birth.The law rules.

129lb411292al, 1292b34--38

3

Propertyqualificationis still 1293a26--3O All citizens are eligible to hold higher. The officials keep the office. The law rules. offices among themselves as they, according to law, are appointedhereditarilyfrom father to son

1292a2-3, 1292b38-4O

4

The poWeris in the hands of a very few rich men; it is a dynasty close to monarchy. Human beings rule.

1292a4, 1292b411293a9

1 A large number of people own property,but in smaller amounts.Amultitude of people share in the government. The law rules.

1293a30-32

Final or newest democracy. There is pay for office and the citizen body is large, made up of craftsmen and labourers. The masses, not the laws rule.

The first type of each constitution is of a moderate kind and the differences between the two are rather small and the law rules. The fourtb type is extremes in diverging directions concerning the opportunities to take part in politics - oligarchies are increasingly narrow and democracies are increasingly participatory, but the two extremes have in common that human beings, not law, rule. The second and third types of each constitution make up intermediate forms. It should be mentioned tbat Aristotle also refers to a democracy (unnumbered in the table) in which poor and rich are equally in control, but since the populace is always in majority, he defines

dvm, 610:OE-rOiWoi;Ka'tTIJvc'tyroyllv rcoAtw'llecr0mOT]µO'tTKffii;, Oµolmr;OErcO:Atv reap&AAoti; 'tllv µEv Ka't"O. wlli; vOµoui;clvm rcoAi-rciavOriµonKo:rtEpav, Tij 6 Clyroy'TI Kat wii; E0ccrtv 6).tyapxelcr0m µfi),).ov. (1129bll-17).

-.------

36

37

2. Democracy then and now

2.1 Thoughts on demokratia in antiquity

the regime as a democracy. However, Aristotle omits this 'pure' form from the subsequent more elaborate discussion on democracies, and it can readily be seen as an intellectual experiment. As mentioned earlier, a fundamental principle of democratic government is freedom - one element of this freedom is to rule and be ruled by turn; the other is the freedom to live as one likes. These two criteria, according to Aristotle, are definitions of the government which all advocates of democracy agree upon ( 1317a401317b 11). Leaving the various types of democracies aside, Aristotle summarizes the following elements as democratic (13 l 7bl 7--40):

this is the case to an even higher degree concerning democracy. In this context it is important to distinguish between which constitution Aristotle held to be the best and most desirable in theory, and which of those existing in reality he preferred. As mentioned earlier, democracy and oligarchy were the most prevalent constitutions, and to these he gave more attention than to for instance aristocracy and kingship. The highly esteemed politeia was infrequent and can be considered a hypothetical ideal. Aristotle's statement that democracy is a deviant constitution (1279b4-10) has been used to confirm the prevailing opinion of his negative attitude to democratic governing. However, to my mind the content of the Politics gives a different

I. 2. 3. 4. 5.

All choose leaders among all. All rule over all by turn. The officials are elected by lot. The holding of offices is not dependent on property. The offices are short-termed and can only be held by the same man once or twice. 6. All are judges, chosen among all, and judging in all sorts of cases. 7. The assembly has the sovereign power in all matters. 8. Payment is given for political service.

Aristotle does not define 'all' (pantas), but implies a citizenship without any restriction of census class. The criteria given by Aristotle are useful when considering ancient forms of government and are used in one way or another, more or less explicitly, by modem scholars of ancient history. The constitution that Aristotle calls politiea (often regarded as the government he prefers) does not, in his view, come into existence very often (1293a40--41). It is defined differently in various passages in the Politics. Firstly, he describes politeia as the many ruling to the advantage of the whole community (1279a37); secondly, he says that it is a mixture between oligarchy and democracy (1293b33); and thirdly, the mixed regime is made up of those who bear arms (1297bl). Thus, it should be considered as a mixture of rich and poor, the latter wealthy enough to possess arms. The defining principle of a good combination is that you can call the same constitution oligarchy and democracy, and each of the extremes is revealed in it (1294b1318). Accordingly, taken together politeia and (at least) the first form of democracy could be considered as equivalent. 56 Aristotle also points out the change in terminology. He says that, due to population increase as well as the growing strength of those who possessed heavy arms, more people came to share in the government, and that is why what we nowadays call politiea, our predecessors called democracy (1297b22-25). Thus, the opinions on what criteria define a democracy were, and still are, variable and complex. Which regime Aristotle considered to be the best is a matter of scholarly dispute, and evidence to support various opinions is found in the Aristotelian corpus. Many scholars claim that politeia is the constitution Aristotle preferred. Certainly, there is no lack of positive expounding on politeia (e. g., 1293b21-1294b41), but 56

See also Lintott 2000 on Aristotle's theory of the politeia.

impression.

Aristotle weighs the pros and cons of the different regimes. He concludes that the multitude should have authority rather than those who are best and few in number. He expounds this essentially as follows: None of the many is individually a man of excellence, but each of the many has a part of excellence and intelligence, and when they join together they become like a single person. For this reason a mass (ochlos) can judge many things better than any one man. Additionally, the many are less likely to be corrupted and overwhelmed by anger or other emotions, which can exert an influence on the individual's decision-making. However, in the same volume Aristotle also says that the multitude should not have a share in the highest offices because of their injustice and imprudence. On the other hand he maintains that states which are filled with poor not sharing the political power are unstable. Therefore, he says, they should take part in deliberative and judicial functions of government (1281a40-1282a24, 1286a28-37). Doubtlessly, this is a defence of democracy. Bates takes this even further. He suggests that the way Aristotle arranges his arguments in book 3 of the Politics also meets the criteria for the best and most choice worthy regime. Aristotle's central thesis that a human being is by nature a political animal also bears witness to his preference for a radical participatory democracy. 57 Political stability and change Aristotle is concerned with stable political conditions, and the fundamental condition is the composition of the citizen body. He observes that all cities are made up of three categories of citizens: the exceedingly well-off, the exceedingly poor, and those in the middle between them (1295bl-2). The middle is less tempted to go to extremes, and therefore the political community that is based on the middle is the best. Aristotle claims that, in those cities capable of being well governed, the middle element is larger and stronger than the extremes. In such cities the middle tips the balance and prevents the emergence of an excess of the opposite extremes. It is of importance that the citizens possess a moderate amount of wealth, because if some have a lot and others have none, the result will be the most 'recent' forms of democracy and oligarchy, and tyranny can result from these two extremes, which is less likely to happen from moderate systems of government (1295b34-1296a5). Of the two prevailing forms of government, democracies are more stable and last 57

Bates 2003, 2, 122f.

39

2. Democracy then and now

2.1 Thoughts on demokratia in antiquity

longer than oligarchies, since in a democracy those in the middle are more numerous and have a greater share in honours. Democracies are also less prone to factional conflicts (stasis) than oligarchies, because in an oligarchy there are two types of possible conflict: between the oligarchs themselves and between the oligarchs and the people. In a democracy there is only risk of conflict between citizens favouring democracy and citizens favouring oligarchy, and no serious factional conflict arises in the people against themselves ( l 302a8- l 3). Aristotle also emphasizes that the best legislators, exemplified by Solon, Lykourgos and Charondas, come from the middle citizens (1296a13-16). He also maintains that stability demands that those who are going to rule in the controlling offices should foremost be friendly towards the established regime (1309a33-34). Furthermore he declares that to exist and last, a democracy as well as an oligarchy needs both the well off and the multitude. To secure stability the regimes ought to defuse their hostilities towards the opposite party. In a democracy the leaders should always seem to be speaking on behalf of the well off, and correspondingly, in an oligarchy the leaders should be held to be spokesmen for the people (1309b37-1310a8). Irrespective of regime, however, Aristotle claims that education relative to the regime is the separate most important element for preserving a system of government, since even the most beneficial and widely approved laws bring no benefit if people are not accustomed to and educated in the regime (1310a 12-16). Thus middle regimes are considered to be best and most stable, but according to Aristotle most regimes are not of the middle sort. This is partly because in most cities the middle often is small and one or the other side is always in excess. In such cities the middle is abandoned, and the dominant party conducts the regime to suit themselves. Whenever one side or the other is dominant there are factions and fights and the victor does not strive to establish a common or equal regime, but grasps for pre-eminence in the regime as the price of victory (1296a22-31). As for revolutions and other forms of political change Aristotle applies universal and particular principles to explain the causes and forces behind them. However, what Aristotle meant by these two principles is ambiguous and a matter of dispute. A cause might for example be universal to all types of change or to all types of constitution.58 However, Aristotle says both: behind factions and changes in regimes there are general causes (1302a16-18, 1304b5-7), but it is necessary to study what happens in the case of each regime (1304b19-20). Further, he points out that regimes can be destroyed from without and from within (1307bl 9-20). Aristotle pays most attention to the internal causes, 59but I find the external - i. e., the presupposed dichotomy between systems of government - more interesting. For instance, one external cause behind the overthrow and destruction of oligarchies is when their mistreatment of the people stirs up a popular leader against them (1305a37-38), while another is when the oligarchy is extremely narrow and the well off who are excluded revolt ( 1305b 1--4). As for the change of democracies, the principal reason is when the demagogues attack individual property owners and thus urge them to

band together out of fear, and when they also spur on the people against the wealthy; as a result democracies undergo revolution (1304b20-23). Factional conflict is a serious threat against social order. According to Aristotle factional conflict, generally speaking, is the result of inequality and occurs when classes that are unequal do not receive a share of power in proportion. In short, people engage in factional conflicts to seek equality (1301b26-29). This is what happens in oligarchies. But it is not only the poor, from below, who cause conflicts. In democracies the well off cause factional conflicts because they share things - i. e., political power - equally in spite of being (economically) unequal (1303b6-7). A similar cause of revolution is when people are not of the same tribe, homophylon 60 (i. e., ethnically fragmentised) 'until people breathe as one'. A split into factions occurred in several colonies where joint or later settlers were taken in (1303a25-28). To conclude, Aristotle prefers a large, relatively homogeneous middle of the citizen body, and moderate differences between the citizens on the extremes, as well as just and decent behaviour of the ruling body towards the opposite part.

58 59

61

Hahm 1995, 7.

62

Outside the description of the anakyklosis theory, the usual word for tyrant is monarchos.

38

Polybios on the form of constitutions

Polybios reveals explicitly an awareness of the various constitutions, the processes of constitutional change and the causes behind them, which he tries to explain theoretically. In spite of being short and transmitted only in fragmentary form, Polybios' book 6 provides us with the most complete surviving text of Greek political theory from the hellenistic age.61 The main purpose of his Histories is to explain by what means and by which system of government the world fell under the rule of Rome (1.1; 6.2). In book 6 his explicit aim is to clarify what causes make for success or failure in politics. According to Polybios (6.2), the principal factor is the form of government. As an introduction to his discussion of the Roman constitution he explores the different kinds of Greek constitutions and their development. He refers to earlier authors (names not given) who distinguished between three kinds of constitutions: basileia, aristokratia and demokratia (6.3.5). Polybios, however, objects to their emphasis on which of these three constitutions is the best, since he is of the opinion that the best constitution is the mixed one that includes elements from all three. This, he says, was proved by Lykurgos, and these three elements were united also in the Roman constitution (6.11.11). Moreover, Polybios, like his predecessors, recognises a wider range of constitutions than the three main ones. According to him, each of these constitutions has a degenerated counterpart (6.4.6) which he denotes monarchia (or tyrannia, e. g., 4.6.8), 62 oligarchia, and ochlokratia (mobrule). Like Aristotle (Pol. 1279b), Polybios mainly believed that the nature of the constitutions was dependent on the rulers' motive, whether selfish or unselfish. Polybios was of the opinion that the strength of a mixed constitution was the avoid60 LSJ 6µ64>uAOv-'of the same race or stock'. The translationchanges significantly in the course of time: Rackham 1923 (Aristotle in twenty-three volumes 21. Politics, Loeb)= 'race'; Lord 1984

Polansky 1991, 332f. Polansky 1991, 333.

= 'stock';

Simpson 1997

= 'tribe'.

40

ance of the vice which is implicit in the individual forms of government, since in a mixed constitution no principle became preponderant and declined into the corrupt counterpart, and thus a state of equilibrium was attained (6.10.4f.). In reassurance to the ordinary reader of philosophy like myself, Polybios remarks_that the process by which the different kinds of governments naturally are transformed into each other has been explored elaborately by Plato and other philosophers (Aristotle not mentioned), but in such a complex and lengthy way that they are beyond the reach of all but a few. Therefore Polybios attempts to give a brief summary of the theory (6.5). Thus, he makes clear that he is drawing on a rich and varied tradition of political theory and the origin of human culture. 63 The theory of constitutional change is explained by Polybios in two versions, at the same time parallel and interrelating. Firstly, he describes a seven-staged cycle which originates with a primordial, natural form of monarchia, sequentially followed by the six constitutional types basileia, tyrannialmonarchia, aristokratia, oligarchia, demokratia and ochlokratia. The last constitution in turn reverts into the first and the process starts again (6.4.7-11). This theory of development is called anakyklosis (6.9.10). Secondly, the development within each of the phases is explained by Polybios as an organic five-stage development, in analogy with the life-cycle of a living creature. This organic development, however, can also be applied to the seven-stage anakyklosis theory. Polybios maintains that, depending on where in a cycle a state is, one can tell its history and predict its future (6.4.12). He adds that the method also facilitates the understanding of the development of Rome (6.9.12-14). Scholars have found the theory of Polybios inconsistent, and especially the two theoretical versions are seen as incompatible. 64 This may partly be due to the fragmentary state of book 6 in which essential explanatory sections seem to be missing. However, I do not intend to enter the sophisticated scholarly debate on the condition of the text and its supposed content in detail, but will merely state that there are several problems. In my opinion, however, the modern demand to present a theory perfectly applicable to political development seems unrealistic and asking too much. Regarding the illogic of the anakyklosis theory, Walbank thinks it stems from the difficulty Polybios experienced in coordinating different concepts to form a rational whole. 65 Hahm, who drew attention to the correspondence between constitutional and biological development and change, is of the opinion that Polybios introduced this analogy in order to explain the nature of the three imperfect constitutions. 66 The two courses of development - the five-stage 'inner circle' which concerns the individual constitution, and the seven-stage 'external circle' which embraces the development from beginning to end - can be understood as illustrated by the table. 67

63

Walbank 1972, 133.

64

For extensive references, see Hahm 1995, 11, n. 13. Further references are Fritz 1954, 60-75,

65 66 67

and Podes 1991, 577-587. Walbank 1972, 134. Hahm 1995, 141. The table is based, aside from PoJybios, partly on Hahm's clarifying article.

41

2.1 Thoughts on demokratia in antiquity

2. Democracy then and now

Table 2. Polybios' theory of anakyklosis (6.4.7-13) Polyhios 6

Greek term

Constitutional stage

Constitution

Biological stages

4.7, 13

synistemi/systasis

Formation of the generic type

1 monarchia

Conception

4.7, 12 4.12, 13 4.8, 9, 11

genesis, auxesis phyo/physis

Improvement of its 2a basileia qualitative condition to a 3a aristokratia state of perfection 4a demokratia

Bi1th and growth

4.12

akme

Ideal or perfect state

Maturity

4.8,12

metabole

Degeneration back to generic type

2b tyrannia 3b oligarchia 4b ochlokratia

Decline

4.8 4.12

katalusis telos

Dissolution or end

e. g., 2b leads to 3a; finally 4b to 1

Death

Polybios continues to explain the causes and forces behind constitutional change in a rather detailed account abridged as follows: 68 1. Monarchia: Political societies originate when need of a leader arises due to natural disaster. Thus, men (like animals) follow the lead of the strongest and bravest. In this primordial form of monarchia, the ruler is the leader of the herd only in capacity of his Btrength (cf. 'Big man'). As sociability increases and a common culture arises the leaderships develops by the art of man into kingship, hasileia. At this stage the notions of right and wrong are born (6.5.5-6.5.10; 6.7.1). 2a. Basileia: Kingship is weakened by the hereditary succession since the leaders are no longer chosen by virtue of their leadership. The kings are born to privileges and distinguish themselves from their subjects by dress and over-consumption. This giyes rise to offence, envy and hatred, and kingship changes into tyrannia (6.7.2-6.7.8). 2b. Tyrannia: Soon enough, measures are taken to overthrow a tyranny. This is done through a conspiracy of the noblest and most high-spirited men. The people, when consolidated, combine with these men against the ruling power, and thus the rule-of-one is abolished and aristokratia begins to grow (6.7.8-6.8.1). 3a. Aristokratia: The multitude (hoi polloi), in gratitude to the abolishers of tyranny (labelled monarchy), make them their leaders and entrust their destinies to them. To begin with, these noble leaders rule in the interest of the conrmon best. However, their children, who inherit this position of authority, have no experience of civil equality and liberty of speech. Since they rule in a spirit of selfishness and live in greed of gain and in scrupulous moneymaking or indulgence in wine and convivial excess, aristocracy converts into oligarchia (6.8.2-6.8.5). 3b. Oligarchia: The shift to oligarchy arouses in the people feelings similar to those nuder a tyranny, and the oligarchs meet with the same disastrous end as the ty68

The figures below correspond to the numbering of the constitutions in the table.

42

2. Democracy then and now

r

2.1 Thoughts on demokratia in antiquity

I

43

I

rants. This is made possible because as soon as one man bas the courage to speak or act he has the whole mass of the people ready to back him. Moreover, they no longer venture to set a king over them, nor can they entrust the government to a select few; the only hope is in themselves, and thus they convert the state into a demokratia and assume the responsibility for the conduct of public affairs (6.8.6-6.9.3). 4a. Demokratia: As long as any survive who endnred the evils of oligarchic rule, they are pleased with the present form of government and treasnre equality and freedom of speech. But, again, when a new generation, i. e., the grandchildren, come to succeed, they are accustomed to equality and freedom of speech and cease to value them. Furthermore, they begin to aim at pre-eminence and lust for power and begin to seduce and corrupt the people. This in turn stimulates among the masses both an appetite for bribes and the habit of receiving them, and thus the rule of democracy is transformed into government by violence and strong-arm methods, cheirokratia, (i. e., ochlokratia) (6.9.4-6.9.7). 69 4b. Ochlokratia: The people, used to feeding at the expense of others, choose a leader who is enterprising and insolent but excluded from the honour of office because of his poverty, and they introduce a regime based on violence. They massacre and despoil until they finally degenerate into a state of bestiality, and once more find a master and a monarchos (6.9.8-6.9.9). 70 Thus according to this reasoning, the cycle of political revolution, anakyklosis, is completed (6.9.10). To sum up, the connecting thought is that an improved constitution initially governs well without self-interest, bnt new generations become corrupted and rule arbitrarily and selfishly, and the constitntion degenerates into its unimproved counterpart. When the abuse of power and circumstances in society have become unendurable, the government is overthrown with popular support and a new form of improved government is introduced. As mentioned earlier, Polybios preferred the mixed constitution since it weakened the flaws contained in each constitution, and thus stability was achieved. Ac: cording to Polybios, the Roman constitution united all three kinds of government and thus the strengths balanced the weaknesses. 71 Moreover, in the Roman state absolute rule rested in no single body, as its legislative, execntive and judicial institutions were shared among the three (6.11.11). A more serious contradiction than 69

70

71

When describing the change from democracy to its degenerated counterpart, Polybios makes a distinction between those with power, the demagogues, and the people, (ton pollon). Walbank (1957-79, I) comments that Polybios uses 0£A£U~etVspecifically for demagogic action tending

towards ochlocracy. Illustrativeexamples of this meaning are the people of Phoenice who were driven by Charopsto institute a reign of terror(32.6.2), and the people in the Peloponnese who were seduced by Critolaos (38.11.11). The behaviour of men like beasts is exemplified in the descriptionof the massacre in Cynaetha in 220, due to social and political tension and conflict (4.16.10--4.17; 4.21). According to Plutarch(Agis and Cleomenes 17.3) the people mistakenly believed thatthe reforms of Cleomenes III should result in the abolition of debts and redistributionof soil. Monarchy- the consuls; aristocracy-the Senate; democracy- popularassemblies (e. g., Comitia Centuriata).

that delivered by the critics of his theory of political change, is that Polybios elsewhere (6.9.12-14) maintains that also Rome, which more than any other state has been formed and grown naturally, will undergo a natural decline and change to its contrary. This reasoning, however, inevitably follows the biological law promoted in the theory of anakyklosis. Considering the modes of democracies in the hellenistic age, throughout his Histories Polybios gives different import to the word 'democracy'. In book 2, he gives prominence to the splendid democratic constitution of the Achaian League (2.38.6): "It would be impossible to find anywhere a political system or guiding principle which allowed more equality and freedom of speech, or which was more genuinely representative of true democracy, than that of the Achaian League." 72 Here and elsewhere (2.41, 2.44) the word 'democracy' is positively charged, meaning foremost freedom from arbitrary power exercised by an individual or a group. In book 6, democracy is certainly adhering to the improved form of constitution, but is neither criticised nor praised; it is merely established that, like kingship and aristocracy, it is inferior to the more stable mixed constitution. An exception is the concluding remarks where Polybios declares freedom and democracy to be the finest of all constitutions, although it will eventually change its natnre to the worst there is-mob-rule (6.57.9). 73 Generally, Polybios uses the term 'democracy' in the same sense as Plato and Aristotle, as a system characterised by a rather unlimited majority rule and by a strong influence of the poorer classes, 74 but he gives no specification of the various forms of democracies. One detail in Polybios' account of constitutional change is therefore of special interest. In his description of the mechanism behind the transformation from democracy to ochlocracy, the people take a leader who is ambitious and daring but excluded from the honours of office because of his poverty (6.9.8). 75 Unfortunately, Walbank passes over this line in silence. The imme~iate conclusion is that Polybios implies a democratic constitution where,(at least) the lowest census-class is not eligible to hold office. Another probability is that Polybios is influenced by Rome, where to a greater extent than in Greece it was necessary to have money to hold an official position. Even if plebes from c. 287 formally could reach the consulate it was quite exceptional. Theories presuppose conformity to 'laws', and Polybios, like historians before him and ever after, had and have problems forcing 'reality' or 'a past reality' to fit into these patterns, at least without ad hoe solutions. Polybios' theories, however, are rooted in contemporary political events as he experienced them. The great merit of his reasoning, in my opinion, is his plausible explanations that constitutional 72

73

74 75

Polybios 2.38.6: £mt 15o'Uv,OJi:; EµT\Mxa, wto:'Ut11 ni:;.lcrriyoptai:; Kat nappncrtrn;Kal Ka86Aou 8nµoKpatiai; UAriStvfji; m'lcrt11µa Kat npoatpemv dAtKptvecrEpavo1JK&v e'Upottti:;TI\i:; napCltoli:; 'Axmoli:;'\mapxoUcrrti;. Transl. Ian Scott-Kilvert, Poiyhius. The rise o_fthe Roman empire, London 1979. Polybios 6.57.9 o'UyevoµEvou tffivµEv 6voµ6:1:rov tO K0:AAtcrtov 111t0Att£iaµEtaAT]\tfEtm, tllv Eft.e8EptavKat 8nµo,cpatiav, tffiv 15£rcpayµ6:trov tO xetptcrtov, tf\v OxAOKpattav. Fritz 1954, 8. Polybios 6.9.8: µeyaA6q>povaKat toAµrip6v,EKKAEt6µEvov 15£81ClnEviav tffiv Ev tji noAttEic;t ttµtrov.

44

2. Democracy then and now

changes were due to disequilibrium and abuse of power. Historically, changes often come about through revolutions and political coups d'etat, as for instance in Rhodes and repeatedly in Syracuse. Even if Polybios' cycle of constitutional development follows a chronological pattern, it is not chronological in toto, since it perpetually starts over and over again. In fact, constitutional succession did not follow a streamlined pattern as is often depicted. For example, tyrannies did not end with the late archaic-early classical period followed by democracies and/or oligarchies, but existed in various places also in the hellenistic period. 76 To sum up, Aristotle and Polybios adapt partly to the traditional division between unjust regimes ruling to their own advantage and just regimes ruling with a view to the common good, and partly to the traditional tripartite system: rule of the one, rule of the few, and rule of the many. An all-pervading theme is that revolutions or civil unrest are caused by social injustice and inequality among the inhabitants, which incidentally was acknowledged already by Solon. Too large differences between sections of the population with regard to wealth and possibilities to political participation, lead to tensions and revolutions and pose a threat to the entire community. Both authors prefer some sort of mixed constitution in which the extremes on either side are neutralised.

A note on the hellenistic schools of philosophy Those who lived after Aristotle were familiar with his production and were influenced by it, and the Peripatetic school as well as the Academy at Athens continued to treat political issues during the heJlenistic period, concerned as they were with constitutional matters in accordance with the established tradition. However, the philosophical outlook on political theory changed in the course of time. Simplified, the discussion about the best constitution was more or less abandoned and instead efforts were made to explain and justify absolute kingship, not only in political and philosophical treaties but above all in the form of panegyric biographies. 77 On the general, philosophical level the focus shifted from political philosophy, as developed by Plato and Aristotle, to moral theory. The two main hellenistic schools of philosophy, the Epicureans and the Stoics, did not debate the pros and cons of oligarchy and democracy, and neither did they elaborate prescriptions for the best constitution. Instead they, like the Cynics, introduced ethical reflections which called the inteJlectual bases of classical politics into question. Plato and Aristotle, although holding somewhat different opinions in factual matters, developed their ideas of justice in a constitutional framework within the polis organization, that is, the distribution of duties and rights among citizens. Fundamental in their doctrines was the subordination of the citizens to the polis. The heJlenistic schools in general defined the achievement of happiness and good societal life more broadly and extended the focus of interest outside the traditional border of the polis and its citi-

r I

2.2 Concepts of modern democracy

zens. 78 To the Stoics, local and 'national' membership was of less importance than that of the worldwide community, and the idea of cosmopolitanism (kosmou polites - 'world citizen') in differing forms was present in the hellenistic schools of philosophy and developed further in Roman Stoicism. 79 In short, judging from the fragmentary evidence, there seems to have been an indifference to constitutional matters. 80 In the Politeia by Zenon, directed against Plato, the idea of the ideal city is elaborated, but it concerns moral agents and their mutual relations more than it constitutes a contribution to political theory. Thus, the particular political context of the polis was given slight attention. 81 In accordance with the shift of focus from polis citizens to the relationship between men in society, regardless of stains, a change in attitude to the notion of human dignity is observable in hellenistic philosophy. This is especially interesting when considering the distinction between the Aristotelian ideology of slavery and that of the early Stoa, a topic which will be touched upon briefly in chapter 3.4.

2.2 CONCEPTS OF MODERN DEMOCRACY Democracy is both a political system constituted by its institutions and procedures, and an ideology related to liberty and equality. In other words, democracy refers both to a polity and an ethos. However, what democracy really signifies is a matter of opinion as it is constantly changing and a definite usage is lacking. In our societies in general, the word 'democracy' is nsed to denote phenomena in many areas and at many levels in society. However, there is agreement on the fact that political democracy foremost is a form of government for the state, that is, a political policy-making that shall be in charge of society's common affairs. 82 Alf Ross, writing in the wake of the Second World War, took a broad definition as standpoint for further elaborations: "Democracy is generaJly defined as the form of government in which the State authority (the political power, "the sovereignty") legally belong to the whole of the people, and not only to an individual or a definite, narrow circle of people." 83 A somewhat more precise definition is given in the Encyclopaedia Britannica: "The term [democracy] has three basic senses in contemporary usage: (1) a form of government in which the right to make political decisions is exercised directly by the whole body of citizens, acting nnder procedures of majority rule, usnally known as direct democracy; (2) a form of government in which the citizens exercise the same right not in person but through representatives chosen by and responsible to them, known as representative democracy; and (3) a form of government, usually a representative democracy, in which the powers of the majority are exercised within a framework of constitutional restraints designed to guarantee all citizens the enjoyment of certain 78

76

For tyrannies during the hellenistic period, see Berve 1967, vol. 1, 386-509.

77

Aalders 1975, 17-19. Laudatory biographies ("Ftirstenspiegel") of prominent kings include for instance, Xenophon, Kyropaedia, Hieron; lsokrates, Euagoras, Agesilaos, Nikokles, ad Nikoklem; pseudo-Aristeias, Letter to Philokrates.

45

Laks & Schofield 1995, 1-3.

79

M.C. Nussbaum, 'political theory', in OCD3, Oxford 1996.

80 81 82 83

Erskine 1990, 70. Annas 1995, 77. Lundquist 2003. Ross 2003, 93.

46

47

2. Democracy then and now

2.2 Concepts of modern democracy

individual or collective rights, such as freedom of speech and religion, known as liberal, or constitutional democracy."84 As I understand this, the author implicitly presents these forms as chronological phases of democracy. However, ancient Greek direct democracy contained elements of the third form: power was exercised within the framework of constitutional restraints, that is the laws, and the citizens enjoyed rights such as freedom of speech, isegoria. Moreover, one of the pillars of Athenian democracy, as Hansen has pointed out, was the belief that ordinary citizens were prepared to disregard their self-interest. The poor, in spite of always being in majority in the assembly, abstained from opportunities to exploit the rich. 85 Before we continue, it is important to observe the distinction between descriptive and normative definitions of democracy. Descriptive definitions are concerned only with 'plain facts' such as the constitution, the judicial system and precepts for human behaviour. Advocates of this type of definition contend that values such as equality and human rights are extraneous to democracy. Normative descriptions are concerned with norms of justice and morality, including the assumptions that democracy is the best way to implement a good society, and that democracy has an

3. Quality of a state: 'democracy' refers to facts that adhere to the form of government. Democracy denotes a certain distribution of institutionalised power among the citizens in a state. 4. Naturalism: the import of 'democracy' should be descriptive and refer to measurable facts. Thus, a statement that a certain state is democratic is an empirical judgement, not a normative. 5. Dimensionality: the concept of democracy should be perceived as a dimension which places all states in order of precedence on a scale. If a zero is stipulated on such a scale, also this thesis becomes a semantic convention which is with-

intrinsic value irrespective of resolutions and consequences.

So, is it possible to agree on a definition of democracy, which moreover is nonpartisan? The Swedish political scientist Mats Lundstrom draws attention to the fact that some scholars are of the opinion that a certain definition of 'democracy' may be an expression of a political standpoint and thus biased. His own opinion is that it would be devastating to the research on democracy if a definition of 'democracy' implied a normative standpoint, that is, which type of government is right or wrong, good or bad. He thinks that one ought to distinguish between definitions which give 'democracy' a descriptive meaning and arguments for (or against) democracy which give the term a normative import. 86 Lundstrom stresses that the concept of democracy often is said to be "essentially contested". 87 He maintains, however, that there is a prevalent semantic consensus among political scientists with regard to the term 'democracy'. 88 After discussing definitions and interpretations of democracy made by some prominent scholars of political science he summarizes their definitions in the following 'semantic theses' :89

I. Nominalism: a definition of 'democracy' expresses only a linguistic convention. 2. Lexicality: a definition of 'democracy' should relate to a prevailing linguistic usage. 84 Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, 'democracy' (accessed October 24, 2003). http://search. eb.com/eb/print?eu=:30382 85 M.H. Hansen, handout S6dert6rn 1999. 86 Lundstrom 2001, 42. 87 A te1m expressed by W.B. Gallie in 1956, 'Essentially contested concepts', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56. 88 Lundstrom2001, 41 f.; Bobbio 1993, 27, is among those who maintain that the general descriptive import of the term 'democracy', from antiquity unti1modern time, has not changed. It is the emotive charge of the term which has changed during the course of time depending on what sort of government has been preferred. 89 Lundstrom 2001, 49.

out normative implications.

6. Reconstructive minimalism: a definition of 'democracy' should be clear, analytical, distinct and adequate, i. e., neither too wide, nor too narrow. However, Lundstrom points out that a descriptive import of the term 'democracy' does not prevent it from being value laden, but the emotive signification of a term is not a semantic quality, but a psychological effect of its application. The import of both normative and descriptive terms can be emotionally charged. 90 In contrast to descriptive significations, normative definitions are concerned with different aspects of safeguarding democracy. He examines three types of normative or "from the point of view of contents" definitions of democracy, namely 'socialistic', 'liberal' and 'efficient' definitions, of which he is critical. According to him, linguistically the use of the term democracy is arbitrary, and thus ideological (emotive) conflicts between democracy and other political ideals are disguised. To the question posed in the title of his article, "Can definitions of democracy be impartial?" Lundstrom answers 'yes'. He argues that since 'democracy' has a descriptive import, definitions of democracy cannot express a normative standpoint which is biased.91 He concludes that there is a logical barrier between arguments for definitions of democracy, and arguments for democracy. 92 The political scientist Robert Dahl is one of the most influential theorists on democracy. He has made elaborate efforts to identify and explore democratic principles as he construes them. He uses the Athenian democracy to construct an ideal model of a procedural definition of democracy, by setting out five criteria which enable us to distinguish the features of a democratic process and evaluate how democratic a society is. 93 The more of these criteria that are fulfilled, the more democratic the government. These criteria are as follows:

1. Effective participation: "Throughout the process of making binding decisions, citizens ought to have an adequate opportunity, and an equal opportunity, for expressing their preferences as to the final outcome. They must have adequate

90 Lundstrom 2001, 49. 91 Lundstrom 2001, 55, 59, 62, 65f. 92 Lundstrom 2001, 69. 93 Dahl 1989, 106-131. Dahl does not think that classical democracy is possible in large political units. He uses the term 'polyarchy' to refer to the democratic form of government in modern states (see Dahl 1971).

48

2. Democracy then and now

2.2 Concepts of modern democracy

49

and vote out the highest officials of the government. 104 The institutions of polyarchy are the following (quoted from Dahl): 105

and equal opportuuities for placing questions on the agenda and for expressing reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another." 94 2. Voting equality at the decisive stage: "At the decisive stage of collective decisions, each citizen must be ensured an equal opportunity to express a choice that will be counted as equal in weight to the choice expressed by any other citizen. In determining outcomes at the decisive stage, these choices, and only . these choices, must be taken into account. "95 3. Enlightened understanding: "Each citizen ought to have adequate and equal opportunities for discovering and validating (within the time permitted by the need for a decision) the choice on the matter to be decided that would best serve

I. 2.

3. 4.

the citizen's interests." 96

4. Control of the agenda: "The demos must have the exclusive opportunity to decide how matters are to be placed on the agenda of matters that are to be decided by means of the democratic process." 97 5. Inclusiveness: "The demos should include all adults subject to the binding collective decisions of the association. "98

5.

6.

Dahl believes that it is sufficient to have the first two criteria fulfilled in order to have a democracy, but then in a narrow sense. The first four criteria are required for a fully democratic process in relation to the demos. 99 The fifth criterion concerns the problem of who has the right to be included in the demos. A state can be fully democratic in the process but exclude a large proportion of the inhabitants. In our Western democracies a large group of the adult resident population, namely those without citizenship in the state they live, is excluded from political rights. 100 This fivefold procedural democracy is, however, only an ideal model: to modern countries Dahl applies the term 'polyarchy' which he, together with Charles Lindblom, minted in the 1950s. 101 Polyarchy is a set of political institutions that distinguishes modern representative democracy from all other political systems, whether modern non-democratic or ancient democratic. Dahl emphasizes that one of the most distinctive characteristics of polyarchy as compared to earlier democracies or republican systems is the wide expansion of individual rights_l02 On the general level polyarchy is distinguished by two broad characteristics: citizenship is extended to include citizen women, 103 and citizenship includes the rights to oppose

7.

Elected officials. Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials. Free andJair elections. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon. Inclusive suffrage. Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials. Right to run for office. Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices in the government, though age limits may be higher for holding office than for suffrage. Freedom of expression. Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined, including criticism of officials, the government, the regime, the socioeconomic order, and the prevailing ideology. Alternative infonnation. Citizens have the right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected by laws. Associational autonomy. To achieve their various rights, including those listed above, citizens also have a right to form relatively independent associations or organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups.

Dahl points out that these rights, institutions and procedures are actual and not merely nominal and can be used to serve as criteria for evaluating which countries are governed by polyarchy. The institutions of polyarchy are necessary to democracy: groups of between two and seven of these institutions are necessary to satisfy each of the five different criteria for democracy. For instance, 'elected officials' and 'free and fair elections' are required to fulfil the state of 'voting equality', but all seven institutions of polyarchy are required to fulfil the democratic criterion 'control of the agenda'. According to Dahl, the institutions of polyarchy are necessary to democracy: if one of the institutions is missing, there is no polyarchy, but that is not to say that the presence of all seven is sufficient. Democratization can develop further, although according to Dahl, "so far no country has transcended polyarchy to a "higher" stage of democracy." 106 The political scientist David Held problemizes the concepts of democracy in contemporary thought. He stresses, as mentioned earlier, that today every regime

94 95 96 97 98 99 100

Dahl 1989, 109. Dahl 1989, 109. Dahl 1989, 112. Dahl 1989, 113. Dahl 1989, 120. Dahl 1989, 110, 114. In Sweden, however, resident aliens who hav.e been registered in the local municipality for three years before the polling day, have the right to vote and are eligible to office in county council and municipality. 101 Dahl & Lindblom 1953. 102 Dahl 1989, 2!8f.

tries." However, regarding Europe, far from all resident aliens possess political rights and not always social rights. Slavery is formally abolished, but is a matter of definition and outlook on people. Trafficking in human beings as well as different forms of slave labour is part of the global economy, and humans are abused not only in the 'Third World', but also in Europe and North America. For instance, reports of sexual slaves from non-West European countries abused within Western Europe are becoming frequent.

104 Dahl 1989, 220f. 105 Dahl 1989, 221. 106 Dahl 1989, 221-223.

103 Dahl 1989, 220, maintains that "the slaves, metics, and women excluded from fu11citizenship in the Greek democracies have all gained the rights of citizenship in modern democratic coun-

j

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2.3 Modern definitions of ancient Greek democracy

claims to be democratic. "Democracy seems to bestow an 'aura of legitimacy' on modern political life: rules, laws, policies and decisions appear justified and appropriate when they are 'democratic'." 107 According to Held democracy basically implies a state in which the people have some form of political equality, but as he says, there are problems already in defining each element of the phrase 'rule by the people'. Who are included in 'the people'? What areas in society does 'rule' cover? Does 'rule by' imply an obligation to obey? With regard to the question of inclusion, he certifies that historically efforts have been made to restrict the import of 'the people' to certain groups, for instance with regard to sex, race and wealth. 108 After analysing classic models and contemporary variants of democracies, he suggests a model for today (i.e., 1987) which he calls 'democratic autonomy'. The main principles of this model, concerning liberty and equality, are suggestive of the UN Universal Declarations of Human Rights, article 1, and they are also characterised by extended individual participation as well as extended obligations and responsibilities both in the state and in the civil society. 109 After the fall of the Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 and 1990 (as well as the displacement of political power from the nation-states to federations such as EU), Held focused on the relation between democracy and the global system. The change of systems, including the mode to place parts of the public sector into private hands in Western Europe, coincides with international developments, that is globalization, or, as Held prefers to call it, 'Western globalization' .110 He points out that hitherto it has been assumed "by theorists and critics of modern democracy alike, that 'the fate of a national community' is largely in its own hands and that a satisfactory theory of democracy can be developed by examining the interplay between 'actors' and 'structures' in the nation-state." 111Now, as a consequence of the change of the international order, the role of the nation-state is also altered, including its autonomy and sovereignty vis-a-vis supranational organizations and global economies. As for the future prospect of democracy, Held suggests a 'federal model of democratic autonomy', provided that international agencies, organizations and states choose a democratic political future. 112 The essence of his model, elaborated in a number of theses, is "the theory of the democratic state within the global order and the theory of the impact of the global order on the democratic state." His intention with this theory does not imply the naive assumption of "a harmonious cosmopolitan international order", but he emphasizes the importance of articulating democratic processes and practices within the complicated sphere of national and international politics. 113

One of the latest trends in the theory of democracy (even though it is a blend of new and old) is the idea of deliberative democracy. 114 The term 'deliberation' implies a collective conversation and discussion on binding decisions. 'Deliberative democracy' is broadly defined and divided into two parts. The democratic part "includes collective decision-making with the participation of all who will be affected by tbe decisio.n or their representatives." The deliberative part "includes decisionmaking by means of arguments offered by and to participants who are committed to the values of rationality and impartiality." 115 Deliberation is thought to enhance the moral value of democracy since it results in conclusions that are just. 116Arguing is the linchpin of deliberative democracy: it proceeds by argument and must be justified by argument. 117 Habermas believes that public deliberation forces people to use impartial and universalistic arguments, and individuals' attitudes change during the conversation. 118 Thus, deliberative democracy has an epistemic value since people are educated through the interactive process of discussion. As mentioned earlier, deliberative democracy is not new; it is as old as democracy itself. An Athenian example is found in the eulogical speech of Perikles, which includes both the expectations on the ordinary citizen to take on his share of responsibility for the conduct of public affairs and the assumption that the means to reach wise decisions is conversation:

107 108 109 110 111 112 113

Held Held Held Held Held Held Held

1987, I. 1987, 2f. 1987, model summarized 290f. 1991, 206. 1991, 199. 1991, 226. 1991, 234.

Our public men have, besides politics, their private affairs to attend to, and our ordinary citizens, though occupied with the pursuits of industry, are still fair judges of public matters; for, unlike any other nation, regarding him who takes no part in these duties not as unambitious but as useless, we Athenians are able to judge at all events if we cannot originate, and instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all. (Thuc.2.40.2) 119

2.3 MODERN DEFINITIONS OF ANCIENT GREEK DEMOCRACY With regard to modern apprehensions of ancient Greek democracy, we have to distinguish between two groups of scholars: firstly, scholars of political science and related disciplines, including political journalists who foremost are concerned with modern or early modern circumstances; and secondly, scholars of ancient history, which this section concerns. The first group, treated in the previous section (2.3), 114 This short passage ·on deliberative democracy is based mainly on a lecture given by Mats Lundstrom at the Department of Archaeology and Ancient History, Uppsala University on December 10, 2002. 115 Bister 1998, 8. 116 Elster 1997, 12. 117 Bister 1998, 9. 118 Elster 1997, 12, refers to Jurgen Habermas, 'Discourse ethics. Notes on a program of philosophical justification', in Moral consciousness and communicative action, Habermas (ed.), Cambridge 1990, 43-115, (non vidi). 119 Transl. R. Crawley, History of the Peloponnesian war, London 1901, Perseus Digital Library Online (accessed November 6, 2003). http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus %3Atext%3A1999.01.0200

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2.3 Modem definitions of ancient Greek democracy

often describes ancient democracy more simplified and sometimes more negatively than it deserves. This can be due to many things. One reason may be too high a confidence in and a reiteration of what others have written instead of forming a closer opinion of one's own, since their retrospect on ancient conditions often merely serves as a historical base for comparison with modern democracies. The second group, ancient historians, are usually not knowledgeable enough in political theory and political science, and therefore run the risk of accepting the 'facts' positively. Their outlook on history is also significant. In comparisons between ancient and modern democracies, ancient historians occasionally tend to idealize the former. In modern treaties on ancient history the meaning of detnokratia is often implied or the author takes for granted that the reader shares the same understanding of the concept as she or he. Furthermore, the absolute majority of scholars claim that the distinction between democracy and the-rule-of-the few disappeared in the hellenistic period. According to this view, democracy still existed formally, but the executive component was predominant and in turn was dominated by a limited group of wealthy families. 120 Peter Rhodes rightly objects to this and calls attention to the fact that, in the classical period as well, despite the absence of formal hindrances such as property qualification, poverty made it in practice impossible for a less well-to-do and less well-educated citizen to become a leading politician. 121 Giving a general definition of democracy in practice as compared to oligarchies, Rhodes discerns two fundamental features. The first is that a democratic polis gives basic political rights i. e., membership of the assembly and the right to be juror to all free men of local ancestry. There might be property qualifications for holding office. The second feature is that, constitutionally, the assembly was comparatively strong and the council and individual officials were comparatively weak (in an oligarchy the reverse was the case). In Athens it was certainly the council which set the agenda of the assembly, but the assembly constituted the sovereign decisionmaking body and any member of the assembly could make a proposal or enter into the debate. 122 Irrespective of the more or less evasive statements on the watered-down meaning of hellenistic democracy, what is lacking is a more specified pronouncement on which criteria should be fulfilled to call a constitution democratic. Susan SherwinWhite, in her study of the polis of Kos, constitutes a rare exception. On the basis of a study of inscriptions from hellenistic Kos, she stipulates three basic criteria of Greek democracy: 1) The damos was composed of all male citizens regardless of class. As for Kos, the possession of full political rights is evident by the homopoliteia between Kos and Kalyrnna at the very end of the third century, according to which every citizen had to swear to abide by the established democracy and be a just judge, and to take part in elections without favouritism but in the interest of the common best. 2) The damos was sovereign with the final decision of policy. The

sovereignty was realised through the right to discuss proposals and the right to vote on them. 3) The magistrates were popularly elected. According to Sherwin-White, in general in the hellenistic period the use of the lot for the selection of magistrates was limited, and thus hellenistic democracy was less radical than for instance that of fifth-century Athens. 123 However, the epigraphic support for the use of the lot is almost non-existent for all periods of time, and thus cannot be used as an argument to regard hellenistic democracy as less participatory. But there is evidence of allotment. Gabrielsen points to the discovery of six small bronze plaques in hellenistic Rhodes, each bearing the name, patronymic and demotic of an individual identified as a jury-ticket. The form of the tickets fits a kleroterion, the existence of which can be inferred from inscriptions that mention a klarotas ton dikastan, the official who was entrusted with the operation of the kleroterion. 124 Some Rhodian inscriptions bear witness to the drawing of lots for the election of officials, although a decree from the latter part of the fourth century mentions laws which proclaim the election of priests and officials by show of hands. 125 The lack of evidence from other places does not prove anything and Sherwin-White does not support her statement on the change of electoral customs. As for Kos, she concludes that it was a democratically governed state in the hellenistic period. Clearly, the fulfilment of Sherwin-White's three criteria constitutes a democracy, but no other city-state outside Athens provides us with such an abundance of inscriptions as Kos, and the pictures we get of the government of most poleis are more kaleidoscopic. Rhodes, however, agrees that "by the second and third criteria most Greek states were indeed formally democratic in the hellenistic period, and also in the Roman." With respect to the first criterion, he points out that even if every citizen could attend the assembly without restrictions, the access to the council and offices may have been limited to certain privileged groups. 126 However, his opinion is that even if the offices were not open to all citizens, a state was democratic as long as the office-holders were appointed by and held accountable to the citizens. 127 To verify a presumed limitation of office-holding, though, demands that a careful prosopographic examination be carried out, and this cannot be done without a sufficient amount of inscriptional material. Besides, even if council and offices de facto were filled by people of privileged groups, it may not imply a formal limitation. The second criterion is formally fulfilled, wherever the prevalent enactment formula of the dernos decrees E8o~e trot 811µonor E8o~e -rfit ~ou1cf\tKat trot 811µcmcan be found. In order to evaluate the import of this formula, however, the

120 E. g., De Ste. Croix 1981, 321 f.; O'Neil 1995, 103-33; Hahm 2000, 457. 121 Rhodes 1997, 531f. 122 Rhodes 2003, 22.

123 Sherwin-White 1978, 176; Generally in agreement on those criteria, Rhodes 1997, 533, remarks that Sherwin-White does not specify whether she by 'popularly elected magistrates' means.from all citizens or by all citizens. 124 Gabrielsen 1997, 27f., nn. 54-56, pl. I; klarotas ton dikastan: JG XII,1, 55,4; Maiuri NS 18,7; Carratelli ASAtene NS 22, 157, 7,8 - KAaproTCLv -rOOv OlKacr-rciv ye.v6µevov. 125 Gabrielsen 1997, 159, n. 56; Election by drawing oflots: /G XII,1 833, Blinkenberg, Lindos II, 312, 315, ASAtene NS 14-16, 1952-54, 256, 5,38, SGDI 3756 ~ Syl/ 1 723. Election by the show of hands: JG XII,! 761~Syl/ 1 340.

126 Rhodes 1997, 533. 127 Rhodes 1997, 528.

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2.4 Modern theories on factors connected with the emergence of democracy

substance of the decree and, whenever possible, the political context must be taken into consideration. Of course, formulas as such cannot just be taken literally, but sometimes it seems easier to dismiss them rather than to acknowledge them as positive in,dications of ancient democracy. This is especially the case for heJlenistic democracy, a fact which may be due to differences in historical outlook and scholarly demands on the evidence from the classical and hellenistic periods respectively. But if one feels dubious about heJlenistic democracy one can doubt aJI democracies in the world. In the pessimistic words of the historian Ronald Syme, marked by the politics and events of the 1930s: "In all ages, whatever the form and name of government is, be it monarchy, or republic, or democracy, an oligarchy lurks behind the fa9ade. "12s A similar definition of ancient democracy as that of Sherwin-White is given by O'Neil. However, he takes his standpoint in Aristotle and identifies three obvious criteria for determining whether a government is democratic on a general level, here without regard to different types of democracy: I) Popular control over the selection of magistrates. Either through election by the people, by the use of lot, or a combinatiou of the two. In antiquity sortition was regarded as more democratic than election. 2) Popular control over decision-making in politics. Constitutions open to hoplites (but not to the poorer classes) were by some ancient authors considered as oligarchies, and by others as democracies. O'Neil, however, chose to define hoplite-based constitutions as oligarchies. and he perceives popular control over decision-making as rule by all the adult male citizens. 3) Popular judgement in court cases. O'Neil also distinguishes another, more general trait of ancient democracy (according to him valid also for aristocracies!): the diffusion of power across the magistrates, with the result that no individual had a decisive influence on the policy pursued. 129 So, how is one to define, identify and evaluate an ancient regime as democratic? Robinson, in his study on early Greek democracies, applied the criteria formulated by Robert Dahl to the source material (recounted in 2.3). 130 Robinson points out that Dahl's first four principles fit direct democracy better than the representative variant. 131 The first two criteria, 'effective participation' and 'voting equality on a decisive stage', seem possible to apply to the epigraphic material provided that the 'democratic' formulas are considered with regard to the contents of the text and the political settings. In the concluding chapter nine I will apply Dahl's criteria on the decrees of the four city-states that are examined in chapter eight. In addition to using 'democratic' formulas, a number of states, as will be shown in chapter four and appendix C, referred explicitly to their own or others' freedom, autonomy and/or democracy. In our time the word 'democracy' is a positively charged key-word used also by totalitarian regimes such as the People's Republic of China and the former Deutsche Demokratische Republik. In ancient Greece Jess popular forms of government did not have the same obvious reason to appear democratic. Of course, the

words in themselves constitute no firm proof of actual democratic regimes and must not be taken at face value, but neither do I find it reasonable to unreflectingly dismiss them as merely propagandistic. Likewise, the Jack of such formulas is not evidence of the opposite. The big problem is not to find definitions of democracy, since those of Aristotle, to some extent Polybios, and the modern authors referred to above are no doubt reasonable and useful. Rather, the main problem and challenge, as I understand it, is methodological: how is one to apply them to a sometimes scattered and generally insufficieut source material? ·

54

128 R. Syme, The Roman revolution, Oxford 1939, 7. Quotation taken from Robinson 1997, 31.

2.4 MODERN THEORIES ON FACTORS CONNECTED WITH THE EMERGENCE OF DEMOCRACY

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Aristotle and Polybios thought that democracy emerged from a pronounced disequilibrium of power among the members of the society. An oligarchy could be overthrown through revolution and a democracy established because of the leaders' abuse of power and mistreatment of the people (Pol. 1286b17-19, 1305a371305bll; Polyb. 6.8.6--6.9.3). Aristotle also drew atteution to the fact that in citystates with a large population democracy was the most likely constitution to arise (Pol. 1286b20-22). Moreover, the indispensable participation of the poor in war encouraged popular demands for increased political influence, and democracies were set up (Pol. 1304al 7-34). Aristotle also thought that a large middle has a stabilizing effect on society since it balances the extremes, and thus democracies are more stable and durable than oligarchies since they have more middle people with a greater share in political prerogatives (Pol. 1296a13-16, 1302a8-9). Additionally he stressed that all citizens should possess a moderate amount of wealth, because if there is too great a difference between rich and poor, revolutions are likely to happen (Pol. 1295b34-1296a5). Modern theories are also concerned with the requirements for and mechanisms behind the emergence of democracy. In the early 1970s Dahl formulated a fundamental prerequisite, posed as a question: "Given a regime in which the opponents of the government cannot openly and legally organize into political parties in order to oppose the government in free and fair elections, what conditions favour or impede a transformation into a regime in which they can?"l 32

There is no consensus in the research on democratization today, but in order to explain political changes two main groups of theories prevail. One group is that of structure theories which explain changes of political systems on the basis of structural qualities within the system. One example is the relation between economic development and democracy. The other group is that of action theories which focus on how the most important political actors have behaved during the transition stage. Thus, the centre of attention is the political elites, both from the old regime and from the political opposition. 133 With reference to structure theories, Max Weber

129 O'Neil 1995, 1-3. 130 Robinson 1997, his method is outlined on pp. 13-16.

131 Robinson 1997, 31.

132 Dahl 1971, 1. 133 Sannerstedt 1994, 56f.

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2.4 Modern theories on factors connected with the emergence of democracy

was critical. He was of the opinion that key historical events were decisive to different national structures and thus diverse processes were set into motion in differ-

and the transition from authoritarian political systems to democracy. 141 On the basis of two case-studies, namely Sweden 142 and Turkey, he introduced a genetic theory which emphasized democratization as a process of four consecutive phases. 1) Background condition: There must be a tradition of national unity. 143 2) Preparatory phase: There must be a political strife between different interest groups, often social classes, ~harply marked off from each other. The basis of such a strife is often that a new elite has developed and demands political influence. 144 3) Decision phase: There must be one or more decisions which imply a conscious approval of a democratic system of precepts. This entails that the old regime yields and, through compromise, democratization begins. 145 4) Habituation phase: The parties must adapt to solving conflicts in a democratic way. 146 Thus, Rustow conceived of democratization as a multistage process from strife, via compromise, to adaptation. In this model, economic development is not a necessary prerequisite for democratization, and a high educational level is, according to Rustow, a result of economic growth and democratization rather than a precondition for democracy. ' 47 As for the transition to democracy in developing countries, Axel Hadenius in a quantitative study tested structure theories, namely the relation between economic standards and democracy, on a material that comprises the countries of the Third World. ' 48 He investigated indices of economic development such as GNP, the public sector, urbanization, infant mortality, literacy, growth of mass media, etc. All these factors have strongly interrelated connections, and he found that literacy is the factor that has the strongest relation to the degree of democracy. ' 49 Further, he found a connection between democracy and Christianity and the absence of ethnic fragmentation. 150 (Ethnic and religious fragmentation counteracts national unity, cf. Aristotle & Rustow.) Hadenius is also of the opinion that integration into the capitalist

ent countries. 134 In an attempt to identify out of which conditions democracy has emerged, Martin Upset formulated a pioneering structure theory. In 1959 he carried out a quanti-

tative investigation of the relation between democracy and economic development. He divided 28 European and English speaking nations overseas into 'stable democracies' and 'unstable democracies and dictatorships', and 20 Latin American nations into 'democracies and unstable dictatorships' and 'stable dictatorships' _135 Thus he had four categories of states which he compared in pairs, 'more democratic' and 'less democratic', by indices of wealth, industrialisation, education and urbanization. 136 He found that more democratic nations showed higher welfare. He was of the opinion that the making and stabilizing of democracy was located in north-western Europe and its English-speaking offspring overseas. This development, he believed, was dne to the interrelation of several factors: 1) Capitalist economic development created the burgher class. 2) Protestantism stressed individual responsibility and furthered democratic values. 3) Increased strength of the middle class resulted in an alignment between burghers and the throne which preserved monarchy and thus facilitated the legitimacy of democracy among the conservatives. 4) Gradual political change. Whether or not any of these factors was primary, he maintained that they were related and not least did this apply to legitimacy and democracy. 137 For the most part his theory was supported by Mccrone and Cnudde in 1967, who demonstrated the relation between urbanization, education and developed mass communication on the one hand, and democracy on the other. They explained this as a causal connection: urbanization promotes an increased educational level which in tum promotes more developed mass communication which furthers democratization. 138 Although Lipset's outlook is Occidentocentric, his arguing on the provisions for democracy seems reasonable; but what he does not discuss is why these democratically governed parts of the world have a higher degree of welfare. It has also been pointed out that there are many deviations from the stipulated conformities: there are nations with low developed economy and democracy (e.g., Gambia), and nations with highly developed economy but no democracy (e. g., in Southeast Asia). 139 In an attempt to combine structure and action theories, Rustow in the early 1970s elaborated a genetic model. He had noted that hitherto the research on democracy foremost had focused on how democratic systems preserved their stability. The factors that keep a democracy stable, he maintained, may not be the ones that brought it into existence. 140 Therefore he concentrated on the birth of democracy 134 135 136 137 138 139 140

Weber 1949, 182-185. Lipset 1959, 74, table I. Lipset 1959, 76f., table II. Lipset 1959, 85. Sannerstedt 1994, 60; McCrone & Cnudde 1967, 72-79. Sannerstedt 1994, 61 f. Rustow 1970, 339, 346.

economy seems to promote, rather than counteract, democratization.

151 Moreover,

52

small island states are to a remarkably high degree democracies. ' Consequently, the fact that there are many democracies in the Caribbean but few in Africa - two areas of similar degree of economic development - could be explained by the connection between island states and US-trade. Ethnic fragmentation is certainly

141 Rustow 1970; Sannerstedt 1994, 62. 142 Rustow 1970, 12, points out that Sweden in the beginning of the 20th century "had one of the most restrictive suffrage systems of any country with a representative constitution: it was a stable oligarchy."

143 144 145 146 147

Rustow 1970, 350. Rustow 1970, 352. Rustow 1970, 355. Rustow 1970, 358. Sannerstedt 1994, 63f.

148 Hadenius 1992; Hadenius' results are summarized by Sannerstedt 1994, 74.

149 150 151 152

Hadenius Hadenius Hadenius Hadenius

1992, 89. 1992, 113, 120. 1992, 103-111. 1992. 124-126.

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2. Democracy then and now

r I

present in both areas, but it has had and still has much graver consequences in Af-

2.4 Modern theories on factors connected with the emergence of democracy

these popular forces. Little by little the suppressing regimes must convey the power to democratic institutions, albeit reluctantly. Most theories of democratization focus on circumstances within a country. However, international factors may also play a decisive part in the process, not least today because of the development of the globalized economy and supranational organizations. Disregarding the enforcement of a democratic government by an occupying power (e. g., on Germany and Japan after the Second_World War) or by a colonial power (e.g., on India and Papua New Guinea) processes of democratization are also initiated through diffusion. In some cases, as for instance in Central Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union, democracy has gained ground because it has been perceived as a practical and desirable way to govern a country. In other cases, for good or for bad, diplomatic pressure by means of economic sanctions, commercial treaties and development assistance has been of vital importance. The necessity of integration into the capitalistic world economy also has essential significance as does a desired membership in the Council of Europe and the European

rica.153

Quite another aspect of democratization than those mentioned above was taken as a basis by Adam Przeworski in 1988 in a study of the political development within Eastern Europe. Instead of focusing on economic development and stable social conditions as prerequisites for the introduction of democratic government, he emphasizes that, as a result of the suppression of people under authoritarian regimes, internal conflicts may be a direct cause of such a change of regime (cf. Aristotle, Pol. 1301b26-29, 1305a37-38, J 305bl-4). According to him, an authoritarian regime or dictatorship is fundamentally characterised by its ability to prevent political outcomes which contrast sharply with their own in!erests. 154 Przeworski concentrates on what he calls 'negotiated assumption of power', leaving aside violent political changes caused for instance by civil war or military defeat against an external enemy. 155 He points out that authoritarian regimes sometimes go through periods of liberalization, a process by which civil rights are introduced, though the authority in office still has absolute power to intervene. 156 This glasnost may likewise render the beginning of a process of democratization. 157 According to Przeworski, the transition to democracy demands that two conditions are fulfilled: 1) the old authoritarian machinery of power is dissolved; and 2) the new political powers elect democratic institutions. Those who dethrone a regime may very well obliterate the weaker members of the alliance and create a new dictatorship. 158 To dethrone a regime it is initially indispensable that the opponents mobilise the support of the masses. 159 But to introduce an enduring democracy it is necessary, in Przeworski's view, to have institutions which make it improbable for the election result to have an outcome in strong contrast to any party's interests in a given distribution of economic, ideological, organizational and other relevant resources. One institution that can secure this is a fair system of distribution of mandates in voting areas. 16 Functioning political institutions are crucial to prevent new leading politicians from abusing the power in their own interest. 161 Hence, the core ofthis model of the democratization process is popular discontent with the authoritarian regime, which through a period of temporary openness makes possible a mobilisation of

Union. 162

To summarize, the theories of the processes that foster democratization that have been discussed hitherto present essentially the following criteria: economic development; Christianity/Protestantism; concord between social groups; gradual and not violent political change; literacy; and urbanization. Even if one agrees that these factors are related to democracy and democratization, this does not elucidate what is cause and what is effect. Moreover, the research that has been referred to is based on a completely Euro-American point of view. It is suitable to recall the statements by Amartya Sen, who rejects the Western monopoly of democracy. He states that, "Democracy movements across the globe ... reflect people's determination to fight for political participation and an effective voice. " 163 There are, however, several aspects of those presented in this section which should be relevant to consider when studying ancient Greek societies, such as the connection between democracy, and economic development, relations between social groups, international relations, and the case of island states on the other.

°

153 154 155 156

Hadenius 1992, 113f. Przeworski 1992, 241 (1988). Przeworski 1992, 251. Przeworski 1992, 242. 157 In 1985 Gorbachev introduced the term 'glasnost' (Russian-publicity)

as a catchword for his politics. Openness in the mass media should make clear to the citizens that the country was in a crisis and facilitate criticism of negligent people in powers. His intention, however, was to preserve the Communist regime and to strengthen the Soviet Union, but the exposure of crime and the scope for political opposition led to a process of democratization and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Source Nationalencyklopedin Online http://www.ne.se/jsp/search/article. jsp?i_art_id=l83067 (accessed January 8, 2004).

158 159 160 161

Przeworski Przeworski Przeworski Przeworski

1992, 244f. 1992, 253. 1992, 247 f. 1992, 259.

59

l

162 Sannerstedt 1994, 79-81. 163 Sen 2003, 28.

r 3. AUTONOMY AND SOVEREIGNTY The independence of the city-state in the hellenistic world has generally been called into question. But what about the circumstances in the preceding era? A glance at the conditions in the classical period is suitable. Studying this period. Amit draws attention to the biased focus of historians on the struggle between the great powers of Greece at the expense of the portrayal of the conflicts between the small and the great cities. He has carefully examined the relations between the great and some of the small poleis in the classical period - that is, Athens vs. Aegina, Sparta vs. Mantineia and Thebes vs. Plataia - and concludes that the small poleis were undoubtedly dominated by the great. 1 Without exploring the Greek interstate relations in this period further, for example Athens' extremely harsh treatment of her allies when they objected to her increasingly imperialistic policy towards them, one can wonder what difference there was between the classical and hellenistic eras for the individual city. If there was a difference in liberty of action, must it necessarily have been a deterioration with respect to the cities' independence? As regards the Greek cities of Asia Minor they had been more controlled by the Persians before the coming of Alexander in the 330s than they were by the hellenistic kings. Certainly, in the hellenistic period, the Greek poleis of Asia Minor also had to adapt to the predominant political situation. However, at least until the beginning of the second century, it seems as if the continuous struggles for power among the hellenistic hegemons in some respects allowed considerable room for manoeuvrings; although the hellenistic kings raised their military and political supremacy through wars of conquest, they were also dependent on co-operative poleis within their spheres of interest.

3.1 THE AUTONOMOUS CITY-STATE - PREVIOUS RESEARCH As a political unit the free polis is regarded as an essential prerequisite for independent government, especially for democracies. One issue that is often called into question by modem scholars is whether there existed a political independent polis at all after the battle of Chaironeia in 338, and thus it is essential to be aware of the principal opinions in this scholarly debate before entering into the main parts of this chapter: the ancient and modem concepts of autonomy and sovereignty. 2

I

I .1

I ~-

Amit 1973, 7f. 2

The view of the polis as extincted in the hellenistic period was and is promoted by for instance:

Glatz, 1928. 1. 35-38, 448; Tarn & Griffith 1957, 79ff.; de Ste. Croix 1981; Ehrenberg, 1974• 92ff., 97: "In the fourth century B.C., and even more in the Hellenistic age, we meet with two new phenomena; in a world of large monarchicalstates the Polis lost in political power, and its society, more and more under the influence of economic motives, tended to disintegrate.";Murray & Price, 1990, vii; Runciman 1990 states that:"a polis must be juridically autonomous in

62

63

3. Autonomy and Sovereignty

3.1 The autonomous city-state - previous research

The Copenhagen Palis Centre (CPC), under the leadership of Mogens Herman Hansen, has since 1992 been in the process of producing an inventory of the Greek city-states during the archaic and classical periods. The investigation indicates that the number of poleis during the period examined is as high as a good 1,000. 3 Independence as a criterion for the existence of the polis has no support in the ancient sources according to Hansen, and neither has the opinion that every polis wanted to be autonomous. He states that already by 350 a large number of poleis were dependencies,4 and that in the hellenistic age a city-state could be ruled by a king or dominated by a hegemonic polis and still be regarded as autonomous. Both dependent and independent city-states could be self-governing. 5 Hansen has earlier pointed out that autonomy, in contrast to domination by others, was highly esteemed not only by democracies but also by oligarchies in the classical period. 6 Although he concentrates on the relation between autonomia and the polis in the time before the hellenistic period, Hansen states that there had been a change in the meaning and use of the word autonomia. From having denoted 'independence' in the midfifth century, it came to mean 'self-government' in combination with subordination to a hegemonic power at the end of the fourth century. 7 To have a phoros or syntaxis imposed by an external power, which was a common phenomenon in the unequal relations between the Greek cities and the hellenistic kings, is not compatible with autonomia in the classical sense of the word according to Hansen. He stresses that it is not the payment of taxes in itself that makes it inconsistent, but how it is imposed. 8 A. Giovannini, too, objects to the opinion that with the hellenistic period came the end of the Greek polis. He is of the opinion that autonomy was not an essential feature of the polis. He stresses that the cities of the Macedonian kingdom and the members of federal states, both of which enjoyed only a limited autonomy, were called poleis all the same. He points out that autonomy and freedom of the Greeks was used as a slogan against any hegemonic power, whether Greek or not. 9 Giovannini also objects to the traditional view that the polis is necessarily a state, and focuses on it as above all a community of people living together. He asserts that as

such they enjoyed some autonomy and had their own decision-making assemblies. 10 John Ma holds a similar view. Writing about the relations between Antiochos III and the Greek cities of western Asia Minor, he asserts that the words autonomia, demokratia and eleutheria, which frequently appear in decrees from the Greek cities, were used synonymously and indicate free government - free in accordance with behaviour, that is. 11When a city was conquered and surrendered to a king, its laws and liberty could be given back in the form of royal grants: 12He points out that there are no threatening letters from the kings, but he is of the opinion that the language of royal euergetism was used to disguise their power as benefactions. The decrees and letters, according to Ma, mirror the power relations without speaking explicitly in terms of submission or power. The power relations are mainly expressed in the 'contract clause', in which the city is promisedfature benefactions in return for its eunoia, goodwill, that is, if the city behaved well. 13However, his study shows that these relations were not strictly vertical and unequal, but reciprocal, in such a manner that also the hegemonic power was dependent on the individual citystate's benevolent co-operation. Military compulsion, which often was a dominant element in the initial phase of getting into power, and the creation of phobos, terror, were not feasible in the long run. 14 In 1937, A. Heuss presented a study in which he focused on the relationship between the Greek cities and the hellenistic rulers. He thought that the Greek cities were not subject to any formal subordination and that they enjoyed full self-government and were merely allies of a king. 15This extreme, positive view of the independence of the Asiatic Greek city in the hellenistic age was partly followed by Tarn and Magie. 16Magie made a distinction between those cities in western Asia Minor which had been founded by the kings, and those Greek cities which had existed as political units earlier but had been deprived of their freedom by the Persians.17 He concluded that the latter category, from the conquest of Alexander into the Roman ,period, enjoyed independence and freedom from control by any outside power. 18The strongest objection to these opinions, and above all to that of Heuss, was presented by Orth in 1977. Orth maintained that the Greek city was totally defenceless in relation to the kings and that any formal status of autonomy was merely nominal. 19 This view has, in a more or less modified form, been predominant among scholars well into the 1990s, at least in the standard works of reference. 20

the sense of holding a monopoly of the means of coercion within the territory to which its laws

apply ... and the social organisationmust be centred on a distinction between citizens and noncitizens." If these criteria are not fulfilled, there is no polis; Peter Green 1990, 25, affirms that:

3

"Autonomy was indeed synonymous with polis rule, and a vital condition for its survival." He claims that the city-states in the hellenistic period had lost their independence, had only an illusory freedom and lacked real political power, see.for instance pp. 25-28, 55, 80. In the final publication of the Copenhagen Polis Centre, the total number of poleis in the archaic and/or classical periods is estimated to 1,035. It is stressed, however, that all poleis did not exists at the same time and that number of poleis in any one year cannot have passed 1,000, Hansen & Nilesen (eds.) 2004, 53f.

4 5 6

Hansen 1993, 22. Hansen 1995a, 40f., 43. Hansen 1989, 11.

7 8 9

Hansen 1995a, 41. Hansen 1995a, 31. Giovannini 1993, 268-69.

I

10

Giovannini 1993, 270.

II

Ma 1999, 113, 161.

12

This was the case with Iasos in the letter from Queen Laodike, c.196. JK Jasos 4 I.

13 14 15 16 17 18

Ma 1999, 179, 235-238. Ma 1999, 108-111. Heuss 1937. Tarn 1948 II, 199-227; Magie 1941; 1950, 56f., 822-34. Magie 1941, 174f. Magie 1941, J85f.

19 20

Orth 1977, 50-61. His reading of the sources is seriously criticised by Ma 1999, 167f. Raaflaub 1996, "In the Hellenistic period, politics were controlled by the great powers; local autonomy was the best that could be attained", 'Freedom in the ancient world' in OCD 3 1996; cf. Green 1990.

64

3. Autonomy and Sovereignty

Even as late as 2001, Bederman in his specialist study on international law in antiquity stated that: "Thereafter, [i. e., after Alexander's victory in 334] the independence and autonomy of the Greek poleis was largely a fiction and an authentic State system ceased to exist in Greece. "21 This is all the more odd considering that the epigraphist Louis Robert through his extensive studies of inscriptions especially from Asia Minor, repeatedly showed that the Greek city did not die with Ch,iironeia_ but continued to exercise a vital political life: "A l'epoque hellenistique - quoi qu'on dise et repete et repete encore-la cite grecque existe toujours ... elle n'etait pas morte it Cheronee." 22 However, important to bear in mind is that the issuing of polis decrees was not necessarily tantamount to the existence of an independent polis; 23 even subject cities possessed decision-making bodies, military and financial means, and continued to exist as political units. 24 The negative view of the hellenistic city-state has definitely changed dramatically on account of the work of the scholar Philippe Gauthier, even though it has taken over a decade for his conclusions to become more generally accepted. Already in 1985 he asserted that it is wrong to think in terms of political degeneration after the battle of Chaironeia, and that we should distinguish the early hellenistic period, which ended c. 150, from the late. In his analysis of honorary decrees to politicians and benefactors from the hellenistic period, he argues that political life changed, but that citizens continued to act politically and even democratically. 25 Christian Habicht, also focusing on the honorary decrees, is prepared to draw the line of political change in the Greek poleis even later than Gauthier. 26 On the basis of inscriptions he concludes, in broad agreement with Robert, that even after Chaironeia there existed a vital political life both in the larger and the smaller poleis. According to Habicht, there was no considerable difference in polis life between the classical and the late hellenistic period. 27 Concerning the reputed political recession of Athens after the battle of Chaironeia, Habicht's study on hellenistic Athens presents a more complex and fluctuating picture than the usual one of unambiguous decline and subjection: He shows that Athens not only retained its prominent cultural position, but that there were also periods of extended political freedom. 28 Peter Rhodes expresses a similar view of the Greek cities in the hellenistic period. He thinks that it made no difference to the small city-states whether they manoeuvred between the more powerful city-states such as Athens and Sparta in the classical period or between the hellenistic kings, and that self-government was still possible. According to him, the hellenistic kings did not interfere particularly often or in any serious way in the internal constitutional set-np of individual cities. It was Athens and Sparta, used to subduing other states, that had to face the

3.1 The autonomous city-state - previous research

greatest interference in political life. True change came when Roman rule was consolidated because the liberty of action among the Greek states was then much reduced. 29 There were no longer any possibilities of engaging in diplomatic manipulation because tbe Romans monopolised the hegemony. Analysing the Roman expansion in the Greek East from 146 to 62 BC, R.M. Kallet-Marx takes an even less linear view of this development. In agreement with Gruen he is of the opinion that Rome was drawn into the Greek East largely in response to Greek invitation. 30 He stresses that there was no marked difference for the Greek city-states if the hegemon was an hellenistic king or Rome, and he argues that the vital change in Roman attitudes only began in the first century BC and accelerated with the First Mithradatic War, 89-85. This he considers to be the turning point from hegemony to empire. 31 It is also important to note that the Roman expansion did not necessarily involve an immediate decrease in the freedom of action for the individual polis. The status of a polis was dependent on its attitude towards Rome in the various conflicts and wars, past and present. In 188 after the defeat of Antiochos III, Rhodes was granted Lykia and Karia in appreciation of the Rhodian military effort which strongly contributed to the victory of the alliance. In 167, however, because of the Roman dissatisfaction with Rhodes, Lykia and Karia were freed from Rhodian domination and they regained their liberty of action, and Lykia was independent, at least formally, until AD 43. 32 In short, considering the scholarly opinions on the ability of the hellenistic Greek poleis to exist and to mind their own political life, the present predominant tendency seems to be that 'the time of subjection' is postponed from the battle of Chaironeia in 338 to the late hellenistic period. As regards the existence of the polis as a political unit, the Copenhagen Palis Centre concludes that, whether democratically or oligarchically ruled, the polis lasted until the late third century AD, when local self-government was broken due to the centralizing of the administration by Diokletianus. 33

29 30

21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Bederman2001, 41. Robert 1989, 150. J. & L. Robert 1954, 301, n. 2. Ma 1999, 151. Gauthier 1985; 1993, 211-31. Habicht 1995a, 87-92. Habicht 1995b, 13. Habicht 1995b; see also Rhodes 1997, 35-61.

65

31

Rhodes 1993, 173f.; 1994, 589-591; 1997, 533,542. Gruen 1984, e.g., 96, 119; Kallet-Marx 1995, 161. He points out that since the Peace of Apameain 188 the Greeks turned to the Senaty in Rome the get help to resolve international disputes to their own advantage. Kallet-Marx 1995, 289f. On p. 336 he concludes that the development of the Roman imperium in the East was an historical process and not a territorial annexation, as it traditionally is described. According to him, this traditional view of Roman military conquest is due to the use (and abuse) of sources like Cicero, which are much later than the events they describe.

32

Ma 1999, 251.

33

Hansen & Nielsen 2004, 19f.

66

3. Autonomy and Sovereignty

3.2 THE CONCEPTS OF AUTONOMY AND SOVEREIGNTY ANCIENT AND MODERN USE As mentioned previously, autonomy, or freedom from external restraint, is a vital condition for a state's ability to conduct its own political affairs, and the ancient Greek use of the noun autonomia and our understanding of it is of central importance because it is closely related to our outlook on the Greek city-states' possibilities to exercise democratic government. Since the definitions of the concepts of autonomy and sovereignty may be even more diverse and confusing than those of democracy, it is necessary to present the more prevalent opinions among scholars. In an attempt to make some of these different aspects somewhat clearer, this section deals partly with modern studies on the ancient use of autonomia, partly with definitions of sovereignty in political science, and finally with the discussion of a possible ancient concept and expression of sovereignty. In this context, John Davies' statement should be kept in mind. He claims that there is a gulf between historians of political thought and classical scholars, primarily because they use different sources. The former prefer to read Aristotle and the latter the Attic orators and inscriptions. Also, the latter are not conscious enough of political theory. 34 One consequence of this lack of knowledge among classical scholars is, as I perceive it, a tendency to make simplified definitions that are blindly believed in, and which in turn lead to conclusions without nuances. Before entering upon the ancient Greeks' use of autonomos and its cognates, and modern scholars' idea of this use, I will point out that the noun literally mean 'own laws', that is, 'living under one's own law'. This must have been the original meaning as the Greeks perceived it. The right to live under one's own laws implies independence.

Autonomia - its origin and import

The word autonomia is frequently used juxtaposed with eleutheria in the inscriptions, often as a formula. Eleutheria is the earlier word, appearing already in Mycenaean documents of the 13th century, and Bickerman thought it was connected to the collective human liberty (i. e., the communities') vis-a-vis foreigners; 35 autonomia appears in the sources in the 440s. Eleutheria has a much wider sense than autonomia; its basic meaning is 'freedom, liberty', and its opposite is douleia (slavery). Eleutheria as well as its cognates occurs frequently in Greek inscriptions and texts, mirroring its central importance to the Greeks. 36 It designates not only freedom from a superior power (internal or external), which is the focus of interest here, but also being freeborn, being not a slave, and it is connected with the manumission

34 Davies 1994, 55f. 35 Bickerman 1958, 339. 36 The freedom of the Greeks of Asia is an old concept already present in Herodotos, see Seager 1980, 141-154.

3.2 The concepts of autonomy and sovereignty - ancient and modern use

67

of slaves. 37 In this context it is worth noting the cult of Zeus Eleutherios, which adheres intimately with the freedom of a community. It had a political origin and began as a 'democratic' manifestation, protecting the community from tyrants, but it also came to imply the individual city's fortune in the field of international relations. 38 In Samos, for example, the founding of the cult to Zeus Eleutherios is dated to 479 and obviously associated with the liberation from the Persians. 39In the hellenistic period the cult of Zeus Eleutherios is present above all in Karia in Asia Minor. Although interesting, its possible connection to the political situation will not be explored here. 40 As for autonomia, Bickerman, who took his stand mainly on the basis ofThukydides and to some extent on Herodotos' use of the concept, was of the opinion that it was a concept that originated in Asia Minor to express the Greek cities' status under Persian rule. He stressed that the independence of the autonomous state always stood in the shadow of the mightier power. Moreover he asserted that this concept was always used by the weaker part, and never by the stronger power. 41 Martin Ostwald has also studied the origins of the word autonomia. He has made a case study of the Delian League, basing his account mainly on Thukydides. Ostwald agrees with Bickerman concerning the use of the concept by the weaker part, but concludes that originally it was coined by the Athenian allies as part of their protest against Athens' domination and her violation of certain rules. 42 Already in 1923, Keil made a distinction between the two nouns. With regard to the epigraphic material,- he thought that eleutheria indicated external freedom, equivalent to modern international law, and autonomia internal freedom, corresponding to constitutional law. According to him, both words designated sovereignty, and thus the combination of the words signified complete freedom and sovereignty.43 Tarn objected to this. Relying on literary sources, he asserted that the two words meant the same thing, and that the combination of them was only a tautology. Furthermore, he was of the opinion that they both included internal as well as external freedom. 44Gomme, commenting on Thukydides, understood autonomia as the freedom of a state to conduct its own internal affairs, but as a member of a league its freedom in foreign relations was limited. Such a membership, however, did not preclude autonomia. According to Gomme, if a state, for example, was forcibly prevented to leave a league, this would further limit its eleutheria, but not its

37

Numerous inscriptions give evidence of manumission of slaves. See for instance TCal 167-211 and the 'Greek Manumission Project' at the University of Virginia, http://jefferson.village.virginia.edu/meyer/home.htm1 (accessed February 15, 2002).

38 39

Quass 1979, 46. Raaflaub 1985, 125-147, spec. 139f.

40

Zeus Eleutherios is, for example, mentioned in different kinds of inscriptions in the Labraunda

41 42

area: Ilabraunda 6; IK Mylasa 207, 207B, 801,814, 816B, 863. Bickerman 1958, 327-343. Ostwald 1982.

43

Keil 1923, 318. He also pointed out that complete sovereignty could only exist during total isolation, and therefore according to him, the Greek cities strived for autarkeia.

44

Tarn 1948, ll 204f.

68

69

3. Autonomy and Sovereignty

3.2 The concepts of autonomy and sovereignty - ancient and modern use

autonomia, which was an elastic term. 45 Figueira, based on Thukydides, also makes objections to Bickerman's understanding of autonomia as 'internally independent' or 'independent within an alliance'. Figueira claims that it originally simply meant 'independent' .46 Karavites, dealing with the fifth century, is of the opinion that eleutheria was used with regard to general status, whereas autonomia referred to specific situations. 47 According to the analysis of autonomia by Bickerman and later Ostwald, the word was loaded with negative connotations: they perceived it as an indirect expression of submission. In contrast, Hansen asserts that the word would never have become such a popular slogan - frequently used by the Greek po leis from the fourth century and onwards - if that had been the case, but that it depended on an explanatory or strengthening context. 48 As we shall see when investigating the occurrence of autonomia in hellenistic inscriptions, the great majority of the phrases with autonomia also include eleutheria and/or demokratia.

Greek or barbarian, on the mainland or any island, who is not subject to the great King wishes to become an ally of Athens and her allies, he may do so enjoying his freedom and independence and any constitution he pleases, without the imposition of garrison or governor or the payment of tribute, on the same terms as the Chians, Thebans and other.allies." 51 This should be contrasted to the Athenian decree from c. 435--405, ·which refers to the member states of the Delian League as "the cities over which the Athenians rule" .52 Disturbances occurred intermittently from 373/72, however, and led to a revolt in 357-55 of the allies, caused by their dissatisfaction with Athens' infringement of some of the clauses in the treaty. Similar language as in the decree of the second Athenian confederacy is used later in the literary sources. Polybios describes autonomia as a desirable condition, and sometimes he nses the word together with eleutheria (4.27.5; 21.19.9; 21.22.7; 25.5.4). Nevertheless, the same state of independence is expressed by him without using the word autonomia. Polybios defines the freedom of the Eleans, promised by Philip V in return for their loyalty, in terms of eleutherous, aphrouretous (free from garrisons), aphorologetous (free from tribute), and as having their own form of government (4.84.5). This and similar combinations of positively loaded words are present even in the inscriptions, which will be presented in chapter four. According to Diodoros (14.61.3), writing in the first century BC, in 314 Antigonos proclaimed that all the Greeks were eleutherous, aphrouretous (free from garrisons), and autonomous. Diodoros conclndes that this announcement by Antigonos would make the Greeks willing allies in the war against the other Diadochoi (14.61.4). A precise definition is not possible, or even desirable, to achieve. In the above related instances of autonomia, the stress is both on freedom from external restraint and the right to decide one's own business. Freedom was a desirable condition worth protecting and maintaining, and its significance to the Greeks both in private and public,matters should not be underestimated. Neither should freedom and independence through grants be excused as merely empty phrases; even the stronger part had something to gain.

Ancient definitions and ideas of autonomia According to Thukydides, the meaning of autonomia was a matter of definition, dependent on various conditions. Describing the year 432/31 when embassies were sent back and forth prior to the outbreak of the Archidamian War, he lets Perikles say to the Lakedaimonians:, "we will grant our cities independence if they were independent when we made the treaty, and that we will do it when the Spartans, too, grant their allies the right to act in a way that is best not for Sparta, but in accordance with their own wishes"(l.144.2). 49 In other words, it was the hegemon that decided whether the allies should be treated as independent or not, an interpretation shared by Bickerman and Ostwald. Autonomia became a slogan used by the Greek cities especially after the King's Peace in 387, in which Artaxerxes guarantees the Greeks autonomia, but he declares that the cities in Asia should be subject to him (Xen. Hell. 5.1.31; Diod. 14.110.3). In 384, Athens and Chios signed a bilateral defensive treaty, the first in a group of similar alliances, which included a clause that the alliance was concluded on the basis of freedom and autonomy of the two states. 50 Already in 379/78 we have a distinct definition of the word autonomia. In the second Athenian confederacy, a maritime defensive alliance system that constituted an extension of the Athenian-Chian treaty, and in further treaties that followed it, it is stated that "if any 45 46 47 48

Gomme 1945, 384f. Figueira 1990, 86. Karavites 1982, 154. Hansen 1995a, 26, 34.

49

According to Gomme (1945), a vauge phrase; -r!lt&v 'AAEv1irov Ka't 1:ot EVE.KTIJµf.votKal wl ycropyEllv1ec; Ev "AAEvtt Ka\. IU.Arit,14>v'CEnoAEvtav Ka't 'ProµairovKai..µci:oixrov, E1Eiµacrav K't'A..; Sherwin-White 1978, 172f., nn. 124, 127, points out that resident foreigners with the right to possess and farm land constituted a separate class, 't"OlEvEK'tflµE.vot,consisting of metoikoi and later also Romans. Resident foreigners without these rights were called 1ol napo-LKot,but from c.200 the expression wt 1icrµa 679 Muller 1976, 58; Nawotka 1999, 99. 680 Nawotka 1999, 113. 681 McLean 2002, 217. 682 M!LETOS 9.

266

7. Modes of Government - the Cases

ing the honouring of Apame, wife of king Seleukos I. His proposal was transformed into a motion by Lykos, son of Apollodotos, and approved by the boule and ratified by the demos in regular probouleutic order. This procedure followed the normal praxis; a proposal by a non-councillor had to gain formal support by a member of the council in order to be discussed. To judge from this inscription the mover Demodarnas was not a bouleutes, but Lykos was. 683 Considering the other decrees of this group, I find it likely that we also here have to do with individuals who had applied for the right of approaching the council, but that the procedure left no traces in the records, that is, these named persons were not members of the council. The issues that were treated in these decrees are mainly of a domestic nature. Group 2 includes three different boards, the synedroi, the prytaneis and the 'phylakes '. The synedroi appear as formal proposers pleading the motion of an individual in three cases between 334 and c. 300/299, i. e., yvroµT]EtOo[xp-i-c]ou

Proxeny and citizenship decree for a Kyrenian, granting isoteleia and egktesis

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Honorary decree for a Milesian advocate who represented Kalymna in the arbitration between Kalymna and Kos, granting egktesis; basileus Damatrios mentioned

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Decree granting citizenship to Agorakles at the request of his father Agoranax; P

1tpocr'tmciv;M E1teA8COv 12

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Honorary decree in four fragments for a judge who had settled a civic strife in Kalymna on the orders of basileus Ptolemaios; refs to homonoia;P

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Citizenship decree for Lampsakos; P

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prostatai, hiereus, poletai, tamiai, hierophylakes

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(48)

260-240

No. Date

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Other references

tlioi;,e

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Proposer

Title of officials

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napoiai hiereus timachoi

Decree of the deme of Halasarna concerning the use of sacred vessels; P

[01:]C.KK/\,Tjcrt-

E~a'YTJ'ml n)'nav 3

monarchos Lex sacra. Regulations concerning purification rites for the cult of 8EUKA~S[enl 1tpomu1:av 0£] 5, Demeter epistatai hieropoioi exagetai 3

frg

[A: Decree of the Thessalian koinon]; B: Koari decree in honour of the Thessalian poleis, concerning purchase of grain

Km[

260-240

KokkorouAlevras 2004a 119ff.; 2004b, 5

ES0

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240 c.*

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at

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Fragment of decree, probably an honorary decree for Makareus

yvffiµa [1tpoo}m1:av

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Honorary decree for an unidentified Kalymnian

[yv]mµa

1tpocrta1:t'iv

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TCal 75; GIBM 267;BE 1954, 201;CSAD

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250--210

SBBerl 1901. 478-480.2; Chiron 28, 13a

E'!:01:'A'Aacmpvt1:t'iv

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prostatai napoiai

Decree of the deme of Halasarna for Herodotos, son of Herakleitos, representative of Herakles; [PJ

46

250-200*

Chiron 31b, I

-

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8c.vy£vric; 'Exa't00c6pou 7 El1tE

monarchos cf>1A,c&ta neopoiai napoiai epimenioi

Subscription to complete the temple of Apollo at Halasarna; A: Decision of an unidentified body to establish a fund-raising board and to launch a public subscription; B: End of decree relating to the same project, passed slightly later; P

242 aft.

Chiron 28, 14

frg

damarchos

Honorary decree (of a deme?) for the physician Praxianax P

47

frg

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Decree concerning the building of a tliesauros in the temple of Asklepios

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41

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Proxeny decree for an Athenian

RivFil NS 12, 1934. 169. (Al~ KFF7;Bl~KFF 8); CSAD

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Other references

EOO~E

liEooxOcn

Proposer

Title of officials

Main contents

o,[oJ

fig

prostatai

Decree for Theukrates of Kalymna who had lent money to Kos, referring to King Antigonos (Gonatas/Doson), granting citizenship; P

prostatai napoiai

Honorary decree of the deme of Halasarna for Diokles, son of Alexandros, who had served as priest of Herakles; P

monarchos MaKcipeuc;

[A: Decree of Halikamassos for a Koan physician, dated by the Koan monarchos]; B: ll. 23-35 Koan answering decree

B: yvCOµa 1tpocrta-tfiv

monarchos tA.lvo w

No.

Date

PHI

M=Milet D=Didyma

fool;e

oeoox-

Proposer/s

Titles of officials

Main contents

yvc&µT]Emcr-ca'tffiv-

epistatai, presbeis 2, presbeutai, election of 75 synedroi, tamias, prytaneis, election of 75 'men'

Decree of demos honouring Knidos for loan of money; P + leukoma

epistatai

Decree of boule and de mos ordaining that King Ptolemaios II's letter to be read to the ekklesia.

epistatai, presbytes, presbeis, 'phylakes'

Decree of demos making provisions for perpetuating philia and symmachia with King Ptolemaios II; pseudo-amendment; P + leukoma

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0in

tvl\~ur0cn 14

282

M40

Ml:3,138

2'0 uO avaypmvm

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'Emcr9E:vrii;''AAxOoi; El1tEV'

AEuKroµa 15

262-260

M52

Ml:3,139B

f:t~K'CO

-

yv@µ:ri2mcr-ca-r00v· 'E1taµeivrov 'Ecrnaiou 7

El7tEV'

16

262-260

M34

Ml:3, 139C

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ypmvm

yvffiµT]Emcrrm&v· TIEt0£voui; 0apcmy67 pou Etit:EV"

A£UKcoµa

17

234

M36

Ml:3,141

e-rOava-

1J1M

yvffiµTjcruvEOprov -r&v synedrois, heieropoioi, aipESEv-rrov10 Einav· prytaneis

Decree of demos regulating relations with Kios; P + leukoma

ypmvm 11£uKroµa 18

234/233

M54

MI:3,33a-g

A: [s]so

-

A: yvffiµTjcruvEOprov -r&vaipc.0Ev-rrov24+ B: oi CJUvc.Opot Elnav·

Ent w'U 9Eo'll0EmEpou -ro'UµE't 'A0rtvay0pav· synedroi, hyparchontes, demosiois

Decree of demos accepting judgement of synedroi concerning sharing citizenship with Kretans and according new citizens land in vicinity of Myous, with oaths of new citizens.

19

229/228

M55

MI:3,37a-f

SOO

vM

yvffiµTJtEmma1&v· 'Avtl1ta1po[i; ... cl ncv·]

epistatai, prophetes, tamias, stephanephoros, prytaneis, 'phylakes'

Decree of demos concerning giving citizenship to Kretans; homonoia; P+leukoma

oeoox-

Proposer/s

Titles of officials

Main contents

E't'Oavaypmvm A..Euxroµa

f ~ ~

--~! ____ ------No. Date

PHI

M=Milet D=Didyma

tliol;e

0cn

tvl\~ur0,m 20

229/228

M56

MI:3, 36aa+36 [TAPA 82, 1951, 111126,]

[solo

fig

1. 81, -rOv Ofiµov Kup&crm Ka001t

oM

21

218/217

M37

MI:3, 143A

frg

22

215/214

M38

Ml:3,146A

E't~K't0 oM E'CO avaypmvm AEUK@µa

23

211/210

M41

Ml:3,147

SOO

212-200

Syl/3 590

E't~K't'O

Probouleuma conce"rningnew citizens, to be ratified by the demos.

stephanephoros 1, grammateus, tamias, theoroi, presbeutas, prosetairoi, 'phylakes'

Decree praising Seleukeia (=Tralles) and granting isopoliteia; P

yv@µriEmma1&v· 'ApxEAai;Bicovoi;El 7tEV'

stephanephoros I, epistatai, hyparchontes, presbeutas, grammateus, tamias, prosetairoi, prophetes

Decree of boule and demos establishing isopoliteia with Mylasa; P + leukmna

1J1M

yvffiµT\npmClvErovKa't. 1&v~tpTjµkvcovEnt 't'T\t$uAa!CTjtKai1&v O:no0EtX8Ev-rrov cruvEOprov. ol npmlivEti; xat oi iitpTJµEvot £n't.'tftt $uAalCTltxat oi cr'UvEOpot Ehav·

prytaneis, 'phylakes', synedroi, grammateus, hypogrammateus, tamiai, hiereis, archontes

Decree of demos providing payments (misthos) to those who guaranteed mqney to the city with list of donors (+ epitropoi). Two women are among the contributors; pseudo-amendment; P + leukoma

os~

yvffiµTJ E1tl(J1a-r&v· 'HpaKAEWTI\i; 8wvu~ croOcbpouEl1tev·

epistatai, election of presbeutai E1tt 'lnoKpfrreui;

Decree of boule and demos concerning Didymeia and embassy to Kos, and fragmentary answer by Kos.

E't'Oavaypmvm A.EuKroµa

24

yvcbµricruvE[Oprov 1cai synedroi, prytaneis, 'phylakes', tamias, npu16:vErovKai 1&v election of five ~tp11JµEvrov Ent tiit theopropoi 'from all'