Hellenica Oxyrhynchia [reprint 1993 ed.] 0856683582, 9780856683589

Citation preview

HELLENICA OXYRHYNCHIA

edited with translation and commmtary by

P.R. McKechnie &

S.J. Kern

) P.R. McKechnie & S.J. Kern 1988. All rights reserved. No part rf this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or .ransmitted in any form by any means without the prior written rermission of the publishers. The Greek text of the Cairo fragment vas first published in the Studia Papyrologica of 1976 and is present n this volume with the kind permission of the Pontifico Istituto Siblico. The Greek text of the fragments in Florence and I-ondon is rom V. Bartoletti's edition of 1959 and is reproduced here with the (I.6

They chased.the enemy but not for. vgry long, -""uutry for they could not catch them becair"-irr" ---They _ulority weie and troops without armour. killed about six hundred of them, then they broke off the pursuit and

rZE"

three possibilitiesare [levJltarooi ouq, Ien]ftcrooi ouq and lorlltcrooiouq. At the end of the last Iine of column 5 after onLitoqt there is space

for up to three letters. 14^ 1, tt> rnere $ a punctuation mark in the

papyrus after ]eoOar. 183 I€[pt inne]uov Boissevain. 1,92 The papyrus reads av&otcvteq. 193 The papyrus reads t6v gspBsJov.

OJ

in' aird rd otgardne\oy rd rdv BafqBdqlaa.lxafta),aBdarcs6i yuAaxily ol onoudailaEx)afleford)octurafi-l 25c"rq af.qafiow,xalif ).apBduouowlo)izdta lnolfAiiu piu dyopdv,ouTaolue)6i fu,8gcbno[o]s, nil"hld 6i) oxeuq xci, yqilpara (td) piv ltdtfv &JJ,anzd d[i] Ttooagtlqyougl w3zofi.

}(II (Vil) I'eaop,iurle6i zffiq,)pdXrleror,aulr)r1qoi' pila dfp B Bagot. xa'can),ay(w eE lr oi E) E u.r1aag &neyrbgr1olav eiv) rQ Trcls$oagtpuet ngds dE Zdgde6' Ayrlofi"aosdi odrot qeig fipriqaE,tv aIE roiE uexgaiE negltp,efiaaE 6noonldu)6oucdnl\axea rolg nlo))tep,iotExai rponaiov dorrlloef xai rfiu yfiu finaoaa Bln6g8)qoea,npofiyev rd orgldre)uy,a [email protected]) peyd),7v,,2 Bnorciro 6i lr)i1v nopetctaI z6aix6rc ouvreraypiaooElyaa fu dp 21,0 n),lrlufliq rodE orqarrcbra4,,d.A' idty oiroig 6or1a TritgaqEn#vat xai xaxdtEnorclh, roig) fiBoil,ouro r'ije 'I'cooagigvqe nolepllouq. 6i nuS|peaogrotE lV),Lr1aae B)adtlew eiErd nqdoSeQ,)dud.aprbua68r,EroiE FlaeBdpouEB)nrfixd,o)tjI ee6n rc0ev | 4oai r 6 a noJ.).ottg,om6 i oluE 6rc7ota.3 Ay)qot]'laoE) 6i 6rcEe18lr)nfrd nel|fiou d rdty Au66x,lflye rfia orp]artda 1.. . . . .] 6d r6lv) 6gCoa rdy 6d.p6,ooa xeltptvav tfi)e rle AuitaEfxoirfie @puylas' Bnefil di 6rcnoglet5&7oavta6ra, xarepipfaoe tu)s E).1.r1vaseiE trja (Dlquylat, tuogd.gtxowo ngdg tfdv I zzo

went to the camp of the barbarians. Taking the garrison, which was not well organised, by surprise, they seized the camp speedily and captured lots of supplies, many men and much equipment and money, some belonging to others, some to Tissaphernes himself. )il.1

XII.3

'the This being the nature of battle, the barbarians, terrified by the Greeks, moved away with Tisqaphernes to Sardis. Agesilaus, having waited there three days (in which he returned to the enemy their dead under truce, set up a trophy, and ravaged the entire area), then once. again led his force forward to Greater phrygia. KI.2 He made the journey no longer having his soldiers drawn up in square formation btrt allowing them to attack what land they wanted and to cause harm to the enemy. Perceiving that the Greeks were advancing, Tlsbaphernes, once again taking the barbarians with him, followed behind them, keeping many stades distance. Journeying through the plain of Lydia, Agesilausled the army ... through the mountains lying between Lydia and Phrygia. When they had crossed these, he brought the Greeks do.vn to Phrygia until they reached the Maeander

203 The work of the first scribe begins again here. 21,4 The papyrus reads np6o0e, but at a line-end. 217 [spaXei] 6rd Wilamowitz; [cxoec].ioql 6r cr Fuhr.

64

65

asMalaa\pornorap,6v, tXecp}u tdg nqydq dnd Kd,at-) Qlg v|ou,fi rdy h, @puyigp,eytotq ln6)'r,gilorlu, Bxdi\aot 6'f . . 4 xaraorpa-l eiE$d)"owav napd flptfivqa tslai . rone\edoaq,6i wbE fld"onfour,qoloaExai roiE ofap,pd.76ous tfltierc n*tlegfu Xleil Ql4q|l"iren,rdy norfqlsopdy4 p4, xui Pa\tler,y tni Ketr"al1,ad.E fi ndlrn, ro)Qc orgaucbras dndyett. aiE dri ouvdBlawevair(tl pfi ytyvcoSat xaXd.rd iegd, negtltelifvole Exeltipt r)e fipdgat,'ffunapey$,eroxlti tfia tnrcl6ooa dnfiy)ey rdy ll lo4ariu Ayrloif).aoepia o&lu.. . I . . . . . . d ne6[ot' ri 230 Illatdvf\gouxa),ot5peaolvf | 0t.. . . . . .]. uiltourat Aailoil | ,yl"i . . . . XIII (VIII) . . .]. di BuoL]"et)E l'.[. . . . . . n]egitatrouEl . . "[.

River which takes its source from Celaenae which is the greatest city in Phrygia, and flows out to the sea near Priene and ... )ilI.4

Having encampedthe peloponnesiansand their allies, he made a sacrifice to find out whether he should cross the river or not, whether to ma'rch against Celaenae or to lead his army back again. Since it happened that the sacrifices were not auspicious, he waited there the day on which he arrived and the following d^y, then withdrew his army ... So Agesilaus ... the plain of the Maeander ... there live the Lydians and ..:

. .f.TnoagiQvn I rg[. . . . . r o ) i E "El r),r1 u Ia qp.t. , . . . . .)ropv xai pd.llro)"ola . . . . . . . .1. 6iYa xelPelv

:::::::::: :

:lr'fi ,*i::::::::::':::240

..llorrl.. Trco)aql{Qv... . ...1 l15dea[. Apra[]6q{i.... .)anasf ....111oL.. . . . .l ?nl..lonel.. . . .l . oo([. . . . . ] l o e y [ .. . . 227 6xer pbv cde nnydg and Kel,crrlv6:v Lipsius.

222 erEi 6{V.2 ... the peace, he appears to have managed affairs 'like very well; for he did not, most of the earlier holders of power, go after extortions of money, and ... very democratic ...

X'r. I fxai nfugayyer I xurapala napal,a-

-)_o!:*"-

2l_lvotql.).9[- -)lep"pi, [.]ep.[-- -] ldssdb'lclfg . ,lg.[-- -, a]lp" 6i'lyfercot-- -:l | 6ini ,rt. ,ttivl- -l | fisqp.itoutnqi+l- - -:l I 6t' iaen{.. .lnrt..lg.[: -l l[.]crla,/4.[-- -]f [z]ego, ,.trl- - -l I roxal Frcr(. [- = -] | xg,ilov #t- - -l 1 notrifie Qpydlrcrc -

-.-l-,.1 6po[.\,_ o.[.]q.t.lc[- -]lza,. i.l,i'.i.t.*-- -_ -)l."teygEtl],1yfu,_ __tj t?*t t Troillt'1tyoe,,-,IyS|pC^tg . . . . . . : . .'. .ll-s lolt- _rto}llfiltoa)yryvopl&,our. 6t d1t t!)vtu-)xltJat.&swra tlgis nsdypaot,gatueialI

xeTgqp&,loc.)d ydp r$oneg olt nXeiotot r.dtrt np6 r'ot 6i)lnrcorcatdwailt), citpprloi pg"t td,g r6a TgrliArri &qna)lris, xai lqfpoftrxcbtqlr)g6 T[. . .-:-. . . . . . 298 [y]eveo Bartoletti: the traces of ev are not discernible to p. McK

305 tnldul{tlav or [&]t[u]{ilcrv Grenfelland Hunt. 308 !n[uo]rr r6t{rl9g or 61[po]tr rdrte[p]og Gnenfell and Hunt; the ink is rrery indiitinct. 73

.f_i percnepndlpleyog B* l. . ....._-ll*6yarr,,6o4lol6vrasd[.. . . . . . . 1 l u l a n t r t { o l r a f2- [r. . .

. . . zstE. . . . ..310

.l | *[. . . .].t..1"[. . .]"[-

Fragmenta ColumnaeX ut videtur tribuendt Fr. 10

"r#J",

t.io,nr.,

fl"aneu_l 6o$at't_ _ _ Aaxe\aftpou

tatl

Fr. 11

lrtil f xai 6e{ I . [.]uzar[ )..p{ lq"t6l

I .t.l"it

feotl fat Enel r 6tul (l),rpuBapBdg@lt, .l . [.] d.Md,tfu pel | .l..lrqp6i Btw. ae. [.]g[ * . . .;llgr.rteinoX.tui1t 315 dvJfrl.cioev? IGlinka. 74

75

xalliryoyep' dwi 6v fiyafnrlPn'oE le inoirloe xqvqnegl )u,aq xataoxeual. I zepi 6i rip roul (finis eolumnae)

X'r.12 -1.

sftav nag' Bnecul fo&a ncEpe .l

T

.1"'L

fu tnwal )cXaSel

-l . ,td npootl )qu eih1l. _l. rc)"a:l1

Fr.13

F r. 1 4

X' r .15

lAr

)rrL )nxol )rwl Itdal.

J#t

JG'. [_

larcul

)w ai,tl )aqeio$lat.

ul.[....]'[

loe[.]eoI )ag noj'f

1_i_

331=nydnnLr6voq Bartoletti; nydndto Meyer.

'16

'71

D

XV.1

xv (x) -ll .....Jsflot..

iEitlaCe toJE otqarrcbruE) . .l . xu$' \xdlfotrlu) flft€lg)r.tt' oisv rol,E6llil.oq) ia ltl6t )tpdvlt, nqogaot(dpercqpi)a iva pfi Sqllflupo]uv'reE Teigoaslytur,nrat ngdEduf n(J'e- 350 poulsf)dy,e)voE raie 6i naguoxelud(ewngo9{ptouE] 1tov, 'Podtoug llda i)6uom i,v toTe |lil.otE ainwe naqdv)zctq rrlamo6l.ro roi)e tgyotE intTeqelta' riE di o$vr1$eq tifnaou Bnollrloev)6qewdu \Eemlop,,jv,airdE trtiuei)xoot p,eaoE ),ctBr)tvlr 6tv)q tfigav B( dil.euloeueiEK u6toa,B ou))'6 tnlpi n)apeTuat ry1 \wgSolgQ tGtv dgydvtttt)a,'Iegrtn,r pE l6i x)ai Nmogfip,cgngoo|lru{ev inLp'il")r18fivatti'v fngafyp,drav s6on, atirol nqlpt6go$. 2 of n]egLp'etaaa' nlagdwr,:v Enifilt B(emlop,d)r IteE) Bxeh'qanju i1p,6qu,, xaSrifnegei60et,r5loav.]360 doa otgctttfarav rfi ilorepalg eiEfrd)v )troitE1.tiuairdv napfiyalyovia rctfe 6n).oLq, dn p,6ta,rloliE 6i pcmgbftfo rr1]e&yopd.s. l6i)'Poitcot' c'[ ouyeddreEtila nlp6.[w, ritfe6n6,].aBoa lx)arydv 8y7etpeiveluarrotE {gylotE,ou]vil.|yowo loilu Eyyerydloryeiq airav duaPdfini rila dyopdr, xai Augtpayoe 201p.)iv

*/.2

Each day he reviewed the soldiers with their weaponsat the harbour, the pretext being that they shoutd not become lazy and unfit for the war, but in fact wanting to raise the morale of the Rhodians with the idea that if they saw them there in armour they might engage in action immediately. When he had accustomed them all to seeing the review, he himself took twenty of the triremes and sailed to Caunus, not wanting to be there at the overthrow of the government. He had commanded Hieronymus and Nicophemus, his lieutenants, to take care of the situation.

They bided their time during that day, and when the soldiers were there for the review on the following day in the usual fashion, they led some under arms to tfre harbour and others to just outside the market-place. Those of the Rhodians who were in the know, when they realised it was time to undertake the deed, gathered with daggers in the market-place, and one of them, Dorimachus, got up on the stone where the

The papyrus here show totq o: unusually, the rough breathing is marked. npoegorC6pevoq prb]v Wilamowitz; np6eaorv piv nap6xolv Rich. idv flDoorv Grenfell and Hunt; 5tov i]6clorv Wilamowitz. risllai;ioap,i)toin,iifrw ori"A6 ,,6y xaxdtt, 6polllas di . . . . .'. dorrlqt.. . . . .)a_ airctg eiolf.. Jriiri. no[. . . .] dn

)"dyav I

. . . .j . .1.t..l rilvllndtrn'rql.. . ...dfnonle6oaalreE ynd rfis.t

..[. . .]pt!!c I ypfloaoSacroie . . . . t6ul rgr "i{.air6y Kflaov 6i xavlyltdlaau npoo)eh$dt, ipiE I !qrr..5 sA,ecbaupou ,fjnapyor,,4"1i), ogrf rdu a", _rf6v .ne(6tt pa-ro-e 66y.aratrl4 oaoirlrp 1i"1oilias. i,i ydp lqiyparo a6rQ Bw).ent 6lo6aut rois re gpologit,gr*s lL-llhrtroE,

610

said): they proposed to take the people from Rhodes )O(.4 ... having sailed away and sail to Cyprus ... ... and having called together those of the Cypriots who wanted, going towards the acropolis so that they might as being the cause of all overthrow the power of their troubles, similarly ... for.them ... of the speeches to use the city ... having sailed away from the the ... of the triremes.

)o(.5

After they had put to sea, Conon came to lronymus, the commander of the infantry, and said to him that he was the only one who could save the King's campaign. For if he would give him the Greek garrison, which

603 anonL]e0ocrvree Grenfell and .Flunt, who

expresseddoubts about its use simply with a genitive; rupr]etocv.ueg Boissevain.-

dnrntle0ocvtes6i t[ g--yl,.JV1erou: $ Icl[l]cp{eTlvr dnou Kalinka.

605 Ba8i[Couorv] Grenfell and Hunt: Pcx6rIeToOat]? Bartoletti. 6Q5-6 t[ot K6vovog] Wilamowitz. 61.2 B[ouLo]pevor Grenfell and Hunt; ou] p[uv&]pevor ? Bartoletti. cut[60ev iotior.g t6:v] Grenfell and Hunt; crut[6er oKe0eor td:vl Lipsius; aut[60ev ortiorq t6lv] Gigante. 613 1rt6V npodeA0r)v Bartoletti; Kunpiovl e-f,earv Grenfell and Hunt. 61.4 fncxpxov Keil; cipXovta Wilamowitz. 616 6[o0var totg re Bartoletti; tor)g {r66vcr Genfell and Hunt.

100

101

of,rilu Ka6vor,fgpougolot,,xai) fiiu Kapdta cbEnl.eloroug, natioetlu d1v Bar(t orlparoni\E ralrogayfiv.xd.etioavroE 6li rw Aeontp,)ot:)"apBduetv 6n6oooEpwAerat oqarftcbraE,ra{rlqu p,iurilv flpigou nagfixev,xai yd.gfilt' il"toE azo fi]6q nepi 6uopd.E,eiE di rfiv into6oar', npia fipf{gaa y)ea6o8ac,traprbunopd.rc6 Aeautpoa rdty re fKapfoa) ou1pabE xai robs I LbE)"Lr1vaE dnavraEEfrjyayevlafuo)tE Ex rfis nd),e.r,E'tnerca raiE piu lt,tliuofleuadro6 ro8 orpaton66ou nepd,ovloev,rciE l6i. . .] . t. . . . .)t, ng6g re td.guoiE xali) dv aiym\da l6ted.{arc. tafira 6i notfioaE xai xil"eiloag xr7p6[ar,rldu xilguxa 1p)geia Sxao'rou tdtu oqal2ormndty Bni njlv Eaaro6,oa)t'6AcBe rdty Kpnpiav tdy te KagnaoAla xai rdtr, &.l)ion 6.{fixoara, xai toiE piu dn6,xrewle,rdy 6i oqafrrlydy dyeorailpanea.630 .... o]t xaraLetg$tvreE Bu tfi d[i 8 &xo$oavze6 'P66q (6r)rlyaad.xrloua, xai yal.en)dE Bt,eyxdureE zadg 25dp76ourag zo6 Kdya)aoE xautotdyrae rcitE t"iv | ltSnd pd),troareE EE4laoluyBx ro6) orparon6,6ou, rdu.6i )*p,6vo xaraltndylreq,nofuJa]SdpBou xai ragaTfiu naplf)oyov

guarded Caunus, and as many Carians as possible, he would put a stop to the disturbance in the camp. Leonymus told him to take as many soldiers as he. wanted. He let the day pass for the sun was already near to setting. But on the following duy, before daybreak came, he took froqr Leonymus many of the Carians and all the Greeks, and led them from the city. Then he positioned some outside the camp, others near the ships and the seashore. After doing this and ordering the herald to announce that each man should go to his post, he arrested the Carpasian and sixty of the other Cypriots; he killed them and crucified their general. )0(.6 Having heard ... those left behind in Rhodes were angry and indignant, and they attacked the commanders appointed by Conon and drove them out of the camp, and leaving the harbour they caused much disturbance and commotion among the Rhodians.

"a

.

Lipsius; iq rplt{l,arflly 625 napl{vovblv Castiglioni: nothing vrsible to P.McK. corresponds to the letters c or u. 626 [6ret&{ato Lipsius; [npoonysyi Grenfell and Hunt; Irat6otrloev or [rat6tcrfev Castiglioni. 627 Xar]geTvBartoletti; Bci]verv Wilamowitz. 628 ti1[v ecruto0 Wilamowitz; tr1[v orrlvilv Bury. 631. 6[b tc drei0ev Keil; 6[b td yev6;"leva Grertrell and Hunt; 6[b td yeyov6ra Fuhr; 6[b td yeyov6q Kalinka. 'P6Dq ( 632 6r) lycrv&rct[ouv Fuhr, to avoid the 'P66

u(l

-l

YZI

ol

FI

d'l

II

; I

;

Fi iti

ol

E

(J

II

99 U6 a

l.

little bit ambiguous here as to whether the local councils' iurangements applied at the federal level, but the rbferenceto 'the four councils of the Boeotians,which have all the power' at Th.V.38.2, makes the picture clearer. Arguing against Grenfell and Hunt's view that the federal council was not in four parts, R.J. Bonner notes that the choice is between a statement of Thucydidesand a silence of the Oxyrhynchushistorian ('The Four Senatesof the Boeotians' (C.Phil. 10(1915),pp.381-385,at p.384). The fact that the whole system has the appearanceof a structuredeliberately worked out and implementedat a particular time to supersedeprevious arrangements,tends to iupport the presumptionthat the pattem of organizationof city councils could be the sameas the pattem of the federal council. 3g2. Nlwho lived in that area were arranged in elevendivisions... The map links up the places attestedby the author as being connected

>t 2 JL)

for the election bf Boeotarchs. Wilamowitz was ttre first to note that 'Hysiaeans'must be the inhabitantsof Hyems, to the north of Lake Copais, and not tlre inhabitantsof Hysiae, near Plataea (OryrhynchusPapyri Y (London, 1908), p.227). Hyetnrs was probably under the control of Orchomenusat this period (cf. Bruce, pp.106-7):this grouping supplied'two Boeotarchs.

6l

r.r

EI

?

6L Il

*l

Jo ,Il

EI ol

U

other stretching round the north side of the lake, to both sides of

) '1

There were two groupings,of three cities each, each providing one Boeotarch- one of thesegroupingsto the south and west of Lake Copais,the Orchomenian tenitory. Down towards the south coast of Boeotia was the groupingdominatedby Thespiae('The Thespianswith Eutresisand Thisbe'),

6

6 6r,

zg

d,oT

157

and to the east of Thebes, Tanagra provided one Boeotarch.

As far as can be judged from the comparativelylittle that is known

With Plataea under Theban control and its right to retum Boeotarchs

about the population of the cities of Boeotia, the divisions of the country

being exercised by Thebes, the weight of influence in the administration of

seem probably to have been of sizes at least roughly proportional to the

Boeotia rnust have been with Thebes Oere cf. N.H. Demand Thebes in the

numben of Boeotarchs and councillors they retumed. Thebes was clearly

Fifth Century B.C. (London, 1982), pp.37-38, arguing that from the outset and before the war between Thebes and Plataea the whole point of the federal political

strucfure was to give Thebes effective control). There is some

evidence that in earlier periods Orchomenus and Tanagra had been able to follow a political path distinct from Thebes' (cf. Bruce, pp.106-7), and Thespiae was from time to time a centre of opposition to Thehs

(cf.

Th.IV.133.1 and VI.95.2); but at this date it is clear that Boeotian policy is in effect the policy of the ruling party in Thebes.

much the largest city. There is a scatterof pieces of evidence about the size or military strenglhsof Boeotian cities, relating to datesfrom the early flfth to the early secondcenturiesB.C., collectedby K.J. Beloch in Die Bevdlkerung der griechisch-rAmischen Welt (I*ipzig, 1886) at pp.l6l-172, which cannot really be zummarizedin the spaceavailable here, but with some caution, one comparison may be useful: from late third century ephebic inscriptions, recording the namesof twenty-yearold men completingtheir military training, which exist for eight Boeotian'towns (Chaeronea,Lebadeia,Orchomenus, Hyettus, Copae, Chorsiae,Acraephia and Thespiae),Beloch calculatesthe

404. They provided sixty councillors per Boeotarch...

combined army strengthsof theseplaces at ttrat date at 6,160 (p.171); and

G. Glotz explains the arithmetical calculation which brought the size of the council to 660: the total had to be divisible (he argues) in the flrst place by 11 (the same number of councillors per Boeotarch), in the second place by 4 (because of the four-council system), in the third place by 3 (to allow equal representation

in . the

groupings

of

three

states linked

for

r*rming

Boeotarchs), in the fourth place by 5 (this to account for the grouping '...Scolus, Erythrae, Scaphae and the other places...' which seems to account for the fourth Theban Boeotarch: Glotz supposes that there were two 'other places'). The need for the total to be divisible by 2 (n accommodate the Orchomenus-Hyettus grouping) is of course dealt with by the fact of 4 &ng in the calculation anyway, so that the rigmarole runs: 3x4x5xl1=660 (cf. G. Glotz 'Le conseil f6d6raledes Bdotiens' BCH 32 (1908), pp.27l-278, at pp.277-8).

158

Diodorus (XV[.14.1) recordsthat in 336 when Alexander capturedThebes over 6,000Thebanswere killed, with 30,000takenprisoner(cf. Belochp.166) - those killed being presumably the soldien. If the periods are taken as comparable and an allowance made for the four cities mentioned by the Oxyrhynchus author and not representedby ephebic lists (Coronea,Thisbe, Eutresis,Tanagra),then, assumingno significantshift in populationstructure, the electoralpositionof Thebesmight seemto match its size reasonablywell. 405. and they paid their daily expenses Modem scholarshave failed to agreeon whetherthis meansthat the govemmentor the councillorsthemselvespaid the expenses.The questionis quite imponanr R.J. Bonner ('The BoeotianFederalConstitution'C.Phil. 5 (1910), pp4o54l7 at p.407) assumesttrat the governmentpaid and usesrhis assumptionto argue that the oligarchic systemof Boeotia was basedon a t59

hoplite franchise such that adult men who could afford to arm themselves as

and introductionof demes,advanceddemocracyby creatingnew loyaltiesand

heavy infantrymen could vote, and be candidates for seats on the council.

weakeningthe divisive force of the older arrangements.

J.A.O.

Larsen

agrees about the

govemment paying

(Representative

Goverrunent in Greek and Roman History (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1955), p.205, n.33) but G. Glotz (art.cit. p.272) and P. Cloch€ (ThCbes de B4otie (Namur, 1952), p.73) both argue that the councillors must have paid. If this

413. the Cadmea Named after Cadmus,the city's legendaryfounder,the Cadmeawas the citadel at ttrc heart of Thebes.

were so, it would restrict membership of the council far more tightly, even if (as Bruce, p.108, suggests) the'council members had o spend only a quarter

XYII (Column 12line 31 to column 14line 6)

of the year living on uneamed income. autoi ('they') is masculine and there is a certain awkwardness about

414. the best and most notable of the citizens... Again a hendiadys(cf. 6.2-3 above)and again a phrdsecomplimentary

taking its antecedent to & ta.mere ('the electoral divisions'). But a literal 'and for-these-men they used !o pay translation of the clause in question is

to the upper classes.The author.is careftrl to define the Boeotianpolitical

out the-things for the day': taking toutois ('for-these-men') as referring to the

strugglesas taking placewithin the oligarchicclass(and indicatesimpartiality

same people as outoi ('they')

on the points at issue,as the next note but one shows).This contrastswith the

really presents more difFrculty than the

positionhe takesn 6.2-3, wherehe more or less openly endorsesupper class

altema[ve. Not knowing how often one was permiued to serve on ty

council, it

is not really possible (even assuming that the state paid expenses)to work out

attitudes in Athens at the time of Demaenetus'voyage and speakswith implicit scom aboutthe motivationsof the majority.

what proportion of the enfranchised citizens might at sorne time serve. H. Swoboda attempts some calculations, which if correct would suggest tlmt over a period of years perhaps 3,000 or so Thebans, 1,500 or so Orchomenians or Thespians, might take part ('Sfudien zur Verfassung Boeotiens' K/io

10

419.Leontiades'party supportedthe Spartans This well-constructedsentencefollows the chiastic 'a, b:b, a' pattem. After naming the leading figures (he choosesto give three on each side) he

(19 10), pp3l5 -344, at pp.320-321).

picks up first the secondgroupnamedand givesdetail.

406. For the organization of the army

Twelve yean larcr in 383 Ismeniasand Leontiades(the two first named)were still at the head of their respectiveparties.Leontiadesarranged

Here the author mentions a number of areas (including military service, t3xation, jury rervice) administered via the electoral divisions. This points up how the artificial and carefully thought out constitution acted as an instrument of sociat control, rather as Cleisthenes' reforms to the Athenian tribal system,

r60

Phoebidas'captureof the Cadmeain that year:he had Ismeniasarrested(Xen. HeU. Y.2.28-31). The others mentioned by the author appear to be less important figures, except perhaps Androcleidas,whom the Spartanslater chargedwith beingjointly responsible,with Ismenias,for 'all the trouble and

161

disorderin Greece' (i.e. the CorinthianWar; Xen. Hell. Y.2.3$. Details of possible identifications of Antitheus with a figure called Amphitheus or Amphithemis,and of Asiaswith one Archias,are given at Bruce, pp.ll0-111: so are argumentsfor emending'Conantadas'to 'Coeratadas'.But threenames out of six seemsa high proportion to have to change.Much more likely the

the stages by which the anti-Spartanelement in Boeotian politics grew in influence. 428. many came forward from the cities in Boeotia... Hetaereiai, the dining clubs which were also political associations,

author for literary reasonswanted three leaders for each side. Putting the namesdown conveys an impressionof substance- the detail helps the reader

would normally restrict membershipto citizens of the city they existed in. In this case,after about fifty years following the integratedconstitutiondescribed

feel he has engagedwith the material.Notice that for variation the author uses two leadersfrom eachside at the end of 17.2.But it is quite likely that some

in 16, the political establishmentof Thebeswas admitting membersfrom the oligarchic dlites of the other Boeotian cities.

of the names given belong to people not important enough io appear elsewherein extanttexts.

430.and eyen a little while earlier Clochd (afi.ciLp.334) opposesthe idea that the Ismenias faction had

420. Ismenias' party was accusedof supporting the Athenians

taken power from 404: his preferred explanationis that the I-eontiadesfaction

The author stresses that despite their kindness towards the pro-

had compromisedits pro-Spartanattitude to keep power. Hence Boeotia's

democratic exiles from Athens n 4M, Ismenias and his followers were not

non-participationin Sparta's wars againstElis and Persia: but taking the

pro-Athenian. But they clearly took an anti-Spartanline over a number of

leading role in an anti-Spartancoalition which included Athens, which Thebes

years (see previous note,andalso 18.1 below). By making, and implicitly

c:rme to do as a result of provoking the Locrian-Phocianwar, representeda

endorsing, the distinction between this and being pro-Athenian, the author

much more radical position.The attractionof Cloch6'sview is that it fits in

invites the readerto regardhim as an objective commentaloron the cldms of

well with the Oxyrhynchus author's statementthat bottt parties in Thebes

thesepolitical alignments.

were influential. Xenophon (Heil. 1n.5.3) does not supply details of the political

427. and both partieswere influential... Boeotianpolicy from 431-4U, and especiallyduring the Deceleanwar,

position in his version of the story, and simply calls the Androcleidasparty 'the leading men in Thebes'. Diodorus omits any referenceto the Boeotian

was consistentlyand strongly anti-Athenian.After the Spartanshad come to

govemmenr(xIV.8l. 1-3).

terms with Athens n 4M (annoyanceat this (Xen. Hell.lI.2.l9) echoed Boeotian refusal to join in the peace of 421:-Th.Y.2.26) Boeotian anti-

436. when the Spartanswere at Deceleid...

Athenianismno longer necessarilyimplied supportof Sparta.P. Clochd ('La politiquethdbainede 4M.t396 av. J.-C.' REG 31 (1918),pp.3l5-343)traces

In 413 the Spartansestablisheda pennanentpost in Attica at Deceleia (Th.VII.19.1), up towards the Boeotian border. This put more sustained pressurcon the Atheniansthan they had sufferedearlier in the war.

r62

163

440. becausethe city was profiting considerablyon their account The SpartanstrategybenefittedBoeotia in proportion to the damageit did to Auica. It made moves against Boeoria by the Athenians flike the

Athens of control of Anica was a necessarypart of Sparta's strategyfor final victory. The Boeotianswere the incidental.beneficiariesof tlre destructionof Attic prosperity.

Delium campaignof 424) much less likely. 443. when the Athenians beganto move againstBoeotia... Engrossing these small Boeotian communities into Thebes gave the Thebansthe advantageof a larger population, in the city and under ttre direct control of the govemmenl Later, in Epaminondas'campaignsafter Leuctra, the Thebanssponsorcdsynoecismat Messeneand Megalopolis(D.S.XV.66.1 and 72.4) - this time with the idea of concentratingMessenianand Arcadian

457.it had suffered only slight damage 'Pericleanstrategy' - allowing invasionsof In view of the nature of the Attica and relying on control of the sea - it may seem odd that tlp countryside outside Athens had not been very thoroughly ravaged. But invading armies were only in Attica for a few weeks (until the occupationof Deceleia). Destnoyingstanding cmps was easy, but destroying buildings was much more time-consuming.W.G. Hardy, though noting that it is unnecessary

strengthagainstthe power of Sparta.

to cut down a tree to kill it" points out that two Attttidographen, Androtion (FGrHist 324 F 39) and Philochorus (FGrHist 328 F 125), say that sacred

450. they bought up the slaves...

olive trees were spaled in the Archidamian war ('The Hellenica Oryrhynchia and the devastationof Attica' C.PhiI.2l (1926),pp.346-355at p.351).

At VII.27.5 Thucydides comments on the damage caused to Afiica during the occupationof Deceleia.He mentions that more than 20,000 slaves ran away to Deceleia:the Spartanscoped with this influx by selling the slaves locally.

XVII (Column 14line 6 to column 15 line 32) 46,8.wanting to overthrow their empire so that they would not be swept

454. the wood and iiles of the houses... Much of southemGreecewas not well wooded even at this date; this is why roof timbers and door frames were worth taking away. Thucydides notes (II.14.1) how at the beginningof the Peloponnesian war the Arhenians, obeying Pericles' instructions, brought everything in from the country, includingthe woodworkof their houses. 455. At that time the Athenians' territory.... . The power of Athens was supportedby successfulagriculture in Anica ai well as the league tribute and the output of the silver mines. Depriving 164

aside... The author gives his explanation of the beginning of the PhocianLocrian war in terms of the intemal politics of Boeotia.Taking the.view that attempting to overthrow the power of Spartanswas such a risky enterprise that ttre Boeotian govemment,even if controlled by an anti-Spartanfaction, cannothave had it in mind, Bruce, pp.116-7,suggeststhat the motive (fdar of ttre pro-Spartanparty) may have been imagined by the writer as a result of looking back on the events ot 3832 when the pro-Spartansdid betray the Cadmeato a passingSpartanarmy.

16s

But this suggestion ignores the author's carefiil stressing of the point that both parties were influential in Thebes. The background filled in in the two previous chapters is sauctured to support the explanation offered here: nature of the system; even power of the sides; anti-spartans recently taking power; what the city had gained in the past from friendship with Sparta. The

later to feel that their trust had been abused, he thinks it difficult to accept in view of Ismenias' and Androcleidas'

success in keeping their prominent

position in the anti-Spartanparty until 383/2 (cf. Xen. Hell. Y.2.25-31). This is not a strcng argument. The 'party' was a loose alliance of people of similar opinions, and not a bureaucratically organized unit of

writer's aim has been to make the reader feel he understands the facton which led to the decisions which were made by the people in power. The fact

politicians who would expect to be consulted. The leaders' success in starting

that ttrc anti-spartans struck first makes it impossible to judge whether their fear of the pro-Spartans was realistic.

anti-Spartans were rieht probably on several counts, to ttrink that an open

470. supposing that the King would provide the money...

481. they persuaded certain men among the Phocians...

the desired war probably eamed admiration rather than annoyance. And the attack - a march against Sparta - was not a practical plan.

Back in 7.2, discussing opposition to Sparta in Athens, the author

Xenophon (Heil. IJI.S.T agrees with this author on the point of the

notes how a number of states, including Boeotia, had for some time been

Boeotians having provoked the Spartans to attack by underhand action in

looking for a way to get up an alliance to fight a war against the Spartans. This aunosphereof anti-spartanism, together with the persian King's initiative

connection with the Phocian-Locrian dispute. But on nearly all further details ttre two disagree. It is not only a question of his saying that tlte Boeotians had

in sending Timocrates to pay out money to get a war started and force

made their arrangements with the locrians, but also of his placing the dispute

Sparta's withdrawal from Asia 6en. HeII. m.5.1-2), created conditions where

between Phocis and. Eastern Locris, while the Hellenica Oryrhynchia places

trying to provoke ttre Spartans into military action could seem an intelligent

events around Pamassus, on the border between Phocis and Westem Locris

courseof actionfor the Ismeniasparty.

(see map). Pausanias III.9.9 speaks of the Locrians of Amphissa (Westem Locrians) in this connection.

477. they thought it would be difficult to attack them openly... In an article ('Intemal Politics and the outbreak of the corinthian

The differences are almost as great as those. in the accounts of the Battle of Sardis (see 11 above, with notes); in this case the argument that

War' Emerita 28 (1960), pp.75-86), Bruce makes the underhand nature of this provocative action a main point in his argument against accepting the author's

Xenophon may have been on the spot is not really available. Bruce's

account of the begiruring of the war. He asks (p.80) whether the reader is to imagine that all, br only some, of the anti-spartan party knew of the plan.

Spartan Boeotian informant is speculative. It is the fact that the Hellenica Oryrhynchia account gives a location for the border dispute ('a disputed area

The first altemative he finds implausible; and since the second would involve

near Mt. Pamassus') which conveys the impression that the writer has a

the leading men deceiving their own supponers (p.81), who might be expected

clearer knowledge than Xenophon about what was going on.

166

suggestion (art. cit. p.85) that the Oxyrhynchus author may have had a pro-

t61

z+

It may be that Xenophon found it more plausible to think of the Boeotians as inriguing with Locrians rather than Phocians; in any case the !

account of the Oxyrhynchus author is a bit

.! E

Phocianswere usually the rivals of the Locrians, who were generally friendly

d

3t