Heidegger’s Way of Thought: Critical and Interpretive Signposts 9781472546791, 9780826457271, 9780826457363

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Editors 'foreword

This collection of papers on Heidegger's philosophy by Theodore Kisiel honours an extraordinary scholar whose research has contributed much to a better understanding of Heidegger's work. He published the first of more than 60 papers on Heidegger in 1964. With the publication of the English translation of Volume 20 of the collected edition (Gesamtausgabe) of Heidegger's writings, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, he established his reputation as a first-rate translator. His magnum opus, The Genesis of Heidegger's 'Being and Time", was published in 1993. This work has found world-wide critical acclaim as one of the outstanding works on Heidegger's philosophy in any language and earned its place among the few 'classic' works on Heidegger's philosophy, most notably William J. Richardson's Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought and Otto Poggeler's Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking. Kisiel's decade-long research has been of fundamental importance to Heidegger scholarship. He reintroduced the traditional principles of hermeneutics to his research. The lack of these principles, biography, chronology and doxography (cf. Genesis 7—8), has hampered the study of Heidegger's work in last fifteen years or so. They are the signposts that determine his appropriation and critique of Heidegger's works, and enable him to explain Heidegger's philosophy in relation to the context from which it emerged.

Biography As the old Heidegger tells us, it was his 'theological provenance' which put him on the path of thinking (US 96/10). His early 'hermeneutics of facticity' is also a testimony to his own sense of the biographical element in the 'hermeneutic situation' from which each philosopher speaks. However high philosophical thought may float above the empirical reality of everyday life, every philosopher remains a child of his own time. Philosophy does not take place in limbo, but is influenced by the philosophical discourse of its time and its relation to the history of ideas as such and philosophy in particular.

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Chronology Heidegger has always stressed that his philosophy is a way of thought (genitivus objectivus and subjectivus). It is not a subjective projection of the meaning of being; it is a meditative listening to the voice of being that expresses itself in the intelligibility of the world as such and most clearly in human existence. As Heidegger loved to say: 'It thinks in me!' His thought is never finished but always on the way. In order to follow the development of Heidegger's tracing of the meaning of being, it is of the utmost impor-tance to get the record of his writings, lectures and courses right. Without a reliable record we simply cannot understand the development of the key-concepts of Heidegger's thought. Doxography After having brought together the biographical and chronological evidence, the ancient art of establishing what a philosopher actually says comes into play. As the papers in this volume show, Kisiel has an outstanding grasp of the subtlety, complexity and chronological relations of Heidegger's thought. He has excelled in bringing to light forgotten and obscure sources. Contrary to the traditionally dominant interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy, which remains immanent to the text by treating his thought as sui generis and unrelated to the world from which it emerged and often degenerates into sheer paraphrase, Kisiel evokes the background of history and the history of philosophy to interpret Heidegger's thinking in the context of his life, time, and history of ideas. This kind of careful research of the determining facts is often disqualified as a kind of non-philosophical positivism for which the philosophical substance of Heidegger's thought in its originality and subtlety must remain a closed book. The results of Kisiel's research clearly show in many ways how short-sighted such criticism really is: 1. The philological exactness of his transcriptions of Heidegger's manuscripts lays the foundation for his constructive and leading critique of the edition of Heidegger's works as they are published in the Collected Edition (Gesamtausgabe) by Klostermann. 2. His sensitive and subtle awareness of the particularities of the German language in its terminological use by Heidegger not only enables him to comment in a careful way on the English translations of Being and Time, but also to suggest alternative translations for key-terms. 3. These corrections of the basic means of research and teaching are not the only benefits of Kisiel's research. An inestimable merit of his year-long research in the leading archives is the first presentation and interpretation of many documents that are of essential significance for Heidegger's path

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Editors' foreword of thinking. Kisiel's research enables us today to understand the genesis of Heidegger's philosophy in its continuity and transitions from its original starting-point in the famous lecture course of the war emergency semester of 1919, The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldviews, to the publication of his main work Being and Time.

The selection of the papers in this volume is based upon Kisiel's own hermeneutical principles (biography, chronology, doxography). The papers show both the complete range and the development of his research. We have not ordered them chronologically but in such a way that they follow Heidegger's path of thinking. The last essay in this volume, for instance, that discusses mostly Heidegger's later philosophy is in fact the one that Kisiel wrote first. The first paper, 'Heidegger's Apology: Biography as Philosophy and Ideology', is Kisiel's main contribution to the Heidegger scandal caused by Farias' book on Heidegger and Nazism and Ott's attempt at a Heidegger biography. This careful essay typifies Kisiel's hermeneutical approach. Contrary to many other philosophers he does not take the statements of the two camps, Farias and Ott on the one hand and Heidegger's orthodox defenders on the other, at face value but critically weighs the evidence put forward by both sides. He rejects the tendency to separate Heidegger's life from his thought because it is ideological and as such irreconcilable with the hermeneutics of facticity in Being and Time. It was not the politically naive simpleton from Mefikirch who joined the Nazi party and became rector of Freiburg University in 1933, but the university professor and worldfamous author of Being and Time. Heidegger's own methodological postulate is in his attention to the hermeneutic situation's inherent demand to clarify the ontic-factic suppositions of the ontological analysis and formation of concepts. Kisiel makes consistent use of this postulate and at times uses it against Heidegger himself and especially against the cover-ups of his thinking by his apologists. However, a fair weighing of the evidence is predicated upon full disclosure of all the available evidence, contrary to the fragmentation of the evidence by both sides due to arbitrary and thus suspiciously vested barriers. In this sense Heidegger's biography needs to be written as an apology, although it is still unclear whether it would end in an acquittal or disgrace. The second essay, 'On the Way to Being and Time', Introduction to the Translation of Heidegger's Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs\ was originally intended as an introduction to Kisiel's translation but was deleted at the behest of the literary executor of Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe. Since he found several errors in the German edition, he decided to check the complete text against the manuscripts on which the edition is based. Thus he discovered that the existentialist vocabulary of this summer semester 1925 course was introduced by Heidegger into the manuscript when he later used

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it to prepare his main work, Being and Time, for publication. In his essay Kisiel interprets the main strands of thought of the course with special focus on Husserl's influence on Heidegger's philosophy. Husserl had made the still unpublished manuscript of his Ideas II available to his former assistant Heidegger and there are many indications that he studied this text intensively while preparing the course. We include Kisiel's section-for-section comparison of the lecture course and Being and Time. In Appendix I we publish his bilingual index of key terms and persons. In his commentary on the new translation of Being and Time by Joan Stambaugh, Kisiel comes to the conclusion that the new translation is not better than the old one by Macquarrie and Robinson. They complement each other and need to be studied side by side. Stambaugh started working on her translation in 1976 and completed it in the late 1970s. It is therefore hard to explain how in 1996 she could claim to have taken the full measure in her translation of Heidegger scholarship of the past thirty years. Kisiel discusses the translation of many key-concepts in Being and Time and compares them to the 'old' translations. He often explains their meaning in great detail and thus interprets fundamental conceptual structures of Being and Time. In this conceptual interpretation resides the great importance of this grammatological lexicographer's commentary. The fourth paper, 'Heidegger (1907-27): The Transformation of the Categorial', is in many ways the zero-point of the genesis of Kisiel's Genesis book. In his own words we could call it 'the first draft'. It is astonishing to what extent his interpretation of the development of Heidegger's thought in this period was later substantiated by the publication of the lecture courses. Here, he first proves the importance of Lask's work for Heidegger. He shows the different steps toward Heidegger's shift from language to that which comes to language and to the process of disclosure which precedes and supports speech. In other words, the transformation from neo-Kantianism (Rickert, Lask) by way of Dilthey's categories of life (hermeneutics) and Husserl's doctrines of intentionality and categorial intuition (phenomenology). In 'Why Students of Heidegger Will Have to Read Emil Lask', Kisiel meticulously follows the trace of this important and underestimated philosopher in Heidegger's early thought from the qualifying dissertation on Duns Scotus' Doctrine of Categories and Meaning to the early Freiburg courses. This article was written in 1988 but never published in its originally intended vehicle. It was finally published in 1995 in an updated and abbreviated form, deleting especially those portions that found their way relatively intact into the Genesis book. However, this essay is not just a more comprehensive discussion of Heidegger's earliest thought, for a new theme surfaces in this paper which has been pursued by Kisiel since: the influence of Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Not only is the neo-Kantianism of Lask and Rickert, who supervised his qualifying dissertation, cast in a Fichtean mould, but

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Heidegger also studied Fichte's writings as a student and announced a course on his philosophy for winter semester 1916—17. The course was finally cancelled because Heidegger was drafted into the army. Fichte coined facticity as a philosophical term and it is precisely this term that is so essential to Heidegger's early hermeneutics of facticity. The sixth essay, 'Heidegger's Early Lecture Courses', was written before any of the early Freiburg lecture courses were published. It is a tribute to Kisiel's BCD-approach that his interpretation has been confirmed by the later publication of the courses. He focuses on the most important ideas which began to surface in these courses and which later became the core of Being and Time: the first conception of a hermeneutics of facticity and the first tentative response to the question whether the return to the origins of philosophy should be scientific or historical. Of all the papers in this volume this article most clearly proves the fruitfulness of the impulse and method of Kisiel's research. Kisiel wrote lExistenz in Incubation Underway Toward Being and Time in honour of his esteemed and inspirational colleague, William J. Richardson. It is a retelling of the Genesis story with special focus on the key-term Existenz. But to get this chronological story right, from the first use as indicator of the factic 'I am' in 1920 to that of the pure possibility of ecstatic temporality in 1926, Kisiel once again returns to the manuscripts and transcripts of the lecture courses and corrects the published texts in the different volumes of the Gesamtausgabe. In this respect his work is of enormous value. He has brought to light important sources that are not and in many cases will not be available in any other form. In the eighth paper, 'From Intuition to Understanding: On Heidegger's Transposition of Husserl's Phenomenology', Kisiel follows Heidegger's relation to Husserl from his youthful fascination with the Logical Investigations to the fundamental critique in summer semester 1925. In his careful interpretation of this complex philosophical relationship Kisiel shows how Heidegger moved from the Husserlian primacy of inner and outer perception to being-in-the-world, from intentionality to ecstasis and from oriented selfconsciousness to situated and exposed existence. The final essay in this volume was written in the early 1970s and predates the concept of the Genesis story. It focuses on a remarkable and often forgotten theme in Heidegger's thought: the mathematical. After abandoning his theological study in 1911 Heidegger enrolled in the department of mathematics and physics and took more courses in these subjects than in philosophy. Also in another respect it tells a different story than the other papers in this volume. It centers on Heidegger's later interpretation of Kant, the course of winter semester 1935/36, which was published in 1962 and looks back to Being and Time and forward to Heidegger's later works. Heidegger discovers in Kant's transcendental reflection on the apriori, which

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first found its locus in the movement of thought to its object, the movement of reciprocal grounding between the subjectivity of the subject and the objectivity of the object. This 'between' suggests the ground of a more original unity as the essence of transcendence. Heidegger assumes as his own task a going back to this ground, which he identifies as the hermeneutic relation. It is precisely this relation that makes all human understanding possible. The stage is thus set for a transformation of the mathematical into the hermeneutical. This volume brings together for the first time a representative selection of KisiePs papers on Heidegger's philosophy that uncovers new ground and supplements his Genesis book. In these nine essays Kisiel not only analyses Heidegger's productive appropriation of the philosophical tradition, most notably Kant, Lask, Dilthey and Husserl, and makes the immanent development of his path of thinking visible. He also destroys the myth of Heidegger as a solipsistic genius and situates Heidegger's thinking in the context of his life and time. His genealogical approach, however, does not lessen his estimation of Heidegger's philosophical worth, but on the contrary describes the genuine profile and specific intention of his thought. The editors would like to thank the different publishers for their kind permission to reproduce Kisiel's papers in this volume and Petra Lohmann and Kerin Michael for their bibliographical and editorial help.

Acknowledgements The essays in this volume first appeared in the following books and journals: 'Heidegger's Apology: Biography as Philosophy and Ideology'. In Graduate Faculty Philosophy journal, 14(2) and 15(1), 1991:363-404. Reproduced by permission of Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal. 'On the Way to Being and Time', Introduction to the Translation of Heidegger's Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs. In Research in Phenomenology, 15, 1985: 193—226. Reproduced by permission of Research in Phenomenology. 'The New Translation of Sein und Zeip. A Grammatological Lexicographer's Commentary'. In Man and World, 30, 1997 (239-58). Reproduced by permission of Kluwer Academic Publishers. 'Heidegger (1907-1927): The Transformation of the Categorial'. In H. J. Silvermann, J. Sallis and T. M. Seebohm (eds.), Continental Philosophy in America. Pittsburgh: Dusquesne University Press, 1983, pp. 165—85. Reproduced by permission of Dusquesne University Press. 'Why Students of Heidegger Will Have To Read Emil Lask'. In Man and World, 28, 1995: 197-240. Reproduced by permission of Kluwer Academic Publishers. 'Heidegger's Early Lecture Courses'. In Joseph J. Kockelmans (ed.), A Companion to Martin Heidegger's 'Being and Time'. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986, pp. 22—39. Reproduced by permission of University Press of America. 'Existenz in Incubation Underway Toward Being and Time. In: R. E. Babich (ed.), From Phenomenology to Thought, Errancy, and Desire (Festschrift for William J. Richardson). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995, pp. 89-114. Reproduced by permission of Kluwer Academic Publishers. 'From Intuition to Understanding: On Heidegger's Transposition of Husserl's Phenomenology'. In Etudes phenomenologiques, 22, 1995, 31—50. Reproduced by permission of Editions Ousia. 'The Mathematical and the Hermeneutical: On Heidegger's Notion of the Apriori'. In E. G. Ballard and Ch. E. Scott (eds.), Heidegger in Europe and America. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973, pp. 109—20. Reproduced by permission of Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Abbreviations Note: the page numbers after the abbreviation refer to the German original, the page numbers after the semi-colon refer to the English translation if such is available. KNS = Kriegsnotsemester (war emergency semester) SS — summer semester WS = winter semester

Heidegger's Writings GA = Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann (1975-). GABd. 1, 1978 = Martin Heidegger, Fruhe Schriften. GABd. 1, 1978, pp. 189-411 = Martin Heidegger, Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus. GABd. 2, 1977 = Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit. GABd. 3, 1991 = Martin Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik.l Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. (Transl. by James S. Churchill). Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962. GABd. 5, 1977, pp. 1—74 = Martin Heidegger, Der Ursprung des KunstwerkesJThe Origin of the Work of Art (transl. by Albert Hofstadter). In: Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought. New York: Harper & Row 1971. GABd. 9, 1976 = Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken.lPathmarks. Ed. by William McNeill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. GABd. 15, 1977, pp. 271—407 = Martin Heidegger, Vier Seminare. French Original: Questions IV. Paris: Gallimard, 1974. GABd. 16, 2000 = Martin Heidegger, Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges. GABd. 16, pp. 652—83 = Martin Heidegger, 'Nur ein Gott kann uns retten'. Interview. In: Spiegel Jh.30 Nr.29, 1966, 193-204/'Only a God Can Save Us': The Spiegel Interview. In: HMTh. GABd. 16, pp. 107-17 and pp. 372-94 = Martin Heidegger, Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universitdt, respectively Das Rektorat 1933/34: Tatsachen und Gedanken. Frankfurt: Klostermann 1983/The Rectorate 1933/34: Facts and Thoughts (transl. by Karsten Harries). In: Giinther Neske and Emil Kettering (eds), Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and Answers. New York: Paragon House, 1990. GA Bd. 20, 1979 = Martin Heidegger, Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegrijfs. I History of the Concept of Time. Prolegomena (transl. by Theodore Kisiel). Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985.

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Abbreviations

GA Bd. 21,1976 = Martin Heidegger, Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit. GABd. 25, 1977 = Martin Heidegger, Phanomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen VernunftJ Phenomena logical Interpretation of Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' (transl. by Parvis Emad & Kenneth Maly). Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1997. GA Bd. 26, 1978 = Martin Heidegger, Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz.I The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (transl. by Michael Heim). Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1984. GABd. 29/30, 1983 = Martin Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt - Endlichkeit -Einsamkeit/fFundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude (transl. by William McNeill and Neil Walker). Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1995. GABd. 40, 1983 = Martin Heidegger, Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik.I An Introduction to Metaphysics (transl. by Ralph Manheim). New Haven: Yale University Press 1959. GABd. 24 = Martin Heidegger, Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie.lThe Basic Problems of Phenomenology (transl. by Albert Hofstadter). Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1982. GABd. 56/57, 1987 = Martin Heidegger, Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie./Totuards the Definition of Philosophy (transl. by Ted Sadler). London: Athene Press 2001. GABd. 58, 1993 = Martin Heidegger, Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie. GABd. 60, 1995, pp. 1-156 = Martin Heidegger, Einleitung in die Phdnomenologie der Religion. GABd. 61, 1994 = Martin Heidegger, Phanomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einfiihrung in die phanomenologische Forschung. GABd. 63, 1988 = Martin Heidegger, Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizitdt).IOntology (The Hermeneutics of of Facticity) (transl. by John van Buren). Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1999. GA Bd. 65, 1989 = Martin Heidegger, Beitrdge zur Philosophic. (Vom Ereignis).I Contributions to Philosophy. (From Enowning) (transl. by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly). Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1999. BZ = Martin Heidegger, Der Begriff der Zeit. Tubingen: Niemeyer 1989.1 The Concept of Time (transl. by William McNeill). Oxford: Blackwell 1992. ED = Martin Heidegger, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens. Pfullingen: Neske 1954./(Transl. by Albert Hofstadter). In: Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought. New York: Harper & Row 1971. FD = Martin Heidegger, Die Frage nach dem Ding. Tubingen: Niemeyer 1962.1 What Is a Thing? (transl. by W. B. Barton and Vera Deutsch). Chicago: Henry Regnery Company 1967. GMM = Bernd Martin & Gottfried Schramm, Ein Gesprach mit Max Miiller. In: Freiburger Universitatsblatter 92, Juni 1986, pp. 13-31. HBK= Martin Heidegger - Elisabeth Blochmann. Briefwechsel 1918-1969. Joachim W. Storck (ed.) Marbach: Deutsche Schiller-Gesellschaft 1989. HJB = Martin Heidegger - Karl Jaspers Briefwechsel: 1920-1963. Hrsg. von Walter Biemel & Hans Saner. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann/Munchen-Ziirich: Piper 1990. JS = Being and Time: A Translation ofSein und Zeit (transl. by Joan Stambaugh). New York: SUNY 1996. N = Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche. Band I—II. Pfullingen 1961./Nietzsche Vol. /—TV (transl. by David F. Krell). New York: Harper & Row 1979-1984.

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PhIA — Martin Heidegger, Phdnomenolgische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation). In: Hans-Ulrich Lessing, Dilthey Jahrbuch 6, 1989, 235-274.7 Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle (Indication of the Hermeneutic Situation) (transl. by Michael Baur). In: Man and Word 25, 1992. SD = Martin Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens. Tubingen: Niemeyer \969./On Time and Being (transl. by Joan Stambaugh). New York: Harper & Row 1972. SG = Martin Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grund. Pfullingen: Neske 1963./The Principle of Reason (transl. by R. Lilly). Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1977. SZ = Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit. Tubingen: Niemeyer 1927, 81957, 161986./BT = Being and Time (transl. by John Macquarrie and Eward Robinson). New York: Harper & Row 1962. US = Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache. Pfullingen: Neske 1959./On the Way to Language (transl. by Peter Hertz). New York: Harper & Row 1971. WD = Martin Heidegger, Was heiflt Denken? Tubingen: Niemeyer 1954.1 What Is Called Thinking? (transl. by Fred D. Wieck and John Glenn Gray). New York: Harper & Row

1968.

Sonstige Schriften: CPR = Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (transl. by. Norman Kemp Smith). New York: St. Martin's Press 1965. DW = Otto Poggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers. Pfullingen: Neske 1983.1'Heidegger's Path of Thinking (transl. by Daniel Magurshak and Sigmund Barber) Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press 1987. Genesis = Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger's 'Being and Time'. Berkeley, London: University of California Press 1993. Farias = Farias, Victor, Heidegger and Nazism (transl. by Paul Burrell and Gabriel R. Ricci). Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1989. HMTh = Thomas Sheehan (ed.), Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker. Chicago: Precedent 1981. HN = Karl Lowith, Von Hegel zu Nietzsche. Zurich: Europa Verlag 19411 From Hegel to Nietzsche. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1964. HpPh = Otto Poggeler, Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert (ed.), Heidegger und die praktische Philosophie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1988. Ideen I = Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phdnomenologie und phdnomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Halle: Niemeyer 1913/General introduction to a pure phenomenology: first book [of] ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy (transl. by F. Kerston). The Hague, Boston: Kluwer 1980. Ideen II = Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phdnomenologie und phdnomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phdnomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution. Ed. by Marly Biemel, Husserliana IV. La Hague: Nijhoff \952-lIdeas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy, 2nd book: Studies in the phenomenology of constitution (transl. by Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer). Dordrecht: Kluwer 1989. LGS = Emil Lask, Gesammelte Schriften Band I—III. Ed. by Eugen Herrigel. Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 1923.

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LU = Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Band I—II. Halle: Niemeyer 1900/01/ Logical Investigations (transl. by John N. Findlay). London: Routledge 1970. ME = Oskar Becker, Mathematische Existenz: Untersuchungen zur Logik und Ontologie mathematischer Phdnomene. Jahrbuch fiir Philosophic und phanomenologische Forschung, Bd.8. Halle: Niemeyer 1927. Ott = Hugo Ott, Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie. Frankfurt a.M/New York: Campus 1988/'Martin Heidegger: A Political Life (transl. by A. Blunden). New York: Basic Books 1993. PN = Paul Natorp, Deutscher Weltberuf. Geschichtsphilosophische Richtlinien. Erstes Buch: Die Weltalter des Geistes. Zweites Buch: Die Seele des Deutschen. Jena: Diederichs 1918. PP—Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert (ed.), Philosophic und Poesie: Otto Poggeler zum 60. Geburtstag. Band II. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Fromann-Holzboog 1988. PW=Karl Jaspers, Psychologic der Weltanschauungen. Miinchen-Ziirich: Piper 1985 (paperback edition duplicating the pagination of the 4th, 5th and 6th editions) RE = Jacques Taminiaux, Le Regard et I'excedent. La Haye: Nijhoff 1977. ST = Heinrich Wiegand Petzet, Aufeinen Stern zugehen: Begegnungen und Gesprdche mit Martin Heidegger 1929—1976. Frankfurt a.Main 19776.t'Encounters and Dialogues with Martin Heidegger 1929-1976 (transl. by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly). Chicago: Chicago University Press 1993. TPT = William J. Richardson, S.J., Heidegger. Through Phenomenology to Thought. The Hague: Nijhoff 1963. WM = Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzuge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik. Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) \965.ITruth and Method. 2nd rev. ed. (transl. revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall). New York: Crossroad 1989. ZAH = Dietrich Papenfuss, Otto Poggeler (eds.), Zur philosophischen Aktualitdt Heideggers. Bd. 1. Philosophic und Politik. - Bd. 2. Im Gesprdch der Zeit. - Bd. 3 Im Spiegel der Welt: Sprache, Ubersetzung, Auseinandersetzung. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann 1991—1992.

CHAPTER 1

Heidegger's Apology: Biography as Philosophy and Ideology Every decade since the post-war 1940s has had its public airing of 'der Fall Heidegger,' 'le cas Heidegger? '// caso Heidegger? 'the Heidegger case,' an international convention referring specifically to the philosopher's notorious public involvement with Nazism in the 1930s. The Bibliography in this issue [not reproduced] records the decennial pulse of this discussion in some detail. The first round belongs to Jean-Paul Sartre's Les Temps modernes, as the case was first aired under the French occupation immediately after the war, resulting in Heidegger's forced temporary retirement from teaching at the University of Freiburg. The first real, albeit brief, airing in the German press occurred in 1953 with the publication of Heidegger's lecture course of 1935, in which a post-war generation of German students like Jiirgen Habermas found themselves abruptly plunged back into the thick of the 1930s through a single sentence lauding 'the inner truth and greatness of this movement [i.e. of National Socialism].' The 1960s began with Guido Schneeberger's privately published collections of Heidegger's statements and publicly reported activities around the time of his recto rate which, along with several other 'attacks,' kept the case before the public eye throughout the decade. One result of this sporadic and somewhat repressed discussion was Heidegger's interview with the Spiegel editors in 1966 which, published posthumously upon Heidegger's death in 1976, formed the piece de resistance for discussion in the 1970s, albeit muted in view of the solemn occasion. The next wave of discussion was also triggered by Heidegger's self-vindictive statements, with the posthumous publication in 1983 of his 'Facts and Thoughts' on his rectorate. Then the dam broke in 1987 and the world was inundated by the deluge bursting out of France caused by Victor Farias' book, Heidegger et le nazisme. Now that the public storm generated by this defamatory 'inquisitorial' book has subsided, with the help of more solidly founded researches like Hugo Ott's full-length biography of Heidegger, we might now safely take stock of the situation from a firmer ground and define a few future tasks. Not that all is now quiet on the journalistic front. As I write these lines, I am also busy collecting the new set of newspaper clippings - that portfolio alone has expanded exponentially in the last two

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Heidegger's Way of Thought

years — prompted by the recent discovery in the Baden government archives of a 1929 letter by Heidegger in which he complains of the 'Jewification' of the German mind. But it is precisely this ongoing process of archival discovery which has been fuelling the discussion all along, and it is the projection of this process into the near future which I wish to attempt in the following essay. Taken together, therefore, this attempt might have been subtitled, to distinguish it from other assessments of the ongoing debate, 'a view from the archives.' Such a view looks to the supplementation and correction of current biographies of the Heidegger case, like those of Farias and Ott, through the available evidence which is on the verge of publication. The chosen subtitle points instead to the need to eliminate an even greater hurdle to the full discussion of the most crucial question in the debate. It has virtually become a truism accepted by defenders and detractors alike, formulated in one form or another, that Heidegger's thought, which has become so much a part of the twentieth century mind and letters, must be kept separate from his life, in short, that his philosophy must be kept distinct from his biography. This bit of ideology, ultimately operating as a form of intimidation, was reportedly propagated by the Old Heidegger himself, is now being perpetuated by his literary heirs, and is even conceded by many of his detractors. This position, however, flies in the face of the most unique features of Heidegger's own philosophy both in theory and in practice. For Heidegger himself resorted at times to philosophical biography by applying his own 'hermeneutics of facticity' to himself, to his own situation, to what he himself called his 'hermeneutic situation,' precisely in order to clarify and advance his own thought. This procedure should therefore also be applicable to the one situation to which he never adequately applied it, namely, to his recto rate of 1933—4 and the ensuing events. The procedure involves the specification of an 'ontic ideal of authentic existence' to guide one's ontological analysis. In the same vein, I have selected the well-known story of Socrates' Apology as my guide in the following analysis. Contrary to the usual rules of argument before the Athenian court, the core of Socrates' self-defence was a 'narrative argument' in which he outlined the essential facts of his life. It is a Wisdom Story, the story of how he came to the search for wisdom and of the context and conditions in which this search was and is to be pursued, thus a story in which autobiography itself becomes philosophy. The story of Socrates' trial in effect provides us with a striking parallel to the ongoing story of the Heidegger case in more ways than one, beginning with the continuing resistance from some quarters to accept the approach of philosophical biography as a way of resolving the most crucial issue in that case: Do Heidegger's political engagements mean that his thought is at bottom an expression of one of the most destructive ideologies of this century?

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Bringing the evidence together The current debate over the Heidegger case in fact dates back not to Farias he merely added journalistic ebullience to a heated but polite discussion among scholars3 - but to the earlier appearance of Heidegger's 'Facts and Thoughts' (published in 1983, written in 1945) on the rectorate. This along with the Spiegel interview (1966) is apparently all that we can ever expect from Heidegger himself by way of an apologia pro vita sua. In contrast to Socrates' Apology, they appear at this point to have been an utter failure. But the grand jury is still out, busy gathering more facts and thus arriving at some new thoughts that perhaps did not occur to Heidegger on those two occasions. Heidegger must now be tried in absentia and judged posthumously, not quite yet 'by history' but before that by way of a complete historical reconstruction of the case on the basis of all extant evidence. Farias' 'police blotter' of evidence, by his own admission, does not even approach this, and he is still busy gathering new evidence to support his case with an eye to rounding it out.5 His partiality of viewpoint can in part be attributed to the partial character of the evidence available to him. The lack of complete evidence is in like fashion reflected in the subtitle of Hugo Ott's book, Martin Heidegger: On the Way toward his Biography. The fragmentation of the evidence, the ongoing discovery of new pieces of evidence and their concomitant instantaneous interpretation, and from this the battle lines drawn between Heidegger's defenders and detractors, ultimately stem from a polarization that separates, in view of certain barriers and restrictions, two basically different sets of evidence. On the one hand, there is the wealth of evidence of the Martin Heidegger Archive (Nachlass) deposited mainly in the Deutsches Literaturarchiv in Marbach but also retained in the private possession of the Heidegger family. On the other, there is the evidence of Heidegger's activities and literary output scattered throughout East and West Germany, and beyond, in archives both public and private. Neither side has the full story of Heidegger's complicity with National Socialism and, for that matter, the rest of Heidegger's life and thought, which is now irretrievably also drawn into the debate. Each is being exposed piecemeal, but for different reasons: 1. Ott and Farias exemplify the slow and painstaking resourcefulness required to locate and gather materials from the widely scattered 'unofficial' Nachlass (government and university archives, newspaper files, Heidegger's private correspondents, diaries, etc.). Ott's researches from 1983 on, from which Farias then draws, are in fact driven by the repeated discovery of facts from such sources which suggested a 'counter-reading' (Ott 8) to Heidegger's 'Facts and Thoughts.' But the success of Ott's efforts was assured when he managed to bridge the gap between bodies of evidence through the

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premature publication of large portions of Heidegger's correspondence with Karl Jaspers, which constitutes the guiding thread of Ott's book. The extent of the unofficial Nachlass cannot be underestimated, in spite of the ravages of World War II and its aftermath. Heidegger was a prolific letter writer, with numerous correspondents scattered all over the world. Some of this correspondence is even surprising in its extent and depth, as his recently published correspondence with the relatively unknown Elisabeth Blochmann indicates (HBB). As a thinker, Heidegger was extremely productive; Gadamer aptly calls him a 'dynamo,' especially in the years which preceded Being and Time. Moreover, he was generous with the manuscripts thus produced, lending them out to students and later distributing them as gifts within the intimate circle of his friends. His phenomenal popularity as a teacher resulted in numerous student transcripts of his courses, which were then passed from hand to hand in a traffic that spanned the globe. For example, the very first 34 entries in the Herbert Marcuse Archive in Frankfurt are all typescripts of Heidegger's courses and seminars! The very magnitude of the duplication and dispersal of such documents stemming directly from Heidegger's hand or voice has therefore fortunately frustrated the initial attempts made by the overseers of Heidegger's literary estate to gain total control over all such papers and seal them from public perusal. Add to this the fact that Heidegger was a legend long before Being and Time and so a figure in the public eye long before his involvement with Nazism, and we come to the no less important circumstantial evidence of accounts about Heidegger throughout his life. As Farias' work has shown, the bureaucratic thoroughness of the Nazi regime served to preserve much such evidence, such as Heidegger's payment of party dues until 1945 (which of course must be interpreted within that context of bureaucratic terrorism). Within that same context, and thus belonging automatically in the public domain, we also get some additional important documents directly from Heidegger's hand, like the philosophically revealing plan for an academy to prepare young docents for university careers in the Third Reich, drafted by Heidegger in August 1934 (Farias 197). Farias has in addition located perhaps the earliest second-hand account of significance about the public Heidegger, concerning the talented 19-year-old high school graduate and theology student already speaking out publicly on September 10, 1909, on Catholicism's argument with modernism, in remarks duly recorded in the hometown press (Farias 34). These remarks provide a convenient zero-point in tracing the Young Heidegger's intellectual development in his writings for the Catholic Der Akademiker (first discovered by Ott), through his avid reading of more avant-garde Catholic journals like Der Brenner (not noted by either Ott or Farias) to his clear-cut break with conservative Catholicism's anti-modernism by 1914 (in a letter to Engelbert Krebs made public by Ott). The gathering of such independent evidence moreover brings an

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added dimension of completion and depth, and at times even correction, to Heidegger's own autobiographical statements, as we shall amply see in what follows. 2. Our present zero-point is Heidegger's major autobiographical statement regarding the 'Facts and Thoughts' on his recto rate (GABd. 16). Written in 1945, he left it to his son, Hermann Heidegger, with instructions 'to publish it at the proper time, when the occasion arises.' It was published along with Heidegger's rectoral address, also from the fateful year of 1933. The Preface by Hermann Heidegger presents a brief defence of his father who, 'like many who later became resistance fighters, was at first caught up in the mood of national revolution of the day, which promised a fresh start for the nation.' Hermann Heidegger goes on to explain that his father 'was neither an uncritical fellow traveller nor an active party member and, from the very beginning, kept a clear distance from the party leadership.' Similar statements of apology (in the Socratic sense?) are added, but no attempt is made to justify and support these statements from the vast documentation available to him as literary executor of the Heidegger estate. In fact, he resisted the advice from many quarters to proceed with deliberate speed to make such pertinent documentation public. It is only after the storm broke in 1987 that plans were implemented to publish some of this material. Accordingly, we now have Heidegger's correspondence with Elisabeth Blochmann, a Jewish friend of the family who spent the Nazi years in England, and with Karl Jaspers, who likewise was caught up in the mood of 1933 before becoming a 'resistance fighter.' We still lack the crucial correspondence with Rudolf Bultmann as well as other correspondence (with Karl Lowith, Dietrich Mahnke, Herbert Marcuse, Erich Rothacker, etc.), all of which are in various ways pertinent to the Heidegger case. The courses of this period are also critical. As of this date, for example, no plans have been announced to publish the course on logic in the summer of 1934, which is known to contain a number of statements bearing on that year's political events. Otto Poggeler reports that 'Heidegger himself, in referring to his political involvement, stressed that it must be depicted and represented exactly as it happened' (DW343; 278). In view of an editorial policy that makes a public fetish of fulfilling the 'wishes' of Martin Heidegger, it is to be hoped that this wish for full disclosure might soon be fulfilled by Heidegger's literary executors. There should be no reason to hold back, since Heidegger obviously expressed this wish in the firm conviction that such a depiction would in the end speak in his favor. And in a related matter, Heidegger writes to Poggeler in 1961, 'With regard to the relation of my thought to Husserl, some gross errors have cropped up which can only be removed by careful philological work' (DW353; 286). This concern for careful philological work belies the scorn heaped upon philology by the executors of

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Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe, an attitude which has resulted in a number of editions of poor scholarly quality and a record of misinformation on the factual context of the texts. It is to be hoped that future editions will be equipped with at least a minimum of the traditional philological aids of biography, chronology and doxography required by the reader to place a text in context. The contempt for philology expressed by the overseers of Heidegger's literary estate reflects a larger contempt for the painstaking scholarship required to put a reliable edition together, once again in a misplaced imitation of the Master who, in one of his more poetic moods, once distinguished an 'object of scholarship' from a 'matter for thought' to the detriment of the former. Heidegger's motto for the Gesamtausgabe, 'Ways — not Works,' is accordingly being interpreted in this 'thoughtful' way in defence of the editorial policy of the Gesamtausgabe without also observing that one must get to these Ways through Works as cleared as possible of the obstacles posed to the unsuspecting reader by often hilarious errors in reading the doxographic record, as well as by chronological distortions, biographical misinformation and other forms of bad scholarship.7 Accordingly, there is reason to fear that the blatantly amateurish and biased scholarship of Farias would be answered in kind by the witnesses for the defence. It is therefore fortunate for us that one of the more competent workers of the Gesamtausgabe, Hartmut Tietjen, has been nominated to bring the vast resources of the Martin Heidegger Archive to bear on the 'Heidegger case,' to wit, on his 'Involvement and Resistance' (Tietjen's guiding title for his brief) in the Nazi 1930s. Tietjen seems to be sensitive to the philological problems involved, is prepared, for example, to muster the evidence to show that the parenthetical inclusion in the notorious sentence in the 1935 course on 'the inner truth and greatness of this movement (namely the encounter between planetary technology and modern man)' does not constitute a chronological falsification of Heidegger's development drawn from a later period, but can be 'documented in the unpublished notes around 1935 and is worked out in the portions of the Beitrdge zur Philosophic written in 1936.'8 Moreover, early in his project, Tietjen the philosopher was challenged by the Freiburg historian Bernd Martin regarding the authenticity of the documents he utilized in questioning the standard historians' thesis that Heidegger had played an active role in the summer of 1933 in changing the university constitution to bring it in line with the 'Fiihrer principle,' and came off creditably in an archival dispute which is yet to be resolved. It is too early to tell whether Tietjen's full-length study will provide the definitive 'revised standard' version supplementing the somewhat sketchy official version provided by Heidegger himself in the Spiegel interview and in 'Facts and Thoughts.' But the advance notice of themes to be treated promises philosophical depth as well as political relevance: value-philosophy and biological life-philosophy as the core of the Nazi world view, the distinction between

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world view and philosophy, Heidegger's phenomenology of freedom as a refutation of National Socialism, Heidegger's sense of the national, the folk and the homeland, how this sense of what is most one's own (Jemeinigkeit) has nothing to do with linguistic chauvinism regarded as a refinement of biological racism (Rainer Marten's thesis), Heidegger's critique of the Nazi sense of science and its concomitant university reform, his fundamental misunderstanding of National Socialism and how this was related to his 'conspiratorial concept' of action, etc. Tietjen's sketch of'another documentation' of the facts of the Heidegger case stops with the two 'persecutions' of Heidegger during the post-rectoral period and the denazification proceedings. But it does not seem to address the last and most difficult question of the post-war period, which outstrips even the fundamental deconstruction of the concept of race operative in the above theses: Why did Heidegger remain silent until the end of his life about the bearing of his political complicity upon the Holocaust, which was the most gruesome issue of the regime he helped to install in power in its critical first year? Did he ever really face the full magnitude of his contribution to this later issue, albeit unintended? In the end, then, Tietjen's treatise may not be the Socratic apology that the world still awaits from Heidegger and his defenders. Heidegger's silence, whether this was due to some mental block or ambivalence over the core issues involved, must perhaps be left ultimately to the psychoanalysts, social analysts and ideology critics of twentieth-century German history. Tietjen may not be the Plato that Heidegger now needs, capable of finding a vehicle by which to justify the philosopher's thought, his raison d'etre, in its relation to his life and to defend him by rebutting the charges, both old and new, brought against him by the court of public opinion. From life to thought: deconstructing autobiography It is by no means unusual to find that Heidegger's autobiographical statements cannot be taken at face value, that they require independent verification, supplementation, contextual qualification and correction. This is becoming more evident with almost every new transposition of material from the archives into print. Take the long-standing footnote dating the first beginnings of Being and Time, in which Heidegger remarks 'that he has repeatedly presented this analysis of the environing world and in general the "hermeneutics of the facticity" of Dasein in his lecture courses since Winter Semester 1919-20' (SZ 72n; 490). We now know that both themes were first broached two semesters earlier in the extraordinary Kriegsnotsemester 1919, and that there is no analysis of the world to speak of in Winter 1919. The recently published correspondence with Jaspers and Blochmann dates the first appearance of Being and Time in late April or early May and not in February 1927, as the Old Heidegger later recalls. They also present a

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different sequence of stages in the actual composition of Being and Time than the one provided in the most recent prospectus of the Gesamtausgabe. This is only the most recent example of the misinformation we have almost come to expect from the overseers of the Gesamtausgabe, who after all these years still have not mastered and truly 'overseen' their holdings to the degree needed to manage the publication of an archive with some degree of scholarly competence. Thus we read in the recently published prospectus for the second edition of Volume 24 that Heidegger 'completed the manuscript of the Introduction as well as the First and Second Division of Being and Time at the beginning of the year 1926.' But Heidegger's correspondence with Jaspers in 1926 sketches a different story, virtually galley by galley, of the composition of Being and Time that has the galleys of the First Division printed in April, the hand-written Second Division reworked for delivery to the printer in November 1926, along with the revised galleys of the Introduction and First Division, etc., etc. The clean manuscripts of the First and Second Divisions are thus finalized seven months apart. Within the accelerated timeframe of composing Being and Time, they can be considered worlds apart, resulting in numerous discrepancies between the two Divisions, despite last-minute alterations to the First Division already set in galleys. The full facts of the story are thus not without their importance in interpreting the structure of Being and Time, especially in view of all that the Later Heidegger has had to say about Being and Time as a failed work, and all that has been written about the structure of the work. This reduction to the factual level, to the full contingency of the historical accidents of the year 1926, moreover generates a movement of demystification which contributes to our philosophical understanding of a book rendered almost sacred by being frozen in time, as Great Books are wont to be. Especially this detailed tale of composition renders Being and Time into a non-book, into a way rather than a work, and thus promotes the motto which the dying Heidegger affixed to his Gesamtausgabe. It provides one more example of the significance of the connection between 'Facts and Thoughts', and so serves as a stepping stone to the main concern of this section, the connection between the life and the thought of Heidegger, to begin with (1) as Heidegger himself understood this connection, and then (2) the exploitation of this connection by detractors like Farias and Ott who have written on the Heidegger case. The former is the topic of this section, and the latter that of the following section. There is a tendency among would-be purist Heideggerians to insist on a rigid separation between Heidegger's thought and Heidegger's life, his philosophy and his biography, and so to dismiss the biographical element as fortuitous and irrelevant, perhaps even claiming the Master himself as the source for this attitude. The same attitude is reflected in the editorial policy of the Gesamtausgabe. Under the present circumstances, such a dismissal must be viewed with suspicion and even regarded as a form of ideological

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cover-up, a thinly veiled attempt to insulate the purity of the thought from the 'impure' events that are being dredged up from its vital infrastructure. The one verifiable context in which Heidegger himself underscored this separation confirms this suspicion, a conversation with Heinrich Petzet over the very first of the vitriolic Nazi-baiting books against Heidegger - the paradigm for the future Farias! - written by Paul Hiihnerfeld, which had just appeared (it was 1959): 'Look here, Petzet, this Hiihnerfeld wrote me a half a year ago and described a series of small monographs, Geniuses of the Twentieth Century — Stravinsky, Picasso - commissioned by a respectable Berlin publisher, and asked whether I would see him and give him some biographical material. I wrote back that, as far as I was concerned, it is finally time to charge the reader less with interesting biographical titbits as to have him concern himself finally with the matter and to ponder that to which I have devoted 40 years of long labor. My life is totally uninteresting? Petzet goes on to note that 'Hiihnerfeld had then written a vulgar letter full of barefaced threats: he would get even! And so here we have his "revenge", written in a matter of four months.' And yet, when this conversation took place, Heidegger, several months away from his seventieth birthday, had to know that he had already prepared two very different kinds of autobiographical sketches that were to appear in print within months. And each in its own way serves to bridge the very separation between life and thought which this conversation wishes to sanction. Taken together, therefore, these documents show that Heidegger the thinker was not so much indifferent as he was ambivalent toward his curriculum vitae. Indeed, the earliest of these, the quasi-fictional 'Dialogue on Language' written in 1953-4, is accompanied by a note seeking 'to counter widely circulated allegations' that he was responsible for the deletion of the dedication to Husserl from the fifth edition of Sein und Zeit which appeared in 1942 (US 269; 199). Clearly, Heidegger at this time felt himself to be under siege. The second autobiographical statement, the inaugural speech to the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences in 1957, delivered in the presence of his first two habilitation students who were now professors at the university, Karl Lowith and Hans-Georg Gadamer, was accordingly an occasion for reunion, reminiscence . . . and reconciliation. Lowith, recently back in Germany after decades of forced emigration as a Jew, and one of the first to find a link between Heidegger's political involvement and his philosophy, found many an occasion in his late years to recall his time with Heidegger in the early 1920s by excerpting from their correspondence from that era. Heidegger on that evening in 1957 dwelt on his Catholic past and concluded his reminiscence with 'the exciting years between 1910 and 1914.'11 The following years brought two other accounts by Heidegger of his 'path of thought' in which biography and philosophy are explicitly intercalated:

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the letter to William J. Richardson, S.J., in 1962 and the article on 'My Way to Phenomenology' in 1963. The latter was dedicated to Hermann Niemeyer and, in a brief allusion to the Nazi 1930s, describes how in this decade 'every major publication was suppressed until Niemeyer took the risk of printing my interpretation of Holderlin's "As When on a Holiday" in 1941 without stating the year of publication'(SD 89; 81). In 1966, all such facts are thoroughly aired in the Spiegel interview. In a note prefacing his translation, William Richardson observes that 'the interview takes on the quality of a last will and testament' (HMTh 45). The old Heidegger had made his peace with the journalistic world and turned his attention to the more scholarly aspects of the impending 'grave stillness of God's little acre' (so in the now notorious Abraham speech of 1964). For the old Heidegger — unlike Socrates, who never wrote anything - now had to prepare his wealth of writings, published and unpublished, for posterity. It would be too vast an undertaking here to analyse and assess, as well as to supplement and correct, these five major autobiographical statements. Each has its unique purpose and all are coursed by common threads. The 65 to 75-year-old Heidegger's repeated emphasis of his Catholic past in all five recalls the fact that Heidegger had remained a Catholic on the tax rolls all his life and in the end received a 'Catholic' burial. One is hard put to find the slight allusions to his turn to a Protestant 'free Christianity' in 1917, let alone to atheism in 1929 and to a national folk religion of his own Holderlinized invention in the 1930s. Yet these 'world views' are perhaps more influential on his turns of thought than his original Catholicism. As a result of this autobiographical slanting, for example, we have a veritable industry among Heidegger scholars of analyses of Brentano's dissertation on 'The Manifold Sense of Being in Aristotle,' Father Grober's gift to the hometown boy in 1907, but almost nothing on Schleiermacher's Second Speech on Religion, which sparked the breakthrough of 1919 that brought the young Heidegger onto the central path of his lifelong way. Certainly the most interesting and challenging of the five statements of this decade (1954—66) is the first, the quasi-fictional 'A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer.' The literary vehicle alone is noteworthy for our purposes. Looking over that decade, we thus find a reminiscence before old students, a letter to an American Jesuit (Heidegger's first career goal!) and a 'birthday present' (Festgabe) for his old publisher framed by two dialogs, the first cross-cultural and somewhat poetic and the last prosaic and journalistic, addressed to begin with to the German nation: two very different kinds of conversation. The first is based on an actual conversation of March 1954 with Tomio Tezuka, a Japanese Germanist. Dominated accordingly by aesthetic and cultural concerns common to the two former Axis powers as well as by more sweeping East—West comparisons, the dialog begins with a reminiscence (by way of pictures of his

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grave) on Baron Shuzo Kuki, Heidegger's student in the 1920s who played a major role in introducing Heidegger's thought into Japan in the 1930s. The reminiscence provides Heidegger ('The Inquirer') with an opening to trace his biographical-philosophical development in the 1910s and 1920s culminating in Being and Time. This extended biographical excursus, which (judging by Tezuka's independent account) was not a part of their actual conversation, yields the central fictionalized 'fact' which introduces the central concepts that govern the entire dialog. When first introduced, this 'fact' also allows Heidegger to parody the student traffic in his course transcripts which literally circulated around the globe. But in point of actual fact, this involves a new fiction: The transcript in question never reached Japan; it is nowhere to be found in the Japanese archives among an otherwise abundant supply of Heidegger-transcripts. The fiction begins when the Japanese visitor tentatively recalls a course given by Heidegger in 1921 entitled 'Expression and Appearance' which was attended by his Japanese predecessors. They took a transcript of it to Japan, where it evoked considerable interest and intense discussion of Heidegger's 'hermeneutics.' Heidegger interjects a note of caution since a transcript, a 'murky source,' is involved and since the course itself belongs to his imperfect juvenilia. But later, he is inclined to tolerate this interest in his juvenilia, whereby one nevertheless can 'easily be unfairly judged,' just as the old Husserl had 'generously tolerated' the young Heidegger's penchant for the Logical Investigations at a time when Husserl himself no longer held this early work 'in very high esteem.' Indeed, this allusion to Husserl's attitude to his own work prefaces the entire discussion of transcripts in the dialog. And when the conversation later returns to the course on 'Expression and Appearance,' Heidegger first wonders whether the title after all was not 'Expression and Meaning' . . . the same as Husserl's First Logical Investigation (US 90f, 128; 51, 34f)! But this is immediately followed by an in-depth analysis of the 'metaphysical' nature of each of the terms in the title 'Expression and Appearance' in conjunction with the hidden central theme of the course, hermeneutics, even though that term was explicitly used by Heidegger (as he recalls) first in his course of Summer 1923. We now know that the term 'hermeneutics' in actual fact first surfaces in the breakthrough course of Kriegsnotsemester 1919, such that Heidegger's breakthrough here to his lifelong topic richly deserves to be called his 'hermeneutic breakthrough'; and that the 1921 course on 'Expression and Appearance' whose title is analysed so meticulously in the dialog was in point of fact held in Summer Semester 1920 and entitled 'Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression.' Clearly then, Heidegger is construing his own biographical facts in order to guide the line of thought he wishes to pursue in this dialogue. Call it what you will - irony, poetic licence or whimsical playfulness - this play between fact and fiction, this creative use of

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biography to promote thought, suggests a whole host of structural parallels, oppositions and exchanges (Germany/Japan, West/East, Husserl/Heidegger, Heidegger/Kuki, old/young, teacher (grown old)/student (died young), word/picture, word/gesture, author/interpreter, original/facsimile, thought/ life, philosophy/biography, intuition/expression, expression/appearance, meaning/appearance, etc.) which opens hitherto unsuspected dimensions to Heidegger-interpretation. To carry the play over to our own imagined front, one wonders what Heidegger would have done if he were his own Plato and had had free play on the original transcript of the Spiegel interview, free of the constraints of journalistic accuracy, assuming that it would have remained under the contractual and quasi-existential stipulation of life/death; as it were, his life story in return for his death (Socrates?). Farias (297) already has grounds to complain that he was not granted access to the copy heavily corrected by Heidegger which is deposited in the archives of Der Spiegel, and notes the 'differance' in the published interview of questions asked/questions answered, interview answers/published answers; also that 'the most important and embarrassing question' was left in the dark. What if Farias had been the interviewer? And what questions would we 'journalists' have wanted to have asked? What answers expected? Tomio Tezuka's real concern was the 'present state of the Japanese mind'; in this connection, he was especially eager to hear from Heidegger about the 'present significance of Christianity in Europe.'12 It might have been this line of questioning which Heidegger translated into perhaps the most philosophically telling autobiographical statement in the entire 'Dialogue.' It occurs in the context of showing that the use of the term 'hermeneutics' in his early Freiburg courses was no mere accident, but rather stemmed from the fact that he was still quite 'at home in theology' due to his earlier studies as a Catholic seminarian in 1909—11. The upshot of the story: 'Without this theological provenance I would never have come onto the path of thinking' (US 96; 10). This most telling of the Old Heidegger's life/thought statements may now be supplemented and further qualified contextually by two key statements from the more immediate milieu of the Young Heidegger, statements which have recently surfaced from the archives. In Heidegger's letter to Engelbert Krebs in January of 1919, we read: 'Episternological insights bearing upon the theory of historical cognition have made the System of Catholicism problematic and unacceptable to me - but not Christianity and metaphysics (these however in a new sense).' By exploring the immediate doxographical background to this letter, we discover that what Heidegger really means are the 'hermeneutic insights bearing on the theory of historical cognition' that he gleaned from Schleiermacher's and Dilthey's return to the immediacy of lived experience, which to begin with Is religious experience. Such a return parallels the similar return to experiential roots pursued by radical phenomenology.13

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But the most telling document by far, since it yields not only our third autobiographical statement but also the reason why biography is indispensable to philosophy as Heidegger himself understood it, is his personal letter to Karl Lowith on August 19, 1921. In view of its importance, we shall dwell on this letter at some length. Lowith had just finished his second year of study with Heidegger and took the occasion to assess his relationship to Heidegger in contrast to Oskar Becker's, then also an advanced student: While Becker especially appreciated Heidegger's emphasis on science and method in phenomenological conceptformation, Lowith preferred the 'existentiell pathos'; in short, the 'subjective' side of Heidegger rather than the 'objective' aspects. Heidegger responded by noting that each takes something from him which is not of the essence, since the two aspects belong together in a deeper motivation of his factic existence which neither sees or would ever accept: I work concretely and factically out of my 'I am,' out of my intellectual and wholly factic origin, milieu, life-contexts, and whatever is available to me from these as a vital experience in which I live. . . . To this facticity of mine belongs what I would in brief call the fact that I am a 'Christian theologian.' This involves a particular radical personal concern, a particular radical scientificity, a strict objectivity in the facticity', in it is to be found the historical consciousness, the consciousness of'intellectual and cultural history.' And I am all this in the life-context of the university. Heidegger a 'Christian theo-logian'? The underscoring of '-logian' in fact shifts the focus to the philosophical foundations of theology in the fundamental experiences which phenomenology aims to explore. Whence the importance of the phenomenology of religious life and consciousness at this stage of Heidegger's development. This involves not only the 'personal concern' brought to its extremity in his personal crisis and break with the religion of his youth during the war years, or the 'radical scientificity' of phenomenology's return to origins. Both are closely linked to the consciousness of an 'intellectual and cultural history' in which philosophy and theology have been deeply intertwined, in which philosophy (Greek, scholastic, modern) had contributed to a degeneration of the original Christian experience while at the same time nourishing itself from that experience. His reading of Dilthey, Schleiermacher, Augustine, Eckhart, Luther and Kierkegaard had taught Heidegger how deep the interchanges between philosophy (especially German idealism) and theology really were up to his day in their mutual concern for the 'problem of Christianity,'14 in particular in its relationship to history and the historical consciousness. With his special background, Heidegger must have felt uniquely drawn to a history of philosophy that just happened to be thoroughly permeated by Christianity and, in Nietzsche's words, 'corrupted by theologians' blood.'

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'I am a "Christian theologian'' (1921); 'hermeneutic insights bearing on the theory of historical cognition' which yield a new sense of Christianity and metaphysics (1919): This pair of self-interpretative statements from the Young Heidegger provides the historical specificity and factic articulation to the Old Heidegger's confession that his 'theological provenance' is the key to his philosophical beginnings. The three statements taken together reflect his biographical beginnings as a Catholic seminarian and a student of German philosophy/theology from Eckhart to Dilthey who underwent a crisis of conversion in the shadow of the front lines of World War I. Aside from this religious substance, there is the Young Heidegger's formal admission that his thoughts stem directly from the deepest motivations of his own and quite unique factic situation, in short, that his thought stems from his life; accordingly, one cannot in principle dismiss the biographical element as fortuitous and so irrelevant, contrary to the pronouncements of our purist Heideggerians. The entire letter to Lowith, with topics ranging from university life to an an-archic sense of the philosophical community, is in fact an exercise in the application of Heidegger's own philosophical 'hermeneutics of facticity' to himself, to his own Da-sein and historical situation. It is therefore the very hermeneutic philosophy which he is busy developing that justifies the Young Heidegger's self-interpretive autobiographical statements. Heidegger's own reductive philosophy has discovered a level at which autobiography is philosophy, and it is these biographical facts internal to his philosophical development which Heidegger the philosopher feels compelled to confess about Heidegger the person. And what are these pertinent biographical facts? They are the facts that pertain to the Jeweiligkeit (temporal particularity) of the autochthonous 'hermeneutic situation' of inherited presuppositions and Interrogative motivations out of which a philosopher speaks. They might be called 'situation facts' or 'world facts' or even 'topical facts', if we understand TOTTO^ in its originally pregnant hermeneutic sense. This sense of a situated philosophy/philosophical situation is so important that we might dwell a bit longer on Heidegger's letter of 1921. It says very little about the substance of his being Christian, but instead returns again and again to the stress on scientificity, objectivity, conceptual labor, the life of research and inquiry, which in turn is then equated with the personal pathos springing from his own, very historical and temporally particular facticity. In this autobiographical context of distinguishing himself from his two top students, one senses Heidegger's growing sense of the unique radicality of the objectivity (Sachlichkeit versus Objektivitdf) of the phenomenological way of doing philosophy. The second half of the letter returns again and again to the difference between an 'in-itself objectivity' and one's own temporally particularized facticity:

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You each take from me something other than what is of the essence, what I do not separate, what for that matter is never in a state of equilibrium, namely, the life of scientific research — working with theoretical concepts — and my own life. The essential way in which my facticity is existentielly articulated is scientific research, done in my own way. Accordingly, the motive and goal of philosophizing is for me never to add to the stock of objective truths, since the objectivity of philosophy, as I understand it and by which I factically proceed, is something proper to oneself. This however does not exclude the strictest objectivity of explication; that for me is implied in the very sense of my existence. Objective strictness does not relate to a thing but to historical facticity. . . . Even in the destruction I do not want or dream of an objectivity in itself. It is my facticity which is 'foisted' thereupon, if you will. It is simply a matter of whether a purportedly impersonal stance accomplishes more than going after the things directly, where we ourselves must obviously be involved— otherwise there is no engagement. We are then objectively one-sided and dogmatic, but philosophically still 'absolutely' objective and strict. ... It is only crucial that we agree that what counts is for each of us to go to the radical and utmost limit for what and how each understands the 'one thing necessary.' We may be far apart in 'system,' 'doctrine' or 'position,' and yet together as only human beings can really be together: in existence.' In the light of this 'proper' sense of phenomenological objectivity, with its an-archic sense of philosophical community, Heidegger will in the ensuing years articulate, for example, the unique occasionality or insuperable 'temporal particularity' (Jeweiligkeit, in SS 1923) of Dasein and the inescapable ontic founding of ontology (Being and Time, 1927). Once again, what Heidegger himself tells us here is that his thoughts stem directly from the deepest motivations of his own factic situation, in short, that his thought stems from his life and that one cannot therefore divorce the ontological (his philosophy) from the ontic (his biography). In view of this reciprocity between biography and philosophy, it is quite valid, perhaps at times even essential, on Heideggerian grounds to seek to understand philosophically Heidegger's peculiarly personal engagement with his Christianity... as well as his later engagement with an admittedly 'private brand' of National Socialism. And both religion and politics are of their nature world views, basic attitudes toward life. In Being and Time, these are described as an ontical ideal of authentic existence, 'the factical ideal of Dasein which underlies the ontological interpretation of Dasein's existence' (SZ 310, 266; 358, 311). For on the ontic level of life, the call of conscience which summons us to our potentiality for being 'does not hold before us some empty ideal of existence,

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but calls us forth into the situation (SZ 300; 347). This exacts the demand, on the methodological level of philosophy, 'to unfold with ever greater penetration' (SZ310; 358) the 'content' of this ideal (SZ266; 311) or, more precisely, the ontic presuppositions of the hermeneutic situation which sustains the philosophically developed ontological interpretation. Put in other terms, although the primordial existentiell truth does not necessarily need the existential analysis, the latter needs the former as its ontical basis (SZ316, 312; 364, 360). Jiirgen Habermas, in his article 'Work and World View' which prefaces the German edition of Farias' book, merely underscores the obverse side of this ontic projection into the ontological by noting the possible infection of a work of thought by elements of an 'ideologically tinged world view.' A fundamental attitude toward life, the fundamental project which becomes the guiding 'how of interpretation,' whether it be Christian or tragic (as it was for a time for the Later Heidegger), is riot pure but is always garbled by the static of alien messages in need of demystification. Heidegger's first crisis was in fact just such a rite of passage to a more purified experiential Christianity, which in turn as a hardening world view itself had to be put out of play for the sake of further sallies into the full dynamics of factic life. The limpid 'formally indicative' concepts needed to allude to the immediate experience of already finding oneself underway in existence stand in sharp contrast to the hardened ideological concepts that ballast such an approach. The very need to constantly outstrip one's viewpoints toward the immediacy of life's dynamics is itself an admission of the blind spots, the repressed and other covert elements which stand in the way of such transcendence. To be already caught in existence willy-nilly means that one cannot completely escape one's roots and the trajectory onto which one has been 'thrown.' Biography (= facticity) cuts both ways for a philosophy which professes always to be underway. Autobiography is also ideology. Though we may quibble with the specifics, Habermas performs a service to Heidegger and the Heideggerians, sometimes too close to their work to see such things, by pointing to the 'German ideology' that secretly encumbers the argumentation of Being and Time and will grow rampant in the Nazi 1930s: the elitist self-understanding of the German mandarin, a fetishising of Geist, especially der deutsche Geist, idolatry of the mother tongue, the pathos of heroic nihilism in the face of 'fate' and 'destiny,' etc. etc. It is to this program, already launched by Ott and Farias, that I want to contribute in the following sections by way of supplementation and correction, with an eye especially to what the archives may yield in the near future. In view of my research interests, most of these contributions relate to the Young and Early Heidegger leading up to his magnum opus, Being and Time. Since I shall be building especially on the archival work of Farias and Ott, it is fitting that I first present a brief review of the essence of their work.

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Beyond Farias and Ott: on structuring a philosophical biography Farias' thesis is loud and clear. Stated baldly, Heidegger's life and thought is Nazi through and through, from beginning to end. Stated more qualifiedly in developmental terms, Heidegger's entry into the Party in 1933 was simply the natural outcome of years of preparation determined by the attitudes he acquired from the region of his birth and youth. 'As you began, so will you remain': This favourite line from Holderlin is here turned back on Heidegger with a vengeance to condemn him to a basically static Bildungsroman in life and thought. Once a peasant, always a peasant. Whatever progress he made in his vaunted 'path of thought,' Heidegger is irretrievably trapped 'in a way of thought nourished by a tradition of authoritarianism, anti-Semitism, and ultra-nationalism that sanctified the homeland in its most provincial sense' (Farias 4). His legacy to us is 'poisoned at its roots' (New York Times, February 4, 1988), roots of home and country, Blut und Boden, that Heidegger himself never ceased to glorify. If we begin with this thesis, willy-nilly, Heidegger's entire life from beginning to end becomes suspect and calls for the closest surveillance. Thus Farias (Ch. 3 and 18) literally 'frames' Heidegger with the charge of antiSemitism through his lifelong adulation of his distant relative and native son of the region, Abraham a Sancta Clara, imperial court preacher in baroque Vienna who found a niche in German prose as the Capuchin preacher in Schiller's Wallenstein. The Young Heidegger first broke into print with a newspaper account of the unveiling of a statue of Abraham (a good Jewish name for a rabid anti-Semite) in his hometown. And after he himself became famous, likewise finding a niche in German classics like Giinter Grass' Hundejahre, the Old Heidegger had even more grounds to identify with his baroque role model. Thus, in a talk to the hometown folk in 1964 at the Latin school that both he and his famous relative once attended, he describes the life and times, language and thought, of Abraham in ways that are replete with parallels to his own. But Farias is too eager to get at Abraham's antiSemitism and pogrom bellicosity and, by association, Heidegger's latent forms of them, to take notice of even the more political parallels between the baroque period and the twentieth century made in the talk, like the treaty that brought no real peace (Westphalia, 1648/Versailles, 1919; by extension to Potsdam, 1945), a parallel which could not have been lost on Heidegger's older kinsmen in the hometown crowd who had suffered that fate in common with him: 'The desolation and misery left behind by the Great War were followed by new wars and threats, more hunger and poverty' (GABd. 16, 598-608). Out of this tumultuous play of poverty and fortune, war and peace, 'the terror of death and the lust of life,' Heidegger singles out, from the vast 'selection of flowers' in Karl Bertsche's anthology (Bliitenlese), one complex play on words by which Abraham describes his times, upon

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which the Nazi-hunting Farias (289) pounces: 'On a single day we find warmth, want and wails of "Lord, have mercy" (warm, arm, und das Gott erbarm), and our peace is as far from war as Sachsenhausen is from Frankfurt.' This is too much for Farias, for in 1964, Frankfurt, the setting for the ongoing Auschwitz trials, had to be associated with Sachsenhausen, one of the most feared concentration camps of the Third Reich. German reviewers of the French edition of Farias were quick to point out the geographical confusion between this quiet suburb of Frankfurt and the death camp near Berlin bearing the same name — this was corrected in the German but not in the English edition — and so to dismiss the association as a biased travesty of the facts, perhaps the most absurd of the surfeit of errors riddling the French edition. But the laws of unconscious association are clearly not checked by such facts. The French press, regularly exposed to far freer poststructuralist and post-deconstructionist interpretations of texts, was more tolerant and attentive to the possibility that Heidegger on this festive occasion had perhaps slipped past his internal censor and unwittingly bared his Nazi libido. In the end, however, Farias himself does not know what to make of this Freudian slip. Was it the brief upsurge of an inner conflict secretly raging within Heidegger's repressed libido? And what exactly are the antagonistic terms of this inner polemic which is allowing Heidegger no peace? Is it, as Farias suggests, the admission of the connection in German history between Abraham's anti-Semitism and Auschwitz, but 'without taking the risk of linking the sacred fatherland with the greatest monstrosity that mankind has ever known' (290)? Was it therefore an unconscious retraction compensating for Heidegger's public silence and his stubborn refusal to criticize himself or otherwise make a 'clean breast' of his complicity in this monstrosity? Or was it more an expression of resentment than of repentance, an 'in' text for those 'in the know', a blatant provocation by which Heidegger (not untypically) challenged post-war public opinion (typically self-righteous) on the Holocaust, and 'manfully' took responsibility for his part, as Himmler alone among the Nazi leaders, with their litanies of nicht schuldig at Nuremberg, dared to do by committing suicide instead (Farias 290; this example is deleted from the German edition!)? Indeed, the historical parallels between the baroque period and the twentieth century implied in the talk on Abraham a Sancta Clara, who thought in palpable images and so described the 'mass deaths [Massensterben] during Vienna's months of plague' in terms of Death the Reaper (GABd. 16, 603), are but one step short of the arguments used in post-war Germany's 'dispute among the historians.' Farias does not notice this, but Abraham's peasant realism is most likely the post-war Heidegger's 'inspiration' for a series of gruesome comparisons, beginning with the substitution of the word 'East Germans' for 'Jews' to make the equation between post-war Russia's expulsion of refugees and the Holocaust, the only difference being that 'the bloody terror of the Nazis was in fact kept a secret

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from the German people'; the comparison of the 'fabrication of cadavers in gas chambers and extermination camps' with the motorized food-industry of our depersonalized agriculture and the systematic starving of millions in the Berlin blockade; and, finally, the distinction between an individualized personal death and impersonal 'mega-death', in a coarse description which is virtually vintage Abraham a Sancta Clara:16 Hundreds of thousands die en masse. Do they die? They succumb. They are done in. Do they die? They become items in an inventory for the business of manufacturing corpses. Do they die? They are liquidated without ceremony in extermination camps. And even without such a machinery, millions of poor souls are perishing from hunger at this very moment in China. It was not anti-Semitism that Heidegger learned from his kinsman Abraham, but rather his brutally realistic way of describing plagues, wars, the siege of Vienna, a certain rhetoric and metaphorology, a thinking in images, parallels, rhymes, repetitions, oppositions and abrupt turns of phrase that come from this preacher's mastery of the multifaceted possibilities of the German language. And how did this native son of the provinces come to master the language? Not by playing with words, but by listening to the language (GABd. 16, 608). Heidegger identifies himself with Abraham not for his crude anti-Semitism but for the sometimes equally coarse but often gently poetic sense of his native language. And though Farias (295) sometimes alludes to this distinction between biological racism and the more 'refined cultural fascism' or 'southern chauvinism' which lauds the power and beauty of the German language, more often than not he obscures this focus by page after page of excursus into anti-Semitic smut muckraked from secondary authors writing about Abraham. In other contexts, Farias spends inordinate pages diverging into the 'brown' political backgrounds of the authors who contributed to the same journal as Heidegger, or of the names on the same petition, or of the members of the same committee on which Heidegger happened to serve. American readers in particular are inclined to be alienated by such an obscene and scurrilous display of guilt-by-association tactics. In the present instance, the reader would have been better served by a disciplined and meticulous exegesis of the entire text on Abraham a Sancta Clara, which lends itself to the same subliminal plays of oppositions and exchanges and complex overlays of associations which we found in the quasibiographical 'Dialogue on Language' of 1954: Abraham/Martin, imperial Reich/Third Reich, city/country, cosmopolitan/peasant, rich/poor, war/ peace, plague's devastation/baroque harmony, life/death, coarse/gentle, fame/disgrace, freedom/destiny, call/response, etc. The same sort of quasibiographical analysis applies to the other 'hometown' texts written by

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Heidegger, where we can often ask what sort of self-interpretation he is promoting or what he is revealing about himself, both wittingly and unwittingly. But Farias did get it half right. The new witnesses in the forthcoming retrial of Heidegger will be experts not only in textual analysis of various kinds but also in psychoanalysis, likewise of various schools. This was the conclusion of Rudolf Bultmann after his post-war reunion with Heidegger. After years of separation, he received a surprise phone call from Heidegger requesting a visit with the explanation, 'I want to ask your forgiveness.' At the end of a day of animated conversation and exchange of ideas in which old bonds were spontaneously restored, Bultmann came back to the remark made over the phone. ' "Now you must, like Augustine, write your Retractationes\ I said to him, "and not only for the sake of the truth of your thought". Heidegger's face froze into a stone mask. He left without saying a word ... One probably has to explain his reaction psychologically' (quoted in Ott 164). The closest Heidegger came to an admission of guilt was in a letter to Jaspers on March 7, 1950, in which he explained that he had not crossed the threshold of the Jaspers household since 1933 not because of his Jewish wife but because he 'simply felt ashamed' (Ott 32). The paths of the two old friends never crossed after the war,. If Heidegger was a 'resistance fighter' before and during the war, he certainly was no hero, not even after the war: he was a survivor. Was Heidegger constitutionally unable to make a retraction? There is a substantial record of Heidegger's nervous breakdown in early 1946 subsequent to the stress of the denazification hearings, when he spent three weeks in a sanatorium for 'psychosomatic treatment' (Ott 300, 322); and this condition is confirmed by reports, in scattered letters, of his neurasthenia throughout his life. The 'existentiell crisis' (Ott 70) of 1911 manifested itself through a health condition, which kept Heidegger far from the front lines until the last three months of the war. The extended midlife crisis recorded in his letter to Jaspers on July 1, 1935, around which Ott structures his entire book (Ott 42; like Dante's Inferno^, possibly also found its climax in a nervous collapse. Socrates had more stamina. Heidegger was a stressed soul and so perhaps constitutionally incapable of Luther's 'Here I stand!' A medical history and psychological profile may be the last remaining explanation for Heidegger's silence and ambivalence after the war. Or is this psychosomatic frailty merely derivative to a more basic existential frailty, as the Heidegger of Being and Time was wont to say? After his breakdown of 1946, Heidegger overtly cultivated an entire school of existential psychiatrists who could provide us with an answer. Medard Boss, confidante of the Old Heidegger, in particular seems to hold some of the missing links to a Daseinsanalysis of the post-war Heidegger. Was it a fatal flaw that kept him silent, or the existentiell tact of a fragile personality who opted to reserve his failing energies exclusively for his work? In October 1946 Heidegger

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wrote: 'Intense intellectual concentration is an effort which can be maintained at the same high level in the long haul only with difficulty; but without it nothing lasting comes into being . . . Everything must now be sacrificed to the restoration of an intellectual world' (ST50). Did the Old Heidegger accordingly regard the rising tide of world opinion against him as a third 'persecution,' already a remarkable choice of words, and therefore as life-threatening as the denazification proceedings and the paranoid 'persecution' he felt from his Nazi colleagues? In his defensive posture, did he therefore feel that he did not even owe the world an Apology? Perhaps in the stress and strain he had simply forgotten the example of the Old Socrates. The above paragraph illustrates how indispensable Ott's book is as a reliable source and compendium of the facts of the Heidegger case. Moreover, on the basis of these facts, derived to a large degree from correspondence and private archives, Ott wants to 'reveal Heidegger from the inside out' (Ott 12), to fathom his 'mentality' (Ott 10). But as a 'guild historian,' he wishes to do this without getting into the problem of the relation of Heidegger's life to his thought, that is, to his philosophical works, which he would leave to the 'guild philosopher.' But what if Heidegger's very being, his raison d'etre, is defined by his thought, as it in fact was in the case of Socrates? Precisely what mentality is reflected simply in the archival fragments that Ott manages to gather together, in particular to cross-check objectively the statements of self-vindication focused in Heidegger's two apologies, which all too often have proven to be distorted subjectively, say, by Heidegger's faulty memory of was tatsdchlich geschehen ist (Ott 212)? Ott's corrective action is in large part still a matter of Heidegger's own words, but now gathered from the documents along his entire Lebensweg, in order to 'illuminate the mental disposition of the philosopher in the very specific way' that 'such profound self-testimonies' allow (Ott 13). Of the philosopher? In part, yes, but ultimately of the Man. This is the historian's Ecce homo reflected in the plethora of documents that Heidegger left behind, a Portrait of the Philosopher as a genius but also as a very fallible human being, using that genius to win friends and influence people, learning grantsmanship and career-building in order to rise out of his peasant origins and 'make it,' so to speak, in the German 'ivy leagues,' parlaying his fame as a teacher and author of Being and Time into a power-grab for Freiburg's rectorship under Hitler and a vain attempt to become Fiihrer of all the German universities, etc. It is a story of double-crossing intrigues and petty back-biting on the level of academic politics and national politics, which in the German university system have never been unrelated, as a ready vocabulary of German words like Hochschulpolitik, Wissenschaftspolitik, Kultusministerium, etc., basically bureaucratic in origin, suggests. Out of this story there emerges a picture of an opportunistic and pompous Heidegger

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not always honest in his grantsmanship and refereeing, made vain by fame, and the like. The Heidegger who followed Hitler was, in the words of one reviewer, em bduerlich-kleinbiirgerlicher Nationalromantiker, 'a boorishly rustic, petty-minded bourgeois, nationalist romantic.' This all-too-human self-portrait is supplemented by Heidegger's public image in the eyes of others, likewise gleaned from the archives, like the telling judgement of his old friend Jaspers: £ He seemed like a friend who betrayed you behind your back, but there were unforgettable moments, which thus proved to be hollow, where he was incredibly close.' Martie, we hardly knew you. At another level, the complex self-portrait constructed from the archives yields a psychological profile which Michael Zimmerman, in a synoptic tour deforce of these terms, neatly summarizes in the compass of his brief review of Ott's book:1 delusions of grandeur and monstrous hubris stemming from a self-mythification of his fated role as Germany's spiritual leader; the resulting 'unbelievable loss of reality' (Ott 22) accounting for the serious moral blindness which led him to absolve himself - and Germany! - of responsibility and to make a scapegoat of others; his increasing defiance toward his friends' insistence that he come to terms with his own guilt. One could go on. For example, Jaspers (a psychologist by training) likens the post-war Heidegger to a 'dreaming boy' (Ott 22) in a state of shock, traumatized from reality into a fantasy world, who does not know what he is doing. He thus suggests a connection with the Young Heidegger, who poetized his way through his neurosis (Ott 71), except that by 1950, this 'therapy' had grown into a full-fledged 'self-mythicizing Holder lin-ideology.' There may have been more than philosophical reasons for Heidegger's heeding 'the voice of the poet from his tower' (Ott 19f), with more than a measure of trepidation. Nietzsche, too, could have been an object lesson. By now, one may wonder whether Ott's Ecce homo has not turned into a sheer expose, the objectivity of which itself is in need of cross-checking.2 But so far, we have only parodied Ott and not yet come to the heart of the matter. For Ott, the real key to the personality of Heidegger is not the surface academic-politician nor the psychologically disturbed inner life but the religious Heidegger. Taking his cue from Heidegger's own characterization of his 'midlife crisis' in a 1935 letter to Jaspers, Ott (Ott 42) organizes his factual material around two 'thorns in the flesh' or two central issues which especially plagued the mature Heidegger, giving us the two longest chapters in the book on 'the faith of my heritage' and 'the failure of the recto rate.' Of these two foci of religious belief and political conviction, the former turns out to be the more important and in fact eventually subsumes and accounts for the latter. More precisely, it is 'the conflict with the faith of my heritage' which is troubling Heidegger, which Ott takes to be his rabid anti-Catholicism, and it is this anti-Catholicism — not, as Farias

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would have it, his anti-Semitism — which underlies Heidegger's turn to National Socialism. But the motivating ground is in fact a bit more complex than that. To supplement Ott, who lets his own Catholic heritage get the best of him in regarding Heidegger simply as a Catholic apostate, let us recall Heidegger's three autobiographical statements on the 'theological heritage' which brought him onto the path of thinking. By 1921, when Heidegger relates this motivating ground to the fact that 'I am a "Christian theologian",' the 'faith of my heritage' is not only the Catholicism of his medieval hometown but also his new-found Lutheranism. And both belong to his German heritage, since his revolt against the Italian papal line on modernism had earlier turned Heidegger from Roman Catholicism to an Eckhartian Catholicism. By 1922, when Heidegger first proclaims the fundamental 'atheism' of philosophy, we can add another famous German alongside Eckhart and Luther to which Heidegger is heir, namely, Friedrich Nietzsche. It will take a decade, but it will be not just an anti-Catholic or an anti-Christian but the full-blown anti-religious attitude of the German Geist ripened from German Idealism21 that sweeps Heidegger into National Socialism, with all the romantic fervour of another religious conversion. By 1935, he is thinking of an indigenous German Volksreligion of Blut and Heimat to sustain his straitened political convictions - 'the failure of my rectorate' - and thus finds his way to a fourth native son, Friedrich Holderlin. This purely German Denkweg needs only to be supplemented with its Greek 'way markers' to provide it with a cultural infrastructure which can account for all of Heidegger's proclivities at the self-professed core of his being, namely, his thought. It is with this schematism of a philosophical biography that we can bring together the most central concerns of Heidegger's life and thought, religious, philosophical, political, poetic, and to examine their underpinnings in what might be called this peasant mandarin's 'German ideology,' and in turn the complicity of the latter with National Socialism. Such a philosophical-biographical structure does not doom Heidegger to a deterministic frame, as in Farias, but allows for the freedom of both life and thought, inasmuch as 'heritage always has a future.' That this religious schematism for a philosophical biography is an oversimplification of a more subtle development of Heidegger's religiouspolitical attitudes, that Ott's jaundiced 'inside story' does not take the full measure of the man, is readily demonstrable from the recently published personal letters of Heidegger to Elisabeth Blochmann, a close family friend who taught philosophy of education on the university level until her forced emigration to England during the Nazi years interrupted that career. The correspondence thus gives us entry into the intimacy of the Heidegger family circle and at the same time reveals to us not only Heidegger the man and philosopher but also Heidegger the dedicated teacher, which Ott chooses to

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neglect, aside from allusions to the post-war fear that Heidegger might 'corrupt the youth' of Germany in view of his previous record of zeal for the 'gods of the state' now defunct. The letters reveal the many faces of Heidegger. His correspondent's central interest in the education of women, for example, evokes his own deep interest in women and his thoughts on 'feminine existence' along with a few erotic moments. But the unified core of fusion between life and thought is also very much in evidence, and the letters trace its shifting emphases along Heidegger's path of thought, as he uses his current philosophical ideas to interpret his personal life and in turn lets the essence of that life govern his thought. The letters themselves are accordingly proof of the possibility of a philosophical biography on Heideggerian grounds that takes us to the very center of his Denkweg, and not merely providing us with useful chronological benchmarks, which in themselves are already indispensable for a thought that would emphasize ways instead of works. Thus we have the Young Heidegger of 1918—19 describing his personal life in the Bergsonian-Husserliari language of the 'stream of experience' and its elan vital, and the Early Heidegger of 1928 (August 8) announcing a new turn in his thought, while noting that for the human being to exist is already to philosophize! One may wish to sort out biographical facts in reference to accidental or external circumstances as opposed to the more internal conditions of thought, but one cannot totally exclude these facts of life as such from an account of that thought. With the equation of existing and philosophizing, even the 'external' may point to the deepest implications. Thus, if we follow Heidegger's developing 'conflict with the dying spirit of Christendom' (March 30, 1933) in these letters, starting from his critique of Protestant theology in the controversial talk of 1927—8 entitled 'Phenomenology and Theology' (August 8, 1928), we discover, within his ongoing critique of Protestantism (the anti-Greek Protestantism of the journal Die Tat: December 19, 1932) and Catholicism (the Jesuitism of the 'Romish' Center Party, worse than Communism: June 22, 1932), the repeated expression of his highest regard for life in 'Beuron,' the Catholic monastery near his hometown, 'as a tiny seed of something essential' (September 12, 1929), where he himself regularly spent weeks of his vacation until 1932 living the life of the monks, to the point of wishing that he too might wear the monk's robes (October 11, 1931). And what was it about the simple and primitive existence of 'Beuron' that attracted Heidegger? We get a hint from his remarks on the matins, the night prayers of the monastery breviary: 'The matins still contain the mythical and metaphysical primal power of the night, through which we must constantly break in order truly to exist. For the good is only the good of the evil. ... The matins have thus become the symbol of existence being held into the night and of the inner necessity of the daily readiness for the night' (September 12, 1929).

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Notes toward a philosophical biography One can go further with this work of supplementation and correction of Heidegger's public image dictated simply by the new documentation indicated in the Blochmann letters, for example, by Heidegger's letter of reference on behalf of his Jewish friend in a vain attempt to save her position in 1933; or by the enthusiasm in 1934 for his pet project of a school for docents to prepare them for university teaching in the Third Reich. But at this point I wish to make a brief survey of this impending larger task of supplementation and correction by pointing to a few specific places in Heidegger's development where further substantial archival evidence is forthcoming for this task. Here, I am specifically interested in a philosophical biography of the formative years of Heidegger's development prior to his magnum opus, Being and Time, which, if Farias is right, will turn out to be the biography of a proto-Nazi. In view of the grave charges mounted against the very essence of Heidegger's thought since Farias, one can no longer restrict the examination of its political implications merely to the works from 1933 on. One must also become sensitive to the seeds of any of the tares of nazisms already latent at the very roots of this philosophy.

1909-14 Farias (Farias 33) has found a zero-point for such a biography in a newspaper report of Heidegger's activity in 1909 as president of a student committee preparing for the forthcoming dedication of the monument of Abraham a Sancta Clara near his hometown. In a speech before the committee, the Young Heidegger urges his fellow students to subscribe to the ultraconservative Catholic review Der Gral in support of its battle against the forces of modernism. Ott's discovery (Ott 62—6) of Heidegger's articles in the equally ultraconservative journal Der Akademiker provides the particulars of the young academic theologian's attitudes then: strict adherence to the authority of the Church against the rising tide of ethical-religious individualism based on the modern cult of personality in the 'spirit of Nietzsche and Zola' (Farias 42); a philosophy oriented to the objective truths of the intellect rather than to the subjective opinions derived from 'inner experience' (Erlebnis: Farias 45). But then Heidegger went into his adolescent crisis in 1911, left theology and the seminary for other curricula, and eventually emerged in 1914 on the side of the Catholic modernists. In addition to the poetry that pulled him through the crisis, what else was the Young Heidegger reading, writing and pondering in this transition? If we are to believe Farias, the Young Heidegger continued to imbibe deeply (if he ever did) in the muckraking anti-Semitic

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smut prevalent in southern Germany and Catholic Austria. The Old Heidegger presents us with an entirely different reading list: 'What the exciting years between 1910 and 1914 brought cannot be adequately stated but only suggested by a selective enumeration: the second edition, now doubled in size, of Nietzsche's Will to Power, the translation of Kierkegaard's and Dostoevsky's works, the awakening interest in Hegel and Schelling, Rilke's works and Trakl's poems, Dilthey's Collected Writings.' The remarkable thing about this list is that it to a large extent matches the authors that Heidegger was being introduced to through his subscription since 1911 of an avantgarde literary journal begun the year before in Catholic Austria. Instead of Richard von Kralik's Der Gral, Heidegger was now reading Ludwig von Picker's Der Brenner, where Trakl first published his poems, thanks in part to Ludwig Wittgenstein's financial support, and Theodor Haecker was introducing Kierkegaard's critique of The Present Age and his proposed antidotes in German translations and commentaries. In contrast to the reactionary views of Der Gral, Der Brenner provided Heidegger with a vastly different, more sophisticated and satiric view of modern society, institutionalized Christianity, anti-Semitism, life and values in the city and country, the sham democracy of liberal individualism, the chauvinism of the German intellectual community during the war years, the sterility of scientific reason divorced from the more comprehensive Geist, etc. The latter distinction would take root in the philosophical Heidegger as early as the Conclusion of his habilitation work of 1916, Kierkegaard's crowd-man makes an official appearance in Summer Semester 1923, Rilke in 1927, Nietzsche in strong doses by 1930, Trakl not until after the war, when Heidegger first meets Picker and the two make a tour of Trakl's old haunts in Innsbruck (ST 114—6). 1917-19

The Blochmann letters provide the first truly substantial evidence of what Heidegger was thinking during the still obscure interregnum of 1917—19, when he did not teach or otherwise go public, and underwent a philosophicreligious conversion which first put him squarely upon his lifelong path of thought. In the present context, it might be described as Heidegger's conversion from Catholic to Protestant romanticism, where Heidegger's Messkirchian nostalgia for the Latin middle ages gives way to a more basic Lutheran nostalgia for primitive Christianity in its Pauline Greek world. The most important moving figures are Dilthey and Schleiermacher, and Heidegger demonstrates his thorough knowledge of the latter in advising Blochmann on November 7, 1918 — in the vicinity of the front lines, a few days before war's end - on how to read Schleiermacher for her dissertation. These two figures serve to bring Heidegger to a 'hermeneutic breakthrough'

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to his lifelong topic of thought, which at this early stage centered on the question of how to articulate the immediate experience of already finding oneself already caught up in existence and underway, thus of 'saying the unsayable'. How to gain access to this, our most immediate experience, which in ovo is thus at once total and full reality, which in its immediacy precedes thought and thus is not even 'given', i.e. an object standing over against a subject? For Schleiermacher, it is our fundamental religious experience, the 'feeling of absolute dependence,' akin to Eckhart's mystical birth of the Word sparked in our heart of hearts.23 This Heideggerian quest for the constant background experience of all of our more specific experiences is nowadays sometimes disparaged as a throwback to Romanticism (Rorty), a nostalgic quest for origins (Derrida), the quest for the ineffable sublime (Lyotard). Is this sort of romanticism and mysticism the fertile seedbed of Heidegger's alleged Nazism, pregnant with the potential for ideological and narcissistic distortion into a primitivist, neo-pagan and ethnic quest for the autochthony of one's native ground and roots, as Emmanuel Levinas suggests? GERMAN MILITARISM Another set of clues to Heidegger's romantic proclivities is more overtly disturbing, but traceable perhaps more to his 'German ideology' than to his philosophy. The sickly 'Airman' Heidegger, finally permitted to serve in a meteorological unit near the front lines in the Ardennes sector in the last three months of the war, in this capacity therefore reported to have done his share in poison gas attacks on the enemy, was oddly exhilarated by the 'primitive Dasein' of the soldier's life, even in defeat. Allusions to the war experience recur in his lecture courses beginning with the 'war emergency semester' (Kriegsnotsemester) of early 1919, which was designed specifically for returning war veterans. Heidegger took every opportunity to heroise Emil Lask 'in his distant soldier's tomb,' 'who fell in the battles in Galicia, May 1915; his corpse is still missing.'25 Karl Lowith, whose voice still bore the signs of a severe lung wound received in the Italian campaign, came to Heidegger's courses in 1919 and instantly became a favored student. It should therefore not surprise us that Heidegger came to admire the much decorated Ernst Jiinger, whose war novel Stahlhelm was a best-seller in the 1920s, and later the Luftwaffe 'ace' of World War I, Hermann Goring (Ott I47ff). This also partly accounts for Heidegger's antipathy toward the pacifist, Hermann Staudinger, in 1933 (Ott, 20 Iff). Even Heidegger's later membership in 1959 on a working committee to 'fight atomic death' does not really lift our wonder over his attitude between the wars. From 1919 on, Heidegger was prone to use military examples in his courses, which tend to strike the contemporary reader as odd. To illustrate

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the reciprocal permeation of situations in Summer Semester 1919, Heidegger mentions the coincident duration of a semester and a 'year in the field,' reminiscent of the content of the first Blochmann letters. Just before Christmas of 1919, in a course already replete with phenomenological examples, Heidegger illustrates modifications in experiential contexts by the following example: An infantry column on a forced march becomes exhausted, every man is rendered limp. Suddenly the regimental band sounds up, everyone comes to attention and is drawn along by the music. Bystanders at the roadside may perhaps co-experience this empathetically, but they do not truly c go along' with the transition in the way the soldiers do. To illustrate the suddenness of approach of a fearful thing in Summer Semester 1925, Heidegger speaks of a grenade striking the ground nearby, and labels the experience as an everyday occurrence 'with which we are very well acquainted' (GABd. 20, 398; 287f)! And in a way it was a part of the everyday life of Germany between the wars, and so probably accepted as a matter of course by Heidegger's students, striking as the examples may seem to us. Over the years, favored examples of auditory experience are the column on the march (SZ 163; 207) and the rumbling panzer. In Winter Semester 1935—6, an example of tool use is the experience of learning how to handle a rifle as a weapon (FD55; 71 f). The time has come to move from this outer perimeter of biographically tinged examples to the inner center of Heidegger's thought: The cover of the first edition in 1930 of War and Warrior bears the portrait of a particularly vicious-looking Hun warrior complete with Stahlhelm, much like the caricatures of 'Krauts' in American war-propaganda films. The editor's foreword by Ernst Jiinger mentions the surfeit of war books of the past decade with the observation that 'with justification, the war is the Event which has given our time its face.'26 The position he assumes is called the 'heroic realism' of German nationalism. The book is no longer addressed to its opponents in the camp of liberalism, since that is now (in 1930) an obsolete position, but exclusively to the German youth, 'which knows its responsibility as well as the duty to implement this feeling of responsibility with a position which will define German life. The question here is no longer whether armament is necessary or not, but the space in which the renewal of armament has to unfold.' To address this question, Jiinger offers a lead essay entitled 'Total Mobilization.' The essay becomes the focus of Heidegger's philosophical concerns in the 1930s, insofar as Jtinger 'expresses a fundamental understanding of Nietzsche's metaphysics, insofar as the history and present of the Western world are seen and foreseen in the horizon of this metaphysics' (GABd. 16, 375; 484, 488n). It leads to Heidegger's reflections on the Hericlitean 'polemos,' understood as a confrontation which allows those who are thus set apart to reveal themselves. Although Heidegger insists that the Greek term be stripped of all the coarse militancy and savage

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barbarism that 'war' implies, we are nevertheless left to ponder how the pure nobility of this 'heroic realism,' coupled with the much-discussed 'yearning for hardship and severity,' 7 can be brought together with the peasant realism that he learned from Abraham a Sancta Clara and will use to interpret the Holocaust. Those who have compiled such military litanies in the past tend to observe with some sarcasm that Heidegger himself, small in stature, was hardly the warrior type. Such a tack is clearly an inadmissible argumentum ad hominem, which moreover belies the facts about the Man Heidegger. Heidegger the peasant, like Socrates the urban proletarian, was 'tough,' although Socrates had a more notable war record (Apology 28E). Friends who have gone skiing with Heidegger, for example, have been struck by his remarkable physical courage and endurance. His stamina and endurance is of course especially manifest in his superabundant capacity for disciplined, tenacious and frenetic intellectual work over a career of some 60 years, which finds its tangible proof and final embodiment in the staggering range and variety of thought experiments ('Denkwege) to be found in the hundred-and-some volumes of his Gesamtausgabe. The character and extent of this radical discipline and stamina is exemplified in the remark Heidegger made upon first hearing Hiihnerfeld's scornful anecdote about how he was passed over for active duty at the beginning of the war because he was a 'weakling': 'Do you know why I was too weak? Because I had starved for months on end in order to at least finish the habilitation — month after month after month! I wonder whether Herr Huhnerfeld knows what hunger is when someone has no other way and no one to help him?' (ST90). THE NATORP RELATION Paul Natorp in Marburg, acting as it were at a distance, was just as important as Husserl, acting as Heidegger's mentor and immediate adviser on location in Freiburg, in promoting Heidegger in the German university hierarchy in the crucial post-war years during which Heidegger quickly gained fame as a great teacher but published absolutely nothing. In fact, between the two 'German mandarins' who gave Heidegger his start, Natorp had a far more developed public stance to the inevitable nexus within that university system between philosophy, politics, and education, making significant contributions to all three areas of German public life. The effect that this stance had on Heidegger, who would be destined to fill a similar role, first in Natorp's and then in Husserl's university chair, is yet to be measured. Important in this regard, also for the post-Versailles background against which the two older men struggled with the decisions which would right the course of a university system devastated by the war and its aftermath, is the extant correspondence

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among the three, which is yet to be published. The correspondence positions Heidegger in the nexus of influence and philosophical counterpoint defined by his two older mentors and provides the starting point for tracing how Heidegger exploits the career opportunities they give him to find his own way between and beyond them. The philosophical side of this story, ending with Natorp's death in 1924, clearly marks two of the three major steps — in the years 1919 and 1922 — in Heidegger's progress toward his magnum opus, Being and Time (1927). The ideological side is a bit more latent and elusive to track, but is ultimately just as essential for Heidegger's development, especially after 1927. In an important letter to Airman (Luftschiffer) Heidegger 'in the field' in September of 1918, Husserl mentions two books by Natorp, one strictly philosophical and the other more patriotic, which he had recent occasion to read. For the first time since its appearance six years before, Husserl had taken the time to read through the direct attack on his phenomenology contained in Natorp's Allgemeine Psychologic, and concludes that Natorp, despite his genial premonition of the phenomenological problem of constitution, 'was completely incapable of grasping the clear and obvious sense of phenomenology as an essential analysis of pure consciousness preceding and leading philosophy and science, and to allow this sense to prevail in matters of seeing and what is given in seeing.' 9 Husserl's remarks here become a kind of research program for Heidegger in the first year of his assistantship under Husserl, culminating in a full-fledged 'destruction' - the term is first used in this course - of Natorp's concept of constitution in Summer 1920. The key to Heidegger's hermeneutic breakthrough to his lifelong topic in Kriegsnotsemester 1919 is his resolution of Natorp's double objection against the accessibility and expressibility of phenomenology's central topic of description, the immediate pre-theoretical experience in which we always already find ourselves underway. As Natorp points out, intuitive reflection 'stills the stream' of experience and phenomenological expression generalizes and objectifies it. Heidegger's genial response to Natorp's equally genial objections leads him to develop a hermeneutics of 'formally indicative' strategies of expression of the purported ineffability of the dynamics of immediate experience which in later years will assume more poetic forms, but assume basically the same intentional tack as in 1919.30 In a final footnote to his 1918 letter, Husserl also mentions having read Natorp's 'beautiful, heart-warming double war book,' Germany's Mission in the World, divided into two volumes: I. The Ages of the Spirit', II. The Soul of the German. This rousingly patriotic and semi-popular philosophical statement by Natorp, seeking to provide 'guidelines from the philosophy of history' (the book's subtitle) for his fellow Germans, especially the young, is perhaps the most profound of the spate of chauvinistic war books written by philosophers (Max Scheler, for one) at that time. Natorp's justifiable

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pride in his 'nation of poets and philosophers,' his historical tracing of the German Spirit from its Greek and Judaeo-Christian roots, especially through religious figures like Eckhart and Luther (a chapter is devoted to each), find numerous counterparts in Heidegger's own attitudes at this time. Small wonder, then, that Natorp thinks he sees some of his own ideas on the historical development of the German Mind in the Introduction to an Aristotle-book which Heidegger had sent to Marburg in October 1922 in support of his bid for a university chair. A German Mind distinct, say, from a French Mind? Indeed. Let us take but one example from Natorp's 'war book' worthy of further examination in the present context. The deepest experience of humankind working itself out in human history is the 'eternal ground' revealing itself in the 'divine spark' (Eckhart) buried deep within the human soul, which we therefore call con-science (Gewisseri) rather than 'science' (Wissen: PN I, 80; PN II, 51, 85). Not the superficial French foundation of clarity and distinctness governed by the Cartesian selfconsciousness but this profound and dark 'abyss' of the conscience is the basis of the soul's dialog with its (not higher but deeper) self. Natorp will temper this ground of history with the universalist tendencies of the enlightened Kant, such that history becomes 'the eternal ascent from the unfathomable depths of life' (PN I, 12) toward 'the eternal future of humankind' (PN I, 19) understood as an infinite task, a Kantian idea, to be achieved by creative human deeds (PNI, 7). The romantic Heidegger, by contrast, will stress the more receptive moments of repeated regress to a pre-theoretical abyss as the moving force of history, thereby giving priority to an undigested irrational core to history with its potential for fanaticist exploitation. Whence his penchant for Schelling, for example, in his courses of the 1930s. As a result of Natorp's powerful endorsement, Heidegger got the appointment, despite a lack of publications, and immediately became Natorp's close associate for a scant academic year (1923—4). In the last months of Natorp's life, Heidegger taught courses pursuant to the plan first sketched out in his Introduction of destroying the entire history of ontology, including his summer course on 'Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy,' in which the Early Heidegger was at his most political, in dealing with texts like Aristotle's Rhetoric and Politics. In his obituary on the opening day of the following semester, Heidegger recalled Natorp's spiritual leadership of the German youth movement since 1913, and calls upon his young auditors to continue Natorp's heritage of seeking to place 'our German Dasein on pure foundations.' A significant aside to this story is the anti-Semitic atmospherics which worked to Heidegger's advantage in getting the appointment in Marburg. In a letter to Husserl in January 1922, Natorp considers Richard Kroner instead of Heidegger as a third nominee on the list of candidates for the chair, along with Ernst Cassirer and Moritz Geiger: 'But the faculty would probably

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balk at having three Jews on the list. Even he who applies the strictest objectivity can still have second thoughts as to whether he, through the — nevertheless so "false" - appearance of partiality to the other side — is merely reinforcing his resistance to even the most qualified Jews (or those of Jewish descent) and so instead prejudices the case that he would promote.'32 UNIVERSITY REFORM War's end brought a rash of plans for educational reform descending largely from the upper echelons of the university. Natorp, for example, developed a plan for integrating intellectual with manual labor at all levels of education which still smacks of the elitism of Plato's Republic. A similar plan strictly at the university level would emerge later in Heidegger's rectoral address. The Blochmann letters show us that the Young Heidegger's thoughts on regenerating the German University were already incubating before war's end. The opening day of Kriegsnotsemester 1919 brings the first of a series of statements over the years on the 'renewal of the university,' typically addressing the issue of the relation of life to science in a radically phenomenological manner. Heidegger's phenomenological stress on science as an originally vital process, both personal and historical, rather than a finished theoretical product antedates by almost a half-century the same stress in recent decades by the 'new philosophy of science' (Polanyi, Kuhn, Toulmin). In terms of Heidegger's everyday teaching, this translates into the effort to inculcate the personal habit of the 'genuine archontic Lebemform of science in those who would become active participants in the scientific lifeworld. One encounters this manifest pedagogical dedication again in the course of Winter Semester 1923—4, for example, which seeks to introduce 'phenomenological research' through Aristotelian insights, sometimes turned against Aristotle. In his opening remarks, Heidegger urges his students to adopt a more 'phrenetic' attitude toward their chosen science, contrary to the traditional equation of scientific comportment with 'theorem, intuitive comportment, which in fact places us more at the finished end of science rather than at its interrogative beginnings. Instead, he recommends the restless passion for the genuine questions of a particular science ensconced in its situational presuppositions, contrary to the 'utopia' of pre-suppositionlessness. It is a matter of becoming a 'native' in an ongoing science by making its pre-suppositional and motivational situation one's own, and so confronting its particular matters and resolutely seizing its temporally particular interrogative opportunities. All true scientists must cultivate a phenomenological sense of their motivating origins. Heidegger's practical thoughts on the nature of science, organized around his sense of phenomenology as a pre-theoretical primal science of origins, is

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accordingly the most important single thread from 1919 to 1933, lying at the very heart of his philosophy, as he himself observes in his 'Facts and Thoughts.' For there he spells out the philosophy behind his rectoral address, thereby rooting it in the central impetus of his thought by locating the essence of the university in the essence of science, which in turn is rooted in 'the essence of truth,' where the 'original vital unity joining inquirers and scholars' is to be found (GABd. 16, 373; 482). Heidegger's reflections on the essence of truth, which begin in earnest in 1930, are thus preceded by his reflections on the essence of science, which began in 1919 around the question of whether phenomenological philosophy is to be regarded as a 'strict science' (Husserl) or as something more than a science in view of its attunement to pre-theoretical origins, and so, as Heidegger concludes by 1928, not really a science at all. One strand of this development significant in this context is a series of courses designed to introduce the beginning student to the university and to 'academic studies,' the first of which was given in Summer Semester 1919. Its tacit assumption is that the raison d'etre of the university is the Idea of science, which in turn is rooted in the Idea of philosophy phenomenologically understood. Whence the concern for the tendency of developing sciences to depart from life ('un-living') and the repeated need to retrace the 'genesis of the theoretical' back to its original life-context and lifemotivations at the dynamic heart of any science. The course is accordingly interspersed with practical advice on how, in coming to scientific maturity, to keep in touch with the first spontaneity of one's original motivations in becoming a scientist, be it in the natural or human sciences, motivations which are so original in their dynamism that they lie on this side of any and all of those hypostatized standpoints that we call world views. This course of 1919 may be regarded as a zero-point of development which finds a second station in a similar beginners' course on 'academic studies' exactly a decade later, but this time finding its focus in Plato's well-known Allegory of the Cave. This particular course can be understood against the background of the more public statement on university reform incorporated in Heidegger's Inaugural Address at the University of Freiburg in July 1929, 'What is Metaphysics?'. Here, the origin of the field of sciences which constitutes the university is traced back to the Angst of a radical questioning challenging the extant foundations of a science, in which beings as a whole become strange and the researcher is exposed to their 'nothingness,' which is the topic of philosophy. It is especially in these revolutionary moments that science and philosophy are drawn together and become one in the crisis of life. The final station in this academic series is a seminar which Heidegger gave during his rectorate. Originally announced for Summer 1933 under the title 'The Concept of Science,' it was apparently postponed until the following

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semester and bore the title 'Folk and Science.' Heidegger tells us in Tacts and Thoughts' that this 'well-attended seminar' (for which not even a transcript has yet come to public light) is to be understood against the background of his new direction toward 'the essence of truth,' which since 1930 was being elaborated in a series of courses and lectures focusing on Plato's Allegory of the Cave (GABd. 16, 373; 482). A topic of his courses since 1927, a central focus since 1929, this Platonic parable is undoubtedly one of the clues to the interpellation of the tripartite structure of Plato's Republic into the rectoral address. Intersected as it is by so many essential strands of Heidegger's philosophical development, the rectoral address itself must be regarded as an indigenous and essential step in Heidegger's Denkweg. Although it may be regarded as one of the many Holzwege that branch off from the main path, it is nevertheless a significant part of what Heidegger himself characterized as his 'turn.' Heidegger's apology: closet Nazi, late Germanic, or Socratic? The last two series in particular bring out Heidegger's profound dedication to his teaching and to his students, so neglected by his recent biographers. This still does not dismiss him of the charge of 'corrupting the German youth' unwittingly (Apology 26A), willy nilly, by infecting them with a national malady inherent in a latent ideology with deep roots in his own German past. Habermas' charges are akin to the deeply seated old charges of Mephistophelean wizardry that Socrates felt compelled to answer first in his trial. These grave issues are only clouded by the spurious charges of antiSemitism levelled by Farias (=Meletos), whose sophistic tactics are easily exposed upon cross-examination, though his case may yet find its vestige of truth in the ongoing process of producing further facts, like the newly discovered letter of 1929. A fair weighing of the evidence is first predicated, however, upon a full disclosure of all available evidence, contrary to the present fragmentation of the evidence due to arbitrary and thus suspiciously vested barriers. The new evidence will dictate a new trial, not before das Man (if that is the tribunal that Der Spiegel gives us) — Socrates also had a low opinion of the 'doxa' of the 'polloi' but first before 'the nation of poets and philosophers' which the post-war Heidegger seems to have both shunned and invoked. Heidegger must be made to speak again to answer for his life and thought in its entirety, to the extent that this can now be brought to light. I envisage a new Apology that perhaps may take some liberties with the details, like Heidegger's quasi-fictional 'Dialog on Language,' but which will be truer to life and thought in the structural exchanges that it uncovers. The first of these exchanges must be the open admission and understanding of the reversible Gestalt-switch that is operative between life and thought,

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biography and philosophy. Which is why even the most complete evidence would still be mixed. Accordingly, whether such a dialog will conclude in a beau geste or a boorish whimper would still be left to the individual narrator to decide. The less than Platonic Socrates no doubt also had clay feet. Winfried Franzen has aptly called the dimension of biography that relates 34 to Heidegger's philosophy 'inner biography,' those pervasive enduring elements that dominate a life as opposed to the passing and accidental elements. Socrates ultimately argued his own case not before the Athenian court, for which he repeatedly betrayed his contempt, but instead before Apollo, the tribunal of Truth and a spiritual court, and before his own conscience, giving a public account of how he carried out the god's mission given to him at Delphi. Heidegger, by contrast, was by nature a taciturn man. He was not a loquacious Greek, prone to bare his soul so fully in public after the fashion of Socrates. We are left to eavesdrop on the private record which he graciously left behind, looking for the hints which will reveal the man in his innermost motivations. His world-wide influence is a final argument for full disclosure. Even Heidegger's intimacies now belong to the world.

CHAPTER 2

On the Way to Being and Time; Introduction to the Translation of Heidegger's Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs The announced title of this lecture course for the summer semester of 1925, 'History of the Concept of Time,' reflects the titles of two earlier lectures given by Heidegger at significant turning points in his career. Heidegger's demonstration lecture at the beginning of his teaching career in 1915 was entitled 'The Concept of Time in Historical Science'; it is concerned with that concept as it is developed in both historical and natural science. The more famous lecture given by Heidegger to the Marburg Theological Faculty on July 25, 1924, was entitled simply 'The Concept of Time' and has been called by one who was there1 the 'Urform of Heidegger's magnum opus, Being and Time (1927). Some of the concepts and theses sketched out in this germinal lecture are worked out in far greater detail, probably for the first time in the general form they were to assume in Being and Time, in the lecture course of 1925 presented here. The general thesis which emerges from this decade of deliberation on 'the concept of time' is that it is to be drawn first and foremost not from natural or historical science but from the more basic dimension of 'human being' (earlier designated as the 'factic experience of life' but by 1924 designated as 'Dasein', literally 'being there' or, more idiomatically, 'being here and now') understood as the entity which experiences itself in its 'temporal particularity' (Jeweiligkeii) or, in the more existentialistic emphasis which this formulation assumes by 1927, the entity whose being is 'in each instance mine'(yV meiniges\ more abstractly, the basic character of Jemeinigkeif). The fundamental assertion T am' which each of us can make about ourselves thus becomes the initial locus for understanding the concept of time, which now assumes the form of understanding the conceptual relations between being and time and evokes the need to re-examine the traditional concepts of time. But the lecture course of 1925 falls far short of a re-examination of the traditional concepts of time, the task implied in its announced title and divided into three historical stages in the Second Part of the announced

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outline for the course (11). In fact, only the first division of the First Part of that outline, 'the preparatory description of the field [namely Dasein] in which the phenomenon of time becomes manifest,' is developed in any great detail. And so little is said of time itself that there is some indication, in Heidegger's repeated anticipatory remarks on the subject, of a growing impatience among the students attending the course. Heidegger chooses to introduce the organization of the themes projected for the course through the announced subtitle of the course, 'Prolegomena to the Phenomenology of History and Nature.' In short, the course is to provide what is first needed 'in order to be able to do a phenomenology of history and nature' (1). Why he does this is not made clear, and there is a certain opaqueness to the opening sections because of this seeming detour. To be sure, the distinction between history and nature and its immediate association with the two main groups of empirical sciences reflects Heidegger's earlier concern, in the aforementioned demonstration lecture, with the concept of time in historical and natural science; indeed, time is here introduced as an 'index' (8) for distinguishing these scientific domains. But Heidegger makes it abundantly clear that a phenomenology of history and nature cannot remain enmeshed in the fact of science and what it has discovered, as the neo-Kantians of his day were inclined to leave the matter, but must disclose the reality of these domains precisely as they show themselves before scientific enquiry. This is the basic task of what Heidegger calls a 'productive logic' (2), in the next semester a 'philosophizing logic' and finally, following Husserl, a 'regional ontology' which serves to found a particular empirical science and its domain.3 Thus 'logic', that is to say philosophy or ontology for Heidegger, leaps ahead of the sciences in order to draw or revise their fundamental concepts out of the matters themselves. Philosophy, that is phenomenology, as the primal science must perform the same task for itself, disclosing new domains in the matters themselves, such as Dasein, in order thereby to dismantle and reconstruct its own concepts, such as time and being. This is the mark of a scientific philosophy (21). In this period of Heidegger's thought, philosophy (phenomenology, ontology) is decidedly conceptual labor. But once again, why does the course begin with the problem of the distinction between nature and history? The reason, I believe, is to be found at a pivotal point in the later course, when Heidegger concludes his critique of phenomenology in general and Husserl in particular by suggesting that all the earlier phenomenologies end in a 'primal separation of being' (170, 178) into immanent and transcendent, psychic and physical, rational and animal, personalistic and naturalistic, consciousness and reality, spirit and nature. Heidegger notes that Husserl's quest for a personalistic psychology then took the form of a course given repeatedly and entitled 'Nature and Spirit' (167). Here, in the context of some personal remarks about his relationship

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to Husserl, Heidegger reveals that earlier in that year he had received from Husserl the then unpublished manuscript of Ideas II, which is devoted to the problem of the constitution of the domains of nature and spirit that underlie natural and historical science. It is accordingly this fundamental distinction plaguing the early phenomenologists which Heidegger's own course from the outset is designed to overcome. From the start, he suggests that the separation of these two domains may well be hiding an original and undivided context which underlies them. There is more than one indication here that Heidegger studied the newly acquired text of Ideas II intensively in preparation for his own course, The new text seems to have driven Heidegger to a renewed detailed examination of Husserl's work, especially the Sixth Logical Investigation, the Logos-essay and Ideas I. The result is the most sustained and specific confrontation of phenomenology in general and Husserl in particular that we are likely to get from Heidegger. It is therefore not without reason, no mere case of pedagogical dawdling, that the so-called Preliminary Part on the history and nature of phenomenology grows far beyond the 'short introductory orientation' (11) which it was initially intended to be. Here we find the fruit and climax of the close working relationship which Heidegger then enjoyed with Husserl, more than two years before the celebrated 'falling out' between the two began. Here Heidegger specifies in precise philosophical detail what it was in Husserl's breakthrough book, Logical Investigations, that so 'fascinated' him, and how he interprets its central discoveries (intentionality, categorial intuition, and the ensuing new sense of the apriori) in the direction of his more hermeneutical version of phenomenology. Here he repeatedly takes sharp issue with Husserl's placing of primacy on the 'bodily presence' of perceived things in favor of how the world 'appresents' things, a term he seems to have borrowed directly from Ideas II because of its temporal connotations. In short, this 1925 course gives us Heidegger's most profound appreciation and criticism of Husserl's founding contribution to phenomenology during the period when Heidegger was still immersed in the struggle to go beyond his teacher. By contrast, the old Heidegger's remarks on the Sixth Logical Investigation in the 1973 seminar in Zahringen appear quite sketchy, though by no means insignificant, as we shall soon see. The course is also a kind of summary of Heidegger's efforts since early 1919, when he took up his teaching duties as Husserl's assistant in the 'war emergency semester' (February to April 1919), to revolutionize phenomenology from within. Little is known about Heidegger's scholarly pursuits and thought during the previous war years. What is known is that Heidegger came back from his army service transformed, an enthusiastic proponent of phenomenology but already bent on taking it in a new direction. Heidegger later notes that the 'hermeneutics of facticity' in Being and Time was already developing in his courses since the winter semester of 1919-20 (SZ 72n; 490).

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Phenomenology is to take as its subject matter not just the theoretical but also the practical and, most basically, the factical life, the great 'fact of life'. It is the relation to the pretheoretical 'matters themselves' which makes phenomenology the science of origins and the original science and setting it off from all the other sciences: The course given in the 'war emergency semester' was entitled 'The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of World Views.' All the courses of this period were given under the banner of phenomenology as Heidegger understood it, for example, in the summer semester of 1920: 'Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression: Theory of Philosophical Concept Formation.' The course in the winter semester of 1921—2, 'Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle,' was in subtitle and content really an introduction to phenomenological research on the basis of Aristotle. The first course at Marburg in 1923-4, purportedly on Descartes and modern philosophy, is actually entitled 'Introduction to Phenomenological Research.' It contains Heidegger's first overt critique of Husserl's turn toward consciousness, the first detailed clarification of the term phenomeno/0g)/ (here with painstaking attention to the Aristotelian sources and senses of the component parts of this term), and a history of the breakthrough and initial development of phenomenology. All of these themes are again taken up in the 1925 lecture course. What is therefore novel and unique to this course is the detailed treatment of the three 'breakthrough' discoveries of phenomenology (intentionality, categorial intuition, an a concomitant new sense of the apriori) in the Preliminary Part and a number of hints in the Main Part on how these Husserlian themes are subsumed by the terminology of Being and Time. For the Main Part is by and large a first draft of the First Division of Being and Time and, in view of its organic continuity with the preceding Part, a phenomenological draft. In fact, upon closer inspection, the lecture course itself is not an existentialistic draft at all; it is a pure phenomenological draft. The scattered allusions in this published version of the 1925 course to ExistenzwA the 'existential-ontological' (218, 297, 313, 328, 335, 338, 339, 390, 402, 405, 408) are later additions superimposed upon the stenographic typescript of the lecture course 'aus letzter Hand Heideggers? apparently in the process of drafting the final version of Being and Time. In fact, at one point in the course itself, Heidegger mocks 'Existenz and 'decision' as the modewords of his day which had replaced the pre-war mode-words of Erleben and Erlebnis (lived experience) in the philosophical fashion show (375). In view of how completely the terminology of 'existence' dominated Being and Time itself, it is in fact surprising how diligently he avoided this language in the first draft of 1925. (The technical term Existenz and the problem of developing special categories called the existentials, however, are mentioned as early as 1923 in Heidegger's lecture courses.) The 1925 course thus provides dramatic proof of Heidegger's repeated contention that the way to Being

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and Time passes through phenomenology rather than through existentialism, contrary to decades of commentators who have chosen to ignore his disclaimers of existentialism. On its surface, the Preliminary Part appears to be a chronological historical survey of the phenomenological movement up to 1925: the philosophical situation around the turn of the century out of which it developed; the central discoveries contained in its 'breakthrough' book, Logical Investigations^ the later developments in the direction of a phenomenology of consciousness (Husserl) and of person (Scheler). But a careful reading of the text reveals that this purportedly 'short introductory orientation' on the 'Sense and Task of Phenomenological Research' — which takes up well over a third of the present volume! - is really a phenomenological reflection upon the history of phenomenology designed to point to the need for Heidegger's own problematic of Dasein, being and time. And as Heidegger has already noted in his opening remarks, any phenomenological reflection involves both 'historical' and 'systematic' aspects in a unity which can only be didactically separated (10). The systematic thrust of this Part is to radically define 'the matter itself of phenomenology, and so phenomenology itself from its matter, beginning with the terminology first developed in the Logical Investigations', for Heidegger, 'the basic book of phenomenology (30). The historiological aspect is found in Heidegger's repeated attempts to identify and overcome misunderstandings of this terminology due to the tendency toward traditionalism, the tendency to follow a line of questioning and answering taken from a historically available philosophy rather than directly from the matters at issue (14, 21, 39-46). The governing motif of this Part is therefore the critical application of the phenomenological maxim 'Back to the matters themselves,' in its critical attention to potentially distorting prejudices, acquired from the tradition, which stand in the way of the difficult task of seeing the matters directly and simply. To begin with, there is the crude interpretation of intentionality as a dualistic co-ordination of the psychic and the physical, which hopelessly blocks access to what the term really means phenomenologically (37—9). More subtle variants of this 'thesis of modern ontology,' that the basic distinction of being is spirit and nature (consciousness and reality, psychic and the physical, person and thing) have prevented even phenomenologists from arriving at the original thematic field prefigured in the phenomenon of intentionality. Husserl regards intentionality as the structure of consciousness and reason, while Scheler takes it as the structure of the person in his acts. Neither sees that intentionality, rather than being an ultimate account of the psychic, is in fact 'an initial approach toward overcoming the uncritical application of traditionally defined realities such as the psychic, consciousness, continuity of lived experience, reason' (63). To see this, intentionality must be pursued in its concretion, as Heidegger proposes to do, in keeping

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with the directives of the phenomenological maxim. He finds support for this direction in Dilthey, in his radicalizing attempts to determine the basic reality of 'life' which historical science thematizes; thus, implicit in Dilthey's thought is an operative tendency toward the question of being (19-20, 173). By contrast, Husserl identified consciousness as the region of absolute being and disengaged it from the real world, and yet never confronted the question of what 'being' really means here, and just how it serves to distinguish the immanent sphere of consciousness from the transcendent domain of reality (141, 178). Thus, the early phenomenologists neglected both the question of the being of intentional acts and the question of the sense of being itself, to which the retrogressive movement toward the matters themselves must ultimately come. Such is the upshot of the Preliminary Part in its critical moment: The present task of phenomenological research is to 'repeat' the old Greek question of being in an original way, out of the matters themselves. This is the innermost tendency contained in the maxim itself. Its critical moment, which seeks to hold in abeyance the obfuscating prejudices of the tradition, yields to a more receptive and radical moment: radical in taking us to that most basic of questions, the question of being, and receptive in cultivating an attitude toward any entity of letting it be seen as an entity in its being (186). Heidegger is quick to note at this point that the question of being is not being raised again because of its venerable antiquity — this would be a lapse into the traditionalism with which he has been struggling here — but only insofar as it is dictated by the return to the matters themselves and in the way this is dictated. It is not a matter of rote repetition of the tradition in which the question of being was first raised, but a genuine repetition which appropriates this traditional question in an original way, in terms of'presuppositions which allow us to recover the ground for the question of being simply from the question itself (184). These for Heidegger are to be found in the concrete field of experience which he designates as Dasein. There is at least a practical linguistic dilemma here which Heidegger is only beginning to confront in this lecture course. On the one hand, one is to allow the matter itself to dictate its own terms while eschewing the traps of traditional philosophical language; on the other hand, since one does not philosophize in mid-air, totally removed from every tradition, one cannot avoid at least having partial and temporary recourse to traditional concepts to express the matter at issue. While on the one hand 'categorial intuition' was at first misunderstood because it was discovered in a traditional horizon of questioning and interpreted with traditional concepts, the old concepts necessarily had to serve as the means to bring forth something completely new (93, 97). Heidegger first attempts to express the positive sense of phenomenological research in terms of intentionality, categorial intuition

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and the apriori, all venerable philosophical terms. But in embarking on this attempt to 'retrieve' the sense of phenomenology from the language of the Logical Investigations, he explicitly eschews a mere reiteration of its content in favour of a more active and thoughtful appropriation of the matters at issue, which must be 'repeated anew' (32). What we have here is accordingly an early and abbreviated version of the creative repetition of a text, especially the portions of the Sixth Logical Investigation dealing with categorial intuition. It prefigures the more extensive and notorious recovery operation performed soon after on Kant's first critique, where violence was needed 'in order to wrest from the actual words what they intended to say ... in order to get through to the unsaid and to attempt to find an expression for it.' (GABd. 3, 202; 141). But as Heidegger notes in the Kant-book, such a violent interpretation is not arbitrary but rather is guided by a directive idea which is itself confirmed by its power to illuminate the matter at issue. If we look more closely at this retrieve of the sixth Logical Investigation, we in fact find that its directive ideas are secured through a repeated appeal to the phenomenological maxim. Violence to the text is based upon a receptivity to the matters themselves. This appears from the start in the attempt to preserve intentionality as a pure self-directedness-toward in the paradigm example of the perception of a thing. Contrary to a number of 'scientific' accounts of perception, such as those based on sense-datum theories (Heidegger chooses to ignore their prevalence in the Logical Investigations), the phenomenological maxim dictates acceptance of the 'naive' and natural experience of simply seeing, say, this chair just as it shows itself in the thickness of ordinary experience, in the three contexts in which it is naturally perceived: in the environing world, in nature and purely as thing. Thus in the environing world we accept at face value that 'one sees in the chair itself that it came from a factory ... even though we have no sensation of a factory or anything like it' (52). Perceiving or seeing is here taken in a broad but natural sense as a direct cognizing of structures which can be read off in what is given. This already expresses the gist of the second of the central discoveries in the beginning of phenomenology, categorial intuition. Simply by examining the toward-which of self-directedness in the paradigm case of perception, we are naturally introduced to categorial intuition, which is 'just a concretion of the basic constitution of intentionality' (98—99). It reveals the concrete structures which we naturally encounter in the things through the exteriorizing movement of intentionality. This brings us to the directive ideas which Heidegger 'puts up front' to guide his interpretation of the Sixth Investigation. First, there is the tendency to emphasize the ontological import of this overtly epistemological discussion: the categorial structures are first simply apprehended as 'constituents in entities' before they are conceptually grasped as categories (64). Then there is the universalization of categorial intuition beyond perception to include every experience. Finally,

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after announcing the two general themes related to categorial intuition in the Sixth Investigation, truth and expression, corresponding there respectively to Chapters 5 and 6, Heidegger makes the most far-reaching assumption of all, going far beyond the text in anticipating some of his own themes (65): We shall see our comportments, lived experiences in the broadest sense, are through and through expressed experiences; even if they are not uttered in words, they are nonetheless expressed in a definite articulation by an understanding that I have of them as I simply live in them without regarding them thematically. Heidegger here makes no attempt to justify this bold assumption from the text, as he might have done, say, on the basis of the First Investigation on 'Expression and Meaning' or by equating intentionality with the act of giving meaning. Instead, he is rather abruptly announcing his own pending terminological shift of the discussion from intuition to that which precedes and underlies it, namely, understanding and interpretation. This directive idea thus provides the basis for what might be called Heidegger's hermeneutical reading of the Logical Investigations. In the textual gloss that immediately follows regarding evidence and truth, one can however glean at least a fragmentary justification of this leading idea. First, Heidegger makes much of the unthematic experience of truth to which Husserl occasionally alludes in the Sixth Logical Investigation (§ 39, Addendum to § 88). One sense of truth is the state of identity between intended and intuited resulting from intentional fulfilment. In fulfilment, the subject matter itself is apprehended, but not its selfsameness (identity) with the intended, which is only experienced. In other words, there is no apprehension of identity but only of the identical. Thus, normally I do not thematically regard the truth of a perception but rather live in its truth (66—7, 70). This is what means 'to be in the truth' (SZ221; 263) without knowing it thematically, whereby we understand the structures of the world as 'self-evident,' as a matter 'of course' in a straightforward living of them without considering them thematically. Second, the term 'truth' was traditionally attributed to expressive acts of assertion in the relation of predication. But the phenomenological discovery of the structure of intentionality shows that even non-relational acts, singlerayed monothetic acts such as the simple act of naming, are likewise subject to the possibility of identification. The direct perception of something can also be called true (73). This broadening of the concept of truth suggests a broadening of the sense of expression in the direction of the prepredicative. Now 'assertions in the sense of a formulated proposition are only specific forms of expressness, where expressness has the sense of expressing lived experiences or comportments through meaning' (74). We are thus once

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again drawn back to the unthematic structures of meaning on the verge of predication. At this point, Heidegger introduces his commentary on the relation of 'Intuition and Expression' in the Sixth Logical Investigation by reiterating his directive idea on the universality of expression in comportment and then concluding by underscoring another and far-reaching dimension of it (75): It is also a matter of fact that our simplest perceptions and constitutive states are expressed, even more, are interpreted in a certain way. What is primary and original here? It is not so much that we see the objects and things but rather that we first talk about them. To put it more precisely: We do not say what we see, but rather the reverse, we see what one says about the matter. This inherently determinate character of the world and its potential apprehension and comprehension through expressness, through already having been spoken and talked over, is basically what must now be brought out in the question of the structure of categorial intuition. 'What one says' alludes to the theme of the Everyone which Heidegger will develop more explicitly in this lecture course. Heidegger does not tell us this, but this theme is prefigured early in the Sixth Investigation (§ 8) in the notion of static fulfilment. A static fulfilment is a long-standing habitual fulfilment which is the 'lasting result' of the more 'temporal transaction' (that is, more 'disjoined in time') of the step-by-step 'dynamic fulfilment,' where I first say, then see what I say, and finally recognize that what I say and what I see are the same.8 Instead Heidegger picks up where he left off in his analysis of the later sections of the Sixth Investigation. Although it is rather sparsely footnoted, what we have from this point on (75—93) is a fairly orderly and almost loyal gloss of Chapter 6 on 'Sensuous and Categorial Intuitions.' The text is significant because, almost 40 years later, the old Heidegger once again singles it out as a particularly 'captivating' theme in the Sixth Investigation, with special bearing on the old Aristotelian theme of the 'manifold meaning of the entity' (cf. SD 83; 78). And 10 years later, in the Seminar at Zahringen in 1973, Heidegger once again points to this chapter on categorial intuition, which broadened the notion of givenness far beyond that of sense givenness (GABd. 15, 11 Iff; 31 Iff) because here Husserl 'brushes' up against the question of being in particularly allusive passages that prefigure both the truth of being and the issue of the ontological difference: thus for Heidegger, categorial intuition is 'the focal point of Husserlian thought' (GABd. 15, 111; 311). In what follows, we shall interject a central remark from this later seminar which provides a clearer insight into the nature of categorial

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intuition than the early lecture course, with its more muted interpretation more deeply involved with the details of Husserl's text, tends to give. Contrary to Kant, Husserl maintains that the categorial itself is intuited, therefore given, therefore present. Summarily put in some variant terms that Husserl at various times brings to bear on this point, categorial intuition accompanies every sense intuition, apperception is there with every perception, appresentation with every presentation. There is 'more' to seeing than meets the eye. This surplus of sense, this excess of intentions (77)9 is most readily discovered in a perceptual assertion, say, 'This paper is white.' While the assertion incorporates the directly perceived elements 'paper' and 'white,' it also contains the categorial elements 'this' and 'is' which themselves are not perceived. Yet this substantiality, or this being, 'in its non-appearance enables that which actually appears to appear. In this sense one can even say that it is more apparent than the apparent itself (GABd. 15, 115;3l4). But one might still ask: How does the enabling element appear, how is the categorial given, present? Jacques Taminiaux, in his comments on the 1973 seminar, puts the issue at its most paradoxical by noting that being here is 'absolutely imperceptible' and yet 'intuited' (RE 80, cf. 72). The resolution of this paradox lies in what has already been cited. The enabling element appears in letting things appear, is present in presenting things, or, in the Husserlian term Heidegger implements later in the 1925 course, is appresent (copresent) in appresenting things (making things present). But now to Heidegger's 1925 interpretation of the text in the Sixth Investigation, where this interrelation between entities and their being is at first found between the sensory and the categorial, more specifically, between the simple sensory of a subject matter and its expression in a predicative statement. The categorial act of expression is an act of accentuation which 'makes certain relations stand out from the matter, which is at first apprehended directly and simply in its unarticulated totality. It draws these relations out of the originarily given intuitive content' (76). It is an act of explication which brings out the real parts and moments implicitly present in the simply given but unarticulated subject matter (85). Viewed in this retrogressive direction, the categorial act seems to be nothing but an unoriginal exposition of what is already in the sensory act upon which it is founded. But when we look in the opposite direction, to where the categorial act terminates, we see that the 'state of affairs' which it yields, the relationship (for example, 'being white'), which it brings out of the real subject matter, is itself not a real part of that matter, but rather a new kind of object. Since it is non-real, this new objectivity is tentatively identified as ideal. Accordingly, although the categorial act of drawing out the state of affairs changes nothing in the simply given matter, yet through this new objectivity the given matter becomes expressly visible in what it is. Its presence and its being in the present become more authentic through the assertion, it assumes a

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more authentic objectification and so is disclosed anew (86, 84). The new kind of object allows the given entity to be seen in its objectivity; it actually presents the entity more truly in its 'being-in-itself' (96—7). In more traditional terms, the new objectivity is the universal (the categorial) which is coapprehended in acts of synthesis, e.g. the perceptual assertion, as that which illuminates what is simply given; but the universal as such is expressly apprehended in what it is (namely, as a category or idea) only in the more comprehensive acts of categorial intuition called ideation (91). But this latter possibility of 'working out the categories' always goes back to the categorially mixed intuitions of acts of synthesis, where the categorial first 'presents itself (97) in letting the simply given thing be seen in what it is. In short, it presents itself in presenting things. We thus arrive at the interrelation between being and entities as it was later expressed in 1973, but more in terms of the tortuous language and working descriptions in the Logical Investigations from which it stems. It should now also be apparent that the unidirectional application of the language of founding and founded in describing the interdependence of the sensory and the categorial (84, 90-5), or the entity and its being, is misleading. That the categorial always has a sensory basis is a traditional thesis stemming from Aristotle. But we have seen that the categorial act is a movement of going beyond the sensory given — a transcending now to be regarded as indigenous to the movement of intentionality - which is directed toward a new objectivity without which the simply given matter could not appear as it is. The founded is therefore in its turn founding, inasmuch as the categories are the apriori structure which constitute entities and allow them to be seen in what they are. Though the role of 'ontic' individuals will not be denied, as for example in the 'circular' relationship between entities and their being, Heidegger will follow this ontological turn in the terminology of founding. The pursuit of intentionality to its concretion leads beyond the 'bodily presence' (Leibhaftigkeit) of things perceived in isolation, which Husserl made paradigmatic for the reality and presence of the world, to a more comprehensive given whose presence is far more inconspicuous and non-objective than the 'world' understood as a manifold of things (244—6). Since this new founding context which founds even the bodily presence of perceived things receives its nexus of meaning from the pre-predicative 'prepositions' of praxis (for, in order to, with, etc.) rather than from the predications of perception, it seems to outstrip the traditional categories of objectivity appropriate to the latter (300-1). Access to this meaningful context and its non-objective 'categories' is not through the perception of a thing but rather through the concerned preoccupation with handy tools, which are the immediately given here and founded in the more comprehensive but unobtrusive given called the world (257, 264). World in this sense

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cannot be reached by intuition, but in the same way as we arrive at the being of its proximally given handy tools, by understanding and interpretation. If there is a constant in the contrast, it is a recognition that experience is sustained by pretheoretical structures of 'expression' which present themselves in presenting entities, the insight which Heidegger extracted from the Logical Investigations. One of Husserl's achievements was to show, in opposition to modern philosophy, that these apriori structures are not merely subjective; they are first of all objective, material, and even sensory. All of geometry is testimony to the existence of a material apriori. Such structures indigenous to intentionality are to be found not only in the 'objectifying acts' of cognitive comportment but also in practical, volitional and emotive comportments, where they vary according to the subject matter discovered in each region and the way of access to it (68). This broadening of the sense of objectivity indicates that the notion of the apriori is not just a title for comportment but more comprehensively a title for being (101). Husserl's discovery of categorial intuition thus opened up a vast field of research into the apriori structures (i.e. 'categories') of experience, both regional and comprehensive, which have been the goal of ontology since Plato and Aristotle. Heidegger's positive retrieve of the beginnings of phenomenology therefore comes to the same conclusion as his critique of its later developments: the sense of phenomenological research is to be found in ontology and 'scientific ontology is nothing but phenomenology' (98). Ontology is the locus of'the basic problems of phenomenology,' some of which Heidegger is already raising at this stage in connection with Husserl's broadening of the notions of truth, givenness and objectivity. And the articulation of the task of phenomenology into regional ontologies once again raises his opening question, whether and how time may serve as an 'index' in articulating experience into regions. Husserl's discovery of categorial intuition supplies insight not only into the nature of the 'categorial' but also into the way of access to it. The categorial aspects operating more or less implicitly in 'acts of synthesis' can be made fully explicit in 'acts of ideation'. Ideation is the explicit methodological analysis of the intuited apriori structures and their formulation into descriptions: It is the moving force in the methodological definition of phenomenology which develops from its beginning and initial breakthrough: 'the analytical description of intentionality in its apriori' (108). It has already been suggested that Heidegger, in his quest for the being of the intentional and the sense of being in general, in his attempt to deepen the issue of phenomenology by comprehending non-cognitive as well as cognitive comportments, will feel compelled to modify the basic terms of this definition. This is the subject of the Main Part. But the direction of this modification is already anticipated in the Preliminary Part by the directive

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ideas which weighted the interpretation of categorial intuition in the direction of understanding, interpretation and expression, and by singling out Dilthey's 'hermeneutics of life' for special commendation. Heidegger provides enough hints to suggest that the phenomenological field defined by the constellation intentionality-categorial intuition-apriori can be more comprehensively understood in terms of care (420)-interpretive understanding (190)-time (199). The distinction in the pivotal term between a natural and a more methodological way of access to the heart of the matter at issue, in categorial intuition between acts of synthesis and ideation, now becomes that between a tacit preunderstanding of being which we already have and the more explicit interpretive exposition (Auslegung) of it. Interpretation rather than intuition is now the basic form of knowing, seeking to expose the structures of the 'as what' (359—60 vs. 91). Accordingly, we might venture the following reconstruction of the above methodological definition of phenomenology at this stage of Heidegger's search: the interpretive exposition of care in its time-structure. The matter at issue in this definition, care, clearly belongs to the entity whose being was initially understood in terms of intentionality. When the goal of phenomenology eventually shifts from the being of the intentional to the sense of being as such, as it must, then phenomenology may be defined more universally as 'the interpretation of entities in terms of their being' (423). The Main Part thus maintains a close continuity with the Preliminary Part, inasmuch as it continues to deepen the issue of phenomenology and to reflect on how its matter is to be approached. It is divided into two Divisions which by and large presage the contents of the two Divisions published as Being and Time two years later. The First Division, entitled 'The Preparatory Description of the Field in which the Phenomenon of Time Becomes Manifest,' develops the everydayness of Dasein as being-in-the-world, the worldhood of the world, in-being as such and care. The Second Division on 'The Exposition of Time Itself is basically a very sketchy outline, in the final pages of the volume, of the themes of death and conscience. All of these themes are familiar to the reader of Being and Time. But what is unique about this first detailed draft of that great book is that it was composed in conjunction with the most extensive confrontation with Husserl that we are likely to get from Heidegger. Allusions to the themes and questions raised by the just completed interpretation of Husserl recur far more frequently and in greater depth and detail than they do in the comparable sections of Being and Time. This, then, is the phenomenological draft of Being and Time. What precisely does Heidegger take from Husserl? How does he depart from Husserl? At what precise point do these two phenomenologies part ways? The reader who carefully compares the two Parts will be rewarded by countless suggestions regarding these issues arid will no doubt grasp in broad outline Heidegger's transposition of Husserl's themes ... and yet will find

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no definite answer. There are a number of reasons for this. We have already found more than one occasion to remark on the fragmentary nature of Heidegger's retrieve of the Logical Investigations and to note how this might have been fleshed out more fully. Heidegger the teacher was no doubt in a hurry to finish an already protracted discussion of a difficult text. And as we shall soon see, there is no continuous path from the Logical Investigations to Being and Time, since the move from oriented consciousness to situated being-in-the-world involves a leap. And yet, after the two poles of the leap are worked out in detail, a fair appraisal of the continuities and discontinuities between them can be made. This is precisely what Heidegger invites us to do at the end of the First Division of this Main P a r t . . . without himself performing this 'critical repetition' (420) of the earlier Part, though he does tell us that this is to be done by setting intentionality back into the more comprehensive context of care. And in all fairness to him, Heidegger had already begun this task earlier, for example, in his analysis of knowledge as a founded mode of in-being (219—20). Here, the overt level of directingoneself-toward is founded in a prior level of dwelling with the thing toward which one directs oneself. From this prior level, knowledge, interpretive exposition of something we are already familiar with in a more tacit mode. Finally, Heidegger frankly admits of being still somewhat in the dark with regard to the matter of the connection between discourse and world and at a loss in finding the right term to bring out this connection between them, for example, the world is described as a meaningful whole in order to suggest a connection with verbal meaning (275). These are precisely the issues that lie at the heart of his retrieve of the Logical Investigations (364). Perhaps less obvious is why such a retrieve was performed in a lecture course attempting to develop the phenomenon of time conceptually. Yet the way that development takes place in this course is strongly influenced by two overtly temporal concepts whose roots can be traced back to the Logical Investigations. Moreover, both of the preconcepts on the way to the concept of time, Jeweiligkeit and Apprdsentation, are unique to this course. Both disappear as such in Being and Time, receding as it were into the filigree of the text. Jeweiligkeit is replaced by Jemeinigkeit and the existentialist 'jargon of authenticity,' while apprdsentieren is replaced by the older Husserlian term gegenivdrtigen and the hermeneutic language of truth. Finally, whereas the variant forms of Jeweiligkeit continue to play a significant role in Heidegger's vocabulary and the term itself once again comes into the spotlight later in Heidegger's reflections on Anaximander's fragment, Apprdsentation appears only in this 1925 lecture course, and rather frequently, and then is abruptly and totally obliterated from the Heideggerian framework. What then is the significance of this brief appearance and abrupt demise? First, of course, it once again underscores the deep infiltration of Husserl's phenomenology into the very heart of Heidegger's central question on

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being and time during the years of Heidegger's confessed captivation with the Logical Investigations. This term, coined by Husserl, first appears in his Ideen //, which Heidegger first read in manuscript form in preparation for this course. In its lineage, appresentation10 can be traced back more or less directly to the terminology of apperception in the Logical Investigations, that is, to the hermeneutical theme of the interpretation that accompanies every perception, and so to the problem of categorial intuition. It is therefore no accident that appresentation is given such prominent play in a course which earlier had highlighted Husserl's key discovery of categorial intuition. Because of his own problematic of time, Heidegger was especially attuned to Husserl's reiterated point that intuition 'presents' (prdsentiert: 85—8, 90, 96—7) its object, that it 'makes present' (gegenwdrtigt: 82, 85).11 And categorial intuition introduces a double presence into perception and so raises the problem of the relations between two kinds or levels of presence. In other words, first we have the phenomenon of a double presence and then we have the problem of their relationship. Husserl first coined the more active and transitive term 'appresentation' in his Ideen II after he saw a distinction in certain experiences between a primary presence and a co-presence or 'appresence', i.e. an additional presence (Ideen II 161-9, 198). And typically, the primary given for Husserl is the simply perceived, what is given in sense intuition. This is evident in his favorite examples for appresentation: The directly seen front side of a perceived thing 'refers to' (appresents, evokes the additional presence of) the hidden back sides; the directly perceived human body 'refers to' the person. To which we might add an example more directly pertinent to categorial intuition: The perceptual assertion 'It sounds like a Mercedes diesel' indicates that a directly heard sound is taken as that of the 'make' (brand, model, category) of an unseen car (also a category). While retaining at least some semblance of both Husserl's noematic stress on appresentation and the activity of evoking a presence in phrases like 'making present' and 'letting become present,' Heidegger first takes the ontological turn and reverses the direction between founding and founded presences. As we have already seen, for Heidegger the 'primary given' is the 'inconspicuous' and 'non-objective' presence of the world, whereas both handy things and things on hand (perceived things) are founded presences (244-6). The latent world as meaningful whole now lets us encounter the things within the world, appresents things, that is, makes them present, allows them to become present (258). This is the basic sense of appresentation for Heidegger resulting from the ontological turn, accordingly the sense belonging to the 'order of being'. It is the sense in which the world is the primary presence. And yet because it is a latent presence, there is a sense in which the world can be said to be appresent. Although Heidegger never explicitly resorts to

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this Husserlian usage of appresence, an additional presence, with reference to the world, he at times suggests such a usage. The basic mode of presence of the world is its meaningfulness, upon which every entity within the world is discovered (287). Meaningfulness is therefore the way in which the world itself is encountered, present, disclosed (285). Such an encounter occurs through understanding, which is 'a more original phenomenon of being-in-the-world' (288) than meaningfulness. It is therefore 'beingin-the-world as understanding and concerned absorption' which 'appresents the world' (289, 379). Understanding taken as a mode of being can be developed through expository interpretation, which is 'the basic form of knowing' (359). We thus come to a second sense of appresentation, in the 'order of knowing' - more in keeping with Husserlian usage — and the converse of the first sense, which is in the 'order of being.' Because understanding tacitly appresents the world in appresenting the things within the world, it is now possible to attend to the appresentation of the world explicitly. This is the function of signs, those special environmental things which have referential relations expressly designed to appresent the world in various degrees. The turn signal on a car momentarily exposes, 'makes present' the network of relations needed immediately for making one's way about the world (281). Signs need not be instituted just for present concerns. There is for example a peculiar group of signs which includes sources, vestiges, documents, ruins and monuments with the distinctive function of appresenting the past, explicitly bringing the past into the present (289-91). These are but two examples of expository appresentation, generally called interpretation. It reverses the order of ontological appresentation by moving from things to their meaning, considering the things as 'something'. Interpretation always involves articulation, expression, discourse, though the as-structure need not always be expressed in linguistic form of propositions. But expressness is basically 'the appresentation of meaningfulness and of in-being in correlations and contexts of meaning' (366). It is therefore the appresentation of a world . . . and of its basis, in-being. For the two converse senses of appresenting we have discussed have a deeper and common basis, which would then be the 'primary appresenting' (347). In ontological appresentation, the world makes things present; but the world itself is appresented (made present) as meaningfulness by understanding concern. Expository appresentation makes the world and its basis present through those special environmental things called signs; but expository interpretation is simply a cultivation of an already operative understanding. And understanding concern is purely and simply 'lettingbecome-present — a remarkable kind of being which is understood only when it is seen that this making present and appresenting is nothing other than time itself (292).

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The second temporal preconcept, Jeweiligket (temporal particularity), will serve to shift time out of the present tense toward a finite sense comprehending all three tenses. The most commonly used forms of this abstract term are, significantly, ad-verbs: je, 'in each (particular) instance'; jeweils, 'at any given (particular) time'; jeweilig, 'at the (that) time.' Breaking it down into its components je-Weile, 'each while,' suggests a translation for Jeweiligkeit of 'the particular while' or more abstractly, 'temporal particularity'. Je is commonly used as a distributive universal: je zwei und zwei, 'two at a time,' 'by twos.' A favorite formulation for Dasein in this period is das Seiendey das ich je selbst bin, 'the entity which I myself am in each instance' where je raises the problem of speaking about the radically individual, an issue indigenous to the phenomenological description of personal experience. It is therefore no surprise that the term, after its initial introduction, resurfaces again only at the end of the course with the theme of death: Der Tod ist jeweilig der meine, 'Death is in each instance and in its time my own death' (429). In short, je-weilig refers to 'each whileness' with the kairotic implications of a fate: 'To each his allotted time.' The term is introduced quite early, almost simultaneously with Dasein, in a section entitled 'The Dasein is in the "to be it at its time"' (205). It was already the leading preconception in the 1924 lecture on the concept of time. A year later, temporal particularity is identified as the fundamental character of Dasein, that which governs all other characters and to which all the others refer (206). It indicates why Da-sein, 'to be there,' was coined as a technical term to replace the earlier 'factic experience of life,' which likewise reflects the situated character of human existence. Je as the intensely distributive universal applicable to each individual raises the puzzling question of the nature of what Husserl in the First Logical Investigation (§ 26) identified as 'occasional expressions,' for example, 'I,' 'here/ 'now,' in short, Da-sein. In its simplest terms, Dasein refers to 'I am,' 'you are,' 'he is,' etc., as authentic assertions of being. Dasein is quite simply 'Here I am now,' the paradigm sentence for a whole gamut of phenomenologically descriptive sentences such as 'I am my body,' which are to be understood as universal sentences about the unique experiences of each individual. But it would be a mistake to equate Jeweiligkeit (particular whileness) with Jemeinigkeit (mineness), though Heidegger in his more existentialist moments tends to promote this confusion. The 'occasion' of occasional expressions involves the speaker in his situation (ergo, 'being-in-the-world'!). Dasein applies equally, reciprocally and sometimes ambiguously to the temporally particular self. For the self is what it is only from its particular 'here and now'. From this perspective, Heidegger's thought from beginning to end can be regarded as an ontology of occasional expressions, with the emphasis on the 'how' of this temporal particularity. Here we have the classical problem of time as principium

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individuationis already broached in the 1924 lecture on time, which culminates in 1962 in Heidegger's last word for being, the singulare tantum of das Ereignis. Despite the continuity suggested by this allusion to Husserl's recognition of occasional expressions, because Heidegger makes Jeweiligkeit so central, it constitutes a radical discontinuity with Husserl. It is what Bergson would call Heidegger's 'central intuition.' Heidegger explicitly regards his endeavor as a break with the modern tradition of the 'transcendental ego,' 'pure ego,' 'consciousness in general,' 'wordless subject,' and the like (SZ229; 272). This epoche of the world and consequent inward turn as a way of gaining insight into the universality of the transcendental ego results in an I which does not exist as 'I myself.' In the sphere of immanence, each self is identical, with regard to its potential, to every other self. By contrast, Heidegger sees the individuality of the self as a situational individuality, which at bottom is a temporal individuality. Such a move from Husserl's oriented consciousness to Heidegger's situated existence amounts to what T.S. Kuhn has called a 'Gestalt switch' between incommensurable paradigms. Despite the fact that the first led to the second, the second is really incommensurable with the first, so that (to quote Jean Beaufret) 'to anyone who places himself in intentionality, the experience of ecstasis is inaccessible, just as relativity physics remains unthinkable from the point of view of Newton even though Newton already espied the principle which Einstein was destined to develop. 12 What is especially fascinating about this 1925 lecture course is that here we can witness Heidegger's central intuition slowly and haltingly taking the linguistic shape it is to assume in his masterpiece, Being and Time. We see the first in the 'formal indication' (205)13 of the most fundamental character of Dasein, of 'the entity which I myself am in each instance.' In close conjunction with the temporal particularity contained in this oft-repeated formula describing Dasein, Heidegger also highlights — probably for the first time in this purely ontological form - its active and almost muscular verbal character of'to-be' (Zu-seiri). This unique formulation is important, among other reasons, because it is destined to recede in Being and Time,l4 where it is overpowered by its much more pervasive replacement term, 'existence'. The term Zu-sein is especially important because, like temporal particularity, it is directly linked to the very choice of the term 'Dasein' to designate the entity (more precisely, the situation) which each of us is. 'I am Dasein,' literally, 'I am "to be here and now",' or, in Heidegger's more cumbersome formulation, 'I am it [Dasein] in the "to be it in each particular instance"' (206). What does this 'to be' mean? First, it should not be overlooked that my primary relation to Dasein is to be found simply in 'being it,' even if I do not expressly know about it (206), in short, even before I reflect on it. It is this pre-reflective realm of simply 'being it' to which

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we must return if we want to work out the question of being at its very source, at the point where it first emerges. This initial task of the phenomenology of Dasein (200), introduced in terms of investigating the conditions underlying the being-question, then becomes the search for the most original, and so at times pre-interrogative context of the human being, how he most basically finds himself. This ontic source of the being-question is deliberately called Dasein, for only an 'ontological' entity, an entity with a distinctive access to being, could give rise to the ontological question. The phenomenological backtrack 'to the matter itself is clearly in evidence here. And we have already seen that this always includes specifying what the matter is not. The immediate and active relationship of being that we 'in each instance' have to Dasein, this Verhdltnis which is at once a Verhalten, rules out our regarding Dasein as if it were a thing merely to be handled or apprehended. We are it, it is what is nearest to us (202), and any attempt to construe it in terms of the traditional categories of the things we are not is a misconstrual. Since we have a tendency to do just that, because of both the proximity of our Dasein and the ready availability of the traditional categories, the 'formal indication' of 'to-be' is placed front and center to safeguard us from this all-too-comrnon misdirection, while at the same time seeking to direct our attention more directly to the elusive domain which is to be investigated. Contrary to the usual categories, the very term Da-sein does not express a what but a way to be (Weise zu seiri), and so all further investigation of it is aimed at explicating its specific ways to be (later called the existentials by Heidegger):15 to be in the world, to be authentically or inauthentically, to be toward death, etc., with a decided penchant toward prepositional phrases and adverbs serving to qualify the verbal 'to be'. As the investigation proceeds, Heidegger at times (325, 341) even expresses an aversion to referring to Dasein as an entity, a term which traditionally in our vocabulary and grammar is fraught with the connotations of the substantiality of a thing. The T of Dasein is not a thing but a way to be, not a what but a who, with its connotations of orientation to a unique situation. This contrast between Dasein and a thing does not become fully apparent until the question of their wholeness - death in the case of Dasein is raised. Then it becomes dramatically clear that Dasein can only be understood in terms of open possibilities which it itself is to be, and not in terms of the finished properties of a fixed thing (429—31). Heidegger nowhere gives us a sustained explanation of how Zu-sein itself is to be understood, but the intent of this guiding presupposition is clear enough both from the nuances of the term itself and from some of the steps leading to its selection: It is to guide us in articulating the relational dynamics of the human situation, 'the basic movement of Dasein itself (354), so that we can arrive at a sense of the temporality of its being. Zu-sein not only suggests active directedness — note again the connection of Verhdltnis and

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Verhalten coupled with the suggestion that this is akin to an internal comportment - but its grammatical usage is typically one way of expressing the modals of necessity and possibility in the German. Dasein's to-be entails a having-to-be (209) and can-be (401, 422, 433, 440).18 All this is brought out gradually and sometimes only in passing in this 1925 course. To-be is identified as Dasein's resposability, 'the task . . . to be itself by way of itself' (340). Later, it is discovered that this circle of self-appropriation, 'the basic movement of Dasein itself (354), more basically revolves around its own being. In a formula destined to be repeated ad nauseam throughout Being and Time, it is now discovered (405) that Dasein is an entity which in its being 'goes about' (geht urn), revolves around, is occupied with and concerned with, has as its issue . . . this very being. Hence, the intentional or tendential character of Zu-sein can be expressed in terms of an ontological circle: 'Dasein is out for its own being in order "to be" its being . . . care is this being out for the being which this very being-out is' (407). But now the very Being of Dasein is its 'there'. The to-be of Dasein is, strictly formulated, to be its there (349-50). And the there is gradually being identified with disclosedness — at this stage discoveredness - and possibility (354—5) . . . which years later are to be brought together under the single term 'openness,' the clearing in which Dasein stands and endures, i.e. which it ex-sists. But Heidegger's thoughts on truth are clearly still in a state of flux around 1925 (349n, 444). All we have here is a clear identification of beingthere with being-possible (206, 433). 'I am' means 'I can' (412). To-be is a can-be (401, 422, 433, 440). In short, one of the main values of this lecture course is the diachronic insight it may provide into developing terminology destined to be used a year or two later in Being and Time. One final example may suffice. The highly idiomatic German word Bewandtnis is perhaps the most troublesome word confronting the translator of Heidegger. In Being and Time (H. 84), Bewandtnis is used to designate the being of handy things, which get their meaning and status from the nexus of relations in terms of which they are understood, Bewandtnis specifies the nature and quality of the ordering of such contexts in its references to entities; it specifies how things are ordered and deployed in such contexts. But in the 1925 lecture course, Bewandtnis is first used in a more generic sense, referring not only to the world of things but also to the world of the self and of the others (357).19 The example is that of understanding in an interpersonal context. Idiomatically, this sort of understanding is expressed by saying, 'I know where I'm at with you,' 'I know where [how] I stand with you.' This 'standing' of an entity in a certain context, where it stands and how things stand with it, is generically designated as Bewandtnis. It is a logos-word, referring to the order which gives something its meaning. The standing of others in relation to the self, the disposition (Befindlichkeit] of the self to itself and its world, the deployment

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(Bewandtnis^ of things in the world are all specifications of this generic sense of Bewandtnis^ of 'how matters stand/ All of this suggests that a standing is subject to qualification - the self, other and things can be well, ill or indifferently disposed - and that they can be allowed to stand ('letting them be') or be modified. But first an entity must be understood, and this is done by entering into the standing which it has in its context in order to expose how it is taken here, that is, what it is taken 'as' (359—60). Since Bewandtnis in Being and Time is restricted to the description of handy things in the 'world around us,' one could exploit the etymology of one of its dictionary translations, namely 'circum-stance'.21 But there (SZ84ff; 115ff) this state is also closely linked to its associated act of acquiescence, bewenden lassen, letting something be, letting it take its course, do its work, fill its role. Is it possible that the relationship here between this act of prepredicative positing and its resultant state bears some resemblance to Husserl's account of the intentional sequence of signifying, fulfilling and identifying? Having the tool stand 'ready to hand' in its context and so 'at our disposal' would be akin to empty signifying. Its actual use would be a fulfilment of its function. Accepting it as fitting that context, adequate to its role, suitable for its function, would be akin to the act of identification, commensuration, and accord. The state resulting from this, Bewandtnis, the final disposition of the tool and its function, its standing in the context, would be akin to Bestand, the persistence of the identity of the signified and the 'intuited,' here the manipulated. This active dimension suggests that the tool has been disposed, that is, given a bent in a specific direction, put in place in a certain order of distribution and so finalized ('disposed of). To suggest this state that results from employment and disposition we have selected 'deployment' as a translation of Bewandtnis in the contexts (231, 251) that approach its sense in Being and Time. One could go on indefinitely with the comparison of this early draft with the final published version of Being and Time. In conjunction with the concerns of a translator, I have limited myself here to some terminological comparisons. Other comparisons — for example, structural and methodological — are possible. But it should be evident from the differences in terminology already noted — appresentation, temporal particularity instead of instantiated mineness, to-be instead of existence, the inversion of disco veredness and disclosedness, the generic sense of Bewandtnis — that the prima-facie similarities of this early draft to the final form of Being and Time give way, upon closer inspection, to some no less remarkable differences. Much of this early draft underwent drastic revision and rearrangement in the final drafting of Being and Time. Only an occasional sentence or example or theme in the early version bearing a strong resemblance to those found in Being and Time testifies to the role they and their respective contexts played in leading up to that masterwork. The significance of these constancies and

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changes cannot be overestimated in a thinker who time and again has noted that his thought is via, and that this 'way' is no less important than the results to be found at any particular stage of that way. This particular lecture course and its content constitute a particularly crucial stage of that way, poised on the threshold of the breakthrough book which was to make Heidegger world-famous. It constitutes Being and Time 'in the raw,' and as such provides us with a remarkable diachronic insight into the detailed reconstruction and inner transformations of that masterpiece, a fascinating 'inside story' of the composition of that work. The significance of the differences between this early draft and the final form of Being and Time are by no means exhausted by what has been said here by way of introduction. A comparison of the text with Sein und Zeit This section-by-section comparison of the published text of the 1925 lecture course entitled Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (GZ) with the 1927 book Sein und Zeit (SZ; here the eighth edition published by Niemeyer in 1957) arises from the translator's need to check his translation of this initial draft of SZ presented in lecture format against the comparable passages to be found in that famous book, which was drafted into final form in the year following the lecture course. This schematized comparison of sections attempts to pinpoint similar sentence formulations which then provide the basis for detection of significant variations and general differences. The following tabulation is offered as an aid to the interested reader in finding his own comparison and contrasts between these two important benchmarks in Heidegger's development. Cf. the Translator's Introduction for some of the most important contrasts. Line-counting was sometimes necessary to pinpoint certain passages more precisely: thus (SZ 32/28-31 refers to Sein und Zeit, page 32, lines 28 to 31). The references below are always to the two German texts involved. GZ§1-SZ§3

Both deal with the themes of a productive logic and the role of crisis in the sciences of mathematics, physics, biology, historiology, and theology in redefining their fundamental concepts. But GZ speaks of the resultant original relationship to the subject matters of these sciences while SZ tends more toward ontological terminology in its concern for the being of their domain. GZ§9-SZ§7 A. GZ 111 and the first paragraph of A in SZ28—29 on 'phenomenon' are so close that there is almost no doubt that Heidegger used the Moser

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typescript in redrafting this passage for SZ. But the following passages distinguishing phenomenon and semblance from appearance undergo drastic revision and expansion in SZ. B. On logos: GZ 115/26—9 = SZ 32/28—31 is a good example of a sentence reworked on Heidegger's copy of the Moser typescript of GZ for use in SZ. But several sentences later, the two texts diverge considerably: GZ emphasizes the semantic 'signifying' function of logos while SZ dwells on its truth function. C. GZ 119 = SZ36 manifests very strong parallels on the three modes of covering up. But the detailed account of phenomenology as ontology and hermeneutics is to be found only in SZ. The concluding paragraph of this section of SZ on the inelegance of the language of being receives an earlier formulation in GZ 203—4, shortly before Heidegger cites 'to-be' as the basic character of Dasein. G Z § 1 3 e & f-SZ§ 10

Similarities occur mainly in the texts cited from Scheler (GZ 175—6 = SZ47—8) and on the conception of man in Christianity (GZ 181 = SZ49). GZ§§15-17-SZ§2 The discussion of the formal structure of the being-question is drastically revised and compressed in SZ, with only an occasional sentence similar to GZ. But the terminology is clearly the same. GZ§19-SZ§12

There are many comparable sentences here, but the distinction between inbeing and being-in is more sharply drawn in GZ, and SZ adds the discussion of the distinction between the ontological-existential and the ontologicalcategorial. GZ§20-SZ§13

GZ215—17, 219—22 bears a close sentential relationship to this section of SZ, but the four stages leading from being-involved-with things to knowledge are more clearly articulated and related to intentionality in GZ. This section of GZ also includes discussions of the pseudo-problems of epistemology, as in idealism and realism, the priority of love and hate to knowledge (cf. SZ 139n), and the example of a snail in its shell.

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GZ§21-SZ§14

Each of these sections introduces the theme of worldhood, but how different they are! The term 'ontic' on GZ226 is an addition which post-dates the lecture course; thus SZ more clearly distinguishes the ontic sense of the world as the wherein and its ontological sense as worldhood. The 'worldthing' in GZ becomes the 'innerworldly entity' in SZ; 'wordly' then no longer applies to things in the world but only to Dasein (cf. SZ65).

GZ§22-SZ§20

This section of GZ contains all of the Latin quotations from Descartes's Principles and a commentary similar to that in SZ § 20, along with texts comparable to portions of SZ § 19 (GZ 237-40, 243) and SZ§21 (GZ 241-3).

GZ§23a-SZ§16

Rough parallels in the discussion of breakdowns in serviceability when a tool becomes conspicuous, obstructive, or missing. The question under consideration here is how the world shows itself in everyday concern, but in GZ this is stated in terms of how it presents itself and is present, while SZ asks how the world 'is given' (gibt es), through the disturbance of its normal but tacit referential relations, which are already there beforehand. In this conjunction, SZalso discusses the 'in-itself character of the handy, while GZ develops this only in the following section, after introducing the technical term 'handiness' for the first time in this section (GZ256). In contrast to SZ, this and the following sections of GZ are dominated by the language of presence: how, through disturbance, things become present in an emphatic sense and so bring out the hitherto pale and inconspicuous presence of the world. The Husserlian term 'appresentation' is introduced in the very next section, significantly in the argument against the primacy of the 'bodily presence' of perceived things, and the distinction between handy things and things on hand is first introduced as a distinction of two different modes of presence (GZ258).

GZ§23b-SZ§15 A number of striking examples in this discussion of the structure of the work-world and its relation to the public world and the world of nature

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are carried over from GZ into SZ: GZ 260/21-28 - SZ 70/5-10; GZ260/ 28—35 = SZ 70/37 to 71/3 (custom-made vs. mass-produced goods); GZ26l/8-9 = SZ71/6-7 (relation to the public world); GZ 261/34 to 262/21 = SZ 70/13-25 (relation to materials from nature); GZ 262/32-5 = SZ 71/15—18 (use of the sun and the astronomical order in clock time); GZ 269/25—32 = SZ 71/10—15 (nature's presence in a covered railway platform and public lighting). GZ§23e7-SZ§17

Here we find fairly similar discussions of the nature of signs with some comparable passages (GZ 279/4—9 — SZ 77/23—6) and most of the same examples: the auto turn-signal (GZ 279 = SZ 78), the south wind as a sign of rain (GZ 281 = SZ 80), the knot in the handkerchief (GZ 283 = SZ 81) and fetishism and magic (GZ284 — SZ 81-2). But the stated aim of GZ here is to clarify meaningfulness while that of SZ is to clarify reference, and GZ maintains the distinction between sign-taking and sign-production much more overtly. GZ§24e-SZ§43(b)

There are two different analyses of Dilthey's article on the experience of reality through resistance while the analysis of Scheler's article on the same subject is presented in similar terms, as is the final assessment of the phenomenon of resistance in the context of already being in the world. Parallels to the concluding remarks on realism and idealism in this subsection of GZ (305-6; cf. also GZ 225 on Avenarius) can be found in a more elaborated and more Kantian context in the preceding subsection of GZ (207—8). GZ§25b-SZ§23

Once again, the examples serve to orient us to the parallels between these two discussions of the distinction between the space of concern and objective space: How use is made of the sun and sky in orienting Dasein and spatializing world-regions (GZ 314-15 = SZ 103-4); the measures of a cgood walk' and 'a stone's throw' (GZ 316-17 = SZ 105-6); the remoteness of glasses on the nose compared to an approaching friend (GZ318 = SZ 107); the right and left of the oriented body (GZ 319—20 = SZ 108—9) and the argument against Kant's 'feeling for right and left' (GZ 320-2 = SZ 109-10). GZ is more directly concerned with the relation of this spatiality to time, especially the present.

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GZ§26a-SZ§26

These introductions to the theme of being-with differ significantly in their formulations except for a few sentences which approach literal sameness (GZ 328/2-6 = SZ 120/23-6; GZ 328/19-22 = SZ 120/31-4). In content, GZ does not mention solicitude while SZdoes not speak of appresentation and is far richer in detail here. GZ§26b-SZ§27

The opening pages of these two treatments of das Man contain many comparable and sometimes identical sentences (GZ336—41 = SZ 126-8) but then the texts diverge somewhat: GZ speaks against the tendency to substantify the to-be of Dasein into an ego, say, and interjects the discussion of Humboldt's theory of the spatial origins of personal pronouns (GZ 343-4 = SZ 119-20), while SZ introduces the 'they-self' (the Anyoneself) in its distinction from the authentic-self. GZ§28d7, §29a-SZ§35

Although GZ § 28 deals with disposition, understanding, and discourse, central themes in SZ (§§ 29—34), it is not until we reach the end of this section and the topic of 'idle talk' that we encounter sentences bearing a strong resemblance to SZ (cf. esp. GZ 372/16-22 = SZ 169/7—13). Suggesting how Heidegger's changing insight into truth as disclosure resulted in a drastic revision and expansion of these topics. This is indicated by the next comparable passages (GZ 377/13— 21 = SZ 169/18-25), also on idle talk, where SZ replaces Verdecken (covering up) with Verschliessen (closing off). GZ§29b-SZ§36

Here we find a large number of comparable passages on curiosity which undergo reshuffling in SZ. GZ§29c-SZ§37

After the first two paragraphs, GZ parallels SZ on the topic of ambiguity. But the remarks on pseudo-friendship are found only in GZ and the concluding metaphor of a whirlwind to describe the movement of falling is developed in the following section of SZ (178—9).

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GZ§29d-e-SZ§38

GZ presents a highly schematized version of this discussion of falling compared to SZ. But the relation of this movement to 'thrownness' is found only in SZ, where this dynamic metaphor for facticity is first introduced, and its relation to the dynamics of Hang und Drang (propensity and urge) is not mentioned in SZ.

GZ§30a-SZ§30

This account of fear is much more interspersed by historical references, especially to Aristotle's Rhetoric, in GZ than in SZ, which is much more a pure eidetic description. Although the term of the analysis are essentially the same in both accounts, the sentential formulation differs except for a few scattered passages such as GZ397—8 (= SZ 142/17—22), which however is immediately exemplified by a war experience not found in SZ.

GZ§30b-SZ§30

The same textual remarks apply to the sentence structure of the sections on dread. Some significant thematic differences: GZ (403) identifies dread as a pure 'affection of being as such' and SZ (187—9) emphasizes the radically individualizing nature of dread.

GZ§31-SZ§41

Although the formal definition of care is essentially the same in both, this theme is far more richly developed both methodologically and terminologically in SZ. But the division of this section in GZ into six subsections is helpful in understanding this complex phenomenon better. Subsection b on urge and propensity comes closest to the sentence structure of SZ (195-6) regarding these themes. Subsection e on the Fable of Cura is paralleled in SZ § 42. The problem of retrieving intentionality in the context of care raised in subsection fis a central issue resulting from this lecture course; the problem itself is constantly reiterated in the formulas for the various aspects of care: being out for, ahead of, already involved in. Subsection d is perhaps the clearest statement by Heidegger on the inevitable hermeneutic procedure of projective anticipation, of a 'before' which is placed 'ahead,' for an entity whose being is care.

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GZ§33-SZ§47

The theme of death undergoes considerable revision and expansion in the path from GZ to SZ, but an occasional sentence or passage in the first is mirrored in the second: cf. GZ 427/22-4 = SZ 238/1-3; GZ 428/34 to 429/11=SZ 240/3-12. GZ§34a-SZ§51

The best example of parallel sentences here is GZ 436/26—8 = SZ254/ 10—12. But the theme of sum moribundus is unique to GZ (437—8). The original article was followed by a bilingual index, which appears here as Appendix 1.

CHAPTER 3

The New Translation of Sein und Zeit: A Grammatological Lexicographer's Commentary After years of complaining about Macquarrie and Robinson's (= M&R) English translation of Heidegger's opus magnum, Sein undZeit(1927), which we teachers of Heidegger have endeavored to explicate to our unteutonized students both graduate and undergraduate for over three decades, we now have a new English rendition of the German text from Joan Stambaugh, 'one of Heidegger's students and leading interpreters, [who] takes account of English-language Heidegger research since the first translation of Being and Time in 1962.' The publisher's flyer (from the book's backcover) continues and concludes: The Stambaugh translation captures the vital relation to language that animates Heidegger's original text. Through this translation elements of Being and Time that were not so clearly evident hitherto should become more apparent to readers of the English text. The new translation of key notions here should serve as the standard for Heidegger studies to come. The all too brief'Translator's Preface,' while praising M&R for being cat the forefront of bringing Heidegger's work into English' such that their translation 'came to shape the way in which Heidegger's work was discussed in English,' likewise observes that 'the present translation attempts to take into account the insights of the past thirty years of Heidegger scholarship in English' (xiv). But it at once notes that the newly published translation 'was begun some time ago,' in point of fact before Heidegger's death in 1976, such that we have had Joan Stambaugh's translation of the two Introductions, as edited by David Krell, in the collection of Basic Writings since 1977. Permission for it was granted by Heidegger himself along with the 'express wish' that the now English word and central topic of the book, 'Da-sein,' be hyphenated throughout the new translation. He at the same time graciously gave the translator the hand-written poem on the grace of thought that now graces the frontcover of this translation. The unteutonized reader, however, is

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left bereft of the benefit of a transcription of Heidegger's difficult 'alte deustche script, let alone a translation of the poem. The full translation of the book was completed in the early 1980s and is thereby dated, having circulated in manuscript form for well over a decade. It therefore cannot claim to have taken the full measure of'the insights of the past thirty years of Heidegger scholarship in English,' despite the valiant latter-day efforts of the SUNY editors to update it. The 'new' translation of key notions, which in some cases are left unexplained and unjustified, leaving one with the impression of unilateral wilfulness, should by and large not be made to 'serve as the standard for Heidegger studies to come.' Instead, the hope expressed in the Preface to 'open a productive debate about some of the more original and still puzzling language of the text' should be given the freest play. This is a scholar's experiment in translation, and is thereby restricted in its scope for circulation among other interested scholars, not yet sufficiently polished and equipped for use in the undergraduate classroom. The translator's hope to 'remedy some of the infelicities and errors of the previous translation' (xiv) is only occasionally and imperfectly met, in some cases in fact repeating its errors verbatim, indicating the degree to which the translator herself is obligated to the 'first cut' made by M&R to decipher Heidegger's idiosyncratic syntax and style in rendering this ground-breaking book into English. Not that the new translation followed the old in any diligent and thoroughgoing fashion. Would that this were so. Repeated comparison of the two together, against the original Niemeyer edition,1 is in fact one good way of uncovering the plethora of minor errors and omissions that have somehow been 'left' in or 'crept' into the new translation and, along the way, of acquiring a profound appreciation for the scholarly accuracy of M&R's rendition. Instead of complaining about it, we may well look back at M&R with nostalgia, and renewed gratitude. The opening pages show promise in the verve and simplicity of many of the sentences, raising the hope that this will be the more readable literary translation needed to offset the more literal and scholarly translation by M&R. M&R did their work in a 'hermeneutic situation' in which Sein undZeitwas widely regarded as 'untranslatable'. 'We feel that this is an exaggeration,' they remark tongue-in-cheek in their Preface of 1962. Nevertheless, this then prevalent attitude served to intimidate M&R into a careful attempt to convey as many of the nuances of the multivalent German text as possible into English, often resulting in cumbersome and highly involuted English sentences freighted with an excess of qualifying phrases and clauses. Their careful efforts toward nuanced accuracy are recorded in their many scholarly notes, reflecting their struggle to capture Heidegger's idiosyncratic usage often by verbatim citation of the entire German passage in question. This at least has prompted a whole generation of serious English students of Being and Time to learn the German language in order to understand Heidegger better.

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The new translation, by contrast, is notable for its paucity of Translator's Notes, even where clarification of the translator's terminological decisions would have been instructive to the untutored English reader. But the Translator's Preface from the start rightly notes the 'strong connections' of Heidegger's German to everyday conversation and ordinary usage, apparently setting for itself the laudable norm of trying to capture these connections in equally ordinary English idiom. A glance at the German text reveals that, at least in the less methodological sections of the book, the vast majority of the sentences are structured simply and relatively straightforwardly. The only oddity, which made Sein und Zeit difficult to read even for its first German readers, is the massive relocation of entire prepositional phrases, like beingin-the-world and being-with-one-another, into the position of common nouns, the proliferation of verbal nouns ranging from the infinitive 'to be' and the gerundive 'beings' to abstract coinages of nominalized verbs like Befindlichkeit, the state of finding oneself, and the related penchant for turning common adverbs like 'really' (eigentlich) into abstract nouns. One soon learned that such 'gramma(on)tologicar shifts were part of a grand design to replace the traditional nominal ontology of substance and subject with a verbal ontology of time in its tenses and variable aspects (SZ 349; 400—1), and in the linguistic frames of reference that 'it' develops. But the opportunity to 'capture the vital relation to language that animates Heidegger's original text' is time and again missed in this translation. We see this already in the early pages, which fail to note that such an overtly linguistic ontology of the verb dictates, e.g., that environmental habits of work more accurately develop under the jurisdiction of the present perfect apriori (SZ85; 117), and which fail to translate the difference between the Zeitlichkeit des Daseins and Temporalitdt des Seins that proliferates in the Second Introduction (SZ 19, 23-6, 39-40, 147; 40, 44-9, 63-4, 187), not even by way of the capitalizing convention of '[T]emporality' adopted by M&R and Albert Hofstadter. Temporalitdt, with its allusion to the German word for grammatical tense(s) (Tempus, Tempora), refers accordingly to the 'tensorality' of being. In the months prior to the development of the special categories called Existenzialien in the final drafting of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger considered calling them 'tensors' (Temp or alien). Time in its most proper sense, originative temporality, the time appropriate(d) to each of us, is identified from the start as the ultimate source of the 'radical individuation' (SZ38; 62: now reinforced by the later marginal footnote) that Da-sein itself is, which is itself, in 'formal indication,' first introduced as 'in each instance mine (je meines: SZ41, 114; 65, 150). 'The being which is given over to us for analysis is in each instantiation we ourselves [wir je selbst}' There is a tendency even in M&R, who first called our attention to the pivotal centrality of this easy-to-ignore high-frequency German particle, je (in each particular case), and its adverbial variants, jeweils

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(each occasion, literally 'each while') andjeweilig (at this particular time), to drop these particles in translation, usually to avoid further burdening already overloaded English sentences. Yet these particles are crucial in reminding us of the 'occasional' or 'indexical' nature of Da-sein, being here-now-I in this situational context, and therefore of the kind of categories its 'existentials' are intended to be. They are intended to be distributive universals that vary essentially according to each individuating context, 'je nach dem? and not generic universals that apply indifferently to all. On this 'onto-logic' of universals so crucial to a 'hermeneutics of facticity,' Heidegger repeatedly acknowledges his debt to Aristotle (SZ3, 14, 32n; 22-3, 34, 489), who first noted that 'being is not a genus' and proceeded to explore the logic of variation of its analogical universality. This easily blurred distinction between the temporally particularizing universal (jeweiliges Universal) of the 'each' that Da-sein itself is and the indifferent generality of the 'all' of the Anyone (Heidegger's most existentiell example will be Ivan Ilyitch's 'all men are mortal': SZ254n; 495n) is just another subtle but crucial Vital relation to language that animates Heidegger's original text' that is being lost by translating^ typically as 'always' zn&jeweiligijeweils as 'actual(ly),' the latter only vaguely recalling the individuating urgency intended by these words. The blurring of this distinction and of its individuating thrust is felt especially in the chapter that 'attests' the fundamental authenticating action of beinghere, that of'owning up' to one's own unique situation in its full propriety by way of the resolute response to the call of conscience (esp. SZ276, 280, 284,84, 297-300; 321, 325, 329-30, 343-8). For the 'call' does not exact an ideal and general task from a species-individual, but 'the currently pressing individualized potential-to-be of the temporally particular human situation, being-here' (SZ 280; 325). The existentialistic tendency of this 'new' translation would in fact have been further promoted not only by adopting the more verbally muscular and futuristically active 'potential to be' for Seinkonnen, at least as a variant for the flat and philosophically stuffy 'potentiality of being,' but also an occasional use of 'owned' and 'disowned' in lieu of the jargonish '(in)authentic' for (un)eigentlich, all of which would have been very much in keeping with the formally indicative methodology of Sein und Zeit, designed in particular to develop the relational dynamics as well as an individuating vocabulary for the unique human situation of being-here. Leaving Angst in the German, even though 'angst' has been in the English dictionaries since the 1960s, only serves to call further attention to the existentialist ontics stressed by this translation. The translation of Befindlichkeit as 'attunement' follows this ontic vein, and therefore conflates with Gestimmtheit, likewise the 'attunement' originating from a mood (Stimmung). 'Attunement' of course is far superior to the psychologically tinged 'state of mind,' by far the worst blunder made in M&R translation. Stambaugh rejects, likewise for its suggestion of

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psychological connotations (p.xv), Heidegger's Aristotelian understanding of Befindlichkeit&s a translation ofSiaOecn^, 'worldly disposition,' which, 'as the word suggests, must be a kind of position' (Metaph. V.I9, 1022B2). Befindlichkeit fully translated refers to how one 'finds oneself disposed,' situated, positioned in and by the world. To mute its psychological connotations further, one need only to translate it with its all important 'present perfect' suffix made fully explicit in the English, ergo as 'disposedness,' which brings it into close proximity with the equiprimordial 'present perfect' states of disclosedness, disco veredness, thrownness, fallenness, and resoluteness, as Heidegger himself gradually begins to prefigure, in this careful choice of word-endings, the full panoply of his temporal ontology. In Heidegger's 'formal indication' in first introducing the term, disposedness is the existential-ontological expression of the existentiell-ontic attunement of mood (SZ 134; 172—3). Having a mood may be psychological, but being had by one's situation, being-put-upon by the world ('The world gets to me [geht mich an]': SZ 137-9; 176-9), constantly being moved by the 'happening' of life's contexts into 'be-having' in one way or another, is its worldly and ontological counterpart. The middle-voiced reflexive verb, 'finding oneself,' is clearly being pushed formally to the outer limits of its receptive and passive passional past of already 'having found oneself and 'having been found (out),' thrown, already acted upon, determined, disposed. Global Sichbefinden is regarded as the already intentionally structured, spatiotemporally schematized, holistic finding that 'befalls' us, as opposed to the findings of Empfinden, 'sensing,' which in the Kantian framework is at first multiple, unstructured, chaotic, and random (SZ 137; 176). This holistic fact of already being-in-the-world, as in a meaningful context, thus grounds the parallel distinction between facticity and factuality (SZ 135; 174). Heidegger early in his development 'regionalized' the world into the Selbstwelt, Mitwelt, and Umwelt, and eventually assigned a kind of care proper to the human activity in each world, Sorge (care), Fiirsorge (concern), and Besorgen (taking care). In departing from M&R's triad of care, solicitude, and concern that many had become comfortably used to, Joan Stambaugh in fact also introduces (without commenting on it, p. xv) the first of several double translations that alternate between two verbally unrelated options for the same German word, in this case Besorgen as a 'taking care' of things and as 'needfulness' (i.e. carefulness). The latter translation is introduced in part in order to 'take care of the high-frequency adjectival use of the term, such as in besorgendes Aufgehen, 'heedful absorption' (SZ72; 102), besorgender Umgang, 'heedful association' (SZ73, 79, 103, 352, 355, 357, 361; 103, 110, 136, 403, 406-7, 408-9), besorgende Umsicht, 'heedful circumspection' (SZ83, 111), and besorgende Alltdglichkeit, 'heedful everydayness' (SZ 106; 140). In addition to the confusion thereby created by all such disparately double translations, especially for the present TV generation's none too

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attentive crop of readers, one wonders why the more consistent adjective, 'caretaking,' or even 'careful/ would not have sufficed. The phrase 'taking care of in frequent gerundive-like clauses yields a plethora of inelegant cumbersome sentences (e.g. SZ111; 145). Even the economical German phrase 'Im umiveltlich Besorgteri becomes 'In what is taken care of in the surrounding world' (SZ 126; 163), doubling the length of the English sentence. But if we adopt M&R's adjectival 'environmental' for umweltlich along with their site for 'concern,' we get an economical sentence that is both idiomatic and to the point: 'In environmental matters of concern, the others are encountered as what they are; they are what they do': Where the nonreifying 'matters' quite accurately refers to chores and everyday affairs and not to 'things at hand taken care of,' an awkwardness at once inaccurate in its reification that occurs frequently in the new translation, at least in misleading nuance. In the many decisions involved in retranslating a great work, Heidegger's Swabian maxim of advice drawn from the idiom of habitual everyday concerns, 'lassen es bewenden? suggests a pragmatic English equivalent: 'If it ain't broke, don't fix it.' But once one has taken this line of translating the terms of care, the newly fashionable gerund 'caregiving' suggests itself as a more consequent translation for expressing the solicitude/concern for others, Fursorge, and its distinction and connection to the other two kinds of caring. 'Concern' likewise reappears in the translation of Heidegger's oft-repeated formal indication for the understanding-0/^being, that 'Da-sein is a being which in its being "is concerned about" [geht um — goes about] this very being' (SZ 12, etpassim-, 32), a decided improvement over M&R's 'is an issue for.' But when the key phrase is alternately translated as 'is concerned with' in certain contexts, it can be easily confused with the concern that accompanies beingwith-others (e.g. SZ123; 160). In these same contexts, we also repeatedly encounter the untranslated German word Mitda-sein, ugly even by German standards, retained in the English translation as a sort of English neologism. M&R translated it as Dasein-with, and I would suggest 'associate(d) Da-sein,' were it not for the following new confusion. Regionalization is subtly transgressed with the translation of Umgang, which in Being and Time refers strictly to the commerce of 'getting around' with useful things in 'getting about' their surrounding world (Umwelt, M&R's 'environment'), as 'association,' in view of this word's misleading etymological reference to the social. Translated as 'dealings' by M&R, Um-gang (going-around) is perhaps most etymologically translated as 'intercourse,' naturally suggesting (perhaps only to some) the wrong sort of intimacy in 'being close to' (Sein bet) things. 'Interaction' would probably be the most neutral way of expressing our active relations with things. Given the familiarly habitual 'absorption' to which such busyness tends, I have translated such active relations with the less erotically intimate '(pre)occupation' with things,

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which is not too far off in view of the equation of Umgang with the Greek sense of praxis, 'having to do with things [pragmata]' (SZ68; 96). The pragmatist Rorty has suggested 'coping.' The pragmatic world of working with things brings us the distinction of two types of things, Zuhandenes and Vorhandenes, M&R's readyto-hand and present-at-hand, in Stambaugh's translation, thing at hand and objectively present thing. Adding 'objective' to the usual 'presence' of Vorhandenheit is an over-interpretation, too narrow in view of the repeated reference of this term to the background presence of'nature' and to traditional ontological terms like reality, substance, subsistence, and subject, not to speak of the loss of the 'hand' in the translation. But one needs some way of distinguishing this sort of presence from other sorts, \faeAnwesenheit, Prdsenz, Gegenwart, etc. 'Extant presence' is accurate, perhaps even pleonastic, if we can allow ourselves to speak of 'extant/)/ present things.' Zuhandenheitis consistently translated as 'handiness,' but its 'thing' is only 'at hand' (Zuhandenes), thus presumably not yet 'handy.' The being of the handy (of something ready-to-hand [M&R], of things at hand [JS]), its ontological structure, said to lie between two other structures, that of reference and that of significance, is dramatically and elaborately identified by the highly idiomaticized German word from the Swabian dialect, Bewandtnis (involvement [M&R], relevance QS], functionality [Hofstadter], appliance [TK]), perhaps the most difficult German term in Sein undZeitht the translator of any language. The French translations stress the sheer conjuncture of relations either in their fittingness or their 'destination,' i.e. the fulfilment of their purpose and coming to a closure. The modern Greek highlights simply their intertwining into a nexus, sumplexis. Bewandtnis is a category that is located between reference and significance, but is closer to the references of the mediating 'in order to,' while significance, the full meaningfulness of the totality called the world, comes only with the final closure of 'for the sake of Da-sein,' making the latter an existential rather than a category (SZ84, 88; 116, 121-2). The references of 'in order to' (listed seriatim on SZ68, 83; 97, 114) include manipulability (= handiness, Handlichkeit), conduciveness (e.g. the beneficial aids of accessories), detrimentality (preventive measures that ward off harmful effects like corrosion), serviceability (e.g. easily repaired), and usability. The last (Verwendbarkeit— applicability) is etymologically connected with Bewandtnis and Bewenden, whose older Swabian usages include 'application' and 'use' (anwend-eri). We therefore choose to translate Bewandtnis as 'appliance,' understanding it as the present perfect state of having-been-applied of an accustomed usage and practice, which continues to be applicable (effective) only if we repeatedly let it be normative and allow it to ply its course to term (Bewendenlassen). The translation 'ap(t)pliance' is also intended to suggest, from its variant stem-senses, some of the other kinds of reference

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of 'in order to' that it includes: pliancy (workability, adaptability, suppliance), compliance (fittingness, suitability), impliance or implication (more of a hermeneutical connective than M&R's 'involvement'). Between generic reference and significance there is appliance, the being of the handy and the ontological structure of the surrounding world in which we get around with the handy and with which we are preoccupied. But the test of any translation of this term is its illuminating fit into the particular prepositional nexus that it is supposed to interconnect and weave into a world. Three slightly different prepositional idioms are intercalated here: The generic reference (1) ^something to something (SZ 68; 97), say, 0/"a hammer to hammering, becomes, i Heidegger's oft repeated idiomatic expression, 'Mit etwas hat es seine Bewandtnis beim etwas' (SZ84; 116), (2), 'There is with this hammer its appliance to [or implication in] hammering.' That is to say, an intimate habitual 'with' expresses its implication outwardly to hammer in hammering, likewise understood in the familiar prepositions of habitual human agency. In the closely related third prepositional nexus of strict 'in order to,' in which we say that the handy hammer is (3) for hammering, it is clear that 'the to-what [nexus 2 above] of appliance is [correlative to] the for-what [nexus 3] of serviceability, the wherefore of usability' (SZ84; 116). Accordingly, a whole referent-ial chain of the noetic 'with ... in, to' (nexus of intimately habitual human applying), or the noematic 'in-order-to . . . for' (nexus of appl/Wtool handiness), where the same action within the series turns from being the to of an inter-mediate end 'into' the following with of means, can now come to its terminating end of closure: The for-what of serviceability can in turn have its appliance. For example, with this handy thing which we accordingly call a hammer, there is its impliance in hammering, with hammering there is its impliance in nailing fast, and with this fastening together its appliance to protection against bad weather; this protection 'is' for-the-sake-of providing shelter to Dasein. ... The implicative totality of appliance itself [thus] ultimately leads back to a for-what which no longer has an appliance, which itself is not a being with the kind of being proper to something handy within a world. It is rather a being whose being is defined as being-/w-the-world, to whose constitution worldliness itself belongs. The primary for-what is not just one more 'for that' as a possible to-what of another appliance. The primary 'for-what' is a for-the-sake-of-which. But the 'for-the-sake-ofwhich' always refers to the being of Da-sein which in its being goes about this being itself. (SZ84; 116-7) I have translated this crucial passage from § 18 on 'Appliance and Significance' at length, in part to illustrate the care that must be taken in translating the defining complex of prepositions which set the tone that pervades each frame

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of reference, which is not sustained with any kind of consistency and clarity in the Stambaugh translation (SZ84-7, 353f; 115-21; 404f). But, more importantly, this phenomeno-logical description of human actions in their orienting frames of reference has just made its crucial (Aristotelian) distinction between two radically different types of action and frames of reference, (1) the instrumental action of appliance referring externally to things of use, and (2) the ^^referential action for the sake of its own being of properly human being that is the ultimate ground, reason, or 'significance' of instrumental reference. This properly human frame of self-reference, the self-wo rid (worldliness as such), grounds and anchors the surrounding world of getting around and getting by with things. With the emergence of this basic distinction in frames of reference, one begins to see the inadequacy of the translation of Bewandtnis with the overly generic 'relevance/ a word that is equally synonymous with 'significance' as well as with 'applicability,' and is not all that distinct from the generic term 'reference.' The blurring of the crucial distinction in reference by such a generic translation is most evident in statements like the following: 'The referential connection of significance is anchored in the being of Da-sein toward its ownmost being — a being with which there essentially cannot be a relation of relevance [appliance, functionality] — but which is rather the being for the sake of which Da-sein itself is as it is' (SZ 123; 160). Its own being clearly is of acute relevance to an intrinsically self-referential being, which 'in its being goes about [geht um — is concerned with] this very being' (Heidegger's repeated formal formula for the understanding-of-being that Da-sein itself is: SZ12, 42, 84; 32, 67, 117). But this very same being (Sein) cannot itself directly assume the character of appliance referring to things in such a way that would disengage and put out of play the self-reference that it essentially is, a self-reference which in fact is the very basis for encountering beings of the character of appliance at all. 'Da-sein in each instance always already refers itself from and by way of a for-the-sake-of-which to the with-which of an appliance' (SZ 86; 118—19). To put it another way: appliance is the middle ground of instrumental intentionality, the present-perfect milieu of usance where the noematic applied and noetic applying meet, and only the latter properly refers back to the self-reference of significance. This self-referential understanding introduces the most central nounprepositional phrase of Sein und Zeit, das Woraufhin, the very sense or meaning of Da-sein, destined to find its place at the very root of originative temporality. JS by and large adopts, though not without inconsistency (SZ85f; 117f=fbr which), the M&R translation of this key phrase, 'the upon-which.' But such a translation is only half-right, in view of the essentially 'circular' and initially teleological character of the self-referential and double-genitive understanding-0/being, whose pre-suppositional forestructure is at once before and forward, already and ahead. The full,

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temporally 'circular' translation would therefore be (in a crucial sentence first introducing the hermeneutic circle) that 'sense' (more directional than 'meaning') 'is the toward-which of the projection structured by prepossession, preview, and preconception, according-to-which something becomes understandable as something' (SZ 151; 193). One does not need, of course, to cite the full circularity of das Woraufhin, 'the toward-which-according-towhich,' in every context. The 'upon-which' or 'according-to-which' would suffice in less futuristic contexts where the present perfect suffixes of worldliness in its meaning/illness (= significance) prevail, as well as in the habitual referential contexts of appliance and their ultimate significance. But one should at least on occasion be reminded of the full and 'comprehensive' temporality of sense incorporated in das Woraufhin. With this climactic prepositional phrase at the heart of the movement of the meaning of Da-sein, one hopefully begins to sense the importance of trying to get the vectorial (spatiotemporal) sense of ordinary prepositional phrases as right as possible, which as the most idiomatic 'parts of speech' in any language (some, like Hungarian, only have postpositions!) are most resistant to facile one-to-one translation. One must nevertheless strive to translate each distinctive prepositional constellation into one's own idiom in a way that would capture its specific tonality (e.g. the intimacy of bet) and maximize its prefiguration of the sense-structures of reference, those of space as well as of time. As Heidegger explicitly notes (SZ 112; 146-7), the usance of appliance/functionality first defines the lived spatiality of the 'around' (das Urn) of the handy within the surrounding world (Umwelt) in which we get around (umhergehen) and make our rounds (herumgeheri) in a daily circulation 'in order to' (um-zu) carry out our habitual chores. JS's 'together with' for 'Sein-bei-mnerworldly beings' at the very heart of care's structure is an improvement over M&R's 'alongside,' but 'among, amidst,' or best of all 'close to,' would have better conveyed the note of intimate familiarity contained in bei. After all, handiness is first of all the quality of the ready to hand; it refers to something near at hand proliferating around us, accessible to the hand at its convenience, optimally in the right place as well as at the right time. In the end, the 'substantial being' of the things in place is being 'volatized' (SZ 87, 117; 120—1, 153), they 'evaporate' into a subtle spatiotemporal constellation of active habitual relations and the overall tonality of the actions within it. Bewandtnis is a term that suggests two interrelated insubstantial ontological traits, one structural and the other elemental in nature: (1) a conjuncture of available relations, the operative 'means' (Verhdltnisse) that provision a working milieu, its specifiable working conditions, the 'lay' (Lage, Gelegenheit) of a particular 'land,' place, or situation; (2) the imponderable atmosphere that pervades such a state of affairs, the aura radiated by the milieu, the 'air' about it, its felt quality, the mood of a relationship or an environment. The conservative sense of comfort in the

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intimately familiar and the feeling of ease and convenience of already extant conventions are the overtones suggesting themselves in the German idiom of acceptance of the status quo often repeated by Heidegger in this context, 'lassen es bewenden: Let the implications [of familiar appliance] apply/ let the accustomed practice continue. 'Letting something (things) be relevant, in relevance' (SZ84-7, 11 Of, 353-6; 115-21, I44f, 404-8) is wrong also for its appearance of reinstating the substantial 'things,' that can and should be left Volatized' in this reference to the pure network of applicable references, to the background hermeneutic context of the 'referential (appliant) totality of implications.' Thus, Bewandtnis is at once an order concept and a style concept, depicting the overall style or tenor of a set of actions in a practical setting that necessarily shapes the practice. It is an active practical counterpart for the environing world to the more receptive Befindlichkeit structuring the self-wo rid, the disposedness to the world ordered by the moods that it elicits. It is also the very first of a line of concepts that the later Heidegger will gather under the pre-Socratic Greek rubric of ethos, which is first the spirit that haunts a dwelling, its genius loci, then the transmitted custom, practice, usage that structures our current dwelling; in short, the habit of a habitat, how it is inhabited. The tenor of usage in the 'homey' Swabian workplace conveyed by its nexus of 'appliance' ('relevance' is too genetically neutral to suggest a style or mood, but 'functionality' has American pragmatic possibilities) will have to be compared with the style and working conditions that Heidegger discovers in the essence of modern technology, which he characterizes with the deliberately artificial word, Ge-Stell, the artefactic compositing of planetary resources that repositions the world into a global warehouse to hold its 'natural' resources in standing reserve. The atmosphere of efficiency and efficacy pervading a workplace furnished with a planetary reserve instead of a simpler and more local ready-to-hand, how its furnishings are tuned and geared up ('treated') to prepare them for the work they are to perform in each context, how workers are outfitted and trained for their 'craft' or function, take on a distinctively different tenor and ethos in the two extremes of a medieval workshop/farmstead ensconced in the domesticity of guild custom and a modern laboratory in its innovative experimentation, each creating its own unique working 'environ-ment' and 'atmo-sphere.' Recognizing the signal importance of the 'ethical' tonality of its most basic structural terms forces the knowledgeable translator of Sein und Zeit to take far more care in choosing just the right constellation of words from one's native idiom in its current usage in order, within such groupings of terms, to convey a more consistent and nuanced balance in their ineluctable overtones, especially between the two extremes of generic neutrality and overly specific ontic connotations. Heidegger himself testifies to the inescapable ontic roots of his formal ontology of the pro to-practical human situation (SZ 310; 358

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while at the same time seeking to establish just the right balance between the formal and the concrete in the indexical universals that articulate our beinghere-now-we at its most rudimentary level of being. How well he succeeds poses perhaps its greatest challenge for the translator to bring out, especially in the one arena that he does not develop to its full formality in Being and Time, the ethos of social custom and cultural praxis to be found at the primal ontological level of simply being-with-one-another in the with-world. The closest he comes to articul-ating the quality of this relationship equiprimordial with the anxious aura of norma-tive (= authentic) praxis in the self-world (Division Two on resolute responsiveness to the deep demands evoked by my unique situation) and the efficient aura of the surrounding world (Division One on letting the implications of already familiar appliance apply) is his all-too-brief development of the two extremes of being-for-theother. One is immediately struck (at least it struck M&R, if not JS) by the curious mix of pedagogical and political nuances in the terms chosen to express these formal extremes. In pages marred by a number of minor translation errors (SZ 121—3/JS Engl. 114—16: there are unfortunately more than a few such pages in this translation ), we read first of all that the 'care for' others which in the public domain has come to be institutionalized as social 'welfare' (Fiirsorge, also 'concern/solicitude') organizations is to be traced back ontologically to Da-sein as being-with, which 'is' essentially 'for the sake of others.' At this ontological level, the two extreme positive possibilities of being-for and caring-for the other suggest themselves: (1) to 'leap in' for the other and take over his proper responsibility in providing for his own cares and, by thus making him dependent on such welfare, come to dominate (beherrschen — rule and control) the other; (2) to 'leap ahead' of the other 'in her existentiell potential-to-be' (omitted in the translation, p. 115) in order to help the other to become transparent to herself in her own care and free for it. Bringing the other to her own potential is accordingly a movement of liberation (Befreiung). This process is later described as one of'becoming the conscience of others' (SZ 298; 344), whose ontic manifestation could include not only friends and personal mentors but also statesmen-orators (as we know from other texts). This authentic being-with-one-another can never arise 'from the ambiguous and jealous conspiracies and the garrulous factions of clans in the they' (SZ298; 344 politicized translation). The generic state of 'the they,' its antics in its domain of 'publicity,' constitutes the ground category of Heidegger's 'political ontology,' as Pierre Bourdieu pointed out long before Heidegger's texts glossing Aristotle's Rhetoric surfaced to confirm the thesis. In both passages, JS replaces the pedagogical-political tonality of 'liberation' (first from the state of 'the they') with the more generically imprecise 'freeing.' But she reinstates this tonality to some extent with an interesting translation of one of the discretionary sights of concern/solicitude for the

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other, comparable to the circumspection needed in the provision of things, as 'tolerance' (Nachsicht— indulgence, forbearance, patience, leniency; all in the sense of'overlooking' shortcomings and differences). The other discrete interpersonal sight is 'considerateness' (Rucksichi), where a 'regard' for the other would have been more idiomatic as well as etymologically accurate. The importance of this constellation of sights (especially the perspicuity of 'transparency' [Durchsichtigkeit] that authenticates the self) to the overall conceptual structure of Sein und Zeit might also be briefly indicated here, inasmuch as all of them find their orderly grounding in an 'understanding' which is temporally more basic than any 'intuition,' and this understanding is made possible by the 'lighting/clearing' of a sense of being that is through and through temporal. Following this visual trail to the most central terms (and related terms like 'horizon': see the Lexicon to the new translation) of Being and Time serves to 'illuminate' the early Heidegger's only partly successful struggle to get over the all-pervasive visual language of eternal Lichtmetaphysik and re-place it in the more dynamic and relational vocabulary required to describe, not the 'vision,' but the essentially destabilizing non-static 'action' of being. Even the metaphorical usage of seemingly incidental visual relations like 'in regard to' and 'in view of get caught up in this struggle to transform our deeply 'intuitive' habits of language, with ambiguous results (see Considerateness, etc., in the Lexicon). The added ambiguity of inconsistent and excessively 'sliding' translation only further obscures this core struggle that is traced in the linguistic interstices of Being and Time. A final double translation ought to be mentioned. Rather than M&R's fallen-ness, Verfallen is translated alternatively as 'entanglement' or 'falling prey,' and very succinctly described by the translator's footnote as a kind of 'movement' that does not get anywhere (SZ 133 n. 3; 403). Having 'entangled' and 'entangling' available as adjectives avoids the complexifying addition of inelegantly awkward, lengthy adjectival phrases that we get with 'taking care of (besorgendes). Only a slight confusion arises when one of the specific components of entanglement (Verfallenheit) is also an 'entanglement' (Verfangnis), along with the specific 'movements' of alienation, temptation, and tranquillization within the overall inertia of'falling prey.' It remains for the thoughtful reader to decide how well all of these terms 'hang together' in conveying the 'resistance to change' and current 'drag' upon the basically forward thrust of the 'thrown project' of Da-sein that fallenness/entanglement is. The vectorial thrust of time's transcendence and counter-thrust of its decadence and degeneration are also the ultimate basis for the existential polar opposites that structure the self in Being and Time: my-self and theyself, authentic and inauthentic, originative temporality and everydayness. Perhaps the greatest challenge to an occidental language heavily freighted with a Parmenidean metaphysics of identity and static presence is posed by

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the penultimate chapter of Being and Time entitled 'Temporality and Historicity.' As a kind of summation of all that has gone before, this chapter attempts to understand the entire complex of movements that now 'prefigure' Da-sein (by way of a loosely co-ordinated list of equiprimordial existentials or 'tensors') in its tensed unity and continuity. Even his verbally slanted German idiom, Heidegger concludes, is woefully inadequate to illuminate 'the ontological enigma of the movement of the Happening [Geschehen, occurrence (JS), historizing (M&R)]' of Da-sein (SZ389; 441). The classical problem of'being and movement,' now thoroughly temporalized, continues to be 'haunted' by 'enigma' (SZ 391; 443). How is one to render transparent 'the continuity [Zusammenhang, "connection" or "connectedness" for both M&R and JS] of life between birth and death' (SZ373; 425)? Where and how to site this 'Between,' in its narrow everyday reckoning as well as in the authenticating move that overtly takes both 'ends' of life into its account? The 'tensed stretch [Erstreckung\ Between' that Da-sein is (SZ 374; 426) can in English, according to the context, 'happily' be activated from a fallow 'span' of time into the full 'tension' of time's 'tenses' that conative care connotes. Unhappily for JS, however, the unifying 'current' of 'occurrence' cannot be sustained to keep it current to the point of suggesting the single continuity of unique Da-sein. 'Occurrence' continually lapses into its connotations of an instantaneous event that multiplies into a series or loose succession of experiences. Da-sein as such seems to 'occur' successively, but it happily 'happens' in a sustained current, 'comes to pass' in a quasibiblical, momentous but not momentary Happening that already prefigures Heidegger's first and last word for Being as Time, the properizing Event of the singulare tantum, das Er-eignis. Da-sein happens to us, putting us 'datively,' as 'always already' given, on the receiv/'wf end of its ongoing Happen/wg", in a position of response to the demands that it 'puts upon' us. M&R's 'historizing' for Geschehen brings out this sustained dynamics accurately enough, albeit awkwardly, but loses the 'thrown' tonality of this Happening. The ordinary English 'happening' applied to history as such, and properly radicalized for the reader in a translator's footnote or two, would have served to subject the body language of the reader to this ongoing 'undergoing' of Er-fahrung (and its Gefahr, the perils of experience) much more directly and intuitively. The laudable goal set by Joan Stambaugh to give us, wherever possible, a simple and readable translation of the sentences of Being and Time must, in these last chapters, look for its insights to the full amplitude of resources secreted in the English language, from the deep vectorial structure of its grammatology and etymology back to the everyday surface structure of its ordinary but often illuminating idioms on time, life, and history, matching Heidegger's similar efforts in the German language. The multivalent German noun Zusammenhang (from the verb for 'hanging together'), so central to a hermeneutic ontology of life since Dilthey, must in

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these contexts be translated in sliding and yet intuitively interconnected ways across its middle-voice, ranging from the seemingly static connexus of holistic 'context' and '(cor)relation' to the sustained dynamics of'continuity' of tradition and 'contextualizing' of world horizons ('It's worlding!') — not to speak of the challenge exacted by this incessant motion to restore the 'coherence' of historical life. In sum, the 'play' on the German should, wherever possible, be matched by the vehicles of'play' and 'ploys' offered by the host language, within bounds, of course, without a maudlin breach of the current rules of tact set by the customs of allowable usage, without over-offensive violation of the hospitality offered by the host 'ethos.' For Sein und Zeit itself from the start openly exceeded the then acceptable usage of the German language in the philosophical circles at the time of its writing. But not primarily in the metaphorical play on German etymology, as some English imitations of Heidegger's style have led us to believe. For example, the play on Ur-sprung (a hyphenation unfortunately not noted in the translation of the marginal comment on SZ 27 In), origin as 'primal leap,' is an early borrowing from the neo-Kantian Paul Natorp. An indispensable preparation for the translator of Sein und Zeit is a thorough understanding of the peculiar hermeneutic (phenomenological) logic of concept formation that Heidegger devised for developing his framework of existentials in Sein und Zeit, which he called 'formal indication' (formale Anzeige). Mentioned only a half-dozen times in Sein und Zeit, the very phrase and its equivalents, like 'precursory indication,' was usually translated out and disseminated into the interstices of Being and Time by M&R. And JS does not always get it right: On Sein und Zeit 53 it becomes a 'calling attention to the formal concept of existence.' Heidegger himself does not explicitly announce the subtle movement of intentionality succinctly conveyed by the etymology of formally indicative 'ex-sistence,' and how it serves to develop the ek-static (i.e. non-static) dynamics of temporality, until after the drafting of Sein und Zeit. Nor does he note the analogous intentionality incorporated in the more latent formal indications of'(having) to be' in the background of Sein und Zeit and that of'transcendence,' which is to guide the historical destructuring of inherited transcendental philosophy. Knowing this would have made, for example, the more muscularly verbal 'potential-to-be' a self-evident and necessary translation of Seinkonnen and would have illumined the occasional reference to a 'way to be' (Weise zu sein, sometimes rendered static as 'way of being') as an alternative way of identifying the existential 'category.' A greater sense of the indexical intent of the indication, serving to point to the ineluctably temporalized individuation of being-here-now-I, would have prompted the translators to devise various linguistic strategies to nuance their sentences toward thisje-weiligesje-meiniges character of Da-sein, as Heidegger himself does, 'je nach dem! The subtle rhythms of steady steadfast persistence

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and interruptive crisis, the in-constant relapses from the constant stance of 'existing' (Existieren, also often rendered static in translation), the statics and ecstatics repeatedly thrust toward the outermost extremities of ex-sistence, would have been conveyed in translation as fully and as consistently structured as they are vectorially interconnected in the new language game systematically generated in the German text. In short, the new and different attitude toward linguistic usage promoted methodologically by the formal indication of temporally contextualized and individuated intentionality would have sensitized translators to find roughly equivalent vectorial structures and dynamic schematisms latent in the 'genius' of their respective host languages, as Heidegger tries to bring out in the gramma(on)tology of his native German and, lately, Derrida in his native French. This latter development is already 'infecting' the 'textuality' of our new translation in Krell's edition of the two Introductions in 1977, which also supplies the 'exergue' (so in JS, vii) from Plato's Sophist that prefaces the entire text of Sein und Zeit. One discovers, for example, a deconstructionist 'twist' in the rendering, more often that not, of that mode of concealment that Heidegger calls Verstellung, strictly and properly the dissemblance of 'disguise,' into the more motile dissemination of 'distortion,' a metonymic crossing of metaphors more dispersive than that of Lichtung as 'lighting/ clearing.' 'Disguise' is more in keeping with the overall metaphorological drift of the vocabulary of truth/untruth as un-covering and un-veiling, unconcealing, dis-closing and closing off. Even the less erratic hiding that shelters, the Bergen of the later Heidegger, is already alluded to in Sein und Zeit in the form of the preserve of truth through Verwahrung. But M&R already unknowingly launched the most comprehensive deconstructionist twist of all, which mutes the essential genealogical proclivities of Sein und Zeit by their translation of ursprungliche Zeitlichkeit as 'primordial temporality,' which JS continues, rather than 'originat-ive temporality' understood as the ultimate meaning and ground of Da-sein, its transcendental a priori condition of possibility and the ultimate horizon of its being, all of which promise to give a unifying and unique new name to the disseminative temporal scatter of a multiplicity of 'equiprimordial' existentials. The derivative forms of temporality in their deficient or privative modes do not 'originate,' but instead 'arise' (entspringen) from the temporalizing of ecstatic temporality. Nevertheless, any 'arising' is but a degeneration from a single spring, source, or origin so rich that the multiplicity of phenomena that it generates is but one more mark of the 'inexhaustible' wealth of ways needed to 'articulate' that origin (SZ 334; 383). This in no way can be taken to justify the confusion of tongues, inflation of language, and excess of translatory variance that prevents the maintenance of some measure of consistency in vocabulary and style throughout the

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translated text, and that interrupts the thoroughgoing sustenance of the simplicity and literary economy found on many of the pages of the new translation of Being and Time. Henry Aiken's impression upon reading the first English translation of Being and Time, 'it's like swimming through wet sand,' recurs anew for new reasons even for the experienced reader familiar with the German original. The translation, which lay dormant for years as a raw manuscript available upon request from the translator, was then rushed into print at the last minute under the pressure of legal restrictions. It comes to us in a printed state of disrepair, still rife with the plethora of minor errors and omissions that marred the manuscript, along with a pattern of excessively variant and unnecessarily deviant translation of its basic and middle-level terms, and finally the discrepancies that resulted from an incomplete followthrough on changes in translation of key-terms made in the last stages. Even the otherwise excellent and indispensable Index to the new translation, called a 'Lexicon' because of the current politics surrounding editions and translations of Heidegger's works, suffers from some of the same flaws for the same reasons. The Glossary of German terms with their English equivalents, still too incomplete in the last stages of proof-reading, was deleted at the last minute. The printed text needs a thorough 'shakedown' to clear it of its multifarious flaws of commission and omission, perhaps a good job for an advanced graduate class of diligent Germariists and philosophers, or by a summer institute of Heidegger scholars. The two extant translations compared against the German original might in this way be 'aufgehoberi into a third more literate as well as accurate English rendition of Being and Time 'ready to hand' in the college classroom for a new generation of students. The situation is not unlike Heidegger scholarship in Japan where, I've been told, there have been a dozen or so translations of Sein undZeitovzr the last seven decades, some in a worse state of disrepair than the present one. The most unique feature of the new translation is the inclusion of Heidegger's later marginal comments in his 'cabin copy' of Sein und Zeit, jotted down by and large in the 1930s around the time of the composition of the Beitrage zur Philosophie, as footnotes to the main body of the present text. M&R, on the other hand, made a point of restoring the footnotes (now endnotes) dropped from the first edition of 1927, or modified, with the resetting and slight retouching of the seventh edition of 1953, namely, those footnotes that specifically refer to the projected but never published Divisions of Being and Time, making it the most notorious fragment in twentieth-century philosophy. These offsetting features alone warrant the continued study of the two translations together, in order thereby to come to understand the interrelation between the Rise and Fall of the full project of Sein und Zeit, followed by its ongoing deconstruction and the attempted displacement of it by later texts like the Beitrage zur Philosophie.

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Appendix: a last look from the rear A few final words are in order concerning the uniquely revelatory aspects of the Lexicon/Index that brings up the rear of the new translation. Heidegger's peculiar genius in the usage of the German language for philosophical purposes (in contrast e.g. to Hegel's) is not merely in the plying of its etymological 'roots,' as some imitators in stereotypical parody have taken it to be, but also in the intensely verbal orientation even of its non-verbal words (a central tendency even in ordinary German), exploitation of the idioms familiar to him from his alemannic-swabian home-dialect, and the countertraditional grammatical shifts (e.g. toward the impersonal indexical sentence, double genitive constructions and other middle-voiced equivalents like the 'reflexive'). Following the overriding tendency in M&R to index philosophically significant ordinary expressions like 'give to understand' and 'have to be,' the new Lexicon adds some new common expressions like 'way to be' (Weise zu sein, an alternative formal indication of an 'existential' category), 'way' (Weg) and 'underway' (unterwegs), the latter being ordinary ways of alluding to the etymology of method as 'meta hodos.' The unique forte of the Lexicon over M&R is the display of the full panoply of the traditional philosophical and technical terms connecting the intercalated methods that govern the concept formation of the existentials (e.g. distantiality, dedistancing, nearness, making room) of the analytic of Dasein in their distinction from the newly coined categories of the handy (respectively, distance, remoteness, farness, region). The heavily Kantian infrastructure of the transcendental method is reflected not only in the traditional terminology of transcendence and apriori, but also that of constitution, ground, and 'condition of possibility' (which JS restores after M&R tended to disperse this Kantian formula). Such terminology fuses into the phenomenological method, which adds the multivalent central term 'horizon' (indexed in its full complexity) and the intentional schemata that it 'prefigures' or 'prescribes,' which are accordingly the matters for 'demonstration,' 'description,' and 'exhibition,' or made subject to the Violence' of 'destructuring' that precedes the transcendental re-construction of essence (for Heidegger equivalent to existence), by way of a holistic 'analytic' of identifiable existential wholes into their 'moments' or parts. Grounding and founding develop into a complex schematism of modifications, deriving from the original mode, of deficient, negative, and indifferent modes, which are to receive their ultimate founding in the dynamically dispersed 'ground' of ecstatic-horizonal temporality. The 'primordiality' and 'equiprimordiality' of this unique experiential dimension generate a lavish genealogical vocabulary of'temporalizing, arising, coming to be, provenance' from the 'origin,' which already in Being and Time is sometimes expressed poetically as the

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'leaping' from a 'source' or 'wellspring.' These characters all find their way into the especially pervasive hermeneutic method of interpretation, 'reading off,' and exposition of the initially tacit pre-suppositional structures of a prior understanding of what it means to be. The hermeneutic circle dictates the added complexity of application not only directly to the phenomena of Da-sein but also repeatedly to itself in a grand cycle of retrieval of the 'equiprimordial' whole/part structures explicated in the First Division, to be retaken against the background unity and articulation of ecstatic-horizonal temporality after it is 'cleared' in the climactic § 65 of the Second Division. Therefore, despite the intrinsic proclivity toward simple and ordinary language, however unusual and tortuous its grammatical shifts may at first seem, the technical terms of the intertwined philosophical methods complicate the task of the translator of Being and Time exponentially. A careful index sorting out this complex of methodological terms could only aid and abet that task of both the translator and her readers. The identification and sorting out of the existentials from the categories, the tracking of the implicit etymology of the formal indication of 'eksistence' already operative in Being and Time in forming the existential concepts that are to sustain an 'ecstatic' temporality (in terms like existing, con-stancy, and out-standing), noting the incipient grammatolological shift in linguistic function toward the non-apophantic, indexical, exclamatory 'assertion' of impersonal Being in forms like Es gibt (There is/It gives) and the self-referential formal indication of being's understanding, 'It is concerned in its being about this being': These are but some of the tasks that await the lexicographer of the complex of terms called Being and Time. The most overtly central language games include the elaborate vocabulary of truth's unconcealing and the more temporal vocabulary of possibility and its freedom of'leeway' and 'letting,' that prompts Heidegger to promise a new counter-traditional 'modal logic' of being. The very notion of 'logic' thus assumes a new dimension within a fundamental ontology, as do the traditional disciplines of'ethics' and 'physics.' Being and Time has assumed a life of its own in spawning new directions in a variety of traditional disciplines, like psychology and theology. The tracks of other regional disciplines still left fallow should accordingly also be lexically located in the text, e.g. those of economics, genealogy, geography, linguistics, literature, physiology, politics/ rhetoric, technology. More to the points at issue here, the Lexicon, indexed first of all to the German word, allows the careful reader to decide for herself if the slippage in translation that frequents the new English rendition disrupts the nuanced sense of the text to the point of obfuscation and missed communication. Examples of such constellations abound, but one will have to suffice by way of a parting shot: The middle-level terms that amplify and mediate the central vector of the fundamental 'always already' movement of Da-sein,

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thrownness (Geworfenheif), include abandonment (Uberlassenheit, also 'being left'), delivered over (uberantwortet, also 'entrusted'), submission to (Angewiesenheit auf, also 'dependence/reliance on' the world), and surrender (sich auslieferri). In addition to the doubled translations just noted, crossovers among these four not quite synonymous terms abound, in a translator's freedom only occasionally checked by care or tact. Thus, iiberlassen at times becomes 'delivered over' (SZ365, 4l2f; 416, 465f), ausgeliefert turns into 'subject to' (SZ412; 564), angewiesen entails 'being referred [instead of "relegated" or "consigned"] to a here' (SZ417, 470). The latter choices in particular mute the felt sense of 'thrownness' and 'abandon' (Sartre's dereliction] in its full fatality that one would want to bring out in its various tonalities in this vectorial arena, 'je nach deml according to the context. Translating Heidegger at this level with some measure of high resonance and fine tuning is not an easy task . . . nor is indexing a translator of Heidegger.

CHAPTER 4

Heidegger (1907-27): The Transformation of the Categorial Yet they show the beginning of a way which was then still closed to me: the question of being under the guise of the problem of the categories, the question of language in the form of the doctrine of signification. How these two questions essentially belong together remained obscure. The inevitable dependence of the way in which these questions were treated upon the standards of the doctrine of judgement prevalent for every ontologic prevented me from suspecting that there even was an obscurity. (GABd. 1, 55) Heidegger's more autobiographical statements of the last decade or so make it crystal clear that his point of embarkation into philosophy in general and ontology in particular is centered on the 'problem of categories.' Brentano's dissertation on the manifold sense of being in Aristotle (1862), which set the gymnasium student Heidegger on his philosophical way in 1907, is devoted primarily to the articulation of being into its categories. Husserl's Logical Investigations (1900-01), which Heidegger began to read as a university student in 1909, culminates in the doctrine of the categorial intuition. Emil Lask's Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre (1911) calls for a logic of philosophy directed toward the elaboration of the 'categories of categories.' In the same vein, Heidegger, in his dissertation (1916) on the doctrine of the categories of being and of signification in Thomas of Erfurt alias Duns Scotus, identifies ens commune as the 'category of categories' and sees in the medieval doctrine of the transcendental properties of being — the one, true, good, and beautiful — a reflection of the philosophical categories by excellence. This line of development is destined to expand into a concern for the existential categories in Being and Time (Heidegger-I) and to Heidegger-II's penchant to seek out the fundamental concepts of the West emerging from their pre-Socratic roots, in particular the topoi of logos, aletheia, and physis, which, as basic names for being, display a peculiar convergence akin to the 'convertibility' of the medieval transcendentals. If we can hybridize Richardson's Roman numerals with a crucial Arabic notation, this point of embarkation coming to fruition in the early writings

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(1912—16) might be designated as Heidegger-Zero (i.e., before Heidegger became Heidegger, not yet charged with all of the contrary emotional reactions that this internationally recognized name still arouses). In 'my way to phenomenology,' Heidegger has himself underscored the importance for his early development of Husserl's notions of intentionality and categorial intuition. But another profoundly significant link, nowadays by and large ignored by Heidegger scholars on this continent, between the student Heidegger concerned primarily with logical problems and the more hermeneutically oriented Heidegger-I is Wilhelm Dilthey. Dilthey's lifelong quest for a 'logic' (i.e. epistemological foundation) of the historical and human sciences eventually led him to seek an articulation of the 'categories of life,' the basic structures of historical life. Such categories find their roots in the textures immanent in life itself. Ideally, they are first of all the very articulations of life before they emerge from this soil into our judicative structures. The operative task is to let experience come to a natural conceptual blossoming without imposing upon it concepts that have their origin in alien soil. It is this different kind of category — formulated in a language indigenous to life and thus stemming from the earth out of which language springs — that motivates Heidegger to a radical reorientation of the classical question of being. The assumption of an autochthonous language locates this classical question at the very threshold of language and being, the moment of incipience for the being possessed by speech, the very 'event' of an articulation and contextualization in human existence, the emergence of the matrix, texture, and tissue of human experience. Ultimately, this 'grassroots' development of the classical 'problem of categories' raises the question as to whether or not the soil of experience is itself tractable to conceptualization. The following development of the transition from Heidegger-Zero, byway of Dilthey's categories of life and Husserl's doctrine of intentionality and categorial intuition to Heidegger-I - Being and Time will function throughout as the retrospective basis of this commentary - is intended to follow some of Heidegger's first steps toward his won shift in orientation from language to that which comes to language, to the process of disclosure which precedes and supports speech, to dimensions of experience which at first are only sprachma'ssigbut which are accordingly amenable to language in short, to the 'underside' of 'language', which, in its own way, itself 'speaks' of itself.

Heidegger-zero 'Being is said in many ways.' Appearing on the frontispiece page of Brentano's dissertation, this quotation is taken from Aristotle's discussion in the Metaphysics (Book VII) of the categories of reality. For the young

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Heidegger, it suggested the more basic question: What is the unity and simplicity of being which then articulates itself in manifold fashion? What is the leading and fundamental sense that manifests itself in and through the amazing polyvalence of the single little word 'is'? Such an ontological principle of identity is at once a principle of differentiation and is accordingly always accompanied by the problem of the articulation of manifold modes of being. Heidegger's dissertation on psychologism (1914) is concerned particularly with the distinction between psychic and logical reality. The second dissertation (1916) broadens the discussion to include physical, metaphysical, mathematical, and linguistic reality but is ultimately concerned with their coherence in a unified and articulated whole in the form of a 'doctrine of categories,' a theory of the fundamental divisions of reality. This is closely connected with the more grammatically oriented 'doctrine of significations,' which is concerned with the fundamental divisions of our discourse about the world, sometimes called the 'semantic categories.' The connection between the two doctrines resides in the fact that the categories are traditionally the most fundamental concepts and the most universal predicates that can be applied to (said of) a particular realm of beings. Paradigmatic for Aristotle's division of the categories into substance and the nine accidents is real physical being. For Kant, who more unequivocally than Aristotle oriented them toward the synthetic function of judgements, the categories became the apriori forms of the understanding, which serve to constitute the flux of experience into a judicative context. Thus after Kant the categories can become the most universal determinations of any object whatsoever, while retaining their traditional role as predication-forms of a subject matter. The limits of Aristotle's paradigm are brought out particularly in the modern discussion of 'logical reality' or of 'meaning' by the opponents of logical psychologism at the turn of the century. Logic deals with the laws of thought. But 'thought' is an equivocal term. It can refer to the actual psychic activity of, say, judgement made by an individual at a certain point in time, or it can have reference to the object intended by such an activity (i.e. to the meaning or logical content of the judgement, which belongs to an ideal order not subject to temporal fluctuation and variegation). The object of thought (e.g. a sentence in its sense) accordingly remains identically the same in and through any number of acts that think it. From this it follows that logic and psychology have distinctly different topics and problematics. The identical ideal content of meaning is the proper topic of logic, the real psychic activity in time is the topic of psychology, and the confusion of the latter with the former topic is logical psychologism. Nowadays such confusions of levels of being are sometimes called 'category mistakes.' Such difficulties are circumvented only if

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logic single-mindedly concentrates on the stable identical factor of meaning pervading the dynamic flux of mental activity like a continuous thread. Meaning has a way of'taking hold' and 'standing fast' in judgement again and again in and through a manifold of individual acts. Pure logic moves strictly in its own allotted sphere of the meanings thus contained in judgements. And so 'meaning' comes to the center of Heidegger's thought for the first time, never to yield that place, though the tenor and the direction of its problematic goes through a number of permutations. In first asking the question 'What is the meaning of meaning?' (GABd. 1, 170ff), Heidegger selects examples — a businessman planning and evaluating a promising new venture, the effect of a particularly 'meaningful' artwork upon the beholder, a 'sensible' gift thoughtfully chosen for its appropriateness - that stress the reflective character of meaning and are accordingly led to tie the phenomenon of meaning closely to thought, in which judgements are made and evaluated. In other words, emphasis falls on the moment in which judgements are themselves judged in their meaningfulness and thus appear as if they were standing before us like independent objects. The following question may now be asked: What kind of'reality' do such ideal objects have? What is their ontological status? To be sure, an ideal object is not real and temporal like the psychic activities that evoke it, inasmuch as it remains the same throughout a manifold of such numerically distinct activities. As Lotze puts it, 'es /V£ nicht, sondern esgilt" In this sense, the identical moment does not 'exist,' but simply 'holds' (gilt=iis valid'). It is precisely this pervasive holding power that then constitutes the mode of reality of the logical, of the meaning of judgements. The reality of meaning is to be found in the tenacity and stability of its valence, in its capacity to 'take hold' and 'stand fast' in a judgement and thus 'remain in force.' Is it possible to specify the nature of this holding relationship any further or do we have here an ultimate and irreducible dimension that cannot be illuminated by a more comprehensive genus? What exactly is the ontological status of logical reality, of a meaning that holds to the point of obliging us to repeatedly consent to it, if it is neither psychically real nor suprasensible in a metaphysical sense, in view of the immediacy with which we become aware of such meaning as it exerts itself with compelling force upon our consciousness? Heidegger confronts these questions in terms of the structure in which logical meaning appears, namely, the judgement in which meaning 'takes place' and thus 'takes hold' of its object. Meaning appears here as a structured or 'articulated' phenomenon. This point is already implied in the specification of the reality of meaning as a holding relation. What (or whom) does the meaning of a judgement hold? Close analysis of the structure of a judgement yields a two-sided answer to this question. There is (1) the holding relation of the predicate to the subject internal to the judgement and (2) the hold on the mind that a true judgement exercises.

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1. In a predicative proposition, a certain content of signification (P) is said to hold for a specific object (S). The state of affairs thus comprehended is expressed through the copulative 'is' in the unified whole of the judgement (S is P). If the judgement is truly an articulated unity, then its component parts are not fully disparate and unrelated but must already, in their content, 'demand' each other to the point of assuming the intimacy of a form—matter relation. The internal hold finds its focus in the 'is,' which is thus a relation that precedes its relata, the most essential element in the judgement and just a superfluous third element standing in as a mere sign of identity. It is in the 'is' that the form of reality of the judgement is situated. For example, the sentence 'The bookbinding is yellow' in effect says that 'Being yellow holds for the bookbinding.' One might also say that 'Being yellow is true of the bookbinding' (though not the converse) and thus give a specific interpretation to the classical definition of truth as adequation of 'thing' (the matter of the judgement, stated in the subject position) and our knowledge (the form or determination manifesting itself in the predicate of the judgement). The unity of the two, the 'is,' constitutes the meaning under consideration. The 'is' is accordingly the actual bearer and locus of truth. 2. The holding relation of the copulative being of a judgement placed in the perspective of truth naturally leads to a consideration of the hold on the mind, which the true statement exercises to the point of obliging us to assent to it and of compelling our acceptance again and again, depending on how much 'weight' it carries and how long it 'remains in force.' The question of the meaning of meaning thus leads to the question of truth, and the relation of truth shifts our consideration from the hold internal to the judgement to the 'intentional' hold between the judgement thus described objectively and the judicative act, since through judgement we have knowledge and accordingly, in perfect correspondence with the judicative meaning, there is an essentially cognitive awareness, which is not the same as the real psychic activity. This essentially cognitive activity is to be viewed as a 'meaningrealizing activity,' or better, as a 'performance meaning' (Leistungssinn), which is in strict conformity with the judicative meaning (Urteilssinn) immanent in the relation between the members of a judgement. Viewed as a cognitive performance in direct correlation with the judicative structure, knowledge is the activity of taking possession of an object by bestowing a meaningful determination upon it. In knowing an object, we arrest it from the stream of experience and fix it in a definite form (a category). Positing an object is at once a matter of setting it into a form and thereby giving it meaning. 'Reality can become meaningful only when it is somehow grasped by means of the logical; something is broken out of the real and thus distinguished, delimited and ordered' (GABd. 1, 280). If at first the logical realm was found to be somewhat deficient in being in relation to the real order of things, it now appears that the real is dependent

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on the logical for its meaning. For if the real is not somehow held in meaning, we would in fact not know that it exists. Accordingly, to receive its due, reality in all of its modes must be given in and through a context of meaning, which in effect holds it in being. We must live in meaning in order to know that which exists. The logical, at first characterized as 'unreal,' now appears as the very condition of possibility of the real and thus more rightfully deserves the name of being. But no less important than its hold on the real is the compelling hold on the mind that judicative meaning exercises. Being in its most efficacious manifestation is thus to be situated in the median realm between reality and the mind, and it is this realm of intentionality that holds the real secret of the 'meaning of being' contained in our judgements. The concluding chapter of the Scotus book (GABd. 1, 399—411), written after the work was accepted as a dissertation by the University of Freiburg, sets the stage for things to come. The chapter entitled, 'The Problem of the Categories,' makes plaint with the lifeless sterility of past systems of categories and calls for their rejuvenation by setting them back into the meaningful coherences and continuities of the immediate life of the subject in complex correlativity with its objects. The logical problems of category and judgement are to reinserted into the 'translogical' context of the 'living spirit' in which meaning is first realized, where the theoretical attitude is only one possibility and by no means the most significant. The rich and variegated life of the spirit includes within itself the fullness of achievements of its history, which must be made operative in order to work out the 'cosmos of categories,' which is to displace the impoverished schematic tables of categories hitherto proposed. One might then interpret an historical epoch in terms of its categorial structures (i.e. in terms of the manifold senses of direction, which determine the 'form of life' of, say, medieval man, whose acts realize the meanings that vectorially structure his context and the living spirit of his language). The concept of the living spirit thus takes us to a fundamental level in which the uniqueness and individuality of acts and the self-sustaining validity of meaning are brought into living unity, where the character of this unity in and through its differentations poses the most difficult of ontological problems. But only with the 'breakthrough into the true reality and real truth' will it be possible to arrive at a satisfying answer to questions such as how 'unreal' (ideal) meaning grants true reality to us, and to determine the sense and the limits of the form-matter relationship as an account of how categories structure our judgements. With this entry into his new problematic of historical life experience, Heidegger's logical themes of his student days - centered on the judgement in its internal composition and its interweaving with other judgements into the fabric of the sciences - are now to be assessed in terms of a larger context in which they lose their priority, assume a derivative status and at times recede

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completely into the background. As Heidegger notes some years later, 'the idea of "logic" itself disintegrates in the turbulence of a more originary questioning' (GABd. 9, 117; 92). Nevertheless the larger view never loses sight of the smaller units of logical concern. A recurring theme throughout these later years is the question of the nature of the judgement, particularly with regard to the meaning of its being, of the 'is,' which is said in many ways. Manifestly, the discussion of these issues will undergo modification in the changing perspective. After all, a sense of meaning that holds fast in its validity is a static sense promoting a rigidity of being, which Heidegger in his burgeoning opposition to the priority of being as object will now methodically strive to mitigate and delimit. Instead he seeks to uncover a more historical dimension of the meaning that precedes and underlies the 'holding action' of judicative meaning. Hence, Validity' (Geltung) as the deepest sense of meaning and truth, at first lauded as 'this felicitous expression' from 'our German vocabulary' (GABd. 1, 170, 269), becomes 'this word idol' (SZ 156; 198), which only stands in the way of the effort to ontologically clarify the problem of the meaning of meaning. The phenomenon of meaning no longer finds its center of gravity in the contents of judgements, especially theoretical statements about things, and truth is seen to 'take place' not only in the judgement but also more fundamentally in the question, particularly if it is oriented to the basic issues of existence. The meaningful sentence is thus oriented to the contextual and vectorial meanings of existence, and the meaning of the sentence is determined first by what it shows of that meaningful fundament (SZ 154; 196). It is only through this apophantic function of judgement that the internal structure of predicative determination of subject matters acquires its meaning. At the center of this structure is the phenomenon of the copula, which gives expression to addressing something as something, and it is this schema of 'as' that must now be existentially demarcated and ontologically interpreted against the background of the temporal character of linguistic patterns and contexts (SZ159, 349, 360; 202, 401, 411); and the question of truth in the sense of correspondence between ideal and real becomes extremely problematic through the sharp separation of these two realms that the polemic against psychologism promotes (SZ216-17; 258-60). Moreover, the very tenor of the critique of psychologism resides in the assumption of the timelessness of the being under consideration. The polemic is accordingly softened by considering judicative meaning not simply as a logical content but more as an intentional content implicated in a living discourse in which the ideal and real once again merge (SZ161; 204). The temporal interchange between subject and object through the mediation of language thus serves to thrust the ideal object back into life. The task that Heidegger takes upon himself is to elaborate the proper concepts to articulate this 'between.'

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This line of development passes through Husserl's doctrines of intentionality and the categorial intuition and Dilthey's attempt to articulate the categories of life. A Philosophy of Life Wilhelm Dilthey, biographer of Schleiermacher, historian of ideas and art forms, proponent of a descriptive psychology comparable to Husserl's, saw his many endeavors converging in his lifelong quest for a 'logic' of the historical and human sciences as a whole. At first seen as a critique of historical reason paralleling Kant's effort to found the natural sciences, Dilthey's project gradually found itself on the trail of a reason in history that ran counter to Kant's notion of reason. Not the anaemic transcendental ego, 'in whose veins flows no real blood' (I, xviii), but a kind of'logic' immanent in life itself is to be the source for the categorial articulation of the human sciences, which would thus have access to 'predications out of life itself (VII, 238). To paraphrase Pascal, one might say that 'life has its reasons which the reason does not have.' Thus before they are the apriori theoretical forms of objectivity that enter into judgements, as in Kant, the categories are 'forms of life,' or better, the spontaneous articulations of the structural coherences and temporal continuities of life itself. Life itself, considered as an active and nevertheless perduring Zusammenhang (context, coherence, continuity), is the subject of the sentences of the human sciences, whether the sentence refers to the course of an individual life or to that of societies, nations, cultures, historical worlds, and times, and finally to the whole of human reality, which brings us to the sentences of philosophy, whether these be anthropological, epistemological, or ontological in import. An ontology of life would be distinguished not only by its breadth but also by a penetration into the depths of its subject matter to the point of drawing the possible predications about it into such an intimate unity that subject and predicate would well become one. For it would serve to counter the flow of the categories into the sciences and refer them back to their convergence locus in the effective continuity and working context (Wirkungszusammenhang) from which they spring. This would in fact be the culmination and highest achievement of Dilthey's own methodological dictum 'to understand life from out of itself.' Dilthey liked to reiterate, almost as a formula, that life is that behind which thought cannot go. Its negative formulation is directed against any and all metaphysics that would seek a reality behind or beyond the appearances; in particular it sought to counter the other-wordly thrust still present vestigially in the Kantian attempt to delineate an atemporal realm behind the 'appearances' of time. The converse of the maxim serves to develop a much more

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positive sense of the phenomenon of life itself. Relegating thought to 'this side' of life does not necessarily dash it against an opaque wall. That life finds itself amenable to thought suggests the alternative that life is a much richer resource than philosophies, prone to drive a wedge between the two, have been willing to concede. The conviction that thought is inherently compatible with life is brought out most tellingly by the methodological principle of immanence, 'to understand life from life itself/ which Dilthey identifies as 'the dominant impulse in my philosophical thinking' (V, 4). Life is to understood through categories derived from life itself by 'entering ever more deeply into the historical world' (V, 4) (i.e. into the meaningful structures of artworks, human institutions, and customs as well as written documents that we more properly call texts). Where do such meaningful structures come from? Nowhere else than from life itself, replies Dilthey. Das Leben legt sich aus. The principle of immanence thus functions as a kind of 'principle of identity' fraught with consequences for the methodology not only of the historical sciences but also of philosophical exploration of the nature of life itself, for which the most basic issue is the very character of this 'identity,' which now appears as the most radical category of life, defining the very way in which it manifests itself, the 'logic' of its appearance. It is but a short step from here to Being and Time, where phenomenology is formally defined as a matter of permitting 'that which shows itself to be seen from out of itself just as it shows itself in itself (SZ34; 58). Even more emphatically than Dilthey's principle of immanence, this formulation views thought as a function of life, the phenomenon par excellence, 'the guidingthread of all philosophical enquiry at the point where it arises and to which it returns' (SZ38; 62). Accordingly, the phrase 'philosophy of life' is a pleonastic as the 'botany of plants' (SZ46; 72). Rightly understood, philosophy is always and only about life not only as an end but also as a source. Life is that out of which all philosophic enquiry develops as well as that to which it directs all of its questions. If one takes seriously the reversal of priorities that ensues from considering thought as a function of life, then life becomes the issue that gives rise to thought in the first instance, which calls for thought and thus provides the food for thought that sustains it and carries it through to its destination. To understand life from out of itself is therefore to cultivate a certain intimacy between life and thought, already inherent in life itself, to the point where — in Droysen's pregnant phrase — 'life thinks and thought lives.'3 But this path in the later Heidegger's meditation on the relationship between being and thinking, implicit in Dilthey's dictum to understand life from out of itself, has obviously short-circuited a crucial middle term in the process of life's understanding itself. Heidegger's shortcut here stands in sharpest contrast to Dilthey's detour of self-understanding through all the expressions of human life, which establish the proximate conditions for

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the development of that understanding which is first of all a way of life issuing from the familiarity of existence before it is a mode of knowledge. Even the formulation of the bypassed intermediate question bears a qualitative difference because Dilthey does not ask 'How does life disclose (show) itself?' but rather 'How does life objectivate itself?' Yet the coherence and continuity between life-experience, expression, and understanding, which form the basis to Dilthey's answer, are obviously conceptual predecessors to the co-originality of the disclosures of disposition, discourse and understanding, which lie at the basis of Heidegger's analysis of Dasein. (In the same vein, the later Heidegger speaks of 'dwelling, building, thinking.') Dilthey, moreover, sees life as fixing itself in meaningful wholes through the interpretation of the three types of objectivations: (a) the conceptual textures of language proper, (b) the action textures of public institution, and (c) the emotive textures of personal styles whose controlled expression leads to work of art. In a similar vein, in Being and Time the meanings articulated in action and emotion precede and underlie more cognitive and theoretical meanings. Thus the meaningful relations woven in the pragmatic space of action found the possibility of words and language (SZ87; 121) and the attunement of mood first made possible the cognition of something within the world (SZ 137; 176). 'Meanings grow into words. It is not the case that wordthings are invested with meanings' (SZ 161; 204). Thus the basic category of meaning, first encountered in a logical framework and identified as the content of judgements, is now found to be indigenous to life itself. Life is at once the meaningful context in which any particular experience becomes meaningful and the movement of development that makes sense. Before it is holding action in judgements, meaning is the cohesion of context and continuity of direction of the Wirkungszusammenhangoflifc. Meaning first gets its force and carries weight from the efficacy of a life-context before it becomes effective in human judgements; and if meaning is a fact of life before it is the content of logic, then meaning is first of all not imposed from above upon experience as a form upon matter but is rather drawn into judicative structures by being explicated from the textures immanent to life. If this emergence of meaning occurs spontaneously in the context of life, then the scientist and above all the philosopher must learn how to follow and continue this process of explication by inserting himself into the operative context and entering into the process by which life articulates itself, which calls for (heiftt) thought. Heiften takes us to the theory of meaning of the later Heidegger, which converges with his reflection upon life as the principle of identity. Mediating between this later notion of meaning and the more orthodox sense of meaning as validity is the notion of meaning in Being and Time as both efficacious and temporal continuity, beautifully captured in the single German word favored by Dilthey, Wirkungszusammenhang.

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From the Logical Investigations, Heidegger learned that categories of objects likewise cannot be situated in the judging subject but are to be traced back to a pre-predicative dimension of being. The doctrines of intentionality and of the categorial intuition in the Sixth Investigation become for Heidegger the 'formal indicators' to the structures of this new apriori realm of being. The theoretically oriented intentionality is set back into the more 'interestladen' dimension of Being-in-the-world and care and, like them, is to find the condition of its possibility in the transcendence of temporality. Categorial intuition is, as it were, turned upon itself into a prior understanding of being and its modes so that, for example, the 'empty' intention of signification now becomes the project that throws forward an outline of structured meaning that 'can be filled' (SZ 151; 193) by the beings that are discovered in and through this provisional space of disclosure. 'Intentionality' is another name for the phenomenon par excellence of phenomenology and poses for it the most difficult of ontological problems. For what precisely is the reality of intentionality if it is not a co-ordination of the psychic and the physical, the inner and the outer, the ideal and the real? Here one must first learn to consider only the structure as such. Yet to say that the doctrine of intentionality merely affirms that consciousness is always a consciousness of something is almost trite, and certainly far too static in describing the structure of what is fundamentally an activity. Basically, intentionality describes the structure of directing-itself-toward, a movement of 'meaning' tensed between emptily signifying and fully bestowing meaning; and, contrary to terminological appearances, the 'empty' intention is the more basic of the two, inasmuch as it determines that which the possible fulfilment can be, and not vice-versa. In and through the signifying intention, the directing-itself-toward is given a sense of direction (Richtungssinn), which the early Husserl calls Aujfassungssinn and which Heidegger will later call the Vorsicht. This provision of meaning is precisely that which categorial intuition adds to intentionality. The signifying act finds its fulfilment in an act of intuition in which (a) the object itself is present just as it is in itself, and (b) this presence is just as it was initially intended in the signifying act. The second 'as' is the experience of truth as agreement, which takes place in the intentional act of identification of the signified and the intuited on the basis of and out of the originally given thing itself. Truth as correspondence is the noematic correlate of the act of identification, the act of self-evidence. But in the act of fulfilment, we are thematically directed toward the thing itself and the not the selfsameness of identification. What we apprehend is the identical object and not its identity with the signified. The self is grasped thematically, but not the selfsameness, which in direct, naive, straightforward living is not thematically intended but

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simply experienced in the apprehension of the thing itself. We thus live in the state of identity and continuity between the signified and the intuited, a state that we continually experience but do not grasp. This is what it means 'to be in the truth' (SZ221; 263) without knowing it thematically, whereby we understand the structures of our world as 'self-evident' (i.e. as a matter of course in a straightforward living of them without considering them thematically). That which we thematically grasp is the object itself 'just as it is in itself (the first 'as'). Which gives fullness to the signifying intention and thus makes it true. The object itself 'is experienced as the true-making thing.'5 Because it provides the basis for truth as identity and agreement, die Sache selbst is the more basic truth. For it is the thing itself toward which the signifying intention is directed, and it is the thing itself that is itself given in intuition. In short, it is the thing that underlies the entire process of identification. Heidegger will go further and try to show how an advance notion of the thing itself in some way even prompts the initial signifying intention and thus provides it with its sense of direction. Only on the basis of the above two notions of truth is it possible to then speak of the truth of judgement, truth in the sense of correctness. A judgement is correct if it is directed toward the true thing: 'It says that it is so, and it really is so.' The 'is' of the 'really is' refers to truth thematically grasped as a stasis of identity and is not to be confused with the first 'is,' the copula of categorial judgement, which refers to a structural moment of the true state of affairs articulated by the judgement. If we consider the categorial judgement This S is P as an assertion of a perception, it contains the categorial elements this and is, which themselves are not perceived. What is the source of this surplus of senses that sense intuition does not cover? As Kant said, copulative being is not a real predicate; it can find no objective correlate in acts of perception in the strict sense. Nor is it apprehended by reflection upon the acts of judgement through which it appears but rather in the experience of the objects of these acts, the states of affair of the judgement. The categorial form is neither a real predicate of the object nor a result of reflection upon the conscious activity of judgement but an ideal structure of the object under judgement, the same object given straightforwardly in sense intuition because perception gives the whole object explicitly, but its real parts are thus only implicitly given. To highlight these adumbrations calls for the categorial act of predicative explication, which explicitly articulates the parts and sees them as parts of the whole. Not covered by sense intuition, the categorial elements thus evoked nevertheless receive their fulfilment in the perceived thing under judgement through the categorial intuition founded upon sense intuition and operating in unison with it.7 Even though founded, the ideal structures thus intended can be given originally in the perceived thing. This suggests

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that the categorial is implicated in every 'simple' and 'direct' experience down to ordinary perception, so that such experiences are after all not so simple at all but developed out of highly structured contexts. Disengaging such categorial states from their founding objects would serve to explicate their comprehensive structures and permit them to be grasped as categories proper or concepts. Such is the task of the 'universal intuition' of ideation, which brings out the categories of the various regions of objects.8 Judgements are accordingly explicated out of prior contexts of meaning, and their differentiation into regions compensates for the seeming indifference of the pervasive 'is,' which in each case must be understood in terms of the particular region that it articulates and thus shows. Heidegger will view these categories not only as contexts or regions of being but also, more temporally, as projects that already anticipate and guide our understanding of objects that appear in their respective regions. It is the projective 'fore'-structure of the categorial that establishes the indissoluble unity between the doctrine of intentionality and categorial intuition. Intentionality is 'categorizing' movement, which articulates a context of meaning within which things can appear. Categories are first of all incipient presuppositions of an operative context that carry us forward in the movement of interpreting that context. Categories are at work before they are seen, and we attempt to see them to put them to work all the more effectively, for example, in the form of a 'productive logic,' which guides scientific inquiry (SZ10; 30). But if intuition in general can thus be taken back to a more fundamental operative context, then sense intuition is itself a founded mode of knowledge. The directing-itself-toward of all perception arises out of a more basic indwelling in which we are already familiar with the world (SZ61; 88—9). Husserl himself has shown that evidence is a universal phenomenon that reaches beyond the theoretical into more practical and emotive comportments; and these may even possess a measure of primacy over the theoretical. If non-cognitive comportment underlies our more cognitive behaviour, if our more cognitive stances are drawn from our non-cognitive comportment, then this expository movement is a mode of knowing more basic than intuition. Perception itself is to be viewed as a process of specifying something that has already been laid out in other ways. Interpretation and intuition is the most basic mode of cognitive behaviour. Categorial intuition and the question of being Some recently published texts serve to specify more closely the role played by Husserl's doctrine of categorial intuition in Heidegger's 'transformation of the categorial,' especially in the climatic period of 1925—7, while Being and Time was written. Heidegger's lecture courses of this period, now being

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published in the Gesamtausgabe, indicate that it is also a time in which years of attempts to interpret the Logical Investigations are likewise coming to a climax for Heidegger. The lecture course in the summer semester of 1925 couples the most intensive exegesis of the Sixth Logical Investigation Heidegger has ever published with a first draft of the early portions of Being and Time. A retrospective view of some of the elements of this exegesis is provided by the recently published protocol of Heidegger's 'Seminar of Zahringen (1973).'10 In the seminar at Zahringen, Heidegger observes that the Husserl of the Logical Investigations broaches the question of being in the strict sense only in his doctrine of categorial intuition, which accordingly becomes for Heidegger 'the kindling point of Husserlian thought' (GABd. 15, 373; 311). To arrive at this doctrine, Husserl took his point of departure from the then philosophically commonplace notion of sense intuition, in which direct access to 'hyletic data' is obtained. If one also speaks of categorial intuition, then, contrary to Kant, 'categories' too are to be regarded as in some sense directly given. In the intentional fulfilment of the categorial judgement This S is P, the S and the P are loci of sense intuition while the this and is, the categories of substance and being, are not given through the senses but are nevertheless given in their own way. In analogy with sense intuition, Husserl maintains that they are 'seen' in a way that exceeds sense intuition. What is this 'seeing' that is not of the senses? How are 'categories' such as substance and being given? Or, in more phenomenological language, how do they appear? The doctrine of categorial intuition points out that 'substance' and 'being' are no less phenomena than are tables, chairs, trees, and things, accompanying these more mundane phenomena without appearing in the same way. In Husserl's words, the categorial accompanies ordinary perception as a 'surplus of meaning.'11 This for Heidegger is 'Husserl's essential discovery and at once the essential difficulty' (GABd. 15, 376; 314), since being as such is not a phenomenon in the same way as particular beings. What then is the nature of this 'categorial' phenomenality? In the first instance, it is to be situated precisely in its 'excessiveness' in regard to particular beings. Being appears (a) in conjunction with particular beings, (b) in a way that exceeds them, much like a context in which they can appear, (c) accordingly, as the very condition of their appearance, and (d) so that it must in some way 'precede' their appearance. The later Husserl will describe this more subtle presence of 'categorial' structures as a compresence of horizons that are 'apperceived' or 'appresented' with perceived things. As late as the summer semester of 1925, Heidegger is still using the distinctly Husserlian term 'appresentation' to describe the relationship between a thing and the meaningful context or 'world,' which enables the thing to appear as it is, where priority is clearly placed in the world that 'appresents' the thing or tool (i.e. permits it to come to presence).

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Soon after Heidegger replaces the term 'appresentation; with 'disclosure;' and to describe the empowering presence of being — thus a 'category' which is more verbal than nominal in its mode of givenness — and to distinguish it from the mode of givenness of a particular being (i.e. that which is), Heidegger resorts to a literal interpretation of the German idiom es gibt: Perhaps no other being is except that which is, but perhaps something is given which itself is not, but which nevertheless is given in a sense still to be determined. Moreover, in the end it must be given in order that we can have access to beings as beings and relate to them in order that we may experience and understand something like beings at all (GA Bd. 24, 13-14; 10-11). This reversal of perspective from beings to being and from a thing to its world points to the importance for Heidegger of another analogy in the Logical Investigations, which in effect reverse the analogical move from sense intuition to categorial intuition. The analogy first appears in a discussion of meaning-bestowing acts in the First Investigation, in a paragraph (§ 23) entitled 'Apperception in Expressions and Apperception in Intuitive Presentations.' Here the objectifying interpretation that occurs in acts of intuition such as perception, in which a complex of sensations is invested with meaning, is compared with the more familiar 'understanding interpretation' (verstehende Auffassung) of acts of expression, in which the meaning of a word is realized. This new analogy suggests that something like an expression of meaning occurs even in intuitive acts of perception. It emphasizes the understanding of meaning rather than the intuition of a givenness or presence. But ultimately the two, expression and intuition, are placed in continuity and become phases of moments of a single and complete act of intentionality. This leads to a hybridization of the two analogies, which permits one to speak of the presence of meaning and of'categorial' understanding and exposition, in particular the understanding of being, which is precisely the outcome of Heidegger's 'retrieve' of the Logical Investigations. Thus, the 'appresentation' of significance becomes a rudimentary form of expression, if indeed 'expression' means any exposition and articulation of meaning, which is not always a matter of words. Here, the tradition of hermeneutics, made actual for Heidegger by Dilthey, no doubt played its mediating role. The Heideggerian retrieve opposes Husserl in situating the understanding and exposition of meaning not in acts of consciousness but first of all in a preconscious realm of being-in-the-world, which is already pervaded by 'expressivity.' All of our experiences are already articulated, though not necessarily in words, by a prior understanding and interpretation that guide and determine them and so bring them to fulfilment. In discussing simple

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sense intuition, Husserl tentatively observes, 'I see white paper and say "white paper," thereby expressing, with precise adequacy, only what I see,'12 and then adds that the matter is not so simple because of the compresence of categorial intuition. Because of the apriori presence of categorial structures, it would be more accurate to maintain that we see what we say rather than say what we see. Even the simplest perception is already expressed and interpreted by the prior understanding we have of it, which determines how we perceive. This is not necessarily a bias that we impose on our perception; it just happens to be the way we perceive. On the one hand, language overlays our experience and sometimes obscures our access to it, as in idle everyday chatter; on the other hand, the articulations of experience underlie language and optimally manifest themselves through it. This is the double-edged lesson that Heidegger reads in Husserl's discovery of categorial intuition. Categorial intuition is the simple apprehension of the categorial element operative in our experience, an element in which we live without regarding it thematically. As such, the categoric/ is not yet formulated into categories, but provides the basis for such formulation. We are already caught up in meaning, and only later capture it in part for ourselves in and through concepts. Thus Heidegger repeatedly tries to point below our conceptual grasping and logical defining to the horismos13 of meaning, which defines the scope as well as the limits of the human situation, which is first of all given not through the senses or the intellect but in actu exercitu of existence in the world. At this level expression, in the sense of articulation of structures, still bears some relevance to the existential movement of living in the world, while intuition becomes a very tenuous analogy for our first way of access to such structures. Accordingly, 'seeing' yields to an analogy of 'doing,' the understanding 'know-how' that comes from habitual commerce with a familiar world. Husserl approaches this domain of habituality in his discussion of a familiar field of static unions between expression and intuition where 'the expression seems to be laid upon the thing and to clothe it like a garment.'14 In a world that has already been talked over, words have been worked into things and remain impaled on things. On the other hand, by means of the proper reductive procedures, it is possible to loosen the grip that our customary words have upon things and thereby glimpse how the things themselves articulate their own structures. Thus the early Husserl already points to the tension between the habit of language and the disclosive structures of experience, which becomes central in Heidegger's existential framework. Husserl eventually identifies these structures as the material apriori of things and regions, another discovery rooted in the Logical Investigations, which Heidegger regards as a significant departure from modern philosophy, especially Kant. With this discovery, categorial phenomenality, first uncovered in the discussion of logical issues, manifests its

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ontological import, whereby categories become regional essences (for Husserl) and projective contexts of meaning (for Heidegger). But Husserl adheres to the spirit of modern philosophy by placing the ultimate being of these intentional fields in an oriented consciousness. Heidegger, claiming a more faithful adherence to the principle of phenomenology, seeks to shift the locus of discussion from an oriented consciousness to a situated existence, where the question of sense and the truth of being posed by the structures of intentionality and categorial intuition is to receive its answer in some as yet insufficiently named confluence of the world, the self, time, and language. Accordingly, despite the family ties that Heidegger wishes to maintain with Husserl, the transition from the immanent structures of intentional consciousness to the ecstatic structures of worldly existence constitutes a radical departure, which, to use a perceptual metaphor common in Anglo-American philosophy, amounts to a 'Gestalt switch.'15

CHAPTER 5

Why Students of Heidegger Will Have to Read Emil Lask A truly in-depth understanding of Martin Heidegger's lifelong expression of a debt of gratitude to Emil Lask (1875-1915) has long evaded even the earliest students of Heidegger. The most recent articulation of this puzzlement comes to us from Hans-Georg Gadamer's 'Reminiscences on Heidegger's Beginnings,' along with a startling hint and suggestion toward its resolution.1 In order to examine Lucien Goldmann's claim that Heidegger's analysis of the environing world in fact stems from Georgy Lukacs, Gadamer turns to the latter's recently discovered Heidelberg Manuscripts, written at a time when Lukacs had been in close contact with Lask. A close reading of these manuscripts suggests that Lask, in the last two years of his life (1913—15), underwent an anti-idealistic turn by way of a study of American pragmatism, and it is in this context that Lukacs discusses the environing world in terms which are astoundingly similar to those later used by Heidegger in Being and Time. Could it be that Heidegger was privy, by way of third-party informants, to this late development of Lask's thought, which is not particularly in evidence in the posthumously published Collected Writings of Lask? As of this writing, I have not been able to verify any of these connections. An examination of the posthumous final volume of Lask's Collected Writings^ with at least one manuscript dating from as late as 1914 and first published only in 1924, indicates at most only a strong proclivity toward the traditional roots of pragmatism in the practical philosophies of Aristotle and Kant (especially as mediated by Fichte). However, with the recent publication of Heidegger's lecture courses of 1919, the most crucial aspect of Gadamer's tale appears to receive direct verification from the early Heidegger himself: 'Lask discovered in the ought and in value, as an experienced ultimate, the world which . . . was factic' (GABd. 56/57, 122, 12In). Thus it seems that, simply on the basis of the works published during Lask's lifetime (later published as the first two volumes of the Collected Writings) available to the young Heidegger (1907-17), the early Heidegger (1919-29) did find some help from Lask in his breakthrough to an 'analysis of the environing world' and so to the 'hermeneutics of facticity,' which Heidegger himself identifies as the very first steps taken toward his opus magnum, Being and Time.2 If this is correct, it would prove to be the very first tangible evidence

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that we have of the direct influence of Lask on the more hermeneutically minded early Heidegger, beyond his obvious influence on the Early Writings (1912—16) of the logically minded young Heidegger. In approaching the still puzzling issue of Lask—Heidegger, two recent interpreters, Istvan Feher and Steven Crowell, necessarily take their point of departure from the earliest works of the young Heidegger and then leap over to the 1925 lecture course and the works that follow. I do not wish to repeat their excellent labors on the topic, but instead to continue their good work, in a way making it more complex by bringing in the period to which they did not yet have access, namely Heidegger's courses of 1919, which have just been published. My first aim is to introduce and examine this new material on the question of Lask-Heidegger and so (at least on this issue) to mitigate the outstanding gap between Heidegger's juvenilia (1912—16) and Being and Time (1927). Examination of this intermediate phase should at least fill in the somewhat broader comparisons to which they were forced to resort, adding aspects which their lack of evidence perhaps led them to overlook, confirming their comparisons or, if necessary, revising them. I shall at least try to meet their papers halfway, as it were, coming at the issue of the relation Lask—Heidegger more from the perspective of Heidegger himself precisely around the point in time (1919) at which he first truly finds his own voice and begins to articulate his unique hermeneutical approach, setting it off sharply and polemically from the neo-Kantianism with which he had previously allied himself. As a propaedeutic to this task, it will be necessary especially to analyse the young Heidegger's habilitation work (1915—16) in some detail, in which the influence of the neo-Kantians, especially that of their 'point-man/ Lask, was at its peak. The very length of this exegesis is a record of the repeated surprise over how much latent Lask is in fact contained in the habilitation work and how important this proves to be for Heidegger's immediate conceptual development. Preliminaries A summary of some of the more salient points of the articles by Crowell and Feher, especially the ones upon which I hope to build, will serve to spell out the dimensions of the problem, with an eye toward delimiting and focusing a more manageable area of discussion and establishing some of the leitmotifs which will follow. I wish to highlight two major themes for discussion: 1. Crowell's article, raises the question ol" the nature of philosophy in relation to its basic domain, whether its 'logic of logic' is to be regarded as an aletheiology, a logology, or a phenomenology. When Heidegger equates all of this with ontology, he is of course at once posing the question of the convergence (or in medieval terms, 'convertibility') of being with aletheia

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and logos (which Heidegger quite early on prefers to translate 'semantically' as 'meaning' rather than as 'reason'). In comparing this original domain of the Urwissenschaft (primal science) of philosophy, both Crowell and Feher uncover similarities in terminology between Lask and Heidegger which begin to suggest how deeply Lask's terms have infiltrated the language of Being and Time: Lask's pre-judicative, pre-oppositional 'panarchy of the logos' is a domain of meaning and not of beings; whence the ontological difference, in which beings or objects are 'in truth' (intelligibility, clarity). This original domain is structured by the Urverhdltnis (primal relationship) of categorial form and matter, which for Heidegger (as we shall see) reflects a truncated noematic version of the phenomenological Urverhdltnis of intentionality. The categorial form reflects or indicates a certain Bewandtnis (relevance, bearing) 0/~the matter, the 'circumstances' or 'appliant implications' of the matter itself, just as in Being and Time the tool is defined by its Bewandtnis (appliance) in and through the referential structures of the environing world. Finally, the priority of this original realm is such that even the cognition of it always contains a precognitive lived element, such that it is simply 'lived through' and not itself known. I live in the category as in a context such that I simply experience its illumination; I thus 'live in its truth.' When such terms recur in Heidegger, a prior reading of Lask can only add to and deepen our understanding of their sense as well as their source. But, of course, Lask is no longer read — whence the specific examples of the subsidiary theme of Oblivion in scholarship, surfacing by and large in several footnotes. And so most of us are typically unaware of how much latent Lask permeates the fabric of Heidegger's texts at this time. This applies especially to the habilitation work of 1916, where the half-dozen overt references to Lask do not begin to convey the extent to which he had already left his mark on Heidegger's way of thinking about things logical and ontological. The following is accordingly a first attempt at bringing the shadowy figure of Lask, this 'spearhead' of the neo-Kantian tradition lurking in the background of Heidegger's development, out into the open. It is a plaidoyer for reading Lask, from which you too might be rewarded, in baffling your way through some tortuous terminology in, say, Heidegger's Kant-book or his early lecture courses on logic, with the experience of deja-lu. 2. Feher's article, 'The Problem of Irrationality and the Theory of Categories,' in part attempts to identify the problem situation in neoKantianism and life-philosophy out of which Heidegger's thought arose: the resistance to Hegel's panlogism by insistence on the insuperable irrationality of the 'matter' given to thought. Indeed, Lask himself quite early identified the locus classicus of this problematic in his dissertation of 1902, Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte (LGS I): Fichte was the first to explore the various polar pairs in terms of the 'hiatus irrationalis' (LGS I, 84, 173ff et passim), the abyss between the empirical and the apriori, the individual

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and the universal, quid facti and quid juris, intuition and concept. Fichte also saw the problem of the 'irrational' individual in its full panoply of possibilities, not just the minimal epistemological sense which starts with the multiplicity of 'bare' sense data, or the so-called 'brute' facts of history, but also the more cultural senses: the historical individual in its fullest manifestations of freedom and human emotions (the hero, genius, artist: LGS I, 17, 196, 205ff), the historical deeds of the Divine revealing Itself (LGS I, 226ff, 240ff) through interventions in human history in what is since called a Heilsgeschichte. These more surcharged manifestations of 'irrationality' or 'brute facticity' (LGS I, 173; 284: so Fichte) thus mark the entry into history of the unexplainably new, unprecedented and creative (LGS II, 206, 238). The degree to which this tradition is now forgotten — Oblivion again! — is measured by the fact that scholars have only recently discovered that the locus classicus of the early Heidegger's crucial term Faktizitdt is indeed this neo-Kantian tradition and can be traced back to the above-mentioned discussion in Fichte's later period (LGS I, 173, 179, 188, 214, 235, 238, 284, 290). The further task of evaluating what significance this historical root has for Heidegger's sense of facticity will clearly have to reckon with Lask as well as Natorp, Rickert and Windelband. Noteworthy in this very same context of the historical problem-situation motivating Heidegger's thought is a likewise nearly forgotten (!) French study of early twentieth-century German philosophy, which treats Lask at some length along with the ascendant school of phenomenologists. The study was written by the Fichte scholar, Georges Gurvitch, and appeared in 1930, at a time when phenomenology had not yet completely overpowered neo-Kantianism.7 Gurvitch finds the irrational hiatus manifesting itself in Husserl's positivism of material essences ineluctably irreducible to one another (65), in Scheler's emotional intuition of value essences (Chap. 2), in Lask's moment of logical nudity even of logical (categorial) forms (164f), in the alogical dispersion of forms through their matter, thereby making forms themselves opaque to one another (169 = LGS II, 63). All of these currents, and more, fuse in Heidegger's hermeneutics of existence (210), for example, in the irreducible equiprimordiality of existential categories, in the thrownness of emotive disposition, especially in the uncanniness of Angst. 'Anguish is the sentiment of the abyss, of the impenetrable and opaque hiatus irrationalis in which human existence is plunged' (215f), out of which the finitude of its radical temporality is reflected (229). Propaedeutic to 1919 The high praise of Lask that we find in the juvenilia continues unabated if anything, it escalates in philosophical circles in a post-war atmosphere of the heroization of 'fallen' philosophers like Adolf Reinach and Lask — in

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Heidegger's lecture courses of 1919. This is in striking contrast to the sharp polemic mounted here against the major representatives of neo-Kantianism, Windelband, Rickert and Natorp, in order to promote the cause of phenomenology. In siding with Lask against Lask's teacher, Heinrich Rickert, Heidegger notes that he was already expressing such criticisms as a student in Rickert's seminars in 1912—14 in reports on Lask's 'Theory of Judgment,' and 'encountering great resistance' from Rickert.8 This autobiographical testimonial indicates how early and how intensively Lask began to exercise his catalytic function, for which Heidegger both in his youth and old age repeatedly credits him, of mediating between Rickert (thus 'back to Kant') and the then already powerful influences of Aristotle and Husserl (that is, of his Logical Investigations', Ideas I did not appear until 1913). In his 1919 course on 'Phenomenology and Transcendental Value-Philosophy,' Heidegger observes that Lask 'went beyond Rickert under the guidance of insights from the Logical Investigations, without however taking the step into phenomenology,' even though he was well along on the way toward it (GABd. 56/57, 177, 180). What Heidegger is presenting to his students here was in fact common knowledge in 1918. Lukacs, for example, alludes to the phenomenological aspects of Lask in his obituary of that year. And Gurvitch in his 1930 study makes these aspects explicit: Lask's expansion of Kant's transcendental logic beyond Aristotle's categories of nature dictates that such categories themselves must have categories in order to become objects of knowledge. In turn, such categories of categories or 'forms of forms' imply a precognitive moment in which the initial forms first present themselves as simply given in their 'logical nudity,' in being lived (vecu) before they are known: ergo Husserl's categorial intuition (Gurvitch 160f=LSGII, 73ff, 126ff, 190). The very language of Lask's descriptions of the categorial forms enveloping (but not absorbing) their matter cannot help but remind Gurvitch of an objective counterpart of Husserl's intentionality: The forms are essentially in need of completion and fulfilment (erfiillungsbedurftig)', their basic attribute is that of pointing toward (Hinweisen) and being valid of (Hinge Iten) their matter; they are through and through and nothing but a relation, a Hin-\ thus the primal region of Logos casting light upon its manifold 'something' can be described as a Strahlenbuschel von Relationen, a bundle of rays of relations (Gurvitch 166f=LSG II, 58ff, 173ff, 330, 367-74).

1912

And Heidegger? The very first thing that the young Heidegger found in Lask, announced in the superlatives of first discovery in his 1912 review of 'Recent Studies in Logic,' is the demand to situate philosophy clearly and

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squarely in the Third Reich of the Logos as against that of entities, whether (1) physical or (2) metaphysical. Here we have the first appearance in Heidegger not only of the theme of the ontological difference but also that of its oblivion 'in the entire course of the history of philosophy,' which since Plato typically lapsed into 'hypostatizing the [3] logical into [2] metaphysical entities.' Lask's theory of categories is to be included among the great efforts of the past for having clearly singled out this domain of the logic of philosophy which, as a 'logic of logic' whose categories are always 'forms of forms,' of course still bears upon the material-constitutive logic of nature (structured, say, according to Aristotle's categories of being) as well as upon the more remote and general formal-reflexive logic. In relation to the former, the constitutive categories of philosophy are always insuperably paired with the constitutive categories of being (nature) in a dual seriality (Zweireihigkeif) whose very union of form and matter is the source of meaning, or better, is itself meaning. This constitutive relation in turn secures the basis for the more remote general-reflexive categories, beginning with the self-identical 'something in general,' which are without substantive or constitutive content since they are generated strictly in the sphere of the subjectivity. (The contrast offered by the reflexive category will play a crucial role in the next decade of Heidegger's methodological development of the 'formal indication.') Although perceiving the advantages of the sharp separation of logic from grammar in the logical interpretation of intractable grammatical forms such as the impersonal sentence, Heidegger will eventually, in a continuing endeavor to remain in touch with the concreteness of the human situation, oppose Lask's 'metagrammatical subject-predicate theory' as he expands his own investigations beyond a theory of categories to a theory of grammatical significations in the habilitation work of 1916.10 1915-16 The habilitation work represents the high point of Lask's influence on Heidegger. The reader steeped in Lask senses it even in the casual use of terms: dasAlldes Denkbaren as the scope of any system of categories (GA Bd. 1,212); Strahlenbuschel (335), Formgehalt (307, 323, 380), Gegenstandsbemachtigung (218; also 169, 177-8, 180-1), Herrschaftsbereich (dominion: 219, 237f, 314) and finally the study of the 'dominion of logical form' (383), a somewhat more open reference to the subtitle of Lask's Logik der Philosophie. More in the mainstream of the argument of the habilitation, which applies the insights of modern logic to a Scotian theory of categories and speech significations, is the repeated Laskian insistence (GABd. 1, 211, 263, 287f),

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reinforcing Scotus, that Aristotle's categories do not constitute the totality of categories but only a particular class of a particular domain of actuality, that of the real; that the meaning-giving acts of a speaker (especially if they are taken to be 'real') as well as his signifying intentions (either thought or spoken) as opposed to the Valid' ideal objects of such intentions belong to different domains, each with its own governing regional category (especially validity versus reality) differing in meaning from other such regionconstituting forms; if these different domains have their own logic, then there must be a logic which unifies and differentiates them, and this 'logic of logic' (GABd. 1, 288) will in turn have its own categories. What then is the master 'category of categories,' 'the ultimate and the highest, behind which we cannot inquire any further' (GABd. 1, 215: a formula that recalls Dilthey's regarding life!), the moment that pervades any cognizable object, 'objectness as such' (GABd. 1, 216)? Fusing the insights of his neoscholastic and transcendentalist mentors, the young Heidegger answers with ens commune ut maxime scibile (2l4f), the primary transcendental which is convertible with unum, verum, bonum (216), the 'something in general' (217) 'which is the condition of the possibility of knowing any object whatsoever' (215), in short, the matter of a reflexive category! Reflexive categories Among the neo-Kantians, Lask especially has studied the reflexive category (e.g. identity, difference, unity, multiplicity, plurality: Heidegger [GABd. 1, 335] refers to Lask LGS II, 137ff). Its reference is to anything there is. It can thus be called the ^^(LGSII, 130, 142, 155, 162ff, 254), that highest and purest form which is at once the thinnest and emptiest, which buys transparency at the price of depletion (LGS II, 158, 68), which is 'parasitical' (LGS II, 163) upon the constitutive forms and is 'created by the subjectivity' (GABd. 1, 335). The negative terms suggest that the reflexive category would be a prime example of the hyper-reflection and excessive intellectualizing that Lask traces back to the Greeks (LGS II, 202ff). But as a 'mere' surrogate of constitutive categories and dependent upon them, the reflexive category plays an indispensable albeit subordinate role in the field of categories. After all, what would we do without words like 'and' and (!) 'other'?, Lask observes at one point in their defence (LGS II, 164). Of course Lask, who seems inclined to include the mathematical among the reflexive categories (LGS II, 142, 167), might therefore be more predisposed to be positive about them, whereas the young Heidegger devotes many pages (GABd. 1, 220, 231—51) to distinguishing the transcendental one (— reflexive identity) from the numerical one. Heidegger thus links this neo-Kantian discussion with that of the medieval transcendental unum. Any ens or 'something' is at once one with

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itself and different from anything else. Any thing is therefore a relation (!) of 'hetero thesis' (Rickert's term), and this identity and difference which makes the one and the many 'equally primordial' (gleich ursprunglichl: GABd. 1, 216, 224, 230, 381) is in fact the minimal order or 'determinateness' necessary in order to apprehend any object at all (GABd. 1, 218, 224, 230f). At this most primitive level of (pre-objective!) givenness, 'there is (es gibf) no object, no object is given, when the One and the Other is not given' (GA Bd. 1, 231 citing Rickert); when we think of an object, we at once think of the one and the other. Even the barest 'thing,' here the pure logical object, is never isolated; 'in itself it is always already a relation in context. These minimal logical relations recur in the grammar of the noun and verb, e.g. in the simple sentence ens est. Equiprimordial with the noun ens is the state-of-affairs esse. 'Every object has its relational nexus (Bewandtnis), even if it is only a matter of being identical with itself and different from something else' (GABd. 1, 381). The apparent tautology ens est necessarily involves a heterology; a pure monism without opposites (with its implicit non-esse) cannot even be thought (Rickert). Invoking the unum which belongs to every ens adds nothing new to the object - based on a privation, 'not the other,' it has no positive content (GABd. 1, 221) — and yet it brings a clarity to the object by imparting some initial order to it, without which it could riot be thought or apprehended (GABd. 1, 224). In short, it imparts 'form,' removing the object from the realm of heterogeneity or 'absolute multiplicity,' that limit concept at the outskirts of any theory of categories (GABd. 1, 255). At this most primitive level of consideration, we most clearly see the first function of the muchbandied word 'form' in a theory of categories. Form means order (GABd. 1, 280), logos. 'When we say that empirical reality manifests a particular categorial structure, this means that it is formed, determined, ordered. The natural environing world (Umwelf) ... is already categorially determined ... it stands in an order' (GABd. 1, 255). Logicians accordingly like to speak of the 'logical place' of a phenomenon. Any cognizable phenomenon requires a particular place according to its content (yielding its Gehaltssinri), a particularization or determination which, as an order, is itself only possible on the basis of a relational system (yielding its Bezugssinn). 'Whatever has its logical place fits in a particular way into a relational whole (GA Bd. 1, 212). Adding the supernatural to the natural world brings us squarely into the medieval lifeworld (Erlebniswelp. GABd. 1, 409) whose order of analogy is far more complex than the univocal relations articulated by the reflexive categories above (255ff). Scotus went further and regarded this world to be primarily and radically composed of individuals each with their own form of individuality (haecceitas), their own 'this-here-now' (Dasein!), where the individuating categories of place and time suggest neither a univocal relational

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system nor an analogically graded world, but a 'boundless multiplicity' or 'heterogeneous continuum' (Rickert) of equiprimordial 'irreducible ultimates' which borders on the equivocal (GABd. 1, 252f). And yet the Young Heidegger insists that the reflexive categories play a 'predominant role' precisely in the complex of relations of identity and difference operative in the spectrum defined by univocity, analogicity and equivocity as these manifest themselves and function in judgements and speech significations (GABd. 1, 335, 404). A comparison of this spectrum of signifying functions with the reflexive categories reveals some remarkable similarities: 1. Both are clearly products of subjectivity. This connection between the categorial artifices, which Lask asserts are 'created by subjectivity,' and signifying functions 'which originate in the use of expressions in living thinking and knowing' (GA Bd. 1, 335; my emphasis) is one reason why Heidegger in the end will see the need to go beyond Lask's notoriously 'halfsided' (407)H transcendental logic, which gives 'primacy to the objective-logical' (LGS II, 376), in order to 'set the problem of the categories within the problem of the judgement and subject' (GABd. 1, 401), and still further, to set the fullness of this still schematic structure of intentionality within the concrete fullness of life (402, 406ff). In fact, Heidegger came upon this 'translogical' (405) task precisely in his study of the medieval theory of significations which, in its exploration of unified ideal-real structure of speech acts and their contents, 'manifests a sensitive and sure disposition of attunement to the immediate life of the subjectivity and its immanent contexts of meaning' (401). In this same context, Heidegger tantalizingly suggests that the variety of domains in any category system, even though they are differentiated from one another primarily in objective accordance with the actual domains themselves, at least to some extent receive their identitydifference correlations from the 'subjective side' which finds expression in the reflexive categories (404). 2. On the other hand, like constitutive categories, reflexive categories are still 'determined by matter,' even though it is no longer 'specific matter' but rather a 'diluted content reduced to mere contentness' (GABd. 1, 335). Signifying functions like analogicity, which differentiates an identical meaning in accord with different realms of actuality, are even more subject to this meaning-differentiating 'principle of the material determination of any form whatsoever' (GABd. 1, 31 Off). Such functions are moreover objectively anchored by the objective constellation of linguistic expressions and their directions of fulfilment (GABd. 1, 335f). 3. Finally, Lask attributes generality especially to the reflexive category, since its application is determined by no particular form or content (GABd. 1, 336). But in contrast to the categories of natural reality, and much like the reflexive category, linguistic forms of meaning also manifest a

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peculiar dilution and indeterminateness, which is precisely what makes them applicable to 'anything whatsoever,' the very matter of reflexive categories (GABd.1, 3l4f). Constitutive categories The above comparison suggests the sorts of correspondences which the young Heidegger is seeking to establish between the orders of language, knowledge and being (modus significandi, intelligendi, essendi) by way of a categorial scheme. As he moves from the transcendental unum to verum, does he uncover a richer and less superficial scheme than univocity and heterology, one more adequate to the analogical multiplicity of the domains and individuals which enter into the ultimately governing order of being? The first step is not particularly promising. Verum adds knowability to being, which is really nothing new for, as we have seen, this note is already contained in unum (GABd. 1, 267). Is there more than bare univocity implied in the general statement of verum, 'it can be known'? Indeed. For what we have here is nothing less than the 'essential union of the object of knowledge and the knowledge of the object' (GABd. 1, 402, 346), in short, the complex order of intentionality, which now becomes the 'operative concept' (Eugen Fink's word), the 'constitutive' category in Heidegger's modernizing interpretation of the medieval categories. This reversal from the subjective-reflexive to the objective-constitutive category will unfold by way of a parallel reversal in the ordering relations between form and matter which, it goes without saying (and apparently, in Freiburg in 1915, Heidegger did not have to say who his terminological source was), will be thoroughly permeated by Lask's hylomorphic account.12 An object known is an object (1) determined by knowledge (2) by conforming to a knowing subject, thereby undergoing a forming through knowledge. 'Form is really the factor which bestows determination' (GABd.l, 267). To be determined is to be 'affected' (hetroffen: touche in Gurvitch's French account of Lask) by form. The object thus comes to be (3) in knowledge, in the knowing subject, in anima. But the ens in anima is no longer a real being. Its being known has transformed it into an ens rationis, an ens logicum, for which moderns like Lotze (and so Lask) have found 'the felicitous expression "validity" ' (GABd. 1, 269). The 'is' of a judgement, where truth ultimately resides, no longer means 'exists' but rather 'is valid for.' What then is the relation between the domains of real being and 'unreal' ideal meaning, validity? Heidegger answers in both directions across domains: The non-validating kind of reality is given only in and through a validating sort of meaningful context (GABd. 1, 279). Or more in line with the above 'introverting' analysis of the relation of knowledge: 'It is only because I live in the validating element that I know about the existing element' (GABd. 1,280).

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Lask often expressed the same Husserlian point regarding living 'in truth' and thus knowing about things in highly suggestive hylomorphic terms (LGSII, 82, 86ff, 124, 190ff): I know the matter of thought in a mediate way only by living in the form through which I know. The form is immediately experienced but is itself not known. I live in categories as in contexts in which and through which I know the things 'included' in and by them. Matter is encompassed, embraced (umgriffen), surrounded or environed (umgeben) by the form; it is enveloped (umhullf), enclosed (umscklosseri), trimmed (verbrdmt) in the form (LGSII, 75f). This quick survey of just a few of the clearly exploratory and sometimes inventive metaphors used by Lask to express this insight is perhaps not an idle exercise, in view of the controversy generated by Lucien Goldmann and Georgy Lukacs. One could wonder whether such terms were suggestive enough to the early Heidegger in order for him to make the leap from 'category' to 'world' (cf. above, our opening paragraph), which is a central thrust of his first major breakthrough. If we already live in the encompassing forms, finding ourselves already ensconced in them and operating out of them toward the heterogeneous matter, then it is clear enough why 'the problem of the "application" of the categories loses its meaning.' Is this the 'transcendental-ontic interpretation of the concept of the object' implied in Lask's transcendental logic of which 'he in the end was perhaps not fully conscious,' which would yield 'a satisfying answer on how "unreal" "transcendent" sense guarantees us true actuality and objectivity' (GABd. 1, 406f)? Form shapes and determines objects and thus determines the order (world) in which the object finds its place, without which it could not be known. What is new here, over and above the self-identification opposing it to other (external) objects in the unum, is the internal correlation of form and matter 'within' the object. If form is regarded as the active determination of the matter to be known, '"embracing" (umklammern) the matter encountered in givenness, getting it as it were within its power' (GABd. 1, 281), if form is always directed to a matter which is never totally absorbed by it and thus always remains other than it, then the logical object itself noematically reflects the structure of intentionality. 'Forms are nothing but the objective expression of the different ways in which consciousness is intentionally drawn and related to the objective' (GABd. 1, 319). The purported form-matter dualism is bound by the unity of intentionality in the 'boundlessness of truth' (LGS II, 125ff). Accordingly, the regional category governing the logical realm is not validity but intentionality (GABd. 1, 283).14 And yet, whenever Heidegger makes this point, thus modifying Lask's Lotzean formulation (LGS II, 97ff), he almost invariably equates intentionality with Hingeltung, validation o f . . . (GABd. 1, 281, 283), Lask's preferred term to describe the functional relationship of form to its matter in the logical object. Upon first transposing his notion of Hingeltung into traditional hylomorphic terms, Lask observes

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that the objects of validity are intrinsically 'enclitic,' they have a fundamental need to 'nestle against' and 'lean upon' an other, and 'this dependence, this need to be toward an other and for an other, in accordance with a venerable terminology can be called the form character of validity' (LGSII, 32f, 93f). The kind of'reality' which belongs to 'esse verum is a relation, that of Gelten, and before it is a relation in a judgement: between subject and predicate (GABd. 1, 269f), it is a relation of form and matter 'within' the object itself, which, it may be recalled, is itself an external privative relation with any other object! Deficient 'empty' forms stand in need of'fulfilment' by matter. Thus far, it has only been noted that forms 'encompass' and 'affect' matter without totally absorbing or permeating it. Thus far, form has been the active determinant in our 'introverting' account, determining the matter of thought in order to draw it into the compass of knowledge. We must now turn outward from the order of knowing toward the order of being, to their interface where consciousness 'encounters' the object, where it is 'struck' by things and things are 'given' to it (GABd. 1, 281), or in our present terms, where form 'hits' (meets, touches) matter and, by the very nature of the encounter, is itself hit, affected, determined. The reversal in the direction of 'determination' is crucial, reflecting not only the transformation of Kantian inwardness into phenomenological outwardness but, more to the point being made here, also the transformation of a hitherto univocal reflexive category of truth as 'pure' validity into a constitutive category amenable to the 'order of analogy in the world of real sensory and suprasensory objects' (GABd. 1, 282). More specifically, this reversal gradually develops, at first as a suggestive undercurrent (GABd. 1, 251, 256, 264f, 280, 287), which then surfaces rather late in Heidegger's text (310—21), in order finally to become one of the central themes in his Conclusion (402—7), by way of the above-mentioned 'principle of the material determination of form,' i.e. of the determination of form by matter, which in language and content is clearly an outgrowth of Lask's 'doctrine of the differentiation of meaning' (LGSII, 58ff, 102, 169). What exactly does matter, traditionally the receptive 'substrate,' do to form? Heidegger provides the answer quite early (GABd. 1, 251): 'Form is a correlative concept; form is form of a matter, every matter stands in a form. Matter moreover stands in a form befitting it; put differently, form receives its meaning (Bedeutung) from matter.' Put in reverse once more, form accommodates ('tailors': LGS II, 59) itself to a particular matter such that it is itself particularized by meaning. Meaning is thus the fruit of the union of form and matter. Meaning is that very union, which is why the ultimate answer to the question 'whence sense?' cannot really be 'matter' but instead 'by way of matter' or 'relatedness to matter.' The 'moment of meaning' is the 'relatedness of the validlike to the outside' (LGSII, 170). The answer is not at all surprising, in view of the 'operative concept' of intentionality

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which governs the analysis. From the standpoint of 'pure' form, meaning is an 'excess' arising from its reference 'to a something lying outside of it' which Lask views as a kind of fall of pure form from the realm of 'pure' validity into a 'lower' realm mediating the univocal homogeneity of the logical realm (sic Heidegger, GABd. 1, 282) with the 'multiplicity of all that is alien to validity,' with the 'opaqueness, impenetrability, incomprehensibility' and 'irrationality of matter' (LGS II, 59—61, 77). Form accommodating itself to the multiplicity of matter yields the 'impure' middle realm of meaning. The 'moment of meaning' is accordingly the 'principle of individuation' which particularizes and differentiates forms, the 'principle of plurality in the [otherwise homogeneous] sphere of validity' (LGS II, 61), multiplying forms as it specifies them. Form 'burdened' with meaning thus becomes the fuller and more 'specific' constitutive form, 'the categorial determination called for by non-validating matter,' which 'lets the essence of matter shine through, as it were' (LGS II, 172, 103). The constitutive form is accordingly an intrinsic 'reflection of material determination' (LGS II, 65: the only occurrence of Materialsbestimmtheit in Lask; note, however, that Heidegger's term in his principle is invariably without the intermediate V). It is a more determined form which has undergone a Formbestimmtheit (LGS II, 58)15 relating it to a particular matter; i.e. it is a form oriented toward being fulfilled by its own very particular content. What does the young Heidegger draw from this hyperreflective quasitheological story of the genesis and nature of the constitutive category? Leaving aside the Plotinian overtones, Heidegger quickly brings the counterKantian, phenomenological thrust of the analysis in tandem with the central thrust of his own investigation, namely the task of distinguishing and at once characterizing the various realms of reality (GABd. 1, 232, 287, 400). He does this by identifying the starting point and specifying the attitude toward the constitutive category and its domains which he has in common with Lask: 'That there are different domains of actuality cannot be proved a priori by deductive means. Facticities can only be pointed out. What is the sense of this showing, this demonstrative display?' (GABd. 1, 213). Or, in discussing the mathematical domain in regard to its constitutive category of quantity, he observes: 'To give a schoolbook definition of it will not be possible, since it is an ultimate, something which is "last". Its essence can only be described, pointed out (notifican? (247), 'read off (abgelesen: 255, 315, 321, 404)16 from the actuality itself. However, the articulation of especially the nonsensory, logical and psychic domains is 'enormously difficult,' where even the language is lacking and we tend to fall back upon the physical domain of nature for inadequate and ponderous circumlocutions. But it is precisely in such instances that the indeterminate 'dilution' of reflexive categories plays an indispensable starting role in developing more suitable descriptive categories (GABd. 1, 315). It is therefore not out of line, and even necessary,

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to embark first upon some 'general considerations' (214) oriented toward explicating the 'descriptive content' (201f) latent in certain traditional approaches to the Problem of Categories. For the systematic treatment of a philosophical problem cannot really be separated from a concomitant historical treatment (GABd. 1, 412, 196ff). But in the end, this 'strictly conceptual' historical approach is 'one-sided' and will have to be completed by a systematic return to the full concreteness of life (GABd. 1, 400ff). Lask likewise opposes Kant's 'purely logical' deduction of the categories, because they are after all 'not logical through and through . . . but arise from alogical material' and so find their order in a material logic; 'we can determine their place only by way of a detour across this matter, persistently looking at it and regarding its stufflike nature' (LGS II, 62f). Also, contrary to Hegel's panlogism, the individual forms are not intertwined by reciprocal logical relations. They stand before us in a reciprocal heterogeneity and irreducible multiplicity. The pure forms in which we stand at most give us the inner light by which to regard their matter, since it is also being reflected from the impenetrable surface of matter's brute facticity. In our encounter with this interface of facticity, we can only accept its alogical order of being and resign ourselves to the limits of reason. The young Heidegger, concerned with the explication of texts and concepts in the process of'doing a dissertation,' nevertheless already displays a remarkable propensity for cutting through the verbiage of exegetical content in order to expose and describe the moments of'brute' encounter at the interface between knowing and being, or speaking and being. This is particularly evident in his handling of simplex apprehensio versus judicium (GABd. 1, 267—81), but it also surfaces in the categorial problems of analogicity (255—65, 333—6) and the differentiation of forms of signification (310—21). At this stage, I must be content with a cursory summary of these themes by tracing them with some dispatch back to their intersection in the fulcrum 'principle of the material determination of form,' to the 'ground and keystone of the knowledge of an object' (305), in short, back to 'the matter itself.' The truth of'simplex apprehensio,' of simply having an object, has as its opposite not falsehood but rather non-acquaintance (Nichtkenntnis), not being conscious of. But in a certain sense, simply pro-posing (Vor-stellen) something, simply bringing it to givenness, can also be called false, when it apprehends the object in a determination not befitting (zukommenden: Lask's term for form-fitting, e.g. LGS II, 333) it. This intrinsically false meaning can nevertheless come to consciousness. Even if it does not admit of objective fulfilment, it is still something objective, a 'quid nominis? a meaning independent of judicative characterization. Because the given precisely as given always becomes an object, simple pro-posing is in turn

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always 'true . . . . The truth is consummated in givenness and does not extend beyond it' (GABd. 1, 267f). With these sentences which introduce his one sustained account of the judgement, Heidegger first clearly broaches the radical pre-judicative level of direct acquaintance with 'bare' givenness, which Lask liked to call the 'supraoppositional' stratum precisely because it precedes the judicative opposition between true and false sentences. And yet, at this rudimentary level, there is another, more pervasive, and 'boundless' truth, 'the truth in itself which is identical with meaning (LGS II, 129) which in turn, as the fruit of the union of form and matter, is identical with the object populating this level, the 'ideal object' then much discussed in the war against psychologism. The conflation of terms tells us where we are within the relation of intentionality, namely, 'oriented toward objectness (modus essendi) in the noematic realm' (GABd. 1, 310), the realm of meaning pure and simple. Modus essendi activus A similar conflation occurs between the 'modes' or orders (ratione) of being, knowing and signifying, precisely by way of the above limit-possibility of a misfit meaning, therefore false, which nevertheless achieves objectness and is therefore true (intelligible, meaningful). The question is really that of the scope of the sphere of meaning (ergo of a category system) in order to have it include every possible object of knowledge, including privations, fictions, perhaps contradictions like 'square circles' (they were excluded on p. 220), indeed non-being itself. 'After all, "non ens" is also an object of knowledge, enters into judgements, is apprehended in meanings and signified by words' (288), which accordingly has its own actuality, if not reality. Putting the question at its simplest: We speak and think about reality. Granting the indispensable role of the first two modes (significandi and intelligendi), how are we to understand the third (essendi)^ What then are we to include in 'reality'? The three orders conflate when we take speaking and thinking 'passively,' i.e. noematically, in terms of their object or 'matter' of concern, namely, reality. Their matters converge and coincide with the governing matter of reality, the 'about which' of their concern. This is the universal realityprinciple, the 'principle of the material determination of every form' (GABd. 1, 311, 314, 315, 317). It dictates that the particular forms of signification (say, of parts of speech) be derived or 'read off (315, 321) from the 'givenness' (modus essendi) of reality in its 'form differentiating' or 'meaning differentiating function' (314, 316). But what about privative meanings like 'blind,' which refer to something lacking or missing in reality, therefore absent from reality? The young Heidegger's initial response: 'Form can also be determined from somewhere else, with the proviso that the form does not

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contradict the matter for which it is to be the form, i.e. provided ... that the matter tolerates this forming' (312). And his solution: A privation is to be understood as an ens rationis. Its reality is precisely its being known (313). There is more to reality than meets the eye. The modus essendi must include 'not only the real actuality of nature but also the non-sensory logical, the known as known, and thereby anything objective whatever. The modus essendi coincides with the universal domain of "something in general," circumscribed by the primal category of ens (314: my emphasis). His conclusion: 'The forms of meaning (modi significandi) are thus read off under the guidance of the given (modus essendi), which in turn is givenness only as known (in the modus intelligendi)' (312). One might also add that the modus essendi would in turn also have to include the linguistic modes of signification which it serves to articulate and differentiate. Thus, for example, when he identifies intentionality with Lask's Hingeltung, Heidegger likewise brings 'assertibility' into the equation (GABd. 1, 281). What then is reality? 'The modus essendi is whatever can be experienced and lived (das Erlebbare), in the absolute sense whatever stands over against consciousness, the 'robust' reality which irresistibly forces itself upon consciousness and can never nor again be put aside and eliminated' (GABd. 1, 318). The overriding sense of fact!city emanating from this passage has been building ever since Heidegger mentioned the fact of different domains of reality, whose very difference cannot be proven but only pointed out, shown. 7 'Whatever gets pointed out stands before us in its selfness and, graphically put, can be grasped immediately . . . . Regarding the immediate there can be no doubt, probability and delusions. For, as immediate, it has, as it were, nothing between itself and the apprehension (simplex apprehensio)' (GABd. 1, 213). And we get hints of it in the analogical distribution of an identical meaning differentiated 'in each case' (je) in accord with 'the inherent differentiation of meaning coming from the domains of reality themselves,' and so 'determined by the nature of the domains' to which the meaning is applied (GABd. 1, 256f, 287). A few years later, the small German distributive je, so easy to ignore (it often is by translators), becomes the veritable mark of the facticity of Dasein, which in formal indication is 'in each case (je) mine.' But by now, it should be evident that the Young Heidegger is also working at cross-purposes with his mentors regarding the basic 'noetic' character of this rudimentary level of givenness and meaning, reflected in terms like simple apprehension, direct acquaintance (Kenntnis), pre-judicative cognizance and finally 'lived experience' (Erleben). Is it living or knowing, or perhaps both at once? What exactly is the modus essendi activtis (GA Bd. 1, 320; my boldface) analogous to the active noetic correlate in the orders of knowing and signifying? What is the character of the immediate experience corresponding to immediate givenness? This question of a rudimentary 'understanding

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of being' is at least speculatively 'mirrored' in the remarkable 'backtracking' into the Scotian text (or, if you will, 'reduction' or 'deconstruction' of) which we have been following. The crucial pages (GABd. 1, 317—20) bear closer scrutiny, inasmuch as they are invariably missed or botched or balked by virtually all commentators, much to their detriment, especially in understanding the much-remarked Eckhartian footnote in the Conclusion (402), which refers more or less explicitly back to those pages. In the words of one commentator, 'it would make no sense to speak of a modus essendi activus apparently because, when it comes to the given, all that one can ultimately say is 'that is how the things themselves are.'18 But 'brute' facticity is not the last word for medieval man, who can always go on to say 'God made it that way'; likewise not for the young Heidegger, who is still operating wholeheartedly out of the medieval worldview (GABd. 1, 409; his Vorhabe in common with 'Scotus'). And it is precisely those allusions to the ultimate baseline of medieval experience, namely, to that 'distinctive form of inner existence anchored in the transcendent Ur-relationship of the soul to God' (GA Bd. 1, 409), that he now draws out of the Scotian text. Heidegger begins his final 'backtrack' here by observing that all three modes, though they converge noematically by being one in their matter, nevertheless differ in form, in the regard in which that matter is taken, where he clearly includes the modus essendi among them (GABd. 1, 317f). What then is its form, especially if we recall that 'forms are nothing but the objective expression of the various ways in which consciousness is intentionally related to the objective'? (319). What is striking here is that 'Scotus,' even though he never explicitly speaks of a modus essendi activus (as the young Heidegger explicitly does, p. 320), nevertheless invests this mode with a particular ratio, thereby making it 'approach the character of a determinateness of form, which must correspond to the character of an act.' What then are 'the acts in which immediate givenness actually becomes conscious?' (320). The answer can no longer be put off: The modus essendi is the immediately given empirical reality sub ratione existentiae. There is something significant here which must be noted: Duns Scotus characterizes even this empirical reality as standing under a 'ratio,' a point of view, a form, an intentional nexus (Beivandtnis)', this is nothing less than what is nowadays being said in the following terms: Even 'givenness' already manifests a categorial determination' (GABd. 1, 318). In Rickert's words, what we have here are the 'most rudimentary logical problems' which force us to 'draw even "pre-scientific" knowing into the sphere of our investigation' (ibid.}. Or in our terms, the immediate experience corresponding to immediate givenness is that of 'a categorial determination,' it is a categorial experience, in short, it is what Husserl called a categorial intuition. Lask's way of putting it is particularly telling in this nexus of thoughts and thinkers. In a fascinating but elusive chapter on 'Living and Knowing,' Lask

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speaks of an immediate experience not only of the so-called 'sense-data,' but in particular of the non-sensory as it is in its first occurrence, 'as a pretheoretical something' in which we first simply live before we know it. So far, this only repeats what has been said above regarding Lask's transposition of Husserl's 'categorial intuition' into his own framework. But then he continues in a decidedly 'mystical' vein with his descriptions and examples. In brief summary: Our first experience of categories is such that we are 'lost' in them in 'pure absorption,' for example in aesthetic, ethical or religious 'dedication' (Hingabe: LGS II, 191; but also 56, 85, 103, 129, 132 et passim) in which we find ourselves simply 'given over' to the given form, meaning, value (LGS II, 191). This is the life especially 'deserving' of philosophical study, 'not brute factic life but rather the sphere of immediate experience replete with value, of life already made worthwhile' (LGS II, 196). And this is precisely what the young Heidegger finds in the medieval experience of reality sub ratione existentiae, namely, the immediate experience of the transcendental verum and bonum convertible with esse existentiae, according to which 'to be' is at once 'to be true' because reality is in intrinsic conformity with the mind of its Maker. Or, put in a term relating to the above discussion of the transcendental realm of meaning, the scholastic doctrine of ontological truth, of the conformity of being with (especially the divine) intellect, yields the result that being is intrinsically intelligible, and so, put noetically, intellectualizable by intellectually disposed beings. The latter also yields, inasmuch as being is primum in intellecto and so the primum intelligibilium, what Heidegger will later prefer to call an initially preontological 'understanding of being' (SZ 7; 26—7) definitive of Dasein. But what is especially tantalizing in this nexus is not so much the early anticipation of this keystone of Heidegger's hermeneutic ontology: in early 1919, 'understanding' is openly identified with categorial intuition; shortly thereafter, the Husserlian experience of truth in evidence, Selbsthabe, is used to express the fulfilment of the self in authenticity, thus placing the medieval equation of being and truth on the level of personal conation. What is especially fascinating is the shadowy presence of Laskian terms like Hingabe and Bewandtnis within this nuclear fusion of terms outlining the rudimentary transcendental realm of intentionality and meaning, and so planted into the seedbed out of which Heidegger's concepts will grow. The multi-faceted Hingabe (submission, resignation, self-abandonment, devotion, dedication), used by Lask first in a pre-decisional way, i.e. finding oneself already absorbed in meaning, puts us in a direct line toward not only pre-volitional Befindlichkeit but also the more volitional, Eckhartian Gelassenheit (lettingbe, releasement, abandonment). The Young Heidegger uses the term Hingabe once, to characterize the medieval's high regard for tradition in the attitude of 'absolute devotion to and passionate immersion in the transmitted body of knowledge.' This 'giving of oneself over to the matter' explains why 'the

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value of the subject matter' prevailed over that of the subject (GABd. 1, 198). Aside from being an early articulation of authentic historicity, this is the earliest example in the text of the intentional receptivity implicit in the 'principle of the material determination of form.'

PMDF The principle itself first clearly emerged, according to Heidegger's retrospective summary in the Conclusion, by way of a study of the medieval doctrine of significations. 'Duns Scotus's task of analysing a particular level of act, that of the modus significandi, forces him to go into the sphere of acts as such and to establish some fundamental matters regarding the individual levels of acts (modus significandi, intelligendi, essendf) and their relationship to one another' (GABd. 1, 401). (After a year's time, the young Heidegger's textual discovery is still very much on his mind!) He continues: 'The very existence of a doctrine of significations within medieval scholasticism reveals a fine disposition to tune in on the immediate life of the subjectivity and its immanent contexts of meaning, without however acquiring a precise concept of the subject' (ibid.). Nevertheless, this return to a fundamental sphere of subjectivity, the levels of acts, 'leads to the principle of the material determination of every form which, in its turn and for its part, includes the fundamental correlation of object and subject' (402). It is from this most fundamental correlation of the 'understanding of being' suggested by the above modernizing of the medieval verum that 'Eckhart's mysticism first receives its philosophical interpretation and appraisal in connection with the metaphysics of the problem of truth' (402 n). But Heidegger did not hold his course on medieval mysticism and Eckhart, announced for the Winter Semester of 1919—20. Thus, the very first clear application that we got from Heidegger's publications of such 'mystical' structures of receptivity, in particular, of the attitude of'letting be' inherent in the unio mystica, took us from the sublime to the mundane. In the 'absorption' of the craftsman in his world of 'handy' tools, in his 'submission' (SZ 87; 120—1) to that world which meaningfully organizes his tools, tasks and materials, the truly responsive craftsman understands, 'knows how' to let his tool serve its purpose by yielding to its tasks and being compliant to the appliant material that it works, i.e. to let it take its course along the paths prescribed by his world, to let it 'do its thing'; or, in Heidegger's words, 'to let something handy be so-and-so as it already is and in order that it be such' (SZ 84; 115-17). From this letting serve, deploy, comply and so letting be, we can in turn quite naturally 'read off the very being of the handy tool, its being-such and so-and-so, namely its appliant deployment, its Bewandtnis (SZ84ff; 115ff)! In applying Lask's alternative

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word for form and order to a 'system of relations' (SZ 88; 122) far richer than that schematized, say, by a reflexive category, the Early Heidegger has clearly travelled some distance from the old hylornorphic framework he himself once employed. Although he himself never wrote what he, in his critique of Lask in the Conclusion of 1916, already deemed indispensable, namely 'a fundamental investigation of the value and limits of this form-matter duplicity' (GABd. 1, 405), he nevertheless indicated the direction of such a deconstruction shortly thereafter, in his critique of thinkers like Natorp.19 But even this story is too long to be told here, especially in regard to a word like Bewandtnis, in my opinion the most difficult of the early Heidegger's words for the translator. But some light can perhaps be thrown on this translator's problem by summarizing how the Young Heidegger first appropriates this word from Lask. Bewandtnis, as an alternative word for form (logos, ratio), quite naturally first appears with the introduction of the concept of form (GABd. 1, 223). In relation to matter, it is a 'how' word, the way in which matter is taken, viewed, faced, regarded, namely, 'as' such-and-such or so-and-so. To the question 'How?' one answers 'So!' Bewandtnis thus specifies the 'with regard to' (hinsichtlich), the 'in view of (gegeniiber), e.g. matter 'as to' its quantity, the regional category generating and ordering the domain of mathematics (GABd. 1, 235). One problem: Is such an ordering regard noetic or noematic? Is Bewandtnis the regarding that orders or the order that results from the regard, the facing or the facet? Or should perhaps, thirdly, the direction of the regard be stressed, i.e. the perspective, angle, slant, tilt, inclinatio (GABd. 1, 387), bearing, which gives the object a noematic 'bent' or 'twist', thus highlighting a certain facet or aspect of it? Thus, in the sentence ens est, the verb-form 'declines' the noun-matter in a certain direction (ibid.), bringing out a specific aspect or face(t). Accordingly, being 'something,' being a 'what' (Et-was), is called the 'primal face' (Urbewandtnis) of everything which is and can be an object (GABd. 1, 346). (Soon, eidos is called the 'look' of an object by Heidegger.) So far, in my translation of two places out of the text, I have vacillated between the first two, more generic senses, going from the noematic 'relational order' to the noetic 'intentional ordering.' Let me try a few more passages in conjunction with the third sense, the sense of direction (directed stance, bearing), beginning with its first appearance: 'All that stands "over against" and "in relation to" the I in experience is somehow apprehended. The relation of "vis-a-vis" itself is already a certain regard (a respectus), a bearing (Bewandtnis) which it has with the object' (GABd. 1, 223). Accordingly, once the minimal order of the reflexive category is in place, it can be said: ' Through the unum, there is [it has] a certain bearing with the object' (224; my italics). The bearing is together with the object: In other words, the noetic bearing-to wards (or upon) is immediately correlatively reflected in the noematic bearing of the

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object. Thus, Bewandtnis always 'analytically needs an object upon which it can, as it were, support itself (388). The prepositions are ultimately the key to understanding our term, which itself is a preposition in disguise controlling a cluster of prepositions. In one fascinating passage, Lask brings many of them together, emphasizing the most important: 'To know something thus always means: to have something else before oneself, namely, a categorial form in regard to or concerning ['touching'] it, to apprehend the truth about and clarity over it, to be aware of the objective bearing which it has with it, thus always to experience something about it and around it' (LGS II, 82).20 Even the unemphasized prepositions are worth pondering, as anyone who has studied the early Heidegger's analysis of the world 'around' (um) us knows; perhaps even someone who just thoughtfully looks 'about' in order to ponder what that world is 'about' and says 'about' us. Then consider the hapless translator already suspended between two overlapping but not really coincident linguistic networks of prepositions; add to that the transposition from a hylomorphic to a mundane network; and there you have the problem of translating the net surrounding Bewandtnis from Heideggerian German into the King's English (as well as virtually every other language)! A last, albeit still incomplete look at the Conclusion, * to flesh out a bit further the young Heidegger's project of a 'translogical' philosophy of life, will provide a springboard into the 1919 courses, whose basic thrust is likewise geared 'Toward the Definition and Mission of Philosophy'. 22 The operative concept defining the object of philosophy in 1916 is intentionality, which is no longer to be regarded as just a theoretical attitude, but is to find its concretion in the fullness of the 'living spirit' (Friedrich Schlegel's term), which in turn is a 'historical spirit in the broadest sense of the word' (GABd. 1, 406f). The ground shifts from an epistemology to a metaphysics, and the metaphysics of truth now becomes a metaphysics of history with truth as its telos. On the one hand, in keeping with the full medieval sense of verum, Heidegger would seek insight into the ultimate 'still point' of intentionality correlative to the realm of 'supraoppositionality' (ibid.) in a study of the phenomenon of mysticism, especially Eckhart's account of it (GABd. 1, 402n, 410). On the other hand, in keeping with the modernizing of such categories, such a metaphysics of God and the world (GABd. 1, 264) will include 'the task of an ultimate metaphysical-teleologicai interpretation of consciousness, [for] in it the valueladen already lives in primal authenticity insofar as consciousness is meaningful living deed which realises sense' (GABd. 1, 406). This statement of purpose has a Fichtean tone23 and has already surfaced in Lask's singling out of'the sphere of immediate experience replete with value' (LGS II, 196), which includes ethical, aesthetic, religious as well as theoretical values, as the true and full object of philosophy. This sphere is in fact history, the arena of 'value formation' (GABd. 1, 410) correlative to the living spirit in 'the entire

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fullness of its accomplishments' (408). History so understood and 'teleologically construed in the manner of a philosophy of culture must become a meaning-determining element [i.e. a form-differentiating matter, a realityprinciple] for the problem of the categories' (ibid.). Such a broadly based 'cosmos of categories' governed by the principle of analogy, in replacing the current 'inadequate and schematic table of categories,' would provide the conceptual means 'to bring to life and to comprehend individual epochs of intellectual history' along with the 'qualitatively filled and value-laden lifeworld' correlative to each. The young Heidegger is interested especially in the 'medieval worldview,' which is 'so radically and consciously teleologically oriented' (GABd. 1, 408f). This, after all, is what he himself ultimately expects from his own modernized metaphysics - a 'genuine optic' (GA Bd. 1, 406) ... a worldview! While it to some extent presages what is soon to come (the historical ego immersed in the environing world), Heidegger's statement of the return to historical life clearly still relies heavily upon the vocabulary of the transcendental philosophy of values. In the context: of this Conclusion, Lask is the only one of this persuasion who is openly confronted (GABd. 1, 405—7), in both praise and criticism, and more (as we have seen) in conjunction with the two tasks propaedeutic to this third, namely, domain differentiation and the inclusion of subjectivity in the transcendental realm. In Lask, Heidegger sees a kindred spirit in the effort to return to the concrete, where 'supraoppositionality' is an especially 'fruitful element' in bringing together a number of competing epistemologies. But the obverse to this are the complications thereby introduced into the problem of opposition and thus of value. How are values and their negative poles distinguished? Is the value of validity a form of 'ought' or a peculiar sort of 'being'? These are the questions that Heidegger hopes to clarify by the return to life, which he assumes, as Lask does, to be already fraught with values. In explicit conjunction with such questions stemming from Lask and in response to the need to supplement Lask where he has not gone far enough, the young Heidegger promises a more thoroughgoing investigation on 'Being, Value, and Negation' (GABd. 1, 407n). This promise is in some part fulfilled by the courses of 1919, but only after undergoing one final, crucial purification, which amounts to a 'metabasis eis allo genos'. 1919

In view of my chosen theme, treatment of the revolutionary courses of 1919, which blaze the trail that eventually leads to Being and Time, must be selective and sparse. At this stage, I am more interested in how the early Heidegger is developing from Lask's neo-Kantian context rather than where he is going (cf. Genesis Chap. 1). The following retrospectives will simply serve both to

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bridge the gap and to measure the leap between 1916 and 1919. Our first question: What now happens to the young Heidegger's concluding philosophical hybrid of a phenomenological neo-Kantianism laced with medieval metaphysics? The focus of the question now falls upon the neo-Kantianism, already partially transformed because of the hybridizing, in part through Lask. For the first task of the 1919 courses is to set phenomenology off as sharply as possible from neo-Kantianism, especially the branch called 'transcendental value-philosophy,' beginning with Windelband and ending with Lask. In view of his own close alliance with this branch, the courses represent for Heidegger a personal exercise in self-deconstruction that involved a distantiation from his former teacher, Rickert. A sharp contrast is dictated by the very proximity of the two schools. In 1919, both approaches in particular lay claim to the venerable ambition of establishing philosophy as the 'primal' or 'original' science (Urwissenschafi). Both seek to determine origins and ultimates, the first and the last things, the underived from which all else is derived, which can only be 'shown' or 'pointed out' but not 'proven,' thereby inexorably implicating the original science in a circle, assuming in the beginning what it wishes to find in the end. What, for example, is the 'original leap' (Ur-sprung: GABd. 56/57, 24, 31, 60, 95 = 218, 230, 305 in the habilitation) of thinking or knowing, the point from which it gets its start? Phenomenology places this search for origins under the motto, 'zu den Sachen selbst.' The young Heidegger adds a metaphysical note to this regress toward origins, this search for the 'primal leap,' by asserting that philosophy's real mission is to get beyond the surface of things and to aim at 'a breakthrough into true reality and real truth' (GABd. 1, 406). It is therefore striking when Windelband uses the same word to describe the neo-Kantian quest in terms which are unequivocally opposed to all 'metaphysical hypostatizing.' For the primal science is not metaphysical but instead 'critical,' and the breakthrough that it seeks is not toward reality but toward reason. It is not after what actually is but what ought to be, those normative values in every sphere of human activity - cognitive, practical, emotive - which are universally valid even when they are not in fact so acknowledged. Thus the 'fundamental fact of philosophy' (cf. GABd. 56/57, 153) is the 'conviction' (!) that 'there are' such norms. 'Philosophy is thus the science of the normal consciousness. It searches through the empirical consciousness in order to establish the points of saliency within it where such a normative universal-validity "leaps out".' Working on the basis of the conviction that 'here and there' within the movements of natural necessity of the empirical consciousness a higher necessity 'now and then' appears, 'philosophy looks for those points at which such a necessity breaks through (my emphasis). Accordingly, the very idea of philosophy, as the science of the consciousness of these norms, is itself an ideal concept realizable only within

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limits. As a product of the human spirit, it is closely tied to the history of that spirit, which in the pursuit of its particular problems on occasion makes the 'breakthrough' to the consciousness of universal norms. The history of philosophy is in like fashion teleologically oriented, depicting in its progress an ever deeper and more comprehensive grasp of the normal consciousness. But the teleological necessity which it exposes, whenever and wherever 'the immediate evidence of normative validity comes to light/ neither explains nor describes 'brute' reality as such, its natural necessity or the acknowledgement thereof. The critical-teleological method is indifferent to factual acknowledgement. Philosophy's sole role is simply to show that, in such necessities in fact acknowledged, there is another necessity whose validity must be acknowledged unconditionally, if certain goals are to be (ought to be?: sotten 'unclear' here! See GABd. 56/57, 154) fulfilled. These are the norms which have to hold if the human being wants its particular activity to be fulfilled in absolute fashion: for thinking to be true, for willing to be good, for feeling to apprehend beauty.25 Even the young Heidegger had begun to point out the ambiguities of 'being' in this formidable system of values built upon Lotze's distinction between being and validity (GABd. 1, 347). And from early 1919 on, the early Heidegger will embark on a path which, in SS 1920, leads to the explicit naming of 'facticity' as the positive leitmotif of his thought, in effect adopting a term from neo-Kantianism in blatant provocation against it. But before taking a look at this course of development, one should at least note that the later Windelband himself yields to 'a certain metaphysical pressure' (GABd. 1, 415) within his System and makes room for a metaphysics precisely in his philosophy of religion. One therefore cannot exclude one final possibility of rapprochement between him and the young Heidegger, who clearly also has a philosophy of religion on his mind (GABd. 1, 205f, 402 n) in his quest for a 'breakthrough to true reality and real truth.' Windelband's essay is entitled 'The Holy,' which is identified as the goal, norm and ideal of religion. The holy is not just one more value alongside the others but rather the value which comprehends the others. The 'crux of the holy' (GABd. 56/57, 145 n) is moreover not just the unity of the true, good and beautiful, but also their reality. It is the absolute telos ('true reality and real truth'!) which 'lifts' the distinction between being and value. 'The holy is thus the normal consciousness of the true, good and beautiful experienced as transcendent reality.' Religion is transcendent, meta-physical life. Thus, at the very limits of the reflection carried out by the critical sciences of values (logic, ethics, aesthetics), there emerges a belief in the really real, 'the conviction that the norm of reason is not our invention or illusion, but rather a value which is grounded in the ultimate depths of the reality of the world.'26 The early Heidegger therefore has grounds to conclude, on the opening day (February 7, 1919) of his course on 'The Idea of Philosophy and the

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Problem of Worldviews,' that the critical science of values, despite its antimetaphysical animus, 'based as it is on the basic acts of consciousness and their norms, has in its system an ultimate and necessary tendency toward a worldview' (GABd. 56/57, 12). And breaking with his own earlier desire for a metaphysical 'optic' as well as with the entire tradition of philosophy, he proposes, as an opening thesis, that philosophy and worldview have absolutely nothing to do with each other. The course thus places itself in pursuit of 'a brand new conception of philosophy . . . which would have to place it outside of any connection with the ultimate human questions' (GABd. 56/57, 11). And if philosophy is still to be the Ur-science, this would necessarily entail an entirely new conception of origins and ends, the first and the last things. Philosophy itself, in its entirety, now becomes a problem: in its starting point, subject matter, method, and goal. What then is The Idea of Philosophy? As promised in the Conclusion of 1916, the course moves, albeit slowly and laboriously, to displace the neo-Kantian starting point for the original science in 'the fact' of thinking and knowing with the phenomenological starting point in life and experience. Situating the original domain of philosophy beyond the theoretical in a 'pre-theoretical something' at once overcomes the circularity of presupposition and proof which characterizes the neo-Kantian Idea of Philosophy. The principles and structures developed in 1916, largely by way of Lask's catalytic role, play a significant part in this movement of displacement. The following selective summary of the course27 will focus on the strategic use of those principles and structures - PMDF, reflexive versus constitutive categories, Hingabey etc. — in that deconstruction and regression toward the original domain of the 'environmental experience' and of 'life in and for itself.' The Principle of the Material Determination of Form surfaces already in the second hour, in the specification of the Idea of the primal science. As a Kantian Idea, as an infinite task, it must be left open to further determination. Any further determination of the Idea depends on the content of the object of the Idea, i.e. on the 'regional essence' or categorial character of the object which motivates the search (GABd. 56/57, 15). The problem of Material Determination then gradually but inexorably displaces the teleological determination that the 'forms and norms of thought' provide. In order to found the laws of thought in an ideal and normative manner rather than in actual fact, the teleological method is at first sharply set off from the genetic-psychological method. But in order to offset the abstract constructivism of the early Fichte's 'dialectical-teleological method,' the 'critical-dialectical method' allows for, in fact is in need of, a 'material clue' or 'guideline' (Leitfaden: GABd. 56/57, 37 = GABd. 1, 321!) simply to find the points at which the goal of reason is 'realized.' Thus, for example, philosophy 'borrows' from psychology the material distinction of psychic functions into

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thinking, willing and feeling, on the basis of which it then proceeds to articulate the normative domains into the true, good and beautiful. But in the end, psychology offers only the formal characteristics: 'The real content, the formations of rational values, is first shown in history, which is the true organon of critical philosophy. The historical formations of cultural life are the real empirical occasion for the critical-teleological reflection' (GABd. 56/57, 38; correcting the last word from Bestimmungto Besinnung). The quotation also recalls the young Heidegger's third task for a 'cosmos of categories,' of factoring in the Material Determination of 'history in its teleological interpretation along the lines of a philosophy of culture' (GABd. 1,408). Psychic and historical matter provide the 'impetus' that 'motivates' the bestowal of norms. The operative concept of intentionality is clearly in evidence as the early Heidegger gradually draws the givenness of matter and the giving of normative forms into an indissoluble intentional unity. The noetic side involves a first attempt to unravel the neo-Kantian tangle of validity, value and oughtness. For the weak link of the critical-teleological method is its noetic hinge: It is in search of the universal valid values which 'ought to be' acknowledged once they are 'pointed out.' But acknowledgement is not the same as consent or approval, which is the 'Yes' response Windelband really wants to a valid judgement, but cannot demonstrate. In what 'form of experience' does validity 'give itself? 'Does it correspond to a subject-correlate of an original kind or is it a founded phenomenon, perhaps even extremely founded?' Heidegger points to the direction he would take: 'In the end, validity is a phenomenon constituted by its subject matter, presupposing not only intersubjectivity but the historical consciousness as such!' (GA Bd. 56/57, 50f). And oughtness? 'How does an ought give itself at all, what is its subject-correlate?' (ibid. 45). Is its object-correlate always a value? Clearly, the reverse does not always hold. The value of the 'delightful,' for example, gives itself to me without a corresponding experience of the ought. This entire tangle of experiences calls for an 'eidetic genealogy of primary motivations' to set things right (ibid. 46, 73). For that matter, even to call the valuable an 'object' is already wrong. Like validity (es gilt), the valuable is best expressed in an intransitive impersonal sentence. 'The value is not, but simply 'values' ... In the experience that is 'worth taking', 'it values for me, for the worth-experiencing subject' (ibid. 46; correcting urteilende with werterlebende, 'worth-experiencing'). The Heidegger of 1919 is already finding that language is not 'up to' the 'new typology of fundamental experience' that he wishes to express. The complaint about language is not incidental. It puts us in touch with the very 'nerve' of the course. It explains why this course, despite its intricate structure and laborious development, created a sensation and started the 'rumor of a hidden king in Academe' (Hannah Arendt) circulating through

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post-war Germany. The rumor reached Gadamer a year or two later of an 'extremely individualized and profoundly revolutionary lecture course' in which Heidegger had used the audaciously idiosyncratic phrase, es iveltet.28 This was his first course after the war, in the extraordinary 'war emergency semester' of early 1919. Without further ado, let me present the capsule summary of the entire course contained in the progressive sequence of impersonal sentences, common German idioms except for the two aforementioned idiosyncratic coinages, which are intoned on its pivotal pages (GABd. 56/57, 46,61,73,75). es gilt, es soil, es wertet - es gibt - es weltet, es er-eignet sich The very fact that the most basic constitutive categories of neo-Kantianism and hermeneutic phenomenology are separated here by Lask's formulation of the reflexive category par excellence, Es-Geben (GABd. 56/57, 67, 69 = LGSII, 130, 142, 155, I62ff), now gives substance to the methodological claim we discovered in the young Heidegger (GABd. 1, 315): In those instances when language fails us, the very indeterminacy and dilution of reflexive categories can 'play an indispensable starting role in developing more suitable descriptive categories.' But have we been prepared in any way for the impersonal content now emerging from this ultimate regress to the Ur-sprung, to a non-objective realm which 'is' not, but instead gives, values, worlds, etc.? Have not all the prior descriptions of the fundamental stratum of meaning (intelligibility, truth) made allusion to at least an 'ideal object' to describe it? What precedent could there possibly be for an impersonal, non-objective, even non-entitative realm of experience? How are we to fathom, let alone think of, a pre-theoretical realm which precedes and underlies the distinction between subject and object while at once describing their dynamic intentional unity? We have indeed been prepared for this 'breakthrough' of 1919 by both the Young Heidegger and Lask. The exemplar, the model of prefiguration offered for this reduction to the ultimate pre-theoretical situation is the unio mystica. The so-called 'mystical element in Heidegger's thought' (Caputo) is operative from the very beginning of his career, and will be used here as a guiding clue in the central phenomenological task of articulating the structures of immediacy. It is perhaps significant that Oskar Becker, in his transcription of this course, adds a footnote to es werteP. 'Compare es west ["it essences"] in Eckhart' (this verbal already appears on GABd. 1, 260). Going far beyond what Windelband and Rickert ventured to do in their 'transcendental empiricism' (GABd. 56/57, 40), where matter is a mere appendage to the teleological method, Lask gleans the following description of the material realm from Fichte's 'middle' period, in his most extreme 'positivism' (LGS I, 148): 'The "really real" is what you "really live and

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experience," the givenness which happens to you, "filling the flowing moments of your life," the self-forgetting and immersion of dedicative intuition.' This is life at ground-level, 'raised to the first power,' so to speak; or in reverse, it is 'the sinking of consciousness to its lowest power.' 'Whatever occurs in this sphere is what is called "reality," "facts of consciousness" or "experience" [Erfahrung].' Is Lask/Fichte here describing the mute life of the dullard, 'the limiting case of dull abandon to the given' (dumpfes Hingegebensein),29 or is it the immediate contact with the very source of life, the 'mystical' stirrings of the initial upsurge of meaning in human experience? In short, is this immediacy mute or meaningful? The first alternative applies if we rule out the possibility, like good Kantians, that our most immediate experience is already 'categorially' charged. The latter option is clearly the early Heidegger's direction of interpretation, if we were to judge simply on the basis of his continued use of Lask's language for categorial intuition in his own descriptions. 'The only way to get at this original sphere is by pure dedication (Hingabe) to the subject matter' (GABd. 56/57, 61; 65). 'Let us immerse ourselves again in the lived experience' (ibid. 68). To escape unwarranted opinions, free-floating theorems and speculative excesses, 'the philosophers ... throw themselves into history, into robust reality' (handfeste Wirklichkeit—GABd. 1, 318!) and 'give themselves over to its richness and its movement' (GABd. 56/57, 135). For this primitive level of direct acquaintance or 'taking cognisance' is already 'characterized by a pure and undivided dedication to the subject matter. It operates first of all in the very stuff of natural experience.' It is subject to different levels of clarity and so can be improved upon. It can become the preparatory form of the theoretical but is also the 'primal form in the religious' (ibid. 212). It is in fact toward this boundary issue of immediacy ('Mute or meaningful?') that Heidegger now, at the very fulcrum of the course, directs his thought experiment, which aims to reduce everything to the level of the es gibt (there is, it gives; thus, 'there is given'), that is, to the level of'brute' facticity, of the sheer and naked 'there it is ... and nothing else': Is there something? Is there even the 'there is'? Everything is now made to hinge on such boundary questions reminiscent of Leibniz's famous question. 'We are standing at the methodological crossroad which will decide the very life or death of philosophy; we stand at an abyss: either into nothingness, i.e. absolute thingness, or we somehow manage the leap into another world, or better: for the first time into the world as such' (GABd. 56/57, 63).3° The issue leading up to this critical juncture is in fact the material determination of the forms and norms of thought by their psychic matter. The joining of the issue begins when the matter and the ideal norms are drawn so closely together that Heidegger can entertain the anti-Kantian question: Is the giving of matter perhaps also the giving of ideals? For in a

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certain sense, 'everything is psychic or mediated by the psychic.' Can we perhaps arrive at an 'objective level' within the psychic itself at which the ideal norms could be grounded? Can psychic processes be so regarded such that they at once give the ideal? How is the psychic itself as a total sphere, perhaps as the primal sphere of origins, to be given? (GABd. 56/57, 60). 'We can only get at the sphere by pure submission to the subject matter.' Without bringing in assumptions or theories, we must fall back upon a description 'pointing out the facts befitting the "thing itself" '. Just the facts (Tatsachen) of the thing (Sache) itself, of the psychic? Description? 'But description itself is a psychic phenomenon [and thus also] belongs in the thing itself. What is that supposed to mean, to have one thing describe another? Is description really a way of connecting things?' (ibid. 61). 'We are thrown from one thing to another, which remains mute like any thing' (ibid. 65). Can we even speak of things when there are only things? 'Is there even one thing when there are only things? Then there would be no thing at all, not even nothing, for with the total domination of the thing itself there is not even the "there is". Is there the "there is"?' (ibid. 62). And yet, there is still something in the interrogative movement itself, 'Is there . . . ?' What does the interrogative experience itself give us? If we simply immerse ourselves in the experience itself, in its movement toward what motivates it and nothing else, and now diligently seek to avoid stilling the movement through the blatant reification ('absolutizing of thingness') of our previous reflection, we really do not find anything either psychic or physical. The 'object' of our present reflection is a living experience and not 'a mere entitative occurrence.' It is even questionable whether we have an 'object' here. 'The living-out of an experience is not a thing which exists in brute fashion, beginning and ending like an encountered process. The "relating to" is not a piece of a thing attached to another piece, the "something." The living and lived of experience are as such not like entitative objects stuck together' (ibid. 69f). In fact, this particular experiencing is itself not only non-objective but also impersonal. For is it really I myself, in full personal involvement, who asks, 'Is there something?' Not really, precisely because what is asked about (Gefragtes) does not touch me personally. The experience is related to an I (n'importe qui} but not to my I (GABd. 56/57, 69). Finally, what is asked about, that toward which T live in the experience, the content of the question or its 'hold' (Gehalf) and so its 'hold' on me. For in any experience, intentionally understood, there is a 'pull' (Zug) toward something, such that the noematic pole, in its directive sense (soon to be termed the Gehaltssinn], motivates the experience. In this experience, something is asked about something in general. What is being questioned 31 (Befragtes), the matter of the question, is 'something in general.' What is asked about, what stands in question, the form that the question takes, the

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actual content (Formgehalf) of the question, is the 'es geben.' In both form and matter, the question contains the emptiest, the most general, the most theoretical of the reflexive categories. From Lask, we have learned that 'givenness' is the very minimum that can be said about the most minimum. It is so devoid of substantive meaning that we have a tendency to fill in the phrase with examples. This very 'pull' reflects a certain dependence of the phrase on something more concrete which itself will have to be explored. Even apart from its interrogative quality (which in fact proves to be irrelevant in this course), this experience both noetically (the empty ego) and noematically points beyond itself to another land of experience upon which it depends and (presumably) from which it arose. 'The sense of the something, as primitive as it obviously is, in its very sense proves to be the motivator of an entire process of motivations.' 'Where is the sense motivating the sense of the "es gibt" to be found?' (GABd. 56/57, 67f). At this point, therefore, an entirely different experience is described, namely, the environmental experience, an experience not so much 'of as 'out of the immediate world around us (Umwelf), an experience which by its very contrast serves to develop the issue at hand. Looking around for an example, Heidegger selects the mundane, habitual, common and yet in its way individualized experience of walking into class and 'seeing your desk.' If we 'reduce' the more current theoretical constructions as we describe, what I see are not brown patches on rectangular shapes, or a box which I eventually construe as a schooldesk, I simply see my desk at once, quickly noting also at once anything that might be out of place or unusual about it, a book on it, and the like. Others more or less familiar with things academic will also see 'this pupil's desk.' Even a total stranger to such things, say, an African native suddenly transplanted into this classroom, will not see 'a something which is simply given' (reflexive category) but perhaps something to do with magic or a good defence against arrows or, at the very minimum, a something 'which one does not know what to make of or do with.' In this limiting case, therefore, what is experienced is not so much logically contradictory as contrary-to-sense, such that this sense-alien experience of the useless still belongs to the same class as that of the meaning-full desk. All these things (books, pens, cars, campus, trees, shade, etc.) give themselves directly out of the immediate context of meaning encompassing us which we tend to call the 'world.' Much like Lask's objects known only through the constitutive categories in which we live, such things receive their significance from that meaning-giving context encompassing us, whose activity can then be described as 'woriding.' If we then take our campaign against reification one step further, then the true locus of our experience is not in objects or things which 'in addition are then interpreted as signifying this or that,' but rather the signifying element itself now dynamized and set in motion, the 'It' that 'worlds,' which in conjunction with Lask has already

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been called the 'transcendental realm of meaning (intelligibility, truth).' 'The meaningful is the primary, [for] it gives itself immediately, without any detour of thought across the apprehension of a thing. Overall and always, it signifies to me, who lives in an environing world, it is wholly worldlike, "it worlds" ' (GABd. 56/57, 73; 71ff). But is this impersonal es weltet, this completely constitutive es gibt, so to speak, really an impersonal experience? Contrary to the reflexive es gibt with its abstract I, my own and temporally particular I is in some way wholly present 'with' the worlding experience. In fact, in the 'seeing' involved here, my I goes out of itself completely and immerses itself in the world in total absorption. This impersonal experience of the historical I wholly 'given over' (hingegeben) to its world is thus the opposite of that of the theoretical I almost totally remote from its objectified es gibt. The experience of this indifferent I is only a rudiment of the 'living through' (Er-leben) of experience in the full sense; it is in fact an un-living (Ent-leben) of experience. All that is left is an 'impoverished I-relatedness reduced to a minimum of experiencing.' Correlatively, the object is re-moted (ent-fernt), extracted from its authentic experience. The objectified occurrence, a psychic process (Vor-gang) for example, simply passes the cognizing ego by, immobilized like a thing. By contrast, 'in seeing the desk, I am there "with it" with my whole I, it resonates with this seeing in total harmony, we said, it is an experience properly (eigens) for me.' It is my proper experience because it appropriates me and I, in accord, appropriate it. This experience is accordingly not a process but an event appropriate to me, a propriating event (Ereignis). 'This living-through does not pass by before me like a thing posited by me as an object; rather, I myself properize it to myself and it properizes itself (es er-eignet sicti) according to its essence.' Such an 'event' is something entirely new, outstripping all talk of psychic and physical, subject and object; even 'inner' and 'outer' make no sense in this context. 'Living experiences are properizing events insofar as they live out of the proper and life lives only so, in accord' (GABd. 56/57, 75; 73ff). This is vintage Heidegger already in early 1919 (March 21), openly pronouncing for the first time — and surprisingly quite early — his very last word for Being at the end of his career of thought, the singulare tantum of das Ereignis. Later more explicitly tied to the ecstatic and expansive 'reach' of time, the properizing event was, is and remains through and through the very contextualizing (later called 'regioning') of that expanse of meaning that we call the world. If 'life' itself is called an 'event,' the overriding historical and temporal connotations of this word should not be ignored: the historical 'e-vent' in particular refers to those abrupt but meaningful turning points that restructure a historical world (Incarnation, Hegira).32 The 1919 course as delivered (evidenced in student transcriptions) dwells on these connotations more than the printed 'Ausgabe letzter Hand': Event as the

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basic 'trait' (= 'pull' or Zug) of life refers to its 'happening' character — 'I see myself happening, taking place' — and so to its 'immanent historicity.' Theoretization therefore involves a 'dehistorizing, unworlding, designifying' (synonyms!) of life. Heidegger therefore rejects the Laskian word 'irrational' as a characterization of the dynamic facticity of life (GABd. 56/57, 88, 117). Life is a dynamism without nihilism. In the last hour of the course (April 11), Heidegger does in fact divide the e-vent of cworld-ing' into its two parts, as two sides of the same coin, and gives primacy to the suffix, to the (structuring, articulating, meaning-giving) dynamism of 'life in and for itself 'It's world-ing, It's proper-ing.' In wo riding and properizing, this 'It' is accordingly a preworldly as well as pretheoretical something; 'It' is in fact the 'original something' (Ur-etwas). It is indifferent to any particular world and especially to any particular object-type. It is not yet differentiated and not yet worldly; ergo a preworldly something. Its 'not yet' is the 'index for the highest potentiality of life.' This potentiality is the basic 'trait' of life, to live out toward something, to 'world out' (auszuwelten) into particular lifeworlds. Life in itself is motivated and has tendency, it has motivating tendency (— 'thrown project' in Being and Time) and tending motivation. 'But this means that the sense of something as that which can be experienced implies the moment of "out toward," "direction toward," "into a (particular) world" — and in fact in its undiminished "vital impetus'" (GABd. 56/57, 115). 'It is out of this preworldly vital something that the formal objective something of knowability is first motivated. A something of formal theoretization. The tendency into a world can be theoretically deflected before its demarcation as a world. Thus the universality of the formally objective appropriates its origin from the in-itself of the streaming experience of life' (GA Bd. 56/57, 116). In short, the universality of formalization has the direct access to the 'original something' (Ur-etwas) which phenomenological intuition wishes to have. The reflexive categories derived from formalization are not 'parasitical' upon the constitutive categories of the world, as Lask thought. Their contentlessness reflects a freedom from the genera and species generated in the theoretical generalization of the world, a freedom which makes them philosophically useful, as we have seen more than once above. Traditionally, what philosophy seeks is at once comprehensive and fundamental, and the pure and simple universals of formalization come closer to that than the mundane order of strata caught up in a complex web of genera and species in ever increasing generalization. Pure and simple as it is, however, the form of formalization nevertheless reflects an object which, as Lask already noted, 'at once alludes to the "standing over against" in the relation to subjectivity' (LGS II, 72). Add to this the 'heterothesis' essential to identifying one object from another, and the phenomenological ambition to 'go with the flow' of original life and to describe this 'living out toward' from the inside out, as it were, is simply

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thwarted by the escalating diremptions of formalization (GABd. 56/57, 11 If, 117). Why should formalization then be regarded so positively? What does it really contribute to phenomenology's own, enormously difficult category-problem, that of finding the right words for its pre-theoretical sort of descriptions of the dynamism of life? Looking beyond this 'minus,' the prejudice of diremption, we have in fact come upon a third 'plus' which we can now add to our list. In addition to its proximity to the comprehensive uniqueness of life and the methodological flexibility and freedom offered by its contentlessness, the formal category of'object in general' in fact magnifies its relation to subjectivity, what Heidegger will soon call the relational sense (Bezugssinn) as opposed to its content sense, what it 'holds.' The one thing that the formal category lacks, as Heidegger will point out in subsequent courses, is the dynamic 'sense of actualization and fulfilment' (Vollzugssinn). Formalization, so to speak, does not let its phenomenon follow through to its natural conclusion, but instead immobilizes it into an object. Nevertheless, there are methodological lessons to be learned from formalization. Phenomenology needs only to improve upon the schematization of formalization and expand it into the full intentional structure dictated by the phenomenon of life. Small wonder, then, that Heidegger will shortly (WS 1919-20) call the 'open' methodological concept that points the way and guides the explication of phenomena without prejudice, i.e. without falling into standpoints and regional limitations, the 'formal indication' (formale Anzeige: In Being and Time, 'existence' is the formal indication; in this essay, it is what hitherto has been called the 'operative concept' of intentionality; for Lask, it is perhaps 'matter-needy forms.' Each in fact schematizes the same 'tendency.')

SS 1919 The critique of transcendental value-philosophy and of its cultural 'system of teleological idealism' (GABd. 56/57, 121) continues relentlessly and without pause in the following semester — a scant month later in this post-war year — with Heidegger now hoping to apply the developed apparatus of the previous semester in what, from the opening remarks, promises to be a full-fledged 'phenomenological critique' of that historical stretch of philosophy whose waning moments he experienced at first-hand as a student and involved participant. The promise is breathtaking in its scope and 'ruthless radicalism.' Genuine critique is no mere contrasting of standpoints in order to demolish the opposing one, pointing to its logical deficiencies or inner contradictions and marshalling counter-proofs to defend one's own. Phenomenological critique can never really be negative. 'It overcomes and points behind confused, half-clarified and false problems only in pointing to the genuine sphere

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of problems.' Critique here is 'positive attunement to the genuine motivations' and original tendencies operative in the stated problems of a philosophy in order to take them back 're-ductively' to 'their genuine phenomenological Ur-stratum' from which their immanent sense originates. Phenomenological critique is in fact only set in motion by those philosophical intuitions which already in some fashion are traversing 'fields of genuine problems.' Phenomenology itself can only profit from such critiques of intellectual history, gaining further insight into the 'principles of all intellectual life' as well as into the very 'principiality' of all principles which ultimately is its one and only interest, the 'quale of phenomena which is the genesis and terminus' of all inquiry (GABd. 56/57, 121-8). The promise of the course is not fulfilled, beyond this brilliant statement — the very first by Heidegger — of the method and intent of phenomenological 'destruction.' The exegesis of the texts of Windelband and Rickert displays some moments of insight, but is by and large shallow and pedestrian, especially when compared with later similar efforts like the Kant-book of 1929. And, unfortunately for us, Heidegger never gets as far as Lask's texts. We must therefore make do with his promise to do so, dwelling on the probing footnote and several other, more general textual references that he does give us in the context of his opening remarks. At this stage, I must also be brief, leaving something to do for other (hardly a swelling number), perhaps more devoted readers of Lask. Heidegger targets three groups of problems for reduction to the Ur-stratum of motivation from the 'system (III) of teleological (I) idealism (II)': the problems of (I) value, (II) form and (III) system. Lask is mentioned in conjunction with all three problems (GABd. 56/57, 121ff): I. 'Lask discovered in the ought and in value, as an experienced ultimate, the world, which was non-thinglike, non-sensorily metaphysical, as well as not unthinglike, extravagantly speculative, but rather was factic' (GABd. 56/57, 122). This sentence, cited in part in our opening paragraphs, may now be examined more closely. We have already come across this 'ultimately experienced' dimension in the above discussion of Lask's 'panarchy of the logos.' 1. Is it factic? But Lask explicitly told us that philosophy takes its material not 'from factic life but from the sphere of immediate experience replete with value, of the life that is worthwhile' (LGSII, 196). This objection is really only verbal, since the contrast here is between two levels of facticity, the purely sensory manifold familiar to orthodox Kantians and the likewise immediately experienced sphere of aesthetic, ethical, and religious values constituting our cultural but 'pre-scientific life' (LGSII, 185). As Lask describes it, already constituted categorial forms can also be immediately experienced as 'logically naked,' and thus assume the position of factic 'matter' in the 'logic of logic' that is philosophy. In fact, this factic human (cultural) life already replete with meaning becomes the main topic of such a

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philosophy, the philosophy of Da-sein. 2. Is it worldly? Only if we twist the image of the categorial form encompassing its matter into a context which also embraces the I who lives that form ... which is exactly what Lask's texts, following Husserl's sense of categorial intuition, repeatedly suggest! 3. Is it the environing world of the useful pragmata, of'utilitarian values,' the early Heidegger's first paradigm for the world? It seems not. Both in its conceptual roots and in its culmination in a worldview, the teleological context described by Lask is directed more toward the eternal and ideal norms of the 'higher' practical life, and not toward the mundane world of practical 'things,' especially if this is also regarded from its source in life, in its motivating archaeology. Es weltet and es wertet may be equiprimordial, but they are not the same. One is more likely to find a precedent for Heidegger's sense of the environing world in Husserl or Dilthey. Dilthey is in fact named here as an influence on Lask's book, Fichte's Idealism and History ?^ Indeed, Dilthey's distinction between the natural and human (cultural) sciences is reflected in Lask's first book in the distinction between an epistemological and a cultural sense of 'irrational' individuality. II. Lask's categories are at once value and form, telos and arche. Under Husserl's influence, form began to be regarded transcendentally in terms of formal and material apriori. Thus we have the problem of categorial divisions into regions. For philosophy of culture, this meant the problem of the totality of cultural values and their rank ordering (GABd. 56/57, 123). In a note on Lask's problem of form (ibid.\2\n.\ Heidegger relates it to the Husserlian problem of eidetic essence, sense and content as well as to his own problem of meaningfulness as such, which he has already identified with the problem of the environing world. The specific page reference to Lask (LGS II, 38 If) falls in the context of a discussion of the distinction of formal from material logic correlative to the distinction of the non-objective (i.e. the domain of judgements) from the objective region, with primacy given to the latter in view of its 'supra-oppositionality.' The discussion is Husserlian in tone, and hardly an anticipation of Heidegger's sense of the environing world. And yet, in this early period (1915—22), Heidegger repeatedly identifies the regional division of values with regional worlds. For he tends to speak of the 'lifeworld' (first Erlebniswelt, but by 1918 also Lebensweli) in the plural, more often than not classifying them according to the neo-Kantian axiology into the scientific, ethical, aesthetic, and religious lifeworlds, to which he sometimes adds the political and the social (GABd. 56/57, 4, 5, 18, 133, 208, 210, 214). III. Under 'systematics,' which includes the aforementioned problems of hierarchizing of values in a historical culture and the categorial division of material regions, Heidegger refers to the Conclusion of Lask's 'Logik! In a reference to Hegel's dialectic, 'heterothesis,' Rickert's coined word, appears, as well as in two other places in this year (GABd. 56/57, 123; 117, 209),

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suggesting once again that the habilitation structures are still very much on Heidegger's mind in his phenomenological critique of Lask's use of 'formmatter duplicity' to circumscribe his panarchy of the logos. Does not matter, the mark of facticity, inescapably serve a theoretical function here (ibid. 117)? Does not 'logical form', as the subtitle of the 'LogiK declares, always retain 'dominion'? Thus, Heidegger's conclusion under this heading: 'The systematics itself approximates the Hegelian heterothesis, which at the same time is also seen in the theoretical sphere of objects: form-content duplicity' (ibid. 123). If not von oben her by a dialectic of concepts, how is the panarchy articulated into e.g. rank orderings of the true, good and beautiful? Heidegger's unequivocal reply: von unten her, from the very 'matter' of life, resurrected and made replete with meaning like the medieval Scotian's modus essendi, and given full hegemony. Thus the 'expression' of life can (must) be understood as a genitive-'subjective.' In the last class of Winter Semester 1919—20, Heidegger calls this self-articulation of life a 'diahermeneutics.' Against Kant, intuition is given primacy over the concept and then, von unten her, 'intuition' and 'expression' are made equiprimordial. Life manifests itself, gives itself, expresses itself. In his early book on Fichte, in his development of Husserl's doctrine of categorial intuition, Lask flirted with these thoughts but never, it seems, followed the anti-Kantian conversion through to the end. In a final seminar exercise on January 20, 1920, in which he apparently outlined his plans for a course in the coming semester on 'The Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression', Heidegger makes some 'Remarks on Lask.' It was the only part of the entire semester's exercises that Oskar Becker recorded in his notebooks: Lask's concept of knowledge is obtained 'backwards,' and not from concrete experience. It is a limit concept from which we must free ourselves. Problem of the 'Logic of Philosophy,' of the Ur-science, which is a science of itself. Every life is an expressive content and is formed. Intuition in factic life is the self-giving element, directly, without complication and confusion ... Immanent relations in life, which we must experience as gestalts of expression ... I must live in experience, I must be it, it must 'flow from me as from an original source [herausquellen]\ An isolated pregiven experience cannot be had, but only a coherent continuity of experiences.

CHAPTER 6

Heidegger's Early Lecture Courses The latest prospectus on Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe (Collected Edition) from the Klostermann Publishing house, dated April 1984, brings the welcome news that the majority of his lecture courses during his early Freiburg period (1919—23) as a docent and Husserl's assistant will be published. This decision, which was first posed publicly by the first prospectus of the Gesamtausgabe in the fall of 1974 and so has been pending for a decade, can only be lauded. The importance of these earliest courses cannot be overestimated for a number of reasons, especially for a philosopher who has repeatedly stressed that his thought is in via and the (sometimes erratic) steps along this way - especially the lecture courses, which accordingly are being published before other still unpublished works by Heidegger — are just as important as the endpoint reached by that thought. And this particular stretch of Heidegger's Denkweg is doubly important inasmuch as these early courses reveal the chronology as well as substance of the very first steps taken by Heidegger toward his magnum opus, Being and Time (1927), still regarded by some as the most important single book in twentieth-century philosophy. Heidegger himself has noted that at least two of the leitmotifs of Being and Time, the environing world and the 'hermeneutics of facticity,' were the subjects of courses since the Winter Semester of 1919-20 (SZ72; 490). It is therefore fortunate that three of the four courses Heidegger held in 1919, including this last course of the year, ar among the ones to be published. For 1919 must be regarded as the pivotal year in Heidegger's development of the ideas which resulted in Being and Time. Simply by consulting Richardson's list of Heidegger's course titles constructed from university catalogs, we note the first appearance of the term 'phenomenology' in that year, and its recurrences in course and seminar titles until 1929 (TPT 663-6). It seems that, after a two-year absence from the university for a stint in the army, Heidegger came back from the front philosophically transformed, an enthusiastic proponent of phenomenology (perhaps naturally, as Husserl's assistant) but, as we shall see, already bent on taking it in his own new direction. The titles of Heidegger's lecture courses before 1919 bear strictly on themes out of the history of philosophy. But the evidence of university catalogs must be viewed with caution in trying to establish the public record of Heidegger's teaching career. Typically,

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an instructor must report his course titles early in the previous semester for publication in the university catalog. He then may later, perhaps as late as the opening day of the following semester, announce a different title to students. This occurred rather frequently with Heidegger. Or in some cases, sometimes for unknown reasons, the announced course was not held at all and no other course took its place. This seems to be the case for the course on 'Scepticism in Ancient Philosophy' announced for WS 1922—3. Another such example: In every semester of Heidegger's army service, when he was clearly not at the university, the Freiburg University catalogs announce a course title before his name: SS 1917: 'Hegel'; WS 1917-18: 'Plato'; SS 1918 and WS 1918-19: 'Lotze und die Entwicklung der modernen Logik.' This was always followed by the 'explanation' in parenthesis that he was a 'serviceman' (Kriegsteilnehmer), so there may have been some bureaucratic or propaganda reason for this listing, which included other instructors as well. It is to be noted once again that all these titles are taken exclusively from the history of philosophy, like the first courses from 1915 to 1917, which presumably were held. But nothing appears to be known about the content of these earliest courses; no original manuscript of them apparently exists: no plans to publish them have been indicated. This brings us back to 1919. If we supplement the public record of university catalogs with some more substantive internal evidence, namely, extant student notes of Heidegger's lecture courses, we discover that the very first lecture course given by Heidegger in that year was in an extraordinary 'war emergency semester' (KNS) from February to April 1919, designed to give war veterans an early start in their interrupted studies. The announced title for Heidegger's course for this special semester was 'Kant,' but the actual title turned out to be 'The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldviews.' This course as well as this semester is not reported by Richardson and, to the best of my knowledge, has never been reported or discussed in the 'literature.' And the latest prospectus does not announce any plans to publish this course, so presumably there are no extant manuscripts of it written by Heidegger himself. In view of this lack, the importance of this course — in chronology, it is the very first lecture course of Heidegger's which is accessible to us; in content, it is Heidegger's very first phenomenological course (its titl alludes to Husserl's Z0gw-essay) in the 'phenomenological decade' (1919—29) which produced Being and Time — serves to underscore the value of student notes (commonly called the Nachschriften, 'transcripts') at least in filling such lacunae in Heidegger's Denkweg. From the very beginning of this postwar period, Heidegger's students made a virtual 'commerce' of comparing, exchanging and passing on their notes, and so refining them to the point where certain drafts over the years became prized possessions whose loss, say in the flight from East to West Germany in the 1940s and 50s, was deeply felt. Some students attempted to take down the words of the lecture almost

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verbatim in longhand as it was presented, others tried to summarize as they listened, and still others formulated succinct paraphrases (perhaps from several students' notes) after the hour; some students made an 'official' stenographic record in shorthand and typed it up afterwards in longhand for Heidegger's perusal, others passed on their notes in the original shorthand. Extant Nachschriften from the phenomenological decade which is our topic here include those composed by Oskar Becker (at the time also Husserl's assistant, on the same level as Heidegger), Franz Josef Brecht, Karl Lowith, Hermann Morchen, Simon Moser, Fritz Neumann, and Helene Weiss. This 'commerce' in the circulation of transcripts is so well known that Heidegger himself alludes to it in his 'A Dialog on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer.' In this perhaps quasi-fictional dialog, the Japanese visitor tentatively recalls a course given by Heidegger (the 'Inquirer') in 1921 entitled 'Expression and Appearance' attended by his Japanese predecessors, a transcript of which they took to Japan, where it evoked considerable interest and discussion over the years in the Far East. Heidegger confirms the title and year, but notes that 'transcripts are really muddy sources' (US 91; 6) and that the course itself was most imperfect, since it belongs (he later suggests) to his juvenilia (US 128; 35). In response to the stated reason for the interest in the transcript, namely the characterization of his way of thought as 'hermeneutical, 'Heidegger recalls tentatively that he first used the words 'hermeneutics' and 'hermeneutical' in a later course, in the summer of 1923, at the time when he began to jot down the first notes for Being and Time. The course of SS 1923 indeed bears the title 'Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity.' But the term 'hermeneutics,' the subject of considerable discussion in this dialog, already occurs in the course of KNS 1919 as well as WS 1919—20! And the early lecture course whose title 'Expression and Appearance' is meticulously analysed in the dialog was in point of fact held in SS 1920 and entitled 'Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression.' And even though Heidegger devotes several concluding hours in this course of 1920 to his hermeneutic predecessor, Wilhelm Dilthey, the term 'hermeneutics' itself does not seem to be mentioned. What are the reasons for these departures from the facts in a dialog, where, for example, other dates cited by Heidegger out of his curriculum vitae are accurate? Was it simply the old Heidegger's failing memory over his early years coupled by his failure to cross-check his statements against his old manuscripts? Or was Heidegger exercising a bit of irony over the incessant pursuit of the transcripts of his old lecture courses (DW351), extending even to the other side of the globe? Or was it some deeper reason, say, a bit of poetic license to suggest a measure of impatience mixed with the patience with which he tolerated this interest in his juvenilia, whereby one can nevertheless 'easily be unfairly judged,' just as the old Husserl had 'generously tolerated' the young Heidegger's penchant for the Logical Investigations

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twenty years after their first appearance, at a time when Husserl himself no longer held this early work 'in very high esteem' (US 128, 90—1; 35, 5 /Cf. DW351)? Indeed, this allusion to Husserl's attitude toward his work prefaces the entire discussion of transcripts in the dialog; and when the conversation later returns to the subject of the transcript of the course on 'Expression and Appearance,' Heidegger first wonders whether the title after all was not 'Expression and Meaning' (US 128; 34) ... the same as Husserl's First Logical Investigation! But this is immediately followed by the in-depth analysis of the 'metaphysical' nature of the terms of the title 'Expression and Appearance,' and not 'Expression and Meaning' or the more historically accurate 'Intuition and Expression.' One therefore cannot disregard the possibility that Heidegger was deliberately exercising artistic liberty in order to introduce the terms (especially 'hermeneutics') he took to be most appropriate for this Dialog on Language. Whatever the reasons for this mixture of fact and fiction (or perhaps error), Heidegger himself was not averse to appealing to 'careful philological work' (DW 353) in order to get the record of his own development straight, despite the well-known scorn (often misdirected of 'faithful' Heideggerians) for 'philology' and 'scholarship' which he expressed in other contexts. And the indispensable basis for such work is the factual record of that development. It has already been suggested that the Nachschriften can play an invaluable and at times even an indispensable role in setting this factual record straight. Two recent examples of just such a function played by the student notes in the editorial work of the Collected Edition can be cited: 1. In her edition of the course SS 1925 on 'History of the Concept of Time,' Petra Jaeger notes that Heidegger's hand-written manuscript ends just short of the Second Division of the Main Part of the course, entitled 'The Exposition of Time Itself,' whereas the transcripts of both Moser and Weiss indicate that the course really ended with two additional days of lectures (July 30 and 31) on the determination of the wholeness of Dasein through the phenomena of death and conscience. These early reflections on the themes of the Second Division of the First Part of Being and Time are therefore included in the published edition of the course from the text of Moser's transcript (GABd. 20, 446; 323). 2. The lecture course of SS 1929, 'Introduction to Academic Studies,' projected as Volume 29 of the Collected Edition since the very first prospectus, disappears from the latest prospectus with the publication of the course of the next semester as 'Volume 29/30' and the announcement by its editor that the course for SS 1929 was not only not held but also not even composed into manuscript form. But Heinrich Petzet, in his book on 'encounters with Heidegger,' describes his very first 'unforgettable' encounter with Heidegger in WS '1928—9' in a course entitled 'Introduction to Academic Studies' in which Heidegger interpreted Plato's Allegory of the

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Cave. And recently, a Nachschriftof the course has surfaced, indicating that it was a one-hour course held, after all, in SS 1929.2 And even if such a transcript gives us only a rough approximation of the contents of the course, such approximations should not be belittled, particularly for a course located at the end of Heidegger's 'phenomenological decade' and so at the very beginning of his 'turn.' If the transcripts are 'muddy sources,' they can also be 'reasonable approximations'; and when nothing else is available, they become indispensable sources. An interesting aspect of this (once again extant) course is that its title harks us back to that of SS 1929, 'On the Essence of the University and Academic Studies,' exactly ten years earlier, just as the course of the previous WS 1928—9, 'Introduction to Philosophy,' in title and content recalls the course for KNS 1919. In fact, the issues of all these courses tend to return to the same pivotal question, namely whether philosophy should be regarded as a science. At the beginning of this phenomenological decade, Heidegger sides with Husserl and responds affirmatively to this question. But at the end, philosophy becomes explicit existing out of the ground, the very 'happening' of transcendence, and so more primordial than any science and worldview (Cf. GA Bd. 26, 231, 275, 286; 180, 212, 221). There are in fact other changes in the factual record which are dictated by the evidence of extant student notes. For example, Heidegger's first course at Marburg in WS 1923—4, generally announced as 'The Beginning of Modern Philosophy,' (Richardson adds the subtitle 'Descartes-Interpretation'), according to student notes actually bears the title 'Introduction to Phenomenological Research.' Though the course concludes with an interpretation of some of Descartes' texts, it first discusses phenomenology in general and Husserl in particular. Then there is the case of the Aristotle-Interpretation sent by Heidegger to Natorp in 1922 in support of his application for a professorship at the University of Marburg. Was this transcript, which has been reported as lost, the manuscript of Heidegger's course on Aristotle of SS 1922? If we accept Gadamer's account of the content of the manuscript sent to Natorp3 and compare it with extant Nachschriften of the course, then it is not: While Paul and Luther are mentioned briefly in conjunction with the classic hermeneutic principle of'determining the dark in terms of the bright,' while the Vorgriffof a 'hermeneutic situation' is at times invoked in interpreting an Aristotelian text and Augustine is mentioned once fleetingly, August Biel and Peter Lombard are not. So the lecture course does not speak 'above all' of the young Luther and Augustine and does not address itself to theological questions 'from the very beginning,' but is basically a novel translation-paraphrase and exegesis of texts selected primarily from Aristotle's Metaphysics and Physics. What Gadamer describes might well be some sort of hybrid composite of the three courses of 1921-2, two on Aristotle and one on 'Augustine and Neoplatonism.''4 But the evidence for this is inconclusive without

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Heidegger's original manuscript. And this apparently is not available, since there are no plans to publish this particular course of SS 1922. In fact, there are two other courses from the early Freiburg period for which no publication plans have been announced, so what we find in the prospectus is not a complete list of these courses. And Richardson's list, useful as it was over the years as a starting point and as a 'historical document' untouched in its corrections and emendations after it left Heidegger's hand, is ultimately not zfactuallist of the courses actually held at that time. Crosschecking the university catalogs against extant student notes yields the following factual record of titles (here left in the original German) of lecture courses (Vorlesungen) given by Heidegger during his early Freiburg period: KNS 1919

Die Idee der Phdnomenologie und das Weltanschauungsproblem (2 hours). SS 1919 Phdnomenologie und transzendentale Wertphilosophie (1 hour). SS 1919 Uber das Wesen der Universitdt unddes akademischen Studiums (1 hour). WS 1919-20 Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie (2 hours). SS 1920 Phdnomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks: Theorie der philosophise/yen Begriffsbildung (2 hours). WS 1920—21 Einleitung in die Phdnomenologie der Religion (2 hours). SS 1921 Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus (announced as 3 hours). WS 1921—2 Phdnomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einleitung in diephdnomenologische Forschung (2 hours). SS 1922 Phdnomenologische Interpretation ausgewdhlter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik (4 hours). SS 1923 Ontologie: Hermeneutik der Faktizitdt (1 hour). Some comments on this list: 1. The course of KNS 1919 may have had the simpler title 'Idee der Philosophie und Weltanschauung' 2. There is a strong indication that the announced two-hour course for WS 1919—20 entitled 'Die philosophischen Grundlagen der mittelalterlichen Mystilz (not listed above) was not held, not only because no extant transcripts of it have been reported, but also because the extenuating fact that the course listed above for this semester, originally announced as a one-hour course under the tile 'Ausgewahlte Probleme der reinen Phanomenologie,' was given on two weekdays (Tuesdays and Fridays) originally specified for the course on 'medieval mysticism,' instead of on the announced Wednesdays. 3. For SS 1922, the student notes give an abbreviated title, roughly 'Phdnomenologische Interpretationen (Aristoteles),' but the above title announced in the catalog is a fuller and more accurate description of the contents of the course.

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4. No extant transcripts of the two-hour course announced in WS 1923—4 on 'Skepticism in Ancient Philosophy' have been reported, so there is some question as to whether it was held. Moreover, no plans to publish it have been announced. 5. The course of SS 1923, already identified as the first overt step toward the terminology and problems of Being and Time, was only a one-hour course. Dates in student notes indicate that the class was held only on Wednesdays instead of the announced Monday-Thursday schedule. 6. Finally, though student notes exist for KNS 1919, WS 1920-21 and SS 1922, no plans to publish these courses have been announced, so presumably Heidegger's original handwritten manuscript for them, prerequisite for an 'Ausgabe letzter Hand,' is not available.

Is the return to origins scientific or 'historical'? A glance at the titles of these early Freiburg lecture courses suggests themes so varied that it is at first difficult to discern a guiding thread running through them: philosophy, phenomenology, religion, Aristotle, ontology, hermeneutics. Some scholars who have had occasion to study the contents of some of these courses have tended to underscore the overriding importance of religion or theology (Poggeler, Gadamer) and Aristotle (Sheehan) in these early years. These judgements might well be premature. There is at least an obvious thematic candidate in the above inventory which must be thoroughly explored as the overriding concern of these early years, namely, phenomenology, which amply supported by Heidegger's own statements about his early years, his 'way to phenomenology' and 'through phenomenology to thought.' It has already been suggested that Heidegger from 1919 on in his lecture courses overtly identified himself with Husserl's program of phenomenology as the way of establishing philosophy as a strict science. His difference with Husserl — again from the start in this his phenomenological decade (1919—29) - was with the issue of just what the 'matter' of such a philosophy was to be. In what follows, I can make only a few preliminary and fragmentary suggestions about this identity and difference by way of a few selective glimpses into the contents of the courses of this decade in chronological sequence. This will at least serve to underscore the importance of these antecedent Freiburg courses for the true understanding of the Marburg courses which follow. In KNS 1919, Heidegger confronts the hermeneutic situation of philosophy as he then finds it and locates his approach with respect to philosophy understood as a doctrine of worldviews (Dilthey) and philosophy regarded as primal science (Aristotle, Husserl). This involved coming to terms with the Kantian 'transcendental philosophy of values' (Windelband, Rickert) as a

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kind of middle position: Philosophy as a system of values which provides the scientific means for personally developing one's own worldview. Heidegger from the start takes a radical approach which breaks with long-standing tradition: Philosophy has absolutely nothing to do with worldview. It is a primal science which is radically different from all other sciences and is capable of demonstrating itself. With this 'circular' sense of philosophy as his guiding presupposition, Heidegger haltingly works his way through historically available solutions toward trying to define the matter of philosophy. Is it really a matter? How is it given! What does 'there is something' (es gibt etwas) mean? Thus already in 1919 we find the coining of impersonal sentences in the tradition of Meister Eckhart's es west (it essences), like es wertet (it values) and es weltet (it worlds)! There is even a passing reference to Plato's sense of aletheia as the 'non-concealed.' Experiences from the environing world (Umwelt) are already drawn upon to get beyond the quasitheoretical experience of perception that Husserl made paradigmatic. Lask was the first to see this phenomenological problem of the theoretization of experience without however finding a non-theoretical solution for it. Theoretization de-signifies, de-historicizes, unlives and unworlds our most original experiences. Philosophy's radical quest for a pre-theoretical something, not only a wordly but also a pre-wordly something, makes the primal science at once a supra-theoretical science. Philosophy must counter the theoretical tendency of other sciences to unlive the world and replace it with concepts by formulating 'recepts' (Ruckgriffe) which root back in the life-contexts underlying the sciences. The primal sense of this pre-theoretical pre-worldly something must be seen phenomenally, i.e. purely intuitively. We must learn how to experientially live such lived experiences in their motivations and tendencies. In short, we must come to understand life. For life is not irrational, it is understandable through and through. Phenomenological intuition as the living of primal experiences is hermeneutic intuition. The goal of phenomenology is therefore the investigative return to origins in life itself, not only theoretical but also practical and factical life contexts. It is therefore the science of origins. It is at once the original science, and so not a science at all in the ordinary sense of the word. Thus already in these early years, Heidegger has occasion to assert paradoxically that philosophy is neither a science nor a worldview. But of greater concern in these early years is the deepening definition and shifting formulization of the original domain of phenomenology: life-contexts (KNS 1919), situations (SS 1919), factic life-experiences (WS 1919-20; Cf. DW27—28). The basic form of a life-context is a motivation, a situation has the character of tendency, factic life is a vital context of tendencies. These tendencies flow from the self-wo rid where factic life finds its center of gravity, such that the with-world and environing world become functionally dependent upon it. The peaking of factic life in the self-world is already there

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unaccentuated in the environing world. Everything that happens in the world is defined by its situational character of self-living, its rhythm and style, its habitus in experiencing intentionally, but it is rather implicit in the course of life itself. In fact, the very possibility of phenomenology as primal science depends on this possibility. For the many-splendored and sometimes chaotic mixture of life-experiences finds its unity in the life of the self. As with any science, preparing the experiential ground for phenomenology and from this shaping the domain of its subject matter and then developing the typical structural concepts of its concrete logic are all carried out in and through the factic tendencies of life, and these are always accompanied by a centering in the self-world. On the one hand, we have the idea of phenomenology as original science, its tendency toward being a science of origins; but on the other hand, this tendency is reciprocally related and motivated by its respective subject matter. What is that? Not factic \ifeper se but factic life as originating. Phenomenology wants to find the origin of factic life. It therefore seeks out the more fundamental situations in which the totality of life clearly emerges and as it were expresses itself. These are the situations in which I 'have myself explicitly, not as an object, but in the process of achieving a certain familiarity of life with itself. Phenomenology is nothing other than this intuitive 'moving with' life itself, where it speaks to itself in its own language through the meaningful context that it weaves. This is the dialectic that philosophy seeks to express, its 'dia-hermeneutics.' And so in SS 1923, the reciprocal relationship between philosophy and its subject matter is entitled 'hermeneutics of facticity.' It is this formula rather than its equivalent, 'ontology of Dasein,' which expresses this central correlation of philosophy as primal science in the closest possible way. In fact, the 'hermeneutics of facticity' is as much a pleonasm as the 'botany of plant.' Facticity characterizes the being of'our' 'own' Dasein; it always indicates this Dasein in its instantiation and particularity, insofar as it is 'there' in its being, that is, in the how of its innermost being and not as an object of an intuition. It is from and through the 'how' that the character of the being of Dasein is of itself articulated. Facticity therefore refers to the self-expression of the being of Dasein. Hermeneutics is therefore merely the explicit continuation of the selfexplication of facticity. It simply magnifies the possibility of understanding already inherent in Dasein itself, and so enables Dasein to be attentive and alert to itself and its ownmost possibilities. It serves to awaken Dasein from its dogmatic slumbers and so to overcome a certain potential of selfalienation also inherent in Dasein. The course of SS 1923 is also noteworthy in Heidegger's Denkweg for the brief formal introduction of the term Existenz. (It appears in previous courses in its normal non-specific sense and in the Jaspers review-article of 1921 in conjunction with Jaspers' use of the term.) Facticity is to be

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interpreted on the basis of its Existenz, that is, on the basis of the authentic possibility which every Dasein as such is. Such an interpretation of factic life develops those special concepts called the existentials. But even though existentials are distinguished from categories and the source of the term in Kierkegaard is acknowledged, nothing is really made of this terminology in 1923, and Heidegger continues to speak of categories for what would later be called existentials. The same sort of allusion to Existenz and the Existenziale occurs in the following semester (on the first day in 1924 after the Christmas break), once again only briefly and without follow-thro ugh. But this time Existenz is located in the third moment of the hermeneutic situation of his interpretation of Dasein (which is the prepossession, Vorhabe) in its Being (which is the preview, Vorsicht). Existenz is now the preconception (Vorgriff) according to which what is already had and seen is addressed and considered and so conceptually grasped and articulated. The same peculiar aversion to the terminology of Existenz persists through the first identifiable draft of Being and Time in the course of SS 1925. (This observation applies also to the much-discussed Urform of Being and Time, the lecture on 'The Concept of Time' which Heidegger delivered to the Marburg Theological Faculty on Friday, July 25, 1924, where it is once mentioned in passing, without terminological elucidation, that Dasein is 'truly existent' in 'forerunning' its own death.) As I noted in the Translator's Introduction to this course, all the references in the published version of this 1925 course to the formal terminology of Existenz, e.g. 'existentialontological' and 'ontic-existentiell,' are later hand-written changes and marginal comments superimposed upon the stenographic typescript of the lecture course 'aus letzter Hand Heideggers' apparently in the process of drafting the final version of Being and Time (probably in early 1926). In view of how completely the terminology of 'existence' dominated Being and Time itself, it is at least odd, if not surprising, that Heidegger hesitated in applying this terminology for several years, right up to the threshold of the final composition of Being and Time. One problem was, of course, the traditional connotations encumbering the term 'existence,' as Heidegger was soon to experience from his critics, despite the careful distinctions he attempted to draw around the use of his term. Accordingly, for the first time in SS 1925, Heidegger instead introduces the verbal and sometimes clumsy nominative but clearly ontological term 'Zu-sein (to-be) to characterize the very being of Dasein. This formulation continues to appear in various forms in Being and Time, where e.g. the existentials are still sometimes called Weisen zu sein (ways to be). But it becomes as it were a recessive term in Heidegger's magnum opus, since it is overpowered there by its much more pervasive replacement term, 'existence.' One can only speculate on the impact Heidegger's most famous book might

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have had if he had consistently retained this more precisely ontological but cumbersome non-existentialist phrase to express the being of Dasein. For the term Zu-sein has the advantage of being expressly ontological and temporal at the same time in a particularly telling grammatical way, so that it is much more evident, for example, from the expression 'ways to be' that the so-called 'existentials' are how-categories rather than what-categories. In his very first introduction of this formulation of Dasein's basic character in SS 1925, Heidegger speaks of Dasein as 'an entity which is in each instance to be it [that is, Da-sein] in my own way' (GABd. 20, 205; 135). The phrase 'is to be' is telling, since it is a common grammatical way of expressing at once the modals of necessity and possibility; it is thus particularly pregnant in expressing the intricate relationship between the necessity of facticity and the possibility of choice that Heidegger wishes to convey. 'That it is and has to be' and that it either can be itself or not underscores the special kind of thatness (existentia, factuality) that belongs to Dasein in contradistinction to things. And the temporal connotations of Zu-sein relate back to the discussions in 1919 of the dynamic tendencies of a human situation and how such tendencies are fulfilled (what Heidegger in 1919 called the Vollzugssinn, later the Zeitigungssinn, of a situation). By 1923, the temporality of Dasein is a central theme for the ontology projected by Heidegger. This culminates in the temporal interpretation of being in SS 1927 in terms of the ecstatic projections of Dasein toward the horizons of time and their schemata. But the course also brings Heidegger's most extreme statements on phenomenology as a scientific philosophy, here more specifically as the science of being. In what appears to be a deliberate retrieve of the guiding ideas of 1919 — the course of 1927 is even entitled 'The Basic Problems of Phenomenology,' like the course of WS 1919-20 — Heidegger begins with a discussion of philosophy as science pure and simple and philosophy as worldview. And although Heidegger here continues to insist that the positive sciences and philosophy are absolutely different - the difference in object between a positum and a 'nothing' — he now concedes (perhaps under the influence of his intensive reading of Kant during this period) that philosophy must proceed in a way analogous to the positive sciences in order to achieve its scientificity: Just as a positive science objectifies its entity by projecting it upon the horizon of being by which it is understood, so must philosophy objectify itself by projecting it upon its horizon of understandability, upon something which is beyond being itself, namely time, which allows us to conceptualize being. Thus philosophy (phenomenology, ontology), in contradiction to the positive sciences, must become a temporal science (GABd. 24, §§1-3). But a year later, philosophy is neither a science nor a worldview, but a certain way of existing which provides the basis for both science and

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worldview. The full climax of this upshot of a decade of development is found in the first of the later Freiburg lecture courses in WS 1928—9 entitled 'Introduction to Philosophy.' Here, Heidegger confronts philosophy in great depths and detail with both science and worldview and has them yield to a third relationship: philosophy and history, or, more precisely, philosophy and the very happening of Dasein. The talk here is no longer of philosophy and its object, but of philosophizing as explicit transcending, the process of letting transcendence happen from and in its ground, that is, of bringing the very essence of human being into movement. Here, philosophy is not a science not out of lack but out of superabundance, because it is something more original than science. Terms like primal science, original science, strict science become misleading in this context, in part because they make us think of particular sciences like mathematics and physics, which radically contradict the very essence of philosophy. The seeds for this relationship between philosophy and history were in fact already sown in the courses of 1919. History was then also not understood from the historical sciences, but as an intensification of life, a familiarity with life which comes from living it in its fullness, a co-movement with the very vitality of life which it was incumbent upon phenomenology to establish in order to shape the concepts which would describe that life. Accordingly, it is far more than the trite title of the first of the later Freiburg lecture courses that prompts us to recall the first of the early postwar Freiburg courses, 'The Idea of Philosophy and Worldview/ In this vein, Heidegger was fond of citing a line from Holderlin's Der Rheim 'As you began, so will you remain.'

CHAPTER 7

Existenz in Incubation Underway Toward Being and Time The terminology of Existenz is so overwhelmingly commonplace in Being and Time that even the most experienced editors of the Gesamtausgabe, among them his students of that period, are hard put to recall when the Early Heidegger did not talk like that. And yet there is not only a time when he did not talk like that; there is also a doxographical record of his vox viva — to be clearly distinguished from the Ausgaben letzter Hand, the 'editions of the dead hand' purported to be his — indicating that Heidegger was quite reticent, indeed 'loathe,' to use the existentialist jargon, then in vogue, in his public lecture courses. The most fashionable of these terms, existentiell, is first mentioned once in passing in SS 1920, and will not be used again publicly (and still sparingly) until SS 1923. Even Heidegger's contrarian spelling of the term, existenz\z\\, may well have been an attempt to distinguish himself — what he meant by the term — from Kierkegaard enthusiasts like his first doctoral student, Karl Lowith. Heidegger becomes more reserved in his language in the Marburg years, revolted as he was by the jargon of'Kierkegaardism' then current in Marburg's theological circles.3 His talk to the Marburg theologians on July 25, 1924, which inaugurates the public drafting of Being and Time, would therefore have been the last place for him to wax existential. This sets the precedent for the first two drafts of Being and Time, which, contrary to the appearances of the Ausgaben letzter Hand, are completely devoid of the existentialist 'lingo.' Given this doxographical record, it is all the more surprising that this language inundates and saturates the final draft, Being and Time itself, so completely. What led Heidegger to adopt the existentialist vocabulary so precipitously and wholeheartedly, literally at the very last minute, after such a long record of reticence and hesitation? The following Begriffsgeschichte von 'Existenz', spanning six light years of incubation in the Early Heidegger's development (1920-6), is governed by an ontological and a methodological thread woven into one: ontological in the synonymy of Existenz with Sein and Dasein that is part and parcel to the German language; methodological in providing the stuff of the 'formal indication,' the mainstay of the early Heidegger's hermeneutic method, and too little discussed and clarified by Heidegger himself. The story thus wends

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its way through those peculiar core-concepts called 'formal indications' that mark the interlocking stepping stones to and through Being and Time: intentionality (divided into three senses in 1920-2), Da-sein (1923), being-inthe-world (first draft, 1924), to-be (Zu-sein: second draft, 1925), ex-sistence (final draft, 1926), and transcendence (1927). Together, they constitute Heidegger's phenomenological way, each new advance still suggesting the initial 'self-directedness toward' of the movement of intentionality while accounting for it in a richer and more concrete vectorial web, destined to articulate the fabric of time. It is against this background that I wish to single out the formal indication of Existenz for special attention, and follow its precise but halting progression from indicator of the factic 'I am' (1920) to that of the pure possibility of ecstatic temporality (1926). The usual story is chronological. Our story in particular demands the simple order provided by the chronological principle, the one and only principle enunciated by Heidegger for his Gesamtausgabe while he was still alive. This single guiding principle is reinforced and in fact rendered more labile by the maxim affixed by the dying Heidegger in 1976 to the entire Gesamtausgabe, 'Ways — not Works,' which draws on the earliest, deepest and most enduring impulses of his thinking. By contrast, the two posthumously fabricated Ersatzprinzipien added years later by Heidegger's literary executors, by contradicting those impulses, must be regarded not merely as uncharacteristic of Heidegger, a momentary aberration or last-minute change of mind, but more, as thoroughly unheideggerian, as devastating fictions totally at odds with Heidegger's lifelong thought. The sooner this is seen and conceded, the better off Heidegger scholarship and research will be, beginning with the inescapably scholarly (philological) activities of edition and translation. The notoriously a-historical principle of znAusgabe letzter Hand, first announced in the prospectus of 1978, clearly puts a premium on fixed works to the detriment of labile ways. As for the 'principle' of 'Edition ohne Interpretation first put forward in late 1982, it is simply inconceivable to me that the pan-hermeneuticist Heidegger, with years of experience in the hermeneutics of editions (Scheler's, Nietzsche's, etc.) as well as in the interpretive handicraft of translation, could have ever been capable of uttering such words. One result of the policies emanating from these pseudo-principles, with particularly malicious effects on the story we wish to relate here, are edited works whose chronological record is not only thoroughly compromised, but also deliberately left in that obfuscated state, left unexplained to mislead generations of unsuspecting readers. Alas, it is now the G/1-editions which are the muddy sources. So we must: return to the transcripts and underlying documents, return to the archives to redo the work of edition, to repair the damage wrought by the mismanagement inflicted by a hermeneutically inept administration. The story which we now wish to relate was especially in need of such damage control and repair.

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Having made our peace with sound scholarship, let us now leave this edition critique behind us, regrettably an indispensable preface to our story, and proceed to the task of philosophy, both systematic and historical (i.e. genealogical): What does Heidegger in the beginning mean by Existenz?. How and why is the term invoked, used with reserve, then withheld, and finally applied in such massive doses in Being and Time itself? The Review of Jaspers' Book (September 1920)6 Heidegger's first terminological confrontation of Existenz, a common enough occasional word in philosophical parlance and so in Heidegger's earliest courses, occurs in response to Jaspers' usage of it and Heidegger's methodological suggestions to Jaspers on how it might be better employed. The first draft of this book review, '[Critical] Comments on Karl Jaspers' Psychology of Worldviews^ was completed in September 1920, and a third and final draft, varying primarily only stylistically from the first, was distributed privately to Jaspers, Husserl and Rickert in June 1921. It was never published in the Gbttingsche Gelehrte Anzeigen, for which it was originally intended. As a 'private communication,' it was a topic of conversation and correspondence especially between Heidegger and Jaspers. Copies of it were also transcribed by some of Heidegger's students at the time (F. J. Brecht, W. Brocker, H. Marcuse). Critique here already means the 'destructuration' of fundamentals to get at the true tendencies and basic motives of Jaspers' problematic, as the opening pages of the review amply explain (GABd. 9: 1—6; 1-5). Jaspers himself lays down a double task for his book: (1) the constitution of psychology as a whole, with its basic question, what the human being is. This holistic task is to be realized not by the usual approach of a general psychology (Natorp's approach) but by way of (2) a psychology of worldviews, which seeks to 'pace off the limits of the soul and so to provide a clear and comprehensive horizon for the psychic (GABd. 9, 1; 1/PW 5f). The assumption is that the limits of psychic life are crucial in defining worldviews. Such an attempt to fix the region of the psychic whole, which by such a route and on such a scale has never before been undertaken, let alone aspired to, from the very onset of the problem works with a certain basic assumption of psychic life. This life has limits, there are 'limit situations' to which certain 'reactions' are possible, such reactions to the antinomically structured limit situations 'play themselves out' in the 'vital process' of psychic life as their medium. Spiritual existence arises through antinomy (GABd.9, 7; 6). Heidegger wishes to go more deeply into this assumption of psychic life, to bring out the preconception (Vorgriff) operative in the very posing of the

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problem of defining the whole of psychic life by way of its experience of limits. Terms like limits, antinomy, reactions which influence spiritual existence, already suggest a 'traditionally charged preconception' in need of exposition, not necessarily to dismiss it as an 'unwarranted presupposition,' but rather to determine whether it is true to the guiding tendency of the problem: Is the task of arriving at the whole of psychology thereby pregrasped with the requisite radicality? Jaspers, who claims to have 'no dominant method, but sometimes this, sometimes that,' all within the basic attitude of 'mere observation and contemplation' (Betrachtung: GA Bd. 9, 10; 9), is in need of a more radical discourse on method in his work. But the preconception brings with it not only a sense of method, but more importantly assumes a certain object of study tentatively called psychic life. The lack of a 'rigorous' sense of this constellation of preconception, method and object can more fatally lead to the surreptitious entry of an 'intuitive and conceptual surrogate' (GABd. 9, 10; 9), which in the end makes itself out to be the genuine phenomenon under study. It is therefore important to note from the start what Jaspers' object of study really is. 'The truly objective dimension in question may in formal indication be fixed as existence (Existenz). In such a formally indicated signification, the concept is intended to refer and point to the phenomenon of the "I am," the sense of being which lies in the "I am" as the starting point of a fundamental phenomenal context and the problematic belonging to it' (GABd. 9, 10; 9). Jaspers himself introduces the term as a Kantian Idea, 'something which counts as the whole, or as existence'; he then traces it back to its sources in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, for whom Existenz refers to 'the life of the present individuality' and always implies the question of the genuineness of psychic life and the extreme movement of unrest (Unruhe) in psychic Dasein (PW12f). An existence pervaded by interrogative distress over the authenticity of its individuality; the whole of existence regarded as a Kantian idea, like spirit, life, or substance, a 'something ... which is unproven and unprovable, which mocks and defies any formulation, since any formulation must again be withdrawn. It is not a rational presupposition nor a logical principle, but an infinitely changing thought and at once more than a thought or idea' (PW12). What more could Heidegger want for his own approach? Rather than as a Kantian idea in the face of the ineffable, however, Heidegger approaches Existenz as a 'formal indication' — a crucial methodic idea, as we know from previous semesters, which he refuses to explain in this review (GABd. 9, lOf, 29; 9f, 25) and will do so for the first time only in the following WS 1920—1 — precisely to avoid merely lapsing back into the particulars in which Kierkegaard and Nietzsche understood the term (GABd. 9, 11; 9). Likewise, he does not explain the uniquely ontological twist he gives to the term, which will take fruit years later only in the very last draft of Being and Time. But he does accept Jaspers'

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approach to a genuine sense of the phenomenon of existence through limit situations, provided that one takes the precaution of being alert to the traditional preconceptions operative in Jaspers' account. Jaspers, on his part, will over the years steadfastly refuse an ontological conceptuality in his repeated approaches to the question of the human being, of being human. LIMIT SITUATIONS

Thus, only on one point do they really join forces: The phenomenon of existence is illuminated in and through limit situations, those decisive situations 'which are tied to what the human being as such is, and are inevitably given with finite Dasein' (GABd.9, 11; 10/PW229). They all pose ultimate incompatibilities or antinomies which frustrate our desire to see our finite situation as a whole, to ascertain the totality of the world and of life. The limit situation of death contradicts life, chance contradicts necessity and meaning, war contradicts reciprocity, guilt contradicts innocence. We react to these antinomic situations by looking for ways to resolve them and to find stability in relation to them. For the antinomic means destruction, which is always experienced in a co-experience of the whole, of the unity which is somehow being broken. 'Contradictions remain as antinomies at the limit of our knowledge in the face ^/infinities' (GABd. 9, 12; 10/PW232). The consciousness of limits is the consciousness of the infinite whole of life, the experience of antinomy is at once the experience of its unity. The sense of antinomy and limit is traceable back to a particular aspect of the infinite. From antinomy springs the will to unity as a force of life, which in fact is the life of the spirit (GABd.9, llf, 25f; 9f, 21f). A unity broken, a totality disrupted, an infinity limited: it is clear that the preconception of the 'whole' (unity, totality, infinity) is what imparts sense to the very talk of antinomy, contradiction and destruction. Insofar as the human being sees himself situated in the whole of life as an ultimate, experiences his existence as encompassed by this unbroken medium, he stands in antinomies. It is only from the perspective of flowing life as a whole that the antinomies destroy and divide. The experience of the limit situation is couched by Jaspers in the terms of the then current life-philosophy (GABd.9, 12; 10-11). On Heidegger's part, his overt fascination with the 'destructive' character of limit situations, more so than Jaspers, goes more deeply than their tantalizing parallels with his own, by now well-developed, methodical destruction. It is more a matter of method learning to imitate life. Just as limit situations provide access to existence, so does phenomenological destruction aim to bring us back to our original philosophical experiences. But Jaspers is too quick to regard destruction as the break of antinomy and contradiction, while

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Heidegger's more formal sense cultivates the extreme kenotic moment of destructuration down to the sheer indeterminacy of sense, which in an about-face is then to be reinvested with determinability. As in the thought experiment of KNS 1919, this destructuririg is first identified with the sterile emptiness of theoretical formalization, which almost to the last hour is described as the epitome of unliving, unworiding, designifying and dehistorizing. But at the end of the course, these unacceptably negative consequences of extreme formalization suddenly turn positive in their revelatory capacity, and become the channels of access to the extreme concretization of our most comprehensive but usually hidden experiences. The limit situations reveal the concrete whole of existence precisely because they are the now positive extremes of unliving (death), unwo riding (accident), designifying (suffering), which thereby reveal individual life, the world and meaning for what they truly are (but not as 'Kantian ideas'). The defining ex-tremities at the out-skirts of existence are already ripe here for articulation by way of formal indication, but it will take five years of incubation to develop them into the insight of ex-sistence. DASEIN In the meantime, the seed for another and related central idea is also being planted in the Jaspers review. Jaspers' way of developing his preconception suggests that he belongs among the life philosophers of that time, and is therefore subject to the usual critique, newly posed by Rickert (1920), of vagueness of concepts, totally devoid of any methodical sense of philosophical concept formation. But, on the positive side, it must be said that life philosophy, particularly with the superior level it attains in Dilthey, dares to take a radical direction in philosophy, concealed as it is in a traditionally derived, rather than the originally drawn, means of expression which it demands. It is a matter of seeing that the most highly developed life philosophies tend toward the phenomenon of existence. From the fruitful plurivocity of the then current word 'life' regarded as primal phenomenon, two predominant directions of sense can be drawn, both of which express the tendency toward the phenomenon of existence: (1) Life as objectification in the sense of creative shaping and achievement, ex-positing from out of itself and thus 'being there (Da sein) in this life and as such a life; (2) Life as vital experiencing (Er-leben), as the peripatetics (Er-fahren) of learning encounter, apprehending, drawing to itself and thus 'being there in such experiencing (GABd. 9, 13—15; 11—13). Thus, some three years before Heidegger will define Dasein as a technical term (in SS 1923), he utilizes its hyphenation, admittedly with some obscurity and ambiguity, to suggest in a single term both the 'externalizing' and the 'internalizing' movements of life,

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the complex vectorial relations of'being out toward,' in-volved with in-terest 'in' the world. It will take as long for Heidegger to let the term 'life' go and replace it with 'Dasein' as his central topic of investigation, the 'primal phenomenon.' It will take him longer to identify its 'outering' formally with an etymologically understood sense of ex-sistence. Existence would in some sense hold together, in equiprimordiality, both vectorial directions of life, of 'Dasein.' To sum this up in Heidegger's later terms, being-in is at once being-out. Heidegger had already analysed the hermeneutic situation of SS 1920 in terms of this double direction of life according to two modish words, culture and lived experience, two philosophies of the day, transcendental value-philosophy and life-philosophy, two prevalent problems, the apriori and the irrational, and two philosophical goals, strict science and worldviews. Thus 'Dasein' and 'existence' are discretely being groomed to find a resolution to this polarity between the rational and the irrational, the ins and outs of life, at that threshold of experience where the implicit initially becomes explicit. Dilthey in his more Hegelian moments liked to say, 'culture is the ex-pression of life.' Life, however, was not considered as such, but instead in relation to ultimate norms and values, to the devaluation of life itself. Phenomenology's genealogically oriented formal indication accordingly seeks to bring us closer to the immediacy of life 'itself than Jaspers' teleologically oriented Kantian idea is capable of doing. Critique of Jaspers Jaspers makes an advance over life philosophy by concentrating on the problem of existence, in the context of psychology, byway of hitherto unseen phenomena like the limit situations. He fails to get at the problem philosophically by believing that this pre-grip from the whole of life truly gives him a grip on the phenomenon of existence, and that he can grasp it with the conceptual means of the prevalent scientific milieu (GABd. 9, 15; 13). The effort betrays an objectifying perspective which sees life as the enveloping region, an infinite flowing whole in which the constructive and deconstructive processes of life unfold (GABd. 9, 18; 15). Even when it is noted that the primal phenomenon of life is the subject—object split, this makes sense only when the 'unsplit' is regarded as the basic reality. 'Everything split, all movements, actions and reactions break out of the whole and return to it and time and again pass through it' (GABd. 9, 21; 18). This would make the ultimate striving of life toward the encompassing absolute into a movement toward an ineffable 'mystical' unity beyond the subjectobject split. Nevertheless, the basic sense of the relation between subject and object would be the split. It is the closest that Jaspers comes to the sense of intentionality which is the core of any formal indication. But if we move

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from this theoretically reverted sense of intentionality of a subject standing over against an object, and go back to the pre-theoretical triple sense of relation, containment and actualization which schematizes the intentionality of our concrete existence, we find a more determinate basic striving toward a unique future, rather than toward the mystical. 'This authentic dimension ... is the pre-structuration of one's own existence actualized in a selflike appropriation in each particular facticity oi: life, that is, the opening and holding open of the concrete trouble-laden horizon of expectation which every context of actualization as such develops' (GABd. 9, 22; 19). What basic bearing or experience motivates Jaspers' preconception? Where does it come from? If he were asked, the question might seem trivial and hollow, or he might answer (GABd. 9, 23; 20): Life as a whole is for me a leading idea, I only have to look around, this life is everywhere simply there. This whole, unified, unbroken, beyond opposition, enveloping every life, alien to fracture and destruction, ultimately harmonious, guides me. In its light I see every detail, it provides true illumination, it prefigures the basic sense in which everything encountered is determined and grasped as forming itself and breaking forth from this life and sinking back into it. This whole provides the essential articulation of the objective dimension which the contemplation has sought to order. Jasper's motivational experience is accordingly the holding in view of the whole of life as such as an idea. It can formally be called an 'aesthetic basic experience.' This means that the relational sense of the primary experience which pregives life as an object which is 'everywhere simply there' is a looking at, a covetous be-holding (Be-trachten) of something as a spectacle (GABd. 9, 23; 20). It is the bearing that contemplatively holds (Haltung) the whole of life in unity and harmony, untroubled by any self-worldly concern (GABd. 9, 37; 32). (Two years later, Heidegger will begin to describe this attitude under the heading of 'curiosity.') Where historically does Jaspers get his absolute of the whole of life? Jaspers' 'contemplation' clearly stands in the heritage of Kant's doctrine of antinomies and the concept of infinity which guides it, along with Kierkegaard's concept of the absolute purified of its specifically Lutheran or theological elements. These two components are then inserted into the current concept of life in all of its dilution, which in fact becomes the prevailing element. Assumed in this uncritical fashion, this 'accidental' heritage only serves to obscure the genuine insights (e.g. limit situations) into a genuine problem (existence) which Jaspers has to offer (GABd. 9, 27; 23). The three major points of critique of Jaspers are remarkably similar to those developed in the previous semester (SS 1920) against Natorp and Dilthey. The real question is whether Jaspers' preconception, in its objective

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regionalization, aesthetic attitude and terminological heritage, can approach the phenomenon of existence at all. How does it stand with existence? How is it to be even approached? Existenz ... is a particular way of being, a certain sense of the 'is,' which 'is' essentially the sense of (I) 'am.' It is a sense that is not genuinely had in theoretical intending, but instead in the actualization of the 'am,' which is a way of being of the 'I.' The being of the self thus understood signifies, when formally indicated, existence. This also provides the indication of where the sense of existence as the particular how of the self (of the I) must be drawn from. What becomes decisive is that I have myself, this is the basic experience in which I encounter myself as a self, so that, living in this experience, I can question the sense of the 'I am' in a responsive way, appropriate to its sense. This having-myself assumes different senses in different regards, so that this manifold of sense must be made comprehensible not in orderly contexts set off for themselves in systematically regional fashion, but in specifically historical contexts (GABd.9, 29; 25). Existence thus gives an ontological spin to the original experience of phenomenology that we have encountered in previous semesters. But it is the same concrete self-worldly Dasein, which is actualized in the way 'I have myself/ I am in having myself. The concepts of'being' and 'having', Heidegger already noted in the previous semester, are to be developed out of the basic experience (GABd. 9, 5; 4). The truly actualized ground experience of the 'am' thus 'goes about (geht um — concerns) me myself radically and purely' (GABd.9, 29; 25). It is not experienced as an I which stands in a region, as an instance of a universal; the I is simply experienced in its full actuality and facticity, as itself. Every attempt to set it in a 'stream of consciousness' or 'context of lived experiences,' and the like, would only congeal the sense of the 'am' and turn the T into an object. Whence the necessity of a radical suspicion of all objectifying and regionalizing preconceptions. 'Followed to its origin and genuine ground experience, the sense of existence is precisely the sense of being which cannot be obtained from the "is" which explicates specifically by taking cognizance and so somehow objectifies, but from the distressed having of itself which is actualized before a possible supplementary, but for the actualization unimportant, objectifying cognizance of the "is"' (GABd.9, 30; 26). The 'I am' of existence, as a sense or how of being, can also be formally addressed as 'he is,' for example. But it should also be noted that this can assume different nuances of significance, and this variability serves to articulate a manifold of life contexts or regions of objects: (1) 'he is' in the sense of being on hand, or 'present at hand,' an occurrence in objective nature; (2) 'he is' as playing a role in the

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environmental with-wo rid, as in 'Why is he in the cafe?'. This latter 'is' includes a 'was' and 'will be' which are of decisive significance for the 'he' (GABd.9, 31; 27). ORIGINAL EXPERIENCE AS INEFFABLE Having confronted Jaspers with his own preconception of existence, Heidegger takes time off here (GABd. 9, 29-36; 25-31) from his function as a reviewer to continue to present some of his own work on a 'hermeneutics of facticity,' then focused on defining the original experience of phenomenology. In this basic experience, the facticity of the I is decisive. One's own here-and-now lived factic experience, brought to actualization in this historical situation, also actualizes the original experience that arises from it, remains in it and returns back to the factic. This factic experience of life is not a region in which I stand, but is essentially a historical phenomenon in accord with the how of its own actualization. 'Historical' here does not mean object-historical, which regards my life as playing itself out in the present, as in the historical sciences, but rather is actualization-historical, experienced in the process of actualization. (This distinction within the 'historical' will play an important role in the two Religion courses of the coming semesters.) It is not the correlate to objective historical observation but to the what and how of the distressed concern (Bekummerung) of the self for itself. Like the later 'care', this forerunner is experienced as a peculiar non-objective union of the self's past, present and future. For the having of self grows out of, maintains itself in, and tends toward this distress. And the troubled self is the self actualizing its conscience, which serves time and again to renew this distress. Having myself is having a conscience. This suggests a connection between conscience and historical experience, when history is understood more fundamentally as the history which we ourselves are and by which we are burdened and borne. This sense of conscience and responsibility carries over into history in the ordinary sense, the 'objecthistorical' sciences, whose roots go more deeply than mere curiosity to the distress that we ourselves are. But the tendency to fall away from these deeper sources must constantly be counteracted by way of the 'destruction' of the tradition which, once again, has as its positive function the revival of these motivating original situations, in this case the motives for the very return to the originally historical (GABd.9, 32-4; 27-30). Heidegger concludes his review with a recapitulation especially of his critique of Jaspers' method, and even his lack of concern over this issue. A recurrent excuse has been the purported 'ineffability' of life (GABd. 9, 19f, 24; 16f, 21), in view of its 'infinitely flowing' character, where concepts would only disrupt and 'still the stream' (Natorp). This 'specifically Bergsonian argument' only leaves the real methodical issue of the relation between

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concepts and meanings of phenomena begging. Besides, this sort of gesture gives the impression that one has really caught a glimpse of inexpressible dimensions. But if one has really succeeded in exposing new contexts of phenomena, as Jaspers has in fact done, such a perverse theory of expression is superfluous. Then it is more a matter of noting how the terms that mark the ineffability, like 'life,' function in context. For Jaspers, clife' is the enveloping realm, the basic reality into which all phenomena are inserted. The term thus performs a definable linguistic and methodical function. Heidegger thus in the end sees a further task in any appeal to ineffability: 'Instead of repeating again and again the oft-quoted individuum est ineffabile, it is high time we ask what sense thefari (speech) should thereby have and what sort of apprehension should come to expression ...' (GABd. 9, 39f; 34f). This is in fact Heidegger's problem of the 'formal indication,' which had dominated his thought since the hermeneutic breakthrough in KNS 1919, and will continue to do so through Being and Time until WS 1929—30. (Contrary to the impression given by the Jaspers review, the linguistic formality of the expressions of the 'ineffable' is not just an etymologic [da sein, ex-sistence] but more comprehensively should also include a grammatologic of the impersonal sentence, infinitive, double genitive, middle voice, etc.) There are also the hidden motives being betrayed in such appeals to ineffability, in Jaspers' case, that of the detached observer who only describes what is 'already there' and in the process erects elaborate typologies of human behavior. This is the major point that Heidegger is trying to communicate to Jaspers, namely that his own interpretive behavior is very much a part of his topic. What Jaspers thus classifies is not just bare and naked 'life': It is life that has already been brought to understanding and conceptual expression. And what Jaspers does is to insert all of this into his own context of understanding through his own preconceptions. Jaspers thus should become more attentive to his own historical situation of interpretation, ' "historical" not only in the external sense, that the interpretation is valid for a certain time, but rather that it, in its ownmost sense of actualizing its "contemplation," has something essentially historical for its object' (GABd. 9, 38; 33). Heidegger accordingly concludes his review by advising that 'mere contemplation must go on to the "infinite process" of a radical questioning which holds itself in the question' (GABd. 9, 43; 37). The surprising new development in the 1920 review, responding to Jaspers' adoption of the term Existenz, is accordingly the overt ontologizing of the topic of phenomenology, which up to this point had been oriented toward a phenomenology of life. The original experience of phenomenology is an (pre)ontological experience. Radical phenomenology is ontology, an ontology of'da sein,' an ontology of the '(I) am.' Existence, a term subject to the same incidental and casual uses as 'being,' is to indicate the 'sense of being' (Seinssinn) of the 'I am.' And this sense of being is to find its sense

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of actualization (Vollzugssinn) within the triple sense of intentionality operative in the concrete Dasein. One is reminded of Heidegger's scholastic training as he makes 'I am' the prime phenomenon, and then regards it as the prime analogate from which other analogates, like che is,' are to take their bearings. But in the context of the review, the first effort is to shift the locus within the central question of psychology, 'What is it to be human?', from the psyche, human life, to the £is,' and even more tellingly, from the T to the 'am.' Heidegger already seems to be aware of the dangers of anthropologization of his starting point. The locus of the cam' is not in the psyche but in history, the history 'which we ourselves are,' therefore (against Jaspers' metaphysical proclivities) not in life as an ineffable infinite medium but in time, and as time. One can however doubt whether the titular question of 'Being and Time is yet fully grasped at this point, or even whether Heidegger has yet begun to refine his concept of time to any great extent. Some steps in this direction will be taken in the following semester. With Heidegger's reluctance to let go of the term 'life' altogether, the shift from 'life' to 'Dasein' will take several more semesters to complete, and to 'existence' not until the final draft of Being and Time. He clearly senses that the shift to the personal 'I am' could irretrievably overpower his initial sense of being as an impersonal 'primal something,' an It which worlds, properizes, and so 'happens' to me (KNS 1919). But this impersonal function is now to be taken over and conveyed by the 'facticity' of the 'I am,' a term first adopted from the neo-Kantians in SS 1920. Almost exactly a year after he first sent his review to Jaspers, in 1922, Heidegger writes to him to reinforce its most telling points and, first of all, 'the basic sense of the facticity of life' (HJB26F). It must be made clear what it means to be involved in 'making up' human Dasein, to have a part in it. But this means that the sense of being of lifebeing, of human-being, must be originally won and categorially defined. The psychic is not something that the human being 'has,' consciously or unconsciously, but something that he is and which lives him. Fundamentally, this means that there are objects which one does not have but 'is'; objects whose What rests simply in the 'That they are.' Heidegger then goes on to explain that, for this task, the categorial structures of the old ontology of the Greeks - terms like What versus That - must be subjected to a 'critique at their roots' and 'newly built from the ground up.' It is now mid-1922. Clearly, the ontological direction first struck in the Jaspers review two years before is beginning to shape itself into the doublepronged ontological program, at once systematic and historical, which will eventually become Being and Time.

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But in 1922, the ontological thrust of the program, its formal indication, focuses first on the full facticity of the 'I am,' and not on its project of 'existence' understood as a forward-tending '(having-)to-be' (Zu-sein: 1925). Significantly, when Heidegger first broaches the formal indication of the 'I am' publicly to his students in the last two hours of WS 1921—2, in late February 1922, he never even mentions the term 'existence' (GA Bd. 61, 17281, 145-55).8 But in this early attempt to get at the peculiar 'objectivity,' or sense of being, of factic life, the bridge between the facticity of the 'I am' and the later project of 'to be' emerges in the question 'Am I?' by which the 'I am' is concretely actualized in the context of factically 'ruinant' life. The question in all of its disquietude and distress does not admit of a ready and simple Yes or No response, becomes more concrete and original the more counter-ruinant it becomes, and for the philosopher is all the more indeterminate and labile by its focus on the 'am' rather than the 'I.' This counterruinant questionability of factic life is really the new immediacy of life's facticity, exposing it in all of its mobility as the new 'object' of philosophy, breaching the 'insular sacrosanctity' (GABd. 61, 152) of the old immediacy of the givenness of the lived world which temporalizes itself in factically ruinant life, from which the factic Dasein itself is in fact absent, is simply not 'there' (GABd. 61, 148, 154f). The new 'object' of philosophy is therefore not an object at all in the traditional sense of an in-itself, but a deliberate counter-movement which brings us to a new kind of'ob-ject' (Gegen-standas 'counter-stance': cf. WS 1920—1) which is insuperable in its resistivity and opposition when compared to the purported resistance of the object in the traditional sense (GABd. 61, 177f, 148). This new ob-ject is in fact the mobile context of factic life in the full vitality of its facticity, i.e. in its specific temporality, which is accessible only in the questioning that reverses life's ruinance and so counters the annihilation of its very being. Following this counter-movement to its originality opens the possibility of genuinely illuminating the basic experiences in which factic life qua life can en-counter (be-gegnen: GABd. 61, 176) itself. This oppositional connection between life's temporal movement and its counter-movement constitutes the nuclear insight structuring the systematic part of the program which will first be developed later in the year of 1922 and will eventually bear the title 'Being and Time.' (Doxographical interlude. The archival trail up to this point records only the occasional usage of the terms Existenz and existenziell in Heidegger's vocabulary, rarely in his public courses, a bit more frequently in his 'private communications' [Existenz is made central first in the Jaspers-review, existenziell is used five times in the famous letter to Lowith in August 1921]. The coming years will gradually see the introduction of Heidegger's own existential coinages; first, and quite sparingly, those special categories called

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1

' Existenzialien'; finally, but not until the very last draft of Being and Time in March 1926, the adverb 'existenzialJ) The years of incubation (1922—6) OCTOBER 1922 This brings us to October 1922 and the version of the Aristotle-Einleitung sent to Marburg and Gottingen. This particular Einleitung (probably the third of a half-dozen versions) is likewise a 'private communication/ intended only for two juries of peers designated to appoint successors to vacant university chairs. In it, Heidegger spells out for the very first time the doublepronged program that will structure Being and Time, that of a (1) fundamental ontology and (2) destruction of the history of ontology. Its focus is clearly on a 'prinzipielle ontology of facticity, in which the 'existentiell possibility' of Existenz plays a central but limited role (still reflected in the narrower sense which the term plays in the structure of care in Being and Time). At this point in the typescript, in a remarkably terse and concentrated burst of novelty, Heidegger for the very first time suddenly introduces a series of new terms (averageness, the Anyone, interpretedness, etc.) and organizes them around the temporal polarity of life's movement and counter-movement. What we have in this polar tension, accordingly, is the nuclear core of the book Being and Time in its two extant Divisions, or more precisely, of the Daseins-analytik which is to serve as a fundamental ontology. Existenz is here juxtaposed with falling and regarded as its countermovement, as that Existenz attainable by way of a deliberative seizure of the prospect of death in life. Existenz thus has the narrower sense of life's most unique and authentic possibility, just one of the possibilities which can be temporalized within life's facticity, and not the more comprehensive sense it first assumes in Being and Time, as the formal indication of Dasein's possibility as such. As a counter-movement, it: is in some sense a 'not,' of life against life, of one possibility against another, of the authentic against the inauthentic. This 'against' expresses itself in a unique questionability which has its roots in the distressed concern (Bekurnmemng) intrinsic to existence itself. The more comprehensive 'being of life' that fundamental ontology seeks to thematize is at this stage nevertheless still to be found, not in existence, but rather in the 'formal indication' of facticity. SS 1923

So far, the students following Heidegger's public courses have been spared the existentialist jargon. The course of SS 1923 breaks that silence only briefly, when the same restricted sense of Existenz, narrowed down to Dasein's ownmost possibility, is carried over from Heidegger's 'private

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communications' to make a pair of cameo appearances early in the course. Existenz is Dasein's most intense possibility, the ability to hold itself awake and be alert to itself in its fullest (GABd. 63, 16; 13). Furthermore, when we interpret our facticity, understood as our prepossession (in Being and Time, 'existence' is the Vorhabe^, in terms of this unique possibility of existence, we then develop those special categories called the Existenzialien (ibid.). Thus, temporality is 'not a category but an existential' (GABd. 63, 31; 25). But beyond these two occasions early in the course — contrary to the published edition (GABd.63, 35, 44, 66; 28, 35, 51) - Heidegger thereafter diligently avoids this newly coined existential vocabulary and continues to speak publicly of 'categories' or else of 'ways of being,' 'characters of being,' or 'basic categories' of Dasein where he should have said - and is sometimes purported to have said in the lecture (GABd. 63, 35, 66; 28, 51) - 'existentials.' WS 1923-4 The same remarkable reserve is carried over into the following semester, in the first of the courses at Marburg. In a running critique of the ousiological 'categories of the daylight' of Aristotelian Lichtmetaphysik, Heidegger, in the first class after the Christmas break, once again makes passing mention of the 'existentials' needed to elaborate Dasein in its being. For in the present hermeneutic situation, the existentials are the preconception that result from the prepossession of Dasein being placed under the preview of being (in Heidegger's very first use of the technical term Vorsicht). At this point, a total blackout of the existentialist vocabulary falls over the doxographical record of Heidegger's development, both public and private, precisely in the period in which Being and Time undergoes its various draftings (1924—6). The closest that Heidegger comes to it is in the public address of July 1924 on 'The Concept of Time,' where it is pointed out that 'Dasein is authentically with itself, it is truly existent (existent)' (BZ 18) by persistently forerunning the certain possibility of its 'being gone' (Vorbei). Why this diligent evasion of a vocabulary which Heidegger began to develop in his early Freiburg period and which is destined to inundate the book Being and Time* In addition to the strong aversion to 'Kierkegaardism' which he developed upon arriving in Lutheran Marburg, could it be that Heidegger for a time came to regard such language as inessential, dispensable and replaceable? WS 1925-6 The reserve is severed over two years later, in the very last hour (February 26) of the Logic course of WS 1925—6, on the verge of the all-out effort to finalize

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the text of Being and Time for the printer (March 1926). The course is genealogically important for a number of reasons: the first of five extant Logik courses in Heidegger's teaching career, the return to Kant. Both have their impact on the most important reason: WS 1925—6 sets the stage for the thematic structure of the book Being and Time in both its published systematic First Part and the never published historical Second Part. We shall concentrate on the stage that it sets for the reappearance of existentialist vocabulary onto the scene, after two drafts of Being and Time completely devoid of such vocabulary (November 1924, SS 1925). Ever since the student Heidegger reviewed Emil Lask's Logik der Philosophie in 1912, logic for him meant philosophical logic, 'a logic of logic' in the Scotus dissertation (GABd. 1, 230), ergo a 'transcendental' (phenomenological, hermeneutical, ontological) logic. Beginning in SS 1925 (GABd. 20, 2f; 2), it is portrayed as an 'original logic' (in fact a 'logic of origins') whose first function is to 'produce' the fundamental concepts which articulate the incipient ground of all of reality as well as of its particular domains, as the starting basis for further scientific research in those domains. Contrary to traditional 'ontic' and mechanically rote 'school logic' (GABd. 21, §3), this hermeneutically ontological logic, operating at the very interface of being and language, is confronted with as yet unexplored, inchoate pre-theoretical realms which demand and 'e-voke' hitherto unspoken languages apropos their particular matter. Since the course in Ontology in SS 1923 was originally intended to be a Logic course, we perhaps should not be surprised that Heidegger takes the occasion to first mention, albeit in passing, those innovative and tradition-breaking categories called existentials. But in WS 1925—6, such fundamental concepts, which seek to articulate Dasein's 'ways to be' (GABd. 21, 209, 229, 414), which are 'characters of being' and not of beings, are first called Temporalien (GABd. 21, 243) before they are finally called Existenzialien (GABd. 21, 402). Our basic categories are meant to be 'tensors' (the German Tempus, Tempora = [gramm.] tense) rather than 'existentials.' And the 'hermeneutically indicative sentences' (GABd. 21, 410) which employ such tensors are accordingly 'temporal sentences' like the verbally reiterative Die Zeit zeitigt, 'Time times (comes to maturity, ripens to fruition).' Though the sentence has the structure of a worldly assertion, its primary sense is not to manifest something on hand but rather to indicate the being of Dasein, to point to its structures of time, to index their potential conceivability accessible to the understanding. Such hermeneutically indicating sentences are meant first to break old habits, say, of viewing the tenses of time in objective fashion, to reorient habitual apophantic ways of understanding, to displace us toward a non-reifiable index of reference which prefigures our sheer being-there (ibid.).

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A final farewell to Habe (= 'ousia') But in order to arrive at the labile sense of time meant to be conveyed by such categories, in order to break with everyday 'now-time' and come to this more 'original time' (GABd. 21, 243), our ousiological habits must now be fully suspended, the last vestiges of having, Habe, 'ousia', must be placed in brackets or used with caution. This would include some of Heidegger's own favored expressions since 1920: having myself, having the world, having to do with things, and (still in Being and Timel) having a conscience. The world with which we have to do in the end can be too much with us. Having to do may well be the busywork which obscures our sheer 'having to be' (Zu-sein, the formal indication of SS 1925). And this turns out not to be something we have, a firm possession, but instead something we are. 'Having' now is the obligatory 'ought' of being itself. Dasein in its absorption in its concerns persists in these concerns. What concerns it and that for which it is concerned is that in which it abides and holds to, the having (Habe) that has become a habit and habitat, about which ever more possessions become the concern. All acquisition and provision, understood in a sense broad enough to include the acquisition of knowledge and know-how, all of this already presupposes a certain possession to begin with. And the one who already has is the one who is in a position to augment his possessions (GABd. 21, 232). The inertia of Having which continues to escalate of itself, this having which promotes its own habit, is the pendency of fallenness, de-pendency on the world to which Dasein is relegated. To escape this inertial cycle, Dasein must find its way to the possibility 'of giving up all worldly acquisitions and possessions' (ibid.). It is the leitmotif of ascetic, other-worldly Christianity (in the formal purity that Nietzsche's last true friend, the 'atheistic theologian' Franz Overbeck, underscored), which is not merely a staple of medieval philosophy. 'All of modern philosophy in its problematic is incomprehensible and would be absolutely impossible without the doctrinal content of Christianity' (GABd.21, 233). In Heidegger's formal structure, this new possibility is found by transcending concern toward care, which formally refers to that structure of Dasein according to which it, in its being, 'goes about' (the geht um of an Umgang) this very being. The 'formal logic' drawing out the consequences of that structure is now cited in full below, not only because of the crucial 'inside story' it gives of Heidegger's concept formation, but also to suggest something of the formal purity of the gramma-ontology of prepositions and verbs which Heidegger has erected for himself (GA Bd. 21, 234f):

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Implicit in this 'it goes about' is the consequence that that which it goes about is not a fixed possession (feste Habe)\ and as long as this 'it goes about' belongs to Dasein, that means insofar as it is, and that means as long as it is, this says: that 'about which it goes' and for which it is concerned is never firmly had; and nevertheless this 'it goes about' is precisely a beingtoward (Sein-zu) the 'about which.' And this being-toward is not a being intimate with something on hand, but purely and simply a being-toward, which indeed is not yet a firm possession and in the end can never become one, according to its most proper sense. This toward-which of the beingtoward, which is care, is however nothing other than the being of Dasein, namely, in each instance the being which is not yet but can be; implicit in the 'it goes about' there is accordingly a being-out-for (Aussein-auf} its own being qua can-be. Being-0&£-for its own can-be: the ultimate intentional core of Being-toward within the structure of care itself. All this is now being highlighted with an eye to the ultimate temporality (TemporalitaP. GA Bd. 21, 234) of care. And now the Moment We are on the verge of Heidegger's critical terminological re-vision of his formal indication, where 'to-be' (1925) is now displaced by ex-sistence (1926). Note the context of influence: Greek ousiology finally severed by transworldly Christian elements operative in the philosophical tradition, which Heidegger has also formalized in the structure of care. Significantly, we have already encountered the upshot of this passage, being-0z^-for, in the first two drafts of Being and Time precisely in their meditation on death as outermost possibility. Circling his way from the ontic back to the ontological, Heidegger now repeats these mortal intimations — 'insofar as it is and as long as it is,' 'and in the end can never become a fixed possession' — before moving to his final formalization. Being-out-for: another one of those many ways of expressing anxiety in the German idiom — Aussein-auf. being anxious to, bent on, eager — for now to be taken literally.. The key word is 'out,' 'ek', ex, that simple adverb in the middle modifying in both directions, not only 'being' but also the preposition in the phrase, auf, for, to, sometimes zu, toward: every nuance 'counts' in this precise grammatological gambit. Always out, never finished, constantly underway toward, never at an end, never in its entelechy: both meditations on death, in their razor's-edge distinction between an unfinished Dasein and a thing which only comes into its own precisely when it is finished (GA Bd. 20, 430; 311), clearly sound the knell of the ousio-logic of constant presence. The leading indicator, the determining indicator, is now the future, which at once retains its indeterminacy. The present perfect indicator of already-being-in-the-world is outstripped by the self confronting itself stripped of this being-in, being out of this in, being

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beyond the world itself. (Recall the ins and outs of 'da sein' in the Jaspers review: Death has clearly added a new dimension to this vectorial field.) Genealogical excursus: the ins and outs of ex-sistence and trans-cendence Looking forward, we find that the meditation on death in Being and Time itself is introduced by the same farewell to Habe (SZ 233; 276), to ousiology, while it of course also betrays its new departures. The very nature of Dasein puts in question not only any attempt to 'have' it ontically, but also conceptually, by way of a conceptual analysis. 'Being-out-for' becomes a recessive term in Being and Time, withdrawing almost entirely into the filigree of the text (SZ 195, 210, 26 If; 239-40, 253, 305f). After all, it is no longer really needed. The formal indication into which it has been translated, by way of the Latin, is now front and center, dominating every page of Being and Time: ex-sistence, out-standingness. Terms like Auslegung and ausgezeichnet now play crucial indicative roles in Being and Time, typically overlooked by the formally insensitive reader ... and translator. Heidegger does not admit to his etymological legerdemain until SS 1927 (GABd. 24, 242, 377; 170, 267), but he slyly plays with it precisely in these pages on death in Being and Time. 'So long as it is, there is always something in Dasein that stands out, something which it can be and will be. To this standout belongs its very "end," which for being-in-the-world is death' (SZ233f; 276f). He then must demystify the ontic pitfalls of the term Ausstand (outstanding debts: SZ242ff; 285ff) in the German, but this only serves to bring out the purity of his own formal indication of existence. Having developed his ek-static temporality out of that same indication, he then once again gradually reverts ex-sistence back to the in-sistence of being-in-theworld (GABd. 24, ibid.\ disguising its Christian upbringing. But that is the beauty of the flexibility of formal concepts! How being-out-to became ex-sistence to begin with, how existence could become the formal indication and pre-empt that role from facticity, is itself an example of that. At first, existence was but the most unique possibility of Dasein to be found within its facticity (Oct. 1922). But if ^x-sistence is itself being-0z/£-for its own can-be, and this is something that can never find its end and will always remain unfinished, if this end cannot be had, then this never-ending 'out' is not only possibility but at once facticity in the very extremity of a very incomplete finitude, to wit, being caught up, 'being had' willy nilly in a precipitous movement beyond its control; one might say 'thrust' into existence as a fact, in its sheer sense of 'bare' existence, now understood as sheer dynamism. Existence thus can be turned inside out into its facticity, and made to order for the full scope of care, now taut from the tension of the haves and havenots, comprehending the addictive pendency of having, which acts inertially as a pull-back on the dynamic forward thrust of existence. Its ousiological roots naturally lead to characterizing 'falling' as the drag of substantive fixity

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characterizing possession, the reifying tendency wanting to maintain the constancy of presence. 'Existence' specifically designed as a formal indication of temporality, formally thought through the full 'from-to' of always being 'underway,' becomes amenable to the double sense it plays in Being and Time: narrowed to the future within the structure of care (the role it acquired in Oct. 1922) and broadened into a formal indication of Dasein in its full vectorial field of relations. One can finally ask whether this broadened version has been sufficiently formalized, detheologized of its initial roots. Heidegger clearly wants an active experiential sense of finitude which is not simply dogmatically equated with creatureliness and createdness. 'Thrownness' (Sartre translates it as 'dereliction'), first introduced in the final draft of Being and Time, does that in a brutally dramatic fashion. But the question of finitude will arise primarily with regard to the even more theological twin to the formal indication of existence, to which we now turn. The 'out' added to the intentionality of being-toward in fact yields a second formal surrogate for intentionality, one that has deeper roots in the Judaeo-Christian tradition than Kierkegaardian existence. Stemming from the same deep source both etymologically and traditionally, it shadows 'existence' and subliminally assists in sustaining its verbal potency. With a slightly retarded incubation but a more overt doxographic trace in the Heideggerian corpus, it will soon break out and overpower 'existence' as a surrogate for intentionality in the coming years of development. Because of its more overt history relating back to the Greeks, it will serve an especially important role in the destruction of that history. It first surfaces in SS 1923, mediated by that 'Catholic phenomenologist' (but cf. GABd. 24, 28; 20) Max Scheler, who, in a powerful statement worthy of quote, was the first to identify it with intentionality. The context is similar to that of the genesis of ex-sistence, namely, that of distinguishing the Greek ousiological definition of the human being from the 'theological concept' (GABd. 63, 25; 20-1): What is man? ... He is 'the intention and gesture of transcendence itself, a God-seeker,' a 'between,' a 'limit,' ... 'an eternal Out or Beyond (Hinaus),' a 'door of sudden opportunity' for grace ... 'the only meaningful idea of the human being is a theo-morphism through and through, the idea of an X which is the finite and living image of God This laudation of trans-cendence, of the human being as an 'eternal outtowards (Hinaus-zu)' (GABd. 20, 181; 130) by way of quotation of the texts of the Christian tradition (esp. Calvin and Zwingli), recurs into Being and Time itself (SZ49; 74). Heidegger's attraction to this formulation of intentionality is in fact already recorded in his habilitation, where he

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identifies intentionality concretely with the 'transcendent primal relationship of the soul to God' (GABd. 1, 351). To what extent will its 'mystical' sense for the Young Heidegger be carried over to the later development? Transcendence becomes a formally indicative term only after 'ex-sistence' launched the trajectory taken by Being and Time itself. But it is important to identify it now, as a twin of ex-sistence, and root it in the same vectorial fieldd. of conceptual relations, of care ripening into temporality. Its Christian roots are clearly still manifest when we identify transcendence as the countermovement to 'decadence' or fallenness, which itself loudly proclaims its religious roots. But transcendence formalized will allow Heidegger to develop a peculiar reciprocity of the immanence of transcendence, and the transcendence of immanence, in the same vectorial field. In terms of transcendence, the destruction of the history of ontology naturally focuses on the tradition of transcendental philosophy, from Plato to Kant to Husserl. The categories of the being of Dasein can now be called, not only tensors and existentials, but also transcendentals, to be sure in a transformed sense, but nevertheless circling back to the habilitation, and earlier, to the native soil of Catholic Messkirch which the Old Heidegger, awaiting 'the grave stillness of God's little acre,' became fond of evoking. The climactic last hour Meanwhile, back in the last hour of WS 1925-6 (GABd.21, 402-15), things are being wrapped up, loose ends are being tied. Heidegger is concluding his very first analysis of Kant's schematism with a summary which recalls the motivations for embarking on this historical interlude, namely to find a new non-chosistic 'concept' of time capable of expressing the Temporalitdt of care's 'already' and 'ahead of without substantifying them. He is searching for a more telling language, of being rather than of entities, to articulate these 'at first obscure characters of time' (GABd. 21, 245). Following Kant while admittedly going beyond him (GABd. 21, 406), Heidegger has developed a highly sophisticated temporal sense of the assertoric comportment of 'making present' (Gegenwartigeri). The course itself had undergone some unanticipated massive changes, departing from its initial outline, shifting somewhat abruptly from Aristotle to Kant, from the question of truth to the question of time, thereby expanding the sphere of 'logical' analysis from the assertion to the whole of Dasein. A somewhat worn hermeneutic indicator, 'initially only a cliched catchphrase, just as the first thesis is always an arbitrary one' (GABd. 21, 205), was thus proposed quite early in mid-course: 'Dasein itself is time.' That had been an earcatching statement, a favorite rhetorical device of Heidegger's, ever since his talk of July 1924, oft repeated in the journal article of November 1924 and in SS 1925. It will never be repeated again after the concluding hour of WS 1925-6: 'The transition in being from pretheoretical comportment

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toward the world to pure presentifying is a rnode of temporality itself — and would be absolutely impossible if Dasein itself were not time' (GA Bd. 21, 407). Kant's sense of time as an 'on to' and 'towards' that steps back into the background as it articulatedly brings forward and reveals things in their categorial structures: This very intentional sense of time is to be equated with Dasein itself. This should not surprise us, since all of Heidegger's formal indications reflect intentionality in their filigree, certainly his previous formal indication of Dasein as a very tendentially understood 'tobe.' And Heidegger does not abandon his old indications: Zu-sein likewise makes its cameo appearance in this last hour, conceptually in a very strategic way, leading to a hitherto unexpressed dimension of care in the drafts of Being and Time. Heidegger also reviews for us what he really intended to express in this old formal indication, about to be displaced. He is discussing the aspect of 'already' in the structure of care. 'The "already" is the indication of the apriori of facticity' (GABd. 21, 414). He first warns against taking this in the sense of a brute fact as something on hand. 'The structures of Dasein, temporality itself ... are in their most proper sense possibilities of Dasein to be, and only that.' But this can-be of the ways-to-be includes already having decided, either authentically from itself, or by renouncing such a possibility, or by not yet being equal (gewachsen — 'grown') to such a decision, like a retarded child. Accordingly, 'Dasein is delivered over (iiberantwortet) to itself in its to-be. Being delivered over [being charged to, having to answer for] — that means: already-in, already ahead of itself, already by the world; never on hand, but always already a possibility decided so or so' (ibid.). In addition to being the very first instance in which Heidegger has distinguished a separate third dimension (ultimately a tense, the past), the 'already-in,' in the structure of care, the passage underscores how the dimension of possibility, the conative future so strongly implied in the muscular 'to-be,' also reaches back into the recesses of the past and is to be sought indicatively in all three dimensions of care. This broader applicability is a trait which the new replacement for to-be, ex-sistence, is meant to add to the analysis of care. Being-there is purely and simply being-possible. Which of the two indicators is better suited to perform this conceptual function of developing the primacy of the possible? Not an idle question, since, by now, we know that every nuance counts when it comes to formally indicating the immediacy of being, which is now to be indicated in its full temporal immediacy. 'Being itself is time.' Heidegger never actually says this. But, besides the problematic 'is' in any statement about being, is he himself 'shrinking back' before the horror of horrors, the sheer flux of being, as Kant did before him? For he does make some other rather strange statements in this last hour, at least from the vantage of Being and Time itself. For if time is something like a schematism, if the goal is the 'logos of time,' a 'chronologic' (GABd. 21, 200), what's to

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worry? Everything is tending toward the issue of the ' Temporalitdt of Being itself,' despite the slovenly use of this term upon its first introduction in mid-course in WS 1925—6. 'Care itself is time' (GABd. 21, 409). This appears to be a corollary of 'Dasein itself is time,' since the being of Dasein is care. But let us try to follow Heidegger's logic here. This is after all still a course in logic, and Heidegger is here busy trying to straighten out his language in reference to phenomena, their categories and the resulting assertions, hermeneutically indicative versus world assertions (GABd. 21, 410). He is in this last hour outlining in his mind the final draft of Being and Time, which is about to be written. He is wondering about its basic 'language game.' Concern and care are structures of the being of Dasein. They articulate its being toward the world. We now wish to situate these structures with respect to time. The problem stems from a traditional concept of time which turns beings into on-hand realities 'in' time. But the 'ahead' and 'already' in the structure of care would be thoroughly misunderstood in terms of such a time. Yet they are obviously characters of time. 'In what sense is care, the structure of the being of Dasein, characterized by time? These structures are moreover what they are neither in time nor in some kind of relation to time. Care is instead defined "by" time such that it is itself time, the facticity of time itself (GABd. 21, 409). But later, we read: 'Care is only possible in what it is insofar as its being is time itself (GABd. 21, 413). The being of care is time itself: a bit less direct and less thought-provoking, a bit more careful, ontological . . . and obtuse. Perhaps a verbosity without telling power. Heidegger's self-criticism sometimes took this direction, a devastating critique for a phenomenologist. This no doubt was also at least the symptom that led finally to the demise of Being and Time, the withholding of the unpublished Division from the press. It would seem to be an intrinsic hazard of the ontological 'language game,' where it is so easy to forget that 'being' is not a bland abstraction, but the very stuff of our most immediate and most comprehensive experience of 'being here,' or in Kant's more complete litany of occasional indexicals, of 'now, here, this, I.' How to maintain this sense of concrete immediacy in questions like 'What is time itself?' and now, by way of master structural concept of care, 'What is the structure of time?' or 'How does time structure itself?' Heidegger's answer, the language of existentialism, may have been in part an answer to such problems of misunderstanding and disorders in ontological communication. Ever since Engelbert Krebs evaluated his first courses and Jaspers listened to Heidegger read from his manuscripts, he was quite self-conscious of his dry and intractable (bildarm und hartndckig) style. We might also recall how important the theme of communication became in WS 1925-6, resulting in the first introduction of the category of 'solicitude' (Fiirsorge: 223) and what it means to be 'for the Other,' say, for

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Johanna A. (her final semester in Marburg), especially in the communicative situation between teacher and student. Instead of to-be, the leading formal indicator is now, rather abruptly, Existenz. Instead of'tensors' (GABd. 21, 243), which claim but a passing moment of glory, all 'specifically structural concepts, which express the being of Dasein and its modes, shall be designated as existentials' (GABd. 21, 402). The language of Existenz is suddenly there again, after a two-year hiatus, without explanation for both its long absence and new presence, or how it is the key to the structure of the being of Dasein, say, because it ex-presses the universal ek-static character of Dasein, as the already formalized clue of being-