Hegel's Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life 9780521728720, 9780521429573, 2008028858

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HEGEL'S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

This fresh and original book argues that the central questions in Hegel's practical philosophy are the central questions in modern accounts of freedom: What is freedom, or what would it be to act freely? Is it possible so to act? And how important is leading a free life? Robert Pippin argues that the core of Hegel's answers is a social theory of agency, the view that agency is not exclusively a matter of the self-relation and self-determination of an individual but requires the right sort of engagement with, and recognition by, others. Using a detailed analysis of key Hegelian texts, Pippin develops this interpretation to reveal the bearing of Hegel's claims on many contemporary issues, including much-discussed core problems in the liberal democratic tradition. His important study will be valuable for all readers who are interested in Hegel's philosophy and in the modern problems of agency and freedom. PIPPIN is the Evelyn Stefansson Nef Distinguished Service Professor in the John U. NefCommittee on Social Thought, the Department of Philosophy, and the College at the University of Chicago.

ROBERT

HEGEL'S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY Rational Agency as Ethical Life

ROBERT B. PIPPIN University of Chicago

. . . ~.,.,. CAMBRIDGE ;::

UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo, Delhi Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge c B2 8R u, u K Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this tide: www.cambridge.org/9780521728720 © Robert B. Pippin 2008 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2008 Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge

A catalogue record for this publication is available ftom the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data Pippin, Robert B., 1948Hegel' s practical philosophy : rational agency as ethical life I Robert B. Pippin. p. em. Includes bibliographical references (p. 282) and index. ISBN 978-0-521-42957-3 (hardback)- ISBN 978-0-521-72872-0 (pbk.) r. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-183L 2. Ethics. 3· Agent (Philosophy) 4· Free will and determinism. I. Tide. B2949.E8P47 2008 193-dc22 2008028858 1s BN 978-0-521-42957-3 hardback

Is BN 978-0-521-72872-0 paperback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of u Rr.s for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

For joan, as ever

Contents

Acknowledgments

page viii

PART I SPIRIT 1

Introduction: leading a free life

2

Naturalness and mindedness: Hegel's compatibilism

3

36

3 On giving oneself the law

65

4 The actualization of freedom

92

PART II FREEDOM

5 The freedom of the will: psychological dimensions 6 The freedom of the will: social dimensions

121

147

PART III SOCIALITY

7 Hegelian sociality: recognitive status 8 Recognition and politics

2IO

9

Institutional rationality

239

Concluding remarks

273

IO

Bibliography Index

Vll

Acknowledgments

This book started out in 1990 as a book about Hegel's theory of modern "ethical life," essentially about his ethical and political philosophy. In the course of writing that book and a few preliminary articles, it became clear that Hegel's theory could not be properly understood without an appreciation of his very unusual position on the nature of human agency. More accurately, it began to seem that his ethical and political philosophy essentially was a theory of human agency. Such an appreciation required, in turn, a detailed treatment of the theory of freedom appealed to in that account, and what was for Hegel the most important condition for the exercise of agency as a free subject: rationality. Hegel's position on each of these issues was, to say the least, non-standard. He did not distinguish between actions and events, or agents and non-agents, on the basis of a metaphysical dualism, nor did he deny the distinction in any reductionist monism. His theory of freedom was not a voluntarist or causal theory, and neither was it a standard compatibilism. And his theory of practical rationality was not a theory of about a faculty or reflective power exercised by an individual. It soon became clear that these preliminaries required their own book-length treatment. In completing this project over several years I incurred many debts and I am happy to acknowledge them. The new project begin in earnest during a sabbatical stay in 1997-8 at the Eberhard Karls Universitat in Tiibingen, supported for the second time in my career by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. I am very grateful to that foundation and to my hosts and colleagues in the philosophy department, Manfred Frank, Otfried Hoffe, and Anton Koch, for their hospitality and conversations during my stay there. (I am especially indebted to Tony Koch for his seminars on Hegel's Begriffilogik and on Robert Brandom's Making It Explicit.) In 2003-4 I was very fortunate to have been awarded a fellowship at the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, where I was able to complete several chapters of the book manuscript. The Wissenschaftskolleg Vlll

Acknowledgments

lX

is as close to an ideal research environment as I can imagine, due in large part to the extraordinary staff there and to the stimulating fellows they assemble each year. I owe that staff and the fellows in my jahrgang a great debt. While in Berlin, my friend Rolf-Peter Horstmann of the Humboldt University (whose work on German Idealism has been an inspiration for thirty years) was kind enough to organize a bi-weekly seminar of philosophers in the Berlin area. I was able to present drafts of several chapters at these seminars and profited immensely from the comments of colleagues there, especially from Dina Emundts, Rolf-Peter Hortsmann, Andrea Kern, Hans-Peter Kruger, Christoph Menke, Terry Pinkard, Sebastian Rodl, and the late Rudiger Bubner. Another profound institutional debt is to the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, whose Distinguished Achievement Award underwrote research leave over the three years from 2004 to 2007 and so much of the work on the issues discussed in chapters 6 and 9· The extraordinary generosity of the Mellon award made possible much, much else during these years, but it most importantly made possible the final work on the book manuscript. My greatest institutional debts are to the University of Chicago and to the Committee on Social Thought. Phrases like "support for one's research," and a "climate of integrity and dedication," and "constant intellectual stimulation" cannot adequately convey the uniqueness of these institutions and neither can I adequately convey how privileged I feel to be a member of such communities. · It would take at least a chapter-length narrative to thank properly the many colleagues and students to whom I am indebted. But I have to mention the following. Starting in 2004, Jim Conant at Chicago and Sebastian Rodl, now at the University of Basel, organized a "TransCoop" or international cooperation project, supported yet again by the ever-generous Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. The subject was "Transcendental Logio from Kant to Frege." This made possible yearly meetings over several years, one year in Chicago and one year in Germany, and so another forum for trying out both my interpretation of Hegel and for evaluating the philosophical cogency of the position attributed to him. I benefited greatly from the exchanges at these meetings, particularly with Jim Conant, Paul Franks, Sebastian Rodl, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithoffer, and Michael Thompson, but above all from several sustained exchanges with John McDowell. I learned a great deal, more than I can adequately acknowledge, both from the work McDowell presented at these traveling seminars (and from his work in general) and from his

X

Acknowledgments

criticisms and responses. This was equally true of a series of lectures on agency and action theory that McDowell gave at the University of Chicago in the spring of 2007. I have been discussing Hegel with Terry Pinkard for over twenty years and continue to value greatly what I have learned from these exchanges. Here at Chicago conversations with Jim Conant in the last several years, particularly about issues in Kant and in contemporary work on perception and agency, have been very helpful, and the seminars taught in the last few years by Candace Vogler on "action-based ethics" proved indispensable in the final draft of the manuscript. I had the great privilege of several spirited exchanges about Hegel with Richard Rorty in the last years of his life, some in public, some in print, and all were very valuable. Axel Honneth invited me a few times to give lectures on Hegel's practical philosophy at Frankfurt and I was always happy to do so. The philosophical atmosphere that Honneth has created at Frankfurt is among the most stimulating and rigorous of any I have found anywhere and I learned a great deal from conversations there, especially from Honneth. I am grateful as well for exchanges with Robert Brandom, Dieter Henrich, Jonathan Lear, Beate Rossler, Nathan Tarcov, Ludwig Siep, and Robert Stern. In ways I would not have anticipated, conversations and engagements with Michael Fried about the nature and history of modernism in painting and photography, and especially a brilliant seminar Fried gave at Chicago in 2004-5, proved extremely illuminating about a variety of issues addressed in this book. I would have approached a number of issues differently and, at least in my view, not as well had it not been for the benefit of Fried's work, conversation, and friendship. (I am also grateful for his help in securing permission for the wonderful Menzel on the cover.) Finally, there is no way to acknowledge properly the debt I owe to graduate students in Social Thought and Philosophy over the last decade of seminars on Kant, German Idealism, and Hegel. I am especially grateful to three research assistants for their invaluable and diligent help in the preparation of the manuscript: Mark Alznauer, David Possen, and Jonathan Baskin. Versions of some of the chapters that follow often appeared first, sometimes in very different and early form, in journals and collections and I am grateful for permission to reprint here: chapter 2 first saw the light of day in The European journal of Philosophy, vol. 7, no. 2 (1999); chapter 7 in The European journal of Philosophy, vol. 8, no. 2 (August 2000); chapter 8 in lnternationales jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismusl

Acknowledgments

xi

International Yearbook of German Idealism, vol. 2 (2004); and chapter 9 in The Southern journal of Philosophy, vol. XXXIX, Supplement, "The Contemporary Relevance of Hegel's Philosophy of Right" (2001). Some other earlier versions of chapters appeared first either in Germany (where authors retain copyright) or in Cambridge University Press publications.

PART I

Spirit

CHAPTER I

Introduction: leading a free life

In Hegel's Encyclopedia system, what contemporary philosophers would call practical philosophy is called the "philosophy of spirit [Geist]." By "practical philosophy" most philosophers nowadays would mean an account of the distinct sorts of events for which we may appropriately demand reasons or justifications from subjects whom we take to be responsible for such events occurring. As it is sometimes put, to focus appropriately on that issue we also need to ask for a broad delimitation of the practical normative domain (whatever is done for reasons, purposively, where reference to such reasons js essential in understanding what was done), and so are asking about the possibility that there are these distinct sorts of events, actions, things done for reasons. r That there may be no such distinction, that there might be just natural objects and their properties and ontologically uniform natural events, has been a major issue in modern practical philosophy for some time now. We often ask as well, sometimes as an independent question in practical philosophy, sometimes as tightly interwoven with an answer to the first, for an assessment of what rightly should count as such reasons or justifications, as distinct from what subjects might as a matter of fact themselves count as such reasons. 2 .In accounts that tie acting well to the exercise of practical reason, these discussions obviously include claims we take to be of the

' See Anscombe's well-known account of "a certain sense of the question 'why?,"' in Anscombe (2ooo), pp. nff. 2 As we shall see, the most distinctive feature of Hegel's account of this issue is that he treats the boundary between natural events and spiritual activities not as a hard and fast either/or. There can be considerable overlap of issues regarding the sort of account that would be appropriate. This is clear in his unusual account of "Anthropology" and such issues as the relevance of geography and diet and unreflective habits of mind characteristic of a people or tribe as all parts of an account that is still essentially of human conduct, not animal behavior. This can lead to some unusual discussions. See for example, his account of boredom at EPG:92; PM, 69.

3

4

Hegel's practical philosophy

highest importance - ethical and moral sorts of reasons, questions of right or justice, etc. 3 Within his comprehensive practical philosophy, the heart of Hegel's answer to both sorts of questions consists in a theory of freedom. This theory is at the heart of the account of the ontological distinctness of actions, and at the heart of what could loosely be called Hegel's value theory. The basic features of this' theory are well known, at least in a textbook sort of way, but it also comes with presuppositions and implications that either resist attempts at interpretive clarity or, ifclarified in a certain way, have seemed quite objectionable. The theory ascribed to ~~ Hegel in what follows has two basic components: that for Hegel freedom I consists in being in a certain reflective and deliberative relation to oneself !1 (which he describes as being able to give my inclinations and incentives a II1 "rational form"), which itself is possible, so it is argued, only if one is also ! already in certain (ultimately institutional, norm-governed) relations to others, if one is a participant in certain practices. This account is resistant to any analysis of these forms of self- and other-relation that would isolate the possibility and the very content of any self-understanding from social and political structures at a time, so it is much less straightforwardly psychological than many other modern theories. This is the feature of Hegel's account that is probably the most well known, but mostly with respect to the question of the nature of social norms, social institutions, and social practices. That is, it is well known that Hegel is an opponent of "methodological individualism" in accounts of such things. Such norms, institutions, and practices should not, in his view, be accounted for as built up out of, or as consisting in, or as sustained by, the individually held beliefs or commitments of individuals, or as created by the individual decisions (or putatively undistorted rational choices) of individuals. Being opposed to this view means one holds that there would be no possible content to such individual mindedness unless such individuals were not already members of complex social networks, or that the relation of dependence between individuals and social structures does not go from social structures to the individuals who sustain it, but the other way around. I want to suggest something 3

We also obviously demand and give reasons for what we believe, and while Hegel is suspicious of any strict separation between theoretical and practical reason (see the discussion in chapter 5), and as insistent on taking account of conceptual change in both arenas, a full account of the relation between theoretical and practical "sense-making" would be an independent study. I shall here just concentrate on the practical issue. Some suggestions about how Hegel views the general problem (the theory of conceptual content) is given in chapters 3 and 4·

Introduction: leading a free life

5

much stronger: that Hegel thinks that something like this reversal of /1 methodological individualist logic is necessary to explain the conditions ~~ of the possibility of agency itself. This last point will quickly become quite complicated. Along with many of the features now taken for granted as constitutive of an event counting as an action - that it be intentional under some description, that it admits a distinct sort of response to a ""Why?" question, that it involves some sort of relationship between conative and doxastic elements, and so forth - I want to say that Hegel adds an element not usually raised and which leads him to the issues of sociality just suggested. Put most 1 ~;,w,·cs- 212 necessity, 278: Antigone and, 145; freedom and, 34, 62, 75, 103, 241; moral, 70; natural, 17, 40; normative, 17, 217; pragmatic, 220; realm of, 13; self-legislation and, 76; social, 219; spirit and, 45, 52, 229; subjective, 109; substance and, 98; will and, 129 "Negative Liberty," 124 negation: dissatisfaction and, 177; of immediately rational response, 126; "logic of experience" and, 230; nature and, 126 (n. 5.7); of putative immediacy, 40; of and spirit, 223, II3 (n. 4-20) negativity: absolute, 40, 45, 190-191; denial of immediacy and, 52, 53; identity and, 45; modes of, 53; of norm, 40; self-reference of, 125; social life and, 193; as subjectivity, 224, 235, 195 (n. 7.17)

neo-Aristotelian, 187 (n. 7.8) neo-Kantians, 236 (n. 8.19) neo-Wittgensteinian, 151 (n. 6.II) Neuhauser, Fredrick, 247 (n. 9.II), 253 (n. 9.19), 255 (n. 9.24), 264 (n. 9·35), 266 (n. 9.40), 271 (n. 9.48) New Testament, 233 (n. 8.17) Niet2Sche: the bad poem and, 161 see also poem; Genealogy ofMorals, 28o; "lightning flash" simile and, 161 (n. 6.27); self-subjection and, 73 normativity see also practial norms: actualization and, 20, II5-II8, 279; autonomy of, 8 (n. 1.7); conceptual determinacy and, 98; contemporary context of, 236 (n. 8.19); contractualistic model of, 196; crisis or breakdown or failure of, 74-75, 121, 161, 176-177, 201, 276-277 (n. 10.3), 277-278; dependence and, 99; fluidity of, 232; function of philosophical reflection and, 276; Hegel's general theory of, 12, 19, 67-91; passim, 63 (n. 2.36), 198 (n. 7.21); Hegel's theory of recognition and, 196-207, 2rr, 243; highest modern, 280; Kant and, 65, 67, 108, II6-n7, 236; legalistic model of, 196; legislative authority and, 103; legitimacy and, 62; modern political reflection and, 218; nature of requirements, 49; self-legislation and, 17, 50, 105, 198, 201, 206, 236, 260, 273> 275; similarities in approach by Kant and Hegel, 108 see also Kant and normativity; spirit and, 17, 128, 193 see also spirit as self-imposed norm; spirit-nature dualism and, 61; "true infinite" and, 64; Utilitarian conception of, 196 norms, practical, 3, 12, 65, n5, 184, 276, 277 (n. 10.3) Oakeshott, Michael: civic associations, 209 (n. 7·33) On the Waterfront, 162 Orestes, 245 (n. 9.6) organicist, 93 Orwellian, 97 (n. 4.8) O'Shaughnessy, Brian, 142 (n. po), 172 (n. 6.43) Ottman, Henning, 125 (n. 5.5) Owl of Minerva, 177, 269 paradox, pragmatic 197 (n. 7.20) Parkinson, G.H.R., 15 (n. 1.18) Patten, Alan, 21 (n. 1.22), 215 (n. 8.5), 278 (n. 10.4) Peperzack, A., 129 (n. p1) personhood, 199, 205

306

Index

Phenomenology of Spirit (PhG): account of civil

People's Democratic Republics, 97 (n. 4-8)

Quante, Michael, 40 (n. 2.7), 169 (n. 6.36), r86 (n. 7.7), 190 (n. 7.n)

freedom in, 214; account of conceptuality in, roo, 231, 235; account of partiality in, no; and action, 24, 231-233; Antigone and, 144-145 see also Sophocles: Antigone; breakdown of norms in, 75, 177 see also normativity; central movement of, 235; chapter on spirit in, 152; chapter on sense certainty in, 142; desire and, III; developmental logic of, 63; discussion of physiognomy in, 38; introduction to, 224; and natural desire, III; recognition and, 202-205, 220 see also recognition; relation to Honneth, 213; self-education in, II4 (n. 4.21) Philosopher-Kings, 267 philosophers: as "sacred priesthood", 272 philosophy: British, 155; practical, 3-4, 8, 12, 20, 28, 29, 35> 95 Philosophy of Right: commentaries on, 123; content of intention and, 169, 173, 175; defense of social norms in, 202; explanation of institutions in, 264; Honneth' s "reactualization" of, 255; Introduction to, 21, 24, 38-39, 123 (n. 1.23), 271 (n. 9.48); notion of the "organic" in, 250; practical rationality in, 274; Preface to, 268; "rational system of the will" and, 109; relation to Phenomenology, 227; relation to Science of Logic, roo-ror; sociality and, 15; speculative language of, 123, 125, 206; substantialist metaphysics and, 207; "what is rational is actual" and, 93 phronimos, 279 physicalism, r66 (n. 6.33) Pinkard, Terry, 72 (n. 3-13), 232 (n. 8.15), 270 (n. 9·45): new translation of Phenomenology, 233 (n. 8.17); on sociality of reason, II3 (n. 4.19), 252 (n. 9.17) Plato: "continuity" and, 268; dialogic activity and, 273 (n. ro.r); free will and, 94, 135; Republic, 209 (n. 7·33) poem, r6r polis, Greek, 201 Popper, Karl, 26 positivism: cultural, 266; historical, 93, 96 "post-Focauldean" world, 280 Pothast, Ullrich, 37 (n. 2.2) property, private, n8 Prussia, 269 psychology, 128, 129, 193, 202 (n. 7.23): of dependence, 219; moral, 24, 271 (n. 9.48); rational, 54 (n. 2.23); social, 210, 215; the will and, 121 Pufendorf, Samuel von, 69 (n. 3.6) Putnam, Hilary, r6r Pyrhagorean, 26

rationality: actuality of, 66, 97; failure of, 79-80, 83; family and, 117; formal constraints of, 75; Hegel's theory of, 105, 197, 206; historical, 30, 32, 261; institutional, 13, 31, II7, 131, 203, 238, 239-269; passim, 275; instrumental, 192; normativity and 64, 85, 217; objective, 6 (n. r.6), 32, 35, 246 (n. 9.10), 248, 255, 258262, 261-262, 275; practical, 19, 21, 24, 96 (n. 4.6), 195, 202, 240, 246, 263-266, 267, 271 (n. 9.48), 273> 274, 275, 275-276, 277 (n. 10.3), 279; reflective, 71, 278 (n. 10.4); subjective, 31, 262; will and, 138 Rawls, John, 275 (n. 10.2): Basic Structure, 197 (n. 7.19); Concept and conceptualization, 92; · rational agency and, 21; self-legislation and, 71 (n. pr); state's coercive authority and, 212; A Theory ofjustice, 278 Rawlsean: Constructivism and, 201; Koorsgaard and, 89 Rechsstaat, 2 74 Rechtsphilosophie, 242, 243, 269, 270 (n. 9·45) recognition: civil society and, 193 (n. 7.15); desire and, III; Hegel's emphasis on, 140 (n. 5-19); freedom and, 183-209; in Hobbes and Fichte, 184 (n. 7.4); independence and, r6r; mutuality of, 140, 146, 184 (n. 7.4), 196, 199, 201, 241, 243, 279; in phenomenology ofspirit, 145, r6o; political implications of, 240; self-realization and, 140; social responsiveness and, 178; social theory of subjectivity and, 210-223; as theory, 183 (n. 7.1) recognitional politics, 30, 218 see recognition Reformation, 244 (n. 9.5) "regress" argument, 76 regret, 173 "relational state" theory, 12 relativism, historical, 195, 197 (n. 7.20), 201 Religion, Philosophy of, 272 religiosity, 280 Rickert, Heinrich, 236 (n. 8.19) Riedel, Manfred, 184 (n. 7.4) rights-bearers, 205, 206, 209, 227 right: abstract, r68, 206, 255, 264, 265 (n. 9.37); actuality and, 95-97, 95 (n. 4.6), 96 (n. 4.7); as citizen of good state, 26 (n. 1.30); in Philosophy of Right, 244 rigorism, 29, 196 (n. p8) Ritter, Heinrich, 187 (n. 7.8) roles, social, (social role theory), 30-31, 66-69, 68, 86, 145, 198, 242-243, 246 Romans, 94, 135

Index Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 71 (n. 3-12), 219 (n. 8.6): alienation and, 21, 124; centrality of for Hegel, 37 (n. 2.1); citizenship and, 252; practical reason and, 19; rational agency and, 21; relation to Hegel, 96 (n. 4-6), 121, 245, 253, 255; Second Discourse, 219; self-legislation and, 71; Social Contract, 214, 252 (n. 9.18), 254 (n. 9.22); the state's coercive authority and, 212 Russell, Bertrand, 26

Sache selbst, 250 Sandel, Michael, 215 Scanlon, T.M., 197 (n. 7.19) Schacht, Richard, 15 (n. r.r8) Schelling, Friedrich, 238 Schellingean, 62 Schiller, Friedrich, II7 Schmidt, Carl, 237 (n. 8.21) Schuld, r66 Science of Logic, 7, 13, 19, 38, 49, 63, 97-106 passim, 267 see also Concept Logic Searle, John, 163 (n. 6.30), 172 (n. 6.43) secularization, 280 Segal, Jerome, 12 (n. 1.10) Sellars, Wilfrid, 41 (n. 2.8), (n. 2.9), 47 (n. 2.14), 59 (n. 2.29), Go-61, 61 (n. 2.33), 102, 236: normativity and, 62 (a. 2.34) Sellarsean, 19 (n. 1.21), 277 (n. 10.3) self, "locus" theories of, 12 (n. 1.10) self-consciousness, universal, 200 self-deceit, r62, r65 self-externality, 233 (n. 8.17) self-knowledge, 8, 10, 50, 85, r85, 229, 235, 238, 280 self-legislation, 18, 19, 65, 72 (n. 3.13), 92 (n. 4.1), 98, 105, 109, III, 121, 133, 203, 205, 254 (n. 9.21) see also normativity and self-legislation; Rousseau and self-legislation; Kant and self-legislation self-liberation, collective, 198 self-negation, 126, 223-225, 233, 235, 237 Shakespeare, 154 Siep, Ludwig, 140 (n. 5-19), 183 (n. 7.1), 184 (n. 7.4), 207 (n. 7.31), 221 (n. 8.9), 224 (n. 8.10), 265 (n. 9·39) Sittlichkeit, 6, 22, 30, 69 (n. 3-4), 96, 109, 124, 139, 140, 167, 184, 192, 205, 207, 217, 220, 239> 241, 256, 259> 261, 279 (n. 1.5) skepticism, 203 slavery, 95 (n. 4-6), 276 Socrates, 6 (n. 1.5), 134, 177, 266 (n. 9.40) Socratic, 165, 177, 224 solipsism, r69

Sophocles: Antigone, II7 (n. 4.23), 144-145, 154, r6r, 176, 240 (n. 9.2), 245 (n. 9.6), 263, 265; Oedipus Rex, 26, 175 (n. 6.45) soul: animals and, 128; in Encyclopedia, Go, 63; as the "I", 43; immortality of, 57; introspection and, 156; manifestation of spirit in, 52; Die seele, 128; See/ending (as a thing), 14 (n. 1.15), 54 (n. 2.23); separate existence of, 47; substantial unity of, 51-53 Speight, Allen, 157 (n. 6.23) Spinoza, Baruch de, 6 (n. r.6), 12 (n. r.u), r6, 134, 136, r86 spirit: absolute, 15, 32, 42, u2, 229, 268; as collective historical achievement, 59, II2-II3; cosmic, 26, 42, 121, 132, 153 (n. 6.15); Divine, 93, 94; expression and depth of, 233 (n. 8.16); failure of, 225; as form of collective mindedness, 17, 104; freedom and, 94 (n. 4.4); general notion of, 109; historical account of, 275, 278-279; justification of deeds and, 9; objective, ro, 15, 24, 32, 36, 48, 68 (n. 3.3), II2, 127, 138, 161, 190, 193, 199, 249, 271 (n. 9.46), 279; perpetual dissatisfaction and, 223-229; philosophy of, 3, 4I (n. 2.ro), r84 (n. 7.4), 233 (n. 8.17); philosophy of subjective, 23, 54> 55-58, 204 (n. 7.27); problem of, 127; as product of itself, r6, 17, 34, 56 (n. 2.25), 59 (n. 2.30), Go, 64, 65, 223-224, 252, 260, 261; satisfying itself, 49, 55 (n. 2.24), 104; as self-imposed norm, 62, II2; selflegislation and, 196; as self-supporting, 227; subjective, 93, 134; totality in Time and, 228-229; World, 93; wounds of, 235 (n. 8.r8)

see also nature and spirit state: coercive force and, 203 (n. 7.24), 212, 215, 217, 257; freedom and, 195, 243; Hegel's conceptions of, 251 (n. 9.16), 259-262; individual and, 248-250; liberal versions of, 2n-215; organic theory of, 210; representative, u8; self-legislation and, 260; theory of, 37 St. Paul, 127 (n. 5.8) stoicism, 203, in Philosophy of Right, 208 Strauss, Leo, 126 (n. 5.7) struggle to the death, 29, 96 (n. 4-6), III, 126 (n. p), 197 (n. 7.20), 214 subject, absolute, 184 subjectivity: achievement of, 20; debates over "originality" of, 185 (n. 7.6); Hegel's theory of recognition and, 204, 210-217; modern vs. ancient, 245 (n. 9.6); persistence of, 176-177; in post-Kantian tradition, 78; principle of modern states and, 94 (n. 4.5); reflective endorsement and, 91; right and, r67, 169; selflegislation and, no; substantial unity and, 246 (n. 9.10); temporality and, 229

308

Index

substance, 13, 45, 94 (n. 4.3), 195 (n. ].17)

System ofSittfichkeit, 184 (n. 7.4) Tat, 148, 164, 166, 171 (n. 6. 5) Taylor, Charles, 40 (n. 2.7), 136 (n. 5-17), 147 (n. 6.2), 148 (n. 6.4), 152-153 (n. 6.15), 190 (n. 7.11), 210, 215 teleology, 44, 45 (n. 2.13), 59 (n. 2.30), 112, 238 Telos, 59 (n. 2.30), 204, 229 terror, 137 terrorist act, 16o Theunissen, Michael, 45 (n. 2.13), 92 (n. 4.2), 140 (n. 5-19), 184 (n. 7·5), 207 (n. no), 269 (n. 9·43) Thompson, Michael, 47 (n. 2.15), 87 (n. 3.44) tragedy, Greek, 237 transparency condition, 174 Truman, Harry S., 175 "unfreedom", 131 unhappy consciousness, 203 universality, affirmative, 193 "Urheber" (authorship) principle, 73-74, 75, 86-87: Hegel's modification of, 115 verificationism, 164, 165, 173 volunrarist(ism), 15 (n. 1.19), 37, 41, 122, 127 (n. 5.8), 143, 163 (n. 6.30), 164, 186-187, 261 (n. 9·33)

Wallace, R., 33 (n. 1.35) Walsh, Terrance W.H., 110 (n. 4.17) Warnke, G., 45 (n. 2.13) Wildt, Andreas, 140 (n. 5-19), 184 (n. 7.4), 187 (n. 7.8) Williams, Bernard, 22, 96 (n. 4.6), 140 (n. 5.19), 155 (n. 6.19), 175 (n. 6.45), 184 (n. 7.5), 221 (n. 8.9), 272 (n. 9·49) Wi!!kiir, 7 (n. 1.6)

will: freedom of, 16, 44, 94, 121, 125-144, 12i 137, 147-177, 195, 253; weakness of, 27, 81-85, 165, 174 Windelband, Wilhelm, 236 (n. 8.19) Wirrgensteinian(s), 14 (n. 1.15), 225 Wolff, Christian, 72 Wolff, Michael, 253 (n. 9.21), 261 (n. 9·33): Das Korper-See!e Problem, 58 (n. 2.28); freedom and, 186 (n. 7.7); on Hegel's non-Aristotelianism, 194 (n. 7.16); on Kant's teleological theory, 251 (n. 9.15) Wood, Allen, 15 (n. 1.18), 76, 124 (n. 5.3), (n. 5.4): analysis of Kant, 76 (n. 3.20); on Hegel's Aristotelian ethical naturalism, 194 (n. 7.16); "Introduction" to Philosophy ofRight, 124; on "priority of freedom over happiness", 23 (n. 1.28); on rational agency 21 (n. 1.22), 87 (n. 3·45)