Hegel and Scepticism: On Klaus Vieweg's Interpretation 9783110528138, 9783110527353

Table of contents :
Preface
Contents
Sextus Empiricus als eigentlicher Vater der modernen Philosophie
Hegel’s Critique of Skepticism and the Concept of Determinate Negation
“The dialectic of all that is determinate”
The Conception of Philosophizing
Old and New Scepticism, Old and New Empiricism
Hegel on Scepticism in the Logic of Essence
Faraway, So Close
The Problem of Action in Pyrrhonian Skepticism
Politische Philosophie unter skeptischen Bedingungen
Friedrich Schlegel’s Sceptical Interpretation of Plato
The Reception of Aenesidemus in Fichte and Hegel
Isosthenie in der Praxis
History of Philosophy of Science and Hegel’s Critique of Skepticism

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Hegel and Scepticism

Hegel-Jahrbuch Sonderband

Herausgegeben von Andreas Arndt, Brady Bowman, Myriam Gerhard und Jure Zovko

Band 10

Hegel and Scepticism On Klaus Vieweg’s Interpretation Edited by Jannis Kozatsas, Georges Faraklas, Stella Synegianni and Klaus Vieweg

ISBN 978-3-11-052735-3 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-052813-8 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-052747-6 ISSN 2199-8167 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress. Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Typesetting: Costas Passas Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck ♾ Printed on acid-free paper Printed in Germany www.degruyter.com

Preface ‘Hegel and scepticism’ remains an intriguing topic directly concerning the logical and methodological core, and formation, of Hegel’s system. Hegel’s thought has evolved through his vivid involvement in the vigorous debates over scepticism that took place in Germany around 1800. Contrary to many major scholars of his time, Hegel did not turn to immediate realism, empiricism, or to subjective idealism, in order to overcome scepticism and its deconstructing consequences for philosophical thought itself. Hegel’s strategy did not consist either of any fatal immediate confrontation with scepticism. In the sceptical attack against the phenomenal world Hegel will see a powerful means for thoughtfully negating any mythical narrative about the giveness of the empirical. In the alleged hostility of scepticism against theory he will discern a powerful means of thoughtfully criticising any untheorised belief on the finiteness and the boundaries of thought. His interpretation of Agrippa’s five tropes, as they have been delivered by Sextus Empiricus, remains invaluable for his attempt to form a philosophical system that sublates both dogmatism and scepticism. Contrary to any fatal attempt to discard sceptical critique, Hegel will aim to immunize philosophy against the threat of scepticism by integrating the latter into the former as its negative and free moment. To find a way out of the ‘hell of negativity’ means to integrate scepticism as the moment of dialectic, the moment of negation, into the philosophy itself – therefore to transform scepticism into a sceptical method, into a ‘self–accomplished’ philosophising which negates its own negation and embraces the Absolute, not in the form of a dogmatic substance but in the form of the subject, of the concept (Begriff), of the identity of the identity and non–identity. In the last decades there is a growing interest in the issue ‘Hegel and scepticism’ – an issue which has been more or less neglected in the former Hegel–literature. Research has been oriented to the crucial logical and methodological problems of Hegel’s strategic confrontation with scepticism from his earliest academic years till the end of his life. To understand not only Hegel’s genuine conception of philosophy but moreover to test the fertility of his approach for the current philosophical debates presupposes for someone to go deep into the logical elements of his system and to investigate the evolution of his thought through his own works and the intellectual frame of his time. This book presents a series of contributions on different topics concerning the polymorphous relationship of Hegel to scepticism as well as its critical role in dealing with crucial philosophical questions. Around a keynote paper by Klaus Vieweg – a Hegel scholar who has devoted much of his academic work to the historical and systematic relationship between Hegel and scepticism – will unfold different DOI 10.1515/9783110528138-202

VI | Preface

approaches which will try to understand and restate the limits and the content of this relationship. Various Hegel readers with different theoretical concerns and academic backgrounds deal with Hegel’s strategy against (or with) scepticism in a large range of areas from logic and epistemology to practical philosophy and the history of science. The current volume contains the proceedings of a workshop organised by the Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences (Department of Political Science and History) and the Friedrich Schiller University Jena (Institute for Philosophy) that took place in Athens on 27th and 28th May 2016. For the offer to publish this collective work as part of the renowned series Hegel–Jahrbuch Sonderband we remain sincerely thankful to De Gruyter Publishing House and personally to the former Editorial Director of the Philosophy Department, Getrud Grünkorn, as well as to the Editors of Hegel–Jahrbuch, Andreas Arndt, Brady Bowman, Myriam Gerhard and Jure Zovko. Equally cordially we would like to thank a good friend and colleague, Costas Passas, for undertaking the complicated and grinding task of typesetting this book gratis. Finally, we also owe many thanks to the Project Editor, Johanna Wange, for her constant willingness to solve any technical issue for us till the final preparation of this volume. The editors

Contents Preface | V Klaus Vieweg Sextus Empiricus als eigentlicher Vater der modernen Philosophie | 1 Maria Daskalaki Hegel’s Critique of Skepticism and the Concept of Determinate Negation | 21 Georges Faraklas “The dialectic of all that is determinate” | 39 Anna Tigani The Conception of Philosophizing | 61 Jannis Kozatsas Old and New Scepticism, Old and New Empiricism | 81 Ioannis Trisokkas Hegel on Scepticism in the Logic of Essence | 99 Antonios Kalatzis Faraway, So Close | 121 Folko Zander The Problem of Action in Pyrrhonian Skepticism | 133 Stefan Enke Politische Philosophie unter skeptischen Bedingungen | 143 Johannes Korngiebel Friedrich Schlegel’s Sceptical Interpretation of Plato | 165 Suzanne Dürr The Reception of Aenesidemus in Fichte and Hegel | 185 Stella Synegianni Isosthenie in der Praxis | 195

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Thodoris Dimitrakos History of Philosophy of Science and Hegel’s Critique of Skepticism | 207

Klaus Vieweg

Sextus Empiricus als eigentlicher Vater der modernen Philosophie Zu Hegels Inklusion der pyrrhonischen Skepsis¹ Zusammenfassung: Für Hegel, der im Skeptizismus den entscheidenden und ewigen Herausforderer der Philosophie sieht und seine Phänomenologie des Geistes als sich vollbringenden Skeptizismus versteht, muß die Philosophie in Hinsicht auf ihren skeptischen ‚Schatten‘ zwei Forderungen genügen: Erstens muß den Äquipollenzattacken Paroli geboten werden, den scharfsinnigen Isosthenie–Argumenten ist standzuhalten. Zweitens vermag die Philosophie eine solche Immunität oder Resistenz nur mittels der Inklusion der echten Skepsis erreichen – der wahre Skeptizismus muß ‚in jedem echten philosophischen Systeme implicite zu finden‘ sein. Hegel beschreibt dieses integrierte Skeptische als das negativ–vernünftige oder dialektische Moment des Logischen, als das Prinzip aller Bewegung, alles Lebens. In diesem Sinne repräsentiert die Skepsis einen notwendigen Durchgangspunkt und ein konstitutives Prinzip der Philosophie. Im Zentrum von Hegels Immunisierungsstrategie stehen die von Sextus überlieferten 5 Tropen des Agrippa.

Wer recht erkennen will, muß zuvor in richtiger Weise gezweifelt haben (Aristoteles) Wer den Aristophanes noch nicht gelesen, hat noch nicht wahrhaft gelacht (Hegel)

Die Sentenzen der beiden europäischen Meisterdenker Aristoteles und Hegel verweisen auf den Zweifel und auf das Lachen als Formen des Widerstehens gegen alles vermeintlich Festgefügte, als Ausdrucksweisen der Auflehnung gegen alles angeblich Evidente und ewig Sichere. Als ein besonders bemerkenswertes Exemplar dieser Widerspenstigkeit, als widerborstiger und stets gefährlicher und zu zähmender Kontrahent der etablierten Philosophie gilt der Skeptizismus, speziell seine 1 Der Beitrag fasst einige Ergebnisse mehrjähriger Studien zur Skeptizismus–Interpretation Hegels zusammen. Vgl. dazu Vieweg 1999; 2007. Klaus Vieweg, Prof. Dr. Klaus Vieweg, Friedrich–Schiller–Universität Jena, Institut für Philosophie, Professor für Philosophie DOI 10.1515/9783110528138-001

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Urform, der Pyrrhonismus. Letzteren sieht Hegel als den wahren, eigentlichen, echten Skeptizismus – der ‚hohe antike Skeptizismus, wie wir ihn namentlich beim Sextus Empiricus dargestellt finden‘. Diese Skepsis und ihre Fürsprecher wurden in der Geschichte mit den verschiedensten Kennzeichnungen bedacht: sie galten als Vertreter der Einheit des Zetetischen, Ephektischen und Aporetischen; als ein jeglichen Dogmatismus abführendes Mittel, als die Abgesandten der Hölle, ja als Teufel selbst – ‚spiritus sanctus non est skepticus‘ hatte Luther laut und unmissverständlich ausgerufen. Die Rede ist von mephistophelischen Geistern, die stets verneinen, von den Protagonisten der Rebellion und permanenten Insurrektion, von Betreibern der intellektuellen Guillotine oder blutsaugenden Vampiren, thematisiert werden kritische, unvoreingenommene und undogmatische Geisteshaltungen, Lachen und Narrenweisheit. Für Edward Gibbon (The Decline and Fall of Roman Empire) repräsentierte der ‚ausschweifendste Skeptizismus‘ in Gestalt der ‚Beredsamkeit Ciceros‘ und des ‚Witzes von Lukian‘ die ‚Mode des Unglaubens‘, eine Krankheit des Denkens und des Geschmacks. Alles Heilige und Göttliche werde diskursiv destruiert und verlacht. Gibbon hat somit schon die beiden klar zu unterscheidenden Dimensionen und Ausdrucksarten der Skepsis im Blick: das scharfsinnige Argument und das erzählend Poetische in Gestalt des Satirischen, Ironischen und Komischen, hervorgegangen aus den ursprünglichen Mischformen des Pyrrhonismus, den Tropen und Hypotyposen. Scharfsinniger Einwand und humoristisches Verlachen bilden somit die Hauptformen des Skeptischen, neben der Lektüre von Platon, Aristoteles und des Sextus sollte die von Aristophanes und Lukian stehen. Auch später trägt die Skeptik das Stigma der gefährlichen, ja bösartigen Krankheit, sie wird als Gebrechen des Zeitalters attackiert. Der Skepticus gilt als advocatus diaboli der Philosophie, als ein alle Gewissheit Negierender, als ewiger Zauderer und stets Unentschiedener, der Alles dahingestellt sein lässt. Nietzsche hält zwar die früheren Skeptiker für große und freie Geister – ‚der einzig ehrenwerte Typus unter dem so zwei– bis fünfdeutigen Volk der Philosophen‘. Aber ebenso repräsentieren sie für ihn eine aus der Décadence entstandene ‚europäische Krankheit‘, gar ein ‚russisches Nihilin‘, geprägt von Nervenschwäche und Willenslähmung. Die ‚große Blutsaugerin‘, die ‚mit Fragezeichen überladene Wolke‘ bilde einen hochwirksamen Tranquilizer der abendländischen Kultur. Dagegen sei eine andere und weit stärkere Skepsis zu richten. Neben dem Befund ‚Symptom einer kulturellen Krankheit‘ trägt die Skepsis ein zweites Signum, sie wird mit dem nüchternen Scharfsinn und der Ataraxia, der Freiheit des Denkens und der Freiheit des Charakters assoziiert. Die Pyrrhoneer vom Schlage eines Sextus Empiricus sind keinesfalls lethargisch Zweifelnde, sondern besonnene Prüfer, stets Spähende und Suchende, die erst nach dem Isosthenie– Befund, der Feststellung der Gleichheit entgegengesetzter Überlegungen (isotes

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enantion logismon), ihr Urteil zurückhalten. Das Fundament dieser Skepsis als einer Lebensform bildet die Ataraxia als ethisches Axiom: die Meeresstille der Seele, in der das höchste Glück gesehen wird. Die Kraft dieses Philosophierens in Gestalt einer Lebensform wird in der (dem buddhistischen Weltverständnis ähnlichen) ruhigen Zurückhaltung, in der ungestörten Gelassenheit, in der inneren Ruhe, in einer den Menschen ‚zufallenden‘ Unerschütterlichkeit gesehen. Die griechischen Stichworte für diese Skepsis als glückverheißender Lebensweise sind Ataraxia, Adiaphoria und Apatheia. Als pyrrhonisch gelten aber ebenso die reifliche Überlegung und gründliche Prüfung, die Vermeidung aller Voreiligkeit, die Destruktion unbegründeter Propositionen, gestützt auf die Hauptwaffen im Arsenal der pyrrhonischen ‚Kunst‘ – die relativistischen Isosthenie–Argumente, die ihre paradigmatische Form in den Fünf Tropen des Agrippa finden. Geklettert wird an der ‚Strickleiter der Logik‘, die alt–skeptischen Tropen gelten als Kathartikon gegen allen Wahn, gegen den ‚wurmstichigen Dogmatismus‘, als unbarmherzige Zermalmer des vermeintlich Sakrosankten oder Ewig–Gültigen. Verlangt wird Prüfung, Legitimation und Begründung; leeres Versichern, bloßes Annehmen oder pures Behaupten hingegen werden als unhaltbar bloßgestellt. In all diesen durchaus verschiedenen und auch divergenten Hinsichten repräsentieren die pyrrhonischen Haltungen und Ideenformationen das Prinzip der Negativität und der Freiheit, die freie Seite jeder Philosophie. Hier anzufügen wären knappe Erläuterungen zu Hegels Gebrauch des Wortes „Zweifel“: Das natürliche Bewusstsein halte sich unmittelbar für das wirkliche, reale Wissen, ist somit unmittelbar positiv oder dogmatisch, insofern dieser eigene, eine Fall unbedingt gelten soll. Ein wie auch immer geartetes Prüfen erfordert aber die Annahme der Möglichkeit von mindestens einem zweiten Fall, einer zweiten Variante, einer Andersheit, es ist darin zwei–fällig, in Zwei–heit – so verwendet Hegel zunächst das Wort Zweifel. Dubitare geht wohl auf zwei, duo, diversi generis zurück und diversitas drückt die Verschiedenheit, den Unterschied aus. Zweifel beinhaltet somit die Möglichkeit der Andersheit, der Unterscheidung und impliziert die Negation des Ersten, die Überwindung der Singularität des Dogmatischen, die Konstitution des Verhältnisses, der Relativität. Den paradigmatischen Typus oder Anwalt dieses Prüfens, des Zetetischen schlechthin, welches das Zweite und die Negation des Ersten, geltend macht, somit Andersheit und Relativität fixiert, sieht Hegel in der Skepsis, in der Negativität, die jeder echten Philosophie immanent ist. Die verschiedenen Darstellungsformen des Pyrrhonismus, von den Tropen und Hypotyposen bis hin zum Essay, zeigen das charakteristische Oszillieren zwischen Philosophie und Literatur, zwischen Argument und Erzählung, zwischen Logik und Metaphorik. Aus dieser doppelten Natur, aus dieser besonderen Zwischenstellung zwischen Kunst und begreifendem Denken entspringt das außerordentliche Interesse für die Skepsis in der Moderne. Zum einen bildet die Situation des Skep-

4 | Klaus Vieweg

tikers das ‚Hauptmoment der modernen Poesie‘ (Hegel), zum anderen zeigt sich dies im Trend zur Ästhetisierung oder Literarisierung der Philosophie. In den folgenden Überlegungen soll keineswegs auf die Kraft der Metaphorik verzichtet werden, ihre spezielle Leistung liegt eben in der vielfältigen Veranschaulichung, Verdeutlichung und Verstärkung von Begriffen und Argumentationen. Allerdings sollen auch Gründe dafür beigebracht werden, dass die Vorstellungen, die Metaphern oder die Bilder ungeeignet sind, innerhalb des Begründungsverfahrens der Philosophie die Stelle von Begriffen einzunehmen. Auch im 20. Jahrhundert blieben die skeptischen Herausforderungen auf der Tagesordnung. Zum einen erlebten die Gedanken des Relativismus, des Perspektivismus, der ästhetischen Skepsis, die Ideen der Epoché und der Wahrscheinlichkeit wahre Konjunktur. Die Todesanzeigen für Wahrheit, Wissen oder Metaphysik häuften sich und wurden zur Mode, mit der man sich schmückt und andere Positionen als ‚überlebt‘ und ‚altmodisch‘ herabzusetzen versucht. Wer auf diese angeblich überlebte Denkungsart systematisch rekurriert, gerät in den Verdacht der unbelehrbaren Starrsinnigkeit, der hoffnungslosen Verstocktheit. An die Stelle der alten Metaphysik – so die Verheißung – treten verschiedene Varianten einer ‚post– metaphysischen‘ Philosophie, welche die philosophische Grenzwächter–Attitüde pflegt und (ähnlich wie die Widersacher Hegels) unüberwindliche Barrieren für das Wissen postuliert. Solch hehre Ansprüche wie Wahrheit oder systematisches Philosophieren seien endgültig zu verabschieden. Die damit verbundenen Versuche der Verbannung Hegels ins philosophische Museum, ob nun unter dem Stichwort ‚letzter Dinosaurier der Metaphysik‘ oder unter der Flagge ‚Historisierung seines Systems‘ sind bis heute an der Tagesordnung und erzeugen in ihrer monotonen Wiederholung Langeweile und Überdruss, zumal kein auf dem Niveau Hegels sich bewegendes Konzept entgegengestellt werden kann. Die Forderung nach einer solchen ‚Historisierung‘ bedeutet im Kern eine Art Despotismus der Gleichmacherei, eine Nivellierung der Entwürfe – man könne ja an alle Denker der Philosophiehistorie irgendwie anschließen, so das ‚Argument‘. Die sich so nennende Philosophie habe es – so Hegel in weiser Voraussicht auf das 20. Jahrhundert – ausdrücklich ausgesprochen, dass ‚das Wahre selbst nicht erkannt werden könne‘ – die Erkenntnis der Wahrheit werde „für einen törichte, ja sündhafte Anmaßung erklärt, wie die Vernunft, und wieder die Vernunft, und in unendlicher Wiederholung die Vernunft angeklagt, herabgesetzt und verdammt“ werde. (RPh, S. 18, 22) „Das Wahre nicht zu wissen und nur Erscheinendes, Zeitliches und Zufälliges, nur das Eitle zu erkennen, diese Eitelkeit ist es, die sich in der Philosophie breitgemacht hat und in unseren Zeiten noch breitmacht und das große Wort führt.“ (Enz III, S. 403) Für Hegel, der im Skeptizismus den entscheidenden und ewigen Herausforderer der Philosophie sieht und seine Phänomenologie des Geistes als sich vollbringenden

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Skeptizismus versteht, muss die Philosophie in Hinsicht auf ihren skeptischen ‚Schatten‘ zwei Forderungen genügen: Sie muss erstens der Gefahr trotzen, ‚von skeptischen Seeungeheuern verschlungen zu werden‘ (Fichte), das heißt, den Äquipollenzattacken muss Paroli geboten werden, den scharfsinnigen Isosthenie– Argumenten ist standzuhalten. Verlangt wird eine subtile Verteidigungsstrategie gegen die Liebhaber von Ruhe und Unentschiedenheit, welche Bestimmtheit als Makel sehen. Zweitens: Eine solche Immunität oder die Resistenz vermag Philosophie nur mittels Inklusion der echten Skepsis zu erreichen – der wahre Skeptizismus muss ‚in jedem echten philosophischen Systeme implicite zu finden‘ sein. Hegel beschreibt dieses integrierte Skeptische als das negativ–vernünftige oder dialektische Moment des Logischen, als das Prinzip aller Bewegung, alles Lebens, alles Tätigseins, als ‚bewegende Seele des wissenschaftlichen Fortgehens‘. In diesem Sinne repräsentiert die Skepsis einen notwendigen Durchgangspunkt und ein konstitutives Prinzip der Philosophie. Hegels ‚Exorzismus‘, sein bis heute einzigartiger und erfolgreicher Versuch der Zähmung der widerspenstigen Sachwalter des Negativen in Form einer theoretischen Inklusion und ‚Domestikation‘ des Widerspenstigen enthält sowohl die Integration der denkenden Skepsis als auch die Aufhebung der ästhetisch–poetischen Skepsis in seinem Konzept der modernen Kunst. Im Mittelpunkt der folgenden Überlegungen können nur wenige Facetten der Hegelschen Denkungsart stehen, zum einen Hegels Konzept der Inklusion der Skepsis in theoretischer und praktischer Absicht, zum anderen die Offenlegung des doppelten Gesichts des Pyrrhonismus, als einer Form zwischen Logik und Metaphorik, zwischen Bildlichem und Begrifflichem, zwischen Philosophie und Literatur, ein Aspekt, dem bislang zu wenig Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt wurde. Entscheidend hierfür war der von Hegel im Blick auf Sextus freigelegte Zusammenhang zwischen dem Erscheinenden (phainomenon) und der reinen Subjektivität als Phantasia, des pyrrhonischen Verständnisses der Erscheinung als subjektiver Vorstellung, als Phantasie oder Imagination. Die facettenreiche Integration der echten Skepsis in die Philosophie, die Aufhebung des Pyrrhonismus, war für Hegel keineswegs ein marginaler Punkt, sondern die Initialidee und der Grundbaustein für seinen neuen Idealismus des Absoluten, seiner modernen Philosophie der Freiheit. Das Vollziehen oder Vollbringen der Skepsis ermöglicht erst die ‚Befreiung von dem Gegensatze des Bewußtseins‘, der entscheidenden Voraussetzung für die Philosophie als Wissenschaft, schafft erst die geeigneten Fundamente für einen Idealismus der Freiheit, für eine Philosophie des freien Denkens und des freien Wollens und Handelns, für eine Philosophie, die gegen jede Art von Dogmatismus, Fanatismus und Fundamentalismus steht. Mit Hegels Worten: Der Skeptizismus bildet die ‚negative und freie Seite jeder Philosophie‘.

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1 Amphi bios Der römische Gott Janus galt als der Vater aller Dinge, als Gott allen Ursprungs und Anfangs, zugleich als Gott mit einem doppelten Gesicht, der Anfang und Ende, Ein– und Ausgang, Land und Meer symbolisiert, somit einer Amphibie ähnlich ist, ein amphi bios, ein doppellebiges Wesen. Der pyrrhonische Skeptizismus zeigt ein solches Janusantlitz, er gleicht – so die These – einer Amphibie, die in zwei Terrains zu leben beansprucht, sowohl im Terrestrischen des Logisch–Argumentativen, auf dem Lande des Urteils als auch im Aquatischen der Erzählungen und Bilder, der Vorstellung und Phantasie, im Wasser der Urteilszurückhaltung. Diese Sphinx versucht gleichsam die Brücke oder die Synthese zwischen Philosophischem und Literarischem zu bilden. Im Zentrum der folgenden Überlegungen steht die Sprache der pyrrhonischen Skepsis, ihre Darstellungsform, ihre Mitteilungsweise, die Frage nach der dem Skeptizismus angemessenen, adäquaten Ausdrucksart – die These von der philosophisch–literarischen Hybridnatur des skeptischen Sprechens, sofern er sich zu diesem Ausdruck entschließt und nicht beim Schweigen und Lachen verharrt. Die Orientierung im Labyrinth der Skepsis bleibt schwierig und das Stimmengewirr von babylonischer Art. Eine Facette dieser Problematik liegt auch in der Verkennung der philosophisch–literarischen Amphibolie der Sprache des Pyrrhonismus. Zuerst scheint im Anschluss an die Bemerkung von Pierre Bayle ein Rückgang auf die Hauptquelle des alten Skeptizismus, auf Sextus Empiricus, sinnvoll und erforderlich, um die Wurzel des philosophisch–literarischen Doppelcharakters aufzuweisen. Bayle sah in Sextus den eigentlichen Vater der modernen Philosophie. Als Magna Charta der antiken Skepsis gelten bekanntlich die Pyrrhonischen Hypotyposen des Sextus, worin das skeptische Vermögen zunächst mit der Trias des Zetetischen, Ephektischen und Aporetischen konnotiert wird. Auf der einen Seite verstehen sich die Pyrrhoniker als Prüfende, als gründlich Untersuchende und Abwägende, die alles mit nüchtern–kritischem Scharfsinn betrachten, als quaesitores et consideratores. Unter Nutzung der berühmten Tropen wird die Isosthenia aufgewiesen und aus dieser Diagnose der Gleich–Gewichtigkeit bzw. Gleich–Gültigkeit der Urteile folgt die Zurückhaltung des Urteils, die Epoché, – neben der Ataraxia ein Kernmoment des pyrrhonischen Unternehmens. Diese Applikation von Tropen, besonders der 5 Tropen des Agrippa, erscheint auf den ersten Blick als ein klar und eindeutig logisch–argumentatives Verfahren. Mit Hilfe der Tropen wird die Unzulänglichkeit und Unhaltbarkeit des dogmatischen Philosophierens auf logisch–diskursive Weise offengelegt. Aber auf den zweiten Blick tritt die Crux ebenso deutlich hervor, die bereits in der Verwendung der Worte „Hypotyposen“ und „Tropen“ liegt. Im Anschluss an das traditionelle

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Verständnis der Hypotypose als rhetorische Figur bedeutet diese für Sextus Entwurf oder Umriss, ähnlich wie bei Cicero das Vor–Stellen als ‚Vor–Augen–Stellen‘, eine Veranschaulichung oder Vergegenwärtigung (repraesentatio), eine figürlich– bildliche Darstellung, eine Beschreibung, ein erzählendes Berichten. Diese Verbindung mit dem Erscheinenden und der Versinnlichung finden wir auch in Kants Gebrauch von Hypotypose im Kontext der Überlegungen zur ästhetischen Idee, der Vorstellung der Einbildungskraft, der kein Begriff adäquat sein kann. In all dem Genannten tritt die Einschränkung des rein Logisch–Argumentativen hervor. Auch der Tropus hat seine Herkunft in der Rhetorik und gilt als „Wendung“, worin der eigentliche Ausdruck durch einen uneigentlichen ersetzt wird, z.B. ein Begriff durch eine mehrdeutige Metapher. Die von manchen zu den Tropen gerechnete Ironie ist wegen ihres dezidiert negativen Charakters in besonderer Weise zur Darstellung des Skeptischen prädestiniert. Auf jeden Fall verbinden sich in den Hypotyposen wie in den Tropen das Begrifflich–Argumentative und das Vorstellend–Bildliche, sie sollen im Zwischenreich situiert werden – wenn sie reine Argumente wären, so würde der Pyrrhoniker am von ihm bekämpften Spiel des Dogmatismus teilnehmen, wenn es sich hingegen um bloße Erzählungen handelte, würde der Anspruch auf Destruktion des Dogmatismus und auf Philosophie schlechthin verloren gehen, zwischen der Scylla des puren Urteils und der Charybdis der puren Urteilsdestruktion soll gesegelt werden. Dies sei an einigen Schlüsselstellen bei Sextus demonstriert, aus welchen sich ein Tableau der entscheidenden Termini des Pyrrhonischen ergibt. Über den skeptischen Suspens, den Behauptungsverzicht, findet sich bei Sextus folgende neuralgische Stelle: „daß ich von keinem der Dinge, die ich sagen werde, mit Sicherheit behaupte, daß es sich in jedem Falle so verhalte, wie ich sage, sondern, daß ich über jedes einzelne nur nach dem, was mir jetzt erscheint erzählend berichte“ (Sextus Empiricus 1985, S. 93 [PH, I, 4]). Hier sind wichtige pyrrhonische Stichworte verbunden: 1) das Ich und das Einzelne, 2) das Hier und Jetzt, der Augenblick, 3) das Erscheinende und 4) das erzählende Berichten eines eigenen Erlebnisses. In der ersten deutschen Fassung dieser Passage von 1791 übersetzt F.I. Niethammer – ein vorzüglicher Kenner des alten Skeptizismus – wie folgt: „meiner gegenwärtigen Einsicht gemäß“ gebe ich ‚von allem, nur so wie ich es jetzt einsehe, bloß historischen Bericht‘ (Niethammer 1792, S. 198 – Herv. K.V.). „Die Skeptische Schule hat zu ihrem Kriterium die Erscheinung, worunter sie eigentlich die Vorstellung der Erscheinung verstehen.“ (Niethammer 1792, S. 209 – Herv. K.V.) Erscheinung und Vorstellung gehören zum unverzichtbaren Vokabular dieser Skepsis. Der Pyrrhonist fragt nach dem über das Erscheinende Ausgesagten, wobei Erscheinungen als Sachverhalte in der Form „einer erlebnismäßigen Vorstellung“ (Sextus Empiricus 1985, S. 98 [PH, I, 19] – Herv. K.V.) gelten. Es geht dem Pyrrhoneer um die ‚Mitteilung eines menschlichen Erlebnisses‘ – etwas, „was dem

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Erlebenden erscheint“ (Sextus Empiricus 1985, S. 141 [PH, I, 203] – Herv. K.V.). Mit dieser Strategie will der Pyrrhoniker die Voreiligkeit des Urteilens vermeiden und sich zugleich dem Anspruch auf die Geltung von Wissen, wie er in der Metaphysik gestellt wird, entziehen. Die oft dem Skeptiker zugeschriebene Behauptung „daß kein Wissen möglich ist“ wird gerade bewusst vermieden, da auch in einem solchen Satz ein der Metaphysik eigener Geltungsanspruch liegt, der Skeptiker so nur zum negativen Dogmatiker würde. Der Pyrrhonist schließt nur für den jeweiligen Augenblick Wissen aus, es handelt sich um ein temporäres Dahingestellt–Sein–Lassen, keinesfalls um einen prinzipiellen Ausschluss – der Skeptiker räumt ein, das er vielleicht künftig durchaus Wissen erlangen könne. Er liefert einen Bericht über das von ihm hier und jetzt Erlebte, er teilt seine Erlebnisse in Form der Erzählung seiner Vorstellungen mit. Jeder Behauptung müsse so die Wendung ‚wie es mir gerade hier und jetzt erscheint‘ vorausgeschickt werden. Erscheinendes (phainomenon), Vorstellung (phantasia), Negativität und pure Subjektivität verschmelzen in diesem Konzept. Was erscheint – so Sextus in seiner Schrift Gegen die Dogmatiker ist ‚individuell und momentan‘, eine solche negative Position will bloß partikulare Subjektivität und Scheinen bleiben. (SkepA , S. 249) Das Kriterium des Skeptizismus – so Hegels grundlegende Einsicht – bildet das Erscheinende, worunter (in Übereinstimmung mit Sextus) das Subjektive (phantasia auton) zu verstehen ist – phainesthai und phantasia (Sextus Empiricus 1985, S. 224). Darin liegt der Gedanke der Subjektivität als Unabhängigkeit von jeglichem Gegebenen, die Unvoreingenommenheit – die Subjektivität als freie Seite der Philosophie. Die endlichen Dinge schlechthin gelten als nicht für sich bestehend. Infolge der ‚Herrenschaft‘ des Subjektiven – die Begierde ist ‚zerstörend und selbstsüchtig‘ (Enz III, S. 218) – werden sie verändert und vernichtet, durch diese absolute Negativität des Praktischen werden die Objekte aufgezehrt und als Ideelle gesetzt. In diesem puren praktischen Verhältnis liegt eine Art naturwüchsiger Idealismus im Sinne einer ersten Auffassung des Endlichen als eines Aufzuhebenden. So kann das nicht–theoretische oder atheoretische Verhalten der Tiere, die das Endliche unbefangen auffressen, eine solche Form des Idealistischen darstellen. Selbst in der ‚untersten Schule der Weisheit‘, in den eleusinischen Mysterien, zeigen sich ursprüngliche Skepsis und Idealismus in Form der Gewissheit der Nichtigkeit des Endlichen (Phän, S. 91). Der Idealismus der Philosophie besteht Hegel zufolge darin, das ‚Endliche nicht als ein wahrhaft Seiendes anzuerkennen‘ – jede Philosophie ist wesentlich Idealismus‘. Jedoch im Unterschied zum erfüllten, absoluten Idealismus repräsentiert der pyrrhonische Skeptizismus einen formellen, subjektiven Idealismus. Das Phänomen des Skeptikers ist kein gleichgültiges Sein, das außer seinen Bestimmungen und Beziehung auf das Subjekt bleibt. Insofern ist die skeptische Auffassung Idealismus und Anti– Realismus, positioniert sich gegen den Realismus, welcher ‚den subjektiven Begriff

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als leere Identität erfaßt, welche die Gedankenbestimmungen von außen in sich aufnehme‘ (WdL II, S. 503). Laut Friedrich Schlegels treffender Beschreibung sucht der Skeptiker das subjektive Element der Philosophie rein darzustellen, was aber mit dem Verlust an Objektivität erkauft wird – die Erscheinung versteht Sextus als meine Vorstellung, das phainomenon als pure Subjektivität (frei von jeglicher Objektivität), als bloß subjektive Vorstellung, phantasia, imaginatio, als mein inneres Bild. Als Medien des Pyrrhonismus erweisen sich neben dem Argumentativen der Bericht, das Narrative, das Vorstellende, das Ästhetische als Versinnlichungen des Allgemeinen. Die pyrrhonischen Hypotyposen nehmen so eine Zwischenstellung zwischen Argument und Erzählung ein, man kann sie sowohl als Argumente als auch als bloß subjektive Berichte lesen. Die pyrrhonische Mitteilungsweise schwankt, oszilliert notwendig zwischen dem Begrifflichen und dem Bildlich– Anschaulichen.

2 Die 5 Tropen des Agrippa Damit sind wir im Nervenzentrum des isosthenischen Unternehmens angelangt, in der Rüstkammer der skeptischen Geschütze gegen die philosophische Erkenntnis. Es gibt laut Hegel „keine tauglicheren Waffen gegen den Dogmatismus der Endlichkeit“ (SkepA, S. 245). Implizit wird darin die Forderung erhoben, dass Philosophie schlechthin Immunität gegen diese Einreden besitzen muss, im andern Fall wäre sie dogmatisch. Die fünf Hauptwendungen der alten Skepsis gehören der Vernunft an, da sie aber ausschließlich Reflexionsbegriffe enthalten, nur die reine Differenz bzw. Nicht–Identität fixieren, verbleiben sie zugleich in der Reflexionssphäre und indizieren die Selbstvernichtung des endlichen Wissens. Während der pyrrhonische Impuls bei den früheren mehr ‚praktisch‘ oder ‚agogisch‘ geprägt war, geht es hier mit hoher abstraktiver Kraft des Denkens gegen das endliche Erkennen, mit intellektueller Stärke gegen alle Erschleichungen des Verstandes bis hin zur Urteilsenthaltung und der Selbstzerstörung des Verständigen. Die 5 Tropen setzen mit ihrem isosthenischen Verfahren den Schlussstein des Reflexionswissens, in ihnen ist das Maximum des Vernünftigen ‚im‘ Verstand fixiert. Sie sind der diskursive Ausdruck der Tragödie des Endlichen², sie repräsentieren den wahren ‚spekulativen Karfreitag‘. Die Beschäftigung mit diesen skeptischen Grundformeln erfolgt –

2 Die Zerstörung der Antipoden bedeutet für Hegel nicht den Sieg des Todes, sondern den durch das Erkennen der Einheit im notwendigen ‚absoluten Verhältnis‘ beider eintretenden Sieg der Vernunft. Vgl. dazu: Chiereghin 1996, S. 47.

10 | Klaus Vieweg

dies ist ein Muster für eine die Einheit von Geist und Buchstaben respektierende Interpretationsstrategie – in drei Schritten: Zuerst werden die Tropen nach Sextus‘ Überlieferung aufgereiht, dann schließt sich eine Interpretation an, in der gezeigt wird, wie die Isosthenie den Dogmatismus des Endlichen widerlegt. Schließlich deutet Hegel das eigene Vernunftverständnis anhand der Agrippaschen Tropen an und zwar in Gestalt des Aufweisens ihrer Inhärenz im Vernünftigen. Auf der zweiten und der dritten Ebene versucht Hegel eine innere Logik in die skeptischen Wendungen zu bringen, sie werden gewissermaßen in einen Kreis mit der Reihung 3 – 5 – 4 – 2 gebracht, beginnend oder endend mit Tropus 1. Im 1. Tropus wird die Verschiedenheit der Auffassungen, die Diaphonia, behandelt. Da es kein höheres, allgemeines Kriterium für das Wahre geben kann – das von Philosophen reklamierte Allgemeine erweist sich als ein je Beschränktes –, bleibt der Widerstreit unentschieden oder unentscheidbar. Es wird darin nur die Verschiedenheit gesehen, nicht die Identität. In aller Mannigfaltigkeit haben wir es aber – so Hegel – nur mit einer Philosophie zu tun. Das Vernünftige ist „ewig und allenthalben sich selbst gleich“ – so heißt es in Anspielung auf Platons Behandlung des Einen und Verschiedenen im Philebos.³ Die Verschiedenheit wollen wir uns nicht verbergen, Sokrates fordere den Mut, dies weiter durchzuprüfen. Nicht für den Sieg einer Seite, sondern für das Richtigste müssen wir doch wohl beide streiten. Dieses Suchen nach der ‚Mitte‘ lässt das ‚Dialektische vom Streitsüchtigen‘ unterscheiden (Philebos, S. 16–17). Es geht Platon wie Hegel um die ‚nicht–kindische‘ Einheit, die „immer dieselbe ist, und weder Werden noch Untergang zuläßt, dennoch zuerst zwar eine solche Beharrlichkeit sei, hernach aber in dem Werdenden und Unendlichen wiederum, [. . . ], dieses selbige und Eine zugleich sowohl als in Vielen wird.“ (Philebos, S. 15) Die Anknüpfung an das hen–panta–Prinzip – „daß Eines vieles ist und Vieles eines“ – findet sich in dem angesprochenen Abschnitt. Mit dem skeptischen Dualismus allein lässt sich diese Einheit nicht denken. Grundlegende Bedeutung für Hegels Auffassung vom Absoluten kommt dem 3. Tropus des Verhältnisses, der Relativität zu, welcher im Parmenides allgegenwärtig und bei Aristoteles präsent ist.⁴ Gegen den Dogmatismus, der ein Endliches, mit der Entgegensetzung Behaftetes (z.B. reines Objekt oder reines Subjekt bzw. Dualität und Identität) als Absolutes setzt, zeigt die isosthenische Vernunft, dass

3 „freilich muß diese Einheit so wie jene Ungleichheit nicht auf die, wie Platon sagt, gemeine und knabenhafte Art genommen werden, daß ein Ochse usw. als das Eins gesetzt wird, von dem behauptet würde, er sei zugleich viele Ochsen.“ (SkepA, S. 246). Dies bezieht sich auf Philebos, S. 14–15. 4 Der 8. Tropus des Aenesidem enthält bereits diesen Gedanken (vgl. SkepA, S. 244).

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dieses vermeintlich isolierte und scheinbar absolut selbstgenügsame Endliche notwendig eine Beziehung auf ein Anderes hat und somit nicht absolut ist. Wir können demnach – so Sextus – nicht wissen, wie etwas absolut (apolytos) und seiner Natur nach (pros ten physin) ist – bis heute eines der Hauptargumente der relativistischen Denkungsarten, eine Kernthese der Philosophien der Differenz. Gegen das Hegelsche Absolute läuft diese Attacke ins Leere, denn dieses Absolute ist nichts als das Verhältnis, die Beziehung selbst. Indem es als Selbstverhältnis, als selbsterkennende Vernunft genommen wird, hat es keine notwendige Beziehung auf ein Anderes, das es nicht selbst ist. Damit ist das Fundament gelegt, auf dem dann der Geist–Begriff als erkennendes Selbstverhältnis in die Mitte des absoluten Idealismus rückt. Zudem erscheint hier die Distanz zum ‚über–relationalen‘ Einen des Proklos und Plotin. Die Diallele, der Zirkel (5. Tropus) – das Andere hat den Grund im Ersten und das Erste den Grund in diesem Anderen – kann nur auf das Endliche (in einer Beziehung Stehende) zutreffen, nicht auf das Absolute: „in der Beziehung ist nichts durcheinander zu begründen“. (SkepA, S. 247) Falls zur Vermeidung des Zirkels das Andere als in sich selbst begründet und somit zur unbegründeten Voraussetzung erhoben wird (4. Tropus der Voraussetzung), so hat doch dieser ‚Grund‘, insofern er ein Begründendes ist, sein Entgegengesetztes. Dieses wiederum kann mit gleichem Recht als Unbegründetes vorausgesetzt werden (SkepA, S. 245). Der Skeptiker will die Notwendigkeit der Voraussetzungs–losigkeit aufweisen, die Unhaltbarkeit der Setzung eines unverfügbaren, unvordenklichen Grundes. Sollte das Andere als Grund wieder in einem Dritten begründet sein usf., gerät der Verstand in die Reflexionsunendlichkeit (‚Grundlosigkeit‘), in den unendlichen Regressus bzw. Progressus (2. Tropus).⁵ 5. und 4. Tropus enthalten den Grund– Folge–Begriff, da es aber in Hegels Konzeption „für die Vernunft kein Anderes gegen ein Anderes gibt“, fallen beide Einreden wie auch die unendlich fortgesetzte Forderung nach einem Grund (SkepA, S. 247). Hier kündigt sich schon Hegels Topos vom Absoluten und Endlichen als dem „Anderen seiner selbst“ an (vgl.: Henrich 1982). Der Einwand der Verschiedenheit (1. Tropus) ist entkräftet, womit der Kreis sich schließt. Die skeptische Prüfung der skeptischen Grundmaximen führt zur Aufhebung der Isosthenie, die Gleich–Gültigkeit wird auf die Gleich–Gültigkeit appliziert und als Resultat dieser Negation der Negation ergibt sich die Identität der Identität und Nicht–Identität. Damit wird ein Meilenstein auf dem Wege zum Projekt der sich selbst vollziehenden Skeptik gesetzt.

5 Parmenides, S. 132–133: „so erscheint immer ein anderer Begriff über jenen, und wenn jener wieder ähnlich ist noch einer, und niemals hört dieses Erscheinen eines neuen Begriffs auf, wenn der Begriff dem, was ihn in sich aufgenommen hat ähnlich sein soll.“

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Das rein Negative als bloße Subjektivität – verbunden mit dem allgegenwärtigen Vorspruch wie es mir scheint – impliziert das pure Meinen ohne weiteren Geltungsanspruch. Es wird keine ‚Objektion‘ (für Einspruch steht im Englischen objection) zugelassen. Dies endet im radikalen Relativismus und Perspektivismus, in der Eitelkeit des je Meinigen, in der Absolutheit des inwendigen Orakels, in der Einsamkeit des Denkens und dem daraus resultierenden Versanden jeder Kommunikation. Resultate sind die totale theoretische Gleich–Gültigkeit in Form der Beliebigkeit, ein radikales anything goes, das Desinteresse am Diskurs schlechthin – „wenn ich nicht Wahres erkennen kann, so ist es gleichgültig, wie ich denke“ (RPh, S. 276 – Her. K.V.). Die Aporemata sind das letzte Wort; die Kontra–Diktion wird ewig wiederholt, dies gleicht dem Drehen der Gebetsmühle. Da dieses Spiel immer remis ausgeht (unentschieden) oder zu einer ewigen Hängepartie (unentscheidbar) wird, bleibt das Verbindende des Unverbindlichen – die Langeweile und der Überdruss. Die doktrinelle Skepsis stellt so eine Philosophie des Remis dar, auch die praktische Gleich–Gültigkeit offenbart die entsprechende Ambivalenz. Indem ein solches Philosophieren die Erkenntnis des Wahren für eine leere, den Kreis des Erkennens, der nur das Scheinende sei, überfliegende Eitelkeit ausgibt, muß es unmittelbar auch das Scheinende in Ansehung des Handelns zum Prinzip machen und das Sittliche somit in die eigentümliche Weltansicht des Individuums und seine besondere Überzeugung setzen. (RPh, S. 273)

Die aus der kritischen Attitüde heraus gewonnene innere Souveränität und Selbstbestimmtheit, die Distanz zu allem Sakrosankten im Sittlichen, Religiösen und Politischen, die permanente Insurrektion gegen jeden Dogmatismus verkehren sich in die pure Adiaphoria, in eine weltflüchtige Schein–Neutralität, in einen Rückzug aus dem politischen Gemeinwesen. Im alten Athen konnte der politische Handlungsverzicht das Todesurteil nach sich ziehen; die philosophische Schein– Neutralität führt zur Vernichtung des vernünftigen Denkens, zur bloßen Affirmation des gerade in Mode Seienden. Die philosophische geht mit der politischen Apragmosyne einher, die Aussagelosigkeit (aphasia) mit der Tatenlosigkeit. Der Zweck des freien Willens ist die Zwecklosigkeit. Im Theoretischen wird die de– facto–Anerkennung des Erscheinenden und somit die Wende des Skeptizismus zum Empirismus und Pragmatismus vollzogen, für die sittliche Sphäre wird die ‚ansichtlose Unterwerfung‘ unter die gerade bestehenden Zustände (Sitten, Gebräuche, politische Verfasstheit etc.) empfohlen, der totale Kotau vor der ‚Mode‘. Mit dieser Konsequenz ihres praktisch–ethischen Relativismus zerstört die Skepsis ihren kritischen Charakter und somit sich selbst.

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3 Die Integration der Negativität und der Anfang der Philosophie Der Anfang ist die Hälfte des Ganzen (Aristoteles)

Kant stellte die entscheidende Frage: ‚Ob und auf welche Art dennoch der Vernunft ein Weg zum Wissen offenbleibe‘? Die skeptische Methode gehe „auf Gewißheit dadurch, daß sie in einem solchen auf beide Seiten redlich gemeinte und mit Verstande geführten Streite den Punkt des Mißverständnisses zu entdecken sucht, um, wie weise Gesetzgeber thun, aus der Verlegenheit der Richter bei Rechtshändeln für sich selbst Belehrung von dem Mangelhaften und nicht genau Bestimmten in ihren Gesetzen zu ziehen.“ (KrV, B 451–452) Hegels Konzept des sich vollbringenden Skeptizismus in der Phänomenologie des Geistes folgt diesem Gedanken. Auf seinem Wege des ‚Aufhebens‘ bis hin zum absoluten Wissen verfährt Hegel ähnlich dem weisen Gesetzgeber und entdeckt im Widerstreite die Leistungskraft wie die Begrenzung der einzelnen Gestalten des Bewusstseins und ihrer Wissensansprüche. Kant zufolge gestattet die transzendentale Vernunft „keinen anderen Probirstein, als den Versuch der Vereinigung ihrer Behauptungen unter sich selbst und mithin zuvor des freien und ungehinderten Wettstreits derselben untereinander“ (KrV, B 453). Die skeptische Methode sei ‚der Transzendentalphilosophie allein wesentlich eigen und könne nicht entbehrt werden‘(KrV, B 452). Man müsse dem Skeptizismus Paroli bieten, indem „man in sich den skeptischen Geist aufwachen lasse“ (Kant 1922).⁶ Damit ist der Leitfaden für Hegels Konzept der Inklusion der Skepsis gegeben, das Programm der Aufhebung des Pyrrhonismus vorgezeichnet, das sich durchaus vom kantischen Verfahren gravierend unterscheidet und den Anspruch der Legitimation des Anfangs des Philosophierens erhebt. Der Versuch einer Annäherung an Hegels Verständnis von interner Negativität soll hier unter dem Blickwinkel der Frage nach dem Anfang der Philosophie erfolgen. Man kann mehrere signifikante Orte im Hegelschen System identifizieren, wo die Aufhebung dieser Negativität thematisiert ist, sowohl in der Wissenschaft der Logik wie auch in der Philosophie des Rechts, wobei beide Momente – das theoretisch–epistemische und das praktische – stets verbunden bleiben. Für diesen entscheidenden Tatbestand sollen an dieser Stelle zwei Belege angeführt werden: Im Vorbegriff zur Logik charakterisiert Hegel den vollbrachten Skeptizismus als den „Entschluß, rein denken zu wollen“ (Enz I, S. 168). Das Entschließen gilt hier

6 Zur Relevanz von Kants Interpretation der Skepsis für Hegel vgl.: Vieweg 2000.

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als Willkür und die reine Abstraktion als denkende Vernichtung des Bestimmten. Die gleiche Terminologie wird in den ersten Paragraphen der Rechtsphilosophie für die Bestimmung des Willens verwendet und die Untrennbarkeit des Theoretischen und Praktischen, von Wollen und Denken herausgestellt. Erwähnt sei hier ein Auszug aus § 5: Der Wille enthalte das Element der reinen Unbestimmtheit und Unmittelbarkeit, der reinen Reflexion des Ich in sich selbst, jeder gegebene und bestimmte Inhalt ist aufgelöst, der Wille schließt die absolute Abstraktion, das reine Denken seiner selbst in sich (RPh, S. 49). Diese negative Freiheit, der negative Wille, die leere Freiheit sei zwar einseitig, aber dies Einseitige enthalte eine wesentliche Bestimmung, diese abstrakte Einzelheit ist notwendiges Moment der Autonomie (RPh, S. 51). Im § 6 erfolgt dann die Kritik an der Einseitigkeit dieser abstrakten Einzelheit, damit implizit die Kritik am Pyrrhonischen – das genannte Moment kann nicht die wahrhafte Allgemeinheit sein. (RPh, S. 52–53) Es ist Bestimmtes, insofern es die Abstraktion von aller Bestimmtheit ist und diese Abstraktheit oder Einseitigkeit macht eben seine Bestimmtheit und Endlichkeit aus. Hegels Aufhebung des Skeptischen erfolgt auf besondere Weise in der Phänomenologie des Geistes, die ausdrücklich als Weg des Zweifels, als Weg der Verzweiflung, als sich vollbringender Skeptizismus verstanden wird. Im Gedanken der bestimmten Negation ist das Skeptische aufgenommen und umgedacht. Jede Gestalt des Bewusstseins löst sich in ihrer Realisierung zugleich selbst auf und hat ihre eigene Negation zu ihrem Resultat. Die mit solch prüfendem Verfahren unternommene Wanderung durch das erscheinende Wissen, der Aufstieg auf der ‚Leiter‘⁷ endet in der Schädelstätte alles Endlichen und bei der vollkommenen Er–Innerung als dem reinen, begreifenden Denken, das jetzt gedacht werden muss – zunächst in der Logik als Denken des Denkens. Von grundsätzlicher Bedeutung bleibt die Einschätzung dieses sich vollbringenden Skeptizismus und damit des Resultats der Phänomenologie im § 78 des Vorbegriffs zur Logik in der Enzyklopädie. Dieser Skeptizismus als ‚eine durch alle Formen des Erkennens durchgeführte negative Wissenschaft‘ vermag die Nichtigkeit aller bestimmten Voraussetzungen offenzulegen. (Enz I, S. 167–168) Die Forderung eines vollbrachten Skeptizismus, von der Hegel jetzt spricht, sei die gleiche wie die, dass der Wissenschaft das Zweifeln an allem, die gänzliche Voraussetzungslosigkeit vorangehe. Das Resultat der Phänomenologie wird in folgender Sentenz komprimiert: ‚Die vollbrachte Skepsis besteht im Entschluß, rein denken zu wollen, der durch die Freiheit vollbracht wird, welche von allem abstrahiert und ihre reine Abstraktion, die Einfachheit des Denkens erfaßt‘ (Enz I, S. 167–168) Mit dem Vollzug des Skeptizismus wird der Anfang der Philosophie gewonnen und

7 Diese Metapher stammt von Sextus Empiricus 1998, S. 160.

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legitimiert: Wenn man beginnen will zu philosophieren, dann muss man denken, dies ist das ‚einfache‘, aber entscheidende Ergebnis von Hegels Jenaer Jahrtausendwerk. Das Denken, das sich selbst setzt, ist die abstrakte Bestimmung. Der Anfang der (Hegelschen) Philosophie liegt im Denken, die Freiheit des Denkens gilt als die Bedingung des Anfangs. Hegel hat diese Negativität als reines, denkendes Selbstverhältnis anschaulich beschrieben, wobei er an die bei den Pyrrhonikern auftretende Metaphorik von Ruhe und Stille anschließt: Sextus charakterisiert die Ataraxie als eine Meeresstille der Seele, Timon schreibt von der Oberfläche des Meeres, die von keinem Wind bewegt ist. In der Vorrede zur 2. Ausgabe der Wissenschaft der Logik spricht Hegel von ‚der Teilnahme an der leidenschaftlosen Stille der nur denkenden Erkenntnis‘, von den ‚stillen Räumen des zu sich selbst gekommenen und nur in sich seienden Denkens‘ (WdL I, S. 34, 23). Eine markante Enzyklopädie–Stelle lautet: Alle scheinbar sicheren Standorte werden preisgegeben, die Gewohnheit schlechthin wird bezweifelt (Enz III, S. 415–416). Der Entschluss, zu philosophieren, wirft sich rein in das Denken, er wirft sich in einen uferlosen Ozean (Enz III, S. 415–416).⁸ Alle bunten Farben, alle Orientierungspunkte sind verschwunden, alle sonst freundlichen Lichter sind ausgelöscht. Im Angesicht des Fehlens jeglichen äußeren Leuchtturms befällt den Geist in seinem Alleinsein, in seiner Einsamkeit Furcht und Grauen. Er kann nur noch auf den inneren Kompass des freien Denkens setzen (Enz III, S. 416). Das pyrrhonische Vermächtnis in Hegels Auffassung vom Anfang der Philosophie spielt in einschlägigen Darstellungen kaum eine Rolle, obschon in Hegels Überlegungen zum Anfang in der Wissenschaft der Logik und der Enzyklopädie die Präsenz des aufgehobenen Skeptizismus bis in die verwendete Terminologie hinein offenkundig ist. Erstens wird, wie schon angedeutet, nicht der Zweifel selbst, sondern der vollbrachte Skeptizismus als ‚Entschluß rein denken zu wollen‘ zum Startpunkt erklärt, zweitens enthält die Struktur des Hegelschen Anfangens das aufgehobene Dilemma des Pyrrhonismus, wobei die Dimension des „dass“ und die Dimension des „was“ unterschieden wird. Im § 17 der Enzyklopädie erscheint der Anfang als eine Beziehung auf das Subjekt, welches sich entschließt, zu philosophieren, das Element der praktischen Freiheit ist im Denken enthalten. Es handelt sich um den freien Akt des Denkens, sich auf den Standpunkt der Selbstbeziehung zu stellen, um ein Denken für sich selber, das sich seinen Gegenstand, seinen Zweck selbst gibt, ihn erzeugt oder setzt (Enz I, S. 62–63). In der Logik wird von einem Akt der Erhebung auf den Standpunkt des reinen Wissens gesprochen, von

8 Auch Hume (1989, S. 341) spricht am Ende des Treatise von jenem ‚grenzenlosen Ozean, der sich in die Unendlichkeit erstreckt‘.

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einem Entschluss, dass man das Denken als solches betrachten wolle (WdL I, S. 68) Noch aufschlussreicher in Sachen Skepsis ist folgende Stelle: „Das reine Wissen hat alle Beziehung auf ein Anderes und alle Vermittlung aufgehoben“ (WdL I, S. 68). In diesem Unmittelbaren, Leeren wird alles Vorhergehende, Vor–Läufige entfernt, alles „IST“ annulliert. ‚Es ist‘ erlaubte sich der Skeptizismus nicht zu sagen“ (WdL I, S. 20). Im Anfang haben wir kein Anderes, nur die scheinbar reine Bestimmungslosigkeit oder Unmittelbarkeit. Falls aber diese Erhebung auf den Standpunkt des reinen Wissens, dieser freie Akt als ausschließlich unmittelbarer gefordert werde, so lande man bei der aus der Pistole reiner Willkür geschossenen intellektuellen Anschauung. Der Anfang gilt Hegel nicht als bloß subjektives Postulat, nicht nur als unmittelbar, sondern als zugleich vermittelt. Die Logik hat in diesem Sinne die Phänomenologie zu ihrer Voraussetzung. In der Logik sei dasjenige Voraussetzung, was sich in der Phänomenologie als das Resultat erwiesen habe, der Anfang könne nicht Empfinden, Anschauen oder Vorstellen sein, weder etwas nur willkürlich und einstweilen Angenommenes noch ein bittweise Vorausgesetztes oder unmittelbar Gewisses, sondern die Idee als reines Wissen. Dieses notwendig am Beginn stehende Unmittelbare erweist sich infolge des Ernstnehmens der Skepsis, welche ihrem Inhalt nach das Gegenteil der Unmittelbarkeit ist, nicht als rein Unmittelbares. Unmittelbares und Vermitteltes werden schließlich als ungetrennt und untrennbar, ihr vermeintlicher Gegensatz als ein Nichtiger aufgezeigt (WdL I, S. 71). Die Vernichtung aller Beziehungen auf Anderes, die radikale Einnahme der Position des Selbstbewusstseins war die eine Seite des Pyrrhonischen, alles „IST“ wurde getilgt, mit der einen ‚fatalen‘ Ausnahme des „IST“ des eigenen Denkens. Damit gelangen wir zum zweiten Moment des Anfangs, der Frage nach dem Was: Sofern ich anfange zu denken, muss ich stringent zunächst das Ist dieses Denkens denken. Das Einfache, Unmittelbare, Leere, vermeintlich Bestimmungslose hat eine Bestimmung, nämlich die der einfachen Unmittelbarkeit, es ist reines „IST“ oder reines Sein. Der Anfang schließt also ein Sein in sich, lapidar gesagt: er „ist“. In Hegels Sprache: Der Anfang ist Anfang der Philosophie, es liegt in der Natur des Anfangens selbst, dass er das Sein ist und sonst nichts. Wenn ich anfange zu denken, dann setze ich notwendig zuerst das „IST“ des Denkens, das reine Sein als den ‚Inhalt‘ des Anfangs. ‚Der Anfang enthält also das Sein als ein solches, welches das Nichtsein, das Moment der Negativität, aufhebt. (WdL I, S. 73) Der von Hegel konzipierte Anfang der Philosophie kann nur einsichtig werden, wenn er als ein Resultat der Aufhebung des Skeptizismus begriffen wird. Erst die Berücksichtigung dieser skeptischen Dimension ermöglicht ein angemessenes Verständnis sowohl der Phänomenologie des Geistes – des ‚sich vollbringenden Skeptizismus‘ – als auch des Beginns der Wissenschaft der Logik – dem Resultat

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des ‚vollbrachten Skeptizismus‘. Darin kommt die (bislang weitgehend unterschätzte) fundamentale Relevanz der Pyrrhonismus–Interpretation für die Hegelsche Denkarchitektonik zum Ausdruck.

4 Kurzes Resümee Aufhebung des Pyrrhonismus heißt für Hegel die Inklusion von echter Negativität und Subjektivität, die Aufhebung besteht im Gelingen der beschriebenen Internalisierung oder Inklusion der radikalen pyrrhonischen Freiheit von Denken und Tun. Diese echte, eben vollbrachte Skepsis, das Sichaufheben der endlichen Bestimmungen und ihr Übergehen in ihre Entgegengesetzten, die Idee der Selbstaufhebung des Endlichen müsse in jedem philosophischen System als Durchgangspunkt zu finden sein. Hegels Aufforderung in Sachen Skepsis könnte somit lauten: Making it implicit. Im Bestreben, aus unserem Geist die wilde Bestie der ungeprüften Meinung und der Unbedachtheit zu verscheuchen und die Freiheit des Denkens und Wollens zu erlangen, würde Sextus in Hegel einen Geistesverwandten erblicken, hinsichtlich der Forderung, in uns den echten skeptischen Geist erwachen zu lassen, um gegen Dogmatiker und Zweifler gewappnet zu sein, wäre Kant sicher auf der Seite Hegels. Auf jeden Fall zählten die Gedanken des Sextus Empiricus für Hegel zu den wohl wichtigsten Anregungen und den größten Herausforderungen auf seinem Denkweg. Auf die Frage, ob man Hegels Teufeleien noch ernst nehmen solle, würden all die Zweifler wohl zähneknirschend antworten müssen: No doubt, kein Zweifel über den anstehenden Hegelian turn in der Philosophie!

Siglen TWA: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1969–1971): Theorie–Werkausgabe – Werke in zwanzig Bänden auf der Grundlage der Werke von 1832–1845, neu edierte Ausgabe. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Hg.). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

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Bibliographie 1 Siglen zitierter Werke Enz I: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: „Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I“. TWA 8. Enz III: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: „Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III“. TWA 10. KrV: Kant, Immanuel (1922): „Kritik der reinen Vernunft“. In: Kant’s gesammelte Schriften. Band 10. Berlin: Reimer, Leipzig: de Gruyter. Parmenides: Platon: „Parmenides.“ In: Platon: Werke in acht Bänden. Band 5, 4. Auflage. Eigler, Gunther (Hg.). Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 2005. (Abdruck der kritischen Ausgabe von Auguste Diès; daneben die deutsche Übersetzung von Friedrich Schleiermacher, 2., verbesserte Auflage, Berlin 1818). Phän: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: „Phänomenologie des Geistes“. In: TWA 3. Philebos: Platon: „Philebos.“ In: Platon: Werke in acht Bänden. Band 7, 4. Auflage. Eigler, Gunther (Hg.). Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 2005. (Abdruck der kritischen Ausgabe von Auguste Diès, 4. Auflage, Paris 1966, mit der deutschen Übersetzung von Friedrich Schleiermacher, 3. Auflage, Berlin 1861). RPh: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: „Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse“. In: TWA 7. SkepA: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: „Verhältnis des Skeptizismus zur Philosophie. Darstellung seiner verschiedenen Modifikationen und Vergleichung des neuesten mit dem alten“. In: TWA 2. WdL I: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: „Wissenschaft der Logik I“. In: TWA 5. WdL II: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: „Wissenschaft der Logik II“. In: TWA 6.

2 Sonstige Literatur Chiereghin, Franco (1996): „Platonische Skepsis und spekulatives Denken bei Hegel“. In: Fulda, Hans Friedrich/ Horstmann, Rolf–Peter (Hg.): Skeptizismus und spekulatives Denken. Stuttgart: Klett–Cotta, S. 29–49. Henrich, Dieter (1982): „Andersheit und Absolutheit des Geistes.“ In: Henrich, Dieter: Selbstverhältnisse. Gedanken und Auslegungen zu den Grundlagen der klassischen deutschen Philosophie. Stuttgart: Reclam, S. 412–172. Hume, David (1989): Ein Traktat über die menschliche Natur. Hamburg: Meiner. Kant, Immanuel (1922): Brief von I. Kant an M. Herz vom 7. Juni 1771. In: Kant’s gesammelte Schriften. Band 10. Berlin: Reimer, Leipzig: de Gruyter 1922, S. 122. Niethammer, Friedrich Immanuel: (1792): „Probe einer Übersetzung aus des Sextus Empiricus drei Büchern von den Grundlehren der Pyrrhoniker.“ In: Fülleborn, Georg Gustav (Hg.): Beyträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie, Heft 2. Züllichau, Freystadt: Frommann, S. 60–101. Sextus Empiricus (1985): „Pyrrhonische Hypotyposen.“ In: Grundriß der pyrrhonischen Skepsis. Übersetzt von M. Hossenfelder. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

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Sextus Empiricus (1998): Gegen die Dogmatiker. Übersetzt v. Hansueli Flückiger. Sankt Augustin: Academia–Verlag. Vieweg, Klaus (1999): Philosophie des Remis. Der junge Hegel und das ‚Gespenst des Skepticismus‘. München: Fink. Vieweg, Klaus (2000): „Die skeptische Methode ist aber nur der Transzendentalphilosophie allein wesentlich eigen“ – Das Kantische Skepsis–Verständnis in der Sicht des frühen Hegel. (Beitrag zum Kant–Kongress, Berlin 2000). Vieweg, Klaus (2007): Skepsis und Freiheit. Der Pyrrhonismus zwischen Philosophie und Literatur. München: Fink.

Maria Daskalaki

Hegel’s Critique of Skepticism and the Concept of Determinate Negation Abstract: In this chapter I reconsider Hegel’s attempt during the Jena period to overcome dogmatism and form his own philosophical alternative through critically deploying skepticism. Through this re–examination I clarify the formation of Hegel’s basic methodological tool, the concept of determinate negation. In the two first parts of the chapter I refer to the introduction of the Phenomenology of Spirit to clarify the notion of skepticism Hegel had in mind. In the third part I consider how Hegel understands the relation between skepticism and philosophy in the relevant article of the Jena period. Then I draw on Plato’s Parmenides to examine dialectics as a philosophical method which incorporates the skeptical attitude. After a short presentation of Hegel’s critique of the philosophy of subjectivity, I return to Hegel’s endeavor to ground a new form of philosophical theory that does not exclude but integrates negation as an essential part of it.

In the introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel explicitly names his main interlocutors in this work, i.e. dogmatism and skepticism. This is of utmost importance for the interpretation of his writings during his time in Jena, since the Phenomenology appears to be the final outcome of this period and, in this sense, it results out of his confrontation with the above–mentioned major philosophical currents. Hence, to understand Hegel’s philosophical enterprise itself one must firstly explore what he thought of dogmatism and skepticism.

1 Dogmatism and true philosophy During the years Hegel was struggling to form his own philosophical project he had a specific notion of dogmatism as an opponent he was in combat with. This notion becomes apparent in the introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). The kind of dogmatism Hegel critiques is much wider than the dogmatism of the metaphysical tradition, which had been criticized by modern philosophy and, specifically in Germany, by the representatives of transcendental philosophy. For Maria Daskalaki, Dr. Maria Daskalaki, Collaborating Expert in Philosophy, Centre for Cultural Informatics, Institute of Computer Science, Foundation for Research and Technology – Hellas. DOI 10.1515/9783110528138-002

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Hegel dogmatism pertains to all those philosophical approaches, which explicitly or implicitly presuppose principles or claims that have not previously been proved. As he notes in his article “On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy” (1802), in which he thematizes the dispute between dogmatism and skepticism, “the essence of dogmatism consists in this that it posits something finite, something burdened with an opposition [. . . ] as the Absolute” (Hegel 2000, p. 335). Hegel had early on expressed objections to this method that consists in adopting principles and presuppositions which remain unproved and, in spite of this, they serve as a fundament for the formation of philosophical systems or views.¹ This critical rejection of any mere adoption of principles is explicitly formulated in the introduction of the Phenomenology, a great part of which is concerned with the critique of philosophical approaches such as Kantianism that, although searching for rational means to cast off metaphysical presuppositions, still continue to take their cues from unproved principles. Hegel provocatively ascertains that, while all these attempts take their start from the fear of falling into error, they lean upon or can lead to error. This is the case because “this fear takes something – a great deal in fact – for granted as truth, supporting its scruples and inferences on what is itself in need of prior scrutiny to see if it is true” (Hegel 1977a, p. 47). Therefore Hegel rejects these theories, arguing that they are based on “adventitious and arbitrary” ideas (Hegel 1977a, p. 48). As he notes, such theories are nothing but a “bare assurance” which “is worth just as much as another” (Hegel 1977a, p. 49). Similar formulations can be found in the chapter on “Reason”, where Hegel characterizes the philosophy of subjectivity as “one–sided and spurious idealism” (Hegel 1977a, p. 142). This kind of idealism fails to demonstrate the synthetic character of self–consciousness. Kant and Fichte, as the advocates of modernity in Germany, take self–consciousness as an unquestionable factum alongside any other beliefs. Thus, it represents a bare assurance which can raise the same claim to validity as any other (see Hegel 1977, pp. 141–142).

1 The rejection of systems and views which depend upon unproven principles led Hegel to distance himself from the circle around Hölderlin and his Vereinigungsphilosophie as well as from the philosophical views of his friend and collaborator during the first years in Jena Schelling (cf. Henrich 1981, pp. 26–28).

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2 The way to true philosophy: skepticism The second philosophical current Hegel is confronted with is skepticism. However, Hegel’s attitude towards skepticism is more than positive, since – in his view – overcoming dogmatism is only possible through deploying the skeptic tradition. As Klaus Vieweg comments, early on, Hegel had been concerned with the problem of skepticism in connection to his critique of Reflexionsphilosophie (Vieweg 1999, p. 115) as already formulated in the Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy (1801). In this text Hegel puts at the centre of his investigations the Kantian antinomies which indicate the limit of knowledge as positive and free of contradictions. For Hegel, because of its restricted character, this kind of knowledge has to be overcome to approach the true nature of reason. As he characteristically notes: “If one reflects only on the formal aspect of speculation and holds fast to the synthesis of knowledge [only] in analytic form, then antinomy, that is, the contradiction that cancels itself, is the highest formal expression of knowledge and truth“ (Hegel 1977b, pp. 107–108). The critique of Reflexionsphilosophie results in introducing a new concept, the concept of speculation. Speculation unifies in itself the antitheses stemming from rational understanding by incorporating and at the same time overcoming the latter in a synthetic unity that represents reason (see Düsing 1969, p. 116). As Vieweg aptly remarks, Hegel did not aim at a “restitution of traditional formal logic, but at positing a new logic, in which [. . . ] the universal validity of the principle of contradiction and the principle of the excluded middle is sublated” (Vieweg 1999, p. 115). Hence this postulate demands a “negative knowledge of reason”, at the heart of which lies “the genuine skepticism” (Vieweg 1999, p. 115). In 1802 Hegel published in the Kritisches Journal der Philosophie a critique of Gottlob Ernst Schulze’s Critique of Theoretical Philosophy (1801).² Hegel’s critique represents a thoroughgoing treatise that discusses wider theoretical problems that go beyond Schulze’s work, a treatise in which Hegel demonstrates his views on skepticism.³ Hegel searches for the “genuine skepticism” not in its modern variation but in its ancient version. In contradistinction to the widespread contemporaneous opinion that ancient skepticism is obsolete, Hegel claims that not only does modern skepticism not really foster philosophical inquiry, but it produces new kinds of dogmatism since it puts other presuppositions in place of the dogmatism it critiques, which it takes for

2 For a detailed presentation of Hegel’s critique of Schulze’s skepticism see Beiser 1987, pp. 266–284. 3 About the role of skepticism in the development of modern philosophy see Schmitt 1983.

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granted. As he notes in the introduction to the Phenomenology, genuine skepticism is the “thoroughgoing scepticism” (Hegel 1977a, p. 50), i.e. the skepticism of radical doubt and despair that does not only consist in “the resolve [. . . ] not to give oneself over to the thoughts of others, upon mere authority”, often leading to “changing an opinion accepted on authority into an opinion held out of personal conviction” (Hegel 1977a, p. 50). For Hegel, such a critical confrontation with authority is insufficient, since it “does not necessarily alter the content of the opinion, or replace error with truth” (Hegel 1977a, p. 50). The path consciousness has to follow to free itself of any form of opinion or presupposed belief and to pass the threshold between phenomenal knowledge and real science is the road of despair, the pathway of total doubt, in which the subject does not question only one of its previous beliefs, but “is directed against the whole range of phenomenal consciousness” (Hegel 1977a, p. 50). This is an extreme kind of skepticism that turns against any form of certainty that could form a fundament of knowledge. Nonetheless, we well know that Hegel does not give up the demand for absolute knowledge – a fact that seems to be incompatible with the extreme form of skepticism he suggests. However, Hegel gives us a hint as to how he understands skepticism that could lead to a positive result: The kind of skepticism Hegel chooses to demonstrate his views is the one that does not lead to “pure nothingness” (Hegel 1977a, p. 51). Such skepticism would lead to a vacuum and to absolute abstraction,⁴ since it cannot produce any content. Hegel informs us that the “nothingness” of skepticism that can lead to the desired achievement of absolute knowledge is “specifically the nothingness of that from which it results [. . . ] it is, in fact, the true result; in that case it is itself a determinate nothingness, one which has a content” (Hegel 1977a, p. 51). To see how Hegel understands this form of skepticism and to accurately define the way to true philosophy that Hegel urges us to follow in the Phenomenology we have to review his main text on skepticism.

4 Vieweg is right to stress the distinction between the pure negativity of skepticism as a philosophical current that leads to total indifference and skepticism as part of true philosophy (Vieweg 1999, p. 127) – a distinction Hegel makes in his article on skepticism and maintains in the Phenomenology, where he presents the contradictions of skepticism as an independent philosophical school (see Hegel 1977a, pp. 123–126).

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3 Hegel’s article on skepticism Vieweg points out the role of skepticism in the development of Hegel’s thought as follows: “Without disclosing the constitutive significance of the productive appropriation of skeptical structures of thinking for Hegel’s own way of thought [. . . ] no adequate interpretation of the genesis of his philosophy and the content of his understanding of negativity is possible” (Vieweg 1999, p. 114). In his article on skep¯ ticism Hegel refers to the principle of Pyrrhonism, according to which “panti logoi logos isos antikeitai” (Hegel 2000, p. 325)⁵ and claims that there is no philosophical view that does not succumb to this principle, i.e. that does not yield to the fact that its opposite can equally be true. Even skepticism as an independent philosophical school cannot rid itself of the principle of the equipollence of arguments, i.e. the principle that every claim which is viewed as true has its opposite, which is equally true. This is the case, because such skepticism positively advocates the relativity of knowledge, i.e. it poses a claim to truth (cf. Hegel 1977a, pp. 123–126). Hence, the principle of equipollence implies the antinomic character of knowledge, a result which is of utmost importance for Hegel, since it demonstrates in a negative way the significance of contradiction for the formation of knowledge. Thus, in Hegel’s view, first and foremost Pyrrhonism does not lead to resigning from the search for a positive result of reason, but indicates the limits of understanding, i.e. the form of reason that remains faithful to the logical rule of non– contradiction. For Hegel, demonstrating these limits does not lead to a notion of reason as confined to understanding, as Kantian philosophy would like to have it,⁶ nor to an autonomization of skepticism as a philosophical system of pure negation. Antinomy represents the consciousness of the contradictory nature of reflection, which must therefore be sublated. Therefore, in the eyes of Hegel, skepticism is not directed against philosophy but against the specific form of “consciousness, which holds fast to the given, the fact, the finite [. . . ], and sticks to it as certain, as secure, as eternal” (Hegel 2000, p. 332). Skepticism is directed against reflection: It shows its limits and indicates the need for its overcoming. In this sense, skepticism is the “negative side of the cognition of the Absolute” (Hegel 2000, p. 323).

5 Hegel refers to the Pyrrhonian principle, according to which every proposition/argument is opposed to an equally strong proposition/argument (cf. Sextus 2000, I, 12). 6 Hegel had already criticized Kant’s understanding of the antinomies in the Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy (see Hegel 1977b, pp. 103–109). According to his critique, while Kant discovers the antinomic character of knowledge, he finally restricts it to understanding. This confinement of knowledge to understanding is the essential reason for which Hegel characterized the critical philosophy of Kant as an “incomplete form of skepticism” (cited in Brockard/Buchner 1983, XXIII).

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Hence, such a skepticism, which points out the antinomic character of reason, can “be found implicit in every genuine philosophical system” (Hegel 2000, p. 324) as a moment of true philosophy. Reason as understanding which posits finitude also posits alongside infinity as excluded from it. However, in this way understanding is forced to reflect upon itself in order to avoid contradiction, and perceive itself as the positing of finitude as well as infinity. Thus, understanding becomes conscious of its genuine, contradictory nature and in this way it sublates itself as bare positivity (cf. Buchner 1990, pp. 229–230). Consequently, for Hegel skepticism is not a vain philosophical enterprise that leads to nihilism through radical criticism but a precious philosophical vehicle, which makes true philosophy possible. Genuine skepticism “is in its inmost heart at one with every true philosophy” (Hegel 2000, pp. 322–323), which contains it as a constitutive part (see Hegel 2000, p. 324). Without this inmost connection to true philosophy traditional skepticism together with all its new forms “lead to a dead end” (Hegel 2000, p. 323). In this way Hegel designates another kind of reason that exceeds the limits of formal logic and non–contradiction – a reason that he views as the only way to search for the truth.⁷ Vieweg cogently notes that: the demand for such a complete skepticism [. . . ] is identical to the demand for completely unconditioned or unprejudiced knowledge. Doubting everything must precede the achievement of knowledge. [. . . ] The negative–reasonable element represents a moment or a side of the logical (Vieweg 1999, p. 117).

Hence, the only way to secure philosophy against the principle of Pyrrhonism, which leads to insurmountable oppositions and contradictions, is to embrace this principle, i.e. to accept contradiction as a form of the logical development of knowledge. But how is such an incorporation of contradiction possible? What is this true philosophy⁸ that Hegel had in mind? In other words, how can skepticism be adopted as a methodological means of philosophy that leads to a positive result? In his article on skepticism Hegel refers explicitly to the Platonic oeuvre, which he paradoxically connects with skepticism by espousing Diogenes Laertius’s char-

7 In his dissertation (Dissertatio philosophica de orbitis planetarum), Hegel notes that “contradictio est regula veri, non contradictio, falsi“ (contradiction is the rule for truth, non–contradiction for error; cited in Jaeschke 2003, p. 106). 8 Trisokkas remarks that Hegel does not explicitly go into how he understands true philosophy in this text. However, there are some indications that could help us to approach this concept. Trisokkas summarizes these indications as follows: a) “the rational is always and everywhere self–identical”, b) “the rational is a relation, not a relatum”, c) “the relata included in the relation of the rational are contradictories” (cf. Trisokkas 2012, p. 62).

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acterization of thinkers and artists as different as Arhilochus, Euripides, Zeno, Xenopanes, Homer, Democritus and Plato as skeptics (cf. Hegel 2000, p. 323). According to Hegel, the insight shared by those thinkers and philosophers is “that true philosophy necessarily involves a negative side” (Hegel 2000, p. 323). The significance of negation as a constitutive moment of true philosophy represents the element which impelled Hegel to connect it with such different thinkers under the general category of skepticism. Furthermore, he refers to Parmenides as a model of the method of the skeptics: What more perfect and self–sustaining document and system of genuine skepticism could we find than the Parmenides in the Platonic philosophy? It embraces the whole domain of that knowledge through concepts of understanding, and destroys it. This Platonic skepticism is not concerned with doubting these truths of the understanding which cognizes things as manifold, as wholes consisting of parts, or with coming to be and passing away, multiplicity, similarity, etc. and which makes objective assertions of that kind; rather it is intent on the complete denial of all truth to this sort of cognition. This skepticism does not constitute a particular thing in a system, but it is itself the negative side of the cognition of the Absolute, and directly presupposes Reason as the positive side (Hegel 2000, p. 323).

This reference to Plato’s Parmenides is very interesting for the additional reason that Hegel’s opinion about this text remains unaltered throughout his whole work.⁹ Therefore it represents important evidence for the way he understood skepticism and what true philosophy could be, to which skepticism is supposed to lead.

4 Parmenides as a model of skeptical method Parmenides describes a fictitious encounter between the Eleatic philosophers Parmenides and Zeno and Socrates, who comes to listen to Zeno defending the positions of his teacher Parmenides against his opponents. The peculiarity of Zeno’s defense lies in the fact that he does not attempt to prove Parmenides’ thesis that “the All is one” (Plato 1997, 128a–b), but supports it in a “negative way”, i.e. through demonstrating the contradictions, which the opposing view falls into, namely the

9 In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy Hegel notes that “[t]he fully worked–out and genuine dialectic is, however, contained in the Parmenides – the most famous masterpiece of Platonic dialectic” (Hegel 1995b, p. 56). Most important is his assertion that “Plato’s true speculative greatness, and that through which he forms an epoch in the history of Philosophy, and hence in the history of the world, lies in the fuller determination of the Idea” (Hegel 1995b, p. 53).

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view of those who assert plurality.¹⁰ Then, Parmenides critiques Socrates’ theory of methexis (participation). His critique provokes Socrates’ despair, as he admits: “For the moment, at least, I am not really sure I see” a way out to turn to (Plato 1997, 135c). In the second part of the dialogue a new possibility for Socrates to find a way out of the dead–end opens: Parmenides encourages him (cf. Plato 1997, 135c–d) to continue his philosophical investigation after having been trained in dialectical method,¹¹ i.e. the method according to which “it is also necessary to do this [. . . ] in addition: to examine the consequences that follow from the hypothesis, not only if each thing is hypothesized to be, but also if that same thing is hypothesized not to be” (Plato 1997, 135e–136a). In this method one considers two opposite assertions without taking a position and, based on these assertions, logically concludes new propositions, which conflict with the initial assertions, so that the result seems to be absurd and contradictory. There can be no doubt that this is the method applied by the skeptic philosophers – this is why Hegel considers Zeno a skeptic. As I noted above, the method Parmenides proposes to Socrates represents a way out of the dead end to which the latter arrived after the thorough critique of his views on methexis. In fact, Parmenides warns Socrates that “the truth will escape” him, unless he exercises in this method (Plato 1997, 135d). Socrates is disappointed not because of the negative result of dialectics, but because of the falsification of his theory – a refutation that was the outcome of the critique of his theses formulated in the form of fixed determinative propositions. The wider conclusion is that such propositions can not produce knowledge. Thus, the “negative result” must not be ascribed to the dialectic but to the attempt of a positive determination of knowledge through the formulation of absolute and rigid positions or judgments. The negation as resignation, as nihilism – a danger of skepticism when it is cut off from true philosophy, as we have already considered above – arises out of complete affirmation and not out of the practice of questioning. On the contrary, the dialectic suggests a solution to the impasse by transcending it.

10 As Zeno explains to Socrates, his argumentation “is a retort against those who assert the many, and pays them back in kind with interest; its purpose is to show that their own hypothesis – that plurality is, when followed out far enough – suffers still more absurd consequences than the hypothesis of there being one” (Plato 1997, 128c–d). 11 For an extensive presentation and categorization of the arguments developed in the dialogue and their reversals through logical scrutiny see Taylor (1934). See also Düsing 1990, pp. 174–180; Burnet 1964, pp. 206–221.

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Hence, even in Parmenides, a work often interpreted as a dialogue without a positive outcome,¹² the dialectical method is introduced as the way to truth. Consequently, the dialectical method that consists in questioning every form of dogmatic assertion is not presented as the unfruitful way of relentless doubt, but as the way that leads to truth.¹³ As we have seen above, there are similar formulations about skepticism in Hegel’s relevant article: Skepticism is and must stay connected to true philosophy. If its ties to true philosophy are cut off, it either becomes an unfruitful intellectual game or it is reversed into dogmatism, since – as already noted above – it questions everything except its own views. Thus, there is a clear connection between the dialectical method suggested by Plato in Parmenides as the method that leads to truth and skepticism that leads to true philosophy. The parallel between skepticism and dialectics as presented in the Platonic text, to which Hegel explicitly refers in his article on skepticism, impels us to turn our attention to the Platonic notion of dialectics to specify which “kind” of skepticism Hegel considered to be connected with true philosophy.

5 The way to true philosophy: dialectics Hegel opposes the contemporaneous tendency to “transform philosophy into science” (Bubner 1980, pp. 147–148) and aspires to overcome it without slipping into dogmatism. As already mentioned, during the Jena period Hegel criticized the philosophy of his contemporaries and tried to synthesize his own view through his encounter with their deficiencies. The core of his criticism lies in the subjective and fixed way in which modern philosophers conceive the relationship between being and knowledge. In Hegel’s view, modern philosophy has got caught in the

12 Already in 1916, commenting on the vast bibliography on Parmenides, Paul Elmer More characteristically noted that “[t]he interpretation of the Parmenides [. . . ] depends on the solution of this crux: we have the whole doctrine of Ideas subjected to a process of destructive logic to which Plato makes no direct answer either here or anywhere else” (More 1916, p. 128). 13 Düsing is right to remark that Hegel views Parmenides as a work that presents the true nature of skepticism. In this sense, Parmenides expounds in fact “the negative side of the cognition of the absolute” (Düsing 1990, p. 181). Although for Hegel such oppositions are negative and typical of skeptic philosophy, “they point necessarily to [. . . ] a higher form of knowledge of the absolute and divine”, which is however not named in Parmenides. Düsing aptly remarks that the demonstration of the contradictions of understanding as the negative result of Parmenides automatically also posits “a side of the cognition of the absolute as an immediate presupposition” (Düsing 1990, p. 182). Vieweg comments in a similar way that “the acquisition of philosophical knowledge must always be ‘accompanied’ by the idea of the absolute, this is the condition of the possibility of philosophical knowledge” (Vieweg 1999, p. 128).

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self contradictions of the rigid categories of understanding and cannot thus grasp the antithetic nature of knowledge and truth. As he declares in the preface to the Phenomenology, “the task nowadays consists [. . . ] in freeing determinate thoughts from their fixity so as to give actuality to the universal, and impart to it spiritual life” (Hegel 1997a, p. 20). According to Hegel, in order to impart “spiritual life” to the universal we have to go back to the “concrete variety of existence” (Hegel 1997a, p. 19) in order “to give actuality to the universal” (Hegel 1997a, p. 20). In the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel envisages achieving this goal by actualizing the universal through the mediatory role of natural consciousness, which conceives itself through its immediate experience as the “truly real”, reaching, in this way, absolute knowledge. The goal of natural consciousness is thus to find “the point where knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself, where knowledge finds itself, where Notion corresponds to object and object to Notion” (Hegel 1977a, p. 51). Hence, the dialectic¹⁴ Hegel introduces in his Phenomenology is a movement, in which the distinction between knowledge and truth is transcended – a movement of the absolute mediation of consciousness and its object. Hegel is well aware that the mediation between subjectivity and objectivity cannot be achieved by means of modern philosophy, which remains caught in the one–sidedness of self–consciousness. “Seen in this light ancient dialectic deserves a reappraisal” (Bubner 1980, p. 148). Thus, in order to formulate his two–sided dialectic of subjectivity and objectivity, Hegel turns his attention to the Platonic dialogues, which display that element of dialectic which his contemporary philosophy lacks. Hegel locates the origins of dialectic in Eleatic philosophy and especially in the contribution of Zeno, who recognized the dialectical structure of the relation between being and not–being, thus transcending the schism of Parmenidian philosophy that leads to dogmatism. As he notes in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy: “What specially characterizes Zeno is the dialectic which, properly speaking, begins with him; he is the master of the Eleatic school in whom its pure thought arrives at the movement of the Notion in itself and becomes the pure soul of science” (Hegel 1995a, p. 261). As one can see in Parmenides, the dialectic represents a method based on negation, since it is the method of developing the consequences of opposed assumptions. From this point of view, even the early Socratic dialogues seem to be aligned with the negative effects of the dialectical

14 In an attempt to restate the problem of the Hegelian dialectic and to shed light on its aspects that remain in darkness Michael Forster critically debates the objections that have been formulated against it and the misunderstandings about its invention, application and effectiveness as a method. In his attempt he stresses the monistic character of the Hegelian conception of the relation between subject and object (cf. Forster 1993, pp. 141–157).

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method, since they result in an impasse concerning the definition of the concepts discussed (see Bubner 1990, pp. 93–94). However, the difficulty arising from negation as a demonstrative method – connected with the fact that dialectical questioning and answering seems at first sight to end in aporia – has motivated Aristotle to criticize the dialectical method and exclude it from valid demonstration. Aristotle regards dialectic as an art of refutation of common beliefs, which does not necessarily result in true beliefs. Thus, according to Aristotle, the dialectical method has no demonstrative value, but “deduces from what is acceptable” (Aristotle 2003, I, 1, 100a31). In the eighteenth century Kant rediscovered the dialectical nature of reason as self–contradictoriness through his critique of using the dialectic as an “organon” (cf. Kant 1998, B 85). Even if Kant’s interest is focused on setting the limits of our cognitive capacities following the Aristotelian law of the avoidance of contradiction, he nevertheless paves the way for his successors to value the dialectical method positively. Thus, despite the fact that Kant restricts human knowledge to the categories of understanding, which alone do not suffice to overcome the antinomic character of reason, he rediscovers the dialectical form of reason by placing contradiction in its heart. Therefore Hegel refers to Kant and to his retrieval of dialectics very positively, noting that it “has been the infinite merit of the Kantian philosophy [. . . ] to have given the impetus to the restoration of logic and dialectic” (Hegel 2010, p. 743). Hegel not only shares Kant’s interest in the dialectic, but also imputes to it demonstrative value by rediscovering the Platonic method of justifying a belief as the real speculative way of philosophical thinking. As Hans–Georg Gadamer puts it: “He [Hegel] is the first to actually grasp the depth of Plato’s dialectic. He is the discoverer of the truly speculative Platonic dialogues” (Gadamer 1976, pp. 6–7). In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel comments on the speculative value of the Platonic work: “The logical Philosophy the ancients called dialectic, and its addition to philosophy is by the ancient writers on the subject ascribed to Plato” (Hegel 1995b, p. 48). With this turn towards the dialectic Hegel aspires to transcend the limits of understanding, as set by Kant, and to achieve the knowledge of the true nature of reason (see Daskalaki 2012, pp. 79–104). The paradoxical relation between reason and knowledge implied in Kant’s conception of dialectics motivates Hegel’s daring attempt to find a way to reconcile the two poles of the antithetic relationship between being and knowledge. In other words, Hegel does not follow Kant in isolating the contradictory nature of reason and therefore he does not follow him in reducing the definition of a thing to an array of determinations depicted in the form of judgement (Urteil). According to Hegel, the conception of the thing as a set of determinations implies an external connection between the subject and its predicates. This kind of connection between the two terms of the statement indicates the definition of

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a term depending on an aspect chosen each time to represent the relevant thing. In Gadamer’s words, “the respects in which the subject is judged are external to the subject itself which means that it always can be judged in still other respects” (Gadamer 1976, p. 17). In Hegel’s view this means that the differentiation of a thing/subject from other things/subjects is made according to a criterion external to the thing. Consequently, Hegel refutes the form of the connection between the subject and its multiple determinations, which is reflected in the structure of the statement as such, and intends to convert the opposition between reason and understanding to a dialectic relation between “moments” of a speculative movement that unifies them. According to this view, the definition of the subject is an internal process of self–differentiation, whereby the subject passes over into the predicate and vice versa. As Düsing remarks: “Dialectical thinking [. . . ] is, according to its own claim, notional [begreifend]; it attempts to completely grasp [. . . ] the internal structure of a thing, and comes in many ways across real contradictions, which it thinks of as determinations of that which is” (Düsing 1990, p. 169). One could object that according to this view both, the subject and its predicates, are mutually neutralized, since something seems to be and not to be simultaneously; an option that was initially introduced by the Eleatic philosophy. However, instead of sinking into bare nothingness, Hegel’s dialectic suggests another form of sublation of the subject and its predicates that leads to the reflection of both in a speculative unity which contains them. It is a common belief among scholars of the Platonic oeuvre that, regardless of the specific outcome of the ongoing discussion (i.e. independently of the positive or negative result concerning the definition of a concept), the Platonic dialogues reflect a dynamic process of defining a concept through the method of questioning confounding and often contrary beliefs. The dynamic element of the dialogue lies in the request to determine the indeterminacy of the concepts that are brought into the discussion. Determinacy and indeterminacy are intertwined in the Platonic dialogues in a way that the identity of a thing is mediated from its opposition to its difference, as Plato demonstrates in a very detailed way in the Sophist through the dialectic of being and not being (cf. Plato 1993, 259a). In other words, the definition of a concept results from its self–differentiation. Hence, the definition of a subject is an internal process in which the subject differentiates itself into its predicates and vice versa without any reference to external criteria that would arbitrarily and indifferently be applied to the subject of the statement.

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6 Platonic diairesis and determinate negation The method of self–differentiation of the essence Plato establishes especially in his later works in order to define general concepts is the method of “diairesis” (division). Plato develops the method of diairesis as an answer to the problem of the connection between the one and the many, a problem that emerges repeatedly in the Platonic dialogues, involving not only the relation between an abiding idea in the unchangeable platonic world and its many appearances in the empirical world, but also the question of how the fixed ideas are connected to each other. In his article “Plato’s Unwritten Dialectic” Gadamer refers to Hippias Major, where two different kinds of participation that correspond to two different kinds of relation between the one and the many are sketched: According to the theory of participation “the idea is what the particular existences have in common, and each of the latter may be said to be what they are to the extent they participate in the idea. And besides that relationship the quite different relationship is developed of the number ‘common’ to the different units in a sum” (Gadamer 1980, p. 132). The difference between these two kinds of division relies on the dependency or independency of the universal (the predicate), which is attributed to the particular (the subject of a definition), on or from the particular itself. If the universal is the result of an abstraction of the specific characteristics of the subjects, then it depends on the aspect, which is chosen over others to identify and group together discrete particulars that may however differ from another point of view. Yet there is another way to approach the connection between the universal and the particular, since the universal could be regarded as a separate unit to its manifestations. The independency of the universal from its manifestations implies its separate existence that functions as an objective ground for the division that is undertaken each time. In other words, the division of a universal into its particular instantiations and kinds is feasible because of the underlying unity that connects the parts of the division and allows their divisibility. This synthetic nature of unity holds together the separate parts, establishing the continuity of the manifestations of the universal. This continuity thus connects the contradictory moments and unifies them in a higher unity that contains both parts of a contradictory relationship (the sameness and the difference, the one and the many) as moments: the crucial element in this conception of division is that, in Gadamer’s words, it “specifically presupposes the speculative relationship of unity in what is opposite” (Gadamer 1976, p. 26). Hence, the speculative moment that Hegel strives to demonstrate in order to transcend the impasse caused by the separation of the subject and its object, which the modern philosophy of subjectivity has provoked, seems to be rooted (at least

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in a primitive form) in the Platonic method of diairesis. However, Hegel critiques the Platonic notion of dialectic and views it as incomplete, since it remains on the level of “external reflection” that cannot complete the mediation between the universal and the particular (see Hegel 2010, pp. 740–741; Hegel 1995b, p. 51). Thus, in Plato, method remains “mixed [. . . ] with the traits of a reasoning that externally conveys its own point of view into the topic” (Bubner 1980, p. 130). In spite of all his critique on the Platonic dialectical method, when he comes to formulate his own philosophy against the philosophy of subjectivity, Hegel seeks to overcome its difficulties through referring to the ancient notion of dialectic and the method of diairesis as is depicted especially in the later Platonic work. This method, however, does not lead to the revelation of pure and fixed ideas or stable laws but consists in a constant movement of detecting relations of sameness and difference between things, building a continuity that penetrates them but is, at the same time, different from them. The continuity between the sameness and the difference is in fact the moment of binding together all the separate moments into a speculative unity which, in this way, shows itself to be innate and simultaneously different from the things themselves. This method thus facilitates the movement, in which thought passes over from the subject into the predicate and vice versa, where, as Gadamer states, there is no firm foundation, no subject which, as such, remains unquestioned. Here our thought does not come to a predicate which refers to something else, but rather to a predicate which forces us to go back to the subject. We do not take up something new or different in the predicate, for in thinking the predicate, we are actually penetrating into that which the subject is (Gadamer 1976, p. 18).

But what exactly is it that Plato adds to skepticism and makes Hegel turn his attention to him to search for a solution to the problem of contradiction, which remains insuperable for formal logic? With the method of diairesis Plato gives determination to indeterminacy, existence to non–existence, limitation to infinity. Diairesis as a dialectical method par excellence does not lead to nothingness, does not cancel the determination of judgment as a limitation against contradiction to establish in–difference. Quite the opposite: It is a method that sets the limit. Plato’s philosophy does not give primacy to infinity against finitude: the world of ideas is the world that sets limits, that gives form where form is absent. Only that for Plato, finitude is not limitation against the unknown infinite, but limitation within it. It is the determination that stems from the recognition of indeterminacy and, in this sense, it is a positivity stemming from negation. Hence, although Parmenides does not lead to a positive result that would arise from the sublation of contradiction and thus from the incorporation of understanding in the reflective nature of reason,

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it opens the way to this sublation, in the same way it gave a way out of the impasse Socrates faced at the end of the first part. Thus, skepticism as determinate negation, to which Hegel refers in the introduction to the Phenomenology, is the skepticism of Parmenides, the one that leads to the revelation of the truth of things as contradictory. Even if Hegel criticizes Plato for not completing the dialectical method, he nevertheless acknowledges his “speculative greatness” (Hegel 1995b, p. 53) and admits that, especially in his late works, he developed the speculative moment as the “bringing together” of notions and particulars (Hegel 1995b, p. 68). He clearly recognizes that the Platonic dialectic, especially of the early Socratic dialogues, remains on the level of abstract thought that “is really only necessary in an external way and for reflecting consciousness, in order to allow the universal [. . . ], unalterable and immortal, to come forth” (Hegel 1995b, p. 52). The completion of dialectical method demands the determination of the universal through its mediation with the particular. It is thus the universal as determined “which resolves and has resolved the contradictions in itself, and hence it is the concrete in itself; thus this sublation of contradiction is the affirmative“ (Hegel 1995b, p. 52). After this description of the completion of the dialectic Hegel asserts: “Dialectic in this higher sense is the really Platonic” (Hegel 1995b, p. 52). The few remarks I have made on Hegel’s critique of the Platonic dialectic are in no way exhaustive. Highlighting the significance of the Platonic dialectic for Hegel may however contribute to a reappraisal of his critique, since through the parallel investigation of Hegel’s views on method and Plato’s Parmenides we arrived at the conclusion that the path of true philosophy as the path of determinate negation was the one they both attempted to follow.

Bibliographie Aristotle (2003): Topics. Robin Smith (Trans.). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Beiser, Frederick (1987): The Faith of Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brockard, Hans/Buchner, Hartmut (1983): “Einleitung”. In: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: Jenaer Kritische Schriften II. Brockard, Hans/Buchner, Hartmut (Eds.). Hamburg:Felix Meiner Verlag, pp. I–XXXIX. Bubner, Rüdiger (1980): Zur Sache der Dialektik. Stuttgart: Philip Reclam jun. Bubner, Rüdiger (1990): “Dialektik oder die allgemeine Ironie der Welt. Hegels Sicht des Eleatismus“. In: Riedel, Manfred (Ed.): Hegel und die antike Dialektik. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, pp. 84–97. Buchner, Hartmut (1990): “Skeptizismus und Dialektik”. In: Riedel, Manfred (Ed.): Hegel und die antike Dialektik. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, pp. 227–243.

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Burnet, John (1964): Greek Philosophy. Thales to Plato. London/New York: Macmillan and Co. Daskalaki, Maria (2012): Vernunft als Bewusstsein der absoluten Substanz. Zur Darstellung des Vernunftbegriffs in Hegels “Phänomenologie des Geistes”. Berlin: Akademie Verlag (De Gruyter). Düsing, Klaus (1969): “Spekulation und Reflexion. Zur Zusammenarbeit Schellings und Hegels in Jena”. In: Hegel–Studien 5, pp. 95–128. Düsing, Klaus (1990): “Formen der Dialektik bei Plato und Hegel”. In: Riedel, Manfred (Ed.): Hegel und die antike Dialektik. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, pp. 169–191. Forster, Michael (1993): “Hegel’s dialectical method”. In: Beiser, Frederick C. (Ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Hegel. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 130– 170. Gadamer, Hans–Georg (1976): “Hegel and the Dialectic of the Ancient Philosophers”. In: Gadamer, Hans–Georg: Hegel’s Dialectic. Five Hermeneutical Studies. P. Christopher Smith (Trans.). New Haven, London: Yale University Press, pp. 5–34. Gadamer, Hans–Georg (1980): “Plato’s Unwritten Dialectic”. In: Gadamer, Hans–Georg: Dialogue and Dialectic. P. Christopher Smith (Trans.). New Haven, London: Yale University Press, pp. 124–155. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1977a): Phenomenology of Spirit. Findlay, John Niemeyer (Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1977b): The Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy. Henry Stilton Harris/Walter Cerf (Trans.). Albany: State University of New York Press. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1995a): Lectures on the History of Philosophy. E.S. Haldane (Trans.). Vol. I. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1995b): Lectures on the History of Philosophy. E.S. Haldane/Frances H. Simson (Trans.). Vol. II. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2000): “On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy, Exposition of its Different Modifications and Comparison of the Latest Form with the Ancient One (1st ed. 1802)”. In: di Giovanni, George /Harris, Henry Stilton (Eds.): Between Kant and Hegel. Texts in the Development of Post–Kantian Idealism. Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hacket Publishing Company, pp. 301–362. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2010): The Science of Logic. George di Giovanni (Ed.). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. Henrich, Dieter (1981): Hegel im Kontext. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. Jaeschke, Walter (2003): Hegel Handbuch. Leben–Werk–Wirkung. Stuttgart, Weimar: Verlag J.B. Metzler. Kant, Immanuel (1998): Critique of Pure Reason. Guyer, Paul/Wood, Allen W. (Ed.). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. More, Paul Elmer (1916): “The Parmenides of Plato”. In: The Philosophical Review 25, pp. 121– 142. Plato (1993): Sophist. Nicholas P. White (Trans.). Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. Plato (1997): Parmenides. Reginald E. Allen (Trans.). New Haven, London: Yale University Press. Schmitt, Charles B. (1983): “The Rediscovery of Ancient Skepticism in Modern Times”. In:

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Burnyeat, Myles (Ed.): The Sceptical Tradition. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 225–251. Sextus Empiricus (2000): Outlines of Skepticism. Annas, Julia/Barnes, Jonathan (Eds.). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. Taylor, Alfred Edward (1934): “Parmenides, Zeno and Socrates”. In: Taylor, Alfred Edward: Philosophical Studies. London: Macmillan and Co., pp. 28–90. Trisokkas, Ioannis (2012): Pyrrhonian Scepticism and Hegel’s Theory of Judgement. Leiden/Boston: Brill. Vieweg, Klaus (1999): Philosophie des Remis. Der junge Hegel und das ‘Gespenst des Skeptizismus’. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag.

Georges Faraklas

“The dialectic of all that is determinate” Sceptical Tropes and Hegelian Method Abstract: For Hegel, philosophy should “reconstruct” our theories and concepts. In this paper I try to determine the extent to which Hegel’s reconstruction of concepts is indebted to the sceptical method. By examining how he shows our concepts of ‘knowledge’, ‘being’ and ‘infinite’ to be non–sensical, I suggest that sceptical tropes such as relation, the diallel and infinite progress play a crucial role in his reconstruction of concepts. After analysing passages where he defines his method in comparison with the sceptical method, I claim that his debt towards Scepticism probably concerns rather the semantic than the epistemological part of his endeavour.

Concepts applied to experience provide knowledge. Not all of them, though. Concepts that provide knowledge must make sense and correspond to experience at the same time. For Hegel, modern science has taught us that conceptual constructions which account for experience use concepts taken from experience. Thus, while having a coherent theory is still a condition for knowledge, we are now aware of a second one: experience must agree with our theory, that is we must test our theory experimentally (W 20, pp. 65, 69, 79). Knowledge for Hegel does not consist in producing reality out of pure thought, though many critics of Hegel (Karl Marx, for example) have thought so (MEW 42, p. 35). It consists in re–constructing experience using concepts that experience itself has taught us and which are in conformity with experience itself. But this situation does not deprive philosophy of its role. A theory conveys knowledge both if it is not non–sensical and if it corresponds to what is, and the role of philosophy is to make sure that both these conditions are met. Philosophy has therefore an epistemological duty. It must promote the awareness of the fact that “nothing is known, if it is not in experience” (W 3, p. 585; GW 9, p. 430),¹ the fact that empiricism is right to claim that “what is true must exist in reality and be present to perception” (W 8, p. 108 – Enzyklopädie, § 38 A). It must

1 In this paper, I propose my own translations of Hegel. Georges Faraklas, Prof. Dr. Georges Faraklas, Professor of Political Philosophy, Department of Political Science and History, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens. DOI 10.1515/9783110528138-003

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overcome the “old representation of science”, i.e. the ideal of constructing theories “without importing [in them] anything empirical from the outside” (W 20, p. 392). It must realize that there is no “a priori knowledge”, for, even when knowledge seems to be a “construction” out of pure thought, it is, in fact, a “reconstruction” (W 20, p. 79). This, I think, is what Hegel views as the epistemological duty of philosophy. Though no treatise on knowledge is to be found among his works, several analyses published during the last decades have shown that he does, nonetheless, have an epistemology.² It is true that Hegel has not exposed his epistemology per se, but we can try to reconstitute it by putting together remarks which are scattered throughout his work.³ What Hegel has in fact developed at length corresponds to another aspect of the role of philosophy. There is no chance a theory may be true if it is non–sensical. Not only must we check that our concepts agree with experience, we also have to make sure that they are not non–sensical. The former is science’s duty, of which modern science first became fully aware. But the second duty belongs to philosophy proper. For Hegel, philosophy doesn’t consist in constructing theories about the world. Even theories on how our mind gets its concepts from experience form no part of his program. The role of philosophy consists in reconstructing the concepts that such theories use.⁴ Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature, for instance, is not a speculative construction of nature, though it may seem to be something of this kind. Emmanuel Renault has convincingly shown that, in accordance with Hegel’s own declarations of intention, this work is only a reconstruction of the conceptuality used by natural sciences in Hegel’s time (Renault 2001; cf. W 9, p. 20 – Enzyklopädie, § 246 Z). I think that the same thing holds for all the ‘philosophical sciences’ contained in his Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences, which include, among other sciences, a theory of the ‘subjective mind’ which, among other issues, explains how knowledge is acquired. A Hegelian ‘philosophical’ science is not a philosophical deduction of theorems bearing on questions of scientific interest, it is an actual science whose use of concepts has been scrutinized and reshaped by philosophy. Hegel complains that sciences reduce all differences to one conceptual identity and claims that it is the duty of philosophy to oppose such reductions by introducing conceptual

2 T. Rockmore (1986) and K. Westphal (1989) are at the beginning of this relatively new trend in Hegelian scholarship (as for older scholarship on this topic, I have found Phalén 1912). 3 This is what I tried to do in Epistemology and method in Hegel (Faraklas 2000b), and ‘Hegel’s epistemology’ (Faraklas 1998), of which a very short version has been published in French: ‘La théorie hégélienne de la connaissance. Une reconstruction’ (Faraklas 2004). 4 My interpretation is close to G. Lebrun’s (1972). It is also close to K. Hartmann’s (1976), though I do not agree with his general “ontological” interpretation of the reconstruction of categories. I have presented it in ‘Donation mutuelle de sens et raisonnement par l’absurde’ (Faraklas 2000a).

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distinctions (W 9, p. 20 – Enzyklopädie, § 246 Z). This means, I think, that for him scientific concepts must be reconstructed by philosophy. If this is the case, then, for Hegel, while sciences reconstruct reality using concepts, philosophy reconstructs these reconstructions. Before philosophy attends to specific concepts used in theories, however, it must reconstruct our elementary concepts, the ones which are in use in every science. This is what Hegel aims at in the Science of Logic, a work he describes as a “reconstruction” of the “categories” used in sciences, as well as in everyday talk (W 5, pp. 30, 53, 55; GW 21, pp. 17–8, 41, 42; W 8, p. 85 – Enzyklopädie, § 23, Z 2). This is probably the most puzzling of his works. Philosophers usually criticise theories, not concepts. But while we could claim that in other works Hegel criticises theories, the Logic, which examines ‘determinations of thought’, is called the “true critique of the categories” (W 5, p. 92; GW 21, p. 22), because the objects of its critique are concepts. Hegel readily admits that we usually validate concepts by “applying them to given objects”. The real philosophical issue about them is, nonetheless, whether they “correspond” not to objects but “to themselves” (W 8, pp. 85–6 – Enzyklopädie, § 23, Z 2). Philosophy may warn science that it must examine whether its concepts correspond to reality, but its own research is concerned with the intrinsic value of concepts. Now, in my opinion, this concern is not to be found in many philosophies. To my best knowledge, Plato’s Parmenides and Sextus’ work may be the only texts classical philosophy has to offer, where not theories, nor applications of concepts to reality, but concepts as such are criticised. This seems, at least, to be Hegel’s opinion. Hegel himself distinguishes the historical meaning of Scepticism, which denotes a particular school of Ancient philosophy (of which modern Scepticism is but a truncated ‘epicureanized’ form) (W 2, p. 222; GW 4, p. 203; W 8, p. 112 – Enzyklopädie, § 39 A; W 19, pp. 360 sqq.), from the systematic meaning of ‘scepticism’, which for him denotes a feature pertaining to every “true” philosophy (W 2, p. 227; GW 4, p. 206). It is in this sense that he claims that the Parmenides, in which he admires the “greatest work of art of ancient dialectic”, is an exposition of “genuine scepticism” (W 3, p. 66; GW 9, p. 48. W 2, p. 228; GW 4, p. 207).⁵

5 Hegel not only claims that the sceptics of the Academy, such as Arcesilaus and Carneades, rightly claim to be true to Plato, he even claims that Sextus didn’t mean to refute them (W 2, pp. 230–1; GW 4, p. 209). This rather controversial opinion (Sextus mentions the Academy as different both from dogmatism and scepticism (PH, I, 3), while criticising its ideas, together with stoic and epicurean ones), but it is testimony to the fact that Hegel does not separate his acknowledged debt to Plato from his debt to Scepticism.

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Scepticism for Hegel consists in being aware of the categories we use,⁶ and, more specifically, in being certain that, once concepts are separated from their opposites, they cease to be valid.⁷ Now, to take into account the opposite of one concept in the way that we determine it is, as we will see, the most important feature of Hegel’s own reconstruction of concepts. Thus, we may say that scepticism, in the systematic sense of the word, is for Hegel an aspect of his own philosophical project. After having presented us with the modes of sceptical criticism, in book I of the Hypotyposes, Sextus inaugurates his devastating work by criticising, in book II and III, concepts such as ‘by whom’ (man as the subject of knowledge), ‘by means of which’ (senses and thought as means of knowledge), ‘according to which’ (representation as what is supposed to provide knowledge), ‘proof’, ‘principle’, ‘body’, ‘whole’, ‘good by nature’ or ‘teaching’. When he goes on to criticise scientific theories in the Adversus Mathematicos, he focuses again on the concepts that they use. He shows that concepts such as ‘hypothesis’, ‘matter’, ‘cause’, ‘atom’, ‘time’, ‘line’, ‘activity’, ‘syllab’, ‘number’, ‘destiny’ or ‘music’ are non–sensical, or, in his own words, that they “don’t exist” (οὐχ ὑπάρχει being the expression he uses at the end of many discussions). Sometimes, however, especially in the case of ‘sign’ (PH, II, 100–1; AM, VIII, 153–4, 202), Sextus distinguishes a valid meaning from the invalid one he shows to be non–sensical. The reader, puzzled by the fact that lots of indispensable concepts are being simply discarded, asks herself why valid meanings are not distinguished in the case of other concepts as well. It is from this point of view, I think, that Hegel’s project is different from Sextus’. Hegel criticises concepts, like Sextus does, but he doesn’t say they don’t exist. Scepticism (as well as “platonic dialectic, even in the Parmenides”), according to him, results in “nothing”, whereas his own ambition is to transcend this “solely negative” outcome (W 3, p. 72; GW 9, p. 56. W 5, p. 51; GW 21, pp. 39–40). Sextus’ critique rightly follows the lines of “logical modes” (W 19, p. 384) –the “new tropes” of Agrippa to which we will return soon–, but he just “annihilates” the concepts he criticises, whereas, for Hegel, a “logical” critique can and ought to lead to a positive outcome. This is what describes his own project. Scepticism teaches philosophy what the “dialectic of all that is determinate” is (W 19, p. 359), but philosophy is more than that: it has to become a “self–fulfilling scepticism”, i.e. a scepticism that transcends its negative result (W 3, p. 72; GW 9, p. 56). Hegel criticises concepts in order to redefine them, not to annihilate them,

6 Skeptizismus ist [. . . ] Bewusstsein über die Kategorien (W 19, p. 388). 7 Cf. W 8, pp. 175–6 – Enzyklopädie, § 81, Z 2: Sextus is certain of “the nullity of everything finite”, i.e. of determinations of thought not related to their opposites.

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but, in doing this, he still thinks in a sceptical way. A “self–fulfilling scepticism” is a form of scepticism. Hegel once said his main interest was in “the formal nature of the idea” (Hegel 1959, p. 35). In what follows, I don’t intend to check if he did find out what it is, but to examine what a Hegelian reconstruction of concepts looks like. In doing this, I will come across some specific sceptical ways of thinking. Sextus and Diogenes distinguish the ‘old tropes’ from the ‘new’ ones (PH, I, 40 sqq.; DL, IX, 79 sqq.). We can say that the ten old tropes aim at disqualifying sense data by showing that “phenomena contradict themselves” (Zeller 1963, p. 57),⁸ whereas the five ‘new’ ones – opposition, infinite progression, relativity, presupposition and the diallel – express, in Hegel’s words, “the dialectic inherent in determinate concepts” (W 19, p. 386). It is the new tropes that will appear at work in Hegel’s critical reconstruction of concepts. I hope that this will shed some light on Hegel’s debt towards scepticism. It is well known that Hegel is no sceptic concerning knowledge. He thinks it is inconsistent to believe that we have no access to things in themselves. But I believe that his reconstruction of concepts follows sceptical patterns, and that he was well aware of this fact.

1 On not talking non–sense The conclusion of the Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel’s most epistemological work, is called “absolute knowing”. It is a quite obscure text. Nonetheless, it gives us some hints as to what Hegel’s concerns are. If we think of the subject and the object as two self–sufficient things, as we spontaneously do, it is not easy to figure out how the first acquires knowledge of the latter. A convenient solution to this problem is to deprive the subject or the object of its self–sufficiency, while maintaining

8 J.–P. Dumont (1985, pp. 77–9) thinks that scepticism does not criticise phenomena, only theories about them, and that Zeller wrongly follows Hegel on this. Dumont’s thesis is similar to C. F. Stäudlin’s (1794, p. 389), and G. E. Schulze’s (1911, p. 34), who accuses Sextus of going too far in his criticism of sense–knowledge (Schulze 1801, pp. 589–99) because “true” sceptics don’t attack “facts of consciousness” (Schulze 1911, pp. 77, 99, 179; 1801, pp. 51–2). There are acute criticisms of Schulze’s idea that scepticism doesn’t invalidate facts of consciousness to be found in all of Hegel’s work. They all repeat what he says in his critical review of the Kritik der theoretischen Philosophie (W 2, pp. 213–72; GW 4, pp. 197–238, especially W 2, pp. 253 sqq.; GW 4, pp. 225 sqq.). It is worth noticing that J. Brunschwig, a contemporary scholar, also claims that Sextus considers phenomena to be “contradictory” (Brunschwig 1997, p. 577).

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that the other term is self–sufficient. But this is not a good solution, because it is non–sensical. This appears clearly when, as Hegel does, we consider the opposite judgements these solutions presuppose. Reducing the subject to the object amounts to asserting that “the being of the I is a thing”. Reducing the object to the subject amounts to affirming that “the thing is I” (W 3, p. 577; GW 9, p. 423). Both propositions are non–sensical. However, there are ‘shapes of consciousness’ which work with such absurdities. Craniology equates our mind with a bone, utilitarianism claims that things exist for us, not per se.⁹ Still, it is non–sensical to say that my mind is a thing, or that things are my mind. These judgements are called by Hegel “infinite judgements” (W 3, pp. 260– 1, 385, 577; GW 9, pp. 192, 282, 423–4).¹⁰ Their being non–sensical is important, because it shows how wrong their presupposition is. And their presupposition is that the subject, or the object is self–sufficient. The conclusion seems to be that, if ‘subject’ and ‘object’ are seen as two relative terms, knowledge ceases to be a non–sensical endeavour. What Hegel calls ‘absolute knowing’ seems indeed to be a point of view according to which we do not presuppose that either the subject or the object is self–sufficient.¹¹ On this account, ‘absolute knowing’ is not about knowing everything, it is about suppressing non–sense, which, in turn, is a condition for knowing anything. It doesn’t guarantee knowledge, as readers frequently assume, but it ceases to prevent us from knowing, because it allows us to not talk non–sense. ‘Absolute knowing’ constitutes the entry to Hegel’s system. It first leads to the Logic, in which Hegel examines our basic concepts independently of their application to natural or human objects (cf. W 5, pp. 44, 68; GW 21, pp. 34, 56). The Logic is followed by the reconstruction of natural and human sciences. This should now come as no surprise. The reconstruction of the epistemological relation offers us a framework that allows us to reconstruct general concepts, i.e. categories, as well as specific, scientific concepts.

9 Hegel refers here to what he wrote in pp. 260–2 and pp. 385, 415 sqq. The mention of utilitarianism is probably a reference to Helvétius. 10 Infinite judgement plays a crucial role in Hegel’s thought, as it has been showed by H. Schmitz, though I don’t agree with his presenting the role of infinite judgement in Hegel’s early work as opposite to the role played by syllogism in his mature work (Schmitz 1957, pp. 90–168; 2007, pp. 50 sqq.). 11 The subject “sacrifices itself” or “alienates itself” in favour of the object, while the object is the “self–alienation” of the alienation of the subject (W 3, p. 590; GW 9, p. 433), i.e. the object “suppresses itself” in giving us a concept that enables us to know it, as the Preface of the work states (W 3, pp. 53–4; GW 9, pp. 39–40). Cf. W 5, pp. 67–8; GW 21, p. 55.

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Hegel expresses his view on ‘infinite judgement’ in his Logic. Though it is “right or, as they say, true” to say “mind is not red”, this judgement is “non–sensical”.¹² This judgement would make sense, if it would make sense to speak of a ‘red mind’. But it makes no more sense to speak of ‘red minds’ than of ‘criminal skulls’. And it makes no sense, because this particular subject and this particular predicate have no “universal sphere” in common (W 4, pp. 134, 198; W 6, pp. 324–5; GW 12, pp. 70). This non–sense proves a contrario, for Hegel, that subject and predicate must have a “unity”, which “is the concept” (W 6, pp. 325–6; GW 12, p. 70). One “meaning of [the word] ‘meaning’”, says Hegel, is “the concept”.¹³ ‘Concept’, the very principle of Hegel’s philosophy, is defined, on this account, not as the predicate of a possible proposition, as it usually is, nor as its subject (for example, as it is assumed by Marx in his early critique of Hegel) (MEW 1, pp. 205–6), but as the condition under which a predicate can be meaningfully attributed to a subject. This is obviously quite useful because expressions with no meaning don’t have any reference either. Which explains why, once the reconstruction of our basic concepts is done, we will then be in a position to reconstruct our knowledge of nature and man. I think this is the issue Hegel addresses in the conclusion of the Logic, when he writes that “the object as it is without thinking and concept, is a representation or just a name”, for “it is what it is only inside the determinations of thought and concept” (W 6, p. 560; GW 12, p. 244). If we keep in mind what he says about the role of experience in the process of knowing, what he means here is not that “thinking and concept” produce things, as we might be tempted to believe, but that a thing is something we can have knowledge of, i.e. an “object”, if, and only if, we are able to reconstruct its concept, and that, as long as this reconstruction is missing, the thing remains for us just a word without a meaning and, therefore, without a reference.

2 Reconstruction, relativity, and the diallel If a concept is a framework inside which different terms (subject and object, subject and predicate) can be meaningfully related, it must contain at least one difference. If I have only one term at my disposal, this one has no meaning. When Hegel, at the beginning of the Logic, analyses the term ‘being’, and then the term ‘nothing’, he says each one of them has no “meaning” whatsoever, if it is not opposed to the

12 Widersinnig (W 6, p. 324; GW 12, p. 70; W 8, p. 324 – Enzyklopädie, § 173 A). 13 The other meaning of the word ‘meaning’ (Bedeutung) being “the example” (W 16, pp. 32–3).

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other.¹⁴ Both are meaningless, their “difference” being just a matter of “opinion” (W 5, p. 90; GW 21, p. 75). At some point, linguistics too came to the idea that a word has a meaning through its being contrasted with others. Indeed, an expression has a meaning only in virtue of its being different from others. Aristotle often says that opposites belong to one and the same science. This is so, because a and non–a both belong to the concept ‘a’. ‘Being’ acquires a meaning, once it is opposed to ‘nothing’. But when ‘being’ is opposed to ‘nothing’, ‘being’ is ‘the opposite of nothing’ and ‘nothing’ ‘the opposite of being’, thus ‘nothing’ is a part of the determination of ‘being’, and ‘being’ a part the of determination of ‘nothing’. Each one contains the other in its own determination.¹⁵ They are relative terms. But this is not the end of the story. We have our a and our non–a, we don’t have an ‘a’ yet. Once we have discovered that our opposites are relative terms, we still need to define what their ‘universal sphere’ is. A concept is needed, wherein both may appear as relative terms. This is a new concept, other than the two opposites. It is identified by Hegel as ‘becoming’. ‘Becoming’ is what takes place when we go from being to non–being and from non–being to being, it is a “movement” that contains both ‘being’ and ‘nothing’. It expresses “the inseparability of being and nothing” (W 5, p. 11; GW 21, p. 921). And since ‘being’ and ‘nothing’, considered as non–related terms, are no concepts at all, ‘becoming’, the framework inside which both are put in relation, is the “first concept” (W 8, p. 192 – Enzyklopädie, § 88 Z) in the Logic. On the other hand, this concept is not really a new one. It is the valid meaning of ‘being’. If ‘being’ ceases to be non–sensical only when it is conceived of as relative to ‘nothing’, if by being conceived of as relative to ‘nothing’ it is defined through both terms ‘being’ and ‘nothing’, and if ‘becoming’ is the name of the concept which contains both these terms, then ‘becoming’ is the meaning of the term ‘being’. In more general terms, if a and non–a both belong to the concept ‘a’, the concept ‘a’ does not have the same meaning as its component a, and, at the same time, ‘a’ is the meaning a was supposed to have. We may say that ‘a’ is the meaningful reconstruction of a. Hegel expresses this situation by using the verb aufheben (W 5, p. 112; GW 21, p. 92): ‘being’ is suppressed, but it is suppressed in ‘becoming’, not destroyed.

14 When I say that I think nothing, this expression has a “meaning” (Bedeutung) because I thereby think of the “difference” between thinking “something” and thinking “nothing”. This is not the case when I think only of “being” or only of “nothing” (W 5, p. 85; GW 21, p. 71). 15 “If we consider both from the point of view of their being different, each one of them, in its being different from the other, exists as a unity with the other” (W 5, p. 112; GW 21, pp. 92–3).

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This is what seems to be at stake at the beginning of Hegel’s Logic. This reminds us of what Sextus calls a diallel. A diallel is a situation where we need a in order to “prove” b and b in order to “prove” a (PH, I, 169), so that we can’t prove anything. It is one of the most frequently used tropes in Sextus. The diallel is distinguished from the trope of relativity, but this does not mean that they are independent from each other. On the contrary, most of the time Sextus accuses philosophers or scientists of falling into a diallel once he has shown their concepts to be relative to each other.¹⁶ By being relative to each other, none of them is able to explain the other. Relativity means we cannot define a without b, nor b without a, and a diallel is what occurs whenever we do define such relative terms as if they were not relative terms, i.e. as if the one of them could explain the other. But Sextus and Hegel do not draw the same conclusion from this situation. Both use a quite similar term in their respective language, ἀναιρῶ and aufheben,¹⁷ as a means to express what happens to concepts caught in a diallel. André Doz has rightly noted that the Hegelian use of aufheben corresponds to the philosophical use of ἀναιρῶ. He cites a passage in Aristotle where ἀναιρῶ cannot mean ‘to destroy’ (Doz 1987, p. 304). But it is in Sextus that ἀναιρῶ is elevated to the dignity of a technical term, as it will be the case of aufheben in Hegel. Sextus constantly expresses the invalidation of every concept he comes to grips with by using this verb. Quite understandably, R. G. Bury (1933–49) does not always translate ἀναιρῶ by ‘to destroy’. If Sextus ‘destroys’ astrology, would we say he ‘destroys’ time? In fact, concepts are not annihilated, but invalidated, even when Sextus says, as he frequently does, that they “don’t exist”. The same goes, as is well known, for Hegel’s aufheben, “one of the most important terms in philosophy”. It does not just signify ‘to destroy’. However, Hegel rightly stresses the specificity of his own use of aufheben by saying that “something is aufgehoben”, not when it is “reduced to nothing”, but when “it has entered the unity with its opposite” (W 5, pp. 113–4; GW 21, pp. 94–5). The positive outcome of the critique of categories is thus that we can find a valid meaning for the concepts we criticise if we take into account their inseparability from their opposites, i.e. their relativity. Hegel uses sceptical patterns, but refuses sceptical conclusions, for, to him, invalidated concepts only need to be reconstructed anew. Their original meaning must be modified, not destroyed.

16 Cf. PH, II, 9, 36, 68, 114–5, 200, 202; III, (19), 22, (74); AM, I, (110), (135); II (65–6); III, 98–9; VII, 340, 426; VIII, 21, 86, 112–3, 340, (364–5); IX, 47, (224–5), (233–4), (240–1), (344); X, (275). 17 Hegel translates ἀναιρῶ by aufheben in his article on Sextus (W 2, pp. 231–2; GW 4, pp. 209–10).

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3 Reconstruction, infinite progress, ‘bad’ and ‘good’ meaning The ‘finite’ is a concept that contains differences such as ‘something’ and ‘something else’. It is the framework inside which one may refer to finite things. Its full meaning requires, however, that we relate it to its opposite, ‘infinite’. How are we to conceive the latter? If, by ‘infinite’ we mean that which contains all that is finite, the ‘infinite’ swallows the ‘finite’. “The finite has vanished”, says Hegel (W 5, p. 150; GW 21, p. 125). But, as we know, if we have only one term at our disposal, this term has no meaning. Thus, we need the finite not to vanish, if we want the ‘infinite’ to mean something. But ‘infinite’ could vanish too. Since being ‘finite’ is already the common quality of all finite things, one could say that it contains ‘all that is finite’. ‘Infinite’ is thus in danger of being just another name for ‘finite’, which is by no means what we intend to say by using this term. Therefore, if we want to know what is meant by ‘infinite’, we have to find out what the difference between ‘finite’ and ‘infinite’ is. Now, if we take this difference seriously, we are faced with a new problem. If being ‘finite’ is opposed to being ‘infinite’, it is no longer included in ‘infinite’, which means that ‘infinite’ has a limit, that “it is a finite infinite” (W 5, p. 152; GW 21, p. 127). Moreover, this difficulty displays only half of the whole picture. If a is opposed to b, then a is determined through its non–b–ness and b through its non–a–ness as well. Thus a and b have a meaning, as opposites, only through the fact that the meaning of a contains the meaning of b and vice versa. From this vantage point – the “mutual determination of finite and infinite”, in Hegel’s words –, it is not only the infinite that is affected by finiteness, the finite is affected by infiniteness as well (W 5, p. 155; GW 21, p. 129). The opposition of ‘finite’ and ‘infinite’ amounts thus to the opposition of ‘infinite as finite’ and ‘finite as infinite’. Each one contains its opposite. In other words, they are relative terms. But they are not supposed to be so, since ‘infinite’ is supposed to be a higher concept than ‘finite’. There is an apparent solution at hand. Facing the fact that each one of these two terms refers to the other, we may decide to redefine ‘infinite’ as something that only tends to exist. When we elevate our thought from ‘finite’ to ‘infinite’, we fail to find a concept which would be independent of the finite, we find a ‘finite infinite’, but we may repeat this operation as many times as we want, claiming that we are always getting closer to the concept we are seeking. What happens then is, in fact, that ‘finite’ and ‘infinite’ alternate. The ‘infinite’ does not swallow the ‘finite’, it is not conceived of as another form of ‘finite’ either, it is now the infinite progression itself. But this is no solution. Infinite progression, a ‘new trope’ frequently used by

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Sextus, is, for Hegel, a way of looking at things that we have recourse to whenever we presuppose that “two relative determinations” have “a self–sufficient existence in opposition to each other”. But the fact that the above terms are relative to each other, and not independent as we want them to be, constitutes a contradiction which is only avoided by this, it is not solved (W 5, p. 155; GW 21, p. 129). The meaning of ‘infinite’, i.e. ‘infinite’ defined without contradiction, without non–sense, would be a conceptual framework inside which ‘finite’ and ‘infinite’ would do more than just alternate. Hegel says ‘infinite’ is “the unity of itself and its opposite” (W 5, p. 157; GW 21, p. 131). Formulations of the type “a’ is the unity of a and non–a’ express the most general structure of the Hegelian reconstruction of a concept. Hegel defines the “absolute” in its most general version as “the identity of identity and non–identity” (W 5, p. 74; GW 21, p. 60). Since in Hegel ‘absolute’ does not refer to a transcendent entity but means the same as ‘non–relative’, such formulations express his way of solving the contradiction which occurs when a relative term is supposed to be independent. ‘Infinite’ ceases to be non–sensical, when it is not defined as opposed to ‘finite’. Hegel says that this is possible if we redefine ‘infinity’ as the “unity” of ‘finite’ and ‘infinite’, i.e. as what I have referred to as the framework inside which the relation of the opposites makes sense. But there is a problem here. ‘Infinite’ already contains ‘finite’ to the extent that they are relative terms. What has changed now is the relation between relativity and independence. We were speaking of a term that is supposed to express something self–sufficient although it has a meaning only by being related to another term. At present, we are looking for a term that expresses something self–sufficient because it is related to something else. The only suitable candidate for this difficult task appears to be relation itself. The relation of relative terms is not a relative term like them, though, at the same time, it is not separated from any of them. Since each relative term, “taken in se, considered per se”, i.e. not as a relative term, “contains its other in itself”, what it contains, Hegel says, is the “relation of the infinite and the finite”, a relation that is the “unity of the finite and the infinite”, i.e. “the unity, that is itself the infinity, which comprehends itself and finity” (W 5, p. 158; GW 21, p. 132). In other words, it is non–sensical to suppose that relative terms are self– sufficient, but it makes sense to say that their being related to each other is self– sufficient. What is “rational”, Hegel writes in his 1802 article on Scepticism, is something that cannot be refuted through the trope of relativity, because it is the “relation” itself (W 2, p. 246; GW 4, p. 220). Sextus says that what exists “absolutely” (Hegel translates: für sich, i.e. per se) cannot be distinguished from something “relative”, because, either it is not different from the relative, or it is different from it, and thus relative to it. After giving a citation of this passage in his lectures on Scepticism, Hegel comments: “but relation itself is a relation in se, not a relation

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to something else” (PH, I, 137. W 19, p. 383). The relation of relative terms is the absolute. ‘Infinite’ and ‘finite’ both belong to the concept of ‘infinite’, in the sense that, as we said, a and non–a both belong to the concept ‘a’. But, of course, this concept of ‘infinite’ has “not the same meaning” as the ‘infinite’ from which we “separate” the finite (W 5, p. 158; GW 21, p. 132). Thus, it seems we have now two concepts of ‘infinite’. Hegel calls “bad” or “false” infinite the one that is opposed to the finite, “good” or “true” or “affirmative” infinite the other (W 5, pp. 156 sqq.; GW 21, pp. 130 sqq.). At the same time, these are not two independent concepts. The second constitutes the correct reformulation of the first, since it expresses what the first is supposed to mean. This, I think, is a good example of what Hegel means when he says that his Logic provides “reconstructions” of the determinations of thought we use in our language and sciences. The reconstructed concept has a meaning that is different from the one it usually has. The sun is finite, says Hegel, for “not only the sun, but the whole solar system belongs to the reality of the concept of the sun” (W 10, p. 36 – Enzyklopädie, § 386 Z). Thus, it is finite, not because it does not extend to the whole universe, not because it belongs to the sensible world as opposed to the intelligible one, but because it doesn’t display all the elements that its own concept needs (we don’t know that the sun is the center of the solar system if we consider the sun per se). According to this reconstructed concept, only the mind is “infinite” (it has “no sense” to speak of ‘finite’ minds) (W 10, p. 36 – Enzyklopädie, § 386 Z). I think that “mind” in Hegel denotes thinking and the products of thought. And it seems to me that thinking is “infinite” in the sense that it consists in putting other things in relation to each other. Now, this new concept is, at the same time, the concept of ‘non being relative to something else’. If we look at our language, Hegel says, we will find this concept to be rendered by the expression “per se” (für sich) (W 5, p. 175; GW 21, p. 145).¹⁸ Thus, ‘being per se’ plays here the same role that ‘becoming’ played at the beginning of the Logic: it is the new category to which the diallel of the first two concepts has led us. It is here that the trope of infinite progress explicitly emerges. On this occasion, we have learned something about the controversial issue concerning what it is that Hegel means by ‘contradiction’: it is the result of ‘opposition’ (if we read the passage of the Logic devoted to this topic, we will certainly come to the same conclusion). Contradiction consists in taking terms which are defined in opposition to each other, as being independent of each other. The sceptical mode of opposition plays

18 This German expression is usually translated in English by “for itself”.

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thus a major role in Hegel, as well as in Sextus, even if, at least in the Logic, it refers to concepts, not to the disagreement between theories, as it often does in Sextus. Similar remarks could be made about the remaining ‘new trope’, namely presupposition. We can say that Hegel’s standard criticism of concepts which are similar to the concept of ‘essence’ is that we presuppose them as explanations of ‘appearances’ without acknowledging that we would not posit them if there were no appearances to be explained, i.e. that their existence depends on appearances, whereas it is appearances that should depend on them. This argument is exposed separately, under the title of Reflection, in the Doctrine of Essence, the part of the Logic devoted to criticising that sort of categories. Dieter Henrich has pointed out the great methodological relevance of this conceptual tool for the Hegelian Logic (cf. Henrich 1978). There are many other passages in the Logic that we could have analysed from the point of view that is of interest to us here. Especially those on ‘Whole and parts’ and ‘Causality’ are strikingly similar to passages where Sextus discusses the same issues. But it’s better to turn now to what Hegel himself says about his logical “method”.

4 Scepticism and the Hegelian method The purpose of the ‘Absolute Idea’, which is the conclusion of Hegel’s Logic, is to display the “method” followed in the book. The book consists in “logic and dialectic in the sense of the observation of the determinations of thought in se and per se”. The Logic does not presuppose that things are “subjects”, i.e. substrates to which determinations of thought would belong “in the form of predicates, properties”. Contradictions that occur do not concern, therefore, opposite predicates attributed to one and the same subject (W 6, p. 560; GW 12, p. 244), as is the case in Aristotle’s most discussed formulation of the principle of contradiction (Metaphysics, 1005b 19–20). It is determinations of thought as such that lead to contradictions. Every “opposition”, says Hegel, like “finite and infinite” or “singular and universal”, leads to a “synthesis”, and the “subject, on which [the two opposites] appear”, is just this “synthesis”, which is the “product” of the “concept” of the opposition (W 6, p. 560; GW 12, p. 244). Let’s paraphrase this by saying that the conceptual framework for each opposition of determinate terms cannot be something we presuppose. Thus, it cannot be a ‘being’ pertaining to each of the opposite terms, nor an ‘essence’ that is supposed to express itself in these opposites (these being apparently the two stances criticised in the Doctrine of Being and the Doctrine of Essence respectively, i.e. in

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the two divisions of the critical part of the Logic) (cf. W 5, p. 58; GW 21, p. 45). The conceptual framework of opposites, i.e. their concept, is something we have to posit, if we don’t want these oppositions to be contradictory, i.e. if we want them to have a meaning. But, in a sense, it is not “we” who do this positing. The framework of two opposed terms may be seen as their own “product”, because it is precisely what their own meaning calls for. For Hegel, the “method” consisting in examining determinations of thought is what Diogenes Laertius attributes to Plato, namely “dialectic”. Plato’s position, according to Hegel, is that “knowing” consists in “observing things in se and per se”. To know things, on this account, is to “bring into consciousness” whatever is “immanent in them” (W 6, p. 557; GW 12, pp. 241–2). But, on Hegel’s account, what Plato views as being immanent in things are “concepts”.¹⁹ Hegel now goes on to explain that there is an objective and a subjective use of this method, while he will propose a third use. Plato’s dialectic found contradictions in “representations and concepts of his time” and also in “pure categories and determinations of reflection” (i.e. in the Parmenides), whereas the Eleatics found contradictions in “movement”, and the Sceptics in “the immediate so–called facts of consciousness and maxims of common life” as well as in “scientific concepts”. The usual outcome of dialectic, Hegel continues, is that things which have been found guilty of contradiction are declared non–existent (W 6, p. 558; GW 12, pp. 242–3).²⁰ This is the point on which we know he disagrees with the Sceptics and with the “sceptical” Plato. Now he is going to explain why. There are usually two parties that are found guilty in perpetrating a contradiction, namely either the object or the subject, in what can be called the ‘objective’ and the ‘subjective’ use of dialectic respectively. For Hegel, both accusations are wrong. It is neither the object nor the subject but the “determinations of thought in se and per se” that are guilty. And this explains why the outcome of dialectic is neither that the object doesn’t exist, nor that knowledge doesn’t exist (W 6, p. 558; GW 12, p. 243). What Hegel seems to be saying is that, since an object does not exist apart from its determinations, and since the determinations of the object are what our thought finds in it, a contradiction occurring between these determinations is the work of the determinations themselves, not of the object, or of our applying such determinations to objects in order to acquire knowledge of them. Since both the object and the subject do not exist apart from each other as two self–sufficient 19 “Platonic ideas” are not some kind of “existent things” belonging to “another world”: “the platonic idea is nothing but [. . . ] the concept of the object” (W 5, p. 44; GW 21, p. 34). 20 We know that Sextus reiterates the Eleatic objections against movement (PH, III, 63 sqq.; AM, X, chap. II, especially 46, 131, 139).

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terms, determinations of thought are not “predicates” or “properties” either of the object or of the subject, “consequently this is not the fault either of object or of knowledge, if [determinations of thought] appear to be dialectical”. They are contradictory solely “in virtue of their constitution and by being externally brought into relation” to each other (W 6, p. 560; GW 12, p. 244). But if this is so, then objects have again the right to ‘exist’, and so does knowledge, for the contradiction can now be solved. We don’t have to destroy our determinations of thought, we need to reconstruct them instead, so that they can acquire a meaning which is valid and hence be guilty of non–sense no more. According to Hegel, if we accuse the object of being contradictory, we follow the Eleatics, who asserted the non–existence of movement. If we accuse the subject, two options are at hand: either we may think that dialectics is an art aiming at producing contradictions, which can be avoided through a sound discipline of thought (W 6, pp. 558–9; GW 12, pp. 243). Hegel has probably in mind Aristotle’s Organon here, but also the majority of philosophers up to his own time. Or accuse knowledge as such of being contradictory and, thus, non–existent. Scepticism and Kantianism belong, according to Hegel, to this type of philosophy (W 6, p. 559; GW 12, p. 243). To put it otherwise, when we face a contradiction we can turn the modus tollens either against the object or against the subject, and then against the sophisms of the subject or against the subject’s ability to acquire knowledge of things in themselves. But, for Hegel, all these interpretations of the situation we find ourselves in are wrong. The solution is at hand if we are willing to criticize our concepts, because we can get rid of the difficulties by reconstructing these concepts. I think that the method for achieving this is what Hegel sees as the method belonging specifically to philosophy, a method philosophy “had not found until now”, as he quite modestly writes (W 5, p. 48; GW 21, p. 37). This method, however, is not completely new. We may say it is the sceptical method in the systematic sense of the word, the one we find in the Parmenides and in ancient Scepticism, with one addition: its outcome is not thought of as ‘nothing’, but as the “determinate negation” of the determinate concepts that are guilty of contradiction (W 3, p. 74; GW 9, p. 57. W 5, p. 49; GW 21, p. 38). Sextus claims that what the sceptics say is not true, because their sentences “are suppressed by themselves”.²¹ Destruction must thus be destroyed. I believe that it is from this point of view that Hegel can rightly present his own philosophy as a “self–fulfilling scepticism”. When Hegel refuses the negative conclusions of

21 PH, I, 206 (ὑφ’ ἑαυτῶν αὐτὰς ἀναιρεῖσθαι, sich selbst [. . . ] aufheben, in Hegel’s translation, W 2, 232; GW 4, 209). Cf. PH, I, 15, II, 188; AM, VIII, 480.

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scepticism, he may be entitled to claim to do to scepticism what scepticism is asking for. But let me try to be more specific.

5 Scepticism, meaning, and the constitution of Hegel’s philosophy Hegel says that the sceptical principle according to which ‘to every logos an equal logos is opposed’ means that a proposition which we “assert” without “also asserting” its “contradictory opposite” is a “false” proposition (W 2, p. 230; GW 4, p. 208). What does this mean? Is it false to say that it rains, without saying that it is not raining as well? I do not think this is what Hegel has in mind. What seems to be at stake here is the possibility of saying the opposite, not whether the opposite may be true or not. It would be ‘false’, in the sense of non–sensical, to say ‘it rains’, if it were impossible to assert the opposite. When Hegel presents the ‘shape of consciousness’ which corresponds to “scepticism” in the Phenomenology, he compares sceptics to quarrelling young people, who do not mind being in contradiction with themselves, as long as they do not agree with each other (W 3, pp. 162–3; GW 9, p. 121). This indeed seems to make clear that scepticism, for Hegel, is not about proving opposite propositions, but rather about asserting opposite propositions. Scepticism exposes “the dialectic of all that is determinate”, not because it claims that, if someone proves that ‘S is P’ is true, then we should prove that ‘S is not P’ is true as well, but rather because it claims that, if ‘S is P’ can be asserted, then ‘S is not P’ can be asserted as well. What Sextus says allows such an interpretation: “When we say ‘To every argument (λόγος) an equal argument is opposed’, the word argument we use not in its simple sense, but of that which establishes a point dogmatically [. . . ] by any method, and not necessarily by means of premises and a conclusion” (PH, I, 202).²² If this is so, Hegel may be right in thinking that Ancient Scepticism proposes a method for the examination of concepts, which does not necessarily lead to the dismissal of knowledge altogether, even if, by (wrongly) dismissing all concepts, Ancient Scepticism (wrongly) denies us the very possibility of knowledge. Were we not able to say that it isn’t raining, the proposition ‘it rains’ would have no meaning, and, like everything that has no meaning, it could not be true (or false) either. If we want to prove that ‘S is P’, we need not also prove that ‘S is not P’, but we do have to know what ‘being P’ is, and this implies that we can see

22 Translation R. G. Bury (1933–49, Vol. I, p. 202).

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what ‘not being P’ amounts to. ‘S is P’ would have no reference, if we did not know what the meaning of ‘P’ is, and we would not know what this meaning is, if we did not know what its opposite is. To be aware of this, is to know that a meaning has to be reconstructed by taking its opposite into account. It is because it is aware of this that Scepticism seems to be so important for Hegel. In the first book published under his name, Hegel distinguishes philosophical systems along the above lines. A “materialist” should not build his system on the basis of ‘matter’ in the sense that this term has when it is opposed to “life”, i.e. “inert matter”. An “idealist” is not allowed to elect the ‘I’ as the principle of his philosophy in the sense that this term has when opposed to things, i.e. “empirical consciousness”. Otherwise, they take something “finite”, a relative term, for being “absolute”. But to take “something that exists only inside an opposition” for something “absolute” is Hegel’s definition of “dogmatism” (W 2, pp. 33, 47; GW 4, pp. 22, 31). Hegel doesn’t discuss here the issue whether materialism or idealism are true or false, he examines under which conditions such philosophical constructions make sense. Dogmatism may be materialistic or idealistic, but it is not false because it is a materialism or an idealism, it is false because it is a dogmatism, i.e. because it is not aware of the fact that a relative concept cannot be used as something non–relative. Dogmatism is false in the sense that it is non– sensical. Scepticism is ‘aware’ of what ‘categories’ are, thus it doesn’t make that mistake. In his article on Scepticism, Hegel approves Sextus for distinguishing Academic philosophy from both dogmatism and scepticism (W 2, p. 230; GW 4, p. 209. Cf. PH, I, 3). He further says that the “rational” has “no opposite”, because it is not one of two opposites, but their “relation” itself (W 2, pp. 246–7; GW 4, p. 220). I think he is pointing here towards a philosophy to come (he hasn’t yet found his own system when he writes this) that could be called ‘rational’, because it would not be non–sensical, in the way dogmatism is, and because it would be more than just a denunciation of non–sense, which is what scepticism amounts to. This philosophy would be ‘rational’ in the sense that it would conceive of concepts as relations of opposites. This, as I have suggested, is not a bad description of the philosophy Hegel has produced thereafter. If dogmatism amounts to arbitrarily choosing one opposite and taking it as a principle, what we learn from the sceptical criticism of dogmatism is that it is non–sensical to choose any one of two opposites. On this account, our principle cannot be any one of the concepts at our disposal, if it is true that all of them are determinate and must, therefore, submit to the fact that they have a meaning only by being different from the others: they have to submit to “the dialectic of all that is determinate”. The only possible principle is, hence, the “dialectic of all that is

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determinate” itself. Hegel’s ‘Absolute idea’ is not a principle such as ‘matter’ or the ‘I’, it is a method. If this is so, then Hegel’s use of sceptical modes of thinking has greatly helped him in constituting his own philosophy. It has brought him to the idea that philosophy is not about the correspondence of our thoughts with the world, but rather about the non–non–sensical reconstruction of our concepts, what he calls the correspondence of our concepts “to themselves”. This is not, however, a traditional definition of philosophy. After Kant, an important part of philosophy does not aim at saying the truth about the world any more. It rather focuses on epistemological and semantical issues. I believe that Hegelian philosophy embodies the beginning of this new tendency more than the end of the old one.

6 Epistemological and/or logical scepticism Karl Rosenkranz, Hegel’s pupil and first biographer, wrote that Hegel in his thirties studied especially Plato and Sextus (Rosenkranz 1998, pp. 100, 165). While Hegel’s readers have always been well aware of his debt to Plato, his debt to Sextus has been underestimated for a long time. This is puzzling because, as Hartmut Buchner noticed in 1990, Hegel’s early texts refer to scepticism, not to ‘dialectic’ (Buchner 1990, p. 232). This situation has changed. In 1989, Michael Forster tried to show that Hegel intends to immunise philosophy against sceptical attacks by analysing his various relations with scepticism in the historical and systematical sense (Forster 1989, pp. 2 sqq., 99 sqq., 120 sqq., 133 sqq., 180). In 1999, Klaus Vieweg provided evidence showing that Hegel participates in a vivid discussion on scepticism that took place in late 18th century German philosophy (Vieweg 1999; cf. Vieweg 2007). Following these groundbreaking works, many scholars have investigated further into Hegel’s relation to scepticism. But most of these scholars focus on epistemology, not on the importance of scepticism for Hegel’s view on the nature of concepts. In 2007, Dietmar Heidemann (2007) reactualized Hegel’s idea that we can claim to know the truth only by integrating scepticism into philosophical argumentation. In 2008, Bertrand Quentin (2008) claimed that a positive view of scepticism, such as Hegel’s, liberates us from a deterministic view of the world. In 2012, Ioannis Trisokkas (2012) claimed that Hegel’s theory of judgement protects us from sceptical objections. These works, and others published in the last twenty years, corroborate in different ways the idea that by taking sceptical objections into account, Hegel can claim to have reached a better understanding of knowledge. As far as I can see, they do not think that Hegel’s debt to scepticism concerns his theory of meaning as

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much as his theory of knowledge. What I have been suggesting is that Hegel owes a lot to the logical or semantical aspect of sceptical argumentation, even more so than to sceptical epistemological arguments. On this account, Gerhard Hofweber’s 2006 study is an exception, in that it suggests (cf. Hofweber 2006, pp. 89–90) that Hegel borrows from Sextus certain modes of conceptual reconstruction. Hegel wants to integrate scepticism in philosophy, and he affirms that scepticism is “implicitly” present in every philosophy (W 2, p. 229; GW 4, p. 208. W 19, p. 372). One might say that Kant already integrates scepticism in philosophy, since he thinks that we have no knowledge of things in themselves. This is surely not Hegel’s way. Might we say it is the idea of immunising knowledge against scepticism that is present in every philosophy? I think that what Hegel has in mind is a more positive integration of scepticism. I have tried to show that Hegel in his philosophy integrates in a positive way the logical aspect of scepticism, i.e. its “awareness of categories”, that is its critique of concepts. Moreover, I mean to suggest that, according to Hegel, it is this aspect of scepticism which is implicitly present in every philosophy. For Hegel, “doubt” is not the right term for characterising Ancient Scepticism (W 19, pp. 362, 371. Cf. W 2, p. 224). He does know, of course, that both Scepticisms, Ancient and Modern, raise doubts about knowledge. He is aware of the fact that Ancient Scepticism raises more doubts about knowledge than does its modern counterpart, for it claims that we should refrain from giving our assent not only to theoretical but to sensible knowledge as well (W 8, p. 112 – Enzyklopädie, § 39 A, about Hume). And since, for Hegel, true philosophical thought never takes sensible data at face–value, this difference already means that Ancient Scepticism is more philosophical than Modern (cf. W 2, pp. 222 sqq; GW 4, pp. 203 sqq., about Schulze. W 19, p. 373). Nonetheless, I think that, for Hegel, Ancient is “superior” to Modern Scepticism, not because it raises doubts about more things, but because its method enables it to raise a certain kind of doubts. What Ancient Scepticism has and Modern has not, is what Hegel calls the “dialectic of all that is determinate”, a method of criticizing concepts in se. This, I think, is what Hegel considers to be implicitly present in every philosophy, even if philosophers are not aware of it. For Hegel, every important new philosophy relativises the concept that the previous one put forward as a general principle (Hegel 1959, pp. 118 sqq.). This shows that the critique of concepts is never absent from philosophy. After all, not every philosophy is primarily concerned with attacking knowledge, or, on the contrary, defending knowledge against doubt, whereas to find that what people and/or other philosophers say is non–sensical is a rather essential feature of every philosophy that we know of.

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Bibliographie 1 Abbreviations AM: Adversus Mathematicos, libri I–XI: Books I–VI: Sextus Empiricus (1949): Against the Professors. Vol. IV. Transl. by Bury, Robert Gregg. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge (Massachusetts)–London: Harvard University Press; books VII–VIII: Sextus Empiricus (1935): Against the Logicians. Vol. II. Transl. by Bury, Robert Gregg. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge (Massachusetts)–London: Harvard University Press; book IX–XI: Sextus Empiricus (1949): Against the Physicists. Against the Ethicists. Vol. III. Transl. by Bury, Robert Gregg. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge (Massachusetts)–London: Harvard University Press. DL: Diogenes Laertius (1925): Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Vol. I (books I–V), vol. II (books VI–X). Transl. by Hicks, Robert Drew. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge (Massachusetts)– London: Harvard University Press. GW: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1968 sqq.): Gesammelte Werke. In Verbindung mit der Deutschen Forschungs–gemeinschaft. Ed. by the Nordrhein–Westfälischen (1968–1995: Rheinisch–Westfälischen) Akademie der Wissenschaft. Hamburg: Meiner. Metaphysics: Aristotelis (1957): Metaphysica. Jaeger, Werner (Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. MEW: Marx, Karl/ Engels, Friedrich (1961–1966). Werke. Ed. by the Institut für Marxismus– Leninismus beim ZK der SED. Berlin: Dietz Verlag. PH: Pyrrhonian Hypotyposes: Sextus Empiricus (1933): Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Vol. I. Transl. by Bury, Robert Gregg. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge (Massachusetts)–London: Harvard University Press. W: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1969–1971): Theorie–Werkausgabe – Werke in zwanzig Bänden auf der Grundlage der Werke von 1832–1845, neu edierte Ausgabe. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Eds.). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

2 Other bibliography Brunschwig, Jacques (1997): “Le scepticisme et ses variétés”. In: Canto–Sperber, Monique (Ed.): Philosophie Grecque, Paris: PUF. Buchner, Hartmut (1990): “Skeptizismus und Dialektik”. In: Riedel, Manfred (Ed.): Hegel und die antike Dialektik. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, pp. 227–243. Bury, Robert Gregg (Ed.) (1933–49): Sextus Empiricus, I–IV. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge (Mass.), London: Harvard University Press. Doz, André (1987): La logique de Hegel et les problèmes traditionnels de l’ontologie. Paris: Vrin. Dumont, Jean–Paul (1985): Le scepticisme et le phénomène. Paris: Vrin. Faraklas, Georges (1998): “Hegel’s Epistemology”. In: Neusis 7, pp. 159–171. Repr. in: Faraklas, G. (2001): “Auto to pragma”. Athens: Nissos, pp. 37–54 (in Greek). Faraklas, Georges (2000a): “Donation mutuelle de sens et raisonnement par l’absurde”. In : Dagognet, François/Osmo, Pierre (Eds.): Autour de Hegel. Paris: Vrin, pp. 117–38.

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Faraklas, Georges (2000b): Epistemology and Method in Hegel, Athens: Hestia (in Greek). Faraklas, Georges (2004): “La théorie hégélienne de la connaissance. Une reconstruction”. In: Hegel–Jahrbuch 2004, pp. 215–9. Forster, Michael (1989): Hegel and Skepticism. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press. Hartmann, Klaus (1976): “Die ontologische Option”. In: Hartmann, Klaus (Ed.), Die ontologische Option. Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, pp. 1–30. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1959): Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie. Hambourg: Meiner. Heidemann, Dietmar Hermann (2007): Der Begriff des Skeptizismus. Seine systematischen Formen, die pyrrhonische Skepsis und Hegels Herausforderung. Berlin, New York: de Gruyter. Henrich, Dieter (1978): “Hegels Logik der Reflexion. Neue Fassung”. In: Henrich, Dieter (Ed.): Die Wissenschaft der Logik und die Logik der Reflexion. Hegel–Tage, Chantilli 1971. Hegel– Studien, Beiheft 18. Bonn: Bouvier, pp. 203–324. Hofweber, Gerhard (2006): Skeptizismus als “die erste Stuffe zur Philosophie” beim Jenaer Hegel. Heidelberg: Winter Lebrun, Gérard (1972): La patience du concept. Paris: Gallimard. Phalén, Adolf (1912): Das Erkenntnisproblem in Hegels Philosophie, Upsala: Akademie Buchdruckerei. Quentin, Bertrand (2008): Hegel et le scepticisme. Paris: L’Harmattan. Renault, Emmanuel (2001): La naturalisation de la dialectique. Paris: Vrin. Rockmore, Tom (1986): Hegel’s Circular Epistemology, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Rosenkranz, Karl (1998): G.W.F. Hegels Leben. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Schmitz, Hermann (1957): Hegel als Denker der Individualität. Meisenheim: Hain. Schmitz, Hermann (2007): Hegels Logik. Bonn: Bouvier. Schulze, Gottlob Ernst (1801): Kritik der theoretischen Philosophie. Vol. 1. Hamburg: Bohm. Schulze, Gottlob Ernst (1911): Aenesidemus. Berlin: Reuther–Reichard. Stäudlin, Carl Friedrich (1794): Geschichte und Geist des Skeptizismus. Vol. 1. Leipzig: Crusius. Trisokkas, Ioannis (2012): Pyrrhonian Scepticism and Hegel’s Theory of Judgement. Leiden, Boston: Brill. Vieweg, Klaus (1999): Philosophie des Remis. Der junge Hegel und das ‚Gespenst des Skeptizismus‘. Munich: Fink. Vieweg, Klaus (2007): Skepsis und Freiheit. Munich: Fink. Westphal, Kenneth (1989): Hegel’s Epistemological Realism, Dordrecht, Boston & London: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Zeller, Eduard (1963): Die Philosophie der Griechen. Vol. 3.2. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

Anna Tigani

The Conception of Philosophizing Pyrrhonian Skepticism and Hegel¹ Abstract: Hegel’s interpretation of ancient skepticism contains philosophical insights which can lead to an important breakthrough in our understanding of Pyrrhonian skepticism. Current interpretations of Pyrrhonian skepticism, because of a biased conception of philosophy as a positive enterprise, are blind to the Skeptical conception of philosophizing. Hegel’s approach, by contrast, accurately captures and effectively brings to the surface the conception of Skepticism and the conception of philosophy – as well as the relationship between them – which Sextus attempts to outline. According to Hegel, the “noblest side” of Pyrrhonism is its orientation against the dogmatism of ordinary life; it is this orientation which is represented by the Ten Modes of suspension of judgment and which makes Skepticism identical with true philosophy. Although Hegel is historically unjustified when he postulates an original historical phase of Pyrrhonism in which Pyrrhonism used the Ten Modes solely against the certainties and the dogmatism of ordinary life, his account is philosophically and exegetically legitimate. The Hegelian interpretation follows Sextus’ attempt to prove that Skepticism is philosophy and original philosophy is a kind of skepticism and thus to defend Skepticism as the best form of philosophy, exactly because it is devoted to the original aporetic or ephectic way of philosophizing. Michael Forster, in the introduction to his pioneering work Hegel and Skepticism, put forward two innovative ideas: first, that “Hegel’s interpretation of the skeptical tradition in philosophy and his reaction to this tradition are absolutely fundamental to his philosophical outlook” and, second, that “Hegel’s reflections on the nature of the skeptical tradition have considerable intrinsic merit, containing original insights from which contemporary historians of philosophy and philosophers concerned with skepticism can profit” (Forster 1989, p. 1). Since then, an increasing interest in Hegel’s interpretation of skepticism has yielded important insights into 1 I wish to thank Georges Faraklas and Jannis Kozatsas for drawing my attention to Hegel’s work on skepticism and Katerina Ierodiakonou for her critical comments and helpful advice on the first draft of this paper. I would also like to thank Sophy Downes for her sensitive linguistic editing. Anna Tigani, Dr. Anna Tigani, Department of Philosophy and History of Science, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. DOI 10.1515/9783110528138-004

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his philosophy and has proved Forster’s first idea to be especially fruitful. But the same cannot be said about his second idea. Scholarship on skepticism, and on ancient skepticism in particular, still ignores Hegel’s work on skepticism.² In the present paper, inspired by this idea, I will attempt to show that in Hegel’s interpretation of ancient skepticism we can find philosophical insights which will lead to an important breakthrough in our understanding of Pyrrhonian skepticism. I will focus on an article of Hegel from the Jena period (1800–1806), published in the Critical Journal of Philosophy (in 1802) with the title “On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy, Exposition of its Different Modifications and Comparison of the Latest Form with the Ancient One”.³ In this article Hegel attacks the skepticism of Gottlob Ernst Schulze, which he calls “the most recent” skepticism, and argues for the superiority of the Pyrrhonian skepticism of antiquity. Hegel’s knowledge of Pyrrhonian skepticism is based mainly on Sextus Empiricus, and also partly on Diogenes Laertius, as becomes clear from his references to Sextus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism (PH) and Against the Dogmatists (M, VII–XI) and Diogenes’ account of Pyrrhonian skepticism (in DL, IQ 61–116) and his citations from the same works (which in several cases include the ancient Greek terms). Thus, Hegel’s interpretation of Pyrrhonian skepticism is based on the two main sources which scholars still use today to understand Pyrrhonian skepticism. Hegel’s main concern in this work, as the title suggests, is to analyze the relationship of skepticism to philosophy. He emphatically underlines, in his introductory paragraphs, that a cognition of skepticism itself arises from the explanation of the relationship of skepticism to philosophy (Relationship, p. 314), and it is this explanation that in Hegel’s comparison of Schulze’s “most recent” skepticism with ancient skepticism proves the former to be “un–philosophy” and the latter to be genuine philosophy, thereby proving the superiority of ancient skepticism over the new skepticism. At the core of Hegel’s approach is the following thesis: [W]ithout the determination of the true relationship of skepticism to philosophy, and without the insight that skepticism itself is in its inmost heart at one with every true philosophy, and hence that there is a philosophy which is neither skepticism nor dogmatism, and is thus both at once, without this, all the histories, and reports, and new editions of skepticism lead to a dead end. This sine qua non for the cognition of skepticism, this relationship of skepticism to philosophy, not to some dogmatism or other, this recognition of a philosophy that is not a dogmatism, in fine, therefore, the concept of a philosophy as such, this it is that has escaped Mr. Sch[ulze] (Relationship, pp. 322–323).

2 Dudley notices this fact and suggests an explanation (Dudley 2003, p. 88). 3 References are to the translation by H.S. Harris in Giovanni/Harris 2000, pp. 311–362.

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I will attempt to show that in this thesis Hegel foresees a crucial stumbling block in the Pyrrhonian scholarship of our time – i.e. he foresees our difficulty in understanding how Pyrrhonism can itself be a philosophy. At the same time, Hegel, criticising Schulze, identifies the source of this difficulty – common to Schulze and ourselves – which is our inability to conceive philosophy as something that might not be “some dogmatism or other”. Sextus devotes the first book of PH to the attempt to clarify the status of Pyrrhonian skepticism. In the very first paragraphs he presents Pyrrhonian skepticism as one of the three main forms of philosophy, different from positive and negative dogmatism, and the only one properly devoted to philosophical investigation – the only one that does not betray philosophy (PH, I 1–4). But, it is exactly this that seems to be very difficult for us to understand and that has often been thought dubious. For example, Barnes remarks, in passing: “Whatever Sextus may say, the Pyrrhonists did not – in any normal sense – prosecute philosophical and scientific researches” (Barnes 1990, p. 11).⁴ The difficulty is even more apparent in the way many outstanding scholars, contrary to Sextus’ declaration, are ready to doubt that Pyrrhonian skepticism can actually be a philosophy, let alone the only philosophy devoted to philosophical investigation. Striker, for example, writes about Pyrrhonian skepticism: Is it also a kind of philosophy? Yes and no, I think. If by philosophy we mean a search for truth, successful or otherwise, the Sceptical way of life can hardly qualify. Contrary to Sextus’ initial claim that the Sceptic goes on investigating, philosophical investigations seem to be precisely what the Sceptic’s way of life is designed to avoid (Striker 2001, p. 121).

Moreover, she concludes the presentation of Sextus’ account of Pyrrhonian skepticism with the remark: “If this is what was meant by Scepticism as a kind of philosophy, then it is a philosophy in a peculiar sense [. . . ]. But why would anyone wish to describe this as a continuation of the ordinary philosopher’s search for truth?” (Striker 2001, p. 124). Striker, here, adopts an interpretation that is clearly in contradiction to Sextus’ pivotal claim that Pyrrhonian skepticism is true philosophy. Thus, she practically adopts the rather uncommon attitude of not taking seriously what “one of the

4 The same view is echoed in Bett’s remark: “But in Sextus’ official introductory characterization of scepticism (PH, 1.8), it is the process of inducing suspension of judgement (together with the further effect of ataraxia) that is emphasized, not ‘inquiry’ in any normal sense of the term” (emphasis added), (Bett 2010, p. 3).

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most important ancient philosophers”⁵ (as Sextus has been characterized) writes about his own philosophy.⁶ Even more strikingly, other scholars have maintained explicitly that we should not take seriously what Sextus writes about Pyrrhonism.⁷ All these examples indicate how exceptionally difficult it is to understand the claim – central to Pyrrhonism – that Pyrrhonism is a form of true philosophy, devoted to philosophical investigation. Now, it seems to me that in Hegel’s critical comparison, which proves Schultze’s skepticism to be dogmatism and for this reason to be “un–philosophy” and at the same time acknowledges Pyrrhonian skepticism as a vital moment of philosophy, we can clearly see what we fail to realize in our approach to Sextus. Namely, we can see that when we claim, for example, that Sextus’ Pyrrhonism cannot be philosophical investigation in any normal sense of the word, we put forward a value judgment which presupposes a conception of what philosophy is and what deserves or does not deserve to be called philosophy. Realizing this is a precondition for carrying out the exegetical task of understanding what Sextus says about Pyrrhonism. Moreover any interpretation of what Sextus is saying needs to take into account what Sextus is doing. In what follows, I will argue that what Sextus is attempting to do is to alter the common preconception of philosophy, a preconception that was formed by Sextus’ opponents – i.e. by the Dogmatists. Without such an alteration Pyrrhonism was doomed to fall short of philosophy, and Pyrrhonists would have been forced to concede that their Pyrrhonism was just a parasitic activity which lived on the development of Dogmatism.⁸ However, despite Sextus’ efforts, the “happy destiny”, to use Hegel’s term (Relationship, p. 315), that gave universal acceptance to the Dogmatic preconception of philosophy, provided for Pyrrhonism a crucial obstacle to our understanding of this form of philosophy. Now, it is time to turn to the texts. I will follow Hegel’s critical comparison between ancient Skepticism and Schulze’s skepticism and examine the two main

5 Annas and Barnes write in the very first lines of the “Introduction” to their 1994 translation of Sextus’ Outlines: “Scepticism is one of the high points of Greek philosophy, and Sextus Empiricus is one of the most important ancient philosophers”, (Annas/Barnes 1994, p. ix). 6 The attitude that we normally expect from a scholar of ancient philosophy is described in the following remark: “Naturally enough, historians of philosophy try to take the philosophers of the past seriously as philosophers and hence go as far as they possibly can to explain their thought in terms of purely philosophical considerations” (Frede 1987, p. xvi). 7 For example, Glidden denies that Sextus is a philosopher when he characterizes him an “artful dodger”, and he concludes: “We should not deny Sextus his right to speak at all, but we are free to decide whether to take him seriously” (Glidden 1983, p. 243). 8 See for example, the characterizations we find in Sluiter (2000, p. 95): “[T]he sceptic’s parasitic relationship with the non–sceptic world” and “All sceptic discourse is parasitic on dogmatic arguments. . . ” (emphasis added).

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Hegelian claims about ancient skepticism through a close reading of Sextus’ relevant texts. I will thus delineate some aspects of Hegel’s thesis on the relationship of ancient skepticism to philosophy and the corresponding aspects of Sextus’ attempt to establish this relationship in a way that proves Skepticism to be philosophy and original philosophy to be a kind of skepticism.

1 The Skeptics and the division of philosophy into parts. Hegel’s first point of comparison is to underline that Schulze “excludes ethics and aesthetics from his skeptical elaboration of philosophy, and limits himself to the theory of knowledge” (Relationship, p. 316) while, at the same time, maintaining this tripartite division of philosophy in his own arguments, based on empirical psychology. On the contrary Sextus, as Hegel notes, “does not make the division himself but takes it over as he finds it, and attacks it skeptically” (Relationship, p. 317). Hegel is accurate here. Sextus, directly before developing the Pyrrhonian attack on Dogmatic philosophy, presents the different Dogmatic divisions of philosophy into one, two, or three parts (M, VII 2–23) and decides (M, VII 24) to follow the tripartite division. In this context, Sextus makes clear that although in their attack the Pyrrhonians follow the tripartite division, they do not espouse it; indeed, they do not even have an opinion on the matter (PH, II 13: “we follow them without holding any opinion on the matter”). Sextus’ point here is not just that the Skeptics do not want to be committed to dividing philosophy into a certain number of parts. The Skeptics have a deeper disagreement with the Dogmatic philosophers’ division of philosophy into parts, and this is something that becomes clear in the first book of the Outlines. There, Sextus gives his own account of Skeptical philosophy, following a standard model of presentation common in expositions of philosophical schools in Sextus’ era.⁹ Thus, he presents Skeptical philosophy as having aims, origins, and principles,

9 Frede has drawn attention to the similarities between the first book of the Outlines and Ps.– Galen’s De historia philosophica, and he has proposed that both Ps.–Galen and Sextus rely or model their accounts on similar introductions to philosophy (Frede 2008, pp. 140–141). Such introductions must have also included an introductory chapter on the parts of philosophy. Ps.– Galen has such a chapter (6.1–6.14). It would be reasonable to expect that Sextus would have a corresponding chapter, but in Sextus’ account of Skeptical philosophy we do not find anything of that sort.

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and even a definition and a criterion, like the other philosophical schools; but Sextus does not present Skeptical philosophy as having parts.¹⁰ Even more importantly, in the Outlines Sextus systematically¹¹ uses the phrases τῆς καλουμένης φιλοσοφίας (five times) and τῆς λεγομένης φιλοσοφίας (twice) when speaking from the Skeptical point of view about the parts of philosophy (PH, I 18; II 1, 12, 205; III 1, 167, 278). I will argue that Sextus’ purpose in using these phrases is to distance himself from the standard way of speaking about philosophy, implying that the Skeptics do not take for granted that philosophy really is the whole of positive philosophical knowledge or wisdom, which the Dogmatic philosophers divide into parts. At this point in the argument, we cannot avoid some philological details. The phrase “τὸ καλουμένον X” can simply mean “that which is called X”, but it can also mean “the so–called X”. In Sextus we find both meanings. He uses the phrase with the first meaning when he wants to give information about what something or somebody is called (see PH, I 3 and PH, I 235), or when introducing a highly technical term (see M, X 2; X 261; VI 47; VI 51), or even when mentioning a strange or a funny name (see PH, I 82). None of these can be his usage when discussing the division of philosophy into parts, however. In this case, it is clear that his point in using the phrase is to express reservation about a common way of speaking. The phrase is used in the same sense in two similar cases. The first is in PH, I 61, 62, 74 and 75, where Sextus talks about “the so–called irrational animals”. The context here is the exposition of the first of the Ten Modes. In this exposition, Sextus discusses the conflicting appearances that things have, perceived through the impressions of different kinds of animals. More specifically, in PH, I 60–78 Sextus argues against the superiority of human beings and the inferiority of the rest of the animals, as regards the reliability of their impressions. Echoing the Hellenistic philosophers’ debates on the matter, he chooses the dog as an example and argues, in a playful manner, first, that the Dogmatists agree that dogs excel us in perception and then, following the Stoics, that dogs possess all the different functions of reason and that they are perfect and do not lack reason in any respect.

10 Instead of parts, as the common division of philosophy prescribed, Pyrrhonism has two accounts (λόγους), the general and the specific, which are constitutive of Pyrrhonian Skepticism and are peculiar to this philosophy. The subject matter of the general account is the presentation of Skeptical philosophy and the subject matter of the specific account is an attack on logic, physics, and ethics (PH, I 5). 11 Sextus never does anything similar in M, VII–XI, although there are passages and contexts that correspond to the passages and contexts in which he uses this phrase in PH. If M, VII–XI is really older than PH, as Bett has proposed (1997, p. xxiv–xxviii), then it may have represented a less mature version of Pyrrhonism.

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Therefore, when Sextus uses the phrase “the so–called irrational animals”, he is underlining that in calling all animals other than human beings “irrational” he is following a common manner of speaking about these animals. Nevertheless, we should not infer from Sextus’ use of the phrase either that these animals are really deprived of reason or that he is committed to such a view. Similarly, Sextus uses the phrase “the so–called evident things” in PH, II 95, while discussing the criterion of truth, to underline that when the Skeptics say “the evident things”, they are merely following a common way of speaking and they are not committing to the Dogmatists’ thesis that there are things that are evident. So when Sextus, in PH, systematically uses the phrase “the so–called philosophy” to talk about the parts of philosophy, he is indicating that he is not committed to the view that what the Dogmatic philosophers usually divide into parts really deserves the name of philosophy. It is important here to underline that Sextus has no reservations about referring to Dogmatic philosophy. In the introductory paragraphs of PH, Sextus talks about “Dogmatic philosophy” and “Skeptical philosophy” as two main forms of philosophy; nevertheless, a few paragraphs latter (PH, I 5–6), he again mentions “Skeptical philosophy”, but this time contrasting it with the parts of “the so–called philosophy”, rather than with the parts of “Dogmatic philosophy”. Therefore, Dogmatism and Skepticism seem to share, for Sextus, a common ground which makes them both forms of philosophy, but this common ground is not the supposed philosophical knowledge that the Dogmatists divide into parts. For Sextus, this positive side of Dogmatism may not deserve the name of philosophy at all.¹²

2 Philosophy and Skepticism against the dogmatism of ordinary common sense. I turn now to another central point of Hegel’s critical comparison between ancient skepticism and Schulze’s skepticism: according to Hegel, while Schlulze’s skepticism related to the judgments peculiar to philosophy, ancient skepticism ranged over both common, every day experience and philosophy. Hegel initially bases this thesis concerning ancient skepticism on a historical line of reasoning which purports to show two things. The first is that there was

12 The supposed philosophical knowledge that the Dogmatists divide into parts are what Sextus disparagingly calls δογματικὴν εὑρεσιλογίαν “perverse or sophistical ingenuity”, again in contrast with “Skeptical philosophy”, in his introduction to the Skeptical attack on the three parts of “the so–called philosophy” (PH, II 9).

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an actual original phase in the history of philosophy, traceable back to Plato and beyond that to Homer, in which philosophy was not a dogmatism but was rather a kind of skepticism, in the sense that it was directed against “everything limited” and against every “indubitable certainty”. The second is that there was an original phase in the history of ancient skepticism, a phase which Hegel identifies with Pyrrho, in which skepticism did not fight philosophical systems but was aimed solely against the dogmatism of ordinary common sense. According to this line of thought, philosophy and skepticism, in their original phases, coincided. Thus Hegel constructs a history of ancient skepticism according to which its oldest phase “is wholly identical with the older philosophy” (Relationship, p. 330). In parallel with this line of historical argument, Hegel develops a line of argument based on his interpretation of the skeptical modes of suspension of judgment, and especially on an ingenious, and as I will attempt to show exegetically justified, interpretation of the Ten Modes. He maintains that the polemical aspect of opposition to philosophical systems was absent in these modes, which, according to Hegel, “are simply and solely aimed against the dogmatism of ordinary common sense”. He concludes: “These ten articles, then, to which the old school was confined, are directed, like all philosophy generally, against the dogmatism of ordinary consciousness itself” (Relationship, p. 322). Moreover, this “orientation against the dogmatism of ordinary consciousness” is for Hegel “the noblest side of Skepticism”, which all the forms of ancient skepticism had and which modern skepticism lacks” (Relationship, p. 339). To sum up: according to Hegel’s scheme, there was an original phase of Pyrrhonism, represented by Pyrrho and by the Ten Modes of suspension of judgment, in which Pyrrhonism was solely directed against the dogmatism of ordinary life. This phase, according to the same scheme, was followed by a skepticism characterized by “the polemical aspect of opposition to philosophical systems”, which is exactly what Hegel writes that is absent from the Ten Modes. As he writes, this latter skepticism “typified the skepticism of Aenesidemus” (Relationship, p. 322). Scholars have pointed out that Hegel’s scheme of the history of ancient skepticism is wrong, and that the mistake occurs exactly at the point where he attributes the Ten Modes to Pyrrho,¹³ instead of to Aenesidemus¹⁴. But, although Hegel is his-

13 “Hegel is certainly quite mistaken in thinking that the ten tropes (given both by Diogenes and by Sextus) were elaborated by Pyrrho or his direct disciples” (Harris 2000, p. 260). 14 This has also been criticised as “his worst historical error” (Harris 2000, p. 265). Hegel invokes lack of precise information about Pyrrho and Aenesidemus directly before he commits this historical error. But neither Sextus nor Diogenes Laertious, the sources to which Hegel refers, attribute the Ten Modes to Pyrrho. Sextus, especially, attributes them, in PH, I 36, to the older Skeptics, but he clearly ascribes them to Aenesidemus in M, VII 345. Hegel, in Relationship, pp. 328–329, refers

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torically unjustified when he postulates an original historical phase of Pyrrhonism in which Pyrrhonism was directed solely against the certainties and the dogmatism of ordinary life, I will attempt to show that philosophically and exegetically it is legitimate for him to do this, as the image of Pyrrhonism that Sextus deliberately designs strongly suggests Hegel’s interpretation. Now we need to turn to Sextus, initially to PH, I 12, the chapter on the origins or principles of Pyrrhonism. Sextus refers there to two ἀρχαί (origins or principles) of Skepticism, one causal and one constitutive. He writes: We say that the causal origin (ἀρχή αἰτιώδης) of Skepticism lies in the hope of being free from distress (ἀταρακτήσειν). For the persons of great stature (οἱ μεγαλοφυεῖς) got distressed because of the anomaly in things, and as they were in a quandary (ἀποροῦντες) which of these things one should rather give one’s assent to, they turned to inquiring (ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὸ ζητεῖν) what in things is true and what is false. They did this on the assumption that once they had decided these questions they would be free from distress. But the constitutive principle (συστάσεως ἀρχή) of Skepticism is, more than anything, that to each argument there is countervailing argument. For it is on the basis of this that we seem to end up not being dogmatic.¹⁵

In this passage, the term ἀρχή has two meanings: it denotes origin, in the sense of the starting point in time, and principle, in the sense of a general tenet that someone follows, or the practical rule on the basis of which a certain practice is modelled. This is an ambiguity which Sextus not only is not interested in dissolving but seems to use deliberately to speak of both things simultaneously: the two crucial moments in which Skepticism is shown to have had its origin – namely, the causal and the constitutive ἀρχαί coincide with the discovery of, but also in a way represent, the general principles of the practice that Skepticism follows. Thus, understanding ἀρχαί as starting points in time, Frede notices that, according to this account, some people turned to philosophical investigation and became philosophers, but not Skeptic philosophers yet, since they became Skeptics only after they had reached the constitutive origin of Skepticism. We gather that, at some point, some of the people who had become philosophers became Skeptics and others followed the other forms of philosophy. So, what Sextus describes as the causal origin of Skepticism corresponds to the origin of philosophy in general (Frede 2008, pp. 138–140). In this original stage of philosophizing, these first

to passages of M, VII (i.e. M, VII 310–319) that are a few paragraphs before the one in which Sextus clearly speaks about “the Ten Modes of Aenesidemus.” If Hegel had access to this paragraph – which seems very probable – then it is not because he was misled by lack of historical evidence that he is wrong at this point. 15 Translation in Frede 2008, pp. 137–138.

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philosophers established the activity of philosophizing without yet being either Skeptics or Dogmatists. When Sextus says that this stage causes Skepticism, he does not mean it merely in the trivial sense that the beginning of philosophy could be taken to be the causal origin of every school of philosophy. Rather, he means that this stage is the causal origin of Skepticism because he ascribes to it a way of philosophizing in which was formed a general rule or tenet of philosophizing which he wants to suggest the Skeptics were committed to and the Dogmatists betrayed. Thus, it seems that when Hegel maintains that there is a true philosophy “which is neither skepticism nor dogmatism” (Relationship, p. 323) and there is a skepticism that is “wholly identical with the older philosophy” (Relationship, p. 330), he understands and correctly presents the conception of skepticism, the conception of philosophy, and the relationship between them that Sextus attempts to outline. Next we need to understand how Sextus describes the origin of Skepticism and of philosophy and the mode of philosophizing that corresponds to this origin. Sextus refers to people of extraordinary powers of mind (οἱ μεγαλοφυεῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων)¹⁶ who became disturbed, and he specifies a particular kind of disturbance from which these people suffered, the source of which was the anomaly in things (διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀνωμαλίαν).¹⁷ The term ἀνωμαλία denotes something uneven or irregular, which is for that reason remarkable, something that breaks the normal way in which things go on.¹⁸ In our context the “anomaly in things” seems to be referring to things that happen and break the regularity of life. Sextus speaks about the anomaly in things, and not about some subjective affection, underlining in this way the common or the objective and factual character of the anomaly. But, 16 Frede notes that the term μεγαλοφυής “almost invariably is used in a metaphorical sense of a person of extraordinary powers of mind,” and he assumes “that Sextus uses the term to express approval, praise, or even admiration for those who first turned to philosophy as persons of an extraordinary strength and power of mind” (Frede 2008, pp. 147–148). 17 It is important that Sextus does not speak about disturbance in or with life in general, but about a specific kind of disturbance that has a special cause, the anomaly in things. That life is a place full of disturbance for mortals was a common view in Sextus’ time. Disturbance in and with life was thought to have all sorts of causes. Death, for example – the fear of our death or the death of beloved ones – was thought of as a source of serious disturbance. Sextus himself holds the view that disturbance, as a state of anxiety and fear in life, has other sources as well. For example, we become disturbed because of things that happen to us by necessity and that we can neither choose nor avoid (PH, III 239 and M, XI, 141–144; the same picture occurs in PH, I 27 and 29–30). 18 For example: the ups and downs of a generally smooth surface are called “anomalies,” in astronomy the irregular motion of the stars was called an anomaly, and in grammar words or structures that deviate from the general rule are called anomalous. An anomaly seems to imply something exceptional, something different from what we would normally expect, something that does not fit into the general picture or follow a general rule.

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although the anomaly is in things – i.e. it is there to be seen by all of us and not only by the philosophers or by those who were meant to become philosophers – it seems that we are not, not all of us and not all of us to the same extent, aware of the anomaly. Some people may be more sensitive to it, others less, while still others may be totally unaware of the anomaly, as indeed occurs in regard to other aspects of the world – for example, with cold weather or with music. Different people are differently affected by the anomaly in things, and, as we have seen, it is people with exceptional mental powers who are especially sensitive to the anomaly. Thus, awareness of the anomaly seems to presuppose special abilities – for example, the ability both to concentrate on details and to see the larger context. In addition, to give rise to philosophical investigation and to become a philosopher, you need to react to the anomaly in a special way. Hegel seems to refer to something similar to Sextus’ anomaly when he speaks about the skepticism of common sense that stands side by side with the dogmatism of common sense (Relationship, p. 332). And I could not come up with better examples of how the anomaly works than Hegel’s following remarks: What counts for the race as absolutely One and the same, and as fixed, eternal and everywhere constituted in the same way, time wrenches away from it; most commonly [what does this is] the increasing range of acquaintance with alien peoples under the pressure of natural necessity; as, for example, becoming acquainted with a new continent, had this skeptical effect upon the dogmatic common sense of the Europeans down to that time, and upon their indubitable certainty about a mass of concepts concerning right and truth. (Relationship, p. 333)

It seems that our life, however simple and regular it may be, is at the same time a field into which anomaly finds its way. Different points of view about what is right and what is wrong, what is true and what is false come into conflict in one way or another. For example, different codes within the same society or across civilizations may come into conflict, or things may change in history, causing serious disturbance to human beings who then wonder what to do in specific cases. For example, death always disturbs people, but usually there is no anomaly about it; it is something that normally happens in a regular and natural way. So when something like that happens, we know what to do. We follow the customs of our society and do what our religion dictates should be done; for example, we bury the dead body, and typically it is the relatives who take care of this task. But if an order or a law dictates that something else must be done – for example, that no one may bury someone who betrayed his country – then it seems that we have an anomaly which breaks the regularity of how things happen. A relative of the dead person, let us say the sister, may decide what to do following her emotions and the familiar ethical code. But in the case of those who became the first philosophers, their

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exceptional mental powers not only gave them a special sensitivity to anomaly, but also led them to react in a particular way to the difficult and crucial choices that anomaly may involve. As Sextus writes, anomaly and the disturbance that anomaly causes brought them into a condition of ἀπορία. They were confronted with a conflict or dilemma and, as they were in doubt as to with which side they should agree, they came to inquire (ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὸ ζητεῖν) for themselves into what among things is true and what is false, in order to give or withhold their assent accordingly. They hoped that by deciding this question they would rid themselves of the distress that anomaly was causing to them. The expectation that this was something they could do without help – without, for example, the advice of someone who already knew the answer or of an authority who told the truth – and their choice to trust instead their own minds and their own efforts, are also things not everyone would be capable of doing: it is an achievement that presupposes people of an exceptional nature. Next, we need to understand this original form of philosophical inquiry better. First of all, the very origin of this inquiry determined what the first philosophers were looking for. They were looking for something immune to the kind of anomaly that had disturbed them in the first place, and this special interest opened for them a new perspective in how they saw things, leading them to look for a special kind of truth. When burying deceased relatives, or when looking for one’s keys, no one wonders, “Is it really a good thing to bury my dead relatives?” or, “Is there any possibility that my keys might literally have disappeared?”¹⁹ That it is a good thing to bury one’s dead relatives and that keys do not disappear are viewed as self– evident facts. But we may be led to such questions when an anomaly arises and through the special interest we then acquire in finding something on which we can really rely, something that is really true and justified and so cannot simply comprise one side of a conflict in which two or more claims appear equally convincing. It is this interest in finding something safe from anomaly, something that can be the answer to the anomaly, which leads to a certain way of scrutinizing the things we usually rely on. From this perspective, we cannot ignore the fact that in some civilizations people, rather than burying their dead relatives, eat or burn them; thus what we commonly believe to be a good thing becomes just one side of a conflict, and this conflict is enough to disqualify a common belief of our society from being the truth for which we were looking.

19 Before the anomaly arises, or if we do not see things in the light of the anomaly and have a special interest in finding out the truth in the sense of something immune to the anomaly, the question of truth or falsehood does not arise in the same way in which it arises after we face the anomaly, and in the light of the anomaly.

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Thus, the first philosophers became sensitive to seeing the anomaly in things and revealing the conflict of views inherent in any given state of affairs or any set of received opinions that at first sight might look like a presumptive truth. Failing to see the conflict, or being content with what is less than really true, being content with an answer that is not really safe from anomaly and conflict and therefore cannot really be the answer to the problem that motivated the inquiry is not just a partial failure: it means abandoning the original philosophical investigation. This is exactly what happened, according to Sextus, to the philosophers who at a certain point became Dogmatists. By contrast, Sextus describes Skepticism as a developed ability (δύναμις) to investigate, in which the original, common way of philosophizing persists, gradually evolving into the Skeptics’ “ephectic” approach, which opposes appearances and thoughts in all sorts of ways.²⁰ The modes of suspension of judgment are exactly how this ability works and how the Skeptics carry on their philosophical investigation. This becomes clear in the introduction to the presentation of the modes (PH, I 31–35). There, Sextus describes the general process through which the Skeptics come to suspension of judgment (ἐποχὴ) as “through the opposition of things” (PH, I 3: διὰ τῆς ἀντιθέσεως τῶν πραγμάτων). He refers implicitly back to his definition of Skepticism as an ability to oppose things, and he repeats almost verbatim the description that he has already given there about the types of oppositions that the Skeptical ability sets out.²¹ He also concludes his introduction to the modes by saying that his reason for presenting the modes is to provide a more exact understanding of these oppositions, which clearly are the oppositions that, in the definition of Skepticism, Sextus says the Skeptical ability can set out.²² The way Sextus defines Skepticism and introduces the modes shows that he does not conceive of Skepticism as just an concerted attack on Dogmatic philosophy: the modes of suspension of judgment are not just machinery for attacking dogmatic philosophy, instead they are the modes by which the Skeptics investigate into things. When all these investigations have taken place, what is left for (PH, I 31: περιγίνεται) the Skeptics is suspension of judgment. All the different cases of all

20 PH, I 8: “Scepticism is an ability (δύναμις) to oppose things which appear and are thought of in any way at all, an ability by which because of the equipollence in the opposed things and accounts, we come first to suspension of judgment and afterwards to tranquillity.” 21 In PH, I 9: “ποικίλως ἀντιτίθεμεν ταῦτα, ἢ φαινόμενα φαινομένοις ἢ νοούμενα νοουμένοις ἢ ἐναλλὰξ ἀντιτιθέντες” and in PH, I 31: “ἀντιτίθεμεν δὲ ἢ φαινόμενα φαινομένοις ἢ νοούμενα νοουμένοις ἢ ἐναλλὰξ”. 22 PH, I 35: “In order that we may have a more exact understanding of these oppositions, I will describe the Modes by which suspension of judgment is brought about.”

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the different types of investigation that the modes represent lead to – or, translated more literally, bring together (PH, I 35: συνάγεται) – suspension of judgment. Modern scholars are especially puzzled about the role of the Ten Modes. Sextus clearly gives them a prominent role:²³ they cover half of PH, I – i.e. of the book in which he presents Pyrrhonism. They are also given prominence within the overall exposition of modes: their presentation (PH, I 31–163) is the longest section (PH, I 31–186). On the other hand, apart from their codification, the material in them can also be found in other philosophers:²⁴ for example, “the same tower that appears round from a distance but square from nearby” or, “the honey that appears sweet to some and bitter to others”. Nevertheless, we cannot say that when the Dogmatic philosophers produce such material, they are working as Dogmatic philosophers. It seems rather to belong to what Sextus calls the common materials that all the philosophical schools can use, and even life (βίος) suggests

23 Bailey has maintained the opposite: It seems obvious that although Sextus treats Aenesidemus’ tropes in a respectful manner, Sextus himself is more impressed by the five tropes of suspension supposedly handed down by Agrippa and his followers. Agrippean arguments recur with almost monotonous regularity throughout the Outlines and Against the Dogmatists (see e.g. PH, II 19–20, 91–3, 121–3; III 7–9, 33–6; M, VII 315–16, 427–9; VIII 19–23, 340–3; II 174–8) and no other pattern of argument attains anything like this degree of prominence. Moreover Sextus occasionally states quite openly that Agrippean arguments render his other arguments virtually redundant (PH, I 185–6 and II 21). Thus we can safely assume that Sextus’ own ἐποχή is primarily a product of the influence exerted by the type of reasoning set out in Agrippa’s five modes (Bailey 2002, p. 133). Bailey’s thesis does not seem to me to be so “obvious” or so “safe to assume.” First of all, Sextus never states, openly or otherwise, that the Five Modes render the Ten Modes “virtually redundant.” On the contrary, he explicitly remarks that the recent Skeptics “put them [the five modes] forward not as a way of rejecting the Ten Modes but in order to refute the rashness of the Dogmatists in a more varied way by using both sets together” (PH, I 177). In PH, I 185–186, to which Bailey refers in order to establish his view, Sextus remarks that the Five Modes “may suffice,” not generally and in all the cases of Skeptical arguments, but just “against causal explanations (αἰτιολογίαι);” it is instead the specific modes used particularly against the Dogmatic philosophers’ theories of causation which are presented as being perhaps redundant, since the Five Modes that could be used against Dogmatic theories in general could be employed against the Dogmatic theories of causation as well. In addition, respect for the founder of the school, namely Aenesidemus, is not sufficient on its own to make Sextus devote such a long part of his account of Pyrrhonism – i.e. of the first book of the Outlines – to the Ten Modes, especially since he does not even mention Aenesidemus’ name in his presentation of them. On the contrary, he attributes to Aenesidemus the eight modes against the Dogmatic theories of causation, and he expresses his reservations about their use when he says that the five modes suffice against the theories of causation. 24 “In general, the items of information and misinformation with which each of the Ten Modes is illustrated are all pillaged from the writings of the dogmatists” (Annas/Barnes 1985, p. 41).

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(in PH, I 210–211: . . . πάντες κοιναῖς ὕλαις κεχρήμεθα, “We all make use of common materials”). They are common in the sense that we come to these thoughts without the help of a specific philosophical school, or even without necessarily the help of philosophizing, defined as an established way of investigating into things, at all. Anyone in an ordinary situation of observing a tower can have the experience of these two conflicting appearances. Nevertheless, it seems that to take these two appearances as conflicting in a serious way, presupposes the original philosophical perspective from which we are looking for a special kind of truth. This perspective was opened, as we saw earlier, in reaction to the anomaly in things.²⁵ So, the kinds of conflicts we find in the presentation of the Ten Modes seem to belong to the common material that philosophers in general take into account and on the basis of which they start to philosophize. We also find the same idea that some kind of anomaly is the common starting point for different philosophical schools in the chapter Sextus devotes to the difference between the Skeptical school and Democritean philosophy (PH, I 213–214). In this context, the opposition “honey appears sweet to some and bitter to others” is acknowledged to be common to the two schools exactly because it is an instance of “the anomaly in what is apparent” (PH, I 214), from which Democritus, also, starts philosophizing. In the presentation of the Ten Modes, we have both the special example of the sweet and bitter honey, which is said to be reached through the fourth mode (PH, I 101), and other examples which are said to be reached through other modes and which are also described as anomalies in appearances or in things (PH, I 112, 114, 132, 163). But if the oppositions that are reached through the Ten Modes represent this anomaly in things, or if these oppositions are common materials that all philosophical schools can use, how are we to understand the role of the skeptical modes in forming these oppositions and the role of the modes in the development specifically of the philosophical school of Pyrrhonism? First of all, it seems to me that it is not the case that the Ten Modes produce the oppositions: the oppositions, in a way, are there to be seen, and if we adopt a certain perspective, namely the original philosophical perspective, they are there to be seen as serious undecided conflicts. The Ten Modes seem to represent a conscious and systematic adoption

25 Otherwise someone may notice these conflicting appearances but not be bothered by them at all – and the same is true with similar cases, such as the oar that looks broken in the water – since we have ways to test what we see and then to decide what is true and what is false: for example, we easily decide, after looking closer, that the round tower was only an optical illusion and the truth is that the tower is square. However, from the philosophical perspective, these procedures do not suffice to bring us to what we are looking for – namely, for something really true in the sense that it is something totally free from any kind of anomaly and conflict.

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of that perspective. Their role in Skepticism seems to be that they systematize both a common way of thinking and the original way of philosophizing, so as to enable the Skeptics to succeed where the other philosophers failed. They enable the Skeptics to detect a large spectrum of anomalies and contradicting views and thus to persist in the original philosophical investigation and to avoid dogmatism. On the other hand, the Ten Modes are not just a systematization of the ways the philosophers originally investigated into things; instead, they represent the ways in which the Skeptical ability works and the ways through which the Skeptics come to suspension of judgment. The Skeptics, once they have become mature Skeptics, can see that these ways of investigating into things are also ways through which they come to suspension of judgment and to tranquillity; at least this is what has happened to them so far, and this is what remains to the Skeptics through the exercising of the Skeptical ability. Scholars, because they understand Pyrrhonism solely as an attack on Dogmatic philosophy and are oblivious to the possibility of a Skeptical investigation which is not directed against the theories of Dogmatic philosophy,²⁶ understand the Ten Modes solely as weapons in the Skeptical attack on the parts of philosophy.²⁷ But such an interpretation does not seem to be satisfactory: as has been pointed out,

26 It is telling that even the famous controversy between Frede and Burnyeat (See Burnyeat/Frede 1997) did not discuss the role of the Ten Modes or the possibility of a Skeptical investigation which is not directed against dogmatic theories. The central question in this disagreement turned out to be whether the Skeptical attack on dogmatic philosophy is actually also an attack on ordinary beliefs. Thus, the question became whether the Skeptics, whatever they might say about having or not having ordinary beliefs, could not avoid attacking all ordinary beliefs, simply through their attack on Dogmatic philosophy (see Burnyeat 1997). 27 One interpretation that has been proposed is that the Ten Modes are just part of the ad hominem investigation against the Dogmatic philosophers. This is Annas and Barnes’ view (see Annas/Barnes 1985, p. 45). Stough also maintains: “The force of the Tropes is most evident if they are viewed as an attack on philosophical theories (of which the Stoic is in this case perhaps the best example) that purport to transcend the data of experience to an external and, according to Skeptics, unknowable reality” (Stough 1969, p. 93). Her view is that the Ten Tropes are not concerned with differences of opinion, but that “the original disparity in all the Tropes is with sense impressions. . . ” (Stough 1969, p. 78). Many things could be said against this interpretation. Striker gives a general argument against Stough’s view, maintaining, correctly I think, that, “The skeptics, for one thing, did not consider themselves to be arguing from or against a specific philosophical position; that type of argument belonged, according to Sextus Empiricus (PH I 5–6), to the special part of the Pyrrhonist exposition, in which they argued against ‘each part of so–called philosophy’, as against the general account, in which they set out the characteristics of skepticism itself” (Striker 1983, p. 98).

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they are not particularly good weapons,²⁸ and they are not even weapons that Sextus actually uses systematically in this attack. Nevertheless, there are cases in which Sextus uses certain examples that he has cited in the exposition of the Ten Modes against theses that Dogmatic philosophers have maintained. For example, Sextus uses the fact that the honey appears sweet to healthy people and bitter to those suffering from jaundice against the general Dogmatic thesis that the senses are a criterion of truth (PH, II 51), and against the thesis that intellect together with the senses can serve as such a criterion (PH, II 63). The Skeptics reveal that, where the Dogmatists purport to find solid ground on which to establish their doctrines, what we really have is anomaly in things and conflicting accounts, on which we can establish no doctrine without being dogmatic. In this way the Ten Modes can work against Dogmatic philosophy, but it seems that they are not designed, or they are not collected and systematized, in order to be used in attacks on Dogmatic philosophy. Hegel, on the other hand, offers a well–aimed interpretation of the Ten Modes – apart from misdating them – when he maintains that the Skeptics used them against the dogmatism of ordinary common sense, doing what philosophy originally did. His historical scheme, although it is historically wrong, stems from a cognition of skepticism and an explanation of the relationship of skepticism to philosophy which faithfully represents Sextus’ radical Skepticism. Thus Hegel turned the conception of Skepticism, as it emerges from Sextus’ writings, into a history of skepticism. On the other hand, Sextus does not offer such a history because, it seems to me, he does not need a historical proof for his conception of Skepticism as true philosophy. The aporetic way of philosophizing, which the Ten Modes represent, and which Sextus presents as the original and true way of philosophizing, was still generally accepted as legitimate. Nevertheless, the Platonic and the Aristotelian tradition prescribed for this aporetic way of philosophizing a secondary role. They understood it either as suitable solely for exercise, contest, and refutation, or as a task preliminary to doctrinal work, thus identifying

28 It is a quite widespread view that the Ten Modes are bad arguments – Striker conveys this view as a suggestion made to her by one of her colleagues (Striker 1983, p. 96) – especially in comparison with the much more sophisticated Five Modes. The Ten Modes do not much impress modern scholars and philosophers, who view them as neither especially good nor especially interesting arguments. If we look at each of the Ten Modes separately, they do not seem to be contributing anything really new to what the Skeptics offer to philosophical thinking. Moreover, because they have a simple structure of two opposed views and their approach to things around us can seem as naïve, it has been thought that we have no sign of advanced philosophical thinking in them. For example, there is no sign in them of philosophical doubt about the existence of the things around us. Thus, many see them as commonplaces with no particular philosophical interest.

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philosophical investigation primarily with positive, constructive philosophical activity. This Dogmatic conception of philosophizing is what Sextus attempts to overturn, launching into a radical fight over what is true philosophy and what is not. He attacks the Dogmatic doctrines, proving that there are no positive results which could warrant doctrinal philosophy and that therefore these doctrines do not even deserve the name of philosophy – he speaks, as we have seen, about the parts of ‘the so–called philosophy’. At the same time, he defends Skepticism by presenting it as the best specimen of philosophy, exactly because it is devoted to the original aporetic or ephectic way of philosophizing. It is this Skeptical conception of philosophizing to which the current interpretations of Pyrrhonism, because of a biased conception of philosophy as a positive enterprise, are blind. Hegel’s approach accurately captures this conception and brings to the surface effectively.

Bibliographie 1 Abbreviations PH: Sextus Empiricus (1958): Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Mutschmann, Hermannus/Mau, Jürgen. (Eds.): Sexti Empirici Opera. Vol. I. Leipzig: Teubner. M: Sextus Empiricus (1914): Adversus Mathematicos (VII–XI). Mutschmann, Hermannus (Ed.): Sexti Empirici Opera. Vol. II. Leipzig: Teubner. DL: Diogenes Laertius (2013): Lives of the Philosophers. Dorandi, Tiziano (Ed.): Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. Relationship: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2000): “On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy, Exposition of its Different Modifications and Comparison of the Latest Form with the Ancient One”. In: Giovanni, George di/Harris, Henry Stilton (Eds.): Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post–Kantian Idealism. Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett, pp. 311–362.

2 Other bibliography Annas, Julia/Barnes, Jonathan (1985): The Modes of Scepticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Annas, Julia/Barnes, Jonathan (1994): Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scepticism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bailey, Alan (2002): Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Barnes, Jonathan (1990): The Toils of Scepticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Bett, Richard (2010): “Introduction”. In: Bett, Richard (Ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–10. Bett, Richard (1997): Sextus Empiricus, Against the Ethicists. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Burnyeat, Myles (1997): “The Sceptic in His Place and Time”. In: Burnyeat, Myles/Frede, Michael (Eds.): The Original Sceptics: A Controversy. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett, pp. 92–126. Burnyeat, Myles/Frede, Michael (Eds.) (1997): The Original Sceptics: A Controversy. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett. Dudley, Will (2003): “Ancient Skepticism and Systematic Philosophy”. In: Duquette, David (Ed.): Hegel’s History of Philosophy: New Interpretations. Albany: State University of New York Press, pp. 87–105. Forster, Michael (1989): Hegel and Skepticism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Frede, Michael (1987): “Introduction: The Study of Ancient Philosophy”. In: Frede, Michael: Essays in Ancient Philosophy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. ix–xxvii. Frede, Michael (2008): “Ο Σέξτος Εμπειρικός για τις απαρχές της φιλοσοφίας”. In: Frede, Michael: Η Αρχαία Ελληνική Φιλοσοφία. ΄Οψεις της ιστορίας και της ιστοριογραφίας της. Athens: Εκκρεμές, pp. 131–158. Glidden, David (1983): “Skeptic semiotics”. In: Phronesis 28, pp. 213–255. Harris, Henry Stilton (2000): “Skepticism, Dogmatism and Speculation in the Critical Journal”. In: Giovanni, George di/Harris, Henry Stilton (Eds.): Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post–Kantian Idealism. Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett, pp. 252–271. Sluiter, Ineke (2000): “The Rhetoric of Scepticism: Sextus against the Language Specialists”. In: Sihvola, Juha (Ed.): Ancient Scepticism and the Sceptical Tradition, Acta Philosophica Fennica 66, pp. 93–123. Stough, Charlotte (1969): Greek Skepticism: A Study in Epistemology. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press. Striker, Gisela (1983): “The Ten Tropes of Aenesidemus”. In: Burnyeat, Myles (Ed.): The Sceptical Tradition, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 95–115. Striker, Gisela (2001): “Scepticism as a Kind of Philosophy”. In: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 83, pp. 113–129.

Jannis Kozatsas

Old and New Scepticism, Old and New Empiricism Hegel’s Radicalisation of Scepticism and the Sense–Certainty of the Phenomenology of Spirit Abstract: Hegel’s confrontation with scepticism forms one of the most peculiar and elaborate attempts in the whole history of philosophy. For Hegel the only way for philosophy to gain immunity against sceptical attacks is not to reject but, on the contrary, to integrate scepticism into the philosophical discourse as its internal, negative or critical, moment. Scepticism should be thus transformed into a sceptical method, i.e. a mechanism of liberation of any giveness and finiteness. Hegel shows persuasively that scepticism does not result in any absolute nil; its negation is not absolute or abstract but a determinate one. It delivers content which remains beyond inspection and scrutinising although it needs itself to be tested and sublated. This very content of scepticism consists in the reality or in the being of the appearances, in the non–reducible somethingness of the phenomena, which remain, even for Sextus Empiricus, out of the scope of sceptical test. In the present text we will try to follow Hegel’s argument in the Sense–certainty chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, focusing especially on its third moment, wherein a pure sceptical attitude regarding the non reducible character of the sensible – its alleged immediacy, singularity and positivity – is decisively disproved and refuted.

1 Introduction: a way out of the ‘hell of negativity’ What you begin with accompanies you till the end. If you include an element at the beginning of the formation of your philosophical system you cannot really use it as an external ladder (a kind of pre–philosophical Kritik) that you can later get rid of (Kant here was wrong, Wittgenstein with his own ‘ladder’ probably was too). No neutral tool is ever possible – tools do not work sub specie aeternitatis,

Jannis Kozatsas, Dr. Jannis Kozatsas, Post–Doctoral Research Fellow, Department of Political Science and History, Panteion University of Athens. DOI 10.1515/9783110528138-005

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they just transform (Phen, p. 46/Phän, p. 68).¹ If you wish to learn swimming then you have to swim; if you want to learn philosophy then you have to do philosophy (Enc I, p. 34/Enz I, p. 54). If you choose a method, you’ll find it in the content, if you begin with scepticism or ‘amphiboly’, you cannot consistently be exempt of it but it will keep undermining your certainties in every step of your work. If you moreover have realised that you have to begin with scepticism, then you have to walk with it till the ‘end’ of knowledge and truth! As Klaus Vieweg has shown in his reconstruction of the Hegelian argument concerning the problem of inception or of start, philosophy should begin for Hegel as a sceptical inquiry against any certainty, any immediacy, and any giveness at all (Vieweg 2003a). Giveness is, strictly speaking, rather the opposite of philosophy. No truth can be absolute, no philosophy can maintain the truth of its own words if the truth is to be found in something given that lies beyond philosophy itself, i.e. if it is to be found in the ‘breast of men’, in the immediate facts of experience or even in the supposed superiority of a given, though transcendental, spotty ‘Ich’ (Enc I, p. 31/Enz I, p. 49)! Of course truth is to be found just as little in God. . . To begin with scepticism is for Hegel synonymous with saying to begin with thinking, what is rather a tautological claim, insofar as philosophy is nothing more than the thoughtful understanding of reality, a work of reconciling Being and Thinking, a work of leaving them free to prove themselves as identical. To begin with scepticism means however to bring anything into the ‘hell of negativity’ (Vieweg 2003a, p. 131) – a ‘total abstraction’ of everything or an absolute ‘annihilation’ (Vieweg 2003a, p. 137). However, someone could here retort: ‘Such scepticism seems to be not the beginning but rather the end of philosophy itself’. If everything is to be negated, if everything in thought or in experience can be discarded as self contradictory, unstable or uncertain, then scepticism can only be the fatal dead–end of philosophy – a philosophy which would thus remain no more than a matter of belief (and only a Jacobi could feel salvaged in such a hell!). And then. . . what the hell! Well, to begin with means, as we said, to take with or to go with. In this case: to go with scepticism. Hegel does not feel sad at all while doing that. On the contrary: to go together with scepticism into the philosophical voyage seems to him to be rather the only way to beat scepticism. Apply it on itself, negate scepticism in sceptical manner and you’ll find instead of two static standpoints (a ‘noisy’ dogmatic and a ‘silent’ sceptic) a steady logical movement from position to negation and from negation to negation of negation, i.e. a come–back at a now

1 Quotations of Hegel’s major works are derived mainly from the authoritative English translations of his books, giving also references to the original German editions.

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richer starting point which does not only stays as an opposite of its alteration or negation, but, to the contrary, it includes its own whole history. For Hegel this definitely looks a better option. It seems to him to be the only way to integrate scepticism as the negative moment of any philosophy whatsoever, in order to gain immunity against sceptical attacks (Vieweg 1999). Hegel’s strategy is thus not an outsceptical one. His proposal is to take scepticism seriously, because otherwise philosophy can have no future at all. What can be the immediate result of such an examination? Nothing more than the realisation that the sceptical negation is not an abstract one, but one which has a specific content which is nothing more than the content of the negated itself (Phen, p. 56/Phän, p. 74). An immediate logical mistake of scepticism is not to consider the determinate character of negation. Negation is never nil – it always has content and always is a negation which can be likewise negated. Determinate negation, instead of abstract, and negation of the negation as a self referential mechanism which does not stay at the abstract identity but proves the identity to be the sublation of the Other, is Hegel’s answer against any fatality of scepticism. A self performed or self accomplished scepticism (‘ein sich vollbringender Skeptizismus’) (Phen, p. 50/Phän, p. 72) is no more a scepticism which stands against philosophy as a mere immediate inversion of dogmatism, but one which has been transformed into a sceptical method (Vieweg 2003a, p. 132), implicit in any philosophy as its negative and free aspect (Vieweg 2003a, p. 133).

2 Old and new scepticism, old and new empiricism and the basic lines of Hegel’s critique Hegel is the first in the history of philosophy to differentiate kinds of scepticism not simply because of their doctrinal differences (e.g. pyrrhonians vs. academics), but on the basis of their deepest logical presuppositions which belong to the historical dimension of knowledge. The age of antiquity, as the era of the unbiased, undifferentiated thought, of the originally united nature and reason (Enc I, p. 65/Enz I, p. 93; GdPhil III, p. 65; Vorl 10, p. 70), and the age of modernity, the era of the ‘culture of reflection’, of dichotomies and dualisms (Diff; GuW; WphK, p. 181; GdPhil III, p. 64) have their own paradigms of scepticism. For Hegel the unbiased thought of antiquity, which held that the determinations of thought are immediately determinations of things, has led to a scepticism which could demonstrate the thorough demise of any reality (of thought or of experience), without any rest

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that would claim certainty for itself. The immediate unity of Being and Thought, of Nature and Reason has been, according to Hegel, the ultimate presupposition which has allowed a genuine scepticism to come about in the ancient world. As he points out in his Scepticism–essay, when the ancient sceptic says the honey is both sweet and not sweet, there is no other thing (hidden or ‘in itself’) which would bear these allegedly ‘subjective qualities’ – the whole reality has entered entirely in the realm of amphiboly and suspension of judgement (Skept–e, p. 321/Skept–d, p. 225). On the contrary, modern scepticism seems for Hegel rather a doctrine which works only on the inside of an already divided world. The sceptical inspection of thought and reality moves only in between the poles of dualism, only in the middle space between subject and object. The modern sceptic can be for Hegel rather either a subjective idealist or an immediate, common sense realist, but at the end not a genuine sceptic at all. To question and reject the objective reality equals for a modern sceptic rather with rejecting what has been supposed to be behind the appearances and the ideas we have of them such as the Kantian ‘thing in itself’, the innate ideas etc. (Skept–e, p. 321/Skept–d, p. 225). Modern scepticism adheres to the world of appearances not with the ancient attitude that this world is immersed in the absolute uncertainty of nullity, but rather with the hope to find herein the safe ground of certainty and truth. Locke’s attempt to found any knowledge on the safe ground of experience differs very little even from Hume’s wish of dispelling any kind of certainty of universals for the sake of mere, immediate and singular appearances. Thus, according to Hegel, a sharp ontological chasm divides old and new scepticism. The sceptics of antiquity step on different ontological ground from the modern sceptical empiricists. If we accept Hegel’s position, then we should rather admit that ‘genuine scepticism’ is hardly possible in modernity. Hegel is definitely right when he insists on the fact that the context of modern scepticism is the dualistic world of reflection which can take the form either of a stiff subjectivity, i.e. of the subjective idealism, or of a vulgar objectivity, i.e. of the naive realism of common sense. Hegel is definitely right when he implies that if we wish to overcome scepticism we have now to fulfil one more duty: to overcome the context of reflection and duality itself. Hegel is equally right when he dares to equate Hume with Schulze regarding their absolute adherence to certainty, to the being–character of appearances (Enc I, p. 80/Enz I, pp. 111–112). However, one problem remains: if Hume really destroys any certainty both of subject and object as ontological aspects of dualism and reflection, insisting barely on the certainty of each isolated and spotty appearance (idea or impression), without any additional ontological connotation, then why should such scepticism be considered as radically different from the ancient one? Is there more positivity (more reality or Being) in the Humean appearances than in the pyrrhonian ones? Or is an implicit empiricism – or let’s say

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an implicit phenomenalism – of the given the uttermost ground of any scepticism, both ancient and modern? I am inclined to the view that Hegel not only recognises this inherent opposition of Humean scepticism both against realism and idealism – as their negative aspect – but the articulation of his argument against the certainty or positivity of the sensible functions at the same time as an overcoming of scepticism itself as a specific philosophical attitude, thereby integrating it as functional moment in the dialectic of the system. The Sense–certainty chapter of the Phenomenology of spirit offers, to my mind, a paradigmatic account of scepticism both as sceptical method, which works in the direction of sublation of any finiteness and dualism, and as an attitude, a philosophical stance, a radically empiricist adherence to the appearance of sensibility which has to be equally overcome. As I would like to show, focusing especially on the third moment of sense certainty, Hegel offers not only a genuine sceptical purification of sensibility from the realism–idealism modern duality, but, going a step further, builds an elaborate argument for the overcoming of scepticism itself as an implicit empiricist position – an absolute ruin of any belief on the immediacy and positivity of the singular sensible itself, of any allegedly in–itself certain appearance.

3 The ‘Sense certainty’, the critique of empiricism and the transition from scepticism as sceptical method to scepticism as sceptical attitude The Sense certainty is one of the most intensively interpreted chapters of Hegel’s work and like the entire Phenomenology a text which challenges the interpretative imagination of any Hegel–scholar. Phenomenology represents a masterpiece of philosophical critique which conflates the systematic discourse and the history of philosophy in a unique way (Arndt 2007; Φαράκλας 2000). It describes, grosso modo, the evolution of spirit in the context of modernity, in the world of consciousness, of reflexion, of contradiction or of dualism. Phenomenology presents the constant and iterative interplay between the ontological spheres of object and subject and their mutual negation at each step of the formation of the spirit. The fight between realism and idealism, the iterative emergence of scepticism and its constant sublation in richer and more inclusive forms of thought and reality shapes the fatal way of any dichotomic, dualistic consciousness until the total devastation of any stiff duality and the transition of knowledge and philosophy from the context of understanding into the context of reason. This general motive

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outlines the methodological context of the opening chapter of the Phenomenology, Sense–certainty, wherein Hegel undertakes one of its most subtle and thorough critical reconstructions and sublations of the fundaments of empiricism. Three keywords may describe the main assumptions against which Hegel’s argument in the Sense–certainty is directed: immediacy, singularity, and positivity. All three words can be considered as ultimate determinations of the sense content with reference to consciousness and further – if we realise Hegel’s argument in its historical dimension – as the ultimate determinations of any empiricist cognition of sensibility. One more keyword, reality, with the meaning of the non reductive Being–character of any sense content, may it be in thought or in the ‘external world’, represents a fourth, all–inclusive concept, which serves as the ultimate ontological grounding of the other three and of any sense content whatsoever (its actual meaning will be commented on concretely below). Therefore, immediacy means that any sense content is perceived from consciousness in an unmediated, direct manner – may it be Thomas Reid’s immediate real object, Georges Berkeley’s subjective idea, or Hume’s ‘substances’ of experience (impressions) or of imagination (ideas). Singularity means what empiricism from Locke to Hume (if not up to the 20th century) has insisted on: that reality is perceived in the form of an amalgam, in the form of endlessly mixed singular qualities and quantities which can be then mentally singled out (without any alteration of their essence or sense content) by a precisely executed analysis (for a discussion, s. Kozatsas 2016, p. 174 ff.). The truth is thus possible only if we reduce any knowledge to the analytical elementals or monads of sensibility. And finally, positivity, a word which of course does not occur as such in the Hegel–text, but only in the opposite formulation as negativity, means simply that the entire meaning or the entire determination of an immediate and singled out sense content has to be found in that very sense–point and only in that. To be a red point in the here and now does not require external concepts and relations with other substances or categories. Ruddiness or red–spottiness is a self–determined quality – an elemental material of knowledge as a simple idea (Locke 1836, p. 61 ff.) or as an undivided impression (Hume 2007, pp. 23–24; cf. p. 160). No relation to others, no negative determination, is required in order to perceive it. Perceiving ruddiness does not require perceiving blueness and discerning each one from the other. In order to understand what red is, it is quite enough to see it – it is not necessary to understand what blue is and to differentiate it categorically or, talking in a more modern vocabulary, inferentially (Sellars 1991, p. 129) from red. Sense consciousness seeks to establish the certainty of these characteristics of sensible knowledge. That means to ensure the reality of the sense content which, in turn, is possible only in the ontological frame of reflection. Consciousness – itself an expression of a fundamental dichotomy and equally a fundamental relationship

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between the subject and the object of knowledge – can ensure the reality of the immediate, singled out and positive sense content only by adopting successive ontological positions which ascribe the truth and certainty (i.e. the reality) of it either to the object or to the subject. Consciousness inevitably adopts perspectives (Bensch 2005) which represent its efforts to re–unify the divided world of reflection by reducing either the reality of the subject (as knowledge) to the reality of the object (as the content of knowledge) or reversely the reality of the object of knowledge to the reality of the subjectivity of the act of perceiving. Realism and idealism thus make the two necessary forms of sense certainty (Koch 2008) which they, far from dissolving the dualism of subject and object, rather reproduce it by ascribing simple signs of plus and minus alternatively between the object and the subject. Therefore, neither objectivism or realism nor subjectivism or idealism prove to be sustainable alternatives for rescuing this very certainty of sense knowledge. Neither object (the objective Dieses) nor subject (the subjective ‘I’ as Dieser) can be recognised as epistemologically certain and ontologically real, as immediate, singular and positive elements of knowledge. Mediation instead of immediacy, universality instead of singularity, and negativity instead of positivity are met as quasi fatal, invincible outcomes at each step of Sense–certainty’s inspection. Inasmuch as the reality or certainty of sense knowledge depends on the fulfilment of the three keyword–concepts that we saw above, then consciousness’ failure to claim either a realistic or an idealistic position leads it inevitably to a sceptical attitude (Düsing 1973, p. 128) which stays immersed only in the epistemological certainty and ontological reality of immediacy, singularity and positivity of the qualitatively and quantitatively spotty sense content itself. A Humean– or even Sextus–like scepticism, a scepticism which has emerged through the sublation both of a naive, immediate realistic and a subjective–idealistic position, a kind of sceptical ‘neutral monism’ – in the words of Anton Koch (2002; 2008) – an empiricism of the spotty sense content of now and here which has expelled both subject and object as non sustainable entities, remains the ultimate standpoint which a radically empiricist consciousness, as sense certainty, can ever reach. Now we have reached a standpoint which, as Pöggeler argues, has returned to the initial assumptions of ancient scepticism (Pöggeler 1976, p. 175), a standpoint which reveals the relativity and uncertainty of any sensible whatsoever and stays only at the spotty and momentary appearance (of Hume or of Sextus). Now “it is only sense–certainty as a whole which stands firm within itself as immediacy and by doing so excludes from itself all the opposition which has hitherto obtained” (Phen, p. 62/Phän, p. 87). Within this very sense certainty – consciousness hopes – “no distinction whatever can penetrate” (Phen, p. 62/Phän, p. 88). Scepticism, which has thus far – in the first two moments – functioned as a means of liberation and purification from any finiteness such as the dichotomic,

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dualistic contraposition of subject and object – i.e. scepticism at work as sceptical method (Vieweg 2003a, p. 132) – turns now to be in the third moment of Sense–certainty a scepticism at work as a philosophical attitude or a philosophical stance. The superiority of this standpoint for Hegel is crucial insofar as the formal opposition between subject and object was blurring the sensible and prevented from its further examination. Consciousness’s purification from the formalistic opposition, from dualism, was thus a necessary logical precondition in order for the sensible itself to emerge as such. The modern philosophising, trapped in the context of reflection, questions only the subjectivity or objectivity of the sense content instead of scrutinising it itself – and fighting for the ‘source’ without paying any attention to the nature of the content is for Hegel a rather ‘boring’ dogmatic controversy (GdPhil III, p. 206). But to sublate the certainty and positivity of the sense content requires to sublate the domination of dualism and to destroy its categorical and ontological context, i.e. to free the content from the dichotomic chains of modernity. As Klaus Düsing comments, “this consciousness is insofar sceptic as it makes no statement about the truth either as an objective this or as its own immediate meaning” (Düsing 1973, p. 128). But Hegel’s position is not simply that of ancient scepticism: Hegel returns to the standpoint of it, in order to negate its own conditions and to go beyond its own dead–end fatalities and logical inconsistencies. Now we have before our eyes not scepticism as a sceptical method, but as a concrete and firm attitude, which has to be equally overcome. Hegel does not take the stance of ancient scepticism, but he works with scepticism against it, turning its abstract negation into a determined one, as Vieweg has shown regarding the strategic transformation of determinatio est negatio into negatio est determinatio (Vieweg 2006, p. 204). Hegel works henceforth with scepticism against any implicit empiricism of the whole history of philosophy; against the implicit but fundamental empiricism of Pyrrhon or Sextus (Csikós 2002, p. 93); against any assumption of a non reducible positivity of the sensual itself.

4 The third moment of Sense–certainty: Hegel’s radicalisation of scepticism as sublation of implicit empiricism of the whole history of philosophy The consciousness which has developed through the negation of the explicit dualism and opposition between realism and idealism can constitute only a peculiar

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‘whole’ whose essence is the absolute or abstract negation. The ‘whole’ of sense certainty has now attributed the sign of minus both to object and subject. The opposition has been excluded or sceptically refuted. However, one thing has not been discarded or problematised by this sense consciousness, which has worked negatively only on the stage of the form but not of the content as well, and that is the reality or the being of the appearance itself. Although this consciousness has seen all its certainties of an alleged immediate, singular, and positive sense content to break down, it has ascribed the failure of its efforts just to the form, to the formalistic opposition of its ontological presuppositions, but not to the content itself, which has been till now – and till now should be understood as ‘in the whole history of philosophy till Hegel’ – out of inspection. The sceptical position, may it be that of Hume or of ancient scepticism, does not question the positivity and all other connotations of the sense content itself, i.e. it does not question the reality or the being of the appearances – appearance is a nullity which still is something. The ancient sceptics – at least as they sound through the testimonies of Sextus Empiricus – were accepting likewise the truth or certainty of the appearances, explaining that it is just impossible to articulate a positive proposition concerning the things as they are (Forster 1996, pp. 74, 80–81; Heidemann 2007, pp. 275–276). As Sextus argues: when we question whether the underlying object is such as it appears, we grant the fact that it appears, and our doubt does not concern the appearance itself but the account given of that appearance, – and that is a different thing from questioning the appearance itself (OoP, 15/I, 19).

The appearance as such stays essentially out of question even for the most radical scepticism and as Sextus explicitly assures: even if we do actually argue against the appearances, we do not propound such arguments with the intention of abolishing appearances, but by way of pointing out the rashness of the Dogmatists (OoP, 15/I, 20).

Therefore, such a sceptical consciousness necessarily stands in relatively close distance to a Schulze or to a Jacobi, who would gladly go a step further (or better ‘back’) in order to ascribe again an even more hard–core reality–character to the appearances (an objective reality), returning thus back to the beginning of the history of sense consciousness, as Hegel underlines for the recurring movement of the consciousness which “is always forgetting it [its own history or experience – JK] and starting the movement all over again” (Phen, p. 64/Phän, p. 90), that is from the very beginnings of the immediate realism. Among Schulze, Jacobi, Reid, Berkeley, Locke, Hume, and even the hardest sceptics of Greek antiquity, prevails

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the common and deeply rooted logical assumption of a non reducible reality of the sense contents itself and any dispute concerns nothing more than the form of its being. A core–empiricism (or a core–phenomenalism) underlies the assumption not just of the modern empiricists of all nuances but also of the ancient sceptics, who, as Hegel points out in his Vorlesungen “named themselves empiricists” (Vorl 10, p. 32) and, mutatis mutandis, indeed were. Actually, the belief on the positivity or ‘reality’ of the appearances themselves represents one of the commonest truths in the history of philosophy and is not simply an assurance of the modern, inconsistent or ‘ingenuine’ scepticism which tries to make itself compatible with the assumptions of common sense realism by raising the being of appearances up to the status of the objective reality (for a discussion, s. also Vieweg 2003b). The acknowledgment of the existence of such elemental entities which are neither true nor false, but are simply what they are is not to be found for the first time in the phenomenalistic assumptions of Sextus Empiricus, but can be traced back at least to Aristotle, when he explains in his Metaphysics that the same wine might seem, if either it or one’s body changed, at one time sweet and at another time not sweet; but at least the sweet, such as it is when it exists, has never yet changed, but one is always right about it, and that which is to be sweet is of necessity of such and such a nature (Met, 1010b, 22–26).

In the same way, Descartes will stress in his Metaphysical meditations that as far as ideas are concerned, provided they are considered solely in themselves and I do not refer them to anything else, they cannot strictly speaking be false; for whether it is a goat or a chimaira that I am imaging, it is just as true that I imagine the former as the latter (Descartes 1996, p. 26).

This phenomenalistic belief of the reality or being of the sense content in itself will become the ultimate ground of modern empiricism as well, regardless of whether it is considered as objectively or subjectively real, or further, as sceptically uncertain as regards its concrete ontological status. As Locke stresses, no idea, as an appearance in the mind, [is] true or false. [. . . ] the ideas in our minds, being only so many perceptions or appearances there, none of them are false. The idea of a centaur having no more falsehood in it, when it appears in our minds, than the name centaur has falsehood in it, when it is pronounced by our mouths, or written on paper. For truth or falsehood lying always in some affirmation or negation, mental or verbal, our ideas are not capable, any of them, of being false, till the mind passes some judgment on them; that is, affirms or denies something of them (Locke 1836, p. 276).

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The same assumption will be likewise underlined by Berkeley, when he declares in his Three dialogues between Hylas and Philonous that a man “is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually perceives; but in the inferences he makes from his present perceptions”, his mistake lies “not in what he perceives immediately and at present (it being a manifest contradiction to suppose he should err in respect of that) but in the wrong judgement he makes concerning the ideas he apprehends to be connected with those immediately perceived” (Berkeley 1999, p. 181). For Hume’s sceptical account this assumption will be elevated to the status of the sole truth which someone can accept for everything which lies in his immediate experience (may it be in the actual perceiving or in the imagination). As Hegel emphasises, for the Humean scepticism basically is just “the truth of the empirical, the truth of feeling and intuition” (Enc I, p. 80/Enz I, p. 112). The duty is therefore not just to sublate the context of modernity and the formal opposition between the subject and the object, between the realistic and the idealistic accounts of the sensible, returning thus back to the phenomenalistic stance of ancient scepticism. The sublation of the dichotomic framework of modern thought forms only the necessary precondition for the thorough ruination of any giveness, of any empiricist belief on the positivistic mythology of the sensible. The destruction of the formal opposition allows the hidden sense content to emerge as such before the philosophical inspection. Modern scepticism (even a hard–core Humean one) has remained far from conscious about the real consequences of the rejection of the forms of subject and object and moreover of its own commitment to the reality and certainty of the sensible itself. But likewise, ancient scepticism, this oldest and most refined form of radical empiricism, has never realised that the refusal of dogmatic essentialism was leaving an equally not refutable truth to dominate with equally dogmatic right. Hegel shows persuasively that the problem lies in the deepest methodological assumption of sceptical thought and specifically in its constitutive belief that the negation of knowledge can be absolute, that the abstract negation is really possible. Against the strategy both of modern and ancient scepticism Hegel counterposes the determinate character of any negation, showing that any rejection of the forms is always a determinate negation of the form of a content which be thus absolutised and eternalised. The nullity of scepticism is not the result of an absolute or abstract negation, but one which carries a specific content, i.e. that of the negated itself, and has to be further scrutinised. To negate the reality of the subject and the object, to negate the tenability of realism and idealism makes nothing more than attaching a minus sign to the specific kind of reality which they have claimed for their object. But to negate reality or being in this immediate way does not really mean to sublate it. Behind the minus sign, reality and being remain as ever untouched. The result of the determine negation, of which scepticism is not conscious, is called, again, reality – reality of

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the appearances in themselves, reality of the immediacy, singularity and positivity of the sense content as such, independently of any other ontological connotation of it, subjectivistic or objectivistic. Therefore, the duty of philosophy is nothing more than to overcome now this scepticism, to go beyond it, to release it from the abstraction and thus to integrate it thoroughly as the negative, the ‘dialectic’ moment of philosophy itself. Hegel wishes to overcome exactly this very fundamental empiricism of scepticism, while directing his “critique against Sextus Empiricus’ empiricism, who sticks in its phenomenalism and hostility against theory” (Csikós 2002, p. 93). He wants to show the inconsistency of attaching being and, therefore, reality to the alleged nullity of shine as a ‘phenomenon’ or ‘appearance’. The reality of the ‘phenomenon’, the reality of the sensible itself does not concern its actuality, its actual reality as an objective or subjective entity or form. It is not the actual reality of essence, but the mere reality of being – the non reducible reality of the abstractness of a being which has thoroughly distracted from nothing or, in other words, from negation (for a discussion s. Logic, pp. 69–78/Logik I, pp. 97–109). Scepticism finds itself tangled in a contradiction which cannot be solved in the abstract manner it acts. Against any of its efforts to hold itself at the mere negation of any certainty, at the nullity of the world of appearance, while it has emphatically refused to attribute any being to its appearances, scepticism finds itself trapped in the most abstract and most confirmative category of being and thus of reality as regards exactly these very appearances, which are shown as nothing which is still something – a something which is left apart from testing and inspection. As Hegel stresses in Logic: Skepticism did not permit itself to say ‘It is’, and the more recent idealism did not permit itself to regard cognitions as a knowledge of the thing–in–itself. [. . . ] But at the same time skepticism allowed a manifold of determinations for its shine, or rather the latter turned out to have the full richness of the world for its content. Likewise for the appearance of idealism: it encompassed the full range of these manifold determinacies. So, the shine of skepticism and the appearance of idealism do immediately have a manifold of determination. (Logic, pp. 342–343/Logik II, p. 20).

This form of shine casts scepticism back to the determinacy of being, because this abstract immediacy is necessarily existential or that of being, of something that is. Scepticism does not aim to go “beyond being as determinacy” and “lets the content of its shine to be given to it”, i.e. to exist (Logic, p. 343/Logik II, p. 20). Hegel attempts for the first time in the history of philosophy to systematically refute the sensible in itself, the sensible as such, challenging the belief on its alleged immediacy, positivity and singularity. His strategy against any given of sensibility is enunciated in his instigation to “enter the same point of time or space” (Phen, p. 63/Phän, p. 88), to dissolve the undissolvable, to split the sensible ‘atom’ or ‘singu-

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lar’ of analysis (Enc I, p. 49/Enz I, p. 72), in order to reveal the sensible as such as in itself contradictory, and not only in his external opposition to other sensibles. The third moment of Sense–certainty shows explicitly that any attempt to determine immediately and positively a singular sense content is absolutely impossible. Any determination of it can be only a negative one. The posited singularity is totally abstract and thus nothing but a manifestation of an absolute or abstract negation of any other – a thorough mediation of the singular with the totality of the being. The now cannot be determined otherwise but only as an absolute negation of any before and after. The here has its determination only in its negative relation to any other spatial determination. And if we consider not only these forms of sensibility (the temporal and spatial determinations, which as such are later removed by Hegel from the vocabulary of Sense–certainty – s. Enc III, p. 142 ff./Enz III, p. 199 ff.), then we can, more generally speaking, assert that any this (any ‘red’, ‘blue’, ‘salty’ etc.) is nothing but an absolute – and thus abstract – negation of any other determinacy. A red this is not a blue this, is not a salty this, is not a tree, is not a day etc. The desideratum of Sense–certainty, the concrete singular of sensibility, the this with its putative absolute and self–reliant immediacy, singularity and positivity has been transformed into an abstract singular the only determination of which is the negation of all the other and thus its absolute mediation. Moreover, this very character of the singular – its abstractness – is nothing else but the character of the universal itself: a form of “mediated simplicity” or of “universality” (Phen, p. 61/Phän, p. 85). Any this is a this: an abstract identity with itself. Instead of an immediate, positive and certain singular the Sense–certainty finds only an abstracted and thus negatively mediated universal: something that has been determined as the negation of all singulars and at the same time as absolutely indistinctive of them as a this: “a simple thing [. . . ] which is through negation, which is neither This nor That, a not–This, and is with equal indifference This as well as That” (Phen, p. 60/Phän, p. 85). As Hegel points out in Logic: The singular, therefore, is as self–referring negativity the immediate identity of the negative with itself; it exists for itself. Or it is the abstraction determining the concept as an immediate, according to its ideal moment of being. – Thus the singular is a one which is qualitative, or a this (Logic, p. 548/Logik II, pp. 299–300).

The singular, in its very expression, is the simple and spotty sense content which turns by itself to the most abstract determination of universality, to a simple, abstract being. The third moment of Sense–certainty knocks down the last remnants of the mythical narrative of the immediacy, singularity and positivity of the sensible. The last given of scepticism, the determinate left–over of its own negation, the allegedly

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undisputable ‘phenomenon’ is ruined by the same kind of sceptical inspection which has previously led to the ruination of the formalistic opposition between the subject and the object. Sceptical negation proves to be rather a negation which is filled with a rich content that is left untested. The sceptical attitude has a certain foundation on the being character of the sensible itself as a supposedly immediate, positive and singular non reducible, non refutable and certain something – a nothing which is still something, namely a being.

5 Conclusion To sum up: As Klaus Vieweg has emphasised, to confront scepticism does not represent for Hegel an option or a choice of philosophising but, to the contrary, an existential condition of philosophy as such. Confrontation with scepticism means, however, not to discard scepticism but to immunise it through integration. Scepticism should be thus discerned in scepticism which works as a mechanism of liberation of any giveness and finiteness, i.e. as sceptical method, representing the negative and free aspect of any philosophy, and scepticism which works as a firm attitude or stance against philosophy itself. This second, quasi–systematic form of scepticism, should be sublated by applying to it its own criteria. Hegel shows persuasively that scepticism does not result in any absolute nil; its negation is not absolute or abstract but a determinate one. It delivers a content which remains beyond inspection and scrutinising although it needs itself to be tested and sublated. This very content of scepticism consists in the reality or in the being of the appearances, in the non–reducible somethingness of the phenomena, which remain, even for Sextus Empiricus, out of the scope of sceptical testing. The Sense–certainty chapter of Phenomenology of Spirit offers a paradigmatic account of Hegel’s concurrent working with and against scepticism. His unique philosophical contribution on the critique of the empirical content and the transformation of a radical empiricist consciousness offers a brilliant effort in the history of philosophy in the direction of overcoming scepticism not by rejecting it, but by radicalising its scope and transforming it into a self–accomplished philosophising, that is: into a positive dialectic.

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Bibliographie 1 Abbreviations Diff: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1986): “Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie”. In: Werke. Vol. 2. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Eds.). Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, pp. 8–115. Enc I: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1991): The Encyclopedia Logic (with the Zusätze). Part I of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze. Garaets, Théodore F./Suchting, Wallis A./Harris, Henry Stilton (Eds.). Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett. Enc III: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2010): Philosophy of Mind. Wallace, William/Miller, Arnold V. (Eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Enz I: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1986): “Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I”. In: Werke. Vol. 8. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Eds.). Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. Enz III: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1986): “Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III”. In: Werke. Vol. 10. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Eds.). Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. GdPhil III: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1986): “Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie III”. In: Werke. Vol. 20. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Eds.). Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. GuW: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1986): “Glauben und Wissen oder die Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjektivität in der Vollständigkeit ihrer Formen als Kantische, Jacobische und Fichtesche Philosophie”. In: Werke. Vol. 2. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Eds.). Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, pp. 287–433. Logic: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2010): The Science of Logic. Giovanni, George di (Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Logik I: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1986): “Wissenschaft der Logik I”. In: Werke. Vol. 5. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Eds.). Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. Logik II: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1986): “Wissenschaft der Logik II”. In: Werke. Vol. 6. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Eds.). Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. Met: Aristotle (1924): Metaphysics. Ross, William David (Ed.). Oxford: Clarendon OoP: Sextus Empiricus (1933). Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press/London: William Heinemann LTD. Phän: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1986): “Phänomenologie des Geistes”. In: Werke. Vol. 3. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Eds.). Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. Phen: Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (1977). Miller, Arnold V. (Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Skept–d: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1986): “Verhältnis des Skeptizismus zur Philosophie. Darstellung seiner verschiedenen Modifikationen und Vergleichung des neuesten mit dem alten”. In: Werke. Vol. 2. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Eds.). Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, pp. 213–272. Skept–e: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2000): “On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy, Exposition of its Different Modifications and Comparison of the Latest Form with the

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Ancient One”. In: di Giovanni, George/Harris, Henry Stilton (Eds.): Between Kant and Hegel. Texts in the Development of Post–Kantian Idealism. Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett, pp. 311–362. Vorl 10: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2001): “Vorlesungen über die Logik. Berlin 1831. Nachgeschrieben von Karl Hegel”. In: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Vorlesungen. Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte. Vol. 10. Rameil, Udo (Ed.). Hamburg: Meiner. WphK: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1986): “Einleitung. Über das Wesen der philosophischen Kritik überhaupt und ihr Verhältnis zum gegenwärtigen Zustand der Philosophie insbesondere”. In: Werke. Vol. 2. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Eds.). Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, pp. 171–187.

2 Other bibliography Arndt, Andreas (2007): “‘Die ungeheure Arbeit der Weltgeschichte’. Anmerkungen zur historischen Perspektiven in der Phänomenologie des Geistes”. In: Synthesis Philosophica 43, pp. 9–17. Bensch, Hans.–Georg (2005): Perspektiven des Bewusstseins. Hegels Anfang der Phänomenologie des Geistes. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann. Berkeley, George (1999): Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Csikós, Ella (2002): “Begründung und Skepsis – Zu Hegels Skeptizismus–Aufsatz”. In: Vieweg, Klaus (Ed.): Gegen das ‘unphilosophische Unwesen’. Das Kritische Journal der Philosophie von Schelling und Hegel. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, pp. 85–97. Descartes, René (1996): Meditations on first philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Düsing, Klaus (1973): “Die Bedeutung des antiken Skeptizismus für Hegels Kritik der sinnlichen Gewissheit”. In: Hegel–Studien 8, pp. 119–130. Φαράκλας, Γιώργος (2000): Γνωσιοθεωρία και μέθοδος στον ΄Εγελο. Athens: Εστία. Forster, Michael (1996): “Hegel on the superiority of ancient over modern skepticism”. In: Fulda, Hans Friedrich/Horstmann, Ralf–Peter (Eds.): Skeptizismus und spekulatives Denken in der Philosophie Hegels. Stuttgart: Klett–Cotta, pp. 64–82. Heidemann, Dietmar Hermann (2007): Der Begriff des Skeptizismus. Seine systematischen Formen, die pyrrhonische Skepsis und Hegels Herausforderung. Berlin, New York: De Gruyter. Koch, Anton Friedrich (2002): “Hegel über Indexikalität und sinnliche Gewißheit”. In: Oefsti, Audun/Ulrich, Peter/Wyller, Truls (Eds.): Indexicality and Idealism II. Paderborn: mentis, pp. 65–83. Koch, Anton Friedrich (2008): “Sinnliche Gewissheit und Wahrnehmung. Die beiden ersten Kapitel der Phänomenologie des Geistes”. In: Vieweg, Klaus/Wolfgang, Welsch (Eds.): Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, pp. 135–152. Kozatsas, Jannis (2016): Hegels Kritik am Empirismus. Padeborn: Wilhelm Fink. Locke, John (1836): An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Cheapside: T. Tegg & Son/Glasgow: R Griffin/Dublin: Tegg & Wise. Pöggeler, Otto (1976): “Hegels Kritik der sinnlichen Gewißheit”. In: Wagner, Hans (Ed.):

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Sinnlichkeit und Verstand in der deutschen und französischen Philosophie von Descartes bis Hegel. Bonn: Bouvier, pp. 167–185. Sellars, Wilfrid (1991): Science, perception and reality. California: Ridgeview. Vieweg, Klaus (1999): Philosophie des Remis. Der junge Hegel und das ‚Gespenst des Skeptizismus‘. München: Wilhelm Fink. Vieweg, Klaus (2003a): “Der Anfang der Philosophie – Hegels Aufhebung des Pyrrhonismus”. In: Welsch, Wolfgang/Vieweg, Klaus (Eds.): Das Interesse des Denkens – Hegel aus heutiger Sicht. München: Wilhelm Fink, pp. 131–146. Vieweg, Klaus (2003b): “Skepsis und Common Sense – Hegel und Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer”. In: Vieweg, Klaus/Bowman, Brady (Eds.): Wissen und Begründung. Die Skeptizismus– Debatte um 1800 im Kontext neuzeitlicher Wissenskonzeptionen. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, pp. 125–178. Vieweg, Klaus (2006): “Die ‘Umkehrung des Bewusstseins selbst’”. In: Karásek, Jindřich/Kunes, Jan/Landa, Ivan (Eds.): Hegels Einleitung in die Phänomenologie des Geistes. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, pp. 193–208.

Ioannis Trisokkas

Hegel on Scepticism in the Logic of Essence Abstract: The paper, first, discusses Hegel’s identification of seeming (Schein) with scepticism in his Logic of Essence and, second, argues that it is mistaken. It also, third, defends this conclusion against Pippin’s opposite view.

In the Logic of Essence, the second part of Hegelian Logic, Hegel identifies a logical structure, seeming, with “the phenomenon of scepticism” (WL.II, p. 20/SL, p. 396).¹ The present essay, first, fleshes this identification out by describing the argument leading up to it, and, second, argues that it is mistaken. Section 1 deciphers the opening statement of the Logic of Essence, “the truth of being is essence,” by specifying its components’ meaning. The discussion prepares the way for deliberation on the meaning of “seeming,” since seeming proves to be what remains of being in essence; this is done in section 2. It is also shown therein that seeming takes two forms, dualistic and monistic seeming. Section 3 argues that Hegel identifies scepticism only with dualistic seeming, and that the scepticism he has in mind is “subjective scepticism,” a scepticism grounded in the subject of cognition. The section concludes that Hegel, judged by his own standards, is mistaken in this identification. Finally, section 4 considers Pippin’s objection to this conclusion and offers a rejoinder.

1 Being, Truth, Essence Hegel begins the Logic of Essence, “the most difficult part of Logic” (Enz.I, p. 236 [§114]), with the following proposition (“H” stands for “Hegel”): H1 : The truth of being is essence. (WL.II, p. 13/SL, p. 389)

To understand H1 we must know the meaning of its three components.

1 For the reader’s convenience I will be referring also to Miller’s translation of Hegel’s Science of Logic and Phenomenology of Spirit, although all translations in the article will be mine. Ioannis Trisokkas, Dr. Ioannis Trisokkas, Alexander von Humboldt Senior Research Fellow, Department of Philosophy, University of Tübingen. DOI 10.1515/9783110528138-006

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1.1 Being Being is the subject–matter (die Sache) of Hegelian Theory as a whole. It has many Stufen or dimensions, the “determinations” of being; as Aristotle puts it, “being is said in many ways” (Met., Z 1028a10). Determinations are placed on a scale starting from the simplest and ending with the most complex. All determinations are complex with the exception of the simplest. A complex determination “sublates” less complex determinations. Determinations are clustered under super–determinations, which are in turn sublated into higher, more encompassing, super–determinations. Finally, there is the highest super–determination sublating all higher super–determinations, and hence every determination of being.² Being’s simplest determination is being; thus, the tautology of being is a dimension of being. Being’s higher super– determinations include the logical, the natural, and the spiritual dimension. The highest super–determination of being is, once more, being, this time, however, explicitly conceived as sublating all other determinations (WL.I, p. 70/SL, p. 71). Being’s logical dimension contains determinations whose content involves neither natural nor spiritual content. What remains is a content called “logical,”³ the subject–matter of Logic. Hegel divides logical content into three super– determinations: being, essence, and concept. To distinguish the logical super– determination of being from the being which is the subject–matter of the whole Hegelian Theory (being), but also from the being which is the subject–matter of the whole Logic (logical being), let us call it logical–being–as–being. Logical–being– as–being is a dimension of logical being, and the latter is a dimension of being. This makes logical–being–as–being a dimension of being. The term “being” in H 1 refers specifically to logical–being–as–being. The latter has been analyzed in the Logic of Being, which precedes the Logic of Essence and has crystallized its fundamental features: (a) Determinacy: Being is determinate being–there. To be determinate is to be a manifoldness of contrasted qualities and quantities. At the beginning of the Logic of Essence, referring to what has been achieved hitherto, Hegel writes that

2 See the dispute between Schick (1994), Iber (2002), and Trisokkas (2009), over the necessity of having a highest super–determination in Hegelian Theory. 3 I must, therefore, disagree with Dahlstrom (1983, p. 36), who sees Hegelian Logic as “an analysis of the presuppositions of various ways of thinking”. Hegelian Logic explicates a dimension of being, as well as the fundamental structures human thought employs in order to know this dimension. Being’s logical determinations have an identical content (albeit a distinct existence) with thought’s logical structures. A similar view is developed in great detail by Houlgate (2006, pp. 115–143).

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“cognition certainly cannot stop short at manifold being–there” (WL.II, p. 13/SL, p. 389). As Pippin puts it, determinate being–there is “the qualities [and quantities] it immediately has” (Pippin 1989, p. 192), “the properties immediately attributed to a thing” (Pippin 1989, p. 196), “a function of qualitative [and quantitative] properties” (Pippin 1989, p. 197), “a series of immediate qualities [and quantities]” (Pippin 1989, p. 199). In short, the determinacy of being is the qualities and quantities that characterize it. (b) Something: Being is not only qualitative–quantitative manifoldness, determinate being–there, but also something. To be something is to be simple, an entity, a thing (or “a being”), “the factual that is present at hand” (WL.I, p. 123/SL, p. 115). Something is always within itself, a “simple relation to itself in the mode of being” (WL.I, p. 123/SL, p. 115). Thus, being, while certainly being a manifoldness, is also a non–manifoldness, a thing that is there as a self–related singularity. (c) Immediacy: “Being is the immediate” (WL.II, p. 13/SL, p. 389). To be immediate is to appear to be there without the mediation of another element (cf. Iber 1990, p. 75). Being is determinate something appearing to be there without going outside of itself, and without “returning to itself” from an otherness. It appears to have a presence purely on its own, and to provide the thing’s “beginning” (WL.I, p. 66–67/SL, p. 77–78). Sometimes Hegel describes the immediate as “the concrete” (WL.I, pp. 39, 74/SL, pp. 46, 74), and identifies this concreteness with “the manifold determinate” (WL.I, p. 74/SL, p. 74). To be immediate, then, is to appear to be there as qualitative–quantitative manifoldness or as something. The crux of Hegelian analysis is that “the concrete” appears, at one moment, to be a manifoldness, and, at another moment, to be something. These two elements keep their independence from one another, and each does not “return to itself” from its other. It is like when we admire the magnificence of a thousand–year–old bristlecone pine standing alone in the middle of a plain field, without paying attention to its qualitative–quantitative manifoldness. The focus is on its solitude, on its simple self–relation. Yet, we then find our mind running through its awe–inspiring qualitative–quantitative manifoldness: its gnarled branches, its brown callous trunk, its multi–shaped cave–looking hollows, its anomalous piercing roots, its terrifying width. Immediacy, in short, is the indifference between qualitative–quantitative manifoldness and something: they can equally provide the thing’s “beginning”. (d) Passing–over: “Something as becoming is a passing–over (Übergehen)” (WL.I, p. 124/SL, p. 116). Being as qualitative–quantitative manifoldness is structured in terms of a quality’s or quantity’s passing over into another quality or quantity. Even though something is a self–relation, its manifoldness is structured in terms of other–relatedness. Its qualities and quantities pass from one over into another. A tree is there as one, albeit its qualities and quantities are in a constant

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change (WL.I, pp. 124, 140/SL, pp. 116, 130). Hegel writes that “passing–over is the same as becoming, only that in it the involved elements remain externally static to one another and the passing–over is represented as occurring between them” (WL.I, p. 97/SL, p. 93). This means that the qualities–quantities characterizing something do not “merge” with one another in the process of passing–over; they keep their “self–subsistence.” As a consequence of this “externality,” qualitative–quantitative manifoldness has the status of a list of qualities–quantities. The relation they have is not constitutive of them, precisely because they “insist to hold the other [quality or quantity] fest against them” (WL.I, p. 200/SL, p. 178). It is like when an anatomist is asked to describe a body, and her answer is nothing but a list of anatomical properties (PhdG, pp. 11, 210–211, 249/PS, pp. 1, 166, 199). If Hegel indeed understands logical–being–as–being in these terms, H1 must mean that the truth of determinate something (an entity that is immediately there and whose qualitative–quantitative manifoldness has the structure of passing– over) is essence. Yet, what does it mean to say that a determination is the truth of another determination in Hegelian Logic?

1.2 Truth To say that a determination x has its truth in another determination y is to say that y sublates x (WL.I, pp. 115, 218, 225, 382/SL, pp. 107–108, 191–192, 197, 322). Since all determinations bar the simplest, being, sublate other determinations, there are as many instances of truth in Hegelian Logic as there are complex determinations! All instances of truth but one explicate partial truth (cf. Trisokkas 2012, pp. 324–326). Absolute truth belongs only to that determination that sublates each and every determination. This is why, for Hegel, absolutely true is only the whole (PhdG, p. 24/PS, p. 11). What does it mean, though, “to sublate”? The meaning of sublation is twofold. On the one hand, to sublate means to incorporate; this is why Hegel says that “what is sublated is not thereby reduced to nothing” or “annihilated” (WL.I, pp. 113–114/SL, p. 107). The character or “determinacy” of what is sublated is preserved in the incorporating structure. On the other hand, to sublate means “to cause to cease, to put an end to” (WL.I, p. 114/SL, p. 107), to supersede. The sublating determination does not simply repeat the sublated determination. It preserves it, but also adds to it, so that it acquires an altogether new meaning. What is preserved becomes a “moment” in the new structure. This moment together with what is added to it constitute the meaning of the new structure. Incorporation and supersession are the two “opposing determinations” of sublation contained in “one and the same word” (WL.I, p. 114/SL, p. 107).

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If the above specification of “truth” is correct, H1 must mean that essence sublates (incorporates and supersedes) determinate something. What is essence as such a structure of sublation? To answer this question we turn our attention to the minimal meaning of the term “essence” in Hegelian Logic.

1.3 Essence Essence’s minimal meaning derives from a deficiency of logical–being–as–being. The problem is that it does not generate what it “intends” to generate, namely determinate something. What it generates is only determinateness, a sheer manifoldness of qualities and quantities. In logical–being–as–being the “something” in determinate something vanishes. Something vanishes because its immediacy does not allow it to be anything more than another quality or quantity. Being–something is a quality or quantity of being, as it adds a feature to what being is. To be something is to be self–relation; this, however, is another quality or quantity, which, as part of manifoldness, relates to all other qualities and quantities in terms of passing–over. Such a flowing of qualities and quantities constitutes sheer manifoldness, thereby cancelling self–relation, the thing that is there as a unity of manifoldness, out. While, then, something was supposed to be immediate, a “self–subsistent concreteness,” this immediacy causes its degradation into a quality or quantity that passes over into another quality or quantity. Something’s immediacy is the cause of its vanishing as a unity of manifoldness because it prevents it from “merging” with manifoldness in a unity, leaving thereby this manifoldness behind in the “shape” of a “list.” As an immediate being, something “stands against” the array of qualities and quantities, turning thus itself into another point in a list of points. To say of a tree that it is something has the same status as saying that it has branches. Something was supposed not to be simply a quality or quantity; yet, its absolute immediacy prevents it from exemplifying a structure that goes beyond this qualitative–quantitative being. The task of the Logic of Essence is to explicate that structure which enables being to be determinate something. This cannot be achieved through logical–being– as–being alone, precisely because it has a structure of absolute immediacy. What is needed is a structure that allows something to be self–relation or unity without turning it into another quality or quantity. This structure is essence. The Logic of Essence provides a detailed exposition of the relation something must have with manifoldness (or “determinacy”) in order for being to be determinate something, a thing–with–qualities–and–quantities, instead of a sheer qualitative–quantitative manifoldness.

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What is the status of immediate being, to wit, of qualitative–quantitative manifoldness (as it has been shown that immediate something collapses into another quality or quantity), in the structure of essence? Hegel considers the possibility that something is an entity separate from manifoldness. Something neither is a quality or quantity nor can be reduced to a quality or quantity. It is an “essence” lying in “another place” than qualitative–quantitative manifoldness, the “unessential being–there” (WL.II, p. 14/SL, p. 390). The relation between them is one of external connection, and the thing–with–qualities–and–quantities is supposed to be that connection’s result. This “Platonic” solution (cf. Theunissen 1978, p. 322) cannot work. While essence is obliged to generate a unitary determinate something, the external connection of something and determinacy fails to generate this. If something were to be separated from determinacy, it would be “a simple unity with no determinacy,” an “empty simplicity” (WL.II, p. 14/SL, p. 389). These deficiencies are not removed by external connection, for even after this connection something would still be a self–subsistent other “standing against” determinacy. Putting a horse next to a man does not generate a centaur. Since the relation between something and manifoldness cannot be one of separation, it must be one of non–separation. They must have already “merged” in a unity. Hegel writes that such a relation occurs “through [. . . ] the infinite movement of being,” and that in it “the otherness [of manifoldness] is absolutely sublated” (WL.II, p. 14/SL, p. 390). He also says that in the relation of essence determinacy is contained in something (WL.II, p. 15/SL, p. 390). This relation is described additionally as something’s “negative relation to itself,” as something’s “unity with itself in this its difference from itself” (WL.II, p. 14–15/SL, p. 390). Determinacy “remains therefore within this unity and is [. . . ] not a passing–over; so the determinations themselves are neither an other as an other nor relations to an other [as an other]; they are self–subsistent, but only in such a way that they are together in a unity” (WL.II, p. 15/SL, p. 390–391). In essence determinacy is “not free;” it is always subordinated “in the relation of essence” (WL.II, p. 15/SL, p. 390–391). All in all, in essence determinacy has a relation to something that is not one of immediacy. It is, therefore, necessarily a relation of mediation. This relation involves, somehow, “movement,” “negativity,” and “containment.” Yet, immediacy, self–subsistence, and other–relatedness do not simply vanish. Determinate something still exhibits a manifoldness structured in terms of other–relatedness, and still is characterized as a self–relation (hence still becomes a quality or quantity). How exactly are these elements (the structure of immediate being) sublated in a structure of mediation? How could essence preserve determinate something’s unity without falling back into immediate being?

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2 Seeming Hegel describes immediate being, qualitative–quantitative manifoldness, as an element that is sublated in essence and is not an other as an other to something in H2 : H2 : Thus being or being–there has not preserved itself as an other – for it is [now] essence – and the immediate that is still distinguished from essence is not merely an unessential being–there but the immediate that is [. . . ] seeming. (WL.II, p. 19/SL, p. 395)

He also tells us that “seeming is all that still remains from the sphere of being” (WL.II, p. 19/SL, p. 395). All terms involved in H2 are now familiar to us, except “seeming.” Hegel discusses this “determination” in two parts. The first (WL.II, p. 19– 20/SL, p. 395–396) corresponds to what we will call “dualistic seeming;” the second (WL.II, pp. 21–24/SL, pp. 397–399) brings out what we will call “monistic seeming.” This division is significant, for, as we shall see, Hegel identifies scepticism only with dualistic seeming, and not with seeming in general.

2.1 Dualistic Seeming Seeming has minimally the status of immediate being, of qualitative–quantitative manifoldness, but only insofar as this being has been sublated in essence, or, if you will, in something–as–essence: “The being of seeming consists only in the sublatedness of being” (WL.II, p. 19/SL, p. 395). As “sublatedness” being–as– seeming exhibits simultaneously sublation’s two basic properties: (a) ceasing–to– be or “nothingness” or “not–being–there” or “negativity” and (b) preservation or incorporation or being–a–moment. Immediate being’s sublation turns it into nothingness (WL.II, p. 19/SL, p. 395). This nothingness acquires a negative meaning from its differentiation from two other kinds of nothingness: (a) the immediate nothing (WL.I, p. 83/SL, p. 82) and (b) the unessential nothing (WL.II, pp. 14, 18–19/SL, pp. 390, 395–395). The difference from the first is that while immediate nothing is “complete emptiness, absence of all determination and content” (WL.I, p. 83/SL, p. 82), the nothingness of sublated immediate being is full of determinacy, a qualitative–quantitative manifoldness.⁴ Hegel writes that “[seeming’s content] has been transferred from being to seeming, so that seeming has within itself those manifold determinacies, which are immediate, being–like (seiende), and other to one another” (WL.II, p. 20/SL, p. 396).

4 This point is not always appreciated by commentators; see, for example, Iber (1990, p. 79).

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The difference from the second is that while unessential nothing is determinacy separated from something (in which case the “essential” something becomes also unessential), the nothingness of sublated immediate being is determinacy that is not separated from something (in which case something remains “essential being”). As Hegel puts it, “[sublated immediate being] has this nothingness in essence, and [. . . ] outside of essence there is no seeming” (WL.II, p. 19/SL, p. 395). Crudely put, whereas the unessential nothing is supposed to be an entity (an unessential being) that “stands against” another entity (an essence), the nothingness of sublated immediate being is only a “moment” of one entity (essence). Sublated immediate being’s nothingness, then, does not mean indeterminacy or separation from something; this being is fully determinate and inseparable from something. Two questions immediately rise. First, we have been informed what the nothingness of sublated immediate being is not. We still have to find out what it is: what does this nothingness positively consist in? Second, how exactly is sublated immediate being inseparable from something? The response to the first question follows three steps. First, recall that the problem with immediate being was that, due to its immediacy, it did not have the capacity to prevent something’s collapse into qualitative or quantitative being. Immediate being must, therefore, be negated: sublated immediate being is not immediate being. Second, however, something, as a structure of sublation (or mediation), must be distinguished from immediate being. For exactly this reason immediate being cannot vanish from something–as–essence. It remains as the other in opposition to which something is characterized as not–simply–immediate–being. If this were not the case, something would once more collapse into being simply a quality or quantity. Yet, this means that immediate being must be affirmed as an other of something: sublated immediate being is immediate being. Third, we have reached a contradiction: sublated immediate being is and is not immediate being. The contradiction is meant to be resolved through seeming: sublated immediate being seems to be immediate being, although it is not. There is no longer a contradictory relation between an “is” and an “is–not” but rather a non–contradictory one between a “seems–to–be” and an “is–not.” Hegel’s idea is that through seeming something can keep both (a) its not being simply a quality or quantity (to wit, its being a structure of mediation) and (b) its being also a quality or quantity (namely, its having a character of its own, a “self– subsistent” nature). In the first case, something is confronted with an immediacy that is not, a nothingness. In the second case, it is confronted with an immediacy that seems to be; this suffices for something exhibiting a contrast with its other, and thereby asserting its nature as something other than immediate being. This is why Hegel writes that “seeming [. . . ] seems still to have a side that is immediately independent from essence and to be an absolute other of it” (WL.II, p. 19/SL, p.

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395).⁵ This, then, is the response to our first question: Sublated immediate being’s nothingness consists in its not being, but only seeming to be, an immediacy. The response to the second question is that sublated immediate being is inseparable from something because it has a relation of positedness (Gesetztsein) with it. As Hegel avers, sublated immediate being “is the negative posited as negative” (WL.II, p. 19/SL, p. 395). An act of positing is absent from both immediate nothing and unessential nothing, and is precisely that which allows sublated immediate being to avoid the separation from something. This is so because that which posits immediate–being–as–seeming is something itself. Thus, seeming is explicated as something’s positing a qualitative–quantitative manifoldness that seems to be. It is crucial to realize that, given immediate being’s collapse, this is a necessary structure in the domain of logical being. On the one hand, something, an element that has a character of its own and thereby characterizes being, is obliged to posit its determinacy as an other; otherwise it would not be able to contrast itself with it and thereby acquire a character of its own. Yet, on the other hand, something, as an element that incorporates qualitative–quantitative manifoldness and is not itself just a quality or quantity, is obliged to take back immediate being’s otherness and assert it only as what–seems–to–be–but–is– not. This is why Hegel writes that something’s other “contains absolutely the two moments of being–there and not–being–there” (WL.II, p. 19/SL, p. 395). We must not forget that immediate–being–as–seeming has a relation of positedness with something. It is something itself that posits determinacy as seeming.⁶ This means that what–seems–to–be is something’s own determinacy. This determinacy is not an other of something; yet, it seems to be an other of it. This is why Hegel writes that “what remains from the otherness of the unessential, insofar as it no longer has a being, is the pure moment of not–being–there” (WL.II, p. 19/SL, p. 395). The unessential becomes something’s moment precisely because it is no longer an entity that stands against another entity, but rather the determinacy of a single entity, of something. Yet, this means that the determinacy of something, immediate being or qualitative–quantitative manifoldness, is not; it only seems to be. Something posits its own determinacy as what–is–not–there–but–only– seems–to–be–there.

5 The fact that sublated immediate being must still be exhibited as the other of something–as– essence because the latter can be characterized as such only if it is contrasted with it has escaped most commentators; see, for example, Iber (1990, p. 71). 6 Houlgate (2011, p. 141) speaks of a “projection” of seeming by essence: “[. . . ] Essence comes to be understood as that which itself projects the illusion of immediate being, that which itself appears in the guise of immediate being.”

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The concluding remarks of the first part of Hegel’s analysis of seeming confirm my interpretation. He writes that “seeming is this immediate not–being–there in the determinacy of being, in such a way that it is there only in the relation to an other, in its not–being–there, the non–self–subsistent which is only in its negation” (WL.II, p. 19–20/SL, p. 396). This is clear enough: Determinacy, qualitative–quantitative manifoldness, has no being–there; it is there only as negated. This negation is its seeming–to–be–there. It is, as Hegel has it, “the empty determination of the immediacy of not–being–there” (WL.II, p. 20/SL, p. 396). Yet, its nothingness is a relation to an apparent other, something. Something posits its own determinacy as that which is not there but only seems to be there. Such a structure of seeming is what we have called “dualistic seeming” (hereafter “d–seeming”). It is dualistic because what–seems–to–be, something’s determinacy, always refers or relates to something that posits it as what is not there. This is not the Platonic dualism of unessential determinacy that is “in another place” than the essential something. It is rather a dualism that is absolutely esoteric, a structure in something. Something bifurcates itself into a determinacy that only seems to be there and a something that posits this, its own, determinacy as what is not there.

2.2 Monistic Seeming Hegel does not end seeming’s analysis with d–seeming, but with what we can call “monistic,” or maybe “reflexive,” seeming (hereafter “m–seeming”). M–seeming differs from d–seeming in that in it seeming applies not only to immediate being but also to its seeming–to–be. While in d–seeming immediate being only seems to be an immediacy, only seems to be something’s determinacy, in m–seeming immediate being only seems to only seem to be an immediacy, only seems to only seem to be something’s determinacy. The result of this Reflexion, of seeming’s self–application, is the negation of the negation of immediate being, and thereby its restoration as an immediacy, as something’s determinacy. Yet this immediacy is not the immediacy of logical–being–as–being, the immediacy of a qualitative– quantitative manifoldness structured in terms of passing–over, but rather the immediacy of logical–being–as–essence, the immediacy of a determinate something structured in terms of negation of its seeming–to–be–an–immediacy. As a negation of a negation, the immediacy of logical–being–as–essence, something’s

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qualitative–quantitative manifoldness, is in itself a self–relation, which is the fundamental determination of something.⁷ Why should seeming’s analysis proceed from d– to m–seeming? The reason is that seeming is itself a quality or quantity, a characterization, of being. Given the argument above, determinate something is obliged to sublate this quality or quantity, namely seeming. Yet, as seen, this sublation is achieved by means of seeming. It follows that seeming only seems to be. Seeming’s reflexivity does not cancel the seeming of immediate being out completely, for, due to its infinity (seeming’s seeming is once more a seeming, and so on), it constantly falls back to d–seeming. Nevertheless, such “constant falling” has now always already been sublated in the seeming of seeming. It can never again be the d–seeming it once was; now it appears as such only as a “moment” in the circle of seeming. Given that this circle is self–relation, d–seeming is always already a manifestation of, and not a positing by, something. Or, if you will, immediate being that “recoils upon itself,” that endlessly relates to itself, is a positing that is equally a presupposing. What posits (something) always already presupposes that which is posited (determinacy). The crux of this strange formulation is that in m–seeming there is no internal distinction between something–that–posits and something– that–is–posited. Being’s immediacy is in itself a self–relation, and so it is in itself something. Qualitative–quantitative manifoldness is something’s determinacy not because it is posited by something, but because it is in itself something (for it relates to itself ). This is what is gained by seeming’s reflexivity. Hegel writes that as d–seeming seeming “contains an immediate presupposition, an independent side against essence” (WL.II, p. 21/SL, p. 397). This is not an “independent side” in the sense of unessential determinacy, but it still denotes a part of something standing against another part of it. Something is, but its determinacy only seems to be. In m–seeming, by contrast, what–seems–to–be is not only the seeming of determinacy but also this seeming itself. This allows Hegel to say that “seeming is that which is nothingness in itself ” (WL.II, p. 21/SL, p. 397). The emphasis is on the in–itself of nothingness and is meant to bring out the fact that seeming’s reflexivity is now taking centre stage. We have seen that in d–seeming what–seems–to–be is “the immediacy of not–being” (WL.II, p. 21/SL, p. 397). In m–seeming “this not–being is nothing other than the negativity of essence in itself ” (WL.II, p. 21/SL, p. 397). In this way, seeming’s dualism is sublated in essence, for “being is [now] not–being in essence” (WL.II, p. 21/SL, p. 397).

7 One of the major disagreements of my interpretation of m–seeming with Iber’s is that while I take this to be a structure that restores something, he takes it to be exemplifying something’s absence; see Iber (1990, p. 82).

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This is, then, the thrust of the second part of seeming’s analysis, the one corresponding to m–seeming: the nothingness of determinate something applies not only to immediate being, something’s determinacy, but also to itself. This self– application restores something’s immediacy or determinacy. In Hegel’s words, “the immediacy which, in seeming, determinacy has against essence is [. . . ] nothing other than essence’s own immediacy” (WL.II, p. 22/SL, p. 397). Such an immediacy is not a repetition of the immediacy we started with; it is “not the being–like immediacy, but rather the immediacy that is absolutely mediated and reflected seeming” (WL.II, p. 22/SL, p. 397). The mediated immediacy that determines m–seeming is identified with an endless, “infinite” movement (WL.II, p. 23–24/SL, p. 398–399), the constant “return” of the negative into itself. It is the “relation of the negative [. . . ] with itself,” “the negation of the negative,” “the self–related negativity,” or the “absolute negativity” (WL.II, p. 22–23/SL, p. 398–399). Hegel makes it clear that all these expressions correspond to “the seeming of essence in itself ” (WL.II, p. 24/SL, p. 399), confirming thus my interpretation. The Logic of Essence will henceforth take the form of an explication of the various ways in which it can be shown that “the determinations that differentiate seeming from essence are determinations of essence itself, and, moreover, that this determinacy of essence which is seeming is sublated in essence itself” (WL.II, p. 21/SL, p. 397). This means that the Logic of Essence will present the various structures or “determinations” involved in being’s moving from d– to m–seeming. It will be shown that any structure attempting to establish the seeming of immediate being is condemned by necessity to “collapse” or, if you prefer, “evolve” into a structure that establishes the seeming of this seeming, and thereby being’s mediated immediacy.

3 Scepticism H3 : In this way, seeming is the phenomenon of scepticism [. . . ]. (WL.II, p. 20/SL, p. 396)

H3 appears immediately after the first part of Hegel’s analysis of seeming. This shows that what is to be identified with scepticism is not seeming’s reflexivity, m– seeming, the seeming that falls back into itself and thereby generates determinate something, but rather the seeming that is not–being–there, d–seeming. In the first case, something is nothing but seeming, a phenomenon that sublates qualitative– quantitative manifoldness, the field of determinacy, into something. In the second case, something has a side that seems–to–be–but–is–not, a phenomenon that

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“inwardizes” the opposition between the essential something and its inessential determinacy. This “inwardization” strips something of its determinacy and drags it back into indeterminate nothingness. All there is in d–seeming is the indeterminate something, a sheer emptiness and absence of all determinacy. This is so because something’s determinacy, its immediate being, is not (although it seems to be); it has vanished from the plane of being. Thus, what defines scepticism in the Logic of Essence, “essentialist scepticism,” is that it bifurcates something into (a) a seeming, a not–being–there containing something’s determinacy, and (b) a hiddenness, something as an indeterminate being positing its own seeming. This structure, Hegel claims, characterizes a variety of philosophical positions, which, therefore, can all be taken to be manifestations of essentialist scepticism: (a) A part of ancient scepticism, the one grounded in the “modes of Aenesidemus,” considered all things encountered by humans as “seemings,” in the sense that humans cannot identify what–seems–to–be with what–is. As Hegel puts it, H4 : Scepticism did not allow itself to say “it is.” (WL.II, p. 20/SL, p. 396)

Indeed, Sextus constantly reminds us that “we are no doubt able to say how each existing thing appears, [. . . ] but are not able to assert what it is in its nature” (PH, I.xiv.87; cf. PH, I.vii.15, and xiv.93, 112, 123). The reason for this, Hegel notes, is that H5 : [s]uch immediacy [. . . ] would have no being outside of its [. . . ] relation to the subject.” (WL.II, p. 20/SL, p. 396)

(b) Kantian transcendental idealism is another manifestation of essentialist scepticism. Something’s appearance is taken to be an immediacy, a being–there, “which is not something or a thing” (WL.II, p. 20/SL, p. 396); it is only what something seems to be. As Hegel remarks, for Kant “that seeming should not at all have the status of being, [the subject] should not access the thing in itself through [its] cognition” (WL.II, p. 21/SL, p. 397). Thus, the reason for seeming is, once more, the subject of cognition: H6 : [Kantian] idealism did not allow itself to recognize [the subject’s] cognitions as knowledge of the thing–in–itself [. . . ]. (WL.II, p. 21/SL, p. 397)

Indeed, this is exactly what Kant says: “[. . . ] Sensibility and its field, that of appearances, [. . . ] has nothing to do with things in themselves” (CPR A251), and “what objects may be in themselves, and apart from all this receptivity of sensibility, remains completely unknown to us” (CPR A42/B59). (c) Hegel thinks that Leibnizian monadic rationalism is also a representative of essentialist scepticism. “The Leibnizian monad develops its representations

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from within itself; but it is not the power that constructs and binds together these representations. They, rather, arise in it like bubbles. They are immediately indifferent to one another and so to the monad itself” (WL.II, p. 21/SL, p. 396). The key phrase is “immediately indifferent.” Leibnizian idealism collapses into scepticism precisely because perception’s manifoldness, “the representations of the monad,” although it arises out of the monad (the equivalent to Hegel’s “something”), is supposed to have an immediate being that is indifferent to, not representative of, the monad.⁸ This happens because monadic representations are, according to Leibniz, “distorted” by the cognitive subject. This “distortion” is the cause of the unchanging and logically indiscernible essence of a thing being manifested as a plurality of continually changing properties (L, p. 245). Thus, ancient, Kantian, and Leibnizian scepticism share, Hegel avers, the feature of dividing something into (a) a hiddenness, the “reality” or “nature” or “in–itself” of something, and (b) an “appearance” which seems to be something but is not. It is clear from the text, though, that Hegel wants to ascribe to these “scepticisms” not only the belief in a contrast between hiddenness and seeming, but also the belief that seeming or “appearance” is a field of determinacy, a qualitative– quantitative manifoldness: H7 : That seeming and this appearance are immediately determined as a manifoldness. (WL.II, p. 20/SL, p. 396)

There is nothing to object here; ancient, Kantian, and Leibnizian scepticism do indeed conceive what–seems–to–be as a rich determinacy, a qualitative–quantitative manifoldness.⁹ The identification of essentialist scepticism with these historical forms of scepticism starts withering, however, as soon as Hegel claims further that they behave as if the determinacy contained in seeming is something’s whole determinacy. He moves, in other words, from a claim about a belief that seeming is a manifoldness to a claim about a belief that seeming is the whole manifoldness: H8 : At the same time, however, scepticism allowed seeming to be a manifoldness of determinations, or, rather, it allowed it to have as content the whole manifold richness of the world. (WL.II, p. 20/SL, p. 396)

8 Cf. Ingram (1985, p. 434): “[According to Hegel,] Leibniz was not fully cognizant of the contradictions implicit in his notion of the monad and generally tried to suppress them by sundering being into two disparate regions, a world of immutable essences and a world of appearances.” 9 Cf. Iber (1990, p. 79): “The [. . . ] expression ‘immediately’ here denotes the empirical giveness of pre–found contents.”

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H9 : The appearance of idealism, too, contains in itself the whole range of these manifold determinacies. (WL.II, p. 20/SL, p. 396)

This is a mistaken diagnosis by Hegel, for the “scepticisms” he discusses do not take seeming as containing something’s whole determinacy, but only a part of it. Neither ancient nor Kantian nor Leibnizian scepticism takes something to be bifurcated into (a) an indeterminate something and (b) something’s determinacy, but rather into (a) the objectively determinate something and (b) the subjectively determinate something.¹⁰ Objectively determinate something contains determinations that are not mediated by the subject; subjectively determinate something contains determinations that are so mediated. This shows that d–seeming does not correspond to the scepticism represented by the above figures. In d–seeming something posits its whole determinacy as what–seems–to–be–but–is–not. In ancient, Kantian, and Leibnizian scepticism, something posits a determinacy that is left outside of seeming because the subject interferes on its way to seeming. The “nature,” the “in–itself,” and the “reality” of something are constituted by the determinacy left outside of seeming; they are not indeterminacies. How much does this matter, though? Does it not suffice for Hegel’s purposes that these historical “scepticisms” at least distinguish between seeming and hiddenness, that “they isolate and one–sidedly emphasize seeming and hence detach it from that relation to essence [. . . ]?” (Iber 1990, p. 78). Is this not enough a reason to identify d–seeming with these “scepticisms”? For the following two reasons, the answer must be negative. First, the logical structure of those “scepticisms” does not allow them to develop into m–seeming in the way Hegel envisions, and thereby be resolved as manifestations of scepticism. Even if the seeming of a determinate something is turned upon itself, and thereby cancels immediate seeming out, this would still not be a structure of absolute sublation, a structure in which something incorporates its whole determinacy and leaves no residue of itself behind. Something’s objective determinacy would

10 For Leibniz, monads are “complete concepts,” concepts that contain all properties or “determinations” of the monad. These properties are “folded up” within the monad and unfold when they have sufficient reason to do so (M, par. 61). They comprise the monad’s “reality,” which is distorted when it is described from the perspective of the cognitive subject. As far as Kant is concerned, Langton (1998) has convincingly argued that Kant’s “things in themselves” are not indeterminacies but rather objective (non–subjective) properties. Ingram (1985, p. 431) attempts to justify Hegel’s view by writing the following: “Scepticism maintains that appearances, or empirical descriptions of identity, are only subjective and stand in no relation to the substratum to which they refer. A corollary to this kind of nominalism is the idea that substances are ‘bare particulars’ [. . . ].” The problem is that this “corollary” is invalid, since it cannot be derived from the claim that appearances are only subjective.

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still remain outside of the circle of seeming; there would still be a hidden part of something. This is necessarily so because for those “scepticisms” seeming is the product of the involvement of the cognitive subject, an element that can never be removed. The established circle of seeming would always be on the one side of something, the side mediated by the subject. This is not what m–seeming is about; it is supposed to unite something as a whole, and thereby lead any “residue” of something to extinction. Second, the logical structure of the “scepticisms” under discussion does not follow immanently from Hegel’s explanation of the “transition” from the Logic of Being to the Logic of Essence. The “transition” is explained by staying solely within the sphere of a single something, to wit, without employing as an explanans another something. For the logical structure of those forms of “subjective scepticism,” though, what explains seeming, and hence “the phenomenon of scepticism,” is the involvement of a “third” element (an element that is neither the something needing explanation nor its determinacy), namely the subject of cognition. What–seems– to–be is not the result of something’s positing, but rather the involvement of an other of something that “distorts” that positing. Without this other, the cognitive subject, the “scepticisms” in question would not distinguish between seeming and hiddenness, which is what is shared between their logical structure and the logical structure of d–seeming. So, it is the notion of cognitive subject that is fundamental in their structure, and not the notion of something’s positing its own seeming. Based on these two reasons, I must conclude that Hegel’s identification of d– seeming with ancient, Kantian, and Leibnizian scepticism is, by his own standards, mistaken. This, of course, undermines neither the logical structure of d–seeming nor its possible identification with a scepticism that does not involve the notion of a subject of cognition and does not bifurcate something into a hidden determinacy and a seeming determinacy. This would be a scepticism for which something itself posits its whole determinacy as what–seems–to–be–but–is–not. Whether there has been such a kind of scepticism in historical actuality is an inquiry which I cannot pursue here.

4 An objection and a rejoinder Robert Pippin has developed an interpretation in which seeming fits well with subjective scepticism. For him, the notion of cognitive subject is present in Hegelian Logic from the beginning, so it is neither arbitrary nor unexpected to situate a scepticism based on it at the start of the Logic of Essence. Pippin thinks so because he takes Hegelian Logic “to preserve [. . . ] a Kantian project” (Pippin 1989, p. 176),

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in the sense that its purpose is defined as “thought’s attempt to determine a priori what can be a possible thought of anything at all,” or the specification of “how thought on its own can determine objects of thought” (Pippin 1989, pp. 188–189, 204). Thus, for Pippin, Hegelian Logic is solely about cognition in the Kantian sense of the mind’s being aware of a determinate object (a “determinate something,” in Hegel’s terminology). It has nothing to do with the object determining itself independently of knowledge (Pippin 1989, pp. 177, 181, 193). Pippin understands the “transition” from one super–determination to another in terms of a defeatist experience, on the one hand, and a correction, on the other hand. The “transition” from the Logic of Being to the Logic of Essence, in particular, occurs because the cognitive subject (a) finds its “intention” to think a determinate object by means of “precritical realism” (Pippin 1989, p. 201), that is to say, in terms of determinations of immediate being, defeated (it cannot achieve this thought by these determinations alone) (Pippin 1989, p. 209), and (b) corrects this defeat by proposing a new “conceptual scheme” that employs a different structure of cognition, one in which the “unity” or “identity” of a determinate object is owed to the involvement of a synthesis belonging solely to the mind, not to the object itself (Pippin 1989, pp. 201, 203; 2013, pp. 80, 83). This synthesis, Pippin maintains, is what Hegel calls “reflection” (Pippin 1989, pp. 201, 205; 2013, p. 77). Hegel’s reference to scepticism in the Logic of Essence is explained by Pippin in terms of the above process of defeat and correction. The Logic of Being fails to explain the thought of determinate object because its “resources” are limited; what it generates is only the thought of qualitative–quantitative manifoldness. Reflection unites this manifoldness under the conceptual form of objectivity, and the end– product is meant to be the thought of determinate object. This move, however, results in scepticism because the object thought is now something mediated by the cognitive subject (Pippin 1989, p. 210; 2013, p. 75). This something that is not an in–itself but rather a mediation–through–the–subject–of–cognition is, Pippin believes, what Hegel means by “seeming.” In his words, seeming is “an object that cannot be grasped without being [. . . ] referred beyond itself to a mediated, thought–determined structure of explanation” (Pippin 1989, p. 204). Thus, for Pippin, seeming results from the “corrective” move of thought to “mediate” the thought of determinate object with reflection, the subject’s synthesizing function. This interpretation, which fits indeed well with Hegel’s identification of dualistic seeming with subjective scepticism (but not well at all with Hegel’s logic of seeming), is problematic for three reasons. First, Hegel derives reflection from seeming and not, as Pippin assumes, vice versa. This mistake prevents Pippin from recognizing that reflection is nothing but the reflexivity of seeming (in Hegel’s words, “for seeming that has withdrawn into itself and so is estranged from its immediacy, we have the foreign word reflection” (WL.II, p. 24/SL, p. 399), and

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not the cognizing mind that synthesizes the object’s manifoldness. If reflection were the subject’s function of synthesis, it would correspond to what in Hegelian Phenomenology is called “consciousness,” the equivalent of the Kantian cognitive subject or “understanding.” Hegel, however, states that reflection should be identified with neither consciousness nor understanding: H10 : But what is under discussion here is neither reflection at the level of consciousness, nor the more specific reflection of the understanding, [. . . ] but reflection in general. (WL.II, p. 30–31/SL, p. 404)

Additionally, in the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel speaks of reflection as what is in “the living substance,” a “self–restoring sameness [out of substance’s] otherness within itself ” (PhdG, p. 23/PS, p. 10). Thus, as Houlgate notes, “reflexion as such, as it is thematized in the Logic, must [. . . ] be an ontological structure, not just an operation of the mind” (Houlgate 2011, p. 142). I find H10 incompatible with Pippin’s understanding of “reflection,” and hence damaging to his defence of Hegel’s identification of seeming with subjective scepticism. Of course, passages such as H10 undermine also Hegel’s own attempt for such an identification. Second, even if one accepts Pippin’s grounding of the “transition” from the Logic of Being to the Logic of Essence in thought’s defeatist–corrective “experience” of its own “resources,” one fails to find either in Pippin’s interpretation or in Hegel’s text an explanation of the necessity of moving from the thought of being–that– is–immediate to the thought of being–that–is–mediated–by–cognitive–reflection. Pippin never considers the possibility that the “transition” from the Logic of Being to the Logic of Essence represents the move from the thought of being–that–is– immediate to the thought of being–that–is–mediated–by–itself (cf. Baur 1998, p. 147). He does not do this because he takes the Logic of Being as thematizing being’s “immediacy” not simply as the thing’s qualitative–quantitative manifoldness but rather as the “giveness” of this manifoldness to the cognitive subject. In his view, the immediacy of being corresponds to “the facts of consciousness,” what is believed (by “precritical realists”) to be present in the mind before reflection’s involvement. Thus, for Pippin, the Logic of Being is nothing but a “logic of the given” (Pippin 1989, pp. 210, 212–213), and its collapse establishes “the myth of the given.” The problem with this approach is twofold. First, nowhere in the Science of Logic being’s “immediacy” is identified with either consciousness or “the given.” Second, there is explicit evidence that undermines such an identification. Hegel distinguishes sharply between consciousness and pure thought, placing the former in the domain of Phenomenology and the latter in the domain of Logic. Consciousness is defined as the mind’s relation to an external other, which is given to it for

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cognition (WL.I, p. 17/SL, p. 28). It follows that externality and giveness are foreign to Logic. Hegel writes explicitly that pure thought “frees itself from [the] immediacy and external concreteness” of consciousness (WL.I, p. 17/SL, p. 28), and that “pure science presupposes its being freed from the opposition of consciousness” (WL.I, pp. 43, 45/SL, pp. 49, 51). The term “opposition of consciousness” refers to the relation between the cognitive subject and an external object that is given to it (WL.I, p. 57/SL, p. 60); hence such a relation is absent from Hegelian Logic. Concerning particularly “the given,” Hegel writes that “philosophy [including Logic] does not make nature, conceived of as a sensible given to perception, the ground of science; it rather cognizes its determinations from the absolute concept” (WL.I, p. 201/SL, p. 179). Specifically with regards to the Logic of Being, he remarks that “in its true presentation this exposition is the preceding whole of the logical movement of the spheres of being and essence, the content of which has not been brought in from the outside as something given (WL.I, p. 189/SL, p. 532). I find this evidence overwhelming and incompatible with the attempt to identify the Logic of Being with a theory based on either “the facts of consciousness” or “the given”.¹¹ There is, then, no justified reason for Pippin to have ignored the possibility of an “ontological” reading of the “transition” from the Logic of Being to the Logic of Essence. Third, it is not only that the text supports neither Pippin’s understanding of “reflection” as a cognitive subject nor his understanding of the Logic of Being as a “logic of the given”; it is also that it does not support his overall conception of the Logic of Essence as a theory of Kantian cognition, namely as a theory aspiring to explain how the thought of determinate object derives from the “unification” of qualitative–quantitative manifoldness by the mental function of reflection. In H11 Hegel explicitly denies this understanding of the Logic of Essence: H11 : When this movement [from the Logic of Being to the Logic of Essence] is pictured as the path of knowledge, then this beginning with being, and the development that sublates it, reaching essence as a mediated result, appears to be an activity of knowledge external to being and irrelevant to being’s own nature. But this path is the movement of being itself. It

11 Vieweg (2007, p. 122–123) identifies the Logic of Being with “a dogmatic realism that teaches pure immediacy, that posits the world as a given.” It is “a theory of a knowledge through intuition.” The immediacy of being is an exemplification of “the facts of consciousness” and “a variation of the myth of the given as described by Wilfrid Sellars.” The “transition” to the Logic of Essence signals the emergence of a new “theory of knowledge” in which immediacy and mediation “prove to be in an inseparable connection.” Yet, Vieweg derives this conclusion about the Logic of Being from what Hegel says about “immediacy” in the Differenzschrift, and provides no evidence from the Science of Logic that the Logic of Being has anything whatsoever to do with “the facts of consciousness” and “the given.

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was seen that being inwardizes itself through its own nature, and through this movement into itself becomes essence. (WL.II, p. 13/SL, p. 389)

H11 does not mean to say that the determinations described in the Logic of Essence are not structures of knowledge. Yet, it certainly means to say that they are not structures of Kantian cognition, for they exemplify determinations of being itself. They do not signify the relation a cognitive subject has with an external object, but rather thought’s understanding of those objective structures, structures in the object itself, that unify the object’s qualitative–quantitative manifoldness. In H11 Hegel tells us that seeming, the structure emerging from the collapse of immediate being, stands for the “self–inwardization” of being itself “through its own nature” and “through a movement into itself ”. I find H11 incompatible with Pippin’s interpretation of the Logic of Essence.

5 Conclusion I have argued that Hegel’s identification of d–seeming with subjective scepticism must be rejected. This does not mean that d–seeming cannot be associated with some other scepticism. The latter, however, cannot be a scepticism that involves objects being given to subjects. It would rather be a scepticism that employs something’s projection of its own qualitative–quantitative manifoldness as what–seems– to–be–but–is–not. We may call it objective scepticism. Its various manifestations would correspond to the various expressions of d–seeming in the whole Logic of Essence, and the various manifestations of its resolution would correspond to the various expressions of m–seeming therein. Yet, the details of this yet another complicated story must await for a future occasion.¹²

Bibliographie 1 Works by Hegel Enz.I: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1986): “Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I”. In: Werke. Vol. 8. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Eds.). Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.

12 I would like to thank the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung for generous funding in the period during which this paper was written, as well as Andrei Chitu for detailed commentary on an earlier draft.

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PhdG: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1986): “Phänomenologie des Geistes”. In: Werke. Vol. 3. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Eds.). Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. PS: Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (1977). Miller, Arnold V. (Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. SL: Hegel’s Science of Logic (1999). Miller, Arnold V. (Ed.). Amherst, New York: Humanity Books. WL.I: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1986): “Wissenwschaft der Logik I”. In: Werke. Vol. 5. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Eds.). Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. WL.II: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1986): “Wissenschaft der Logik II”. In: Werke. Vol. 6. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Eds.). Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.

2 Other abbreviations CPR: Kant, Immanuel (2007): Critique of Pure Reason. Norman Kemp Smith (Ed.). Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. L: Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1951): “Letters to Samuel Clarke”. In: Wiener, Philip (Ed.): Leibniz: Selections. New York: Scribners. M: Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1998): “Monadology.” In: Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Philosophical Texts. Francks, Richard/Woolhouse, Roger S. (Eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 267–281. Met.: Aristotle (1924): Metaphysics. Ross, William David (Ed.). Oxford: Clarendon. PH: Sextus Empiricus (2000): Outlines of Scepticism. Annas, Julia/Barnes, Jonathan (Eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

3 Other works Baur, Michael (1998): “Sublating Kant and the old metaphysics: A reading of the transition from being to essence in Hegel’s Logic”. In: The Owl of Minerva 29, No. 2, pp. 139–164. Dahlstrom, Daniel (1983): “Hegel’s Science of Logic and Idea of Truth”. In: Idealistic Studies 13. No. 1, pp. 33–49. Houlgate, Stephen (2006): The Opening of Hegel’s Logic. West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press. Houlgate, Stephen (2011): “Essence, Reflexion, and Immediacy in Hegel’s Science of Logic”. In: Houlgate, Stephen/Baur, Michael (Eds.): A Companion to Hegel. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 139–158. Iber, Christian (1990): Metaphysik absoluter Relationalität. Berlin, New York: De Gruyter. Iber, Christian (2002): “Hegels Konzeption des Begriffs”. In: Koch, Anton/Schick, Friedrike (Eds.): G. W. F. Hegel: Wissenschaft der Logik. Berlin: Akademie, pp. 181–201. Ingram, David (1985): “Hegel on Leibniz and Individuation”. In: Kant–Studien 76, pp. 420–435. Langton, Rae (1998): Kantian Humility. Oxford: Clarendon. Pippin, Robert (1989): Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self–Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pippin, Robert (2013): “Hegel’s Logic of Essence”. In: Schelling Studien 1, pp. 73–96.

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Schick, Friedrike (1994): Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik – metaphysische Letzbegründung oder Theorie logischer Formen?. Freiburg, Munich: Karl Alber. Theunissen, Michael (1978): Sein und Schein. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. Trisokkas, Ioannis (2009): “The Speculative Logical Theory of Universality”. In: The Owl of Minerva 40. No. 2, pp. 141–172. Trisokkas, Ioannis (2012): Pyrrhonian Scepticism and Hegel’s Theory of Judgement. Leiden, Boston: Brill. Vieweg, Klaus (2007): Skepsis und Freiheit. Munich: Wilhelm Fink.

Antonios Kalatzis

Faraway, So Close Skepticism, Subjective Idealism and the Problem of Shine in Hegel’ s Science of Logic Abstract: The article discusses the subchapter on Shine from Hegel’s Science of Logic in relation to Hegel’s effort to refute and overcome both, ancient and contemporary forms of skepticism. It is divided into three parts. The first part shows why, according to Hegel’s understanding, skepticism and subjective Idealism share the same onto–logical commitments; the second part will focus on the reconstruction of Hegel’s concrete account of Essense and Shine. In particular, it will show how the chapter relates to the Science of Logic as a whole and how the inconsistency of the logical constellation of Essense and Shine serves as an argument for introducing another, less problematic logical constellation. The third and concluding part will show why skepticism and transcendental/subjective idealism can be subordinated under the logic of Shine and, hence, share the same aporias with it. Finally, it discusses why Hegel’s argument, as encountered in his account of Essence and Shine, paves the way for the ultimate overcoming of the restrictions that skepticism and transcendental/subjective idealism impose on human knowledge and for an objective epistemological account of reality. At first, the chapter on Essence and Shine in Hegel’s Science of Logic appears to be just another, or more specifically, the second subchapter of the Doctrine of Essence; an intermediate point between the opening of the Doctrine of Essence and one of its core chapters, the one on Reflection. Yet, at a closer look, this seems to be anything but the case. As we will see, Hegel’s purpose in this chapter is not merely to give an account of the logical content and the relation between Essence and Shine, but to substantiate the claim that the logical structure he is dealing with here is the fundamental logical structure on the basis of which both, ancient skepticism and transcendental/subjective idealism operate.¹ Hence, what we encounter in this specific chapter is not only an account of some isolated and limited set of

1 Along with skepticism and transcendental Idealism Hegel adds the philosophies of Leibniz and Fichte, but I will leave this aspect aside. Antonios Kalatzis, Dr. Antonios Kalatzis, Post–Doctoral Research Fellow, The Martin Buber Society of Fellows in the Humanities and Social Sciences, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. DOI 10.1515/9783110528138-007

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logical contents, i.e. the logical contents of Essence and Shine, but Hegel’s attempt to account for and, ultimately, to refute two of the most significant trends in the history of philosophy,² i.e. skepticism and subjective idealism. What I will try to do is divided in three parts. First, I will show why, according to Hegel, skepticism and subjective idealism share the same onto–logical commitments; second, I will provide an account of Hegel’s critical exposition of the logical content of Essence and Shine, as depicted in the Science of Logic and in the recently published volumes of the Vorlesungen über die Logik from the critical edition of Hegel’s works. Finally, I will show in what sense both skepticism and transcendental/subjective idealism are variations, according to Hegel, of one and the same logic, the logic of Shine, and how this logic proves to be aporetic – and replaced by another more consistent and adequate set of concepts.

1 Skepticism and subjective idealism To begin with, let us start with the core–sentence of the subchapter, the meaning of which I will unravel gradually. Immediately after the introductory account of the categories of Essence and of Shine Hegel makes the following remark: Shine, the “phenomenon” of skepticism, and also the “appearance” of idealism, is thus this immediacy which is not a something nor a thing – in general, not an indifferent being that would exist apart from its determinateness and connection with the subject. Skepticism did not permit itself to say “It is,” and the more recent idealism did not permit itself to regard cognitions as a knowledge of the thing–in–itself. The shine of the former was supposed absolutely not to have the foundation of a being: the thing–in–itself was not supposed to enter into these cognitions. (SL, pp. 342–343)

What we encounter in this passage is, thus, the aforementioned identification between the logical content of Shine, the “phenomenon” of skepticism, and the “appearance” of (subjective) idealism. Skepticism and subjective idealism respectively reject the claim that knowledge can be objective, i.e. that it can grasp or refer to being or to things–in–themselves as such. This is because both skepticism and subjective idealism share the same assumption, namely that positioning things into a relationship, or, in Hegelese, in “determinateness” is a subjective act, i.e. an

2 For the centrality of the refutation of the skeptical claims throughout Hegel’s work see Forster 1989, pp. 99 ff.

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act that stems from the subject of knowledge, but that actually is external to the nature of the object of knowledge as such.³ Moreover, it is this act that makes impossible the claim for objective knowledge on the basis of a second premise. According to this second premise, which is intrinsically connected to the claim that human knowledge cannot achieve objectivity in its effort to grasp things (–in–themselves) or beings, is that these things or beings are primordially “indifferent” and external to any given relation.⁴ In short, according to Hegel, both skepticism and transcendental/subjective Idealism discard the claim for objectivity on the basis of the assumption that things exist before entering any relations and that true knowledge should be able to grasp things as such, before any relation to each other (see GW 26,1, p. 127). Because discursive knowledge can only know things through their relation, it cannot be considered as objective. In a word, relatedness in ontology means relativism in epistemology.⁵ Thus, Hegel’s account of skepticism in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy appears to be in complete accordance to the connection between Shine and skepticism in the Science of Logic. In the Lectures we read: Skepticism consummated the assumption regarding the subjectivity of all knowledge. Furthermore, it replaced the term being by the term shine in all knowledge. Skepticism is the ultimate peak [of the philosophical stance that takes all knowledge to be relative – A.K.]: the form of being and the knowledge of being are destroyed completely. Skepticism is philosophy, but a philosophy that either is able or willing to become a system. (TW 19, p. 358, my translation)

The same applies to the critical philosophy of subjective idealism which declares only immediateness as the measure for ultimately objective knowledge, and on the basis of this assumption it declares knowledge of entities that belong to a relation, and, thus, all knowledge as untrue and the knowable entities themselves as appearances.

3 For the proximity of skepticism and subjective Idealism in Hegel’s Jena period see Vieweg 1999, pp. 171–177. 4 For this controversy see also Horstmann 1984. 5 As Richard D. Winfield puts it: „Although the sphere of being may have relinquished its own form of immediacy, it still retains determinacy, whose content is simply given to the process that mediates it. The residual givenness of content of what is posited is exhibited in how being gets treated when relegated to a realm of “appearance” or mere “phenomena” by ancient skepticism or Kantian transcendental idealism. Although being now counts as merely relative to our experience or to some concealed ground, it does not lose any of its manifold character but simply forfeits its independent being“ (Winfield 2014, pp. 38–39; see also p. 44). For the way that epistemological relativism fits to the overall agenda of the skeptic see Vieweg 2007, pp. 28 ff.

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Hence, there would only be two things that could claim to achieve objective truth. First, the mere, and thus, immediate, identity of the transcendental I, as the subject of knowledge: The acquaintances with things, gathered from experience, do not measure up to this identity utterly devoid of determinateness, since they are in any case findings of a determinate content. Insofar as such an unconditioned object is taken to be the absolute and the true object of reason (as the idea), acquaintances with things gathered from experience are as a result declared to be the untrue, to be appearances. (EPS, p. 89, § 45)

And, secondly, the equally unmediated and immediate object of knowledge, which rests beyond all relations, i.e. beyond all discursivity: The thing–in–itself (and under thing, spirit, God are also included) expresses the object insofar as one abstracts from everything that it is for consciousness, i.e. from all determinations of sensation as well as from all determinate thoughts of it. (EPS, p. 89, § 44)

In a word, Hegel’s ultimate account of skepticism and subjective idealism is that they take as measure of truth entities that per definitionem cannot be truly grasped.⁶

2 Essence and Shine Now I would like to move from Hegel’s account and identification of skepticism and transcendental/subjective idealism to the concrete reconstruction of the subchapter on Essence and Shine in the Science of Logic. The aim is not only the clarification of this part of the book, but at the same time the depiction of the common logical structure of skepticism and transcendental/subjective idealism and, to a greater degree, the means through which Hegel thinks he can refute the claims and the epistemological limitations encountered in these philosophical trends. We must keep in mind that according to Hegel’s account both skepticism’s and transcendental/subjective idealism’s claim regarding the subjectivity or relativity of all knowledge is based on the assumption that objective knowledge should refer to – onto–logically possible or/and actual – immediate objects, i.e. to objects that can and should be conceived independently of any relation. In other words, in objects which are identical with or related only to themselves. In particular, the two first sets of conceptual contents that we encounter in the chapter of the Doctrine of Essence entitled Shine (SL, pp. 341–353) are: a) the

6 For Hegel’s critical account of the Kantian – but not exclusively Kantian – conception of truth see SL, pp. 507–525.

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Essential and the Unessential and b) Essence and Shine (cf. SL, p. 342). Since the second set is only a contentual development of the first set, I shall begin with the first.⁷ In what exactly does the logical content of its concepts consist? Let us begin from the logical content of the Essential: If, therefore, the absolute was at first determined as being, now it is determined as essence. Cognition cannot in general stop at the manifold of existence; but neither can it stop at being, pure being; immediately one is forced to the reflection that this pure being, this negation of everything finite, presupposes a recollection and a movement which has distilled immediate existence into pure being. Being thus comes to be determined as essence, as a being in which everything determined and finite is negated. So it is simple unity, void of determination [.] (SL, pp. 337–338)

Essence or the Essential is, thus, clearly defined as the “simple unity”, or identity, that is “void of determination”. On the other hand, Shine, we read, is the exact opposite of Essence. It is the development of the logical content of the “Unessential” (SL, p. 314). It is “an independent side vis–à–vis essence” (SL, pp. 343). Or more specifically, since Essence refers to a mere unity, identity or negativity – the terms in this context mean the same for Hegel – Shine refers to what is conceptually excluded from Essence. Shine refers to being or to immediacy as such. Furthermore, since the whole Doctrine of Being was the negative proof for the onto–logical impossibility of any immediate content or entity, the conceptual content of Shine has the peculiar status of being part of the logical discourse, but as something non–existent – as Shine: Since the unessential no longer has a being, what is left to it of otherness is only the pure moment of non–existence; shine is this immediate non–existence, a non–existence in the determinateness of being, so that it has existence only with reference to another, in its non–existence; it is the non–self–subsistent which exists only in its negation. (SL, pp. 342) ⁸

From these two definitions we learn three things, which mark the shift from the Doctrine of Being to the Doctine of Essense, i.e. the shift from a whole set of problems – and of logical contents – to another⁹. What we first learn is that on every level of the logical climax of the Doctrine of Essence we will encounter couples of logical

7 In concrete, Essence is a developed form of the Essential and Shine constitutes a developed form of the Unessential. 8 See also Hackenesch 1987, pp. 213–214. 9 For the three different accounts of concepts and the three different models of dialectic (“passing over into other”, “shining in the opposite” and “development”) that correspond to the three books of the Science of Logic see EPS, p. 302, § 240 and Kalatzis (forthcoming) – a.

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contents, where one of them will be a variation of identity, mediation or unity – in our case represented from the logical content of Essence – whereas the other one will stand for difference, immediacy or disunity – in our case the logical content of Shine.¹⁰ Furthermore, we learn that because of the radical critique of all sorts of logical immediacy, which took place in the Doctrine of Being, any immediate logical content has to be considered as non–being, whereas all logical contents referring to unity, mediation and/or identity as being. This is the reason why Essence is here considered as being, whereas Shine as a mere phaneomenon or as illusory being or as shine. Still, given the radical critique of all sorts of immediacy, and their demonstration as non–being, Hegel’s insistence to re–introduce or to maintain a logical content that stands for immediacy begs the question. In other words, it is anything but clear that in the beginning of the Doctrine of Essence we continue to encounter logical contents, such as the Unessential or Shine that are characterized as “Leftovers of Being” (SL, p. 345; see also p. 342). These logical contents, even if declared as non–being or as aporetic persist in the logical discourse of the Doctrine of Essence.¹¹ Why is Hegel actually re–introducing logical contents that have proven to be aporetical in the preceding Doctrine of Being and, even more puzzling, in the ambivalent status of non–being? The answer to this question is actually the third fundamental element that we get to know about the whole Doctrine of Essence and about the status of all logical contents that it entails. By the same token, it is as well the solution, as we are about to see, to the problematic relation between Essence and Shine and to the shift to the next, less aporetic logical constellation of Reflection. – We must not forget, the reappearance of immediate being as shine or as non–being is a part of the argument for the explication of the logical inconsistency of the logical set of Essence and Shine and of the need for the introduction of a new, less problematic set of conceptual contents. Along with this, we should bear in mind that in Hegel’s understanding Essence and Shine do not exemplify just an individual onto–logical problem, but that the eventual demonstration of their aporetic logical character

10 Cf. „Vom Wesen unterscheiden wir das Unwesentliche. Das Seyende überhaupt, aber 2tens hält der Verstand fest das Wesen, und das Unwesentliche ist auf der andern Seite, es ist auch, es bezieht sich auf sich: es gibt freilich Unwesentliches aber es ist um das wahrhafte Seyn zu thun, nicht um solches schlechtes Seyn: Das Wesen ist Insichseyn, Identität mit sich, durch Negation der Negation überhaupt, das Wesen ist also Bewegung, Prozeß, es ist das Scheinen in sich selbst, der Schein ist Unterschiedenes, zunächst Seyendes aber herabgesetzt zu einem Ideellen.“ (GW 23,2, p. 747). 11 As Michael Theunissen puts it: „An die Stelle des Scheins der Vorgegebenheit tritt, kurz und abkürzend gesagt, die Vorgegebenheit des Scheins.“ (Theunissen 1980, p. 337).

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amounts to the explication of the common aporias and of the implicit fallacious premise, on the basis of which skepticism and transcendental/subjective idealism operate and declare all knowledge as relative. This third element, now, consists in the broadening of the way that immediacy is understood by Hegel. In other words, the logical breakthrough of the Doctrine of Being, which conditions all further logical development, and, thus, the Doctrine of Essence as a whole, is that immediacy does not just refer to logical contents that explicitly stand for immediacy, difference, and independence. “Immediacy” refers to all logical contents that are in fact immediate insofar they do not refer explicitly to their opposite logical content. This means that logical contents that stand for identity, unity, and/or mediation are also immediate if their logical content does not explicitly entail its logical counterpart. In one word, mediation isolated from immediacy is immediate as well. In the case of the logical set of Essence and Shine this means that the logical content of Essence would be itself something immediate and, thus, a non–being, if it would not refer explicitly to its opposite, to Shine. So it is only now that we can understand why Hegel speaks about and operates with “Leftovers of Being”, i.e. with logical contents that stand for immediacy, even if immediacy along with all its variations has been shown to be aporetic, or non–being. In other words, the logical content of Essence refers necessarily in an explicit – even if still problematic (see Kalatzis (forthcoming) – b) – way to its opposite, and this is the reason why immediacy or Shine cannot be abandoned once and for all. The logical content of Essence, which consists in identity, mediation and/or unity makes sense, according to Hegel, only in reference to its opposite, i.e. to Shine which stands for difference, immediacy and disunity. An Essence without its Shine, to put it bluntly, would not be an Essence at all; and conversely we cannot speak about Shine or about phenomena without operating with a concept of being, i.e. without the concept of an actually existing Essence. Furthermore, the critique of immediacy and of self–subsisting difference in the Doctrine of Being did not aim at the dismissal of all difference, immediacy and/or disunity, but only at the ones that are articulated independently of any identity, mediation and/or unity. In a word: Essence is Shine and Shine is Essence, because they belong necessarily in one logical context, outside of which they would be deprived of meaning – and of being. Moreover, if we would actually try to think Essence independently of Shine and vice versa, then we would arrive at Hegel’s dialectical paradox (see EPS, pp. 128–133, §§ 81–82): both of them would show themselves to be the opposite of what their original logical content was. Essence – deprived of its reference to something immediate or different – would show itself to be immediate and different to the conceptual content that stands explicitly for difference itself.

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Conversely, the conceptual content of the Unessential or of Shine, even if examined independently from its opposite, Essence, refers explicitly to its opposite; to something that is not Shine, but Being; to something, whose conceptual content consists in identity, mediation and unity: to Essence. Hence, even if the original conceptual content of Shine appeared to be solely the conceptual content of difference, immediacy and disunity, when we try to actually think of it as an isolated and self–standing logical content, it shows itself, by means of its negative reference to its opposite, to function as a conceptual unifier,¹² which brings unity to logical contents. But this would mean that it would no longer correspond to its original logical content, but to the logical content that only Essence was supposed to have in the first place.¹³ Thus, in order to avoid this paradox of logical instability, we will have to think Essence and Shine not as independent conceptual contents, but as mutually constitutive parts of a broader logical content, of Reflection. Consequently, Essence and Shine show themselves to be – in this specific sense – one and the same logical content, i.e. they are parts of one and the same unity of meaning: The determinateness that shine is in essence is, therefore, infinite determinateness; it is only the negative which coincides with itself and hence a determinateness that, as determinateness, is self–subsistence and not determined. – Contrariwise, the self–subsistence, as self–referring immediacy, equally is just determinateness and moment, negativity solely referring to itself. – This negativity which is identical with immediacy, and thus the immediacy which is identical with negativity, is essence. Shine is, therefore, essence itself, but essence in a determinateness, in such a way, however, that the determinateness is only a moment, and the essence is the shining of itself within itself. (SL, p. 345)¹⁴

12 By conceptual unifier I mean a concept, the content of which refers to another conceptual content in a necessary way and, consequently, unifies itself with it. In this context unification does not mean identification but necessary reference. 13 Cf. “Das Mittelbare ist ein Gesetztes” (GW 23,1, p. 92) and “Die momente des reinen Scheinens sind die der allgemeinen abstracten Denkbestimmungen, die isoliert genommen werden vom Verstande, und so sind die gedanken Cathegorien des abstracten verstandes. In so fern sie momente des wesens sind, gelten sie als die allgemeinen wesentlichen Denkbestimmungen, und grund gesetze des Denkens, die aber das Gegentheil und falsch sind, weil sie nur die Momente des Scheinens ausser ihrer Wahrheit nehmen, welche sie sind unwahr durch die Isolirung” (GW 23,2, p. 612). 14 Cf. “Man scheidet das Wesentliche vom Unwesentlichen, das Wesen bezieht sich auf das Sein überhaupt, das unwesentliche ist das äußerliche, das wohl ist, aber das nicht wesentlich ist. Dem Wesen ist das Unwesentliche nicht unwesentlich es ist nur durch seine negative Beziehung auf das Sein. Es ist in sich, also ist es gegen ein anderes. Dem Wesen ist der Schein wesentlich” (GW 23,2, p. 498).

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3 The speculative solution Now, the proof that Essence and Shine (or Identity and Difference, Mediation and Immediacy and/or Unity and Disunity) can only be conceived in their explicit, immanent and primordial unity¹⁵ has some far–reaching implications: it uncovers the common false premise upon which both skepticism and transcendental/subjective idealism operated, and based their rejection of the possibility of objective knowledge.¹⁶ As we have seen, both skepticism and transcendental/subjective idealism postulated that true knowledge should only be knowledge of immediate things, i.e. of things cognized independently of any relation. Thus, since all discursive knowledge is knowledge of things in and/or through relations, they thought themselves justified to discard all knowledge as relative or as subjective knowledge. The unfounded presupposition of this claim, though, consists in the assumption that unity and self–subsistence (or mediation and immediacy) are onto– logically possible as separated. But the impossibility of this claim is what we have just encountered in the dialectic of Shine. Essence and Shine cannot be thought as independent of each other. Unity or Identity or Mediation cannot be isolated from Disunity, Difference and Immediacy. Thus, the claim of skepticism and of transcendental/subjective idealism regarding the relativism and subjectivity of all knowledge is based on a premise that shows itself to be aporetic. Most importantly, the explication of the falsity of this premise opens the ground for a knowledge that is objective: it is not only that discursive knowledge is a knowledge through relations, but that the eventual object of knowledge is as well an object that can exist only within relations.¹⁷ Hegel’s solution consists, hence, in the shift of our understanding regarding the manifoldness of reality and the alleged subjective cognitive act of its unification. For Hegel, this unification of the manifold is not an external and, thus, a subjective act, but rather what exists from the very beginning. Being as such has to be grasped as the unity of the Essence and its Shine, as an implicit unity that is waiting¹⁸ to

15 On Hegel’s dialectical argument, which I call the argument of logical instability, which should lead the acceptance that contradictory logical contents are not self standing but only parts of a broader logical content, which consists in their explicit unity see EPS, p. 286, § 214. 16 See also Winfield 2012, pp. 159–160. 17 Of course, this argument stands if one, as Hegel does, presupposes the identity of thought and reality. 18 The term “waiting” is not to be understood in a metaphorical way. Hegel’s understanding of reality consists in a double teleological scheme, epistemological and ontological. According to

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be grasped and made explicit¹⁹. Manifoldness is not an external given, but just the other, necessary side of unity²⁰. To put it differently, relations are not states independent to beings that determine them in an external way, as skepticism and transcendental/subjective idealism believe to be the case. On the contrary, beings (or “things”) can only be beings within a relation.²¹ Hence, the shift that allows the overcoming of skepticism and the shift from the transcendental/subjective to the objective idealism is to think the relation of beings as self–relation, or as one, primordially unified object of knowledge. In Hegel’s words: But at the same time skepticism allowed a manifold of determinations for its shine, or rather the latter turned out to have the full richness of the world for its content. Likewise for the appearance of idealism: it encompassed the full range of these manifold determinacies. So, the shine of skepticism and the appearance of idealism do immediately have a manifold of determination. This content, therefore, might well have no being as foundation, no thing or thing–in–itself; for itself, it remains as it is; it is simply transposed from being into shine, so that the latter has within itself those manifold determinacies that exist immediately, each an other to the other. The shine is thus itself something immediately determined. It can have this or that content; but whatever content it has, it has not posited it but possesses it immediately. Idealism, whether Leibnizian, Kantian, Fichtean, or in any other form, has not gone further than skepticism in this: it has not advanced beyond being as determinateness. (SL, p. 343)²²

Seen from this perspective, skepticism with its skeptical method (see TW 19, pp. 359–360), and transcendental/ subjective idealism (see GW 21, p. 40), with its re– discovery of the antinomies of pure reason are to be positioned in the pre–history of speculative philosophy; as philosophies that pointed to the elements that should be overcome, so that objective knowledge can be attained.

this scheme reality is predetermined to be grasped, and the human intellect predetermined to grasp it. 19 For a critical reading of Hegel’s argument see Theunissen 1980, pp. 377–382. Despite its thoroughness and subtlety, it seems that Theunissen fails to discern and account for Hegel’s systematic use of the scheme of implicit and explicit logical relations. Furthermore, it appears that Theunissen does not distinguish in his reading between negation as privation and negation as differentiation. 20 Cf. “der Schein ist dem Wesen wesentlich”, quoted in Theunissen 1980, p. 352. Michael Theunissen is also right when he writes: “Aber die Auflösung des Scheins des daseinsmäßigen Unmittelbarkeit welche die Idealisten und Skeptizisten, damit ihren geheimen Positivismus verratend, dem Schein andichten, soll die »wahre« Unmittelbarkeit dieses Scheins zutage fördern. Was ist daran »wahr«? Daß er ist.” (Theunissen 1980, p. 346) 21 As Richard D. Winfield puts it: „Essence is in virtue of reflecting itself, being through what it posits.“ (Winfield 2012, p. 161) 22 For a concise account of Hegel’s argumentative strategy against skepticism (and, ultimately, subjective idealism) see Forster 1989, pp. 171–180.

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Of course, when inspected more closely, both skepticism and transcendental/subjective idealism could object that they are being measured on a philosophical measure external to them, and from a philosophical standpoint that they would never adopt. Furthermore, they could claim that it is not them that operate with unfounded assumptions, but speculative philosophy itself. Both of these topics, though, would equally require not one, but a series of different articles.

Bibliographie 1 Abbreviations EPS: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2010): Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline. Translated by Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. GW: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1968 ff.): Gesammelte Werke. In Verbindung mit der Deutschen Forschungs–gemeinschaft. Ed. by the Nordrhein–Westfälischen (1968–1995: Rheinisch–Westfälischen) Akademie der Wissenschaft. Hamburg: Meiner. SL: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2010): The Science of Logic. Translated by George Di Giovanni, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. TW: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1969–1971): Theorie–Werkausgabe – Werke in zwanzig Bänden auf der Grundlage der Werke von 1832–1845, neu edierte Ausgabe. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Eds.). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

2 Other bibliography Hackenesch, Christa (1987): Die Logik der Andersheit. Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum. Horstmann Rolf–Peter (1984): Ontologie und Relationen: Hegel, Bradley, Russell und die Kontroverse über interne und externe Beziehungen. Königstein/Ts.: Hain. Houlgate, Stephen (2011): “Essence, Reflection, and Immediacy in Hegel’s Science of Logic”. In: Houlgate, Stephen/Baur, Michael (Eds.): A Companion to Hegel. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 139–158. Forster, Michael N. (1989): Hegel and Skepticism. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press. Fulda, Hans–Friedrich/Horstmann Rolf–Peter/Theunissen, Michael (1980): Kritische Darstellung der Metaphysik. Eine Diskussion über Hegels “Logik”. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. Kalatzis, Antonios (forthcoming) – a: Explikation und Immanenz. Das dreifache Argument der “Wissenschaft der Logik”. In: Hegel–Jahrbuch Sonderband, Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter Kalatzis, Antonios (forthcoming) – b: “Am Anfang war das Ende. Hegels Lehre vom Wesen und der Ansatz einer spekulativen Theologie”. In: Das Problem des Anfangs. Proceedings of the 14th meeting of the international research network “Transzendentalphilosophie/Deutscher Idealismus”, University of Southern Denmark.

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Theunissen, Michael (1980): Sein und Schein. Die kritische Funktion der hegelschen Logik. Frankfurt am Mein: Suhrkamp. Vieweg, Klaus (1999): Philosophie des Remis. Der junge Hegel und das ‘Gespenst des Skepticismus’. Munich: Fink. Vieweg, Klaus (2007): Skepsis und Freiheit. Hegel über den Skeptizismus zwischen Philosophie und Literatur. Munich: Fink. Winfield, Richard D. (2012): Hegel’s Science of Logic A Critical Rethinking in Thirty Lectures. Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield. Winfield, Richard D. (2014): Hegel and the Future of Systematic Philosophy. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Folko Zander

The Problem of Action in Pyrrhonian Skepticism Abstract: The fundamental objective of Skepticism, as well as Stoicism and Epicureanism is rooted in practicality. This is the reason why it appears peculiar that Phyrronism is blamed for leading to an incapacity of action (apraxia). In this sense, Diogenes Laertius tells us about Pyrrhon, that he never tried to avoid barriers and dangers, because his Skepticism didn’t allow him to regard them as harmful or harmless. He sometimes escaped injury only by the courageous intervention of his students. But this is obviously only a caricature that does not do justice to Pyrrhonism. According to this view, Pyrrhonians are supposed to engage in no activity because doing otherwise would be self–contradictory. The accusation of apraxia can be raised in regard of action, which I comprehend in a Hegelian sense as a moral activity. In this essay, I will try to explicate whether it is justified to accuse Pyrrhonism of being incapable of action. In this context, I will investigate whether this assumed incapability of action will lead to incapability of action in a moral sense. In my opinion, the first accusation is easy to refute, the second, less. The second accusation will be dealt with in the second part of my essay.

1 Apraxia as Inactivity The main characteristic of Pyrrhonism is suspension of judgment. Suspension of judgment is not a result of suspension of reasoning, but reasoning itself, since suspension of judgment is a rejection of judgment by reasoning. To achieve its aims Pyrrhonism makes use of dogmatic positions not to refute but to neutralize them. As a tool, Pyrrhonists create “oppositions among the things which appear and are thought of” (Sextus Empiricus 1994, p.5), aiming to show their equivalency (isosthenia). It is evident that the so–called 10 modes, as well as the modes derived from the dispute and from the relativity contained in the collection of modes of Agrippa serve to verify this equivalency, thus the function of the hypothetical mode is to throw us back ad infinitum and that of the reciprocal mode is to expel the dogmatists from their positions into isothenia. The modes are not characteristic for Pyrrhonism alone as they must be acceptable in principle for the dogmatists as well, Folko Zander, Dr. Folko Zander, Scientific Assistant, Institute for Philosophy, Friedrich Schiller University Jena. DOI 10.1515/9783110528138-008

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who, in this manner, are put into a predicament by the Pyrrhonists – and this is the only way the dogmatists can be brought into a predicament. This applies to the 10 older modes, which are, in fact, only a systemized collection of dogmatic positions, and to the 5 modes of Agrippa, which do not create a problem of justification to the dogmatists externally, but pinpoint it as an internal problem of dogmatism. In summary, Pyrrhonism is a meta–reflection on dogmatist positions and it makes use of them in a parasitical way. Although Pyrrhonists don’t have to share any of the dogmatic positions, even if the neutralizing of the dogmatic positions by isothenia depends on the recognition of the law of contradiction, they do not have to recognize this law, they just have to show that, in the end, this law always gets in the dogmatists’ way. The Pyrrhonian Skeptics openly admit that they make no assertions of their own. Consequently, they cannot be accused of apraxia, unless there is an additional assumption: the assumption that certainty on circumstance and purpose is necessary for every action. Because for Pyrrhonists, phenomena cannot be subjects of doubt, only opinions about phenomena, the motivations for action do not have to be mediated propositionally. It is symptomatic for Pyrrhonian Skeptics to be pressured by phenomena and to receive impetus from them to perform instead of simply registering their existence. The phenomena are suffered and the suffering of these phenomena must be accepted. However, what does not have to be accepted is the unnecessary doubling of this suffering by elaborating about them. For those who hold opinions that things are good or bad by nature are perpetually troubled. When they lack what they believe to be good, they take themselves to be persecuted by natural evils and they pursue what (so they think) is good. And when they have acquired these things, they experience more troubles; for they are elated beyond reason or measure, and in fear of change they do anything so as not to lose what they believe to be good. (Sextus Empiricus 1994, p.10)

Frequently, the suffering from dogmatic opinions exceeds the unavoidable suffering from phenomena. As Sextus put it: Being human, they are affected by way of their senses; but not having the additional opinion that the way they are affected is by nature bad, their feelings are moderate. For having such an additional opinion about something worse than actually feeling it: sometimes patients undergoing surgery or something of the kind bear it, while the onlookers faint because of their opinion that what is happening is bad. (Sextus Empiricus 1994, p.204)

It is, above all, the essentialist–ethical judgment, which is pathetically troubling. The only way to get rid of this trouble is to neutralize the judgments that cause it. If this is achieved, ataraxia, the peace of the soul sets in. If this ataraxia were the purpose of Pyrrhonism, ataraxia would never occur because the soul would be

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troubled by the lack of ataraxia, or, having ataraxia, the soul would be troubled by the fear of losing it. Therefore, tranquility should not be aimed at, rather it should follow “fortuitously” by suspending judgment, as fortuitously as the sponge of Apelles, which, when flung at the incomplete picture of a horse, created a representation of the of the horse’sfoaming mouth that Apelles was unable to paint consciously (see Sextus Empiricus 1994, p.10). This coincidence is dependent on the accidental formation of isosthenia, because if the Pyrrhonist were certain of it, there could not be a necessary formation and non–formation of the opposition, and the tranquility of the soul would disappear. Thus, the indifference of the Pyrrhonist has to include the indifference of ataraxia. The tranquility of the Pyrrhonist is, therefore, precarious: it can only occur under the assumption of its possible non– occurrence with the expectation of finding a truth, to which no opposition is possible. The notion that dogmatism adds to the suffering of the soul, is not inevitable. That is why the possibility arises that dogmatism can lessen the suffering from phenomena. For instance, if someone is subjected to physical suffering, he will do himself no favor by reflecting about it because he will only add the pain of bitterness to the evil of physical suffering. Let us assume that the suffering is for a good cause. This could comfort the sufferer and help ease his physical pain. But this view cannot escape Phyrronism either. Every conviction is subject to Pyrrhonian Skepticism. This applies to the conviction that the suffering is due to a just cause, which now becomes dubious. Thus, dogmatism cannot deliver a positive effect because it is incapable of reducing suffering, to the contrary, it increases it, and it must be eliminated by means of Pyrrhonism. Back to the main question. How is it possible to be engaged in doing something and still be a Pyrrhonist? Pyrrhonian Skeptics have no problem with this because, according to them, people are kept busy by taraché that disturbs them in different ways. Sextus: We do not, however, take Skeptics to be undisturbed in every way – we say that they are disturbed by things which are forced upon them; for we agree that at times they shiver and are thirsty and have other feelings of this kind. (Sextus Empiricus 1994, p.11) By the necessitation of feelings, Skeptics are led by thirst to drink, by hunger to food and so on. (Sextus Empiricus 1994, p.63)

The well–known remark by Sextus that Pyrrhonists attend to what is apparent and “live in accordance with everyday observances without holding opinions – for we are not able to be utterly inactive” (Sextus Empiricus 1994, p.11), speaks in favor of the accusation of apraxia. This quote could be understood in a sense that Pyrrhonism in fact leads to inactivity and therefore it has to make the concession

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to reality to “live in accordance with everyday observance”. But it has now become evident that Sextus only had in mind the unavoidability of the necessitation of feelings. These everyday observances, according to Sextus, are fourfold. He identifies the guidance by nature – that, which gives us appearances, and he identifies necessitation by feelings – the need to lead us to activity. We have been familiarized with both of them already. Another everyday observance is the learning of various kinds of expertise. Even this does not appear implausible. The teaching of expertise may be generally connected to the knowledge of internal relationships and funcionality, but it does not have to be. According to Sextus, acquiring expertise could be understood as a kind of mimesis. Learning by mimesis could be interpreted as not making any decisions of our own but following the master blindly. Even if getting expertise is seen as continuous improvement in techniques, this could be imagined as something advancing by trial and error – the way Sextus illustrates it through the example of Medical Methodism (see Sextus Empiricus 1994, p.63). But what Sextus identifies as the fourth of everyday observances, the handig–down of laws and customs, seems offensive and contra–intuitive to contemporary people. It is contra–intuitive because, given his life experiences, the Pyrrhonic thinker is not forced to make any decisions. Yet there is no possible way of handing down the laws and customs without making decisions, and making decisions is not possible without having opinions. This requires a more detailed analysis which will be presented in the second part of my essay.

2 Apraxia as Inaction According to Hegel, action is an attributable activity which is conscious in regard to purposes, consequences and impacts on other people. “Action” is a concept far more sophisticated than the compliance with natural drive or adopting techniques by mimesis, because it requires a subject. There is no attribution without a subject, because for the one who only reacts to an apparent B, there is another one who reacts to an apparent A. There can be no ends of action without a subject, because he who uses phenomena for pursuing an end loses sight of this particular end as the phenomena change. One could say that obeying the laws and customs of the polis was a matter of course in ancient Greece. From this point of view Sextus’ statement does not sound provocative. But it becomes provocative when you keep in mind that Sextus frequently stresses the relativity of laws and customs. Thus he writes: “[T]he myths say that Cronus ate his own children, while among us it is the custom to provide

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for our children.” (Sextus Empiricus 1994, p.39) “Among us, homosexual sex is shameful – or rather, has actually been deemed illegal – but among the Germani, they say, it is not shameful and is quite normal.” (Sextus Empiricus 1994, p.196) Tasting human flesh is unlawful “among us,” but viewed with indifference among barbaric nations (See Sextus Empiricus 1994, p.198). “Among us the law orders that fathers should get proper care from their sons; but the Scythians cut the throat of everyone over sixty.” (Sextus Empiricus 1994, p.199) Death is not everywhere considered as dreadful and birth is not everywhere considered as good. Sextus tell us about some Trachians who “sit around the newborn babies and and lament” (Sextus Empiricus 1994, p.203). These are some examples of the laws and customs according to which the Pyrrhonian Skeptic lives without holding opinions because he is not able to be utterly inactive. But unlike other everyday observances, it is the essence of laws and customs that they are mandatory. The laws are in effect because somone consciously imposes them and someone else consciously obeys them: the belief in Gods is not a matter of indifference to members of society, rather an inner commitment to faith. Isn’t it highly incosistent that the Pyrrhonian Skeptics submit to this? Wouldn’t it be more convincing if the Pyrrhonian Skeptics left the laws and customs alone by not reacting to them and lived only in accordance with the other three observances? It is impossible not to act in accordance with law and custom, and that is not why one is unable to decide this question. Sextus himself gives us an example of a tyrant who forces people to do something forbidden. That leaves two options: either comply for fear of being killed, or to refuse, and be in fact killed. In both cases a decision had to be made, there was no possibility to avoid a decision. But even if there were this third possibility, even if the Pyrrhonian Skeptic, being smart, somehow managed to get into a position where he didn’t need to take a stance any more, because no external power could reach him, this kind of inaction still would have been an action, and he would have had to decide not to act. As far as I see, the Pyrrhonist has three options to get around this problem: 1. Delegating the decision. He delegates the decisions to others and lives in accordance with their decisions, like the child obeys his parents. 2. Decision by situation. He acts truly on his own; he does not only register that he is led by hunger to bread, but sets himself situational objectives. Setting these objectives, however, should have only a situational character. 3. Denying inner approval by acting externally, in accordance with customs and laws, which is pure legalism. 1. Delegating decisions. This reconstruction of Pyrrhonian action was brought into play by Malte Hossefelder. Hossefelder asks whether there are any alternatives to living in accordance with laws and customs. The first of the alternatives would be the rejection of prevailing laws and customs. But this would require a

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re–evaluation of laws and customs. Whether this re–evaluation is self–initiated or adopted from someone else, the decision to re–evaluate would be one’s own. According to Hossefelder, the Pyrrhonian Skeptic has not become what he is by birth, but by his own decision, assuming fortunate circumstances. If he turned himself into a Pyrrhonian Skeptic, he could live by his dogmatic positions he once set when he was a dogmatist and which he now faces as a given fact. The Pyrrhonian has already made countless decisions, among which the present and future overlap, since he has made plans and given rise to expectations. For his awaking philosophical consciousness this situation is a given fact, for which he takes no responsibility, insofar as it doesn’t rest upon decisions he made on the basis of his own philosophical settings. (Hossenfelder 1985, pp.72–72, own translation)

Another alternative would be trying other laws and customs, as suggested by neo– pragmatist Richard Rotry. But because of his indifference, no Pyrrhonian Skeptic is interested in that. It is now evident that the Pyrrhonian Skeptic lives by the only possible decisions at hand, decisions the dogmatists brought into play, be it the Pyrrhonian Skeptic himself as a has–been dogmatist or any other dogmatist. Since this kind of action takes place without any kind of accountability, it can no longer be called “action”. And since the Pyrrhonian can only stumble upon given laws and customs, he is bound even by the most obnoxious customs whose obnoxiousness he wouldn’t even be able to recognize. 2. Decision by situation. The second option is called decision by situation. According to this, acting would be possible because it rests upon decisions of relative, not unconditional evaluations. These evaluations must follow the propositional attitude expressed in the formula: “this is how it is apparent to me here and now”. Here, the setting of aims would be as arbitrary as the evaluations of the methods related to these aims. The current experience of being thirsty and its evaluation as unpleasant could, therefore, be combined with the experience made before, namely that drinking a glass of water would end thirst. The difference compared to the first option is that deciding by situation should not lead to a strict conservatism. Let’s assume there is a Pyrrhonian Skeptic who has been living in a particular polis for a long time, forming a normative pattern of behavior directed against a newly established tyranny. This would even be compatible with the sparse remarks of Sextus on this subject, because he does not explicitly state that Pyrrhonian Skeptics must abide by current laws and customs, even though it seems implausible that he actually holds this view. The experience of moral outrage based on one’s own education can outweigh the opposing fear of the tyrant and enable action against the laws and customs by virtue of laws and customs. Nota bene: This works for Pyrrhonian Skeptics only if the tyrant is not evaluated as bad and one’s own patterns of behavior are not evaluated as good, and with this assumption the created

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moral sentiment is not in conflict with Pyrrhonianism. If this is conceded, could we talk about action in Pyrrhonianism? We certainly couldn’t because the aims pursued in this manner could not be regarded as self–set but rather coincidental. If the relative evaluations are based only on random experience, there can be no attribution. A subject acting in this manner would have the tendency to be volatile, therefore not sane, and therefore not a subject. A subject who found reasons to take a particular action yesterday, may refute these actions today due to other reasons. Today’s subject could not regret yesterday’s action because his motivation for action today is totally different. 3. Denying inner approval. The third option is to deny inner approval while acting externally, in accordance with the customs and laws of fellow citizens, and so not to be distinguishable from them. In tyranny, the possibility exists to deny inner approval of it and to go into a kind of inner emigration. The Pyrrhonian Skeptic does not have the opportunity to deny the approval of customs and laws because this would require a reevaluation of his presupposition, but he can be indifferent toward these customs and laws. He can slip into the role of a dogmatist without identifying with him. For him it is sufficient to use distance–creating Skeptical phrases like “no more”, “I suspend judgment”, “I determine nothing”, (see Sextus Empiricus 1994, pp.46–49) or the prefixed “it appears to me here and now, that” to remain free of dogmatism. That raises the question: does it makes any difference if one is a Pyrrhonian Skeptic or a dogmatist? The Pyrrhonian Skeptic can say or do the exact the same thing as a dogmatist, as long as he first adds the phrase “it appears to me”. In a nutshell: In his actions the Pyrrhonian Skeptic is no longer distinguishable from a dogmatist. And because he is indistinguishable, he could most likely be regarded as an acting subject. But even this is impossible because the Pyrrhonian phenomenalism gets in the way. Phyrrhonians use “Skeptical phrases” showing that their actions are oriented toward phenomena only which indicates that the actions of Pyrrhonians are determined not by them, but by random phenomena. Thus, the sense of responsibility as criterion for action does not apply. Every one of these options manifests another problem: the dependence of phenomena alone. Although giving in to impulses and mimetic activity does not bear these problems, living in accordance with laws and customs does. The person for whom only phenomena matter can function only in accordance with them. But acting is always norm–oriented. It follows that such things as “normative phenomena” must exist for the Pyrrhonist. Once the possibility of this is conceded, the Pyrrhonian Skeptic lacks the criteria to distinguish normative phenomena from other phenomena. But he must be able to make this distinction because he describes his acting as “living in accordance with laws and customs”. When Sextus states: “we do not call anything good or bad with the thought that what we say is plausible – rather, without holding opinions we follow ordinary life in order

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not to be active” (Sextus Empiricus 1994, p.60) opportunism has gone so far that the Pyrrhonian Skeptic not only neglects to evaluate customs and laws, but also neglects to verify whether the apparent laws really are laws. The relativist dictum “si fueris Romae, Romano vivito more” must be regarded as not relativistic enough because it clearly presupposes to know what custom is and what is not. Furthermore, the concept of action has two problems of stability in every one of the presented options. First: Whether they are conceptualized as mere reaction, a more conscious activity, or as attributable action, all these performances assume a more–or–less stable subject. Since presupposing such a subject must be regarded as a dogmatic setting, the Pyrrhonian Skeptic can only hope to be turned by phenomena into a stable subject who will live in accordance with laws and customs. At the very least, the deterrent effect of sanctions following a violation of the law and social pressure must be permanently strong enough to form a subject who will conform to the customs and laws and guide his actions. Second: Living in accordance with laws and customs requires a stable community. Relying on this is more than dubious, given the social and political troubles in Ancient Greece. In a civil war, you actually have to take sides, but the Pyrrhonian Skeptic cannot orient himself as to given moral customs, since all parties to a civil war regard themselves as ethical. The main problem of Pyrrhonian action is language. Although the experience of phenomena or the necessitation of feelings can get by without language, this become more difficult in imitating techniques and unthinkable when one tries to live in accordance with laws and customs. Hence, acknowledging the laws and customs requires language, not to mention living in accordance with laws and customs, which means living within society and not being an isolated individual outside of it. The problem is that by stressing the phenomena experienced by the individual the Pyrrhonist stays in conflict with the very presupposition of language. Here the understanding of the language is not the problem. A linguistic utterance can be regarded as a phenomenon which can be reacted to in a pragmatic way in accordance with other experiences. To play an active part in the use of language, one must make the assumption of being understood. The utterance is adequately understood only if the listener and speaker assign the same meaning to it. But to be certain of this sameness, the speaker should have access to listener’s inner self, which is impossible.Alternatively, both speaker and listener would have to rely on the binding nature of language, which ensures that both interpret the utterances in the same way. In short, both speaker and listener must see language as a medium of generality. However, this is what the Pyrrhonian Skeptic cannot do because of the emphasis he puts on his singular first–person experience. Consequently, the Pyrrhonian Skeptic either must be silent, or use the language in a private manner

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(like Sextus, who refers to his own writing as a kind of a diary), or use the language as a medium of generality at the price of being self–contradictory. Thus, the Pyrrhonian Skeptic must pay a high price for Metriopatheia. Using the challenging art of opposing equal accounts he manages to keep reason out of play by setting it in a kind of catatonic stupor. However, in doing so he gives himself over to conventionalism, conservatism, and eventually inconsistency.

Bibliographie Sextus Empiricus (1994): Outlines of Scepticism, translated by Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994. Hossenfelder, Malte (1985): “Einleitung”. In: Sextus Empiricus: Grundriss der pyrrhonischen Skepsis. Mit einer Einleitung von Malte Hossenfelder. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, pp. 9– 88.

Stefan Enke

Politische Philosophie unter skeptischen Bedingungen Sextus und das Gesetz Abstract: Political philosophy in a sceptic framework – Sextus and the law. Inquiries into the matter of political life in the broadest meaning of the term have always been a very important part of ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy. In this context it is no surprise, ancient Scepticism in its Pyrrhonean form has to meet the demand, too; of course they meet this demand in their own sceptical framework of thinking which is appealing and repelling at the same time. Their political philosophy is confronted with similar criticism as are other parts of the sceptical philosophy. In this essay I try to reconstruct the outlines of political thinking in ancient Scepticism – especially given in Sextus Empiricus. Then I present the criticism, that was brought forward against the sceptical approach in this respect since ancient times. That is the argument, that Sceptics will be unable to live according to their philosophy. Since this attack in this simple form was already answered by ancient Sceptics themselves, I present a more complex version of this criticism made by Hegel. Finally my goal is to defend ancient Scepticism against Hegelian arguments by showing the twofold defence, Sextus can offer: on one hand to show that there is a complete separation of philosophy and acting and on the other hand there is a serious problem in every other political philosophy.

1 Einleitung Der politische Aspekt ist ein zentraler Teil der Philosophie in der griechischen und römischen Antike. Platon und Aristoteles setzen dabei für lange Zeit den Maßstab für politisches Denken. Doch die fraglichen Aspekte spielen in jeder philosophischen Strömung in der griechisch–römischen Epoche eine wichtige Rolle. Und selbstverständlich trifft dies in gewisser Hinsicht auch auf die skeptische Philosophie zu. Auf älteren Ursprüngen beruhend, entwickelte sich unseren Quellen zufolge der Skeptizismus insbesondere durch Pyrrhon und stellt damit die älteste der sogenannten Hellenistischen Philosophien dar (vgl. Lee 2010, S. 13 ff.). Nach der Blüte Stefan Enke, Stefan Enke, M.A., Doktorand der Friedrich–Schiller–Universität Jena, Institut für Philosophie. DOI 10.1515/9783110528138-009

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des Aristoteles hatte sich die politische Landschaft und die politische Philosophie selbst schlagartig enorm verändert. Der zentrale Bezugspunkt politischen Denkens der Griechen – der Stadtstaat oder Polis – verlor sowohl in der Philosophie als auch in der Realpolitik massiv an Bedeutung. Im politischen Alltag wurde die Polis – zumindest teilweise – durch Territorialstaaten wie den Alexanders und die der Diadochen ersetzt. In der Philosophie trat die Betrachtung des Individuums verstärkt in den Focus. In diesem eher individualistischen Kontext sahen die hellenistischen Schulen die Frage nach der guten Polis oder dem guten Staat und der entsprechenden politischen Ordnung als weniger wichtig an. Stattdessen beschäftigten sie sich eher mit Fragen wie: Was ist ein gutes Gesetz und wie kommt es zustande? Gibt es ungerechte Gesetze? Wird der Weise immer den Gesetzen gehorchen? Der Skeptizismus ist hierin keine Ausnahme, wie wir sehen werden. In diesem Essay werde ich einen Überblick über die Aussagen der pyrrhonischen Skeptiker mit politischem Gehalt geben. Meine Übersetzung der Schriften des Sextus Empirikus basieren dabei auf Flückiger (1998) und Hossenfelder (1985), zu denen ich jeweils die englische Übersetzung von Bury (1949) hinzuziehe. Anschließend werde ich den skeptischen Ansatz mit der Kritik Hegels konfrontieren. Hegels Kritik des Skeptizismus hat mehrere Vorteile: Erstens ist Hegel kein Feind des skeptischen Ansatzes. Vor allem dem antiken Skeptizismus bringt er gewisse Wertschätzung entgegen, weshalb seine Kritik daran dieses Philosophieren ernst nimmt (vgl. Forster 1989; Vieweg 2007). Zweitens fasst Hegel mit seiner Kritik die Attacken gegen den Skeptizismus seit der Antike zusammen, die er – drittens – aber erweitert, wie wir sehen werden.

2 Frühe Quellen zur politischen Philosophie im antiken Skeptizismus Über die politischen Positionen der frühen Skeptiker Pyrrhon und seines wichtigsten Schülers beziehungsweise Anhängers, Timon, wissen wir nicht viel: Diogenes Laertius (DL, 9.61.) gibt uns die Information, dass Pyrrhon alle Urteile über Gut und Übel, gerecht und ungerecht für Setzungen der Menschen hält. Wie uns Eusebius (PE, 14.18.19) überliefert, bewundert Timon seinen Lehrer dafür, dass er von Affekten (πάθος), dem Streben nach Ruhm oder leichtfertiger Gesetzgebung nicht beunruhigt wird. Und in einem weiteren Fragment bei Sextus Empirikus (AM, 11.140) wird berichtet, dass Timon die beschriebene Auffassung Pyrrhons teilt, nach der es kein Gut oder Übel von Natur aus gibt, sondern diese nur durch Menschen beziehungsweise Gesetz festgelegt werden. Das ist aber auch schon alles, was wir über die frühen Skeptiker wissen. In den Fragmenten des Aeneside-

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mos, der den pyrrhonischen Skeptizismus wiederbelebte, indem er ihn von der akademischen Form abhob, können wir keinen Hinweis auf politische Philosophie finden. Allerdings können wir einiges von Sextus Empirikus erfahren, der seine eigenen philosophischen Ansichten von Aenesidemos oder der auf diesem aufbauenden skeptischen Tradition aufbaut.

3 Der Skeptische Ansatz bei Sextus Empirikus Ob es berechtigt ist, in Bezug auf die von Sextus Empirikus dargestellte Philosophie von pyrrhonischem Skeptizismus zu sprechen, ist nicht endgültig geklärt. Jedoch teilt seine politische Philosophie zumindest das oben erwähnte Merkmal mit Pyrrhons Ansicht und Sextus sieht wie sein Vorgänger das Gesetz hauptsächlich als eine Konvention: Ein Gesetz ist ein schriftlicher Vertrag zwischen Bürgern, dessen Übertretung bestraft wird, eine Sitte oder eine Gewohnheit (kein Unterschied nämlich) ist die von vielen Menschen gemeinsam angenommene Handlungsweise, deren Übertreten nicht immer bestraft wird, wie etwa Gesetz ist, keinen Ehebruch zu begehen, Sitte aber bei uns, nicht in der Öffentlichkeit einer Frau beizuschlafen. (PH, 1.146)

Dabei müssen wir bedenken, dass diese Darstellung nur eine Art Definition ist, die den Terminus „Gesetz“ von anderen ähnlichen Begriffen unterscheiden soll, wie etwa „Sitte“ im gegebenen Fragment. Wir können an dieser Stelle die Bedeutung von Definitionen allgemein und besonders in Bezug auf Gesetze in der Skeptischen Philosophie nicht ausführlich diskutieren. Wir müssen aber festhalten, dass sich keine engere philosophische Bedeutung mit der Bezeichnung als Definition verbinden muss (vgl. PH, 2.206–212, 2.214). Eher können wir darunter eine Klarstellung zur Benutzung des Begriffes „Gesetz“ verstehen, als dass wir philosophischen Inhalt in diesem Begriff sehen. Wie noch zu zeigen ist, können wir hier eine konventionelle Bestimmung des Wortes annehmen, welche darauf basiert, wie Menschen reden und was sie normalerweise meinen, wenn sie den Terminus „Gesetz“ verwenden. Es kommt daher nicht überraschend, dass sich in dem obigen Fragment deutlich der Einfluss eines römischen Gesetzesverständnisses zeigt, nur schriftlich fixierte Konventionen über gerechtes und ungerechtes Handeln als Gesetz anzusehen. Natürlich können wir weit mehr von Sextus lernen, denn er präsentiert uns die skeptische Herangehensweise umfangreich. Allgemein gesprochen gibt es in der skeptischen Philosophie drei methodische Werkzeuge. Das erste ist die Frage nach dem Kriterium der Wahrheit, das zweite die Methode der isostheneia und das dritte sind die so genannten Tropen. Dies trifft auch für die politische Philosophie

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zu. Am bekanntesten und vielleicht am wichtigsten ist bei Sextus Empirikus der Ansatz der isostheneia (PH, 1.31 ff.). Diese grundlegende Methode wird von dem hellenistischen Skeptiker in seiner Schrift „Grundzüge der Pyrrhonischen Skepsis“ erläutert: „Das Prinzip der Skeptiker ist ganz besonders, jeder Rede (λόγῳ) eine gleichwertige Rede (λόγον) entgegenzusetzen.“ (PH, 1.12) Die Skepsis stellt jedem philosophischen Argument oder jeder Behauptung ein gleichwertiges aber widersprechendes Argument gegenüber. Da beide widersprechende Argumente nicht gleichzeitig wahr sein können, erklärt der Skeptiker die philosophische Frage für unentscheidbar. Auf diese Weise stellt der Skeptiker keine eigenen, dogmatischen Standpunkte auf, sondern zeigt lediglich auf, dass die dogmatischen Ansichten nicht als wahr angesehen werden können. Sextus Empirikus behandelt diesbezüglich die wichtigen politischen Fragestellungen genauso, wie andere philosophische Fragen. Für ihn sind die Fragen nach gerechten oder guten Gesetzen, der guten und gerechten Regierungsform und so weiter letztlich nicht zu beantworten. Um eine solche Gleichwertigkeit der Argumente aufzufinden oder aufzeigen zu können, benutzen die Skeptiker eine größere Sammlung von Methoden, die als Tropen bezeichnet werden. Sextus präsentiert uns verschiedene Sammlungen dieser Tropen, die sich in ihrer Abstraktheit und Detailliertheit unterscheiden. In Bezug auf die politische Philosophie gibt es einen speziellen Tropus, der von besonderer Bedeutung ist. Er ist der zehnte einer zehn Tropen umfassenden Sammlung bei Sextus (PH, 1.36–163). Diogenes Laertius (DL, 9.79–88) überliefert uns eine Liste, ähnlich der genannten bei Sextus, die aber eine andere Reihenfolge bildet und sich im Detail unterscheidet (vgl. Woodruff 2010, S. 214). In dieser wird der Tropus, um den es hier geht an fünfter Stelle geführt und wie folgt beschrieben: Der fünfte [Tropus] bezieht sich auf die Lebensführung (ἀγωγάς), auf die Gesetze, auf den Glauben an mythische Überlieferungen, auf die Verträge zwischen den Völkern und auf die dogmatischen Annahmen. Hierher gehören die Ansichten vom Schönen und Hässlichen (αἰσχρόν), vom Wahren und Falschen, vom Guten und Bösen, von den Göttern und vom Entstehen und Vergehen alles dessen was erscheint. (DL, 9.83)

Sextus ergänzt in seiner Version: „Wir setzen nun von diesen einmal einige sich selbst entgegen, ein anderes mal jedem der anderen.“ (PH, 1.148) Gemeint ist damit, dass die Skeptiker nicht nur verschiedene, philosophische Ansichten gegeneinander stellen, sondern auch existierende Gesetze und Bräuche einander und diese den philosophischen Ansichten ebenfalls gegenüber. Als Ergebnis erweisen die Skeptiker, dass keiner der auf diese Weise behandelten Standpunkte mit Berechtigung gegenüber einen anderen bevorzugt werden kann. In den „Grundzügen der Pyrrhonischen Skepsis“ finden wir längere Passagen, in denen Sextus diese Methode auf politische Vorstellungen anwendet (PH, 3.198–217). Um dies zu tun, wählt er Gesetze, Bräuche, Regeln und Normen, die weit verbreitet sind und für viele in der

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griechisch–römischen Antike selbstverständlich sind und daher auf den ersten Blick als geeignete Kandidaten erscheinen, allgemeingültige Gesetze zu sein und auch von dogmatischen Philosophen als solche dargestellt werden. Letztlich stellt Sextus fest, dass keines dieser als allgemeingültig angesehenen Gesetze von allen Staaten und Völkern als gut oder gerecht angesehen wird. Und ebenso zeigt er, dass die dogmatischen Philosophien sich nicht auf eine einheitliche Auffassung in diesen Fragen einigen können. Dieser Ansatz – nur als gute politische Einrichtung anzunehmen, was von allen als solche anerkannt wird – ist also typisch skeptische Methodologie. Allerdings kann man sagen, dass auch der xenophontische Sokrates (Mem., 4.4.19 ff.) bereits in seinem Gespräch mit Hippias ein ähnliches Vorgehen an den Tag legt, dann aber behauptet, ein allgemeingültiges Gesetz zu finden. Natürlich weist Sextus auch die so aufgefundene Gesetzesnorm als falsch zurück. Um dies zu tun, greift der Skeptiker nicht nur auf seine methodischen, philosophischen Werkzeuge zurück, sondern kann auch ein seit der hellenistischen Zeit erweitertes Wissen nutzen. Gerade zur Zeit Pyrrhons vergrößerte sich schlagartig das Wissen über die Unterschiedlichkeit in der Welt: Die griechische Gesellschaft wurde von Alexander in den Osten ausgedehnt, wobei die Griechen selbst neue Kulturen und Völker kennenlernten und von denen, die sie bereits kannten, ein genaueres Verständnis erlangten. Ganz ähnliche Effekte hatten – bis in Sextus Zeit – die römischen Expansionen gen Westen und Norden sowie der allgemeine Fortschritt von Wissenschaften wie Geschichtsschreibung, Geographie oder Ethnographie. Daher kann Sextus im dritten Jahrhundert nach Christus aus einer größeren Fülle von Informationen schöpfen und ist so in der Lage, mehr widerstreitende aber gleichwertige, soziale Normen aufzuzeigen. Selbst für die am weitesten verbreiteten Regeln und Gesetze findet er so noch ein Volk oder eine Stadt, in der es nicht gilt – oder eben sogar das Entgegengesetzte. Auf diese Weise kann er zeigen, dass keines von diesen allgemeine Geltung besitzt, da keines überall anerkannt ist. Und Sextus geht sogar noch weiter: „Aber selbst wenn wir bei einigen Dingen nicht gleich eine fehlende Übereinstimmung benennen können, so ist zu sagen, dass bei irgendwelchen Völkern, die wir nicht kennen, auch hierüber Uneinigkeit herrschen kann.“ (PH, 3.233) Skeptizismus, vor allem in Hinblick auf die politische Philosophie, muss auch verstanden werden als eine Antwort auf dieses Problem größerer Diversität der Kulturen. Und offensichtlich ist der Skeptizismus nicht allein dabei, diese problematische Situation philosophisch zu lösen, und einige dogmatische Schulen der hellenistischen Zeit versuchen sie unter modifizierter Verwendung skeptischer Strategien zu überwinden.

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4 Kritik am Skeptizismus Die Kritik am skeptischen Ansatz und der skeptischen Philosophie allgemein läuft seit der Antike nahezu immer auf den selben Punkt hinaus. Dieser ist bekannt als das Apraxia–Problem und ist bereits seit der Antike das am besten bekannte Argument gegen die Skeptiker (Vogt 2010, S. 165). Wir finden diese Form der Kritik auch in Hegel und können sie mit ihm formulieren. Hegels Kritik hat den Vorteil, dass sie die altbekannte Zurückweisung erweitert und weitere Aspekte der Untersuchung hinzufügt. Aber schauen wir zunächst die basale Kritik an. Durch die grundlegende Methode der isostheneia verweigert der Skeptiker, ein bestimmtes, eigenes Urteil über irgendetwas abzugeben. Er weist ausschließlich fremde Urteile zurück. Dies aber sollte es dem Skeptiker selbst unmöglich machen, irgendetwas zu tun, denn es gibt keinen Weg, wie er entscheiden könnte, was zu tun, wann es zu tun, wie es zu tun und so weiter. Andererseits ist aber auch die Entscheidung, nichts zu tun, bereits eine Entscheidung und mit Konsequenzen behaftet. Das beständige Gegenüberstellen von gleich gültigen Meinungen, die sich widersprechen, bringt das Problem mit sich, dass der Skeptiker von nichts sagen kann, dass es gut oder wahr sei. Während eine solche Haltung für philosophische Untersuchungen kein Problem darstellt, funktioniert sie nicht im alltäglichen Leben, in dem „Nicht– Entscheiden“ auch Konsequenzen hat. Aus diesem Grund ist der Skeptizismus dem Vorwurf ausgesetzt, dass nach seinen Prinzipien nicht gelebt werden kann. Um diese Sichtweise zu untermauern, wird sehr häufig auf die Anekdoten über Pyrrhon verwiesen, in denen behauptet wird, dass er weder Wagen, die drohten ihn zu überrollen, oder wilden Hunden, die ihn attackierten, auswich (vgl. DL, 9.62), oder ähnliches. Diese Legenden, die sich über die Skeptiker lustig machen, stammen wohl eher aus gegnerischen Polemiken, als dass sie akkurate Berichte über das Leben Pyrrhons darstellen. Nach Diogenes Laertius wurden sie spätestens von Aenesidemos als Verleumdungen zurückgewiesen. Hegel bemerkt in seinen „Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie“ ganz richtig, dass diese Anekdoten nicht mit dem skeptischen Denken in Einklang stehen (TWA 19, S. 370). Bis heute werden sie dennoch benutzt, um die angeblichen Probleme des Skeptizismus anschaulich zu machen. Sie zielen darauf ab, zu verdeutlichen, dass der Skeptiker in völliger Indifferenz gegenüber der Welt lebt – da er alle Wahrheit verneint. Er müsse alle Wahrnehmungen als unbestimmt in ihrer Wirklichkeit annehmen. Wie – oder wenigstens warum – sollte er dann der Wahrnehmung nach drohender Gefahr ausweichen? Wie kann er feststellen und überzeugt sein, dass es da eine Gefahr gibt und so weiter. Leicht können wir sehen, was dies für die politische Philosophie bedeutet. So sagt Hegel über die skeptische Auffassung: „[. . . ] ebenso Gesetze, wenn ihr Grund

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ist, weil sie gelten, so ist auch ihr Gegenteil. Da jedes so gut gilt als das andere, so gilt keins“ (TWA 19, S. 383). Da der Skeptiker durch das Gegenüberstellen von widersprechenden, aber doch gleichwertigen Sichtweisen auf die verschiedenen Gesetze gezeigt hat, dass keines von ihnen generell als evident gut und gerecht anerkannt wird, kann er selbst keines der Gesetze, die existieren oder von den Philosophen vorgeschlagen werden, als zutreffend anerkennen und akzeptieren. Man kann daher die Frage an den Skeptiker richten, ob dies nicht ein Problem im Staat darstellt, wenn er die jeweils geltenden Gesetze nicht akzeptiert oder seine Pflichten dem Staat gegenüber nicht erfüllt. Wird er vielleicht sogar stehlen oder jemanden töten? Wird er, allgemein gesprochen, den Gesetzen gehorchen? Kann der Skeptiker eigentlich am Gesetzgebungsprozess teilnehmen, während er sich von einem Urteil darüber zurückhalten muss, was ein gutes Gesetz ist? Man kann sich noch einige weitere solche Probleme vorstellen, die aus diesem Verständnis skeptischer Philosophie erwachsen. Letztendlich läuft die Kritik dennoch darauf hinaus, festzustellen, dass der Skeptiker nicht in der Lage ist, irgendetwas zu tun, weil er nicht entscheiden kann. Doch durch das Nichtstun ist der Skeptiker noch nicht vom Haken. Klaus Vieweg formuliert die Kritik zusammenfassend: „Radikale Skepsis kann nicht gelebt werden, Zurückhaltung oder Unterlassen ist fatalerweise auch Handeln.“ (Vieweg 2007, S. 38).

5 Eine Unterscheidung der Wahrheitskriterien Natürlich blieb die Kritik, die in ihrer anekdotenhaften Form bereits kurz nach Pyrrhon aufkam, nicht unbemerkt von der Skeptischen Schule und hat Reaktionen hervorgebracht. Das Bedürfnis zur Lösung des Problems resultiert aus der Feststellung, dass der Skeptiker nicht gänzlich untätig sein kann, wie Sextus selbst bemerkt (PH, 1.23). Die Skepsis, wie sie Sextus präsentiert, hat dementsprechend eine mögliche Antwort gegeben. Die Benutzung des zehnten Tropus, wie oben dargestellt, und auch der Ansatz der isostheneia im Allgemeinen werden in der Skeptischen Philosophie einem weiteren Prinzip untergeordnet. Sextus führt seine Untersuchungen so durch, dass er zeigt, dass keines der Gesetze überall oder von allen als gut und gerecht angesehen wird. Im Skeptizismus stellt diese Übereinstimmung von allen ein Kriterium dar, mit dem die Wahrheit von etwas bestätigt werden kann. Es wird als ein mögliches Kriterium angesehen, doch wirft dies bereits einige fundamentale Probleme auf. Nach Sextus wird ein solches Kriterium dazu genutzt, eine „Bestätigung der Wirklichkeit oder Nichtwirklichkeit“ zu geben (PH, 1.21). Die Skeptiker unterscheiden zwischen den Phänomenen und dem Seienden, sind aber

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unfähig, die Relation, in der beides zueinander steht, zu entschleiern. Ein Kriterium, welches der genannten Anforderung entspricht, wäre dazu in der Lage. Sextus führt weiter aus, dass ein solcher „Maßstab“ von dogmatischen Philosophen nach drei Prinzipien gestaltet werde. Man kann demnach Wahrheit erstens dadurch erkennen, durch wen etwas ausgesagt wird, zweitens mit welcher Methode etwas ausgesagt wird und drittens worüber etwas ausgesagt wird. Diese Kriterien, über die hier nicht weiter detailliert gesprochen werden kann, stellen dogmatische Wahrheitskriterien dar und der Skeptiker muss sie selbstverständlich am Ende alle zurückweisen, wie Sextus zeigt (PH, 2.21– 96). Ob es überhaupt ein solches Kriterium gibt – oder überhaupt geben kann – geben die Skeptiker nicht an; sie halten auch hierin ihr Urteil zurück. Das heißt nichts anderes, als dass sie durch die Benutzung der Methode der isostheneia nicht in der Lage sind, zu entscheiden, ob es so etwas gibt oder nicht. Es scheint eher fraglich, dass ein Kriterium die vollen Anforderungen der Skeptiker erfüllen kann, auch wenn Sextus betont, die Zurückhaltung des Skeptikers im Urteil bedeute nur, dass er noch auf der Suche danach ist. Doch eine Entscheidung für ein solches Kriterium der Wahrheit kann ihrerseits auch nur mittels eines Kriteriums der Wahrheit getroffen werden – und dies führt natürlich in eine zirkuläre Begründung ohne Ausweg, wie der Skeptiker zeigt (PH, 2.19 ff.). Das genannte Kriterium allgemeiner Zustimmung steht – erstaunlich genug – irgendwie außerhalb dieser Überlegungen. Vielleicht ist eine solche Übereinkunft, welche einher geht mit direkter Evidenz der offenbaren Wahrheit, von den Skeptikern als prinzipiell möglich angesehen worden. Allerdings macht Sextus auch unmissverständlich klar, dass bisher solch direkte Evidenz in keiner Frage hergestellt worden ist und daher auch keine vollständige Übereinstimmung in irgendeiner Frage besteht. Eine solche Übereinstimmung ist ein theoretischer Endpunkt – das eingeforderte Ziel – der philosophischen Untersuchungen der Skeptiker. Neben diesem Kriterium für theoretische, philosophische Fragen, haben die Skeptiker auch ein Kriterium für praktisches Handeln – mehrere sogar, um genau zu sein. Sextus erklärt, dass die Erscheinungen oder Phänomene dieses Kriterium für das alltägliche Leben sind (PH, 1.22). Allgemein sagen die Skeptiker, dass alle ihre Aussagen nur danach getroffen werden, wie es ihnen erscheint – nach den Erscheinungen also. Wie Hegel sagt, hören und sehen die Skeptiker, und zweifeln dies nicht an. Sextus sagt explizit: Diejenigen, die behaupten, die Skeptiker höben die Erscheinungen auf, scheinen mir unvertraut zu sein mit dem, was von uns gesagt wird. Denn an den Dingen, die uns in einer erlebnismäßigen Vorstellung unwillkürlich zur Zustimmung führen, rütteln wir nicht, wie ich schon oben gesagt habe. Dies sind die Erscheinungen. Wenn wir nun fragen, ob das Zugrundeliegende so ist, wie es erscheint, so geben wir zu, dass es erscheint, wir fragen aber

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nicht nach dem Erscheinenden, sondern nach dem, was über das Erscheinende ausgesagt wird – dies aber unterscheidet sich vom Zweifeln an den Erscheinungen. (PH, 1.19)

Die Erscheinungen, die für das praktische Handeln relevant sind, sind etwas Erlittenes, von dem wir unfreiwillig und unrational affiziert werden. Dies bedeutet, dass sie unabhängig von einer Wahl oder Aktivität des Skeptikers von diesem erfahren werden, wie Sextus selbst erwähnt (AM, 11.143). In diesem Sinne hat es eine rein subjektive Natur, denn das gleiche Ding kann, auch gemäß skeptischer Ansicht, leicht unterschiedlichen Subjekten unterschiedlich erscheinen. Allerdings enthält dies auch eine Form unbezweifelbarer Wahrheit, da man nicht sinnvoll in Frage stellen kann, dass etwas jemandem so erscheint, wie es ihm erscheint. Diese unfreiwilligen Erfahrungen können in vier verschiedene Kategorien unterteilt werden, wie Sextus sagt: „Es scheint diese alltägliche Lebenserfahrung vierteilig zu sein, und teils aus der Vorzeichnung der Natur, teils aus dem notwendigen Erleiden, teils aus Überlieferung von Gesetzen und Sitten, teils aus der Unterrichtung in den Kunstfertigkeiten.“ (PH, 1.23) Es gibt also, erstens, einige Aspekte, die in der körperlichen Beschaffenheit gegeben sind, welche unfreiwillige Erfahrungen aufzwingt. Die Fähigkeit zu Denken und sensorische Wahrnehmungen zu haben sind zwei davon. Zweitens, wird man von bestimmten Erfahrungen gezwungen. So kann man sich nicht gegen solche Empfindungen wie Hunger oder Durst verwehren – und man kann sich von solchen Erfahrungen zu den Handlungen des Trinkens und Essens leiten lassen. Drittens, und hier erscheint nun das Politische, bestimmen auch die überlieferten Bräuche und Gesetze als Kriterium das praktische Handeln. Als ein Beispiel bringt Sextus die Annahme, dass das ausführen der üblichen religiösen Handlungen nützlich und ihre Unterlassung nicht nützlich sei (PH, 1.24). Viertens schließt das Kriterium auch die Unterrichtung in den Künsten mit ein. Wie immer bei den Skeptikern stehen auch diese Bestimmungen unter dem Vorbehalt, dass es dem Skeptiker nur erscheint und daher nicht dogmatisch gemeint ist. Allerdings ist in dieser Passage nicht genau klar, was das genau bedeuten soll. Einerseits kann die Unterteilung in vier Kategorien damit gemeint sein, andererseits das Zutreffen der einzelnen beschriebenen Teile, so dass nicht allgemein angenommen werden kann, dass sie valide sind, sondern nur unter Bedingungen, oder ähnliches. Trotz dieser Unklarheit, ist deutlich, dass diese praktischen Kriterien das Handeln der Skeptiker erlauben und leiten können. Im erwähnten Fall heranbrausender Wagen oder angreifender Hunde gäbe es – oder eben auch nicht – eine entsprechende Wahrnehmung davon und eine Reaktion, die nicht in Betracht zieht, was zu tun die richtige Entscheidung wäre, sondern die nur die Wahrnehmung selbst. Eine Angst und der Instinkt, auszuweichen, sind zwei mögliche Kandidaten, die hier im Spiel sein könnten. Jedoch ist

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mit diesem Kriterium kein Anspruch auf Richtigkeit oder auch nur Rechtfertigung verbunden. Zusätzlich scheint keine Hierarchie zwischen diesen vier Kriterienarten zu bestehen. Daher scheint im sehr wahrscheinlichen Falle eines Konfliktes zwischen diesen Kriterien jede Präferenz für ein bestimmtes eher zufällig zu sein. Die Frage, ob der skeptische Weise den Gesetzen entsprechen wird, bleibt daher noch unbeantwortet und bedarf weiterer Untersuchungen. An dieser Stelle sollten wir noch einmal auf unser erstes Fragment mit seiner Definition des Wortes „Gesetz“ zurückblicken. Wie wir gesehen haben, handelte es sich eher um eine Klarstellung der konventionellen Verwendung des Wortes. Die mögliche Verbindung zum praktischen Kriterium ist leicht zu erkennen, auch wenn Sextus diese Verbindung nicht explizit herstellt. Die Benutzung bestimmter Worte für bestimmte Erscheinungen muss ein konventioneller Brauch sein, der nicht irgendeiner philosophischen Betrachtung bedarf. Eher ist die Benutzung eines Wortes zufällig nach Zeit und Ort. Und die Äußerung eines Wortes enthält nicht die Behauptung ihrer eigenen Wahrheit. In seiner Unfähigkeit, sich selbst nicht zu äußern – oder auch: seiner Unfähigkeit, nicht durch Äußerung zu handeln – muss der Skeptiker Worte in ihrer konventionellen, verstandenen Bedeutung kontingent zu Ort und Zeit der Äußerung benutzen. Es sollte unmöglich sein für den Skeptiker, einen bestimmten Begriff einer Erscheinung oder einem Ding als richtig zuzuschreiben, denn diese Zuschreibung unterscheidet sich von Zeit zu Zeit und Gemeinschaft zu Gemeinschaft. Und natürlich besteht auch hierin Uneinigkeit bei den Philosophen. Daher ist jede Forderung nach einer Bestimmung des Wortes oder dem Gebrauch der Sprache, welche etwas über den alltäglichen Gebrauch und dessen Erfahrung hinaus geht, für den Skeptiker unsinnig. Wie ein Kind, das gerade die Sprache lernt, indem es die Erfahrung ihres Gebrauchs in der Gemeinschaft, in der es aufwächst, macht, ohne dabei irgend eine philosophische Untersuchung anzustellen über die Bedeutung und Funktionalität von Sprache, kann der Skeptiker die Sprache selbst auch im Sinne eines praktischen Handelns gemäß der Kriterien verwenden. Wir finden bei Sextus Empirikus allerdings nur Andeutungen in diese Richtung in den Passagen gegen die Grammatiker (vgl. etwa AM, 1. 36–38, 1.142–158 & 1.176–240).

6 Weitere Kritik von Hegel Die so gegebene Lösung dieser erster Kritik ermöglicht weitere Attacken Hegels. Hegel sagt diesbezüglich etwa in den „Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie“:

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Sie richteten sich allerdings nach dem, was sie sahen, hörten, nach dem Recht und den Gesetzen, die galten, nach dem, was die Klugheit erforderte, aber es hatte nicht die Bedeutung einer Wahrheit für sie, sondern nur einer Gewißheit, einer subjektiven Überzeugung, welche nicht den Wert eines Anundfürsichseienden hat. (TWA 19, S. 370)

Der Skeptiker richtet sich in seinen Handlungen nach den Erscheinungen. Dadurch macht er sich selbst abhängig von den sinnlichen Wahrnehmungen. Gleichzeitig verneint er aber jede objektive Wahrheit aller Wahrnehmungen. Dies ist der Vorwurf der Inkonsistenz beziehungsweise Selbstwidersprüchlichkeit, den Hegel in der Phänomenologie des Geistes zusammenfasst: „[Das skeptische Selbstbewusstsein] spricht die Nichtigkeit des Sehens, Hörens usf. aus, und es sieht, hört usf. selbst, es spricht die Nichtigkeit der sittlichen Wesenheiten aus und macht sie selbst zu den Mächten seines Handelns. Sein Tun und seine Worte widersprechen sich immer [. . . ]“ (TWA 3, S. 161). Die Handlungen, wie Hegel damit bemerkt, können nicht in Einklang mit der philosophischen Position der Skeptiker gebracht werden. Für die politische Philosophie wiederum bedeutet dies: Der Skeptiker kann nicht selbst entscheiden, welche Handlungen gut und gerecht sind, und akzeptiert daher einfach, was gegeben ist, ohne es zu hinterfragen. Er weiß nicht, ob dieses oder jenes Gesetz gerecht ist, also erkennt er das Gegebene an – in diesem Land und zu dieser Zeit dieses, zu anderer Zeit oder an anderem Ort ein anderes, vielleicht entgegengesetztes. Der Skeptiker ist damit nicht nur abhängig von der Zufälligkeit des Gegebenen, sondern ergibt sich damit auch der Willkür des Herrschers. Hegel fasst über das skeptische Selbstbewusstsein zusammen: „Es handelt nach Gesetzen, die ihm nicht für wahr gelten; es ist ein vollkommen empirisches Dasein.“ (TWA 19, S. 400)

7 Eine Anwendung des praktischen Kriteriums der Gesetze Um dies beurteilen zu können, müssen wir näher untersuchen, wie die Skeptiker das praktische Kriterium der Gesetze nutzen. Soweit ich sehen kann, gibt uns Sextus nur ein Beispiel einer solchen Anwendung des praktischen Kriteriums hinsichtlich des Politischen. Dieses ist nicht nur wenig detailliert, sondern auch mit einigen Schwierigkeiten behaftet. Sextus schreibt über den skeptischen Weisen: „Und wenn er von einem Tyrannen dazu gezwungen wird, etwas Verbotenes zu tun, wird er zufällig das eine wählen und das andere vermeiden, auf Grund des Vorbegriffs gemäß der väterlichen Gesetze und Bräuche.“ (AM, 11.166) In diesem Satz sind gleich mehrere Dinge irritierend: Erstens zwingt der Tyrann zu einer

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verbotenen Handlung. Das wirft die Frage danach auf, nach welcher Maßgabe diese als verboten angesehen wird. Gilt das Verbot laut einem Gesetz des Tyrannen, wird dieser die Handlung wohl nicht einfordern. Gilt das Verbot dagegen laut einem früheren Gesetz oder den althergebrachten Sitten, so ist es aber ungültig und durch neue Vorschriften ersetzt. Somit aber erscheint es nicht mehr als ein Verbot im eigentlichen Sinne. Natürlich kann auch die Fortdauer eines früheren Verbotes angenommen werden, wenn es als ein Gebot der Moral anerkannt wird. Ein solches moralisches Gesetz, welches Allgemeingültigkeit beansprucht, kann der Skeptiker allerdings nicht annehmen, da er kein Kriterium dafür kennt. Eine mögliche Lösung für diese Schwierigkeit scheint zu sein, dass ein Tyrann als Herrscher gesehen wird, der keine neuen Gesetze erlassen kann, sondern nur willkürlich herrscht, indem er die Gesetze umgeht. Dies würde durchaus mit dem Verständnis des Wortes Tyrann in der griechischen Antike und auch der von Sextus gegebenen Definition des Gesetzes in Einklang stehen. Zweitens kommt an dieser Stelle der Vorbegriff (πρόληψις) hinzu, nach dem der Skeptiker seine Handlung wählt. Der griechische Terminus prolepsis wurde – soweit wir wissen – von Epikur entwickelt und ist ein wichtiges Konzept in dessen Epistemologie. Sein philosophischer Inhalt muss demnach als dogmatisch angesehen werden. So verstanden, erweist sich der Vorbegriff als problematisch, weil er auf die Meinung der Menschen und den allgemeinen Gebrauch der Sprache verweist. Er ist, mit Bett gesprochen, „an attitude, of a type which would be generally shared among conventional people“ (1997, S. 177). Anders als in der epikureischen Philosophie ist der Vorbegriff bei Sextus wohl kein Kriterium der Wahrheit und nicht verbunden mit einem Anspruch auf Richtigkeit oder Wirklichkeit, sondern gibt nur eine von verschiedenen, möglichen Zuschreibungen von Bedeutungen, wie wir aus einer anderen Passage lernen können (AM, 8.331a ff.). Wir können vielleicht am ehesten Sinn aus der Benutzung des Terminus Vorbegriff machen, wenn wir sie mit dem verknüpfen, was wir über das praktische Kriterium und die gewohnheitsmäßige Benutzung der Sprache gesagt haben. Nicht ganz klar ist allerdings, ob es sich an dieser Stelle um einen eigenen Vorbegriff des Skeptikers handelt oder eben eine geläufige Meinung der Menschen etwa innerhalb einer Polis. Dass beide Arten von Vorbegriff für den Skeptiker sehr eng miteinander verbunden sind, lässt dieses Problem allerdings für uns zweitrangig werden. Drittens ist nicht sicher, ob die Wahl, die der Skeptiker zu treffen hat, im Einklang mit den väterlichen Sitten und Gesetzen stehen soll, oder ob viel mehr der gerade angeführte Vorbegriff mit jenen in Einklang steht. Die erste Annahme legt nämlich nahe, dass sich die Wahl der Handlung direkt am althergebrachten Gesetz orientiert. Hossenfelder (1985, S. 69) scheint genau dies anzunehmen, wenn er sagt, dass das Gesetz seinen Vorbegriff selbst repräsentiert – meiner Meinung nach ein ganz epikureischer Gedanke. Die zweite Annahme, im Gegensatz dazu, legt die Priorität eher auf den Vorbegriff, welcher in den Menschen selbst liegt.

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Diese Auffassung deckt sich mit der Übersetzung Flückigers (1998, S. 300) am ehesten. Burys (1987, S. 465) Übersetzung verknüpft den Vorbegriff direkt mit den Bräuchen und Gesetzen der Vorväter. Wie dem auch sei, aus der Beschreibung geht hervor, dass der Skeptiker die Problematik der Tyrannei in seinen willkürlichen Handlungen, welche nicht als Gesetz anerkannt werden, sieht. Auch dies stimmt mit der skeptischen „Definition“ des Gesetzes, die wir bereits beschrieben haben, überein, welche ja eine Art Konsens der Mitbürger impliziert. Viertens wählt der Skeptiker nun aber zufällig aus: Vielleicht (τυχὸν) das eine oder das andere. Die Andeutung von Zufälligkeit – so Flückigers Übersetzung, Bett übersetzt „perhaps“ – der Wahl kann zwei unterschiedliche Dinge bedeuten. Einerseits unterstreicht es die Tatsache, dass die Wahl auf keinerlei dogmatischer Annahme über die moralische Richtigkeit der Handlung basiert, sondern eine Entscheidung darstellt, die nach dogmatischem Maßstab mit gleicher Berechtigung auch anders hätte getroffen werden können. Andererseits deutet sich hier auch an, dass gar keine irgendwie geartete philosophische Reflexion der Handlung vorausgeht. Diese problematischen Komponenten der Argumentation beiseite gelassen, wird in dem Fragment deutlich, dass der hier beschriebene Mechanismus Handeln ohne Zweifel möglich macht. In der Abwesenheit einer bestimmten theoretischen Wahrheit über das Gute und Gerechte, über das gute und gerechte Gesetz oder die gute und gerechte Staatsordnung ist der kontingente Gehorsam gegenüber den väterlichen Gesetzen genauso gut, schlecht oder was auch immer, wie der gegenüber jedem anderen möglichen Gesetz. Der Zwang, der als ein unfreiwilliges Erleben durch das nicht Befolgen der geltenden Gesetze eines Landes erfolgt, leitet den Skeptiker in seinen praktischen Handlungen. Angst oder Unruhe in Erwartung einer Bestrafung auf Grund solcher Gesetze werden unfreiwillig erlitten, und sind daher unbezweifelbar. Eine Rangordnung der vier praktischen Kriterien–Gruppen scheint ebenso zufällig und subjektiv zu sein. Die Annahme einer eingebauten Hierarchie in der von Sextus gegebenen Aufzählung, die Hossenfelder (1985, S. 85) macht, ist selbst eine dogmatische Vorstellung. Sie hat die Annahme über eine inhärente „Bedeutung des Gesetzes“ zur Voraussetzung, welche die Skeptiker vermutlich als dogmatisch ablehnen würden. Mehr noch sollte man auch die Zufälligkeit in Betracht ziehen, die in der Tatsache begründet ist, dass die in Frage stehende Wahl der Handlungen allein auf der Zuschreibung beruht, ob einer als Tyrann angesehen wird und daher keine rechtmäßigen Gesetze erlassen kann oder nicht.

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8 Die vollständige Trennung von Philosophie und praktischem Leben In der Auffassung Betts verlagert sich die Entscheidung über die Handlung vollständig auf die Vorannahme: „The sceptic’s decisions and actions are determined by these preconceptions, and not by dogmatic opinions.“ (Bett 1997, S. 177) „In fact, it will not be based on reasoning at all; it is simply the causal outcome of the play of psychological forces which his upbringing leads him to undergo in this particular case.“ (Bett 1997, S. 178) Die Betonung der Zufälligkeit in der Wahl unterstreicht dies einmal mehr. Es ist jedoch offensichtlich geworden, dass diese Anwendung des Kriteriums für den nach dem Skeptizismus Lebenden keinesfalls eine simple Unterwerfung unter die „Herrschaft des Erscheinenden“ (Vieweg 2007, S. 39; vgl. Ricken 1994, S. 22) bedeutet. Selbst wenn wir die Vorannahmen als eine Form der Erscheinungen ansehen, wie wir die Gesetze und Bräuche ja auch als solche ansehen, so bleiben dennoch Zufälligkeit und das Wählen des Skeptikers selbst involviert. Die Anwendung des Kriteriums bedeutet daher nicht notwendig, dass der Skeptiker Diener des Tyrannen sein wird – allerdings schließt es das genauso wenig aus. Das Handeln nach diesen Kriterien bedeutet Handeln nach vor–philosophischer Lebenserfahrung. Ohne philosophische Reflexion trifft der Skeptiker auf seine Umgebung und interagiert mit ihr, wie Sextus zeigt (PH, 1.22). Die Bemerkung von Bett, dass vernünftige Überlegung keine Rolle in der zu treffenden Entscheidung spielt, muss ernst genommen werden und steht nicht im Konflikt damit, dass der Skeptiker eine Wahl ausführt. Anders als die meisten Kritiker der Skeptiker annehmen, zeigt sich das praktische Kriterium der Gesetze und Bräuche gerade als nicht philosophisch. Sextus sagt selbst über die Kritiker: „[. . . ] sie verstehen nicht, dass der Skeptiker sein Leben nicht nach der philosophischen Argumentation lebt (untätige wäre er, wenn es danach ginge), sondern nach der unphilosophischen Beobachtung das eine wählen und das andere meiden kann“ (AM, 11.165). Die Wahl der Handlung ist maßgeblich durch ihren Kontext, die individuelle Situation und die Lebenserfahrung des Handelnden beeinflusst. Das praktische Kriterium muss keine Handlung hervorbringen, die einem philosophischem Anspruch gemäß richtig ist. Entsprechend erbringt es nur subjektive, bestimmte Handlungen, die auf Meinungen beruhen, welche in enger Beziehung zur Gesellschaft, zur Kultur und den Traditionen des Handelnden stehen. Diese Antwort auf die Kritik, dass nach skeptischer Philosophie nicht gelebt werden kann, geben die Skeptiker. Die Kritik trifft die Ansicht des Skeptikers also gar nicht. Sextus behauptet nicht, philosophisch korrekt zu leben. Die praktische Handlung orientiert sich tatsächlich an dem, was „gerade erscheint“ und nicht an philosophischem

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Wissen. Hegel bemerkt das, wenn er ausführt: „Die Skeptiker haben gelten lassen, daß man sich danach richten müsse; es aber als etwas Wahres auszugeben, ist ihnen nicht eingefallen.“ (TWA 19, S. 374) Oberflächlich betrachtet, führt dies tatsächlich zu dem Ergebnis, welches Hegel kritisiert: Der Skeptiker ist sklavisch der Herrschaft des Erscheinenden unterworfen. Bei genauerer Betrachtung aber, stellt diese Sichtweise eine komplette Trennung der philosophischen Studien von den Erscheinungen dar. Zu dieser Erkenntnis kam wohl bereits Schlegel (Vieweg 1999, S. 247). Durch eine solche Trennung befreit sich die skeptische Philosophie auch von den letzten, einschränkenden Grenzen. Der Skeptiker erfüllt die Anforderung an den Philosophen, die der frühe Hegel formuliert und nach der „[. . . ] alle Fesseln der sittlichen Wirklichkeit und hiemit auch alle fremden Stützen, in dieser Welt zu stehen [. . . ] müssen von ihm gefallen sein [. . . ]“ (GW 5, S. 270) Ich vermute, dass Hegel genau diese vollständige Trennung zwischen Philosophie und praktischer Handlung sieht, wenn er das skeptische Bewusstsein beschreibt. Er spricht diesbezüglich von einer Dualität im Skeptizismus in der Phänomenologie des Geistes: [. . . ] im Skeptizismus realisiert sie sich, vernichtet die andere Seite des bestimmten Daseins, aber verdoppelt sich vielmehr und ist sich nun ein Zweifaches. Hierdurch ist die Verdopplung, welche früher an zwei Einzelne, an den Herrn und den Knecht, sich verteilte, in Eines eingekehrt; die Verdopplung des Selbstbewußtseins in sich selbst, welche im Begriffe des Geistes wesentlich ist, ist hiermit vorhanden, aber noch nicht ihre Einheit [. . . ]. (TWA 3, S. 162)

9 Der Νόμος als ein Kriterium Warum diese Trennung nun aber so wichtig ist, zeigt Sextus in Adversus Mathematicos, wo der Skeptiker einige politische Schriften der Stoiker behandelt (AM, 11.190–196). Die Passage ist eingebettet in eine Debatte, ob es eine bestimmte Art der Lebensführung gibt, wie sie von den dogmatischen Philosophenschulen, etwa den Stoikern und Epikureern, vorgestellt werden. Art der Lebensführung bedeutet hier einen bestimmte Art, seine Handlungen so einzurichten, dass sie in Übereinstimmung mit dem Guten stehen oder zum Guten führen – und es ist klar, dass diese Vorstellung einer Lebensart vom Skeptiker letztlich zurückgewiesen werden muss. Schließlich kann der Skeptiker nicht das Gute zu einem Maßstab für sein Handeln nehmen, da er sich im Urteil, was das sei, zurückhalten muss, wie wir bereits gesehen haben. In Bezug auf das öffentliche Handeln sind die Gesetze und sozialen Regeln das einzig akzeptierbare Kriterium.

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In der hier zu besprechenden Passage diskutiert nun Sextus die Ansichten der frühen Stoiker, die – wenigstens einige – inzestuöse und kannibalische Verhaltensweisen allein basierend auf rationalen Argumenten verteidigen. Das stoische Argument für Inzest in diesem Fall kann dabei in seiner Methode sogar als nahezu skeptisch angesehen werden, denn es bezieht sich auf die Gepflogenheiten bei anderen Völkern, bei denen es durchaus üblich ist, dass nahe Verwandte gemeinsam Kinder zeugen – wir können etwa an die königlichen Familien in Ägypten denken, die im Kontext unserer Stelle auch angesprochen werden. Sextus erläutert weiterhin, dass der Stoiker Chryssip einführen wollte, dass man die Körperteile von Menschen, wenn sie etwa im Kampf abgetrennt wurden, oder auch die eigenen Eltern, wenn sie verstorben sind, essen sollte, soweit sie essbar und bekömmlich seien. (AM, 11.192–194, siehe auch PH, 3.207). Wir müssen nicht die Details der stoischen Ansicht kennen, sondern uns interessiert die Argumentation des Skeptikers. Er verwirft die Ansicht des Stoikers als falsche Forderung. Allerdings rechtfertigt Sextus diese Zurückweisung der stoischen Ansicht nicht, indem er zum Beispiel behauptet, dass das Essen von menschlichem Fleisch schlecht oder falsch sei. Sein Argument zeigt vielmehr, dass solche von den Stoikern aufgestellte Regeln nicht ausgeführt werden können, schlicht weil sie von Gesetz und Brauch verboten sind. Deshalb können sie nicht als Basis für eine gute Lebensart gelten, wie es die Stoiker darstellen. Wiederum erscheint das Argument der Skeptiker sehr schwach zu sein, denn es verwirft eine Forderung danach, was sein soll, durch eine Beschreibung dessen, was ist. Von Standpunkt der dogmatischen Philosophien aus betrachtet, müsste Sextus eigentlich aufzeigen, warum und inwiefern diese Lehre der Stoiker nicht zu vertreten ist, etwa gegen ethische Prinzipien verstößt und so weiter. Der Skeptiker muss dagegen nur zeigen, dass eine solche Lehre gegen die bestehende Ordnung des Staates mit ihren Gesetzen verstößt und daher nicht ernsthaft von den Stoikern als empfohlene Lebensart dargestellt werden kann. Tatsächlich ist die Erwiderung der Skeptiker sogar noch stärker gegen die Stoiker, da es Teil von deren Doktrin ist, dass ein Gesetzesverstoß in unlösbarem Konflikt zu einem guten Leben steht. Selbst das Essen von menschlichem Fleisch kann vom Skeptiker nur deshalb zurückgewiesen werden, weil es Brauch und Gesetz verbieten. Es gibt, wie das Beispiel der Stoiker zeigt, rationale Gründe, die das Essen von menschlichem Fleisch verbieten und andere, die es für geboten erklären. Philosophisch liegen gleichwertige Argumente vor, so dass nicht entschieden werden kann, was das richtige Handeln ist. Das Verbot des Essens von menschlichem Fleisch, welches von Sextus durchaus als richtig dargestellt wird, basiert allein auf der Tatsache, dass die Gesetze solche Handlungen verbieten. In der unwahrscheinlichen Situation, dass der Skeptiker in einem Land lebt, in dem die Gesetze dem Essen von Menschenfleisch zustimmen, wird er keine wirklichen Einwände gegen Kannibalismus vorbringen. Sextus argu-

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mentiert, dass es höchstens in Ordnung sei, menschliches Fleisch zu essen, wenn jemand sein Leben „zwischen Laestrygonen und Cyclopen“ (AM, 11.195) führen müsste, wo solche Handlungsweisen nicht verboten oder sogar befürwortet werden. Es ist dabei nicht wichtig, dass die erwähnten Gegenden, in denen solche Gesetze gelten sollen, aus Homers Odyssee entnommen sind. Die Aussage zielt auf den Fakt, dass in einem Staat die von diesem festgelegten Gesetze die Rahmenbedingung für das praktische Handeln darstellt, während in anderen Staaten und Poleis andere in Kraft sein, die ganz gegenteilige Bestimmungen zum Inhalt haben – und der Skeptiker würde diesen dort ebenso gehorchen. Interessanterweise formuliert aber der Skeptiker seine eigene Anklage gegen den dogmatischen Philosophen so, wie dieser ihn attackierte. Er wendet das Argument also gegen den Dogmatiker: Es ist nicht möglich für den Stoiker, gemäß seiner eigenen Philosophie zu leben – er erfährt widerstrebende Erscheinungen, wie etwa Gefängnisstrafen und schlimmeres, die ihn davon abhalten, ein solches Leben zu führen. Sextus vergleicht die stoische Forderung nach einer Lebensart mit der Forderung nach Malerei in einer Stadt von Blinden: Unter diesen Umständen ist sie völlig nutzlos (AM, 11.196). Die existierende politische und sittliche Ordnung kann vom Philosophen nach philosophischen Vorstellungen umgestaltet werden, aber nur innerhalb seiner Philosophie. Wenn er aber versucht, diese Ordnung durch praktische Handlungen zu implementieren, muss er scheitern. Daher ist es nicht der Skeptiker, bei dem Rede und Handlung nicht übereinstimmt, sondern der Dogmatiker. Dies beinhaltet implizit auch die Feststellung, dass man nicht der „Herrschaft des Erscheinenden“ entfliehen kann. Ricken führt die skeptische Auffassung aus: „Die gemeinsame Welt beruht auf der Herrschaft des Erscheinenden. Es beherrscht uns, indem es uns unsere Zustimmung abnötigt.“ (Ricken 1994, S. 25). Da die Erscheinungen unwillkürlich erfahren werden, können sie nicht ignoriert werden. Das Gesetz beziehungsweise die mit ihrer Durchsetzung beauftragten Institutionen und Personen werden tätig werden, ohne das philosophische Argument zu berücksichtigen. Unsere Untersuchung macht bis hier her auf eine fundamentale Problematik aller politischen Philosophie aufmerksam. Der Philosoph hat genau zwei Möglichkeiten, politische Fragen zu erörtern: Entweder formuliert er eine „utopische“ Vorstellung, die mit (seinen) rationalen Überlegungen übereinstimmen, aber nicht mit der etablierten gesetzlichen Ordnung. Auf diese Weise gerät er in einen Konflikt mit der bestehenden Ordnung, sobald er versucht seine Philosophie in die Praxis umzusetzen. Ohne Zweifel kann der Konflikt größer oder kleiner sein, und seine Auswirkungen auf die Bestrebungen des Philosophen sehr unterschiedlich. Oder aber der Philosoph kann eine Position formulieren und zu verwirklichen suchen, die vollständig im Rahmen der existierenden Ordnung verbleibt – was ihn zu einem Unterworfenen der Herrschaft der Erscheinungen macht.

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10 Kein zusätzliches Leiden Der Skeptiker kann nicht einfach versuchen, eine politische Utopie oder ein entsprechendes Ideal zu etablieren, allein aus dem Grund, dass er bereits die philosophische Richtigkeit einer solcher Utopie oder eines solchen Ideals erwiesen haben müsste. Dies aber kann er nicht, wie wir gezeigt haben. Deshalb ist er an die gegebenen politischen Institutionen verwiesen. Aber er ist damit nicht anders gestellt, als der Dogmatiker – nur dass es im Falle des Skeptikers nicht gegen dessen philosophischen Standpunkt verstößt. Er mag sich in mancher Hinsicht nach versklaven, in Übereinstimmung mit dem Gegebenen, dem Erscheinenden entsprechend zu leben. Doch nicht in Hinsicht auf die Philosophie. Auf Kosten einer Unbestimmtheit in der Schlussfolgerung kann der Skeptiker alles denken, ohne jede Grenze von Geschmack, Brauch oder Gesetz. Wenn Vieweg schreibt: „Pyrrhon lebt die Nichtigkeit des Sinnlichen und die Nichtigkeit der Polis, aber er sieht, hört, schützt sich vor Kälte, er richtet sich nach den Sitten und Gebräuchen und macht diese zu unbezweifelbaren Mächten seines Tuns [. . . ]“ (Vieweg 2007, S. 38 ff.), ist dies nicht ganz richtig: Der Skeptiker lebt keinesfalls die Nichtigkeit des Stadtstaates, denn die Polis – genommen als Synonym für das Ganze der politischen Institutionen – widerstrebt wie ein Etwas, nicht wie eine Nichtigkeit. Vielmehr ist er in der Lage die Nichtigkeit der Polis – oder jeder gerade geltenden, politischen Ordnung – zu denken, während er sein Leben den aufgezwungenen, unfreiwilligen Wahrnehmungen der Erscheinungen selbst, denn für die Skeptiker sind das praktische Handeln und das Philosophieren sehr unterschiedliche Formen, mit der Welt umzugehen. Jeder nicht–skeptische Ansatz einer Philosophie – oder wenigstens jede Philosophie, welche nicht vollständig zwischen philosophischem und praktischem Tun trennt – ist mit dieser Schwierigkeit konfrontiert. Kehren wir noch einmal zurück zur Bemerkung, dass der Skeptiker nicht völlig untätig bleiben kann. Gelegentlich ist formuliert worden, dass genau diese Untätigkeit als Ziel des Skeptikers angesehen werden müsste. Das Konzept der ataraxia, gerade in Verbindung mit der hellenistischen Metaphorik einer Meeresstille und unbewegter Ruhe, wird oft mit der Vorstellung verknüpft, dass der Skeptiker, indem er ein Urteil unterlässt, auch dass Handeln unterlässt. Als Beweis für diese Zurückhaltung speziell im Hinblick auf die Politik wird auch auf Pyrrhons zurückgezogenes Leben verwiesen, welches bei Diogenes Laertius erwähnt ist (DL, IX.63). Wahrheit – vielleicht von allen akzeptiert? – ist aber, dass niemand inaktiv sein kann: Was erscheint, was sich selbst aufdrängt und widersteht, erfordert Aktion oder Unterlassen als Aktion. Tatsächlich ist aber die skeptische Konzeption der ataraxia keineswegs mit einer Vorstellung von Untätigkeit verbunden. Auch wenn das Konzept selbst weitläufig als eine ethische Forderung angesehen wird (Janáček

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2008, S. 360), ist meiner Meinung nach in Sextus ataraxia nicht als solches dargestellt. Viel mehr zeigt er deutlich auf, dass die so bezeichnete Ruhe sich als eine Erfahrung – also wie eine Erscheinung – unwillkürlich aufdrängt, wann immer er zur Erkenntnis gelangt, dass er sich vom Urteil enthalten müsse. Der Vergleich zum Maler Apelles, der eine ähnliche Erfahrung fröhlicher Ruhe macht, als er zufällig und nicht durch Anstrengung etwas Schönes erschuf, zeigt dies deutlich auf (PH, 1.28). Ataraxia ist deshalb ein Ziel der philosophischen Untersuchungen, jedoch nur in einer speziellen Hinsicht. Indem er die Anforderungen für ein theoretisches Kriterium formuliert, macht der Skeptiker es klar, dass das Ziel der Skepsis weiterhin die Wahrheit bleibt. Dieses Ziel wird durch die ataraxia weder ersetzt, noch für diese aufgegeben. Wie Sextus sagt: „Auch die Skeptiker hofften, die ataraxia zu erlangen, indem sie die Unstimmigkeiten der erscheinenden und gedachten (Dinge) entschieden; da sie das aber nicht vermochten, hielten sie inne.“ (PH, 1.29) Es bleibt zwar etwas undeutlich, warum der Skeptiker überhaupt auf eine solche Ruhe erpicht ist. Man kann an eine ebenfalls vor–philosophische Lebenserfahrung als Ursache denken, wie Sextus selbst andeutet (PH, 1.26). Klar ist aber, dass er noch immer nach der Wahrheit sucht und diese nicht in den dogmatischen Standpunkten finden kann. Die weitergehende „Zurückhaltung auch in der Untersuchung“, die Sextus erwähnt (PH, 1.30), wird nicht der ganzen skeptischen Schule zugeordnet, sondern nur einigen neueren Skeptikern seiner Zeit. Ob Sextus selbst zu dieser Gruppe gehört, wie Janáček (2008, S. 360 ff.) meint, bleibt fraglich. Jedenfalls schließt die skeptische Skizze einer ataraxia ein, dass bestimmte Beunruhigungen und Störungen unvermeidbar sind. Sextus sagt, dass von diesen Beunruhigungen [. . . ] das, was uns täglich begegnet, versetzt uns am wenigsten in Unruhe, da Linderung für dieses (Essen und Getränk und Obdach) leicht zu beschaffen sind. Und das, was sehr extrem ist, selbst wenn es im höchsten Maße beunruhigt, versetzt uns nur für kurze Zeit in Schrecken wie ein Blitz und zerstört uns oder wird selbst zerstört. (AM, 11.154)

Das Erleiden gehört zu den unausweichlichen Dingen, die von den Skeptikern als Bestandteil der praktischen Kriterien angesehen werden. Und die wirkliche Bedrohung für die ataraxia entsteht nicht aus praktischer Handlung, sondern aus den falschen philosophischen, nämlich den dogmatischen Vorstellungen: „Deshalb nennen wir ein Ziel in Hinblick auf die dogmatischen Dinge die Seelenruhe, in Hinblick auf die unvermeidbaren Dinge das gemäßigte Leiden.“ (PH, 1.30) Nun können wir das Verhältnis von Leiden und ataraxia zum Politischen untersuchen. Wenn wir noch einmal die skeptische Herangehensweise an das Tyrannen–Beispiel betrachten, können wir eine interessante Beobachtung machen. Sextus merkt an, dass der Skeptiker weniger unter der Tyrannei leiden wird im

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Vergleich zum Dogmatiker (AM, 11.166). Wie das zu verstehen ist, dazu gibt er eine detailliertere Erklärung, etwas eher im Text: Denn derjenige, der nicht zusätzliche Meinungen darüber hat, dass das Leiden schlecht sei, wird nur von der aufgezwungenen Bewegung des Leidens geplagt. Derjenige aber, der zusätzlich sich vorstellt, dass Leiden schlecht sei, verdoppelt mit dieser Meinung die Belastung, die sich von seiner Gegenwart einstellt. (AM, 1.158)

Während Sextus hier von physischem Schmerz spricht, ist leicht zu erkennen, wie das Tyrannen–Beispiel, welches in direktem Kontext angeführt wird, in Analogie zu verstehen ist. Der Skeptiker, der unter der Tyrannei ebenso leidet, wie jeder andere auch, erleidet keine zusätzliche Beunruhigung dadurch, dass er etwa irgendwelche falschen Meinungen über die Ungerechtigkeit der Regeln und Gesetze des Tyrannen hat. Sextus hat gezeigt, dass es unmöglich ist, nicht Diener der Erscheinungen zu sein. Und er hat ebenso gezeigt, dass der Dogmatiker aus genau diesem Grund mehr leidet, als der Skeptiker.

11 Ist Skeptizismus eine Philosophie? Bisher sind wir zur Schlussfolgerung gelangt, dass der Apraxia–Vorwurf den Skeptiker nicht betrifft, da er philosophisches Denken und praktisches Handeln strikt trennt. Weiterhin haben wir gezeigt, dass es nicht der Skeptiker, sondern der Dogmatiker ist, dessen Worte und Taten sich widersprechen. Denn gerade die Trennung in zwei Sphären – philosophisch denkend und praktisch handelnd – ermöglicht es erst, die skeptische Philosophie mit letzter Konsequenz zu betreiben. Und die Behauptung Hegels, dass es sich wegen dieser Spaltung beim skeptischen Selbstbewusstsein um ein „unglückliches“ handeln muss (TWA 3, S. 163), macht aus Sicht des Skeptikers keinen Sinn, da sich ihm eben durch diese Trennung unwillkürlich die gegenteilige Erfahrung der ataraxia aufdrängt, die zwar subjektive Erfahrung ist, aber gerade deshalb als solche unbezweifelbar. Doch es gibt eine letzte Attacke gegen den skeptischen Ansatz, der von Hegel vorgebracht wird. Wir haben es bereits in den Ausführungen berührt, wollen das Argument aber noch einmal explizit machen. Hegel sagt, dass der Skeptizismus eine einseitige Form des Bewusstseins ist, da er vollständig in der subjektiven Erkenntnis verharrt. Das Skeptische Bewusstsein „vernichtet die andere Seite des bestimmten Daseins“, wie wir bereits oben zitiert haben. Alles, was der Skeptiker sagt, unterliegt der Einschränkung, dass es ihm nur so erscheint, wie wir ebenfalls gesagt haben. Zugunsten dieser reinen Subjektivität gibt der Skeptiker offenbar den Anspruch der Philosophie auf Objektivität auf. Hegel kritisiert, dass der Skep-

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tiker – indem er die Erscheinungen als einzige Kriterien anerkennt – nichts zur Philosophie beizutragen hat. In seinem Skeptizismus–Aufsatz schreibt Hegel: Diese rein negative Haltung, die bloße Subjektivität und Scheinen bleiben will, hört eben damit auf, für das Wissen etwas zu sein; wer fest an der Eitelkeit, daß es ihm so scheine, er es so meine, hängenbleibt, seine Aussprüche durchaus für kein Objektives des Denkens und des Urteilens ausgegeben wissen will, den muß man dabei lassen, – seine Subjektivität geht keinen anderen Menschen, noch weniger die Philosophie oder die Philosophie sie etwas an. (TWA 2, S. 248)

Ohne den Anspruch auf Objektivität, erbringt der Skeptizismus, nach Hegel, nichts für die Philosophie. Die Äußerung des Skeptikers ist dann bloße Narration seines einzelnen subjektiven Denkens. Demnach würde der Skeptizismus offenbar als Philosophie versagen. Sextus würde wohl versuchen, den Spieß in dieser Frage umzudrehen. Gegenüber den dogmatischen Philosophien hat der Skeptiker leichtes Spiel, da er deren „Objektivität“ ohne Probleme durch die isostheneia der unterschiedlichen Schulen als unwahr erweisen kann. Eine dritte Form der Philosophie, die ja Hegel für sich behauptet und die weder dogmatisch noch skeptisch sein soll, kennt Sextus nicht. Wahrscheinlich würde Sextus auch mit der Philosophie Hegels wie mit einer dogmatischen verfahren, auch wenn sich Hegel darum bemüht, sein System gegen skeptische Angriffe zu immunisieren, wie Forster (1989) etwa eindringlich aufzeigt. Die Frage, ob und in wie weit ihm dies aus Sicht des Skeptikers gelingt, kann an dieser Stelle aber nicht mehr erörtert werden, da sie ins „wahrhaft Unendliche“ (TWA 19, S. 396) führt.

Bibliographie 1 Siglen AM: Sextus Empirikus (1949): „Adversos Mathematicus“ (eigene Übersetzung auf Grundlage des Textes nach Bury 1949). DL: Diogenes Laertius (1979): „Vitae philosophorum“ (eigene Übersetzung auf Grundlage des Textes nach Hicks 1979) GW: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1968 ff.): Gesammelte Werke. In Verbindung mit der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft. Hrsg. von der Nordrhein–Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Hamburg. Mem.: Xenophon (1987): Erinnerungen an Sokrates. Griechisch–deutsch. Hrsg. von Jaerisch, Peter. 4., durchges. Aufl. München & Zürich: Artemis–Verlag. PE: Eusebius (1983): „Die Praeparatio evangelica“. In: Eusebius: Werke. Bd. 8: Teil 2: Die Bücher XI bis XV, Register. Mras, Karl/ Places, Édouard des/Berthold, Heinz (Hrsg.). 2., bearb. Aufl. Berlin: Akademie–Verlag.

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PH: Sextus Empirikus (1949): „Pyrrhoneíai Hypotypôseis“ (= „Grundzüge der pyrrhonischen Skepsis“, eigene Übersetzung auf Grundlage des Textes nach Bury 1949) TWA: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1969–1971): Theorie–Werkausgabe – Werke in zwanzig Bänden auf der Grundlage der Werke von 1832–1845, neu edierte Ausgabe. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Hrsg.). Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.

2 Sonstige Literatur Bett, Richard (Hrsg.) (1997): „Sextus Empiricus: Against the ethicists (Adversus mathematicos XI)“. New York: Oxford University Press. Bett, Richard (Hrsg.) (2010): The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bury, Robert Gregg (Hrsg.) (1949): Sextus Empiricus: in four volumes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Flückiger, Hansueli (Hrsg.) (1998): „Sextus Empiricus: Gegen die Dogmatiker = Adversus mathematicos libri 7 – 11“. Sankt Augustin: Academia–Verlag. Forster, Michael N. (1989): Hegel and Skepticism. Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press. Hicks, Robert D. (1979): Lives of eminent philosophers: in two volumes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Janáček, Karel (2008): „῾Η ἐν τα ις ζητήσεσιν ἐποχή“. In: Janda, Jan/Karfík, Filip (Hrsg.): Studien zu Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius und zur pyrrhonischen Skepsis. Berlin & New York: de Gruyter, S. 358–365. Hossenfelder, Malte (Hrsg.) (1985): Sextus Empiricus. Grundriss der pyrrhonischen Skepsis. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. Lee, Mi–Kyoung (2010): „Antecedents in early Greek philosophy“. In: Bett, Richard (Hrsg.): The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, S.13–35. Ricken, Friedo (1994): Antike Skeptiker. München: Verlag C.H. Beck. Vieweg, Klaus (1999): Philosophie des Remis. Der junge Hegel und das ‚Gespenst des Skepticismus‘. München: Fink Vieweg, Klaus (2007): Skepsis und Freiheit. Der Pyrrhonismus zwischen Philosophie und Literatur. München: Fink. Vogt, Katja Maria (2010): „Scepticism and action In: Bett, Richard (Hrsg.): The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, S. 165–180. Woodruff, Paul (2010): „The Pyrrhonean Modes“. In: Bett, Richard (Hrsg.): The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, S. 208–231.

Johannes Korngiebel

Friedrich Schlegel’s Sceptical Interpretation of Plato Abstract: Friedrich Schlegel was, beside Hegel, one of the thinkers at the turn of the 19th century who was most closely acquainted with scepticism. This is demonstrated by his interpretation of Plato, which continues to be influential and which must be understood as, essentially, a reactualisation of his thought before the backdrop of debates at the turn of the 19th century. He thus approaches Plato from a fundamentally sceptical perspective, which is to be shown through the characterisation of four pivotal aspects of his interpretation. Schlegel’s interpretation of Plato is based on a comprehensive relationship between form and content, with the experimentally–dialogic nature of the platonic Œuvre pointing to an ultimately system–critical tendency in the philosophy contained within it. Philosophy is thus – according to Schlegel in recourse to Plato – a fundamentally interminable und thus merely relative pursuit of truth; the corpus platonicum thus being a thoroughly consistent image of Plato’s intellectual biography, remaining substantially incomplete. We thus see why Schlegel rejects both the theory of the unwritten doctrines and the thesis that the theory of ideas contains the centrepiece of Plato’s philosophy. Furthermore, it becomes clear to what extent Schlegel’s interpretation of Plato is critical to the formation of his own philosophical thought. Not only is his account of the form of the platonic Œuvre reflected in Schlegel’s own literary and philosophical work, in systematic regard too his thought relies heavily on ideas derived from his intensive study of Plato.

Besides Hegel, Klaus Vieweg has always been interested in the second best expert on scepticism at the turn of the 19th century – Friedrich Schlegel.¹ A certain ambivalence underlies this perhaps surprising connection. For to the same extent as Hegel and Schlegel were already considered to be proponents of diametrically opposed world–views by their contemporaries – a reference to August Wilhelm Schlegel’s poem Friedrich Schlegel gegen Hegel [Friedrich Schlegel against Hegel] should suffice as evidence here (Eichner 2012, Vol. 2, p. 585) –, so does their thought exhibit

1 Cf. Vieweg 1999; Vieweg 2007, esp. p. 193–214. Johannes Korngiebel, Johannes Korngiebel, M. A., Lecturer, Institute of Philosophy, Friedrich Schiller University Jena; Research Associate, Klassik Stiftung Weimar. DOI 10.1515/9783110528138-010

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surprising similarities. This is particularly the case with regard to scepticism, to which both – Hegel and Schlegel – attribute a significant role in modern philosophy. Whereas Schlegel’s take on scepticism has by now been quite thoroughly studied, particularly in relation to Hegel’s,² one aspect – although not infrequently mentioned in passing – has remained noticeably recondite: Friedrich Schlegel’s systematic understanding of scepticism is heavily influenced by his reading of Plato. I thus hope that it is permitted to offer under the title of this volume a study dedicated to showing in what ways some central tenets of Schlegel’s thought have their roots in his comprehensive study of the works of Plato.³ To that end I will first briefly lay down some historical corner–stones in Schlegel’s lifelong reading of Plato. Secondly, I will expound the central aspects of his reconstruction of Plato’s philosophy, with the focus lying primarily on the explicitly sceptical elements of the interpretation. Finally, I will attempt to demonstrate some of the consequences of the platonic influence for Schlegel’s own philosophical thought.

I Friedrich Schlegel studied the work and philosophy of Plato throughout his whole life. In 1827, one and a half years before his death, he wrote: It is now thirty–nine years since, with an ineffable thirst for knowledge, I read the entire works of Plato in their original Greek; and since then this philosophical investigation has for me, despite various other scientific endeavours, remained my main preoccupation. [Es sind jetzt eben neununddreißig Jahre, seit ich die sämtlichen Schriften des Plato in griechischer Sprache zum ersten Mal mit unbeschreiblicher Wißbegierde durchlas; und seitdem ist neben mancherlei andern wissenschaftlichen Studien, diese philosophische Nachforschung für mich selbst eigentlich immer die Hauptbeschäftigung geblieben.] (KFSA 10, pp. 179–180)⁴

Schlegel’s attention was thus not only drawn to Plato quite early – while he was still preparing for his academic studies towards the end of the 1780s –, this first encounter appears to have been an awakening which caused the sixteen–year–old to devote his life and thought to philosophy. His study of Plato – beside that of

2 Cf., besides the works of Klaus Vieweg, Frank 1996; Forster 2011; Korngiebel 2016b. 3 With regard to Schelgel’s interpretation of Plato cf.: Krämer 1988; Zovko 1990, pp. 61–84; Auerochs 1996; Frischmann 2001; Krause 2002 and Leinkauf 2009, pp. 483–486. 4 Cf. also: KFSA 4, p. 4. Since no standard translation of the works of Schlegel exists, this and all subsequent quotations have been newly translated.

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Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Jacobi – thus remained his preoccupation for the rest of his life. This is further confirmed by the available sources. We not only find countless allusions and references to Plato in – even his earliest – letters,⁵ we also find his notebooks littered with thoughts, excerpts, schemata and essays on Plato’s philosophy.⁶ Furthermore, a number of Schlegel’s early publications take as their subject Plato or his thought: For example Über die Diotima [On Diotima] (KFSA 1, pp. 70–115), a highly influential review of Stolberg’s Auserlesene Gespräche des Platon [Selected Platonic Dialogues] of 1797 (KFSA 8, pp. 38–40) as well as a smattering of remarks in his other studies of the classics. Schlegel also begins his university teaching with the programmatic lecture Vom Enthusiasmus oder der Schwärmerei [On Enthusiasm], which, although its text has been lost, probably referenced Plato’s theory of the highest. His disputation of his habilitation treatise De Platone, with which he ended the short intermezzo of academic teaching in Jena in the March of 1801, should also be considered in the context of this intensive study of Plato (Behler 1993). Only some theses survive of it today. The first of them does, however, make the thrust of Schlegel’s argument abundantly clear: “Platonis philosophia genuinus est idealismus” (Eichner 2012, Vol. 4, p. 160), that is: “Plato’s philosophy is the genuine idealism”. The work of Schlegel’s most famous project on Plato also falls into the time of this avowal: The great translation of the entire works – or as Schlegel puts it – a “German Plato”. Although the origin of this idea can be dated to at least as early as 1796,⁷ the plan only start to take shape in the years of the friendship with Schleiermacher. From 1799 onwards, Schlegel thus again begins to study Plato intensively and tries his hand on exemplary translations of selected dialogues. In February of 1800 he then lays the groundwork for the translation proper. That includes philological investigations into the relative chronology of the dialogues, their authenticity and the spirit of platonic philosophy. Finally, in March of the same year the famous announcement of the translation appears in the Allgemeine Literatur–Zeitung – without any mention of Schleiermacher. Its beginning reads as follows: I have decided to publish an accurate and complete Translation of the Collected Works of Plato, of which the first volume will appear for Easter 1801 in the publishing house of Mr. Frommann. Why I consider it to be useful, yae, necessary to propagate the study of this great writer, with

5 Cf. e.g. Friedrich Schlegel’s letter to August Wilhelm Schlegel of 27.2.1794: KFSA 23, pp. 182–187, here: p. 184 and: Krause 2002, pp. 347 ff. 6 Cf. the register to KFSA 18 and 19. 7 Cf. Friedrich Schlegel’s letter of the 19.1.1796 to August Wilhelm Schlegel and of the 28.1.1796 to Karl August Böttiger: KFSA 23, pp. 274–277, here: pp. 275 and 277–278.

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whom philosophy is most properly begun and most worthily brought to conclusion, generally and particularly now, after the invention and publication of the Science of Knowledge, I will attempt to justify in a separate treatise, which is to open the entire work. That it is possible to solve the difficult problems in the art of translation at the point of development which the German language is only just approaching, will best be demonstrated in the act itself. I can say no more than that I hope to not only satisfy the demands of the philologist and the expectations of the philosophers, but also, through accompanying explanatory notes, those of the layman. [Ich habe mich entschlossen, eine genaue und vollständige Übersetzung der sämtlichen Werke des Plato herauszugeben, von welcher der erste Band zur Ostermesse 1801 im Verlage des Hn. Frommann erscheinen wird. Warum ich es überhaupt und besonders jetzt, nach der Erfindung und Aufstellung der Wissenschaftslehre, für nützlich ja für notwendig halte, das Studium dieses großen Autors, mit welchem das der Philosophie am schicklichsten angefangen und am würdigsten beschlossen wird, allgemeiner zu verbreiten, werde ich in einer besondren Abhandlung, welche das ganze Werk eröffnen soll, zu entwickeln suchen. Daß es auf dem Punkte der Ausbildung, welchem die deutsche Sprache sich jetzt zu nähern anfängt, möglich sei, diese schwere Aufgabe der Übersetzungskunst aufzulösen, wird am besten durch die Tat selbst gezeigt werden. Ich darf also nichts mehr sagen, als daß ich durch die Erklärung des Gedankenganges und Zusammenhanges nicht nur den Forderungen des Philologen und den Erwartungen des Philosophen Genüge zu leisten hoffe, sondern auch durch begleitende Anmerkungen für das Bedürfnis der Laien sorgen werde.] (KFSA 3, p. 334)

We find here some indication as to the central points of Schlegel’s interpretation of Plato. Although the translation should, of course, satisfy “the demands of the philologist and the expectations of the philosophers”, Schlegel does not, primarily, want to offer an historically adequate depiction of Plato’s philosophy. Rather, what he intends is a reactualisation of the spirit of Plato’s philosophy on the basis of contemporary debates – hence the reference to Fichte’s Science of Knowledge. It is in this vein that he wrote in his earlier review of Stolberg’s translation of Plato that one should not “attempt to explain individual words, but rather the spirit of his [i.e. Plato’s] teaching” [“einzelne Worte, sondern den Geist seiner Lehren zu erklären versuchen”] (KFSA 8, p. 39). Schlegel also emphasises the actuality and importance to contemporary philosophy and literature of his ambitious project in his letters to his mentor in Göttingen, classicist and philologist Christian Gottlob Heyne. For instance, on the 16th March 1800 he writes in reference to his planned “complete translation of Plato“ [“vollständige Uebersetzung des Plato”]: “It appears to me to be of benefit to the present situation to reiterate in an understandable fashion this example of how philosophy can be united with to the muses” [“Es scheint mir selbst für das Jetzige heilsam, dieses Beyspiel, wie man Philosophie mit den Musen verbinden kann, neu und allgemeiner faßlich aufzustellen”] (KFSA 25, p.

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73).⁸ Schlegel’s translation should thus be considered in its conception to be a contribution to the philosophical debate at the turn of the 19th century. It is thus not surprising that the time of his comprehensive study of Plato coincides with those months in which Schlegel begins to hold academic lectures on Transcendentalphilosophie [Transcendental philosophy] in Jena (Korngiebel 2016a). In them Schlegel attempts to sum up his early–romanticist thought, which – as will be shown – builds on Plato in some key points. This doubling of his workload – the translation of Plato on the one hand and his lectures on the other – is, however, also the probable reason for the failure of the translation–project. As early as September 1800 Schleiermacher complains repeatedly that Schlegel failed to keep deadlines, was not delivering any new material and had, in fact, hardly translated anything at all. These complaints continue – under the accompaniment of excuses and promises from Schlegel – until 1803 and ultimately lead to the foundering of their planed symphilosophical project, which Schleiermacher proceeds to pursue on his own.⁹ Schlegel, who had moved to Paris in 1802 and had there found new projects to apply himself to, did not, however, cease studying Plato. Although only the Grundsätze zum Werk Platons [Foundations to the Works of Plato] (KFSA 18, pp. 526–530) and the introductions to Parmenides (KFSA 18, pp. 531–534) and Phädon [Phaedo] (KFSA 18, pp. 534–537) survive from this period of work on the translation of Plato (his ostensibly complete translations of Phaedrus, Phaedo and Euthyphro have since been lost),¹⁰ all subsequent works of Schlegel, particularly the large lecture cycles, contain some more or less extensive references to Plato. In the following the foundations of this particular interpretation of Plato will be discussed. Before this can be done, it is, however, necessary to draw attention to one key point: Schlegel’s occupation with Plato did not remain without consequence. Rather, it has had a significant influence – at least in the German– speaking parts of Europe – on the reception of Plato during the last 200 years. This influence is not restricted to the, at least initially, enthusiastically pursued translation, but also extends to Schlegel’s innovative analysis of the spirit of Plato’s philosophy. Ernst Behler quite rightly observes that “romanticism, under the intellectual leadership of Friedrich Schlegel“ [“die Romantik unter der geistigen Führerschaft Friedrich Schlegels”] should be considered “to be one of the great occidental Plato–Renaissances“ [“geradezu als eine der großen abendländischen Plato–Renaissancen”] (KFSA 11, p. 307). Other authors who are beyond suspicion of being associated with romantic thought also acknowledge the significance of 8 Cf. also Schlegel’s letter to Heyne of the 27.4.1800 (KFSA 25, p. 96). 9 Meckenstock (1988) offers a good overview of the progression and failure of the joint venture. 10 The translation of Euthyphro, which can be found in Schlegel’s papers is, however, almost certainly the work of Schlegel’s student Friedrich Ast (Patsch 1988).

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Schlegel’s endeavours for Plato. Hans Krämer – certainly not without welcoming the result – writes: “The categories shaped by F. Schlegel have heavily influenced the depiction of Plato and his intellectual type, certainly in the continental tradition and to this day remain pivotal.” (Krämer 1988, p. 616) Additionally, Krämer has shown Schlegel to be the most important thinker to shape the so–called “romantic paradigm” in the interpretation of Plato. And current readings of Schleiermacher have also shown Schleiermacher’s translation of Plato and the associated interpretation – disregarding deviations in the details – to be greatly indebted to Schlegel with regard to its inception and central ideas (Arndt 2013, pp. 266 ff.; Jantzen 1996, pp. XLV ff.). A second, somewhat less well known, vein of Schlegel’s interpretation of Plato leads through Friedrich Ast, who met Schlegel in Jena and for whom Plato subsequently became the center of his work and life. This is shown not only in his first major work De Platonis Phaedro, his comprehensive volume Platon’s Leben und Schriften [Plato’s Life and Writings] of 1816 and his translation of the works of the Greek philosophers into Latin in nine volumes (1819–1827), but also in his opus magnum, the 2000 page Lexicon Platonicum, published between 1835 and 1838, which became a standard work on Plato and remains in use today. In it he significantly builds on Schlegel’s interpretation, as he developed it in his years in Jena. Ast admitted as much: In an explanatory note to his translation of Euthyphro he writes, for example, that he owed Schlegel for “many insights into the higher criticism of Plato” (Ast 1803, p. 223). Hermann Patsch, who spoke of their connection as a “veritable teacher–student–relationship”, notes that Ast attempted “to systematically execute and historically justify Schlegel’s critical approach” (Patsch 1988, pp. 125 and 127; cf. also Krämer 1988, pp. 610 ff.). Peter D. Krause thus put it in a nutshell when he wrote that Schlegel was the “crucial trend–setter” with regard to Plato at the turn of the 19th century (Krause 2002, p. 351).

II As has already been mentioned, Schlegel’s influential interpretation of Plato began to take shape at an early stage. Apart from scattered comments in letters and notebooks, a coherent account of his position cannot, however, be documented in his early writings. It was due to appear within the scope of the ambitious translation project, which – as has been adumbrated – ultimately came to fruition without Schlegel’s participation. His first detailed account of Plato’s philosophy can thus only be found in his private lecture Geschichte der europäischen Literatur [History

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of European Literature], which he held in Paris in 1803/04. It begins with a passage which already contains the cornerstones of Schlegel’s sceptical interpretation of Plato: Plato’s works, although each one of them is a perfect work of art, can, with regard to the progress of his intellect, the development and connexion of his ideas, only be understood as a whole. Plato does not have a system, only a philosophy; the philosophy of a person is the history, the becoming, the advancement of their mind, the gradual development and evolution of their thoughts. Only when they have finished thinking and have arrived at specific results, does a system emerge. The great unity of Plato’s work can only be found in the certain course of his ideas, not in any final and complete sentence or result. Plato never begins his dialogues with a fixed doctrine, he usually starts from an indirect claim, or by contradicting a commonly held proposition, which he attempts to sublate, and then advances chain by chain, link by link, to an indeterminate indication of what he believes to be the highest. This progression of his philosophical enterprises is wholly in the spirit of his philosophy. They approach the gates of the highest to there adumbrate the infinite, divine, which cannot be identified or explained philosophically. [Platos Werke, obschon jedes einzelne ein vollendetes Kunstwerk ist, können in Rücksicht auf den Gang seines Geistes, die Entwicklung und Verbindung seiner Ideen, nur im Zusammenhang verstanden werden. Plato hatte kein System, sondern nur eine Philosophie; die Philosophie eines Menschen ist die Geschichte, das Werden, Fortschreiten seines Geistes, das allmähliche Bilden und Entwickeln seiner Gedanken. Erst dann, wenn er mit seinem Denken fertig und zu einem bestimmten Resultat gekommen ist, entsteht ein System. Man kann die große Einheit in Platos Werken nur suchen in dem bestimmten Gange seiner Ideen, nicht in einem fertigen Satze und Resultate, das sich am Ende finde. Plato geht in seinen Gesprächen nie von einem bestimmten Lehrsatze aus, meistens fängt er mit einer indirekten Behauptung, oder mit dem Widerspruch gegen einen angenommenen Satz an, den er zu heben sucht, und nun geht es fort von Kette zu Kette, von Glied zu Glied bis zur unbestimmten Hindeutung auf das, was seiner Meinung nach das Höchste ist. Dieser Gang seiner philosophischen Unternehmungen ist ganz dem Geiste der Philosophie gemäß. Sie gehen bis an die Pforte des Höchsten und begnügen sich, hier das Unendliche, Göttliche, was sich philosophisch nicht bezeichnen und erklären läßt, unbestimmt anzudeuten.] (KFSA 11, pp. 118–119)

This passage concentrates the fundaments of Schlegel’s interpretation of Plato. I will now attempt to sketch the four key points I see in them. In doing so I will concentrate on the broad strokes of the interpretation, rather than going into any of the interconnected details. To begin with, Schlegel’s thoughts on the form of the platonic dialogues, which he calls “perfect works of art”, i.e. Poetry in the utmost meaning of the word, are of great note. In that same vein Schlegel already writes in his Gespräch über die Poesie [Dialogue on Poetry] that Plato’s “presentation and its perfection and beauty“ [“Darstellung und ihre Vollkommenheit und Schönheit”] are „not means, but ends in themselves“ [“nicht Mittel, sondern Zweck an sich”] and thus „its form is, strictly

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speaking, by all means poetic“ [“schon seine Form [ist], streng genommen, durchaus poetisch”] (KFSA 2, p. 325). That does not, however, imply that their structure is in any way arbitrary or random. Rather, – according to Schlegel – the individual texts follow a precise and argumentative structure in an artistically exigent manner. It is thus not only characteristic for Plato never to begin his dialogues from a fixed principle, from certain knowledge, most of them end – after the problem has been examined and illuminated from a multitude of perspectives – without a positive conclusion. This aporetic technique can, of course, in itself be considered to be a sceptical motif. In any case, this observation underscores the experimental nature of the dialogues. Accordingly, Schlegel writes in his notebooks regarding the Symposium that it is “a system of experiments, a systematic experiment” [“ein συστ [System] von Experimenten, ein συστ [systematisches] Experiment“] (KFSA 18, p. 214, No. 225). That implies, especially in the case of the Symposium, that the dialogues – as intersubjective conversations – are depictions of, as Schlegel puts it, “communal self–thought” [“gemeinschaftlichen Selbstdenkens”] (KFSA 11, p. 119). Setting out from a collection of individuals, a progressive refutation of misapprehensions unfolds through a series of replies and objections. This ἐλεγκτικὴ τέχνη is by no means restricted to Plato’s roll of characters, rather it addresses itself – across spaces and times – directly to the reader, allowing him to play his part in the dialogue with Socrates and thus partake in a living discussion, a multi–vocal polylogue. What is the case for the individual dialogues, Schlegel also claims for the entirety of Plato’s work. Schlegel’s second fundamental idea is that the corpus platonicum reflects the intellectual development of its author, with all the contradictions and faults that entails, and can thus also be read as a Bildungsroman, an intellectual biography of Plato. Since “the philosophy of a person” is nothing but “the history, the becoming, the advancement of their mind”, the individual dialogues represent the different stages of development and reflection of Plato’s thought. From this thought, Schlegel derives the onus that must be put on a philologically accurate chronological ordering of the individual works of Plato, as well as the analysis of their authenticity. Furthermore, Schlegel views Plato as a continually developing thinker, who, once he has reached them, continually questions his own conclusions, revaluating them and, occasionally, reaching new ones, thus demonstrating that he was never done thinking, his thoughts never complete. In this thought, too, a sceptical motif can be found – the perpetual ‘looking’, ‘searching’ and ‘observing’, which is scepticism at its best. At this point, it is, however, more important to note that Schlegel goes on to transfer these observations on the form of Plato’s work onto its content. The third point of note with regard to Schlegel’s interpretation of Plato is thus the strong connection he sees between form and content. According to him, Plato

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was not unable to complete his philosophising because of some deficiency in his mental faculties, rather it is part of the nature of philosophy itself to be inherently interminable, infinitely open. This nature thus cannot find its true expression in the form of the philosophical treatise, but rather in the experimentally open conversation of the dialogue, which resists any attempts at systematisation and thus opens up philosophy to all times and cultures. Schlegel thus believed to have found the true spirit of Plato’s philosophy in this broader structure of the dialogues. Following on from these considerations, a number of consequences can be arrived at, which can only be touched upon here without discussing them in any detail. Schlegel thus, for instance, rejects that the theory of forms is the core of Plato’s philosophy, arguing that it is only one of many theories which Plato develops, revises and finally calls into question in the course of his thought process (KFSA 11, pp. 121–125 and KFSA 12, pp. 223–225). Schlegel also explicitly rejects the thesis that the essence of Plato’s philosophy is to be found in any sort of unwritten doctrines. Schlegel argues against this theory of esoteric secret teachings, which was introduced into the contemporary debate by Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann (Tennemann 1792–95), by pointing to the diametrically opposed character of the intersubjectively open dialogues and to the presupposition – which Schlegel utterly rejects – that Plato had some positive knowledge of the highest principles, something that he, according to Schlegel, never claimed to have. This fundamental conviction which Schlegel held, and which Schleiermacher too would later adopt, is the true reason for the harsh critique on the part of the Tübinger School (esp. Krämer 1988),¹¹ which sees the essence of Plato’s teachings, that which Plato truly wanted to express, in supposedly reconstructable unwritten doctrines.¹² Schlegel criticises such positions by interpreting Plato’s famous critique of the written word not as a clue towards something hidden and unsaid, which is reserved for verbal instruction, but rather as evidence for the thesis that the highest is intrinsically unutterable. This then is the fourth and final point whose importance for Schlegel’s interpretation of Plato is to be emphasised here. For Schlegel Plato’s philosophical endeavours consist of reaching “the gates of the highest“ and being contented “to there adumbrate the infinite, divine, which cannot be identified or explained

11 Krämer has renewed this critique on several occasions: cf. Krämer 2014, XI, pp. 165 ff., 402 ff., 534 ff. and 572 ff. With regard to the Tübingen School and their new paradigmatic interpretation of Plato, cf. Szlezák 1992. 12 Hegel too assumes the existence of a “purely philosophical (dogmatic) work of Plato” [“rein philosophische[s] (dogmatische[s]) Werk Platons”] besides the dialogues (Hegel 1971, p. 21 & 69).

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philosophically.”¹³ It is, however, notable that this is, according to Schlegel, nothing that is peculiar to Plato. Rather, it lies in the nature of the Absolute that, due to the relativity of language, it eludes any positive representation. Schlegel does, however, claim to have found several techniques for its indirect depiction. In his lectures in Cologne in 1804/05 he thus points to a selection of dialogues: The highest can only be depicted by dressing it in another’s garments, thus bringing it closer to human apprehension; – Plato attempts this in all sorts of ways; he uses every existing art and science to that purpose [. . . ]. In Phaedo he uses the whole of language, the cloak of the mystical, in Phaedrus [. . . ] the rhetorical form is dominant, in Parmenides it is more purely dialectical, in Theaetetus mathematical, in The Republic political in Timaeus finally his treatment is poetico–physical. [Das Höchste läßt sich nur darstellen, indem man es in ein andres Gewand einkleidet, und es so der menschlichen Fassungskraft näher bringt; – dies versuchte nun Plato auf alle mögliche Weise; jede damals bestehende Kunst und Wissenschaft benutzte er zu diesem Zwecke [. . . ]. Im Phädon bediente er sich ganz der Sprache, des Gewandes der Mysterien; im Phädrus [. . . ] herrscht die rhetorische Form; im Parmenides ist sie mehr rein dialektisch; im Theätetus mathematisch; in der Republik politisch; in dem Timäus endlich [. . . ] ist die Behandlung poetisch–physikalisch.] (KFSA 12, pp. 214–215)

This “relative non–representability of the highest” [“relative Undarstellbarkeit des Höchsten”] (KFSA 12, p. 214) thus permits discussion of the absolute only through allegories and images and ultimately results in a philosophy that approaches the divine in ever new ways and by ever new means, but which necessarily remains within the realm of the conditional. Accordingly, the platonic dialogues end “not with a definite sentence or result, but with a suggestion of the infinite” [“nicht mit einem bestimmten Satze oder Resultate [. . . ], sondern mit einer Andeutung des Unendlichen”], which allows the reflection to peter out in the infinite (KFSA 12, p. 210). Here too we find a sceptical motif, one whose scepticism is of the absolute. The interpretation of Plato as a genuinely sceptical thinker is, of course, no invention of Schlegel. It defined the classical inner–academic debates and can, for example be found in the texts of Sextus Empiricus (Sextus 1985, pp. 221 ff.) and Diogenes Laërtius (Diogenes Laertios 1998, III, 51). Schlegel’s case is, however, decidedly different. Not only does he affirm much of what he thinks to have found in Plato, he also considers it essential to his own thought. I will thus finally – and again with a view to the genuinely sceptical elements of his theory – offer a short overview of Schlegel’s own position.

13 With regard to Plato’s thesis of the non–representability of the highest, cf. for instance the Seventh Letter: 341c–e.

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III Firstly, it is to be noted that the leitmotifs of Schlegel’s interpretation of Plato recur in his own philosophical and literary works. With regard to the forms of his thoughts he draws heavily on Plato, writing, for example, a Gespräch über die Poesie, which contains a number of explicit references to Plato (e.g.: KFSA 2, pp. 304 and 325), or a speech Über die Philosophie. An Dorothea [On Philosophy. For Dorothea], which is itself again a conversation with references to Plato (KFSA 8, pp. 41 and 57). It is, furthermore, no accident that his preferred forms are the literary fragment, the characterisation and the essay, all of which lend themselves to the expression of the dialogic–symphilosophical character of his philosophy and of the scepticism and relativity contained within it. For Schlegel – drawing on Plato – philosophy is thus a process of developing oneself and the world [‘Selbst– und Weltbildung’] which must be understood as intersubjective, for only conversation can do the living nature of philosophical thought justice. That is also why Schlegel quickly makes the story of his own development, with all its presuppositions, influences and tendencies, to an object of detailed reflection. His project of the Philosophische Lehrjahre [Philosophical Apprenticeship] (cf. KFSA 12, pp. XII ff.), which were to have included his notebooks as a testament to his intellectual development, thus, in a way, corresponds to the thesis that the dialogues are a documentation of the development of Plato’s thought. Beyond these formal similarities there are, however, numerous instances of concrete parallels between Schlegel’s thought and that, which he believes to have found in Plato. These references are most plain in the lectures Schlegel held on Transcendental philosophy in Jena in the winter semester of 1800/01 – the time of his most intense studies of Plato –, mentioned above (cf. Korngiebel 2016a). There we not merely find references to Plato and “platonism” (KFSA 12, p. 67); rather, the lectures, preserved in the form of anonymous notes, must be understood as an explicit discussion of Plato’s thought. To this effect Ernst Behler notes that “one could indeed best develop Schlegel’s conception of philosophy at the turn of the century on the basis of his interpretation of Plato” (Behler 1993, p. 71). Schlegel himself writes to Schleiermacher at the time of these lectures: “You want to know about my lecture? It is going quite well. I am learning a lot, not just that I have almost got the elements of Plato, Spinoza and Fichte straight, but also how I am to speak.” [“Du willst von meinen Vorlesungen wissen? – Es geht so ziemlich. Ich lerne viel dabey, nicht bloß daß ich über die Elemente über Plato, Spinosa und Fichte nun fast ins Reine bin, sondern auch wie ich zu reden habe.”] (KFSA 25, p. 223) Schlegel’s interest in Plato was thus of central importance during the formation of his own system.

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This is already confirmed by the notes of the first lectures, in which Schlegel defines philosophy – in full agreement with Plato’s Symposium – as “a pursuit of knowledge” [“ein Streben nach einem Wissen”] (KFSA 12, p. 3). This pursuit has its origin in the “longing for the infinite” [“Sehnsucht nach dem Unendlichen”] (KFSA 12, pp. 7–8), which Schlegel found to be a major theme of his own thought in one of his earliest surviving letters (cf. KFSA 23, p. 24). In the lecture he characterises this longing or ‘consciousness of the infinite’ as the highest in man and notes that “some writings of Plato, especially Phaedo” [“Einige Schriften des Plato, vorzüglich der Phaedon”] could be useful in developing it (KFSA 12, p. 8). This longing for the infinite, however, is, for Schlegel, not just another motivation for attempting to develop a reunification between the finite and infinite; rather, it is the true horizon of his philosophy. This, in turn, is determined to be a dynamic between two poles by Schlegel: On the one hand scepticism, with which he characterises lack of knowledge as a “thoroughly negative condition” [“durchaus negative[n] Zustand”], and enthusiasm on the other hand, a term which also has its source in Plato¹⁴ and which describes the aspiring position of knowledge. Both poles are in perpetual contradiction with each other, continually referring to and against the other, thus resulting in an antithetical process, which, under perpetual reassessment and self–correction, tends toward the absolute (KFSA 12, p. 4). This process essentially – with regard to form – corresponds to that which Schlegel claims to have found in the platonic dialogues. The implication of scepticism is named as a condition for this antithetical process by Schlegel, but without any of the reservations Kant still has (cf. Korngiebel 2016b). He does not consider it to be a deficiency – as Kant does –, but rather a necessary driver in the development of thought. In the lecture he thus observes that Plato “illustrates them consummately” [“sehr vollkommen dar[stellt]”] – probably in the dialogues themselves (KFSA 12, p. 42). Schlegel’s specific concept of dialectics can be considered to be a further concretisation of this concept.¹⁵ In the lecture he determines it to be “the communal development of reason and elimination of error” [“gemeinschaftliche[s] Ausbilden des Verstandes und Vernichtung des Irrthums”] (KFSA 12, p. 97). This conception clearly stands in a closer relation to Plato than to contemporary philosophers such as Kant or Fichte. Against Kant’s devaluation of dialectics, Schlegel emphatically advances a revaluation; in that regard he also modifies the concept by returning to the old meaning of “διαλεκτικὴ” as “art or science of conversation” [“Kunst oder Wissenschaft des Gesprächs”] (KFSA 13, p. 203). Referencing Gorgias, Schlegel 14 It is in this regard that Behler (1993, p. 54) cites the “‘love’ of Eros” as the fourth kind of divine insanity (Phaidros, 265b – s. Platon 1977 5, p. 143). 15 For a more detailed treatment of Schlegel’s conception of dialectics cf.: KFSA 13, pp. 203–210, Arndt 2009 and Bubner 1995b.

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observed as early as 1796 that “the Greek name dialectics is very significant. The real art, (not appearance as per Kant), of communicating truth, of conversation, communally searching for the truth, refuting it and finding it.” [“Sehr bedeutend ist der Griech.[ische] Nahme Dialektik. Die ächte Kunst, (nicht der Schein wie bey K[ant]), sondern die Wahrheit mitzutheilen, zu reden, gemeinschaft.[lich] die Wahrheit zu suchen, zu widerlegen und zu erreichen”] (KFSA 18, p. 509, No. 50). Schlegel continued to maintain this – ultimately symphilosophical – ideal at the turn of the century. In his lecture on Transcendentalphilosophie he accordingly notes: In the Socratic era philosophy was dialectical. This then can be an example to us, and we can say, with good reason, that the method of philosophy should be Socratic, i.e. that the spirit of the true philosophy cannot flourish until the art of scientific conversation has been rediscovered and been transformed into the highest undertaking. [In dem Sokratischen Zeitalter war die Philosophie dialektisch. Dies kann uns also zum Beispiel dienen, und wir können mit gutem Grund sagen, die Methode der Philosophie soll sokratisch seyn, das heißt [. . . ], daß der Geist der wahren Philosophie nicht eher wieder blühen kann, bis die Kunst ein wissenschaftliches Gespräch zu führen, wieder erfunden, und in die größte Thätigkeit versetzt wird.] (KFSA 12, p. 103)

According to Schlegel, dialectics, whose ultimate aim is knowledge of the absolute, does, however, remain merely approximative, i.e. it approaches the limit of the absolute without ever reaching it. The reason for this can, in turn, be found in the “principle of the relative non–representability of the highest” [“Prinzip der relativen Undarstellbarkeit des Höchsten”], whose conception Schlegel develops in reference to Plato (KFSA 12, p. 214). Simply, it states that the unconditional cannot be known, since knowledge is in itself conditional. The attempt to know the unconditional must therefore necessarily remain in the scope of the conditional, viz. finite, and thus cannot reach its intended goal, the absolute. This key thought too can be found in Schlegel’s early notebooks. In 1796 he writes: “Cognition always connotes a conditional knowledge. The incognisability of the absolute is thus an identical triviality” [“Erkennen bezeichnet schon ein bedingtes Wissen. Die Nichterkennbarkeit des Absoluten ist also eine identische Trivialität.”] (KFSA 18, p. 511, No. 64) Philosophy, as the communication of the thought of the absolute, is, according to Schlegel, only possible in an indirect way. How this indirect representation can be made possible through the use of different mediums has already been demonstrated with reference to the platonic dialogues. In the lecture Schlegel subsumes all these methods under the term “allegory” (KFSA 12, p. 41). It paraphrases, illustrates and invests, thus enabling the depiction of something undepictable. In the Gespräch über die Poesie Ludoviko says: “The highest can,

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precisely because it is unsayable, only be said allegorically.” [“Das Höchste kann man eben weil es unaussprechlich ist, nur allegorisch sagen. ]“ (KFSA 2, p. 324) Precisely because the highest is more than can be depicted in an allegory, because it continually eludes any attempt to depict it, a process of infinite approximation to the absolute results. Schlegel understands this process – in a practical sense – as Bildung (KFSA 12, p. 40) or, with Plato, as ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, “becoming like God as far possible” (Theaetetus, 176b – s. Platon 1977 6, p. 107). In the lecture he understands this process as an infinitely progressing history of consciousness, which attempts to ascend to its unconditional core, the infinite. This history of consciousness is not, however, to be understood merely as a story of the development of the individual subject, but rather also as encompassing the sphere of intersubjectivity, an eternally perfectible history of humanity. From this point of view Schlegel’s conception of the platonic dialogues can be further substantiated. They are no longer solely an intellectual biography and thus the story of his subjective development; for Schlegel they are also testimony of the development of humanity, which everyone – irrespective of time and space – can build upon. As such they serve as a new starting point for each epoch, offering each intellectual era the possibility of rediscovering them. It thus becomes clear that the infinite, never ending process of the development of the self and of the world implies the relativity of ones own developmental stage. Schlegel, in accordance with this insight, thus summarises his philosophy in the following statements: “philosophy is an experiment“ [“Die Philosophie ist ein Experiment”] (KFSA 12, p. 3); „all knowledge is symbolic“ [“Alles Wissen ist symbolisch”] (KFSA 12, p. 9); “all philosophy is infinite” [“Alle Philosophie ist unendlich”] (KFSA 12, p. 92) und “all truth is relative” [“Alle Wahrheit ist relativ”] (KFSA 12, p. 9). These statements, with which Schlegel characterises his philosophical position at the turn of the 19th century, could, at the same time, be considered to be the central tenets of his interpretation of Plato. As has been shown, both – Schlegel’s own philosophy and his interpretation of Plato – can be traced to broadly sceptical motifs – a scepticism, however, which stands more in the academic tradition, which originated from Plato, of a continual increase in probability, rather than in that of Pyrrhonism (cf. Korngiebel 2016b, pp. 223 ff.). Schlegel is thus not interested in demonstrating the essential undecidability with regard to two opposed judgements and the resulting abstention from judgement. Rather, he is interested in the insight that knowledge is always provisional, conditional and in constant need of revision. Schlegel’s relativity must not, therefore, be misunderstood as the arbitrary juxta-

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position of post–modernism.¹⁶ On the contrary, Schlegel – as Plato did in relation to the Sophists – always believed in the existence of objective truth, while at the same time arguing that it could only be reached by approximation. For Schlegel relativity must therefore be primarily understood as meaning that all knowledge is valid only as long as no error is discovered that makes a revision necessary. This results in an historically open system, which constitutes an approximative series of relative maxima of knowledge. Schlegel thus confronts the mere side–by–side of an arbitrary juxtaposition with his conception of a history of consciousness, i.e. a succession of qualitatively consecutive stages, even the highest of which must, in principle, be considered corrigible. In the lecture Schlegel sums up this position with the following words: Absolute truth cannot be admitted; and this is the charter for the liberty of thought and spirit. If the absolute truth could be found, the undertaking of the spirit would be complete and it would have to cease being, since it exists only in activity. But if all truth be relative, we can yield ourselves with courage and hope to speculation; every series of experiments that has its ground in something real leads to the truth. More cannot be said; if we but destroy error, truth will arise of its own accord. [Absolute Wahrheit kann nicht zugegeben werden; und dies ist die Urkunde für die Freyheit der Gedanken und des Geistes. Wenn die absolute Wahrheit gefunden wäre, so wäre damit das Geschäft des Geistes vollendet, und er müßte aufhören zu seyn, da er nur in der Thätigkeit existirt. Aber so, wenn alle Wahrheit nur relativ ist, können wir uns mit Muth und Hoffnung der Spekulazion überlassen; jede Reihe von Versuchen, die etwas Reelles zu Grunde hat, führt zur Wahrheit. Mehr kann nicht gesagt werden; vernichten wir nur den Irrthum, so entsteht die Wahrheit von selbst.] (KFSA 12, p. 93)

Schlegel may have had this thought in mind when, some years later in Cologne in his lecture Die Entwicklung der Philosophie in zwölf Büchern [The Development of Philosophy in twelve Books], he summarised Plato’s philosophy thus: “In contrast to the dogmatic striving for a system, the sceptical, gradually developing, completing

16 It is to be noted in passing that the early–romanticist theories – contrary to oft repeated pronouncements of the opposite and despite some indubitable similarities – are essentially incompatible with post–modernism. This has been noted by its earliest theorists. Lyotard writes, for instance,: “It appears to me that the essay (Montaigne) is postmodern, while the fragment (The Athenaeum) is modern.” (Lyotard 1984, 81) This is based on the observation that although romanticism denies the possibility of an achievable whole, it does not affirm this loss (which would be in accordance with the post–modern position), rather they regret it and long for it, even crave it (cf. Welsch 2002, 36 and 175).

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spirit of his dialogues is certainly a fruitful and instructive alternative“ [“Gegen das dogmatische, zum System eilende Streben ist gewiß der skeptische, allmählich bildende, vollendende Geist seiner Dialoge der fruchtbarste, lehrreichste Gegensatz”] (KFSA 12, p. 212). From this we can again return to what was said at the beginning. The idea that Plato’s dialogues can continually serve as fecund soil for original ideas underscores the thesis that Schlegel’s interpretation of Plato should be considered to be a reactualisation of his thought before the backdrop of the debates at the turn of the 19th century.¹⁷ It can also now be better understood why the harsh criticism of the ‘romantic paradigm in the interpretation of Plato’ by the Tübinger School misses the mark. For when Krämer writes that Schlegel developed and propagated an “historically inadequate” depiction of Plato, he utterly misjudges his intentions (Krämer 1988, p. 585).¹⁸ Schlegel was not primarily concerned with arriving at a historically ‘accurate’ account of Plato’s thought¹⁹ – he considered such a reconstruction to be impossible on hermeneutic grounds;²⁰ rather, he considered Plato to be the Philosopher of antiquity, whose thoughts most had to be revitalised for contemporary debates. Schlegel’s interpretation of Plato is thus not only of historical interest, but is, rather, itself a step in the history of self–realisation of the mind. Schlegel would thus have been the first to admit that his reconstruction of Plato could never be more than a particular interpretation of Plato. That Plato’s ideas – especially the sceptical motifs in them – could stimulate the debates of modernity in general, and of early–romanticism in particular, does, however, appear to be an original discovery of Schlegel. Translated by Moritz Hellmich

17 Notes such as “Plato the synthesis of Fichte and Spinoza” [“Plato die Synthese von Fichte und Spinosa”] (KFSA 12, 295, No. 1201) are, probably, to be understood in this sense. 18 Regarding the criticism of the Tübinger School and especially Krämer from the standpoint of Schlegel experts, cf.: Bubner 1995a, 35 f.; Vieweg 1999, 137; Frischmann 2001, 85–91; Krause 2002, 362 f. and in reference to Schleiermacher: Steiner 1996, XXXII ff. and XLII f. Regarding the debate among Plato experts cf. the balanced view in Kutschera 2002, Vol. 3, 149–155 and Ferber 2007, who seems to follow the romantic paradigm in certain points. 19 Cf. the self–avowed claim of the Tübingen School: Krämer 1988, 620. 20 Cf.: Bubner 1995a, 36.

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Bibliographie 1 Abbreviations KFSA: Schlegel, Friedrich (1958 ff.): Kritische Ausgabe seiner Werke. Ed. by Behler, Ernst et al. Paderborn: Schöningh.

2 Other bibliography Arndt, Andreas (2009): “Perspektiven frühromantischer Dialektik”. In: Frischmann, Bärbel/ Millán–Zaibert, Elizabeth (Eds.): Das neue Licht der Frühromantik. Paderborn: Schöningh, pp. 53–64. Arndt, Andreas (2013): “Schleiermacher und Platon”. In: Arndt, Andreas: Friedrich Schleiermacher als Philosoph. Berlin: de Gruyter, pp. 263–274. Ast, Friedrich (1803): “Euthyphron. Ein platonisches Gespräch, übersetzt mit Anmerkungen”. In: Philologie. Eine Zeitschrift 2, pp. 219–264. Auerochs, Bernd (1996): “Platon um 1800. Zu seinem Bild bei Stolberg, Wieland, Schlegel und Schleiermacher”. In: Wieland–Studien 3, pp. 161–193. Behler, Ernst (1993): “Friedrich Schlegels Vorlesungen über Transcendentalphilosophie 1800– 1801”. In: Jaeschke, Walter (Ed.): Transzendentalphilosophie und Spekulation. Der Streit um die Gestalt einer ersten Philosophie (1799–1807). Hamburg: Meiner, pp. 52–71. Bubner, Rüdiger (1995a): “Die Entdeckung Platons durch Schelling und seine Aneignung durch Schleiermacher”. In: Bubner, Rüdiger: Innovationen des Idealismus. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, pp. 9–42. Bubner, Rüdiger (1995b): “Zur dialektischen Bedeutung romantischer Ironie”. In: Bubner, Rüdiger: Innovationen des Idealismus. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, pp. 152–163. Diogenes Laertios (1998): Leben und Lehren der Philosophen. Trans. from Greek and ed. by Fritz Jürß. Stuttgart: Reclam. Eichner, Hans (2012): Friedrich Schlegel im Spiegel seiner Zeitgenossen. Mayer, Hartwig/ Patsch, Hermann (Eds.). 4 Vols. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann. Ferber, Rafael (2007): Warum hat Platon die ‘ungeschriebene Lehre’ nicht geschrieben? 2nd edition. München: C.H. Beck. Forster, Michael (2011): “Schlegel and Hegel on Skepticism and Philosophy”. In: Ficara, Elena (Ed.): Die Begründung der Philosophie im Deutschen Idealismus. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, pp. 141–153. Frank, Manfred (1996): “‘Alle Wahrheit ist relativ, alles Wissen symbolisch’. Motive der Grundsatz–Skepsis in der frühen Jenaer Romantik (1796)”. In: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 197, pp. 403–436. Frischmann, Bärbel (2001): “Friedrich Schlegels Platonrezeption und das hermeneutische Paradigma”. In: Athenäum. Jahrbuch für Romantik 11, pp. 71–92. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1971): “Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie II”. In: G.W.F. Hegel. Werke in zwanzig Bänden. Theorie–Werkausgabe. New edition by Eva Mold-

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enhauer and Karl Markus Michel based on the works of 1832–1845. Vol. 19. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Jantzen, Jörg (1996): “Schleiermachers Platon–Übersetzung und seine Anmerkungen dazu”. In: Steiner, Peter M. (ed.): Schleiermacher. Über die Philosophie Platons. Hamburg: Meiner, pp. XLV–LVIII. Korngiebel, Johannes (2016a): “Die Vorlesung als Medium der Kritik. Zu Friedrich Schlegels Jenaer Transcendentalphilosophie (1800/01)”. In: Athenäum. Jahrbuch der Friedrich Schlegel–Gesellschaft 26, pp. 87–120. Korngiebel, Johannes (2016b): “Friedrich Schlegels Idee der systemimmanenten Skepsis”. In: Bondeli, Martin/Chotaš, Jiři/Vieweg, Klaus (Eds.): Krankheit des Zeitalters oder heilsame Provokation? Skeptizismus in der nachkantischen Philosophie. Paderborn: Fink, pp. 215– 235. Krämer, Hans (1988): “Fichte, Schlegel und der Infinitismus in der Platondeutung”. In: Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte 62, pp. 583–621. Krämer, Hans (2014): Gesammelte Aufsätze zu Platon. Mirbach Dagmar (Ed.). Berlin and Boston: de Gruyter. Krause, Peter D. (2002): “Friedrich Schlegel und Plato – Plato und Friedrich Schlegel”. In: Germanisch–Romanische Monatsschrift 52, pp. 343–363. Kutschera, Franz von (2002): Platons Philosophie. 3. vol. Paderborn: Mentis. Leinkauf, Thomas (2009): “Deutsche Klassik und deutscher Idealismus/Platon–Philologie im 19. Jahrhundert”. In: Horn, Christoph/Müller, Jörn/Söder, Joachim (Eds.): Platon–Handbuch. Leben, Werk, Wirkung. Stuttgart, Weimar: Metzler, pp. 474–499. Lyotard, Jean–Francois (1984): The Posmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Meckenstock, Günter (1988): “Zum Platon”. In: Birkner, Hans–Joachim et al. (eds.): Schleiermacher, Friedrich Daniel Ernst. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Vol. I/3. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, pp. XCVI–CVI. Patsch, Hermann (1988): “Friedrich Asts ‚Eutyphron‘–Übersetzung im Nachlaß Fr. Schlegels”. In: Jahrbuch des freien deutschen Hochstifts 68, pp. 112–127. Platon (1977): Werke in acht Bänden. Griechisch und Deutsch. Eigler, Gunther (Ed.). Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Sextus Empiricus (1985): Grundriß der pyrrhonischen Skepsis. Introduced and trans. by Malte Hossenfelder. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Steiner, Peter M. (1996): “Zur Kontroverse um Schleiermachers Platon”. In: Steiner, Peter M. (Ed.): Schleiermacher. Über die Philosophie Platons. Hamburg: Meiner, pp. XXIII–XLII. Szlezák, Thomas A. (1993): Platon lesen. Stuttgart–Bad Cannstatt: Frommann–Holzboog. Tennemann, Wilhelm Gottlieb (1792–1795): System der Platonischen Philosophie. 4 Vols. Leipzig by Johann Ambrosius Barth. Vieweg, Klaus (1999): Philosophie des Remis. Der junge Hegel und das ,Gespenst des Skepticismus‘. München: Fink. Vieweg, Klaus (2007): Skepsis und Freiheit. Hegel über den Skeptizismus zwischen Philosophie und Literatur. München: Fink. Welsch, Wolfgang (2002): Unsere postmoderne Moderne (first pub.: 1987). 6th edition. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.

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Zovko, Jure (1990): Verstehen und Nichtverstehen bei Friedrich Schlegel. Zur Entstehung und Bedeutung seiner hermeneutischen Kritik. Stuttgart–Bad Cannstatt: Frommann–Holzboog.

Suzanne Dürr

The Reception of Aenesidemus in Fichte and Hegel Abstract: This article explores Fichte’s and Hegel’s reception of the sceptic Gottlob Ernst Schulze, who wrote in the style of the pyrrhonian sceptic Ainesidemos and who went by the name of Aenesidemus–Schulze. In the first part of the article I investigate Schulze’s influence on the development of Fichte’s Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre) in order then, in part two, to reconstruct Hegel’s critique of Schulze’s natural realism. In the third part, via a brief comparison, I examine the differences between Fichte’s and Hegel’s views of Schulze. A particular aim here is to show how Fichte and Hegel define the relationship between scepticism and system.

1 Fichte’s dispute with Schulze Fichte distinguishes between two forms of scepticism: a radical scepticism, which for him, however, is no more than a fiction; and a critical scepticism, of which Hume, Maimon and Aenesidemus–Schulze are representatives. Critical scepticism does not dispute the possibility of a system, but functions as a corrective, revealing the inadequacies of any particular posited ground or justification, thereby helping to improve the system. With his distinction between systematic and critical scepticism, Fichte thus draws upon Kant’s contrast between scepticism and sceptical method. While the sceptical method (as method of transcendental philosophy) brings into doubt the transcendent use of the principles of reason, and thereby prepares the ground for the critique of reason, destructive or ‘boundless’ scepticism doubts the very foundations of knowledge themselves and so leads to a self–destruction of reason. For Fichte, neither systematic nor critical scepticism involves a sustainable position: while the self–contradiction of systematic scepticism consists in the fact that it systematically disputes the possibility of a system (and thereby confirms the system), critical scepticism, by arguing that things in themselves are unknowable, denies the possibility of objective knowledge without disputing the possibility of a system. The assumption of a thing–in–itself stands opposed to the concept of a system, since any entity which is by definition imSuzanne Dürr, Dr. des. Suzanne Dürr, Assistant Lecturer, Institute for Philosophy, Friedrich Schiller University Jena; Fellow in residence at Kolleg Friedrich Nietzsche Weimar. DOI 10.1515/9783110528138-011

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manent and discrete allows no external knowledge of itself and so cannot serve as a ground. If systematic scepticism refutes itself in being inconsistent, critical scepticism needs to be externally refuted. Critical scepticism is only overcome once the science of knowledge is established as an immanent system, by showing that objective knowledge is possible without the assumption of things–in–themselves. Fichte takes up the intermediate position Kant had ascribed to scepticism, namely between ‘dogmatism’ and ‘criticism’. The function of critical scepticism consists in revealing dogmatism’s inadequacy, in order to further the science of knowledge. Of decisive influence upon the development of Fichte’s concept of system is Schulze’s most important text, bearing the rather unwieldy title of Aenesidemus, or Concerning the Foundations of the Philosophy of the Elements Issued by Professor Reinhold in Jena Together with a Defence of Skepticism against the Pretensions of the Critique of Reason (1792). Fichte’s Review of Aenesidemus appeared in February 1794 in the Allgemeine Literatur–Zeitung. It is divided in three parts, the first dealing with Schulze’s critique of Reinhold’s concept of first principles, the second thematising Schulze’s critique of Reinhold’s conception of the faculty of representation (Vorstellung), the third concerned with the problematic of the thing–in–itself. Only in the first part does Fichte describe Schulze as a critical sceptic; the second and third parts target his “presumptuous dogmatism” (GA I.2, p. 49), arguing that Schulze no longer holds to his own first principles, e.g. recognising the universal laws of logic. While dogmatic scepticism involves a universal or global scepticism, in that it disputes the possibility of knowledge as such, critical scepticism can be characterised as a partial or local scepticism, since only certain premises are doubted, the validity claims of others being recognised. Schulze’s critique of Reinhold, which Fichte explores in part one of his review, thus represents an immanent critique, in that Schulze shares with Reinhold two essential premises: firstly, that philosophy is possible as a science only by being grounded in a first principle (Grundsatz); secondly, that the content of the first principle is to be determined by the concept of representation (Vorstellung) as highest concept. Fichte accepts the first of these premises while vehemently denying the second. The first part of Fichte’s review then emphasises three key Schulzeian arguments of increasing relevance that tell against Reinhold’s first principle of consciousness (“in consciousness, representation by the subject is distinguished from subject and object and is related to both” – Reinhold 1790, p. 167): 1. The principle of consciousness is not the highest principle, since it is subordinate to the logical principle of the excluded middle. 2. The principle of consciousness is no self–determining principle, as an absolutely first principle must be, since the terms ‘distinguished from’ and ‘related to’ are ambiguous.

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3. The principle of consciousness is not universally valid, since there could be an expression of consciousness in which the three central elements of the principle of consciousness were not present and, moreover, the principle does not express a fact independent of experience. Siding with Reinhold, Fichte maintains that Schulze’s first objection misses its mark, since the principle of excluded middle, as a merely formal–logical principle, lacks real validity and thus also the status of a first principle. Fichte points here to a necessary circularity: one cannot think other than according to the laws of thinking, i.e. logical principles are present in every type of thought, whose horizon they form. He then turns to Schulze’s second critique of Reinhold. For Fichte, the indeterminacy and indeterminability of the terms ‘distinguished from’ and ‘related to’ refers to a higher principle, and here he means a real validity of the principles of identity and of the excluded middle. The laws of logic have the form they do because, for Fichte, they are derivative of the original acts of the “I”. Thus the law of excluded middle cannot be the presupposition of the absolutely fundamental principle because this law itself forms the logical structure of the original act of opposition, which for Fichte is the second fundamental principle. On Schulze’s third point of critique of Reinhold, concerning the merely limited validity of the principle of consciousness, Fichte is in agreement: it has only empirical validity and thus cannot serve as the highest, universal principle of philosophy. Fichte sides with Schulze here and adds the following considerations: firstly, everything which is present in consciousness is defined as representation; secondly, representation constitutes an empirical determination of consciousness; thirdly, all representation with pure conditions is given only through representation, i.e. empirically. Fichte thus concludes that all reflection upon consciousness has empirical representations as its object. Thus to the extent that the principle of consciousness concerns a type of meta–representation, a representation of representation which Reinhold characterises as ‘pure’, it is, qua abstraction, dependent upon an empirical act and thus cannot be ‘pure’. For Fichte, Reinhold’s supposed purity of representation results from a false starting point, namely the assumption that the principle of consciousness must constitute a fact (Tatsache). At this point Fichte levels his decisive argument against Reinhold: representation is, qua fact, something determined, i.e. something immediately given in empirical consciousness. Fichte rejects Schulze’s critique, however, that the principle of consciousness has only empirical validity. He integrates Schulze’s critique into his own argument against Reinhold, while radically rejecting this particular point. For Fichte the principle of consciousness amounts not to a first principle (Grundsatz) but to a theorem (Lehrsatz) whose validity is dependent upon such a first principle. Although the principle of consciousness explicates a fact, this is for Fichte no principle of ex-

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perience. In taking up Schulze’s critique, Fichte alters the very understanding of ‘empirical’. ‘Empirical’ for Fichte is not that which is externally given by experience but that which, qua fact, is present in consciousness as something indeducible, so that even logical principles have the status of empirical circumstances. Fichte will then trace representation qua fact (Tatsache) back to an original fact–act (Tathandlung) (cf. GA I.2, p. 46). In a letter to Reinhold of 28th April 1795 Fichte makes a further decisive objection to the latter’s conception of first principles, namely that Reinhold’s principle of representation is merely theoretical, whereas the unitary ground of philosophy must, qua ‘principle of subjectivity as such’,¹ be a principle which unites theory and practice. Linked to this is the charge that a merely one–sided theoretical beginning with representation implies an external thing–in–itself upon which it is impossible to ground an immanent system. If, for Fichte, Schulze is a half–critical, half–dogmatic sceptic, then Fichte’s criticism of Reinhold is that, insofar as his merely theoretical first principle leads to an infinite regress, his half–critical philosophy reverts to dogmatism. At the centre of Schulze’s critique of the faculty of representation and the thing–in–itself lies the problem of a transcendent use of the category of causality, a category which, according to critical philosophy, should be restricted to the sphere of appearances. Since for Reinhold the concept of a faculty of representation may be derived only from representation as its effect, this faculty is for Schulze an inescapable presupposition and as such a thing–in–itself. Fichte rejects this – in fact justified – Schulzeian criticism and in so doing points to a necessary circularity resulting from the insuperable immanence of consciousness and which expresses no more than the basic constitution of subjectivity. On the problem of the thing–in–itself, Fichte censures Kant and Reinhold for not having argued against it with sufficient clarity. While in Kant the idea of a thing–in–itself is at least thinkable (for an other, i.e. non–human intellectual faculty), for Schulze the thing–in–itself is something that is wholly independent of the intellect. Fichte thinks Schulze’s idea here is paradoxical, an idea which no human has ever had. When Schulze reproaches Kant and Reinhold for a transcendental use of the category of causality, he secretly operates – so Fichte contends – with a dogmatic conception of the thing–in–itself, namely the assumption that it involves a real entity independent of consciousness. Schulze’s critique of Kant and Reinhold misses its mark in this respect, since it is a critique of a fictitious position. Thus Fichte’s critique is directed against both Reinhold and Schulze: on the one hand he criticises Schulze’s own critique as unjustified, in that it treats circularity as a necessary moment of critical philosophy; on the other hand, reinterpreting Schulze’s own critique, Fichte criticises the

1 Fichte, Letter to Reinhold of 28th April 1795 (GA III.2, pp. 314 ff.).

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representation which Reinhold takes to be fundamental, on the grounds that it is merely empirical and that, insofar as it fails to unify form and content, theory and practice, it cannot serve as an unconditional self–grounding principle. According to Fichte, Schulze’s critique here has only limited validity: as critique it strikes not at the content of the principle of consciousness, i.e. its truth, but merely at its form, i.e. its functional position as first principle of a system. Nevertheless, what Schulze’s critique of Reinhold indicates for Fichte is that it is necessary to ground science anew. On the one hand, Schulze’s scepticism is too radical, since the validity of the principle of consciousness is put in question, on the other, it is not radical enough, since Schulze shares Reinhold’s view that representation is a fitting candidate for an absolutely first principle. Schulze serves as an important stimulus for Fichte’s own critique; he has overthrown Reinhold and has, at the very least, rendered Kant’s philosophy suspect.²

2 Hegel on Schulze While for Fichte it is Schulze’s critique of Reinhold’s Philosophy of the Elements (Elementar–philosophie) that is central, Hegel takes issue (in his essay On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy, Exposition of its Different Modifications and Comparison of the Latest Form with the Ancient One [1802]) with Schulze’s Critique of Theoretical Philosophy (1801). Unlike Fichte, for whom Schulze’s scepticism fulfilled a primarily positive function, visible in the label ‘critical scepticism’ he gives it, Hegel views Schulze’s scepticism as a form of dogmatism. Hegel develops his critique via a comparison of Schulze’s latest scepticism, “which claims to stand on the shoulders of the ancient tradition so that it can both see further and be more rationally doubtful” (TWA 2, p. 214; trans. Giovanni/Harris, p. 314), with the ancient scepticism of an Agrippa or an Ainesidemos, as they are presented by Sextus Empiricus. Hegel begins by expounding Schulze’s critique of theoretical or speculative philosophy before proceeding to characterise his scepticism as an ambivalent project. Schulze diagnoses a “hereditary defect” (TWA 2, p. 216; Giovanni/Harris, p. 316, trans. amended) in speculative philosophy which manifests itself in the lack of a unified position and which, since no improvement in the powers of cognition is to be expected, undermines the future hopes for successful speculation. Schulze defines speculative philosophy as a science which seeks the unconditional cause of the conditional. While maintaining that consciousness as well as the facts occurring in consciousness display immediate certainty and are

2 Cf. Fichte, Letter to Heinrich Stephani of December 1793 (GA III.2, p. 28).

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thus resistant to scepticism, Schulze also takes these supreme causes to be things that are beyond consciousness and therefore unknowable. For Hegel, Schulze’s scepticism thus has two sides: to the extent that he criticises speculative philosophy and labels the assertion of hyper–physical things mere ‘fancy’, his scepticism proceeds negatively; the positive side consists, for Hegel, in Schulze’s not going beyond consciousness, i.e. his scepticism remains a philosophy of facts, one which asserts the immediate certainty of consciousness and its givens. Hegel accuses Schulze here of a crude way of conceiving speculative philosophy (cf. TWA 2, p. 219), i.e. he has produced a dualistic model that distinguishes common experience from things lying behind it like “rocks covered in snow” (TWA 2, p. 220; Giovanni/Harris, p. 318, trans. amended). For Schulze, so Hegel argues, there are only two forms of philosophy, namely the sceptical and the dogmatic. Schulze thus overlooks that speculation involves precisely a third form, one which, integrating the negative side of scepticism, achieves for the first time an adequate critique of dogmatism as a one–sided positive philosophy. Through his false understanding of both philosophy and scepticism, Schulze’s sceptical philosophy turns into a dogmatism, i.e. into a philosophy of facts. To the extent that, for Schulze, the striving for grounded knowledge which lies at the root of speculative philosophy also constitutes a fact of consciousness, his scepticism is faced with a contradiction: “Two cognitions are asserted simultaneously: one in which the existence and character of things is self–explanatory and another in which this existence and character is not at all self–explanatory” (TWA 2, p. 222; trans. Giovanni/Harris, p. 319). Hegel then directs his critique at Schulze’s scepticism, which views itself as “true and as more perfect than the ancient one” (TWA 2, p. 223; trans. Giovanni/Harris, p. 320) and contrasts this new scepticism with Ainesidemos’ 10 Tropes and the 5 Tropes of Agrippa. For Hegel, Schulze’s fact–philosophy shares little in common with ancient scepticism. He points to differences between the object of each scepticism: the object of Schulze’s scepticism is not experience, as in the 10 Tropes, but philosophy as speculation, which refers to supersensible things, i.e. things–in–themselves. The object of the 10 Tropes, however, is sense perception, which, unlike in Schulze, brings no immediate certainty and is understood as mere subjective appearance. According to Schulze, ancient scepticism was grounded on the rudimentary state of ancient science, e.g. physics and astronomy. For Hegel, however, these sciences cannot be deemed objective since they involve a mere narration of sense perception and operate solely with concepts of the understanding. The 5 Tropes, by contrast, are directed against both dogmatism and philosophy and to this extent form a transition to the new scepticism of Schulze. The 5 Tropes occupy a middle position: against dogmatism they apply reason, successfully criticizing it; with reference to reason or philosophy, however, they are dogmatic, taking up the standpoint of the understanding or reflection. Against philosophy, the 5 Tropes prove ineffective,

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according to Hegel, inasmuch as they themselves contain reflections. For Hegel, philosophy as a system of reason is not damaged by the 5 Tropes’ critical weaponry since reason is universal (contra Trope 1 on the multiplicity of opinions), is itself a relation (contra Trope 3 on relations), is not externally grounded (contra Trope 5 on vicious circularity) and has no opposite (contra Trope 4 on presuppositions and Trope 2 on infinite regress). These are the same 5 Tropes that Hegel will use to immunise his system against dogmatism. Both the 5 Tropes and Schulze’s scepticism operate, according to Hegel, with a deficient model of philosophy: while the 5 Tropes are based on a concept of the Absolute as something finite, Schulze operates with a dualistic model of appearance and thing–in–itself, whereby he too misunderstands Absolute Knowing as finite knowledge. In so doing, Schulze has borrowed Kant’s critique of metaphysics and turned it against Kant himself. Hegel then distinguishes three forms of scepticism. Firstly an internal scepticism which, as the free or negative moment of true philosophy qua system of reason, forms their integrative component. Secondly, an external scepticism which can in turn be divided into two sub–forms: a scepticism that is directed against reason (the 5 Tropes) and a scepticism that is not directed against reason (the 10 Tropes). Schulze operates with an inadequate, dualistic model of philosophy, one which is located at the level of understanding rather than that of reason, and which thus identifies philosophy with dogmatism, resulting in the opposition between philosophy and scepticism. For Hegel true philosophy and scepticism form a unity. Thus true philosophy is not dogmatic, since it already integrates scepticism as its negative, dogmatism– criticizing moment. From the standpoint of reason, i.e. on Hegel’s monistic model, the principle of non–contradiction has not only a formal but a real validity, since contradiction is sublated by reason, which has no opposite. While in all three versions of scepticism there is a critique of the dogmatism of common consciousness, the latter is for Schulze an immediate certainty. Science is thus for Schulze empirical psychology. Such a position is to be found neither in earlier scepticism, materialism, nor in common sense. In so far as Schulze represents an empiricist position, his criticism of philosophy is no scepticism but a dogmatism, and his philosophy of facts results from his accusation of a transcendent use of reason by speculative philosophy.³

3 Schulze reacts to Hegel’s critique in the Skeptizismus–Aufsatz with two articles in F. Bouterwek‘s journal Neues Museum der Philosophie und Litteratur: 1) “Aphorismen über das Absolute”; 2) “Die Hauptmomente der skeptischen Denkart über die menschliche Erkenntniß“. Here Schulze revises the realism of 1801, putting in its place the sceptical notion of the epoché drawn from the third Trope on relativity. In his Phenomenology of Spirit (1807 – TWA 3) Hegel borrows Schulze’s critique by rejecting the idea that the absolute is a dogmatic presupposition.

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3 Comparison of Fichte’s and Hegel’s reception of Schulze Fichte and Hegel essentially argue with two different Schulzes. Fichte deals with the critical sceptic of 1792, who criticised Reinhold’s principle of consciousness as empirical, and was thereby prompted to form his own model of a system. Schulze’s critique of Reinhold here is an immanent and thus only partial critique, in that Schulze himself works with a model of first principles. At the centre of Hegel’s argument, by contrast, is the later Schulze, whose scepticism can be characterised on the one hand by a radical critique of metaphysics and on the other by a natural realist position. For Fichte, Schulze is part critical sceptic, part dogmatist; his accusation is that Schulze operates with a dogmatic conception of the thing–in– itself as a real entity independent of consciousness. Hegel also accuses Schulze of a dogmatic understanding of philosophy: Schulze takes speculative philosophy to be a dualistic philosophy of the understanding, and not a monistic philosophy of reasoning; and Schulze’s own position of dogmatic natural realism results precisely from his criticism of the transcendent use of reason. While Schulze is central to Fichte for the formation of his own system of science, and thus to early idealism, his scepticism has for Hegel the merely negative function of offering a counter–model to the ancient true scepticism and to his own monistic philosophy of reason. In contrast to Fichte, who never showed the same intense interest in ancient scepticism, engagement with the Pyrrhonian sceptic Sextus Empiricus plays an eminent role in Hegel. Hegel immunises his system against dogmatism by integrating scepticism as the negative moment of philosophy. Although Fichte’s engagement with the critical scepticism of Schulze predates the formation of his Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre), Fichte’s own system displays sceptical features: firstly, the concept of a Science of Knowledge is regarded as merely hypothetical before the real system is established; secondly, the Science of Knowledge displays no absolute certainty (in contrast to Hegel’s system) but merely claims probability; thirdly, Fichte’s dialectical method operates by detecting contradictions which are then synthetically resolved – contradiction (and thus scepticism’s own characteristic object) form the foundational structure of the Science of Knowledge. Finally, both Fichte and Hegel argue against the Tropes of circularity and infinite regress with a model of immanent justification in the form of a self–relation, an absolute subjectivity, which acts as the basic principle of their systems.

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Bibliographie 1 Abbreviations GA: Fichte, Johann Gottlieb (1962–2012): Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Lauth, Reinhard/Jacob, Hans (Eds.), with the cooperation of other authors. Stuttgart–Bad Cannstatt: Frommann–Holzboog. TWA: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1969–1971): Theorie–Werkausgabe – Werke in zwanzig Bänden auf der Grundlage der Werke von 1832–1845, neu edierte Ausgabe. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Eds.). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

2 Other bibliography Giovanni, George di/Harris, Henry Stilton (Eds.) (2000): Between Kant and Hegel: texts in the development of post–Kantian Idealism. Trans. by George di Giovanni & H. S. Harris. Indianapolis: Hackett. Reinhold, Karl Leonhard (1790): Beyträge zur Berichtigung bisheriger Missverständnisse der Philosophen. Erster Band, das Fundament der Elementarphilosophie betreffend. Jena: Mauke. Schulze, Gottlob Ernst (1792): Aenesidemus, oder über die Fundamente der von dem Hrn. Prof. Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Elementar–Philosophie. Nebst einer Vertheidigung des Skepticismus gegen die Anmaßungen der Vernunftkritik. Ohne Ort. Schulze, Gottlob Ernst (1801): Kritik der theoretischen Philosophie. 2 Vols. Hamburg: Bohm. Schulze, Gottlob Ernst (1803): “Aphorismen über das Absolute. Von einem für dieses Mal ungenannten, aber nichts weniger als unbekannten Verfasser”. In: Neues Museum der Philosophie und Litteratur. 3 Vols. in 1. Bouterwek, Friedrich (Ed.). Vol. 1, No.2. Leipzig: Gottfried Martini, pp. 105–148. Schulze, Gottlob Ernst (1805): “Die Hauptmomente der skeptischen Denkart über die menschliche Erkenntniß”. In: Neues Museum der Philosophie und Litteratur, 3 Vols. in 1. Bouterwek, Friedrich (Ed.). Vol. 3, No. 2. Leipzig: Gottfried Martini, pp. 1–57.

Stella Synegianni

Isosthenie in der Praxis Tragische Konflikte und ihre Rezeption von Platon bis Hegel Abstract: In this paper I try to point out some elements of ancient and contemporary philosophy that reflect the moral conflicts of Greek tragedy. The feelings of pity and fear, invoked in ancient theatre, have triggered the philosophical thought since the very beginning. Philosophers seek a solution for tragic dilemmas and questions such as freedom, guilt or the limitations of the condicio humana. In Hegel’s theory, tragedy includes the conflict and mutual recognition of equal principles – a schema reflecting not only Hegel’s dialectical model, but also the sceptical terminus of “isostheneia”. In order to avoid such conflicts, leading to the unavoidable fall of the acting subject, philosophers have proposed diverging solutions, such as the platonic unity of the virtues, the Kantian „Ding an sich“ or the sceptical ideal of epoche and ataraxia.

Die griechische Tragödie schildert das unverdiente Leid eines Menschen, der gut und tüchtig ist; eines Charakters der uns ähnlich ist, oder vielleicht etwas besser ist, als wir. Der Schwerpunkt im Abschnitt des Aristoteles, der uns dies näher darstellt, liegt im Wort „unverdient“ – „ἀνάξιον“ (Poet., 1453a). Das Mitleid, das die Tragödie erregen soll, entsteht nicht aus irrationaler, bloß emotionaler Rührung, die das Denken lähmt, sondern setzt eine intellektuelle Leistung voraus, die jeweils abwägt, wie die Bilanz zwischen Tun und Ergehen eines Charakters ausfällt, bzw. ausfallen soll. Was die Tragödie anspricht, ist genau das: ein Sinn für Recht, auf den die Affekte von Mitleid und Furcht zurückzuführen sind. Wie stark dieser Sinn in jedem Menschen ausgeprägt ist, lässt sich an den Konnotationen, mit denen der Begriff „tragisch“ beladen ist, erkennen. Das Wort „Tragödie“ wurde zum Synonym für intensiven Schmerz, Entsetzen, Unglück – alles, was der Mensch nicht erleben will und möglichst fern von seiner Realität halten möchte. Für unsere Fragestellung zum Thema „Skepsis“ ist dieses Element von mehrfacher Bedeutung. Die Schilderung von unverdientem Leid moralisch guter Charaktere – was die Tragödie leistet, lässt außerhalb des Mitleids im Gemüt des Zuschauers noch etwas Wichtiges entstehen, nämlich Zweifel. Erste Zweifel betreffen die Fähigkeiten des Menschen: Wenn tüchtige, kluge, moralisch integre Charaktere so heftig scheitern, wie die Heroen des Dramas – was vermag überhaupt Stella Synegianni, Stella Synegianni, M.A., Doktorandin der Friedrich–Schiller–Universität Jena, Institut für Philosophie. DOI 10.1515/9783110528138-012

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unser Erkenntnisvermögen zu unserem Wohlergehen beitragen? Ist der Mensch in der Lage, auf irgendeine Weise sein Schicksal mitzubestimmen? Oder ist er nur Marionette von Mächten, auf die er keinerlei Einfluss ausüben kann? Die weiteren Zweifel betreffen die Götter: Gibt es diese, die eigentlich die sittliche Weltordnung bewachen sollten, überhaupt? Warum lassen sie solch unverdientes Leid zu, und wie stehen sie gegenüber den Menschen? Als selige, gleichgültige Wesen, die sich nur um die Beachtung ihrer Ehre unter den Sterblichen sorgen, wie im olympischen Pantheon? Oder als wohlwollende Instanzen, auf die sich der Mensch verlassen kann und Schutz gegen Gefahren von ihnen erwarten? Die Frage „Was soll ich tun?“ wurde als Kernmoment des Dramas herausgehoben (vgl. Snell 1928, S. 35, 65). Es war das Bewusstsein individueller Verantwortung, die mit dem Erwachen der Freiheit auf dem Boden der Demokratie einherging. Die anderen Grundfragen der Philosophie dennoch, wie sie Kant ausformuliert hat, lassen sich nicht weniger brisant in der Tragödie stellen. „Was kann ich wissen?“ und sogar „Was darf ich hoffen?“ schwingen bei der Erschütterung der Zuschauer beim Verlassen des Theaters, schon in der Antike, recht deutlich mit. Es ist demnach kein Wunder, dass sich die Verbindung zwischen Tragödie und Philosophie in der europäischen Geistesgeschichte ununterbrochen belegen lässt. Auf einen kleinen, aber nicht unbedeutenden Teil dieser vielfachen Wirkung wollen wir uns in diesem Aufsatz beschränken, wobei der Fokus auf die praktische Philosophie und die Dialektik zu richten sein wird. Zum Ersten braucht man sich nicht lange bemühen: Musterhandlungen der Tragödie, ihre Charaktere und deren Triebfeder fanden in der Nikomachischen Ethik ihre theoretische Ausarbeitung und wurden, wenn wir uns des Hegelschen Schemas bedienen wollen, von der Sphäre der Sinnlichkeit in die der Begriffe aufgehoben, mit denen die praktische Philosophie seither immer neu zu operieren hat. Der Umgang mit Affekten, die Willensschwäche, Zurechenbarkeit und Schuld, aber auch individuelle Freiheit, sittliche Ordnung und Theodizee – sind Themen, die mit der Tragödie mehr oder weniger direkt in Verbindung stehen, und Probleme, deren Lösung nach wie vor zu wünschen bleibt. Nicht so klar hingegen ist die Relevanz der Tragödie für die Dialektik. Dass die Tragödie schmerzhafte Konflikte darstellt, ist eine selbstverständliche Feststellung. Dass die Streitkultur der Redner in den Gerichten oder das Abwägen von Argumenten in der Volksversammlung bei den kämpfenden Figuren des Dramas wiederklingen, ist ebenfalls nichts Neues; ebenso nicht die Überlegung, dass die dramatische Form von Platons Dialogen ihren Ursprung im Theater zu suchen hat. Der Versuch dennoch, die klassische Tragödie mit der Philosophie so eng zu verbinden, dass sie zum anschaulichen Muster für ein konkretes logisch–metaphysisches Konzept reduziert werden kann, scheint m.E. ein origineller Beitrag Hegels in der langen Geschichte philosophischer Tragödienrezeption zu sein.

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Hegel würdigt die Tragödie mehrfach in seinem Werk, und kommt immer wieder auf sie zurück, um zentrale Stellen seines Systems zu markieren. Die besondere Neuheit, die Hegel mit Blick auf die Tragödie beizutragen hat, spitzt sich auf die Isosthenie der miteinander kollidierenden Mächte zu. Die von ihm beschriebene Abfolge einer Kollision und Versöhnung zwischen Personen, die in ihrem Handeln gleiches Recht bzw. gleiches Unrecht haben, basiert vorrangig auf der Antigone des Sophokles, wobei es auch Argumente dafür gibt, dass sein eigentliches Vorbild die Orestie gewesen sein kann. Die Tragödientheorie Hegels hat viel Treffendes beigetragen, und weist Verdienste auf, deren Scharfsinn wohl nur bei Aristoteles ihresgleichen haben (vgl. Kaufmann 1980, 221 ff.). Ein Aspekt, der Hegel besonders wichtig ist, wird dennoch von Forschern kritisiert: die von ihm postulierte Gleichberechtigung der kollidierenden Mächte ließ zu sehr den Eindruck entstehen, Hegel möchte sein dialektisches Konzept in die Tragödie hineinlesen. Seine Theorie täte „ihrem Gegenstand Gewalt“ an (vgl. v. Fritz 1962, S. 98), und wäre damit letztlich für die Erschließung des antiken Textes unbrauchbar und irreführend.

1 Bestimmtheit und Besonderheit: notwendigerweise eine Negation? Bevor wir aber auf die Kritik genauer eingehen, versuchen wir die Argumentation, wie sie in der Ästhetik dargestellt wird, etwas genauer zu betrachten. Wenn die allgemeinen Mächte des Handelns, vertreten durch die griechischen Götter, in die Realität eintreten, sind sie laut Hegel verpflichtet, sich zu verbesondern (vgl. TWA 15, S. 521–526). Die Verletzung des entgegengesetzten Prinzips entsteht demnach unvermeidbar und erweist sich letztendlich als unzurechenbar: Die tragische „Schuld“ ist Ergebnis der Tatsache, „dass die Individuen überhaupt handeln“. (vgl. Thiel 2011, S. 62). Auf die Frage, ob man in diesem Zusammenhang überhaupt von Schuld noch sprechen kann, antwortet Hegel mit einer Klärung bzw. Neudefinition des Schuldbegriffs. Schuld ist nicht zwangsläufig negativ konnotiert; im Gegenteil, denn „nichts ist ohne Schuld“ – was impliziert, dass Schuld hier eher im Sinne von Zurechenbarkeit anzunehmen ist (vgl. TWA 15, S. 545 ff.). Konkret zur Tragödie liege die Krux jedoch an anderer Stelle, nämlich in der Frage, aus welcher Perspektive man an die Sache herangeht: Nähert man sich dem Problem mit modernen Kriterien, in denen die Gesinnung und die Absicht des Subjekts den Vorrang haben, dann seien die Heroen sehr wohl unschuldig. Nach antiken Kriterien wiederum verhält sich das ganz anders, denn demnach bestände das heroische Selbstbewusstsein aus lauter Konsequentialismus.

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Im Kapitel über die griechischen Götter (vgl. TWA 14, S. 88 ff.) lesen wir in Hegels Ästhetik, dass diese zwangsläufig beschränkt seien, dadurch, dass sie einen bestimmten Bereich vertreten. Die neuen Götter etwa beschützen allesamt die geistige Macht des Staates, aber nicht die der Familie und der Natur, die den alten, dunklen Mächten überlassen ist. Eine solche Einschränkung bleibt im Zustand der Untätigkeit harmlos, im Prozess der Realisierung jedoch führt sie zu schmerzhaften Konflikten: Orest setzt sich für den Vater ein, aber tötet deswegen die Mutter; Hippolytos ehrt die Artemis, aber verachtet dadurch die Aphrodite; Antigone entscheidet sich für die Pflicht gegenüber der Familie, und verletzt dabei ihren eigenen Staat.

2 Der Antigone–Konflikt und zwei Lösungsversuche Jegliche Realisierung eines berechtigten Prinzips, die beim Handeln zustande kommt, bedeutet demnach die notwendige und doch unzulässige Verletzung eines anderen berechtigten Prinzips, das laut Hegel nicht weniger Wert ist, als das erste. Die Folgen sind radikal und schmerzhaft: schöne, edle Gestalten gehen daran zugrunde, dass sie einseitig handeln und nur einen Moment der Substanz, nicht aber ihre Totalität realisieren können. Die Tatsache, dass solche Einseitigkeit ihnen nicht zugerechnet werden kann, macht das Tragische aus: die Heroen sind „unschuldig schuldig“. Ist aber solche Kollision wirklich notwendig? Im Streit zwischen Kreon und Antigone sieht Hegel nicht nur einen Konflikt von menschlichem und göttlichem Recht, wie er im Drama des Sophokles zu lesen ist, sondern einen viel breiteren Kampf zwischen Staat und Familie, hellen und dunklen Mächten (Penaten, Erinnyen), Geist und Natur. Eine im heutigen Sinne subjektive Schuld erkennt Hegel weder für Kreon, noch für Antigone. Kreon muss das Prinzip der Familie verletzen, wenn er den Staat aufrecht erhalten will. Antigone muss das Gebot des Staates verletzen, um ihrer Pflicht als Schwester nachzukommen. Das Recht der Menschen muss mit dem Recht der Götter kollidieren, und genau das macht die eigentliche, klassische Tragödie aus. Es ist ein seltenes Glück, dass wir zum letzten Punkt den Hinweis eines antiken Philosophen haben, und zwar im Rahmen eines Dialogs, dessen Hauptfigur im Zentrum der skeptischen Debatte steht. In Platons Protagoras geht der berühmte Sophist davon aus, dass Gerechtigkeit und Frömmigkeit nicht identisch sind (vgl. Prot., 331a–d): Gerechtigkeit sei als das angemessene Verhalten gegenüber den Menschen, Frömmigkeit gegenüber den Göttern zu bestimmen. Ließe sich aber aus ihrem Anderssein auch ihre Entgegensetzung annehmen? Könnte etwa die

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Frömmigkeit als ungerecht, und das Gerechte als unfromm gelten? Solcher Schluss wird natürlich von Protagoras zurückgewiesen. Menschliches und göttliches Recht dürfen sich eigentlich nicht wechselseitig negieren – auch wenn sie sich beide in unterschiedlichen Sphären bewegen. Doch was passiert dann in Antigone? Bevor wir die vermeintliche Antwort Platons suchen, schauen wir erst einmal in den antiken Text der Tragödien. Denn anders als Hegel, scheint der Dichter selbst nicht von einem gleichen Recht beider Figuren auszugehen (vgl. v. Fritz 1962, S. 92 ff.). Mit seinem Handeln verletzt Kreon nicht nur das Recht gegenüber dem Toten, sondern setzt auch die eigene Stadt in Gefahr: die Bürger können nicht frei aussprechen, was sie von seiner Entscheidung denken. Die nicht bestattete Leiche verseucht die Heiligtümer der Götter, weshalb eine neue Pest das Land heimzusuchen droht. Kreon scheut sich nicht davor, die natürliche Ordnung der Dinge umzukehren: einem Toten verweigert er die letzte Ruhe, und gleichzeitig schließt er eine junge Frau lebend in ein Grab. Anders als etwa Ödipus, dem lediglich das Wissen der Einzelheiten verborgen war, offenbart Kreon eine Gesinnung, die der eines Tyrannen passt: (Antig., 666–667). Er sieht sich im Recht, ungebunden vom Willen aller anderen, eine willkürliche Entscheidung durchzusetzen. Hegel mag Recht haben, wenn er die kollidierenden Prinzipien „Staat“ und „Familie“ als solche, für gleichberechtigt hält. Die Verantwortung der Subjekte trotzdem lässt sich in dieser konkreten Situation keinesfalls wegen der Plastizität der heroischen Figuren abstreiten, oder gar für unzurechenbar erklären. Wenn etwas plastisch durch diese Tragödie erscheint, ist es die Gefahr, die mit der Abwesenheit von Göttern einhergeht. Wer schützt vor der Täuschung des Herrschenden, wenn keine Mächte vorhanden sind, die dessen Willkür eine Schranke setzen? Es war nicht nur Agnostizismus hinsichtlich der Götter, den die Sophisten eingeführt haben – sondern auch ein Relativismus in der Ethik. Wer garantiert die Rechte der Schwachen? Wie lässt sich die subjektive Willkür, oder Verblendung und Hybris korrigieren? Sophokles lässt das Problem nicht durch einen „Deus ex Machina“ lösen, sondern schildert Kreons späte Einsicht als Folge des Opfers von Antigone durch den freiwilligen Tod seiner nächsten Verwandten. Der Gesetzesbruch der Antigone geht nicht so weit, ein Widerstandsrecht zu propagieren. Antigone ruft nicht zum Widerstand gegen den Tyrannen auf, bereitet keinen politischen Aufruhr und ist keine Rebellin. Sie bleibt nur den nach antiker Auffassung allgemeinen, unwandelbaren Prinzipien treu, weil sie diese für mehr berechtigt hält, als das Gebot des Staatsmanns. Sophokles’ Lösung aus dem Dilemma erfolgt durch eine Hierarchie: das Göttliche Gesetz wird höher geschätzt als das Menschliche; es erweist sich jedoch als nützlich, sowohl für die Familie, als auch für den Staat. Um zu Platon zurückzukommen, ist es nicht auszuschließen, dass, bei aller Polemik gegen die

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Dichter, seine eigene Theorie von der Einheit der Tugend bei den Dionysos–Festen vorbereitet wurde.

3 Ödipus und die Diskrepanz zwischen Sein und Schein Im anderen Tragödientypus, der bei Hegel nach Ödipus benannt wird, lässt sich die Veranschaulichung eines dialektischen Musters nicht so genau wiederfinden. Die Kollision findet hier zwischen dem Willen des Subjekts und dem, was von der Handlung objektiv herauskommt, statt – ein im übertragenen Sinne theoretischer „Kampf“ zwischen deontologischer Ethik und Konsequentialismus. Inhaltlich weist dennoch der „König Ödipus“ von Sophokles die deutlichste Relevanz im Hinblick auf die Problematik der Skepsis auf. Das Stück ist voll von Wendungen, Täuschungen, Anerkennungen – welche schließlich zu der erschütternden Erkenntnis kulminieren, dass der Suchende und der Gesuchte in einer und derselben Person zusammenfallen. Es ist durchaus bekannt, was für einen krachenden Höhenfall die Hauptfigur erleiden muss. Ödipus, dieses Kind des Schicksals, war derjenige, der als einziger das Rätsel der Sphinx lösen konnte, welches Selbsterkenntnis verlangte. Gleichzeitig war dieser so kluge Mann ein Mensch, der nicht einmal das wusste, was jedes Kind sonst weiß: wer sein Vater und seine Mutter sind. In dieser Tragödie werden Gegensätze bis an die äußersten Grenzen gezogen – und es wird am deutlichsten der Sorge Ausdruck verliehen, die mit dem Ende des Vertrauens an die Götter zusammenhängt (König Ödipus, 883–910). Bei allem Schrecken, den der Dichter für das Ende des Dramas vorenthält, bleibt diese besondere Sorge immerhin erspart. Der alte Orakelspruch zu Ödipus ist doch in Erfüllung gegangen. Bei der Frage, welche Wirkung solche Peripetien ins Gemüt der Zuschauer ausüben können, gehen die Meinungen ganz auseinander. Für manche ist dieses Stück der Inbegriff des Pessimismus: Der Mensch sei demnach als ohnmächtig gegenüber den Göttern dargestellt, fremdbestimmt und machtlos, und sollte lernen, mit Resignation und Apathie allerlei Schicksalsschläge über sich ergehen zu lassen. Andere wiederum haben durch dieses Drama die Zuversicht bekommen, dass es dem Menschen gestattet ist, „auch in tragischen Wettern, Unverlierbares zu bewahren“ (Lesky 1984, S. 45) – von der Frage nach dem ästhetischen Vergnügen, das bei allem Leid am Ausklang des Stückes zustande kommt, ganz zu schweigen. Fakt ist, dass in der Person des Ödipus die griechische Tragödie tatsächlich mit einem Rätsel endet. Im Hain der Eumeniden, beim allerletzten Drama des Sophokles, gibt es Anspielungen, welche die Ausweglosigkeit traditioneller Moral

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aufzeigen und vielleicht auf den Bedarf einer neuen hindeuten (Öd. Kol., 1189– 1200). Zum Schluss schwebt im Raum ein Geheimnis, das Ödipus nur dem König der Stadt anvertraut, bevor er lebenden Leibes in die Unterwelt absteigt. Dies Geheimnis sollte zum Segen werden – gespendet von einem Mann, der aus seiner eigenen Heimat als Befleckter vertrieben werden musste. Es gibt ein geheimes Wissen – doch, worin das besteht, erfahren wir nicht.

4 Skepsis und Sophistik „unverdient“ Bevor wir uns näher auf die Wechselwirkung zwischen Tragödie und Philosophie eingehen, betrachten wir kurz die wichtigsten Strömungen, die für die praktische Dimension der Skepsis relevant sind. Als erste sei die Sophistik genannt, deren Infragestellen traditioneller Moral in der Tragödie (besonders von Euripides) mehrfachen Anklang gefunden hat. Es ist nicht ganz zulässig, die Sophistik des 5ten Jahrhunderts als eine Art Skepsis „avant la lettre“ zu betrachten. Es lässt sich jedoch nicht leugnen, dass die Sophistik zentrale Lehren und Methoden der Skepsis vorweggenommen hat, wenn auch in anderem Kontext und mit ganz anderer Zielsetzung als die Skepsis (vgl. Lee 2010). Im Rahmen der gerichtlichen Praxis mussten die Sophisten üben, ad utramque partem zu argumentieren – die Antilogien waren fester Bestandteil ihrer Lehre, und es lässt sich wenig bezweifeln, dass die berühmte Formulierung von Sextus Empiricus „παντί λόγωι λόγος ἴσος ἀντίκειται“ (PH, 1.12) ihre geistigen Wurzeln in der Sophistik hat. Während nun die Sophisten hauptsächlich Rhetorik unterrichteten und eine Karriere in der Politik versprachen, suchten die Skeptiker ein ähnliches Ideal wie die anderen Philosophenschulen ihrer Zeit durch Philosophie zu bewirken: ἀταραξία, in einer Welt, die sich rasch änderte, in einer Gesellschaft, in der die Individuen immer weniger am politischen Leben Einfluss üben konnten. Die „Meeresstille der Seele“ wurde dadurch gewährleistet, dass man sich des Urteils enthielt – ἐποχή – was letztendlich auf einer Versöhnung mit der Tatsache (?) beruht, dass Wissen (bis auf Neueres, falls jemand ein Gegenargument zu den Tropen vorzeigt) unmöglich sei. Ist dennoch ein solches Ideal tatsächlich etwas Gutes, worauf die skeptische Lebenshaltung hinaus zielte?

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5 Skepsis und Platon Als Hauptaufgabe der Philosophie gilt natürlich schon für Platon die kritische Prüfung und Kontrolle aller Aussagen; die Tatsache, dass einige Dialoge aporetisch enden, hat dazu veranlasst, in ihm einen nicht dogmatisierenden, ja „skeptischen“ Philosophen zu sehen (DL, 3.51–53). Dabei unterscheidet er sich von ihnen mindestens dadurch, dass er die Wahrheitssuche nicht zugunsten der Seelenruhe aufgeben will. Im platonischen Menon (80a–b) wird etwa geschildert, welche Beunruhigung das philosophische Prüfen am Anfang bewirkt; Zweifel am Wert des Unternehmens gibt es aber kaum. Die Störung der Seelenruhe wird hier durchaus positiv betrachtet. Hinsichtlich der Götter, enthalten sich bekanntlich die Skeptiker, ebenso wie die Sophisten. Platon kritisiert auch die Göttervorstellungen seiner Zeitgenossen. Statt sich zu enthalten, wendet er sich dennoch gegen diejenigen, die „Lügen“ über Götter verbreiten (Pol. 380–383). Die Ideen erhalten bei ihm eine Selbstständigkeit, die bestehen bleibt, ganz unabhängig davon, was Menschen von ihnen denken. Eine Frage, die sich hier stellen lässt, ist, ob eine Parallele zur Haltung tragischer Figuren gezogen werden kann. Denn auch diese weigern sich strikt, den Kampf aufzugeben, selbst wenn sie wissen, dass sie daran zugrundegehen. Die Unterscheidung von menschlichem und göttlichem Recht ließe sich wohl mit dem vergleichen, was Platon mit der Verdoppelung der Welt versuchte: Den absoluten Wert der Ideen gegen Relativismus zu verteidigen – das aber nur am Rande.

6 Die Wendung Hegels Gegen eine solche Verdoppelung der Welt, sei es bei Kant oder Platon, polemisiert Hegel durchgehend – und bei der griechischen Tragödie macht er keine Ausnahme. Anders als Kant, der von der Unzulässigkeit der Pflichtkollisionen spricht (MS, S. 224), sieht Hegel genau darin den Inbegriff der Tragik. Die gewünschte Lösung des tragischen Konflikts wird nicht durch eine externe Macht erwartet, sondern findet (im Idealfall) durch die Versöhnung der Streitenden statt. Die Erkenntnis von der Berechtigung beider Prinzipien ist für Hegel der große Verdienst der Tragödie. Der Untergang der kämpfenden Individuen hinterlässt zwar eine Trauer, die aber zur Arbeit an einer neuen Weltordnung anregt: Aus dem „entweder–oder“ gleichberechtigter Mächte entsteht ein „sowohl als auch“ (TWA 15, S. 545). Solche harmonische Durchdringung wird in der Realität erst in der folgenden Geistesstufe richtig ermöglicht: Im modernen Staat werden die besonderen Rechte des Indivi-

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duums respektiert. Staat und Familie stehen nicht (mehr) in konträrem Gegensatz zu einander.

7 Im Ausklang tragischer Konflikte Nach dieser knappen Skizzierung können wir zu unserer Ausgangsfrage zurückkommen: Wie reagiert die Philosophie auf die Konflikte der klassischen Tragödie? Wie werden die Probleme gelöst, die im Theater zur Schau kommen, und wie versucht man, den Schmerz zu meiden, der aus dem unverdienten Leid guter Charaktere entsteht? Wenn wir die Lösungsversuche rekapitulieren wollen, lassen sich drei grobe Richtungen herausbilden. 1. Die erste Richtung setzt auf eine Art Wiedergutmachung im Jenseits oder durch eine externe Instanz. Die tragischen Individuen werden heroisiert und die Götter gleichen nachträglich das unverdiente Leid aus, dem solche Figuren ausgesetzt wurden. Platon, Kant und, m.E., die griechischen Tragiker zeigen Grenzen des Menschen, Grenzen des Wissens auf. Immerhin darf man auf eine höhere Instanz hoffen, die für das vorhandene Unrecht wiedergutmacht. Der Kampf um das Recht muss geführt werden, auch wenn die handelnden Individuen daran scheitern. 2. Die zweite Richtung zielt auf eine Abstumpfung und Resignation, Abfinden mit dem vorhandenen (schlechten) Zustand. Auf Hoffnungen von göttlichem Eingriff wird verzichtet, das Interesse zieht sich vom politischen Leben zurück und wendet sich ans Individuum. Höchstes Ziel ist die eigene Seelenruhe und Selbsterhaltung. Gut ist das, was diesem Zweck dient. 3. Beim dritten Fall erhofft man die Lösung durch eine höhere Instanz, die aber nicht am Jüngsten Tag, sondern im Hier und Jetzt zu schaffen ist. Für Hegel ist es der moderne Staat. Das Ideal ist noch nicht da, man geht aber davon aus, dass es erreicht werden kann. Auf jenseitige Instanzen wird ebenso verzichtet. Das unverdiente Leid guter Charaktere muss ausgehalten werden. Das Problem der menschlichen Grenzen, das die Tragödie so plastisch zur Schau stellt, hat für die Philosophie Hegels ebenso wie für die Skepsis eine zentrale Bedeutung. Für Hegel lässt sich der geistige Standpunkt, der von Instanzen jenseits des menschlichen Denkens ausgeht, eher dem Bereich der Religion als der Philosophie zuordnen. Die Position, dass es „unabhängig von einem Denken ein

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«an sich» seiendes Wirkliches gibt“, gehört eigentlich dem Realismus, der „den konträren Gegensatz zum Idealismus bildet“ (Fulda 2003, S. 69). Die einzige wahre Philosophie ist laut Hegel jedoch der Idealismus. Grenzen des Wissens dürfen nicht dogmatisch festgelegt werden. Das Denken muss in der Philosophie dominieren, nicht fremde, unbeweisbare Vorstellungen, an denen wir keinen Zugang haben (Vieweg 2007, S. 32 ff.). Ein Plädoyer für die absolute Freiheit des Geistes, auf dem heiligen Boden der Vernunft, die keinen Despoten duldet. . . Wie geht man aber mit dem Begriff der Philo–Sophie um, der schon die Implikation der Unmöglichkeit absoluten Wissens in sich enthält? Der platonische Sokrates bringt das auf den Punkt: „Jemand einen Weisen zu nennen, o Phaidros, dünkt mich etwas Großes zu sein, und Gott allein zu gebühren; aber einen Freund der Weisheit oder dergleichen etwas möchte ihm selbst angemessener sein, und auch an sich schicklicher.“ (Phaidros, 278d) Im Ausklang tragischer Konflikte wurden in der Philosophie Lösungsversuche herausgearbeitet, derer Unterschiede oft unüberbrückbar scheinen. Den Ursprung solcher Versuche liefert immerhin etwas Gemeinsames: die emotionale Beteiligung am fiktiven Leid tragischer Charaktere, und der Wunsch, solches Leid im Leben außerhalb des Theaters zu verhindern. Es lässt sich fragen, ob die tiefe Wirkung, welche das Drama ausübt, genau das anspricht, was als summum bonum bezeichnet wurde. Der Wunsch nach Entsprechung von Glückseligkeit und Glückswürdigkeit schlummert wohl bei den Zuschauern, damals genauso wie heute. Das Mitleid, das die Tragödie hervorruft, ruft dies ins Gedächtnis, und bringt ferner die erschütternde Erkenntnis zu Tage, dass die schrecklichsten Taten auch von Menschen begangen werden, die uns durchaus ähnlich sind. Dadurch, dass man sich in sie hineinversetzt und als Außenstehender ihre Freisprechung wünscht, befreit man sich zugleich von der Angst, dass man sich auch selbst in so einer Lage hätte befinden können. Im Großen und Ganzen, konfrontiert die griechische Tragödie den Zuschauer mit seinen Grenzen. An diese ist tragisches Scheitern zurückzuführen. Solches Scheitern ist jedoch nicht das letzte Wort. Wie auch immer: In der griechischen Tragödie muss der Handelnde entscheiden, welche von zwei Varianten er aussucht. Der betrachtende Philosoph kann sich auch enthalten. An der gewünschten Versöhnung muss wohl auch in der Zukunft weiter gearbeitet werden.

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Bibliographie 1 Siglen Antig.: Sophokles (1912): „Antigone“. In: Hugh, Lloyd–Jones (Hrsg.): Sophocles. Vol 1: Oedipus the king. Oedipus at Colonus. Antigone. Mit einer englischen Übersetzung von F. Storr. London: William Heinemann. DL: Diogenes Laertius (1979): „Vitae philosophorum“. In: Hicks, Robert D. (Hrsg.): Lives of eminent philosophers: in two volumes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. König Ödipus: Sophokles (1912): „Oedipus the king“. In: Hugh, Lloyd–Jones (Hrsg.): Sophocles. Vol 1: Oedipus the king. Oedipus at Colonus. Antigone. Mit einer englischen Übersetzung von F. Storr. London: William Heinemann. Menon: Platon (2011): „Menon“. In: Eigler, Gunther (Hrsg.): Platon. Werke in acht Bänden. Zweiter Band. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. MS: Kant, Immanuel: „Metaphysik der Sitten“. In: Kant. Gesammelte Schriften (= Akademie Ausgabe). Band 6. Hrsg.: Bd. 1–22 Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Bd. 23 Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, ab Bd. 24 Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Berlin 1900ff. Öd. Kol.: Sophokles (1912): „Oedipus at Colonus“. In: Hugh, Lloyd–Jones (Hrsg.): Sophocles. Vol 1: Oedipus the king. Oedipus at Colonus. Antigone. Mit einer englischen Übersetzung von F. Storr. London: William Heinemann. PH: Sextus Empirikus (1949): „Pyrrhoneíai Hypotypôseis“. In: Bury, Robert Gregg (Hrsg.): Sextus Empiricus: in four volumes. Vol. 1. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Phaidros: Platon (2011): „Phaidros“. In: Eigler, Gunther (Hrsg.): Platon. Werke in acht Bänden. Fünfter Band. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Poet.: Aristoteles (1965): De arte poetica. Kassel, Rudolf (Hrsg.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Prot.: Platon (2006): Protagoras. Eingeleitet, übersetzt und erläutert von Bernd Manuwald. Göttigen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. TWA: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1969–1971): Theorie–Werkausgabe – Werke in zwanzig Bänden auf der Grundlage der Werke von 1832–1845, neu edierte Ausgabe. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Hrsg.). Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.

2 Sonstige Literatur Fritz, Kurt von (1962): Antike und moderne Tragödie: neun Abhandlungen. Berlin: de Gruyter. Fulda, Hans Friedrich (2003): Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. München: Verlag C.H. Beck. Kaufmann, Walter (1980): Tragödie und Philosophie. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. Lee, Mi–Kyoung (2010): „Antecedents in early Greek philosophy“. In: Bett, Richard (Hrsg.): The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, S. 13–35. Lesky, Albin (1984): Die griechische Tragödie. 5. Aufl. mit durchges. und erw. Bibliographie. Stuttgart: Kröner.

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Ricken, Friedo (1994): Antike Skeptiker. München: Verlag C.H. Beck. Snell, Bruno (1928): „Aischylos und das Handeln im Drama“. In: Philologus. Zeitschrift für das klassische Alterthum. Supplementband 2. Leipzig: Dieterich’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. Thiel, Rainer (2011): „Hegel und die Theorie der griechischen Dichtung“. In: Vielberg, Meinolf (Hrsg.): Die klassische Altertumswissenschaft an der Friedrich–Schiller–Universität Jena: eine Ringvorlesung zu ihrer Geschichte. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, S. 55–68. Vieweg, Klaus (2007): Skepsis und Freiheit. München: Wilhelm Fink.

Thodoris Dimitrakos

History of Philosophy of Science and Hegel’s Critique of Skepticism Abstract: In this chapter I examine the relation between philosophy and the history of science in light of Hegel’s conception of skepticism. In particular, I argue that the history of science can and has been used as a skeptical weapon against efforts to determine the constitutive features of science; that is, against the philosophical effort to demarcate science. I suggest that Hegel’s critique of skepticism can cast light on this use of the history of science by revealing its inconsistencies and by showing that there is logical room between dogmatism and skepticism. Finally, I present Imre Lakato’s account on the relation between philosophy and the history of science. I argue that, despite its problems, Lakatos” account partly incorporates, even if implicitly, the Hegelian lessons for avoiding both a–historical dogmatism and historicist skepticism.

1 Introduction Philosophy of science is a branch of philosophy which took an autonomous, systematic and mature form during the first decades of the 20th century. Of course, this is not to say that philosophical reflections on science emerged in only the last century. We can classify texts such as Aristotle’s (1975) Posterior Analytics, René Descartes’ (2006) A Discourse on Method or Immanuel Kant’s (1997) Prolegomena as attempts to provide a philosophical recapitulation of their contemporary scientific activity. This is to say that those efforts did not conceive themselves as a separable and autonomous territory of philosophical research but as parts of a general philosophical system. The autonomisation of the philosophy of science reflected the advanced and complicated form that science took during the 19th century. It also came largely as a response to the major conceptual upheavals that took place in the fields of Mathematics and Physics. The emergence of non–Euclidean geometries, the theory of relativity, and quantum mechanics undermined the established certainty that the conceptual framework of classical (Newtonian) physics

Thodoris Dimitrakos, Dr. Thodoris Dimitrakos, Adjunct Assistant Professor, Hellenic Open University; Post–Doctoral Research Fellow, Department of Philosophy and History of Science, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. DOI 10.1515/9783110528138-013

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is the eternal and unrevisable truth about nature, and challenged the dominant philosophical comprehension of science. Furthermore, later in the 20th century a set of academic disciplines which have science as their subject matter emerged and came into maturity. The history, sociology, and anthropology of science are a few fundamental examples. In the post–war period, and especially after the 1960s, those disciplines engaged in a substantial interplay with the philosophy of science. This interplay caused the creation of interdisciplinary departments like HPS and STS.¹ All research – either empirical or philosophical – which takes science as its subject matter can be grouped under the general label of the theory of science. In this chapter I will sketch a historical reconstruction of the theory of science in the 20th century; in particular I will focus on the philosophy of science and its relation to the history of science. This reconstruction is attempted in light of the Hegelian critique of skepticism and focus on the possibility of determining the constitutive standards of science. Hegel played little or no role in the development of the philosophy of science largely due to the fact that the systematic philosophical investigation took place within the boundaries of the analytic tradition in philosophy, to which Hegel was a stranger. However, in recent years Hegelian thought has returned to analytic philosophy (Redding 2007) and, I think, can play an essential role in the philosophy of science too. In what follows I will be concerned with a specific part of Hegelian philosophy, namely his critique of skepticism, as a means of casting light on the relation between the philosophy and the history of science. I will argue that we can detect a dogmatic stage in the theory of science, as well as a skeptical one. As I shall attempt to show, the main weapon of the skeptical attitude in the theory of science is the history of science. Thus, a conception of science which aims to go beyond dogmatism and skepticism should portray a proper image of the relation between the history and the philosophy of science. Hegel’s perspective shows that there is logical room between dogmatism and skepticism and thus it is a valuable philosophical ally in the attempt of forming an account on science which tries to avoid both the a–historical dogmatism and historicist skepticism. My argument will then take the following course: in the subsequent sections I will provide a short presentation of Hegel’s conception of skepticism; then the basic features of the so–called ‘received view’ (McGuire 1992) in the philosophy of science, as well as of the Popperian falsificationism. Both perspectives correspond to the first years of maturation of the philosophy of science and as I shall attempt

1 HPS stands for History and Philosophy of Science departments while STS stands for Science and Technology Studies.

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to show, they can be considered as dogmatic perspectives. In the fourth section I will explain how history of science is used in a distinctively skeptical way, and in the fifth section I will show the problems of this use with the help of the Hegelian critique of skepticism. Finally, I am going to present Imre Lakato’s account on the relation between the philosophy and history of science, as an account which, despite its problems, partly incorporates, even if implicitly, the Hegelian lessons for avoiding both a–historical dogmatism and historicist skepticism.

2 Hegel’s conception of skepticism Hegel’s critique of skepticism is a unique philosophical strategy in the history of philosophy, for, as it has been argued (Cherry/Robison 1977; Forster 1989), Hegel neither ignores skeptical threats nor seeks for a safe foundation, which is supposed to be untouched by the destructive force of skepticism. On the contrary, the Hegelian conception embraces skeptical arguments in order to annihilate the central aspiration of skepticism, which is no other than the ‘suspension of judgement’ (ἐποχή) that leads to tranquillity (άταραξία) (Sextus Empiricus 1933, ch. XII). This strategy presupposes the distinction between different kinds of actual skeptical attitudes that occurred in the history of philosophy and the detection of the purest form among them. In this sense, Hegel (1840/1983, p. 331) opposes modern to ancient skepticism, considering that the latter alone is ‘of a true, profound nature’. The empiricist skepticism of Hume, the rationalist methodological skepticism of Descartes, and more thoroughly Schulzean skepticism are charged with dogmatism, since they exempt from doubt the facts of subjective consciousness.² On the other hand, the skeptical attitudes of the ancient era are not characterized by homogeneity. Sextus (1933, ch. I) himself starts with the distinction between the Academics who affirm that reaching the truth is an impossible task, and the

2 ‘The turning of skepticism against philosophy, as soon as philosophy became dogmatic, illustrates how it has kept in step with the communal degeneration of philosophy and of the world in general, until finally in these most recent times it has sunk so far in company with dogmatism that for both of them nowadays the facts of consciousness have an indubitable certainty, and for them both the truth resides in temporality; so that, since the extremes now touch, the great goal is attained once more on their side in these happy times, that dogmatism and skepticism coincide with one another on the underside, and offer each other the hand of perfect friendship and fraternity. Schulzian skepticism integrates the crudest dogmatism into itself, and Krug’s dogmatism carries that skepticism within itself likewise’ (Hegel 1802/1985, p. 330). The Humeans exempt from doubt the sense–perception (the feeling) while the Cartesians the content of their own cogitations. See Forster (1989, ch.1 §1, especially n. 11).

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‘Skeptics [or Pyrrhonists] [who] keep on searching’. The characteristic quality of Pyrrhonists is that they follow a certain line of reasoning, which is reflected in a set of modes or tropes. Hegel distinguishes between the earlier ten tropes which are attributed to Aenesidemus and the later five tropes of Agrippa. The former are not logical modes and they proceed against common belief or empiricism (Hegel 1840/1983, pp. 346, 356), while the latter express an advanced stage of philosophical thought, ‘for they pertain more to thinking reflection, and contain the dialectic which the determinate Notion has within it’ (Hegel 1840/1983, p. 357). Thus, the purest, and consequently the most advanced form of skepticism, does not exempt anything from doubt and employs the deconstructive force of the later tropes in order to achieve suspension. According to Hegel (1802/1985, pp. 339–340), ‘the essence of knowledge consists in the identity of the universal and the particular or of what is posited in the form of thought and of being’. This is the determination of knowledge as a triple identity: the identity of the universal and the particular, the identity between thought and being, and the identity of the two identities expressed by the aforementioned disjunction³. Let me insist on the identity between the universal and the particular: In one sense, the central aim of skepticism is the deconstruction of this identity and consequently the destruction of the identity between thought and being. Consider the famous example of honey, where Sextus (1933, ch. X) stresses that ‘honey appears to us to be sweet (and this we grant, for we perceive sweetness through the senses), but whether it is also sweet in its essence is for us a matter of doubt, since this is not an appearance but a judgement regarding the appearance’. What is precluded by Sextus is the assertion “the honey is sweet”. But let’s take a closer glimpse a tthis assertion. “The honey is sweet” means that each and every particular instantiation of honey is sweet, and if each and every particular instantiation of honey is sweet then sweetness is a constitutive feature of honey. Something is honey if and only if something is sweet – among other things of course. By rejecting the formula “it is”,⁴ Sextus denies the possibility of existence of constitutive features. If we extend Sextus’ argument in other features we cannot say “the honey is yellow”, “the honey is soft” etc. But then how can we say “honey” at all? The impossibility of constitutive features leads to the impossibility of bringing together the universal terms and the particular instantiations which leaves us with the abstract identity between the particular and itself. It seems that the only thing we are allowed to say is “this thing right now is this thing right now”,

3 ‘The essence of knowledge consists in the identity of the universal and the particular or (this is the disjunction) of what is posited in the form of thought and of being’ 4 See Hegel 1840/1983, p. 347.

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but then the particularity vanishes. Sextus permits himself to say “honey” at the cost of inconsistency. Hegel (1816/2010, p. 343) is well aware of this inconsistency, when he says in Science of Logic: Skepticism did not permit itself to say “It is,” [. . . ]. The shine of [skepticism] was supposed absolutely not to have the foundation of a being: the thing–in–itself was not supposed to enter into these cognitions. But at the same time skepticism allowed a manifold of determinations for its shine [. . . ]. So, the shine of skepticism [. . . ] do immediately have a manifold of determination.⁵

The rejection of the foundation of a being is exactly the rejection of the possibility of existence of constitutive features. However, at the same time skepticism allows itself a manifold of determinations, which is a manifold of constitutive features in order to utter “honey”, for example. In short, skepticism prohibits the formula “it is” (X is Y); while it permits the formula “it seems that X is Y”. Nonetheless, as Hegel shows, the latter presupposes the former, and hence one can permit the latter and prohibit the former only at the cost of inconsistency. Despite this conclusion, Hegel is far from taking skeptical reasoning as an enemy to philosophy. On the contrary, he thinks that skepticism is an indispensable part of every genuine philosophical activity. According to Hegel, ‘[t]he skepticism that is directed against the whole range of phenomenal consciousness, [. . . ], renders the Spirit for the first time competent to examine what truth is’ (Hegel 1807/1977, p. 50). In other words, skepticism is an irreplaceable logical mechanism against any kind of dogmatism, and every genuine philosophical activity begins with the skeptical tests against the dogmatic presumptions. The problem of skeptics is that they do not recognize anything between dogmatism and skepticism; this is largely the result of the assumption that ‘dialectic has only a negative result’ (Hegel 1816/2010, p. 743). As Kenneth Westphal (2003, p. 152) points out ‘Hegel criticized (among others) Sextus Empiricus for being satisfied with mere refutation, with merely ‘abstract negation’, i.e. finding sufficient fault with a theory to reject it as inadequate, but stopping at that’. Against the ‘abstract negation’ Hegel insists

5 The full passage includes a parallel reference to idealism: ‘Skepticism did not permit itself to say “It is,” and the more recent idealism did not permit itself to regard cognitions as a knowledge of the thing–in–itself. The shine of the former was supposed absolutely not to have the foundation of a being: the thing–in–itself was not supposed to enter into these cognitions. But at the same time skepticism allowed a manifold of determinations for its shine, or rather the latter turned out to have the full richness of the world for its content. Likewise for the appearance of idealism: it encompassed the full range of these manifold determinacies. So, the shine of skepticism and the appearance of idealism do immediately have a manifold of determination’.

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on the fact that every skeptical negation is necessarily a determinate one and thus its result is not a pure nothingness, but a new, specific, and progressed form derived by this very act of negation. The following passage is characteristic of this conception: This is just the skepticism which only ever sees pure nothingness in its result and abstracts from the fact that this nothingness is specifically the nothingness of that from which it results. For it is only when it is taken as the result of that from which it emerges, that it is, in fact, the true result; in that case it is itself a determinate nothingness, one which has a content. The skepticism that ends up with the bare abstraction of nothingness or emptiness cannot get any further from there, but must wait to see whether something new comes along and what it is, in order to throw it too into the same empty abyss. But when, on the other hand, the result is conceived as it is in truth, namely, as a determinate negation, a new form has thereby immediately arisen, and in the negation the transition is made through which the progress through the complete series of forms comes about of itself (Hegel 1807/1977, p. 51).⁶

Therefore, skepticism is not the end, or the dead end, of philosophical thought, but a moment within it; a moment which preserves philosophy from sticking in the swamp of dogmatism. Now, if Hegel’s epistemology, namely his theory of knowledge, is correct and if, as Wilfrid Sellars (1997, §38) notes, science is the sophisticated extension of empirical knowledge, then we may be inclined to find an analogous interplay between dogmatism and skepticism in the development of the theory of science. In what follows I am going to provide a very brief reconstruction of the history of philosophy of science in the 20th century and its interaction with the history of science under the light of Hegel’s conception of skepticism.

6 See also the following passage: ‘The one thing needed to achieve scientific progress – and it is essential to make an effort at gaining this quite simple insight into it – is the recognition of the logical principle that negation is equally positive, or that what is self–contradictory does not resolve itself into a nullity, into abstract nothingness, but essentially only into the negation of its particular content; or that such a negation is not just negation, but is the negation of the determined fact which is resolved, and is therefore determinate negation; that in the result there is therefore contained in essence that from which the result derives – a tautology indeed, since the result would otherwise be something immediate and not a result. Because the result, the negation, is a determinate negation, it has a content. It is a new concept but one higher and richer than the preceding – richer because it negates or opposes the preceding and therefore contains it, and it contains even more than that, for it is the unity of itself and its opposite. – It is above all in this way that the system of concepts is to be erected – and it has to come to completion in an unstoppable and pure progression that admits of nothing extraneous.’ (Hegel 1816/2010, p. 33).

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3 The dogmatic stage As I have already said, the theory of science took a systematic and mature form, largely as a response to the major conceptual upheavals that took place in the fields of mathematics and physics. Against this challenge, the philosophers of the Vienna Circle – among others – were engaged to a tremendous philosophical program wellknown under the name of Logical Empiricism or Positivism. The main theoretical preoccupation of Logical Empiricism was the demarcation of science against other forms of intellectual activity and especially metaphysics. The chief dogma that guided – at least initially – the neopositivist attempts for demarcation was the famous verifiability criterion of meaning.⁷ In Moritz Schlick’s (1932/1959, pp. 86–87) words: It is the first step of any philosophizing, and the foundation of all reflection, to see that it is simply impossible to give the meaning of any statement except by describing the fact which must exist if the statement is to be true. If it does not exist then the statement is false. The meaning of a proposition consists, obviously, in this alone, that it expresses a definite state of affairs. And this state of affairs must be pointed out in order to give the meaning of the proposition. [The emphasis is mine]

In this framework, science is depicted as an inductivist process containing a sum of true meaningful prepositions which constitute its solid empirical basis. The progression of science should be understood as the constant and linear expansion of the empirical basis in question. Of course the reconstruction I just offered is simplistic and doesn’t do justice to philosophers such as Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath or Hans Reichenbach, for it does not reflect the richness of their contribution, the range of their disagreements and the “self–conscious” recognition of the acute problems of their own program. For instance, one can recall Carnap’s (1937) ‘principle of tolerance’, which transforms empiricism into a convention; Neurath’s (1934/1983) anti–foundationalist holism, which ends up as a form of epistemological coherentism; or Reichenbach’s (2006) conception of coordinating principles in physics, which are meaningful but not verifiable. Despite that, these philosophers were prominent representatives of logical empiricism resulting in a philosophical picture deviating from the picture I described.⁸

7 The most famous formulation of this criterion has been provided by Waismann: ‘The meaning of a statement is the method of its verification’ (Waismann 1945, p. 119). 8 Also see the neo–Kantian reconstruction of logical empiricism recently provided by Michael Friedman (2001, 2002, 2008).

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However, neither the accurate historical reconstruction nor doing justice to each and every representative of Logical Empiricism or Positivism is the point here. The point is to make clear that logical empiricists – as every kind of foundationalist – attempt to demarcate scientific knowledge by adopting a criterion by assumption (εξ ύποθέσεως in Sextus’s words)⁹ making them vulnerable to skeptical attacks.¹⁰ Moreover, this philosophical attitude leaves room for the development of rival and equally dogmatic attitudes. The Popperian¹¹ falsificationism could be classified as one of these. It is well–known that Karl Popper (2002, ch. 17), maybe against the judgement of many scholars, gave himself the credit for killing logical positivism. His two main objections against verificationist accounts are that the delimitation of science does not go through the determination of meaningfulness (Popper 1962, p. 39) and that the logical problem of induction, as noted by David Hume, has no solution (Popper 1962, p. 41). Hence, Popper rejects the view that induction is the characteristic method of science and suggests ‘that the refutability or falsifiability of a theoretical system should be taken as the criterion of its demarcation’ (Popper 1962, p. 256). Science proceeds by the proposal of risky conjectures¹² and by the constant effort to refute them. As long as a hypothesis resists refutation, under persistent empirical tests, it should be considered empirically corroborated and it is rightfully entitled as scientific. The moment the conjecture is refuted it should be revised or abandoned. Thus, the progress of science consists in the constant elimination of false hypotheses, or in other words, in the gradual elimination of error.

9 ‘In order to decide the dispute which has arisen about the criterion [of truth], we must possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be able to judge the dispute; and in order to possess an accepted criterion, the dispute about the criterion must first be decided. And when the argument thus reduces itself to a form of circular reasoning the discovery of the criterion becomes impracticable, since we do not allow to adopt a criterion by assumption, while if they offer to judge the criterion by a criterion we force them to a regress ad infinitum. And furthermore, since demonstration requires a demonstrated criterion, while the criterion requires an approved demonstration, they are forced into circular reasoning’ (Sextus 1933, ch. IV,) [The emphasis is mine]. 10 One widespread argument against the verifiability criterion of meaning is that the criterion itself is meaningless, since there is no definite state of affairs that can verify it. 11 Popper too is a complicated case since he revised his views often over his long career. Here I am referring mostly to the early Popper of the Logik der Forschung (Popper 1959). 12 In the Popperian framework the riskiness of a conjecture is related to its potential falsifiers. ‘A basic statement which contradicts a theory t may be called a “potential falsifier” of t. Using this terminology we can say that the empirical content of t consists of the class of its potential falsifiers’ (Popper 1962, p. 385).

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What is interesting here is Popper’s conception about the status of the methodology he provides and the methodologies in general. He believes that methodologies are neither analytic, for they don’t have the same status as rules of logic, nor empirical, since they cannot be tested as the prepositions of empirical sciences. He says: I do not believe that it is possible to decide, by using the methods of an empirical science, such controversial questions as whether science actually uses a principle of induction or not. And my doubts increase when I remember that what is to be called a ‘science’ and who is to be called a ‘scientist’ must always remain a matter of convention or decision. (Popper 1959, p. 52)

According to Popper, the status of methodologies is a priori but not nonsensical;¹³ they provide the rules for achieving a certain goal (making science, in this case)¹⁴ but it is only a matter of decision whether to pursue this goal or not. Accordingly, a methodology is a set of rules that you can take or leave and not a theory that can be criticized or revised under light of empirical or other evidences. Besides their apparent differences, logical positivism and Popperian falsificationism share the same dogmatic attitude, since they both posit an unfounded and quite arbitrary criterion in order to determine the constitutive features of science. Neither the verificationist nor the falsificationist determines any kind of test for their proposed criteria. Further, verificationism is unable to empirically verify itself and falsificationism is equally unable to falsify itself. They do not present their criteria as the result of a dialectical process which examines thoroughly their content, thus positing that they are obviously¹⁵ correct. At this point, a Popperian could object that – given the problem of induction – their criterion is logically more consistent. It can also suggest that their account is the result of the critical examination of the verificationist’s account. Thus it is the product of a dialectical process. But even if the Popperian falsificationism is less dogmatic than the verificationist accounts of science, for it incorporates the critical examination of inductivism, this does not necessarily entail that it is a non–dogmatic account. Dogmatic atti-

13 For a further analysis of Popper’s meta–methodology see Nolan (1987). 14 ‘Methodological rules are here regarded as conventions. They might be described as the rules of the game of empirical science. They differ from the rules of pure logic, rather as do the rules of chess, which few would regard as part of pure logic: seeing that the rules of pure logic govern transformations of linguistic formulae, the result of an inquiry into the rules of chess could perhaps be entitled “The Logic of Chess”, but hardly “Logic” pure and simple. (Similarly, the result of an inquiry into the rules of the game of science – that is, of scientific discovery – may be entitled “The Logic of Scientific Discovery”)’ (Popper 1959, p. 53). 15 See my emphasis on Schlick’s passage above.

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tudes can criticize each other and can nevertheless remain dogmatic. They remain dogmatic as long as they do not incorporate the skeptical tests in the process of self–examination which leads to their own progress. Popperian falsificationism does not incorporate any kind of skeptical test, and presents falsification criterion as the a–historical constitutive principle of the “game” of science. Therefore, falsificationism as well as verificationism adopt, by assumption (εξ ύποθέσεως), a normative criterion in order to determine, once and for all, the structure and the function of science, resulting in a dogmatic attitude vulnerable to skeptical attacks.

4 Taking into account the history of science In the first period of theory of science – the period when some versions of either verificationist or falsificationist accounts of science prevailed – the general aim of philosophers was to ‘reveal the unchanging patterns that lie beneath the surface of scientific practice’ (McGuire 1992, p. 144)¹⁶ providing at the same time a normative criterion for demarcating science from non–science. This attempt, though, paid little attention to the actual scientific practice of both past and present, leading to a philosophical picture according to which the vast majority of the historical episodes of science couldn’t meet the proposed criteria of scientific rationality. In other words, according to either a neopositivist or a Popperian perspective the majority of the historical course of science is depicted as irrational, or at best as pre–scientific.¹⁷ This caused discomfort to many philosophers, especially in the 1960s, which rejected the view that the essence of science could be captured by the reduction of the diversity of scientific theorizing and practice to a small number of unchanging formal criteria. At the same time, the discrepancy between the proposed scientific methodologies and the actual scientific practice of the past raised the question of meta–methodology, which ‘is primarily directed towards the following matter: given that historically a large number of different theories of scientific method have been proposed, which should one choose, if choose at all?’ (Nola/Sankey 2007, p. 83). The inquiry about the validity of the proposed methods of science

16 This is McGuire’s opinion for Popperian philosophy. I think that this phrase characterizes the general “received view” in the philosophy of science. 17 As Ernest Nagel (1979, p. 76) stresses ‘[Popper’s] conception of the role of falsification in the use and development of theories is an oversimplification that is close to being a caricature of scientific procedure’. The same could be said about the neopositivist conception.

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was combined with the ongoing interest about the history of science: the historical record was seriously taken into account in the process of constructing a philosophical picture of science and in the self–conscious process of evaluating competitive philosophical pictures. According to the so–called “New Philosophy of Science” (McGuire 1992), which includes philosophers such as Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend and Larry Laudan, science is an essentially historical process and the sketching of a genuine picture of scientific activity and scientific change can only go through the meticulous examination of the historical record. In the first sentence of the first chapter of his famous The Structure of the Scientific Revolutions Kuhn (1990, p. 1) writes: ’History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are now possessed’. In short, the so–called “historical turn” in the philosophy of science casted serious doubts on the previous foundationalist accounts, and rejected the idea that armchair philosophizing alone could shed light on science. This attracted attention to meta–methodology, i.e. questions about the criterion of acceptability of the proposed methodologies, and at the same time to history of science as a means of answering these questions.

5 History as a skeptical weapon. The emergence of this perspective caused various results. On the one hand, it enriched the conception of science with a set of specific determinations which do not relate exclusively to the formal linguistic or logical features of theories. On the other hand, it created a skeptical doubt on the possibility of determination of the constitutive features of science. The history of science played an essential role in the formation of this doubt. According to some philosophers of the historicist trend, the historical record reveals the fundamental diversity of various forms of scientific cognition and practice and hence the attempt to demarcate science is an absolutely chimerical task. The paradigmatic case of this kind of philosophical attitude is, of course, Paul Feyerabend. In his notorious Against the Method he writes: The idea of a method that contains firm, unchanging, and absolutely binding principles for conducting the business of science meets considerable difficulty when confronted with the results of historical research. We find, then, that there is not a single rule, however plausible, and however firmly grounded in epistemology, that is not violated at some time or other. (Feyerabend 1993, p. 14)

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Elsewhere he concludes: ‘the separation of science and non– science is not only artificial but also detrimental to the advancement of knowledge’ (Feyerabend 1975, p. 173). Feyerabend thus declares the epistemic disunity of the historical course of science, and then concludes that there can be no separation between science and non–science. One could think that this is merely a peculiarity of Feyerabend’s extremism, but an analogous argument can be found in far more moderate philosophers such as Larry Laudan (1983, p. 124): ‘The evident epistemic heterogeneity of the activities and beliefs customarily regarded as scientific should alert us to the probable futility of seeking an epistemic version of a demarcation criterion’. Again, the history of science is used as a tool of skepticism for the idea that the boundaries between science and non–science can be epistemically drawn against the idea that the constitutive standards of science can be determined. The general form of the argument is deeply skeptical because it aims to deconstruct the identity between the universal and the particular by dismissing the idea that there can be any kind of epistemic constitutive standards of science. As we saw, the traditional skeptic prohibits the formula “it is” (X is Y) but permits the formula “it seems that X is Y”. Accordingly, the skeptic use of the history of science concludes that there is no predicate Y which satisfies the formula “science is Y”. Hence the formula “science is” is prohibited. Given the supposed epistemic heterogeneity of the scientific activities of the past the only permissible formula is the following: “science is Y according to the socio–cultural framework X”. The means for the deconstruction of the universal conception of science and its particular instantiations is the constant use of one or more historical counter– examples against any effort to provide a universal view of science. The almost inexhaustible pool of these counter–examples is the history of science, as the discipline which provides the description of the particular scientific cases of the past. As Kuhn (1977, p. 5) stresses, ‘[t]he final product of most historical research is a narrative, a story, about particulars of the past [. . . ] [The philosophy] on the other hand, aims principally at explicit generalizations and at those with universal scope’. Both Feyerabend and Laudan provide a historically informed philosophical argument in order to annihilate the general philosophical aspiration of determining the constitutive standards of science, just like the skeptics who employ philosophical argumentation in order to destroy philosophy itself. They aim to be directed against a special form of the formula “it is”, which is the formula “science is”, by disarming the identity between the particular cases of historical scientific episodes and the idea of science in general. In short, the skeptical use of the history of science suggests that for every claim of the type “science is Y” a counter–example

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can be found which demonstrates that “science is not Y”.¹⁸ Therefore, according to this skeptical aspiration, the formula “science is” should be abandoned altogether. However, skepticism about science faces the same problems as the general skeptical argumentation. If a particular case can play the role of the particular counter–example to a general conception of science, then this case should be counted as scientific. A particular, say, political or artistic episode of the past cannot refute a general conception of science. Only a scientific episode can do that. Just like tasting an olive cannot refute the verdict that honey is sweet. Using an episode as a particular counter–example against a general conception of science presupposes that the episode shares at least some of the constitutive standards that this very conception entails. Otherwise it is absolutely impossible for the (particular) episode to refute the (universal) conception; the episode cannot serve as a counter–example, it is just irrelevant. The preclusion of the formula “science is” which goes hand in hand with the rejection of the idea that there can be constitutive standards of science, based on the supposed heterogeneity of the historical record, dissolves the very idea of the historical record of science. And then the historical record cannot serve its role as a skeptical weapon, for there is no such thing as “of science”. In an analogous way the preclusion of the formula “honey is” leads to the impossibility even to utter “honey”. Contrary to what a skeptical attitude fantasizes, the dispute (διαφωνία) of a general conception of science cannot come from a “bare” particular case. In fact, a particular scientific episode is such only within a framework of a general conception of science. Otherwise it cannot be classified as scientific. Thus, what we have in cases of counter–examples is not the discrepancy between a bare particular episode and a general conception of science, but the discrepancy between two general conceptions¹⁹ mediated by a singular episode. For one universal conception, a particular episode signifies a refutation, while for the other it entails corroboration. And this is so because the two conceptions are not absolutely heterogeneous but share at least some common beliefs about the constitutive standards of science. These common beliefs permit the particular episode in question to count as scientific and not as irrelevant. Each particular episode which serves as a counter–example against a universal conception of science does not have as a result the pure nothingness of skepticism. On the contrary, the particular episode, precisely because it can be classified as scientific and can serve as counter–example, leads to a new enriched 18 This is clearly an application of the first mode of Agrippa, the mode ‘based on the discrepancy’ (Sextus, 1933, ch. XV). 19 Of course the second general conception of science may be not articulated explicitly, but it is necessarily here and it is articulable, even if not articulated yet.

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conception of science. As Hegel (1816/2010, p. 33) stresses: ‘[b]ecause the result, the negation, is a determinate negation, it has a content. It is a new concept but one higher and richer than the preceding – richer because it negates or opposes the preceding and therefore contains it, and it contains even more than that, for it is the unity of itself and its opposite’. Thus each historical episode which serves as a negation of a general scientific methodology leads to the ongoing enrichment of our conception of science and not to the skeptical abyss that both Feyerabend and Laudan inconsistently presuppose.

6 A quasi–Hegelian approach. One philosopher who realized that the history of science can serve as a skeptical test against the dogmatic conceptions of science was Imre Lakatos. Lakatos – and this is not independent of his Hegelian education²⁰ – embraced the meta– methodological necessity of the skeptical tests, but he did not conclude that there can be no epistemic demarcation between science and non–science. Again, I cannot but outline here. According to Lakatos (1978, p. 123), a methodology, which – in his terminology – is a name for a general conception of science, ‘can always be formulated as a definition of science’. This is almost identical to what I have called the constitutive standards of science. In one sense, a definition includes the constitutive features of the defined concept. For instance, if honey is defined as the material which is sweet, yellow and soft then sweetness, yellowness and softness are the constitutive features of honey. If science is making self–consistent and falsifiable claims about the world then the falsifiability and the self–consistency are the constitutive feature of science. Thus, a methodology which provides the constitutive features of science is equivalently a definition of science. The question which follows is how can one criticize a definition? What we need is a meta– criterion for appraising the criteria of scientific rationality. This is the question of meta–methodology. In Lakatos’s view, a viable reply to this question should take into serious account the history of science. This is reflected in his famous paraphrase of the well–known Kantian dictum: ‘[p]hilosophy of science without history of science is empty; history of science without philosophy of science is blind’ (Lakatos 1978, p. 102). In order to avoid dogmatism and in order to appraise the various universal conceptions of science he suggests that each methodology should transform itself

20 For an extended analysis of the Hegelian roots of Lakatos’s thinking and also for an explanation of his denial to give credit to Hegel see Kadvany (2001).

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to a quasi–empirical program of reconstruction of the history of science. Given that, different methodologies would provide different rational reconstructions of the history of science. For instance, from a neopositivist point of view, a historical reconstruction would recognize only ‘two sorts of genuine scientific discoveries: hard factual propositions and inductive generalizations’ (Lakatos 1978, p. 104). All the other historical incidents would count as irrational or unscientific. A Popperian historian, on the other hand, would seek for risky falsifiable theories and for negative crucial experiments (Lakatos 1978, pp. 108–109). Again, all other incidents would count as irrational or unscientific. According to Lakatos, neopositivism, just as falsificationism, face serious problems taken both as criteria of scientific rationality and as a meta–criteria for appraising the criteria of scientific rationality.²¹ In light of the historical record, falsificationism falsifies itself while neopositivism cannot be proved inductively. In the actual history of science we can detect episodes, widely accepted as scientific, which violate the strict methodological rules of both Popperianism and neopositivism. In short, Lakatos’s implication is that every methodology, in order to be a genuine conception of science, should first meet its own criteria for rationality, and that this test can be accomplished through the history of science. This is what he calls a “pyrrhonian machine de guerre” (Lakatos 1978, p. 122). Lakatos’ meta– methodology incorporates the history of science as a skeptical weapon against the proposed methodological criteria. It engages the skeptical use of the history of science not in order to annihilate any attempt to demarcate science, but in order to improve the criteria of demarcation. Just like Hegel who incorporates skepticism as the negative and free aspect of every genuine philosophy. The comparison between different conceptions of science takes place on the ground of the rational reconstruction of the history of science. As we saw, each methodology can transform itself into a historical program which appraises the value judgements of the actual scientists in the past. It follows that according to different methodologies, different value judgements count as rational and different as the mere result of various cultural, sociological, political or psychological factors. In Lakatos’s view, there is no methodology which can comprehensively reconstruct the totality of the historical episodes ‘since human beings are not completely rational animals; and even when they act rationally they may have a false theory of their own rational actions’ (Lakatos 1978, p. 114). Thus each rational reconstruction of science should necessarily be supplemented by an empirical historical account

21 That is to say that both neopositivism and Popperian falsificationism face serious problems against the skeptical arguments.

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which explains the irrational episodes.²² In the relevant terminology, the empirical/causal explanations consist of the external history of science. On the contrary, the internal history is the totality of the rationally reconstructed episodes. The measure for the success of a methodology is the ability to reconstruct the majority of the actual historical judgements of scientists as rational. In other words, what makes a methodology better than another is its ability to place more historical episodes in the jurisdiction of the internal–intellectual history of science. To summarize, the actual history of science can serve as the skeptical test for the general conceptions of science, since the rational reconstruction of the actual history can provide the meta–criterion for appraising the existing theories of scientific rationality. This process includes two dimensions. First, each criterion of scientific rationality should meet its own criteria when it transforms itself into a historical program. This I will call the dimension of self–consistency. Second, each methodology transformed as a historical program should reconstruct as rational more episodes than its competitors. This I will call the dimension of scope. I argue that while the dimension of self–consistency is both in accordance with the Hegelian absorption of skepticism and unproblematic, the dimension of scope suffers a crucial problem. The dimension of self–consistency expresses the general philosophical position that the criteria of scientific rationality could not be exempt from criticism. Additionally, it reflects the well–known philosophical strategy of the peritrope or reversal,²³ which consists in the use of an argument against itself. It is also found in accord with the Hegelian conception about the relation between the forms of thought and their critique. In the Encyclopedia Logic Hegel writes: [T]he forms of thought should not be employed unexamined, but examining them is already itself a process of knowing. Consequently, the activity of the forms of thought and their critique must be joined in knowing. The forms of thought must be considered in and of themselves [an und für sich]. They are themselves the object as well as the activity of the object. They themselves examine themselves and they must determine for themselves their limits and point up their deficiency in themselves. (Hegel 1830/2010, §41)

In an analogous way, Lakatos stresses that the criteria of scientific rationality should not be left unexamined, and furthermore that the examination of those

22 In my view, the dualism between internal and external history is the point where Lakatos diverges mostly from the Hegelian line of thought. But this is not the subject matter of this chapter. 23 This strategy can already be found in Socrates’ argument against Protagoras in the Platonic dialogue Thaetetus. However, Sextus gave the name “peritrope” to this kind of reasoning (see Tindale 2010, ch. 6).

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criteria belong to the jurisdiction of their own content. The criteria of scientific rationality are both the object and the activity of criticism. The content of methodology can be used in order to criticize and evolve the content of the meta–methodology. This could be a first and decisive step forward towards the rejection of dogmatism in the philosophy of science. The dimension of the scope, however, is not unproblematic. Consider the case where a value judgment of a scientific community of the past is judged in different ways by two different methodologies. The first one takes the specific value judgement to be rational while the second one does not. According to Lakatos, this is a virtue for the former methodology since it can reconstruct more episodes as rational. But the proponents of the latter methodology could still object: this is not the case of a rational episode, this is a case where scientists, as not fully rational animals, took an irrational decision and hence the episode should be placed in the jurisdiction of external history. Then we are left with two undesirable choices: First, we can assume that there is some kind of ‘pre–analytic intuitions about scientific rationality’ (Laudan 1977, p. 160) which are independent of the proposed methodologies. This assumption implies that what is scientific and what is not is given to our cognition before having at hand an explicit theory of rationality. But then we fall back to a foundationalist dogmatism which exempts itself from criticism and reduces the philosophy of science to common sense. Alternately, we can seek for another – higher level – criterion in order to decide which of two methodologies is right. But then we slip into an obvious infinite regress.

7 Conclusion The philosophy of science undertakes the task of determining the constitutive standards of science, both as a whole and of its parts (e.g. causality, scientific explanation, experimentation, etc). The philosophy of science, then, describes the universal form of scientific thought. This is a complicated task since science is an ongoing process and as Gaston Bachelard (1934/2003, p. 56) has pointed out ‘[scientific] thought is modified in its form as it is modified in its object’. The dogmatic attitude attempts to fulfill this task by proposing a normative criterion which demarcates science from non–science. The attitude is dogmatic as long as it exempts this criterion from criticism or as long as it does not provide a way for examining this very criterion. On the other hand, the skeptical attitude attempts to annihilate any effort of determining constitutive standards of science based on the apparent diversity of the scientific modes of thinking, which can be found in the historical record. It may be clear by now that the dogmatic attitude “feeds” the

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skeptical stance. Every proposed criterion for demarcating science which is adopted by assumption (εξ ύποθέσεως), and therefore is not the result of a dialectical process which incorporates the skeptical tests as its negative aspect, is doomed to meet the destructive force of skeptical negation. At this point the Hegelian critique of skepticism can be of great value, since it can help us escape the unwanted dilemma between the dogmatic and the skeptical attitude. It can lead us to a third option – to a third philosophy – between skepticism and dogmatism. This option recognizes skeptical tests as an indispensable part of philosophizing but does not arrive at skeptical conclusions. It recognizes that every skeptical negation, as a determinate one, does not lead to pure nothingness but to a new, advanced form of consciousness. In the case of science, the role of a skeptical test can be played, among others, by the historically informed particular counter–examples to the proposed universal conceptions of science. These counter–examples can lead to an ongoing refinement of our image of science. As it follows, the history of science, both as the historiographic enterprise and as the ongoing scientific course, plays an essential role here.

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