Health and Hedonism in Plato and Epicurus 9781350080256, 9781350080287, 9781350080263

Table of contents :
Cover
Half title
Series page
Title
Copyrights
Dedication
Contents
Acknowledgments
Notes on the Texts and Translations
List of Abbreviations
Introduction
1 The Pleasure of Psychic Harmony in the Republic
2 Restorative Pleasure and the Neutral State of Health in the Philebus
4 Cicero’s De Finibus and Epicurean Pleasure
3 Plato’s Anti-Hedonistic Process Argument
5 Epicurean Pleasures of Bodily and Mental Health
6 Pleasurable Restorations of Health in Epicurean Hedonism
7 Epicureans on Taste, Sex, and Other Non-Restorative Pleasures
8 Conclusion: Health and Hedonism in Plato and Epicurus
Notes
References
General Index
Index Locorum

Citation preview

Health and Hedonism in Plato and Epicurus

Also Available From Bloomsbury Plato’s Trial of Athens, Mark A. Ralkowski Plato and Plotinus on Mysticism, Epistemology, and Ethics, David J. Yount Plato and Nietzsche, Mark Anderson

Health and Hedonism in Plato and Epicurus Kelly Arenson

BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA BLOOMSBURY, BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2019 This paperback edition published in 2021 Copyright © Kelly Arenson, 2019 Kelly Arenson has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. For legal purposes the Acknowledgments on p. viii constitute an extension of this copyright page. Cover design by Eleanor Rose | Cover Image: Engraving of the Temple of Poseidon at Kalauna (Scene of the death of Demosthène from Cassell’s Illustrated Universal History, 1882) © Getty Images All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: HB: 978-1-3500-8025-6 PB: 978-1-3502-1231-2 ePDF: 978-1-3500-8026-3 eBook: 978-1-3500-8027-0 Typeset by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

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For my parents

Contents Acknowledgments Notes on the Texts and Translations List of Abbreviations Introduction 1 The Pleasure of Psychic Harmony in the Republic 2 Restorative Pleasure and the Neutral State of Health in the Philebus 3 Plato’s Anti-Hedonistic Process Argument 4 Cicero’s De Finibus and Epicurean Pleasure 5 Epicurean Pleasures of Bodily and Mental Health 6 Pleasurable Restorations of Health in Epicurean Hedonism 7 Epicureans on Taste, Sex, and Other Non-Restorative Pleasures 8 Conclusion: Health and Hedonism in Plato and Epicurus Notes References General Index Index Locorum

viii ix x 1 11 29 45 65 85 109 137 157 163 204 210 213

Acknowledgments Many ideas from this book first took shape in my doctoral dissertation in philosophy at Emory University. The project has since turned into a different animal, but I owe my first thoughts on ancient hedonism to my late director, Steve Strange, who many years ago put me on the scent of the Philebus. I am also especially grateful to Tim O’Keefe for his many helpful criticisms and comments on the entire project. The work also benefited in its early stages from comments by Richard Patterson and Jack Zupko. Any errors that remain are, of course, my own. The book took its current shape since I joined the philosophy department at Duquesne University, whose generous Presidential Scholarship for faculty gave me time to write and revise. I thank my many wonderful colleagues at Duquesne for their encouragement (and commiseration) during this process. I am also indebted to the audiences at the conferences and departments where I presented parts of this book, including Duquesne University, the University of Memphis, the Texas Workshops in Ancient Philosophy, several meetings of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy and the American Philosophical Association, and Western University Canada. Small parts of this book appeared in Kelly Arenson, “Natural and Neutral States in Plato’s Philebus,” Apeiron, 44, no. 2, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011, pp. 191–210. I thank De Gruyter for permission to reprint those parts here. Lastly, my deepest thanks to L. Michael Harrington, for always being the face on the other side of the desk.

Notes on the Texts and Translations Most of the Greek text of Epicurus’ letters and sayings as well as the fragments of passages about Epicureanism are from the second edition of Graziano Arrighetti’s compilation Epicuro, Opere (1973). When citing fragments and material concerning Epicureanism that do not appear in more widely available compilations, I provide the passage number from Arrighetti’s edition, followed by ‘A.’ If the passage appears only in Hermann Usener’s compilation Epicurea (1963), I give the passage number from that edition, followed by ‘U.’ Unless otherwise noted, all translations from the Greek of Epicurus’ texts are my own. The Latin text of Cicero’s De Finibus is from L. D. Reynolds’ Oxford edition (1998); my translations are based on Raphael Woolf ’s (2001), with many revisions. Translations of Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura are those of Martin Ferguson Smith (2001), revised by me where noted; the Latin text is from Cyril Bailey’s second Oxford edition ([1900] 1962). All translations of Plato’s Philebus that appear here are my own, but I  frequently referenced Dorothea Frede’s edition (1993). Translations of the Republic are G. M. A. Grube’s, revised by C. D. C. Reeve (1997); I have modified the translation where noted. The Greek texts of all Platonic works are from J. Burnet’s Oxford editions (1900–1907) except for the Greek text of the Republic, which is from S. R. Slings’s Oxford edition (2003). For Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, I have used W. D. Ross’s translation (1983), revised by J. O. Urmson and sometimes by me, and the Greek text from J. Bywater’s edition ([1894] 1970). Details of the Greek and Latin texts and translations of other classical works are provided in the notes.

List of Abbreviations A

Arrighetti, Epicuro, Opere

Ad Hdt.

Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus

Ad Men.

Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus

De Fin.

Cicero, De Finibus Malorum et Bonorum (On Moral Ends)

DL

Diogenes Laertius, The Lives of Eminent Philosophers

DRN

Lucretius, De Rerum Natura (On the Nature of Things)

KD

Epicurus, Kuriai Doxai (Principal Doctrines)

NE

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics

Non Posse

Plutarch, That Epicurus Actually Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible

Phdr.

Plato, Phaedrus

Phil.

Plato, Philebus

Rep.

Plato, Republic

SV

Epicurus, Sententiae Vaticanae (Vatican Sayings)

Symp.

Plato, Symposium

Tusc. Disp.

Cicero, Tusculan Disputations

U

Usener, Epicurea

Introduction

What is pleasure? What is pain? Should we seek the former and avoid the latter? If so, how? If not, why? This book explores the philosophical background of the Epicurean answers to these questions and considers two crucial but often overlooked sources for understanding Epicurean hedonism: Plato’s Republic and Philebus. It is within these dialogues that we find Plato formulating extensive and complex descriptions of the relation between organic health and pleasures of the body and soul. His accounts became part of a trajectory of ideas in antiquity concerning the nature and goodness of pleasure, a trajectory that began with the debates about pleasure among members of the early Platonic Academy and continued on through Epicurus’ time. This book argues for the existence of such a philosophical trajectory, one that links Plato’s sometimes anti-hedonistic agenda with Epicurus’ hedonism. The main claim of this book is that Plato’s treatments of pleasure in the Philebus and Republic can help us understand many of the central aspects of Epicurean pleasure. By first providing an interpretation of the Platonic material, I aim to show that Epicureans, in forming their own theory of pleasure, are asking the same questions as the Platonists about pleasure’s nature and value, and that both schools employ similar concepts in their investigations. Although Epicureans and Platonists have dissimilar perspectives on the ethics and nature of pleasure, I argue that their inquiries bear certain structural similarities. By framing Epicurean pleasure against the backdrop of the Philebus, the Republic, and the ancient debates surrounding those texts, an account of Epicurean pleasure can be constructed that is more coherent than that which emerges from our usual source of Epicurean ethics, namely, Cicero’s De Finibus. While I do not dispute that much of Cicero’s testimony is reliable, I do claim that many of its parts are confused, particularly the account of the Epicurean conception of the two types of pleasure, the so-called katastematic and kinetic varieties, the interpretation of which is arguably the most controversial aspect of any reading of Epicurean ethics.

2

Health and Hedonism in Plato and Epicurus

The main connection between Platonic and Epicurean accounts of pleasure is that both schools consider pleasure in relation to health. The optimal and natural functioning of the organism is of key concern to both Plato and Epicurus in considering not only the nature of pleasure but also whether pleasure ought to be pursued or avoided. Although the two thinkers arrive at different conclusions about how exactly pleasure relates to health and what such a relationship can tell us about the goodness of pleasure, I argue that they frame their investigations of pleasure and health in terms of the same two issues, which I will briefly introduce here in these opening pages. First, both Plato and Epicurus attempt to parse the relationship between health and pleasure: Is pleasure a condition of health itself, is it more closely associated with the process of attaining health, or is it somehow related to both the condition and the process? And just what is health? What does it mean to be healthy, from both a metaphysical and physiological standpoint? Second, how does pleasure’s relation to health affect the goodness of pleasure in general and the goodness of certain pleasures in particular? For example, if pleasure is a state of health, and if a healthy state can be defined as a condition lacking disturbances, then what makes a healthy life desirable? Or if health itself is not a pleasure at all, then why pursue health? Or why pursue pleasure, depending on one’s perspective? Alternatively, if pleasure is generated in the process of attaining health, then is our final goal and highest good pleasure rather than health? If so, then the experience of pleasure might serve only to remind us that our organism has fallen short of optimal functioning, with the result that we might deem it immoral to cultivate unhealthy habits simply in order to bring about the pleasure of returning to health. In short, Epicurus’ and Plato’s concerns are twofold: Is the definition of pleasure bound up with health, and does pleasure’s relation to health make the former more viable as a life goal? I show that these questions lie at the forefront of Plato’s treatment of pleasure in the Philebus and Republic, and I argue that the very same issues suffuse Epicurean hedonism. In the course of articulating this book’s main arguments concerning the link between pleasure and health, I also consider several significant secondary topics, which are worth touching on here. First, I consider the philosophical and historical influences on Plato’s position concerning health and pleasure in the Republic and Philebus. There was a significant trend in antiquity to link pleasure with organic functioning, to associate pleasure with processes of healthy functioning rather than with the end results of such processes, and to judge pleasure’s value in light of its ontological status as a process rather than an

Introduction

3

end. Plato’s assessment of the relation between health and pleasure, particularly his examination in the Philebus, was a focal point of the debates in antiquity about the nature and goodness of pleasure; indeed, Ancient Greece in the fourth century BCE was a hotbed of philosophical controversy surrounding these issues. Notable players in these debates, whose work I consider in parsing Plato’s treatment of pleasure, were Speusippus, Eudoxus, and Aristotle. In the fourth century, the hedonism of Eudoxus was pitted against the anti-hedonism of Speusippus, Plato’s nephew and successor as head of the Academy, possibly spurring Plato to write the Philebus. This dialogue makes sense as a chapter in the debates between Speusippus and Eudoxus about the nature and morality of pleasure, constituting on the one hand Plato’s defense of (what is most likely) the Speusippan position that pleasures belong to the class of generation (genesis) and therefore cannot be good, and, on the other, his rejection of Eudoxan hedonism. In addition, Aristotle’s claim that pleasure is an activity rather than a process or movement reflects his sympathy for Eudoxus’ hedonism and the view that pleasure and the good are not mutually exclusive. Aristotle does not accept Eudoxan hedonism, but his remarks in the Nicomachean Ethics and Rhetoric and the discussion of pleasure in the Peripatetic Magna Moralia serve as robust rebuttals of the anti-hedonism of the Philebus. Since much of the philosophical and historical background on Aristotle’s and Plato’s respective accounts of pleasure, particularly in the Philebus, has already been detailed quite thoroughly elsewhere,1 it is not my primary concern in this book. However, I do describe as much of the background as is needed to understand the connections between pleasure and health in the Republic and Philebus. Another of this book’s secondary tasks is to provide a critical examination of Cicero’s treatment of Epicurean hedonism in De Finibus, with an eye toward showing that we should be wary of building our interpretation of Epicurean pleasure on Cicero’s testimony. Cicero does not consider in any serious or consistent way the notion that the Epicureans may have formulated their notion of pleasure in terms of organic health. Indeed, such a reading of Epicurean pleasure becomes plausible when much of Cicero’s analysis in De Finibus is set aside and one considers instead that Epicurean hedonism may have been influenced by ancient theories of pleasure and health circulating in the Platonic Academy in the fourth century BCE. One must of course have serious cause to discount significant aspects of Cicero’s testimony, given that it is our most detailed source for Epicurean hedonism. I attempt to provide such cause in this book by presenting an interpretation of Epicurean pleasure that reflects

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Health and Hedonism in Plato and Epicurus

Academic debates and ideas, thus obviating the need to rely on Cicero as our main source. Much of my thinking in this book, especially my general wariness of Cicero’s testimony and my reading of Epicurean hedonism, has been influenced by the work of J. C. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor (1982) and Boris Nikolsky (2001). They comprise the minority of scholars who understand Epicurus’ conception of pleasure independently of Cicero’s testimony. In The Greeks on Pleasure, Gosling and Taylor argue that, contrary to what we learn in De Finibus, not all sensory pleasures belong to the kinetic class: those that provide pleasure without any pain are katastematic. I share their position that what counts as properly kinetic according to Epicureans is the pleasure linked to the perceived process of restoring painless organic functioning, whereas what counts as katastematic is the awareness of the organism’s painless functioning. I am also somewhat sympathetic to Nikolsky’s interpretation, which attempts to build on Gosling and Taylor’s work by arguing that Epicurus was less interested in sharply distinguishing kinetic from katastematic pleasure than in showing how the two types are related.2 Moreover, I have followed Nikolsky’s lead in looking to the debates within the Platonic Academy for insight into Epicurean hedonism.3 But although I am fairly sympathetic to the work of Gosling, Taylor, and Nikolsky, my study is not intended as a defense of all their views. As I explain, many of their arguments are underdetermined, and some appear to contradict extant Epicurean evidence. Consequently, my study diverges from theirs in several significant ways, but I nevertheless take their work as the starting point for my own. In the first part of this book, I consider Plato’s arguments about pleasure in the Philebus and the Republic, aiming to establish that Plato considers pleasure in terms of physical and psychological health. Sometimes he considers pleasure from an anti-hedonist perspective, as he does in the Philebus, but sometimes he recognizes pleasure’s positive contribution to human happiness, as he does in the Republic, where he attempts to articulate pleasure’s role in the just and philosophic life.4 It can be edifying to juxtapose these two dialogues since they focus on different types of pleasure and formulate the relation between pleasure and health in different ways. While the Republic features the crucial Platonic discussions of psychological health and its relation to pleasure, the Philebus is the locus of Plato’s assessment of physical health and its pleasure. In the former dialogue, his eye is turned toward mental pleasure—the pleasure a just soul takes in leading a life characterized by harmony and rational order. In the Philebus,

Introduction

5

Plato considers pleasure’s relation to bodily health by framing the discussion in physiological terms, examining such organic processes as heating, cooling, filling, and emptying. In these two dialogues, we comprehend the different ways in which Plato associates pleasure with health, and how he attempts to situate pleasure within the theoretical frameworks of anti-hedonism and intellectual hedonism. In the second part of this book I turn to Epicurean hedonism. There I examine a wide variety of source material, some of it Epicurean, some of it anti-Epicurean, in order to show that Epicurean ethics centers on the relation between pleasures of the mind, pleasures of the body, and the health of the entire organism. According to Epicureans, a healthy state of painlessness is highly pleasurable, and the good life involves experiencing health in different ways. The Epicureans therefore have a robust response to the Cyrenaic criticism that the Epicurean good resembles the state of a corpse: dead bodies might be painless, but they certainly are not enjoying health. I argue that the Epicureans understand mental pleasure in essentially the same way that Plato does in the Republic, namely, in terms of the healthy workings of a soul that operates without frustrated desires, anxiety, and disorder. With respect to physical pleasure, the Epicureans acknowledge, along with early Platonists, that pleasure is linked to the process of an organism’s return to health. But the Epicureans believe that the condition of physical health is also pleasant, and I show that this distinction between processes and conditions is reflected in their distinction between ‘kinetic’ pleasure and ‘katastematic’ pleasure. In my view, the Epicureans achieve one of their greatest philosophical triumphs by rejecting the sorts of moral and ontological criticisms of pleasure and hedonism offered by Plato while at the same time employing concepts that look remarkably Academic, such as the distinction between processes or movements toward health and the condition of health itself. In Chapter 1, I analyze Socrates’ arguments for the superiority of pleasures of the philosophic life in book 9 of the Republic. Here I contend that his best argument for the hedonic superiority of the just life is not that non-rational pleasures are somehow inferior to rational ones—an argument which nevertheless occupies Socrates for much of the treatment of pleasure in book 9—but that the whole soul experiences the most pleasure only when reason governs the soul. The only way that all parts of the soul can attain some pleasure without self-destructing is through rational guidance; for all parts of the soul to exist in such a satisfied, selfsustaining way is just to have a healthy soul. In other words, pleasure is bound

6

Health and Hedonism in Plato and Epicurus

up with harmonious psychic functioning, which Socrates explicitly equates with health in the middle books of the Republic. I claim further that the object of the whole soul’s pleasure is psychic health: what the soul enjoys is just its own health, which is brought about only through virtue and rational order. In Chapter 2 I outline the early parts of Plato’s treatment of pleasure in the Philebus, beginning with his metaphysical explanation of pleasure and health in his discussion of the fourfold division of all things. I analyze Socrates’ claim that at least physical pleasures can be explained on a restoration model: pleasures of the body are linked to processes that restore the organism to its natural state. I then consider how Socrates supplements this simple restoration model with a ‘perception requirement’ for pleasures and pains: processes of restoration and disturbance can be pleasurable or painful, respectively, only when they are perceived. This addendum to the restoration model allows him to deny that certain conditions are pleasurable, most notably the neutral state of the absence of pain, in which movements away from and toward natural harmony go unnoticed. Given the perception requirement, the neutral state must be pleasureless. I consider later parts of the Philebus in Chapter 3, where I focus on Socrates’ use of the restoration model to exclude a large number of pleasures from the ranks of the good by means of a so-called process argument, at 53c4–55c3. He attributes this argument to a group or persons referred to as κομψοί (clever people), who are said to have propagated the reasoning that pleasure is not the good because it is a process of becoming (genesis). I contend that Socrates takes this argument seriously even though he puts it in the mouth of others: by means of his earlier arguments associating pleasure with processes toward health rather than with the state of health itself, Socrates relegates at least the physical pleasures to the class of accessory goods. In addition, I consider early Academic and Peripatetic versions of and responses to the process argument in order to highlight just how prominent the issue of pleasure’s status as a process was in ancient philosophical debates about the nature and goodness of pleasure. To this end, I focus on Speusippus’ and Eudoxus’ potential connections to the Platonic process argument, as well as the Aristotelian presentation of and reply to the process argument in the Rhetoric, Nicomachean Ethics, and Magna Moralia. In Chapter 4, I analyze Cicero’s account in the first two books of De Finibus. I argue that since this text is fraught with difficulties, we ought to be conservative in relying on it as a source for the Epicurean theory of pleasure. Although Cicero correctly understands that Epicureans distinguish different kinds of pleasure,

Introduction

7

he misunderstands how they distinguish them. In general, Cicero misinterprets the role of sensory pleasure in Epicurean hedonism, and his account of kinetic pleasure is especially confused. Chapter 5 interprets katastematic pleasure based on Epicurus’ few extant texts, Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura, and Plutarch’s polemical works against Epicurean ethics. After rejecting several scholars’ attempts to deny that the Epicureans make a distinction between two types of pleasure, I argue that Epicurus conceives of katastematic pleasure in terms of the perception of healthy, painless states, and that he conceives of pleasure, in general, in terms of the perceived natural functioning of the organism. Far from being an unconscious state void of awareness of one’s bodily condition, katastematic pleasure involves the perception that one’s organism is operating without impediment. In this chapter, I discuss the first of two ways that Epicureans believe we can perceive healthy functioning: when we are aware that our bodies and minds are undisturbed— when we are aware of not being cold or beset by fears or harmful emotions, for example. This is a negative awareness in the sense that we perceive healthy functioning when we perceive a lack of unhealthy functioning in the mind or body. Kinetic pleasures are the focus of Chapter 6, where I describe them as perceived processes of restoring healthy mental and physical functioning. These pleasures presuppose some deficiency in the organism and are therefore mixed with pain. After addressing several objections to my interpretation, I evaluate a messy passage from Epicurus’ On Choices (DL 10.136), the only extant text in which Epicurus himself refers to a distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasure. In the passage, joy is categorized as a kinetic pleasure, yet joy is not normally understood as a perceived process toward health, as I claim all kinetic pleasures are. I examine Epicurus’ account of joy in order to show that the passage from On Choices coheres with my reading of Epicurean hedonism and that joy is a good example of a mental restorative pleasure. Chapter 7 focuses on the second way in which healthy organic functioning can be perceived: when we enjoy painless, non-restorative perceptions, such as the pleasures of taste, sex, and sound, which Epicurus claims are greatly important to the highest good. Cicero describes such pleasures as kinetic, but I contend they are katastematic since they are painless in themselves; they are neither preceded by pain nor mixed with it in any significant way. I go on to explain the place of these non-restorative pleasures in the Epicurean ethical system as I have interpreted it. In addition, I examine Epicurus’ assertion in KD 18 that pleasure

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Health and Hedonism in Plato and Epicurus

can only be varied but not increased beyond the absence of pain. Several scholars understand KD 18 to mean that pleasurable variations (what I am calling ‘nonrestorative pleasures’) are kinetic since the variations seem to be contrasted with the katastematic pleasure of the absence of pain. Lastly, I consider the views of the notable Epicureans Philodemus and Diogenes of Oinoanda, both of whom discuss the role of non-restorative pleasures in Epicurean hedonism. Before closing, a few disclaimers are in order. First, although I aim to draw philosophical connections between Epicurean and Platonic ideas, I make no attempt to prove any historical connection between Plato and Epicurus’ respective treatments of pleasure. That is, I do not aim to show that Epicurus had the Philebus or Republic in hand when crafting his ethics, nor that he believed he was responding to particular Platonic arguments. While I suspect that Epicurus was quite familiar with Platonic philosophy generally,5 and its arguments concerning pleasure specifically, my goal is not to establish a historical link.6 Rather, my goal is to propose an interpretation of Plato’s treatment of pleasure that highlights certain concepts and questions that prove to be very useful in constructing a coherent account of Epicurean pleasure. Whether Epicurus had specific Platonic arguments in mind has no bearing on whether Platonic material can help us better understand Epicurean hedonism. Second, this book is not a study of all treatments of pleasure in the Platonic corpus; rather, it is a focused analysis of Plato’s most comprehensive accounts of the connection between health and pleasure, which I believe are found in the Republic and Philebus. For this reason, I do not examine in any great detail Plato’s treatment of pleasure in the Gorgias, Protagoras, or Phaedo. To narrow things even further, this book is a study of only those parts of Plato’s most comprehensive accounts of the connection between health and pleasure that help us understand Epicurean hedonism. As I explained in the chapter summaries earlier, my investigation of the Republic is limited to the arguments about pleasure in book 9 and the connections Plato draws between health, pleasure, and justice in books 4 and 5. My investigation of the Philebus centers on Plato’s treatment of pleasure from, roughly, 31b–54d, with some discussion of the categorization of pleasures entailed by the division of beings described from 23c to 31b. As many have noted, the Philebus is a busy text: in addition to the dialogue’s extended treatment of pleasure, a sizable portion is devoted to metaphysics—to classifying all things into metaphysical groups having to do with limit, unlimitedness, and causes—while other parts concern the problem of the One and the Many as well as the classification of several different kinds of knowledge. The Republic’s

Introduction

9

concerns are equally as diffuse, if not more so. Exhaustive analysis of all these important topics lies well beyond the scope of this work. In addition, I do not try to show that Plato has a single theory of pleasure or health that extends through all of the dialogues I explore in this book. Indeed, I believe that his treatment of pleasure in book 9 of the Republic alone reveals his lack of a consistent definition of pleasure, and I make no claims as to whether his restoration model applies to all the varieties of pleasure he discusses in the Philebus. In my study, I treat each dialogue’s account of the relation between pleasure and health on its own terms. If I do compare Plato’s accounts, it is only to provide a tentative outline of their development, but not to reconcile them. Two final comments: first, because there is a considerable amount of overlap in the content of Epicurean texts themselves, and because there are so many different sources, it can be difficult to develop an interpretation of Epicurean pleasure in a linear fashion; one seems to need all the evidence all the time. As a result, the reader may notice in the chapters on Epicurus that some passages are addressed more than once, and at times the reader is referred to a different section of the book for further explanation. This is regrettable, but it is the price one pays for attempting to formulate discrete arguments concerning texts that contain virtually none. Second and lastly, I do not devote a considerable amount of space to topics that have been thoroughly treated elsewhere, such as Aristotle’s account of pleasure, his response to the Platonic process argument, and the philosophical and historical background of the Philebus. While I do approach these topics, I do not dwell on their intricacies. Throughout this book, I have attempted to home in on the concepts, texts, thinkers, and connections that illuminate our understanding of health and pleasure in Plato and Epicurus.

1

The Pleasure of Psychic Harmony in the Republic

After Socrates establishes in book 9 of the Republic that each of the three parts of the soul has its own particular pleasures, he declares the rational part’s pleasure to be greatest, and then offers an even grander conclusion: “The one in whom that part rules has the most pleasant life” (583a2–3).1 These claims are unsurprising, since Plato makes no secret of the fact that he considers the rational part of the soul to be the most noble and wise; surely, the best part will also be home to the greatest pleasures. It is odd, then, that Plato’s case in book 9 for the superiority of rational pleasures and the pleasantness of the philosophic life should be so problematic. A close look at book 9 reveals that Plato has several different explanations that he subtly shifts between, such that at the end of the discussion we seem to be left with no unified justification of the hedonic superiority of the rational life. Here, I discuss Plato’s attempt in book 9 to prove the hedonic advantage of the soul’s rational part, and I argue that his best justification of this advantage, hinted at in the closing comments of Socrates’ discussion of pleasure, rests on the claim that the entire soul experiences pleasure when reason is in charge, since reason is the best governor and instills order and harmony in the soul. The philosophic life, then, is the most pleasant not just because it is the only life that enables the best psychic part to experience pleasure but also because it enables the soul as a whole to partake of pleasure.2 But even this argument for reason’s hedonic advantage is not as straightforward as it seems: Plato fails to tell us in book 9 what it means for the whole soul to experience pleasure. Does this mean maximizing the pleasure of each individual part of the soul or of that of the aggregate? Or is Plato uninterested in quantitative assessments of the soul’s pleasure, focusing instead on qualitative aspects of psychic enjoyment? Furthermore, how does the soul, or, more macroscopically, the person, experience pleasure as a whole? Although these questions go unanswered in book 9, we

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Health and Hedonism in Plato and Epicurus

do find more of an answer in earlier books of the Republic, particularly 4 and 5, where Plato relates psychic holism to virtues that pertain to psychological consonance, the possession of which he analogizes to good health. Plato’s treatment of psychic holism and health in these books is not incidental to his treatment of pleasure later in the Republic: he links the discussions when he deliberately associates pleasure with psychic harmony in book 9. In the sections below, I examine the many arguments Plato provides in Republic 9 for the hedonic superiority of the philosophic life, focusing especially on the relation between pleasure, psychological health, and holism in his final argument for hedonic superiority in book 9. I then consider what it might mean according to Plato for the soul to experience pleasure as a whole, the crucial notion in his final argument, for which I look to his treatments of health and justice in earlier books of the Republic.

The pleasure arguments of book 9 Early in the discussion of pleasure in book 9, Socrates establishes that each of the three parts of the soul—reason, spirit, and appetite (τὸ λογιστικόν, τὸ θυμοειδές, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν)—has its own loves and its own corresponding pleasures (580dff ).3 The rational part loves truth, rather than reputation and money, and it takes pleasure in learning. Spirit pursues victory and a good reputation, and enjoys being honored. Appetite, a multifarious part, has desires for bodily goods such as food and sex, and takes pleasure in money, with which these desires can be satisfied. Corresponding to these three parts of the soul are three types of people: the philosopher, the victory lover, and the profit lover. Socrates tells Glaucon that it is fruitless to try to determine which of the three lives is most pleasant by simply asking three such people, for each will value her own life over the others; there needs to be a standard by which to judge who is right. Socrates considers the rational part to be the best judge of the pleasantness of the lives, for to it belong the best evaluative tools: experience, reason, and argument (ἐμπειρία, φρόνησις, λόγος).4 According to Socrates, a philosopher will have dabbled in the pleasures of the other two lives, while neither the victory lover nor the profit lover will have ever tasted intellectual pleasures.5 Furthermore, the philosopher was guided by reason in her experience of the lower pleasures, meaning, presumably, that she was moderate in her tasting of them; for instance, she has had the pleasure of eating without succumbing to gluttony, and the pleasure of triumph without becoming pugnacious. Lastly, the philosopher deals

The Pleasure of Psychic Harmony in the Republic

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in arguments, the best tools for judgment, rather than in wealth or profit. Thus, because the philosopher is the most equipped to make hedonic comparisons between the three lives, we should take her word for it that the life of learning and thought is the most pleasant. As Glaucon states, “A person with knowledge [ὁ φρόνιμος] at least speaks with authority when he praises his own life” (583a4– 5).6 At this point in the discussion, all Socrates has shown is that the philosopher is the best judge of which life is most pleasant; if the philosopher says that her life comes out on top, then it must be so. What this argument does not prove is why the philosophic life is most pleasant. To show this, Socrates needs to explain why the pleasures of the rational part are superior to those of the other two, and much of the rest of book 9 is taken up by this task. Socrates’ first strategy to prove reason’s hedonic superiority is to downgrade the truth and purity of the soul’s non-rational pleasures. Most pleasures, Socrates claims, are just “shadow-paintings” (τὰ ἐσκιαγραφημένη) of true ones (583b5); they are experienced by people who compare their calm, painless state to a previously painful condition.7 For instance, when the ill say that health and the cessation of suffering are the greatest pleasures, what they praise is not pleasure at all but the state of being without pain, namely, “a sort of calm of the soul [ἡσυχία]” (583c7–8), a neutral state between the motions of pleasure and pain (583e).8 Accordingly, when people descend from pleasure to a state without pain and suffering (again ἡσυχία), they find such a state to be odious and painful (583e). Socrates asserts that ἡσυχία seems to resemble a pleasure, when it is achieved after suffering, but also a pain, when it follows pleasure.9 Since what is neither of two things cannot be both of them, the appearance that ἡσυχία is either pleasant or painful must be deceptive: “There is nothing sound in these appearances (φαντασμάτων) as far as the truth about pleasure is concerned, only some kind of magic” (584a9–10). These “bastard (νόθος) pleasures” are preceded by pain and only seem pleasurable in contrast to worse states (587c1). Socrates goes on to liken the threefold classification of states—pain, pleasure, and the neutral state—to levels on a vertical line: ἡσυχία finds itself in the middle, above and below which are (genuine) pleasure and pain, respectively. Socrates asks Glaucon, Do you think someone who was brought from down below to the middle would have any other belief than that he was moving upward? And if he stood in the middle and saw where he had come from, would he believe that he was anywhere other than the upper region, since he hasn’t seen the one that is truly upper? (584d6–9)

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The vertical line image coheres with the explanation of the bastard pleasures: the sick, escaping their pain, believe they are moving upward toward pleasure; the healthy, looking back on their suffering, also believe they have moved upward to a state of pleasure. According to Plato, the higher state into which the ill believe they have come is only the middle, that is, the neutral state of freedom from pain. Some scholars, however, have a different understanding of the correspondence between the levels on the line and the states of pleasure, pain, and ἡσυχία, claiming that the lowest level corresponds to the “bastard” pleasures, the middle to the neutral state, and the higher to real, pure pleasures. Frede, for instance, situates the neutral state “‘in between’ the ‘truly upward’ motion of ‘genuine’ pleasure and the ‘bastard’ pleasure of liberation from pain” (1992: 440–41).10 However, placing the neutral state between pure and bastard pleasures leaves out a key element in the spectrum: pain itself. The state of ἡσυχία is the intermediate between pain and pure pleasure, as Socrates indicates in his explanation of the neutral state at 583c–584b and with his claim at 584e8–9 that those who are inexperienced in the truth have unsound opinions about “pleasure, pain, and the intermediate state.” Thus, the three levels are genuine pleasure, genuine pain, and the neutral state; the bastard pleasures are illusions that arise when one moves from the bottom level (genuine pain) to the middle (ἡσυχία), which means that the bastards do not have a proper place on the line. True pleasures, on the other hand, are genuine, and they do not merely seem pleasant in comparison to pains: they do not arise from pains at all and are therefore not bound up with the deceptive appearances inherent in moving from a painful state to an intermediate one. Plato’s examples, which he considers to be “especially good” specimens and uses again in the Philebus (51b–e), are the pleasures of smell: “They suddenly become inconceivably great without prior pain, and when they cease they leave no pain behind” (584b6–7, trans. modified).11 Socrates suggests that pure pleasures are not rare12 and they differ sharply from “relief from pain” (λύπης ἀπαλλαγή, 584b9–c1). The knowledgeable person can distinguish the entirely pure and true pleasures from the bastards because she has experience with both truth and pleasure (584e–585a). As far as arguments for the superiority of rational pleasures go, this one is rather untidy. For starters, it is unclear whether the bastard pleasures are actually pleasures at all. Although it may seem obvious that Socrates believes they are likenesses of pleasures rather than actual ones (mere “images” and “shadowpaintings”), his comparing them with pure pleasure implies there is something real about them. It makes no sense to distinguish real pleasures that are pure from fake pleasures that are impure, since purity is irrelevant if one of the pleasures

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is not actually a pleasure. One might argue that Plato is distinguishing two species of real pleasure, namely, those that are pure and those that are not.13 The problem, as Frede comments, lies in Plato’s failure to separate the fake pleasures from the neutral state: Plato binds their explanations together in such a way that it’s unclear whether the bastard pleasures are really just those of the neutral state or whether they constitute their own category.14 In addition, Plato does not take away from people their feeling of pleasure when they are relieved from pain. So, without an explanation of how the feeling of relief from pain is different from the feeling of ascending to true pleasure, and in the absence of a clear formulation of the metaphysical status of the bastard pleasures, the passage fails to provide an adequate evaluation of the relative worth of different types of pleasure. So we are basically back where we started: the philosopher has more experience of pleasure and truth and is therefore the best judge of the pleasantest life. We still lack a satisfactory explanation for why true pleasures are superior. And even if we had such an explanation, we would still need to know why rational pleasures are the best since Plato includes among true pleasures those that belong more properly to the body, such as smell. Socrates goes on to ask Glaucon to think about whether pleasure in general should be understood in terms of what is natural and harmonious: “being filled with what belongs to our nature is pleasant” (τὸ πληροῦσθαι τῶν φύσει προση κόντων ἡδύ ἐστι, 585d11),15 and the kinds of filling concerned with the soul are truer and share more in being than the kinds of fillings concerned with the body. Socrates elucidates this idea for Glaucon as follows: Πλήρωσις δὲ ἀληθεστέρα τοῦ ἧττον ἢ τοῦ μᾶλλον ὄντος; Δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ μᾶλλον. Πότερα οὖν ἡγῇ τὰ γένη μᾶλλον καθαρᾶς οὐσίας μετέχειν, τὰ οἷον σίτου τε καὶ ποτοῦ καὶ ὄψου καὶ συμπάσης τροφῆς, ἢ τὸ δόξης τε ἀληθοῦς εἶδος καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ καὶ συλλήβδην αὖ πάσης ἀρετῆς; ὧδε δὲ κρῖνε· τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου ἐχόμενον καὶ ἀθανάτου καὶ ἀληθείας, καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον ὂν καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ γιγνόμενον, μᾶλλον εἶναί σοι δοκεῖ, ἢ τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίου καὶ θνητοῦ, καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ γιγνόμενον. (585b9–c5) Does the truer filling up fill with what is less or what is more? Clearly, with what is more. And which kinds do you think partake more of pure being? Filling up with bread, drink, delicacies, and food in general? Or the kind of filling up that is with true belief, knowledge, understanding, and, in sum, with every virtue? Judge it this way: that which clings closely to what is always the same, immortal, and

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Since pleasure involves filling (of either the soul or the body), pleasures can be compared based on the quality of that with which a deficient subject is filled; a truer filling has a truer filler. With this statement, Plato’s case for the superiority of rational pleasures might seem to be complete, since he appears to have shown that such pleasures are the best simply because the fillings with which they correspond have the best objects. In addition, the fillings argument may allow him to claim that bodily pleasures such as eating and drinking are genuine pleasures, since they consist in filling the appetite with its appropriate object (e.g., food). Such pleasures are genuinely pleasant even if they are less pleasant than rational pleasures.16 However, the fillings argument as it is presented runs roughshod over some of Socrates’ earlier statements about pleasure and replenishment and plays fast and loose with the phrase “kinds of filling.” It is not entirely clear what Socrates means by this, but the most reasonable interpretations fail to yield the conclusion about rational pleasures that he seeks. If there is any continuity among his previous comments regarding the difference between pure and bastard pleasures, then presumably the phrase “kinds of filling” aims to differentiate fillings that are preceded by pains, which are only movements toward the cessation of pain rather than genuine pleasures, from those that “become inconceivably great without prior pain” (584b5–6). But if this is what he means, the problem remains that rational pleasures are not the only ones that count as pure, since bodily pleasures that are not preceded by pains are pure too. Thus, neither the earlier argument about bastard pleasures nor the one regarding fillers elevates rational pleasures to a class all their own. Admittedly, this explanation of Socrates’ meaning in the fillings passage at 585b11–c6 is not the most likely, given the rest of the passage, but it is instructive. It relies on the assumption that Plato is trying to maintain a consistent argument in book 9 about the superiority of reason’s pleasures, and that he isn’t sneakily switching between various conceptions of purity and impurity. In the interest of charity, I think we should avoid the conclusion that Plato successfully argues for the superiority of rational pleasures but does so by failing to be consistent in his arguments about pleasure in book 9.17 A likelier explanation of the passage is that fillings can be distinguished based on their objects: if I am filled with what is true and has being rather

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than with what is changeable, then my fillings will be truer and more real, as will my pleasures. Again, in this case we might be able to compare magnitudes of pleasures based on, as Shaw suggests, “how much they partake of being qua fulfillments with what is appropriate to us” (2016: 378). But note that this evaluation of the relative worth of fillings and their corresponding pleasures need not have anything to do with the quality of the fillings-up themselves; rather, it is the “filler”—food, drink, sex, etc.—that degrades the pleasure, not the part of the soul itself that gets filled. What Plato needs is a stronger statement to the effect that each part of the soul is inherently associated with certain fillers, such that the fillings of appetite and spirit themselves, for whatever reason, are necessarily implicated in the inferiority of their objects. I take it this is what Socrates is getting at when he claims that things “cling closely” (τὸ . . . ἐχόμενον) to their fillers in the sense that the filling-up has the same ontological status as what does the filling (585b11–c6). If reason is filled with what is real and true, then reason’s fillings are real and true; if appetite is filled with the changeable and mortal, then appetite’s fillings are changeable and mortal. But in order to prove his point, Socrates needs to make it clear here that certain fillers do not incidentally correspond to certain parts of the soul. He needs to make it explicit that only the metaphysically finest objects can fill reason and reason alone, but he does not do so in this discussion.18 Interestingly, the lower parts of the soul do seem to be related somehow to the activity of reason, for Socrates claims a little later in book 9 that they can “follow knowledge and argument” (αἱ μέν, ἂν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ λόγῳ ἑπόμεναι, 586d5–6),19 and it is not entirely clear that Plato is committed to the idea that rational states are completely stable and changeless.20 Moreover, it is difficult to see how fillings that are concerned with the care of the soul, which Socrates asserts are superior to other kinds of fillings, are not preceded by pain and thus deceptive just like the “bastard” pleasures he discussed earlier in book 9. He claims that ignorance and lack of sense are “empty states of the soul” (585b3–4), and someone who learns is “filled” (585b6).21 Hence, even rational pleasures seem to consist in relief from pain, and in this respect they are no better than any other pleasures. In the Philebus, Plato evades this objection by means of a perception requirement: deficiencies preceding impure pleasures are perceived, whereas those preceding pure pleasures go unnoticed (51a–52b). But Plato does not employ such perception language in the Republic, making it difficult to discern how rational pleasures, which are themselves the products of fillings, come out ahead of the others.22

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One might argue that Socrates has softened his earlier position that the feeling of relief from pain is not a genuine pleasure (583b–585a), and is committed now to the theory about the quality of fillers and fillings (585b–e). According to the fillings argument, both appetitive and rational pleasures are genuine and measurable in term of magnitude. In support of this, one might turn to Shaw’s claim that the fillings argument concerns bodily pleasures such as eating (“mixed pleasures”), whereas the earlier argument about the “bastards” concerns pleasures that are confused in various ways with the process of relieving pain or with a pain-free state.23 This interpretation will make Socrates’ argument for the hedonic superiority of the just life more coherent, since his argument will rest on a comparison between different kinds of genuine pleasures—rational ones versus all the others—rather than on a comparison between genuine pleasures and fake ones. However, I am not convinced that Socrates does not identify bodily pleasures such as eating (a so-called genuine pleasure) with bastard pleasures. Immediately after the fillings argument, Socrates refers to the bodily pleasures enjoyed by the unvirtuous, particularly those of eating and having sex, asking Glaucon, “Then isn’t it necessary for these people to live with pleasures that are mixed with pains, mere images [εἰδώλοις] and shadow-paintings [ἐσκιαγραφημέναις] of true pleasures?” (586b7–c1). There is no reason to think that the bodily pleasures of the unvirtuous are not fillings, yet Socrates describes such pleasures in the same way that he does the bastards—as “images” and “shadow-paintings.” In this same discussion, he describes the pleasures of the unvirtuous using the image of the vertical line he introduced earlier to explain the bastards: Those who have no experience of reason or virtue, but are always occupied with feasts and the like, are brought down and then back up to the middle, as it seems, and wander in this way throughout their lives, never reaching beyond this to what is truly higher up, never looking up at it or being brought up to it, and so they aren’t filled with that which really is and never taste any stable or pure pleasure. (586a2–5)

Socrates here mixes his metaphors: the “fillings” image appears alongside the “up,” “down,” and “middle” image from 583b–585a, which strongly suggests that fillings are being grouped with the (fake) pleasures stemming from relief from pain. On this score, mental fillings still do no better than bodily ones since the former, like the latter, seem to stem from some sort of relief from pain.24 However, James Warren has recently argued based on the Republic and Philebus that Plato does not believe rational pleasures are painful per se; they

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can be acquired painlessly in an ideal educational environment, such as that described in the Republic, where learners are eased into difficult subjects and there is “an assured, if far from universal, level of success” (2014: 32). On this view, the process of acquiring knowledge is indeed a filling, but it is not necessarily a relief from pain. In addition, Warren denies that Plato believes all rational pleasures are those of learning (ἡδονὴν . . . τὴν τοῦ μανθάνειν, Rep. 581d2): Plato also has Socrates describe a painless pleasure of knowing or contemplation (τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἡδονῆς, Rep. 582a10–b1; τῆς δὲ τοῦ ὄντες θέας, οἵαν ἡδονὴν ἔχει, Rep. 582c7–8). But as Warren points out, Plato fails to provide an account of pleasures of knowing in the Republic; indeed, Socrates hardly ever mentions such pleasures in the dialogue, leaving it unclear how they fit into book 9’s arguments, which are focused on pleasure’s relationship to the removal of pain. For clues to understanding pleasures of knowing in the Republic, Warren looks to an important distinction in the Philebus between remembering knowledge one has forgotten and calling to mind knowledge that is not presently being used (Phil. 34b–c). The former is painful if one is aware of the memory lapse, but the latter is not. According to Warren, if we import this account into the Republic, we can understand why rational pleasures win out and thus why the philosophic life is hedonically superior to the other two lives. The philosophers described in the Republic will derive great pleasure from bringing to mind and considering the Forms, the knowledge of which is not forgotten but simply needs to be recalled from memory. Warren explains as follows: The philosopher will turn his attention back to this or that Form or consider how the Forms are related to one another. Whatever he does, precisely, it is reasonable to think that it involves a change of a kind in his soul, the bringing to mind of latent knowledge, and is therefore something we can readily classify as an intellectual pleasure. These pleasures are both plausibly imagined as kinēseis and, furthermore, are related directly to his being a philosopher-ruler. (2014: 49)

The philosopher’s pleasure of recalling knowledge does not necessarily originate from pain, making this pleasure superior to the “bastards.” In addition, this pleasure is exclusive to philosophers, since they are the only ones who have the intelligence and educational background to contemplate the Forms. Although I agree with Warren that Plato does recognize pleasures of knowing, it remains the case that Plato does not make any significant use of them in his arguments in Republic 9 for the hedonic superiority of the philosophic life. The focal points of book 9 are the mental and physical pleasures of filling and the relief from pain, but not pure pleasures of knowing. That the philosophic

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life should prove to be the most pleasant based on pleasures that receive only cursory reference in the dialogue would be odd indeed. Moreover, the fact that the account of painless pleasures of memory in the Philebus may shed light on philosophic pleasure in the Republic does not make up for the argumentative shortcomings of the pleasure arguments of Republic 9. Even if the philosophic life were hedonically superior because it includes pleasures of knowing, it remains the case that the philosophic life as depicted in the Republic also includes painful pleasures of learning. Although we may agree with Warren that Plato thinks such pleasures are not painful per se, nowhere in book 9 does Socrates describe learning itself as a painless pleasure; on the contrary, Socrates repeatedly connects pleasures of learning with the painful experiences that precede them. This is seen quite clearly in the allegory of the cave, which vividly depicts the pain involved in acquiring knowledge.25 Even if knowledge is painless in ideal environments, real philosophers do not operate in ideal environments; as Socrates often tells us, education is a struggle, a fact that his interlocutors know all too well. If Plato is appealing to an ideal version of pleasures of learning in order to prove the hedonic superiority of the philosophic life, then his proof holds true only for philosophers operating in ideal environments; in other words, it will be only hypothetically the case that the philosopher’s life is more pleasant than all others. But it is hard to believe that Plato intends his conclusions about the pleasantness of the philosophic life to be hypothetical, given that he so often appeals to the practical realities of such a life when discussing its pleasures—particularly the reality that learning is a painful, burdensome endeavor.26

The final pleasure argument So far in book 9 Plato has argued for the hedonic superiority of the philosophic life by attempting to show that the pleasures of the rational part are truer, purer, and more real than those of the other psychic parts. In other words, his approach has been to demonstrate the superiority of the philosophic life by demonstrating the ontological superiority of rational pleasures themselves. Toward the end of the discussion of pleasure in book 9, he begins to take a different tack. There, Socrates suggests that all three parts of the soul experience their own highest pleasures only when reason is in charge: θαρροῦντες λέγωμεν ὅτι καὶ περὶ τὸ φιλοκερδὲς καὶ τὸ φιλόνικον ὅσαι ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσίν, αἱ μέν, ἂν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ λόγῳ ἑπόμεναι καὶ μετὰ τούτων τὰς ἡδονὰς διώκουσαι, ἃς ἂν τὸ φρόνιμον ἐξηγῆται, λαμβάνωσι, τὰς ἀληθεστάτας τε

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λήψονται, ὡς οἷόν τε αὐταῖς ἀληθεῖς λαβεῖν, ἅτε ἀληθείᾳ ἑπομένων, καὶ τὰς ἑαυτῶν οἰκείας, εἴπερ τὸ βέλτιστον ἑκάστῳ, τοῦτο καὶ οἰκειότατον; Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, οἰκειότατόν γε. Τῷ φιλοσόφῳ ἄρα ἑπομένης ἁπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ μὴ στασιαζούσης ἑκάστῳ τῷ μέρει ὑπάρχει εἴς τε τἆλλα τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν καὶ δικαίῳ εἶναι, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον καὶ τὰς βελτίστας καὶ εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν τὰς ἀληθεστάτας καρποῦσθαι. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. (586d4–87a2) Then can we not confidently assert that those desires of even the money-loving and honor-loving parts that follow knowledge and argument and pursue with their help those pleasures that reason prescribes will attain the truest pleasures possible for them, because they follow truth, and the ones that are most their own, if indeed what is best for each thing is most its own? And indeed, [Glaucon] said, it is most fitting. Therefore, when the entire soul follows the philosophic part, and there is no rebellion in it, each part of it does its own work exclusively and is just, and in particular it enjoys its own pleasures, the best and truest pleasures possible for it. Absolutely. (Trans. modified)

Only the rational part can create proper order in the soul, which results in each psychic part minding its own business and enjoying its own pleasures without forcing the others to pursue what is “alien and untrue” (587a5).27 What Plato is suggesting is that the philosophic life—achieved when the whole soul is guided by the rational part—is the most pleasant not necessarily because such a life features more of the ontologically best kinds of pleasures than any other life (though certainly it must) but because the philosophic life leads to pleasure for the whole soul. Hedonic superiority thus comes down to psychic harmony and holism: the pleasantest life belongs to one whose soul is free of civil war, each part working at its best on its own proper task. This explanation surpasses the others in that it avoids the sticky theories about purity, truth, being, and filling, all of which complicated the earlier arguments. However, it is still rather undeveloped: In what sense does the whole soul reap the hedonic benefits of rational rule? As a start, several of Socrates’ statements in book 9 suggest that pleasure in the best soul is compartmentalized: the psychic parts pursue pleasures that are “most their own,” since what is most properly their own is best for each one. This could mean that each part pursues what satisfies its own desires, such that the hedonic benefit of rational rule amounts to reason, spirit, and appetite being able to pursue

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pleasures independently of one another. But although Socrates undoubtedly talks about the soul and city as three distinct, independently motivated elements (as he does in much of book 4), he is also keen to emphasize that the best soul and the best city exhibit a unity, particularly when it comes to pleasure. In book 5, when Socrates discusses the legislator’s aims in designing the best city, he explains to Glaucon that maintaining civic unity is the highest priority. Socrates claims about this city, “Whenever anything good or bad happens to a single one of its citizens, such a city above all others will say that the affected part is its own and will share in the pleasure or pain as a whole [συνησθήσεται ἅπασα ἢ συλλυπήσεται]” (462d8–e2). What the city should guard against, he claims, is the privatization of pleasures among its parts—when one part of the city enjoys the very same thing by which another is pained (462a–c). When each part of the city defines what is its own independently of the whole—“whenever such words as ‘mine’ and ‘not mine’ aren’t used in unison” (462c2–4)—the city begins to dissolve. Its greatest good, on the other hand, is that which “binds it together and makes it one” (συνδῇ τε καὶ ποιῇ μίαν, 462b1–2). Citizens effect unity when they share pleasures and pains in common, in relation to “the same successes and failures” (462b5–6). Civic and psychic parts, then, should not frame their pursuit of pleasure in terms of what best satisfies their own individual desires; rather, their individual hedonic pursuits should align with those of the whole. Those parts that are not able or not willing to consider the soul holistically will obviously need direction from those parts that are, but this “direction” should not involve one part inflicting pain on another so as to secure its own pleasure28 since this will privatize pleasure and create disorder. The hedonic benefit that Socrates mentions in the passage concerning the pleasure of the whole soul (Rep. 586d4–87a2) must amount to something other than enabling each psychic part to pursue its own pleasures: the parts of the best soul share their pleasures in common. But what does it mean for the whole soul to have pleasure? Given that each part of the soul has its own distinct pleasures, many of which Plato believes are ontologically and morally suspect, how could the soul possibly enjoy anything as a whole?

The pleasure of the soul as a whole: Health, harmony, and justice As I discussed earlier, the harmony engendered in the soul as a result of reason’s governance is crucial to making sense of the hedonic superiority of the rational

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part. I want to take this a step further and suggest that harmony is also crucial to understanding how the soul experiences pleasure as a whole. The pleasure of the whole soul is of psychic harmony; in other words, the intentional object of the whole soul’s pleasure is the consonance among its parts, which, I contend, results in a state of mental health characterized by peace and contentment. The harmony, and thus the pleasure, emerges as a result of a certain arrangement among the psychic parts; consequently, the pleasure does not belong to only one element, and it is not the sum of the quantities of each element’s pleasure. In the Republic, Socrates often talks about properties and experiences that belong to the soul or city as a whole. The passages I discussed earlier from book 5 suggest that the parts of the city “bind together” to rejoice in common. This involves more than each part rejoicing on its own; Plato ascribes pleasure to the city as a unit. A pleasure emerges, so to speak, from the shared activity of the aggregate, and it therefore belongs not to any single part or person but to the whole. In this way, pleasure is like health in an organism: we might say that individual parts of an organism are healthy, but when we say that a person is healthy we do not just add up the health of all the organs. Instead, we make a holistic, qualitative assessment that does not amount to summing up the quantity of healthy parts. In book 4 Plato relates health and justice, a virtue that is closely related to pleasure in the Republic because both concern psychic harmony, which, as we saw, is bound up with Plato’s justification of the hedonic superiority of the philosophic life. Virtue, Socrates tells his interlocutors, is “a kind of health, fine condition, and well-being of the soul” (ἀρετὴ . . . ὑγίειά τέ τις ἂν εἴη καὶ κά λ λος καὶ εὐεξία ψ υχῆς, 444d13–e1);29 the components of a healthy body are “in a natural relation of control and being controlled, one by another” (444d3–4), functioning under a harmonious order that engenders overall wellness. Like organic health, justice is holistic and involves harmony: we say that a person is just when the soul’s parts are focused on their own tasks and not meddling. But notice that Plato describes being just as more than simply having a soul whose parts do their own job: the just person “puts himself in order, is his own friend, and harmonizes the three parts of himself like three limiting notes in a musical scale—high, low, and middle. He binds together those parts and any others there may be in between, and from having been many things he becomes entirely one, moderate and harmonious [πάντα ταῦτα σ υνδήσαντα καὶ παντάπασιν ἕνα γενόμενον ἐκ πολ λῶν, σώφρονα καὶ ἡρμοσμένον]” (443d4– e2). Proper order among the soul’s parts, then, is a condition of justice (and

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thus also of harmony) but does not constitute justice; justice is a property that reflects the overall functioning of the soul as a whole, just as ‘wellness’ reflects this in the body.30 Justice and health are linked, via harmony, to pleasure, which also belongs to the soul as a unit. We know from Socrates’ final argument in book 9 for reason’s hedonic superiority that the whole soul experiences pleasure when reason rules: reason harmonizes the parts of the soul by guiding them with knowledge and argument (586dff ). Although the lower parts can become hegemonic, Socrates claims that doing so is hedonically disadvantageous for them in the long run: when a non-rational part controls the soul, “it won’t be able to secure its own pleasure and will compel the other parts to pursue an alien and untrue pleasure” (587a4–6). Socrates made a similar claim about the tyrant earlier in book 9, noting that the tyrant’s whole soul, and not just his dominant psychic part, is “least likely to do what it wants and, forcibly driven by the stings of a dronish gadfly, will be full of disorder [ταραχῆς] and regret” (577d13–e2). Lack of rational rule engenders disorder and dissonance in the soul, rendering it unable to satisfy its best desires. Some parts of the soul might achieve satisfaction in the absence of rational rule, but the gratification will be short-lived and self-defeating. We can analogize such a soul to an addict, who subordinates reason to her habit and turns her attention exclusively toward satisfying her craving.31 The addict’s behavior is ultimately self-defeating: in the long run, she achieves less of what she wants since her body, her mind, her relationships with others—her whole life, essentially—deteriorates, thus minimizing her pleasure. What the rationally ordered life has to offer is, in part, freedom from tyrannous desires, which breed conflict in the soul and obstruct reason’s attempts to harmonize the psychic parts. The perilous consequences of psychic tyranny are vividly depicted in the image of the hydra near the end of Republic 9: when the soul—likened to a human, a lion, and a many-headed beast all wrapped up in the form of a human—is unjust, the beast is fed and the human is starved (588e). The unjust person does not properly govern his soul: he finds it beneficial “to leave the parts to bite and kill one another rather than accustoming them to each other and making them friendly” (589a2–4). This soul will get nothing it wants, since it is utterly dysfunctional and discordant. When the soul is governed rationally and is free of tyranny—that is, when it is harmonious and healthy, and the human inside coaxes the hydra and lion to “be friends with each other and with himself ” (589b5)—it experiences pleasure and is just.

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Like justice and health, the pleasure of the whole soul does not belong to certain individual parts, nor is it simply the aggregate of each of the three parts’ pleasure. In addition, Plato is not suggesting that each part will maximize its pleasure as a result of being rationally governed. Each of the lower parts of the soul will not receive more pleasure by following reason, since rational domination involves, to a certain extent, subduing non-rational desires that could be harmful to the soul as a whole. This may mean that appetite, for instance, will end up satisfying less of its desires if it submits to reason.32 However, reason will not necessarily inflict pain on appetite in order to bring about rational pleasure— we saw Socrates’ injunction in book 5 against one psychic part rejoicing at the expense of another33—but it does mean that each individual psychic element will be unable to satisfy its own desires as much as it would like.34 Indeed, if an addict conceives of her pleasure in terms of the satisfaction of appetitive desire, it will be quite difficult to convince her that she can maximize her pleasure by ‘listening to reason’ and curtailing the harmful desires that consume her life. Reason exercises normative control over appetite and spirit: it guides them toward what they should want, not necessarily toward what they do want. And they should want to be moderate and obedient to reason in order to engender harmony, an object of pleasure for the soul. From the perspective of the lower parts of the soul, then, the hedonic benefit of the philosophic life must be measured qualitatively, not quantitatively. The non-rational parts may believe they can satisfy more of their own desires and thus bring themselves more of their own pleasures by being self-governed; to them, submitting to rational rule may mean opting for a better pleasure for the whole soul rather than achieving more pleasure for themselves individually. Now, as we saw, Socrates claims that souls lacking rational order will fail to achieve what they desire: the disorder created in the soul by non-rational rule eventually renders the soul impotent. But the pleasure of psychic harmony belongs to the whole soul rather than to any particular part, and it does require that certain desires go unfulfilled, possibly including those of the rational part itself, if reason’s governance of the soul may detract from the theoretical activities from which it derives its pleasure. Plato never presents a hedonistic calculus by which one might determine whether the soul as a whole achieves a greater net pleasure by controlling the desires of the lower parts and achieving psychic harmony. He provides no mechanism by which to compute whether the soul as a whole achieves a greater quantity of pleasure when, say, reason or appetite steamrolls the other parts and pursues only what it desires, rather than when reason maintains harmony among

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the parts and allows them a moderate amount of satisfaction. And this, I argue, is because Plato does not think of the hedonic benefit of rational rule in terms of points; rather, he thinks of it in terms of psychic harmony. Notice that in Plato’s final argument for the hedonic superiority of the philosophic life in book 9, he refrains from having Socrates claim that the profit-loving and victory-loving parts will attain more pleasure as a result of rational rule; rather, Socrates claims, twice, that each part will achieve better pleasures, “the best and truest pleasures possible for it” (586e6–87a1). It should be noted, however, that Socrates does suggest that the life of the philosopher king is quantitatively more pleasant than that of the tyrant. The calculation, which is notoriously convoluted, results in the king living 729 times more pleasantly than the tyrant, and the tyrant 729 times more wretchedly than the king (587e). As Nicholas White remarks, this passage might suggest that Plato is concerned about the total amount of pleasure the soul achieves as a result of rational rule, such that its hedonic benefit is the maximization of pleasure for the soul.35 However, as White goes on to remark, nowhere else in the Republic does Socrates discuss psychic pleasure in this way, and the dialogue often considers the soul’s pleasure in terms of a balance of satisfaction among the parts, as I discussed. This leads White to conclude that, when writing the Republic, Plato had not yet made up his mind about pleasure in the soul. That is, Plato was not sure whether to conceive of psychic pleasure in terms of maximization, and thus quantitatively, or in terms of balance and harmony, and thus qualitatively. However, Socrates’ comparison of the quantitative pleasure of the kingly and tyrannical lives is so over the top as to be utterly ridiculous, with the result that it does not seriously call into question the claim that Plato is emphasizing the quality rather than the quantity of the soul’s pleasure in his arguments for reason’s hedonic superiority. Indeed, it is difficult to see the cash value from an ethical standpoint of such a quantitative comparison of pleasure: if you, a philosopher, tell me, a cobbler, that your pleasure is 500 times greater than mine, not only would this tell me nothing about what it must be like to have a pleasure of that magnitude or why your pleasure is better than mine but it is also hard to believe that such a grand calculation is possible in the first place. What, exactly, are the ‘pleasure units’ required for the sum? In Plato’s ‘calculation’ in book 9, there are in fact no ‘pleasure units’: Socrates arrives at 729 by first counting the tyrant’s distance from the king in the ranking of psychic constitutions and then performing some “squaring and cubing” (587d9–10). But even in this calculation of quantity, the distance between the constitutions is understood

The Pleasure of Psychic Harmony in the Republic

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qualitatively, as having to do with how true their respective pleasures are. And I believe this is more intuitive, since our everyday quantitative comparisons reflect this same dependence on qualitative justifications. For instance, if I told you that my life is more pleasant than yours because I have a million dollars and you have only a penny, my pleasure would consist not in simply having a certain quantity of money, but in what can be done with the money. I may, for example, earn respect and fame, or be able to buy things that provide me with sensory or intellectual pleasure. In other words, the pleasantness of my life is not explained by saying that I possess a quantity of something; it is explained with reference to qualitative factors. It is therefore doubtful that the relative pleasantness of the philosophic life can be expressed in a number. Glaucon too seems dubious about Socrates’ calculation of the hedonic value of lives: it is “clear to a mathematician, at any rate,” he responds (587d11). In short, the calculation is meaningless because it fails to tell us why the pleasures of one life are better than another, an issue we can be certain interests Plato given his earlier arguments about pleasure in book 9. The hedonic benefit of the philosophic life is not the maximization of the pleasure of any one individual psychic part or even the maximization of the pleasure of the soul as a whole, but the pleasure of having a healthy and harmonious soul. The lives of the profit lover and the victory lover lack this benefit since they are not rationally led. But what does it mean for a person to enjoy having a healthy soul? How does this pleasure manifest itself in the macro? As several scholars have rightly pointed out, for Plato this pleasure is not characterized by a particular feeling or sentiment that comes over, as it were, the harmoniously ordered person; the pleasure is not episodic in nature.36 After all, my taking pleasure in my psychic health does not necessarily entail that I sit here every moment considering how I feel. Rather, I can have a general sense of wellness that does not manifest itself in the form of any particular thought or sensation.37 By linking the pleasantest life with health, Plato indicates that the former, like the latter, should be thought of holistically, in terms of the overall functioning and order of a soul leading such a life. The pleasure of psychic health manifests itself in the soul’s ability to pursue its good without internal conflict— to be free of the inner strife that frustrates its efforts to achieve its goals. And, according to Plato, only the rationally ordered life exhibits such optimal psychic functioning. As Annas explains, “Reason in this role is what organizes and harmonizes other motives and makes it possible for us to attain all or most of our important ends without conflict” (1981: 133).

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The person who lives the rationally ordered life is content and at peace: she pursues activities conducive to mental and physical well-being, makes decisions confidently and without anxiety, and is fulfilled by her projects. When one enjoys these elements of the good life, it is a sign that one’s psyche is rationally ordered;38 to be mentally at peace and content is to take pleasure in one’s healthy soul. This idea is not far from many of our own everyday notions of mental health, which we tend to think entails having a temperate and ordered life, being satisfied by one’s endeavors, and living without mental disturbance. It is also familiar from the Gorgias, where Socrates claims, in opposition to Callicles’ position that living pleasantly entails satisfying one’s appetites as much as possible, that the best life belongs to people who regulate and order their desires and cease to worry about them once they are satisfied (491e5ff ).39 On Plato’s view, being free of mental turmoil—being at peace and content—is a hallmark of the most pleasant life. And since only rational governance can produce mental health, its enjoyment belongs only to the philosopher, whose life is therefore hedonically superior. Thus, for Plato the most pleasant life centers on the harmonious and healthy functioning of the soul, which comes down to being at peace and impervious to mental strife. However, the Republic represents only one facet of Plato’s attempts to articulate the nature of the relation between health and pleasure: in the Republic, Plato treats primarily the mental aspects of this relation, and gives short shrift to the bodily. Plato takes up physical health and physical pleasure in the Philebus, which we turn to next. Taken together, these dialogues form part of a trajectory in antiquity—one in which the Epicureans also occupied a central place—to consider health and pleasure in terms of the functioning of the entire organism, both body and soul.

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Restorative Pleasure and the Neutral State of Health in the Philebus

Early in the Philebus, Socrates sets the agenda for his short discussion with the dialogue’s eponymous interlocutor and his longer discussion with Protarchus, Philebus’ stand-in: pleasure and knowledge are significant factors in our thinking about the best human life, and some sort of extensive analysis is necessary to discern the various types of pleasure and knowledge and their distinct contributions to human happiness. Yet it is only after a series of stops and starts that Socrates and his interlocutors hit upon a viable route: of the two contenders, pleasure and reason, it must be examined “in what each of them is and on account of what condition they come to be when they come to be” (31b2–4). Socrates and Protarchus design their investigation not in order to determine whether first prize goes to pleasure or reason, but to determine which element will go home with second prize, having agreed among themselves that the best life and winner is a combination of both pleasure and reason.1 With the understanding that they seek the element that makes the combined life good, Socrates puts his money on reason (22cff ); in his eyes, pleasure will not even receive third prize, since it will follow after the mixed life, the cause of the mixture’s goodness, and reason (22d4–e3). Protarchus, who ostensibly takes over the hedonist position from Philebus, refuses to let Socrates go without a thorough evaluation of which element under discussion is or is most akin to what makes the mixed life good. The rest of the dialogue is taken up with this task, resulting in an extensive classification of types of pleasure and knowledge that leads to the final ranking of contributors to the good life in the dialogue’s last pages.2 Plato begins his critical and sinuous examination of pleasure in the Philebus by employing a restoration model, in which pleasure is linked to the restoration of a living organism to its natural state.3 Whether Plato describes all forms of the

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two main kinds of pleasure in the dialogue—(i) the mixed pleasures (μειχθεῖσαι ἡδοναί) of the soul, the body, and the soul and body together, and (ii) the unmixed pleasures (ἀμείκτοι ἡδοναί)—using this same model is disputed.4 I do not intend to make claims here about the applicability of the restoration model to all the pleasures Plato describes in the Philebus; rather, I aim to consider his claim that a large class of pleasures, namely, those of the body, can be conceptualized in relation to organic health. The Philebus brings to the fore a tension in ancient thinking about pleasure—a tension that originated perhaps within the Academy itself—concerning pleasure’s relation to health: Is pleasure a process toward healthy functioning or is it the state of healthy functioning itself? Or is it perhaps neither? For ancient thinkers, these were rather thorny issues. As we will see in the Philebus, pleasure’s status in relation to health is both ontologically and morally significant: if pleasure is a process toward health rather than an end, then it belongs to the realm of becoming rather than that of being, and so it cannot, on Plato’s view, qualify as good in itself. Clearly, much is at stake for the hedonist in this dispute: Plato aims to diminish the goodness of pleasure by employing a certain description of pleasure’s nature. Such an attack on hedonism, based as it is on physiology, was fertile ground for Epicurus, who also linked pleasure with health, as I argue in later chapters. Essential to discerning the philosophical connections between Plato and Epicurus’ respective treatments of pleasure are certain key notions in the Philebus. First, Plato is actively working to distance pleasure from the absence of pain in the body (a position that Epicurus will argue against), and he does so by means of a perception requirement that he introduces in the dialogue’s second discussion of a neutral state between pleasure and pain (42b–44b). Such a neutral state, it turns out, is not a state in which an organism is physically undisturbed, as Socrates and his main interlocutor Protarchus claim at first, but a state in which disturbances go unperceived.5 The perception requirement and Socrates’ subsequent modification of the neutral state are crucial to his contention that a neutral state of freedom from pain is not a pleasure. This is an issue that a hedonist such as Epicurus, who attempts to equate pleasure and the absence of pain, must consider. Second, the neutral state of absence of pain, which Socrates so vehemently denies is a pleasure, is synonymous with the condition of health—that is, the proper combination of elements in an organism that suffers no disturbances in organic functioning large enough to be perceived. According to the Philebus,

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what accounts for a healthy person’s lack of awareness of sizable disturbances is precisely the lack of sizable disturbances. Although we can imagine a person being blissfully unaware of major disturbances occurring in her organism, Plato would not call her healthy, since her organism continues to be disrupted despite her obliviousness. Indeed, the Philebus employs a sophisticated physiology to explain the interplay between perception and different kinds of change in an organism. In addition, in the Philebus the state of health itself is not pleasant; rather, pleasure is to be found in the process of attaining the organic balance characteristic of health. Several passages in the dialogue support this conclusion, including the division of beings in the universe, Plato’s physiological description of bodily pleasure, and the process argument (which I discuss in the following chapter). In the present chapter, I work to draw these scattered pieces of the dialogue together into a coherent narrative about the relation between health and pleasure in the Philebus. I begin by analyzing Plato’s account of the relation between pleasure, health, and the fourfold division of all things, an account found in the metaphysical passages early in the dialogue (roughly, 11a–31b). Next, I turn to the connections between pleasure, pain, organic restoration, and organic destruction in the dialogue’s restoration model, and I consider a crucial modification Socrates makes to this model in his discussion of the neutral state between pleasure and pain, a modification which enables him to deny that a neutral state is pleasurable.

Pleasure, health, and the fourfold division of beings Early in the Philebus, Socrates and Protarchus fail twice to discover whether pleasure or reason is most responsible for the goodness of the happy life. Their first failure results from their efforts to identify the many varieties of pleasure and knowledge and to determine why each possesses a definite unity, and the second results from their conclusion that neither pleasure nor reason wins first prize in the contest, since no one would choose to live with only one of the two elements. Without knowledge, the hedonist would be unable to remember, be aware of, or anticipate pleasure; without pleasure, the lover of knowledge would, for reasons that Socrates fails to specify, lead an undesirable life (21d–e).6 After these failures, Socrates and his interlocutors shift gear. Claiming they need a “different device” to settle the issue, Socrates proposes a method of division of everything that exists (τὰ ὄντα) into four kinds (εἴδη): (i) unlimitedness (τὸ

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ἄπειρον), (ii) limit (τὸ πέρας), (iii) what results from their mixture (τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τούτοιν ἕν τι συμμισγόμενον), and (iv) the mixture’s cause (αἰτία) (23c4–27c2). As becomes clear, pleasure and reason belong to different categories of the fourfold division, and reason’s kind is superior. Although it may not seem like it at first, the fourfold division of all beings is an extension of Socrates’ earlier attempt to carry out the “divine method” of collection and division by discerning unities and pluralities: peras (limit) and apeiron (unlimitedness) are dispersed into many things, and they must be collected into a unity.7 Despite Socrates’ claim that collection and division have become unnecessary to their investigation (20c), these are precisely what he aims to pursue with his fourfold division, starting with the unity and plurality of the apeiron: as he reminds Protarchus during their discussion of the many varieties of apeira, their discussion relies on their earlier principle that “for whatever is scattered and separated, we must try to gather together and indicate some single nature [μίαν . . . τινα φύσιν] as far as we can” (25a2–3). Members of the apeiron, such as hot and cold, dry and wet, admit of more and less and possess no definite quantity, being always in flux (προχωρεῖ, 24b10–d7). The more and less reside in members of the apeiron and render them infinitely divisible; if the members ceased to fluctuate, they would be no more. Flux is thus no minor feature of apeira; the fact that they never stay put explains why they are endless and, on Plato’s view, why they are unlimited.8 Furthermore, Socrates claims that members of the apeiron contain opposites—hotter and colder, for example— whose conflict is ended by the imposition of peras (25e).9 ‘Equal’ and ‘double’ are given as examples of limits, as is anything that represents a relation between quantities (25a6–b3). By imposing a definite number and measure on apeira, peras stops the ceaseless fluctuation between opposites that members of the apeiron undergo. As Amber Carpenter explains, mixtures acquire any identity at all because peras unifies and particularizes their indefinite components; in addition, mixtures can be appraised only when they exist as a definite something that can be compared to other definite somethings to form a standard of reference for what counts as a good mixture.10 Because peras brings an end to hostilities, so to speak, between opposing elements, it is said to make them “proportional and harmonious” (σύμμετρα δὲ καὶ σύμφωνα, 25e1). It is important to note that harmony belongs to the mixture of peras and apeiron—the third division of beings in the universe—rather than to either of these two kinds in themselves. The right combination of opposites in the mixture turns out to be responsible for many “fine things,” including the seasons, musical consonance, and health

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(25e7–26c2). Health (ὑγίεια) is thus placed in the third division, that of good mixtures. A little later in the dialogue, Socrates claims there is a “natural combination of limit and unlimitedness that comes to be in a living thing” (τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἀπείρου καὶ πέρατος κατὰ φύσιν ἔμψυχον γεγονὸς εἶδος, 32a9–b1), and I take it that he is drawing on his previous discussion of the good mixture: health is a condition in which opposites—in this case, opposite members of peras and apeiron rather than opposite members of apeiron itself, such as hotter and colder11—are naturally harmonized, presumably by the hand of the mixture’s cause, the craftsman (δημιουργός) who produces the proper combination (27a5–b2). Moreover, it is apparent from the first discussion of bodily pleasure in the dialogue (beginning at 31d4) that health’s combination of metaphysical opposites constitutes the nature of a living organism. Although we have yet to see how this metaphysical conception of health cashes out physiologically, we can see that Plato conceives of health in terms of natural harmony and balance. As something that admits of “more and less,” pleasure belongs to the apeiron and thus is always in flux: “Pleasure itself is unlimited [ἡδονὴ δὲ ἄπειρός] and belongs to that kind that in itself neither has nor will ever have a beginning, middle, or end [μήτε ἀρχὴν μήτε μέσα μήτε τέλος]” (31a8–10).12 As a member of the apeiron pleasure never stands still, an idea that appeals very much to Philebus, the spokesperson for hedonism at this point in the dialogue. He eagerly includes pleasure in the class of the unlimited, since pleasure will not be “altogether good if it should not happen to be naturally unlimited in quantity and degree” (27e7–9). But as Socrates instructs Philebus, boundlessness cannot account for the goodness of pleasure since pain is also boundless, being a member of the unlimited, yet pain is thought to be “altogether bad” (λύπη πᾶν κακόν, 28a1). If pleasure has any stake in the good, its goodness must not be derived from its boundlessness. Thus, Socrates’ and Philebus’ philosophical differences stem from their divergent views on the role of maximization in the ontology and goodness of pleasure. For Socrates, the nature of pleasure is intimately bound up with maximization, which is precisely why Philebus believes pleasure is the highest good. But Socrates sees that in this case ontology does not carry over into ethics, since maximization can account for the goodness of pleasure no more than it can for the nonexistent goodness of pain. As in the Republic, Socrates is uninterested in quantitative assessments of pleasure; what matters instead is the quality. Although Philebus is purported to be the hedonist in this dispute, it is in fact Socrates, with his claims about the relation between pleasure’s goodness and its

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maximizability, who presents a position similar to Epicurus’. As I will discuss in later chapters, Epicurus asserts that boundlessness cannot account for the goodness of pleasure since pleasure is not in fact boundless. Epicurus is clear that there is a limit to the magnitude of pleasure: its quantity cannot be increased beyond the absence of pain, and pleasure does not increase in magnitude with unlimited time.13 In addition, he tends to advocate that we avoid unlimited things, such as wealth, since they cannot be easily satisfied.14 Although Epicurus would disagree with the view that pleasure is a member of the apeiron, he would nevertheless agree that unlimited quantity is not an essential element of the highest good.

The restoration model The metaphysical nature of health and pleasure becomes relatively more concrete as Plato integrates the notion of harmony and movement into his physiological description of pleasure and pain. Socrates claims that there exists a harmony (ἁρμονία) or natural balance in the functioning of a living organism, a natural state of health (ὑγίεια) and bodily integrity. When this harmony is disrupted, the organism begins to disintegrate and pain arises (31d4–6). Conversely, when harmony is in the process of being reinstated, pleasure arises (31d8–9). A little later, Socrates reinforces his definitions of pleasure and pain, noting, “it has now been said repeatedly” that pain arises as a result of various processes disruptive to the natural functioning of the organism, be they combinations (συγκρίσεις), separations (διακρίσεις), processes of emptying, decay, or growth (42c9–d3). He goes on to reinforce the definition of pleasure (after emphasizing again the frequency that the definition has been mentioned): “But when things are restored [καθιστῆται] to their own nature, this restoration [κατάστασιν] is pleasure, as we accepted among ourselves” (42d5–7). Here Socrates introduces the restoration model: pleasure arises in the process of the body’s restoration (κατάστασις) to its natural state, and pain arises in the process of the destruction of that state. Pleasure’s membership in the class of unlimited things manifests itself physiologically in its association with movement toward proper functioning: pleasure in general is associated with movement and change, and bodily pleasure specifically is linked to the process of achieving organic health. A similar description of pleasure and pain appears briefly in the Timaeus: the human organism has a natural state characterized by a lack of sizable

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displacement of its elements. When an organism is affected by a larger mass, a sizable disturbance is transmitted through the body to the immortal soul (φρόνιμον), which determines the cause of the disturbance (64b). Smaller disturbances fail to create a chain reaction in the organism, and as a result they go unperceived (64c). As in the Philebus, pleasure and pain in the Timaeus are described with reference to the organism’s natural condition: “An unnatural, violent disturbance that affects us suddenly is painful, but its sudden departure leading back to the natural state is pleasant” (τὸ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ βίαιον γιγνόμενον ἁθρόον παρ᾽ ἡμῖν πάθος ἀ λγεινόν, τὸ δ᾽ εἰς φύσιν ἀπιὸν πά λιν ἁθρόον ἡδύ, Tim. 64c8–d2).15 Timaeus reiterates this, in different words, a few lines later: “estrangement [from the natural state] is pain; restoration back to it is pleasure” (ἀ λλοτριούμενα μὲν λύπας, καθιστάμενα δὲ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ πά λιν ἡδονάς, 64e5–65a1). In the Philebus, the restoration model is most clearly in play in the case of mixed pleasures of the body, which Socrates initially describes as follows: “Whenever someone undergoes the processes of restoration and destruction simultaneously” (ὁπόταν ἐν τῇ καταστάσει τις ἢ τῇ διαφθορᾷ τἀναντία ἅμα πάθη πάσχῃ, 46c6–7). In cases of mixed physical pleasures, some kind of restoration is occurring simultaneously with destruction. The pleasure can outweigh the pain, or vice versa, and the whole experience is called one or the other based on which predominates.16 Mixed physical pleasures are discussed in two passages in the Philebus—31d4–32b8 and 46a2–47c3—and although Socrates does not explicitly say in the first of these passages that the pleasures are mixed, in the second one he does call ‘mixed’ an experience that he describes in the first as undergoing “processes of restoration and destruction simultaneously” (46c6–7).17 It therefore seems likely that these two passages are parts of a single explanation.18 The first passage features a whole riot of examples of mixed physical pleasures, each following the general restoration model. Hunger is a case of disintegration (λύσις) and pain (λύπη), whereas eating is the corresponding refilling (πλήρωσις) and thus pleasure (31e); thirst is a destruction and pain (φθορά καὶ λύπη), whereas filling with liquid what is dried out is pleasure; unnatural separation and dissolution (διάκρισις δέ γ᾽αὖ καὶ διάλυσις ἡ παρὰ φύσιν), the affection caused by heat, is pain (32a), whereas cooling down, the natural restoration (κατὰ φύσιν δὲ πάλιν ἀπόδοσις), is pleasure (32a); the solidification of fluids during freezing is pain, whereas “the natural process” (κατὰ φύσιν ὁδός) of their dispersal is pleasure (32a6–8). At the end of this list of examples, Socrates concludes that he and his interlocutors

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should accept what happens in the processes of restoration and destruction “as one form [ἕν εἶδος] of pleasure and pain” (32b6).19 Crucial to the soul’s experience of mixed pleasures of the body is memory, which enables the soul to identify the proper object with which to satisfy its desire. Because we can remember what object filled a certain lack in the past, we can desire the appropriate object when we experience the same deficiency later. For instance, once we have perceived that filling with liquid remedies thirst, we desire thereafter to be filled with drink when we feel parched.20 As Socrates claims, “Somehow, some part of the one who is thirsty grasps the filling [πλήρωσις]” (35b6–7), the point of contact being memories in the soul (35c). The soul, then, desires the opposite of what the body experiences, for the body is being emptied while the soul desires filling.

The perception requirement and the neutral state of health Socrates modifies the restoration model significantly in his discussion of the false pleasure of the neutral state at 42c5–44b3, where he introduces a perception requirement for pleasure and pain. It is by means of the perception requirement that Plato manages to distance genuine pleasure from the neutral state of painlessness, a condition that is identical to health. The perception requirement is thus a crucial segment of Plato’s thinking about the relation between pleasure, health, and the condition of painlessness, which Epicurus would later equate with pleasure and, like Plato, would consider in terms of health. Socrates’ initial discussion of a neutral state begins at 32d9, where he makes his first attempt to lead Protarchus to conclude that there exists a condition that is neither pleasant nor painful. There, Socrates makes no mention of a perception requirement for pleasures and pains, employing only a simple restoration model to argue that the neutral state is neither pleasant nor painful: if pain consists in disintegration and pleasure consists in restoration, then, theoretically, there could exist a state in which a living animal were undergoing neither depletion nor restoration (32d9–e7)21 and experiencing neither pleasure nor pain. Such a condition would be a “third one, besides the state of being pleased and the state of being in pain” (32e9–33a1). Socrates instructs Protarchus to keep in mind that such a state exists, since “it is not a small issue in our judgment of pleasure” (33a3–5). Socrates subsequently revises his idea of such a state in his second discussion, beginning at 42c5.22 When he revisits the neutral state there, it is the third of

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either three or four false pleasures discussed in the dialogue, depending on how the discussions are divided.23 In the third case of false pleasure, Socrates takes on those who he believes misconceive pleasure as a state of freedom from pain.24 Socrates sets up this second discussion of the neutral state much as he did the first: he asks Protarchus what would happen if living bodies were neither restored nor destroyed, “not moved in either way” (μὴ κινουμένου τοῦ σώματος ἐφ᾽ ἑκάτερα, 42e9). Instead of responding the same as before, Protarchus, this time less compliant, queries back, “When might that ever happen, Socrates?” (42d11). After conceding that such a state of invulnerability could never occur—agreeing with “the wise men” (οἱ σοφοί) that “everything is always in flux, upwards and downwards” (ἀεὶ γὰρ ἅπαντα ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω ῥεῖ, 43a3)—Socrates shifts gear and asks whether we always notice whenever various processes of restoration and destruction affect us (αἰσθάνεται τὸ πάσχον). Protarchus responds that indeed “almost all of such things completely escape our notice” (ὀλίγου γὰρ τά γε τοιαῦτα λέληθε πάνθ᾽ ἡμᾶς, 43b5–6). As a result of this concession to Protarchus, Socrates must revise his description of the neutral state: it is no longer a state in which nothing disturbs the body but a state that lacks perception of disturbances, the point being that although restorations and disturbances never cease to move the body, we are not always aware of being affected, as happens, for instance, in the cases of growth and digestion (43b2–4). It is no longer simply “changes upwards and downwards”—that is, restorations and destructions—that constitute pleasure, but the perception of those changes. Undoubtedly, the treatment of the neutral state and the restoration model in the Philebus bears several similarities to that in the Republic.25 In both dialogues, pleasure is associated with what is natural and harmonious: in Republic 9, as I discussed in the previous chapter, “being filled [τὸ πληροῦσθαι] with what is appropriate to our nature is pleasure” (585d11), and we have seen a similar treatment of pleasure so far in the Philebus. In addition, in the Republic physical and mental disturbances are explained in terms of lacks in the body and soul. For example, Socrates asks concerning basic bodily deficiencies, “aren’t hunger, thirst, and the like some sort of empty states [κενώσεις] of the body?” (585a8– b1); likewise, he asks of mental shortcomings, “aren’t ignorance [ἄγνοια] and lack of sense [ἀφροσύνη] empty states of the soul?” (585b3–4). Furthermore, in the Republic pleasure and pain are said to be motions (κινήσεις, 583e9–10), an assumption that is at play in the Philebus even if it is not explicitly stated. However, the restoration model differs markedly across the two dialogues in several ways. First, there is no mention in the Republic of a perception

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requirement for pleasures and pains.26 As I discussed in the previous chapter, the Republic equates pleasure and pain with replenishment and deficiency, respectively, without the added feature found in the Philebus that one must be aware of these affections in order to experience pleasure or pain. The neutral state in the Republic is a condition of psychic and/or physical rest, as is indicated by the fact that Socrates calls the neutral state ἡσυχία and contrasts it with motion (κίνησις). Pleasure and pain are motions, but the neutral state is not (Rep. 583e9–10). As a state lacking replenishments and deficiencies, the neutral state in the Republic corresponds to Plato’s initial description of it in the Philebus, before he modifies it in light of the flux theory. In addition, the Philebus, unlike the Republic, neatly distinguishes pleasure from pain, giving each its own definition and separating the neutral state cleanly from both. No longer is the neutral state confusingly bound up with illegitimate pleasures that may or may not be real; it has its own nature as a state void of perceptions of fillings and depletions. As Frede comments regarding the Philebus, “Plato has thus discarded the Republic’s troublesome distinction between motions that are pleasures but ‘not quite real ones’: All motions that are restorations are real pleasures” (1992: 441).27 The flux theory of the Philebus, then, is crucial to Socrates’ description of the neutral state as a condition of non-perception of disturbances; if there is no flux, there is no need to use the perception requirement to explain how organisms undergo a pleasureless and painless state of rest. Given that the flux theory is essential to my interpretation of the Philebus, we should consider why some have questioned Plato’s commitment to the theory in the dialogue. Gabriela Carone, for instance, has argued that Plato’s description of the neutral state as a state of non-perception of disturbances rather than as a state of being unaffected is not in earnest, since, on her view, Plato does not take the flux theory seriously in the Philebus; on her reading, Socrates concedes the flux theory “only for the sake of argument” (2000: 269n22). Carone argues this point as part of her larger claim that because pure pleasures belong to the domain of being (οὐσία), rather than that of becoming (γένεσις), such pleasures are not restorations. On her view, if some pure pleasures belong in the category of things that have being, then they must not be in flux, which means that the flux theory is not meant seriously. I think there are several reasons to be suspicious of this reading. First, it assumes that some pleasures cannot be in a constant state of change because (Carone’s argument goes) Socrates believes they belong to being rather than to becoming, and things in the realm of being are not subject to flux. But the

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conclusion that Socrates does not take the flux theory seriously only follows hypothetically from the claim that some pleasures belong to being; just because logic may demand that Socrates should reject the flux theory does not necessarily mean that he does in fact reject it. Carone notes further that the flux theory “is attributed by Socrates to Protarchus, as if the hedonism initially submitted by him were committed to an ontological theory of flux” (2000: 269n22). Although it is true that Socrates reports the flux theory as something Protarchus “meant to say,” it is not clear why Protarchus’ hedonism would demand a theory of flux. Further, it is Socrates himself who proposes the perception requirement and recognizes that their earlier theory, in which they linked pleasures and pains with organic processes rather than with the perception of such processes, was poorly formulated (43b7–9). Socrates claims that their account “will be better and less open to criticism” if they acknowledge that perception of organic changes is a key factor in understanding the nature of pleasure and pain (43c1). So even if Socrates does not take the flux theory seriously, he does seem committed to the perception requirement, which allows him to claim that the neutral state is a condition of non-perception of organic disturbances. If Socrates does take the flux theory seriously, this likely means that only the sensible world is in flux, not the intelligible realm and things related to it. When he says “everything [ἅπαντα] is always in flux, upwards and downwards” (43a3), he may be claiming that pleasures whose objects reside in the intelligible realm (Forms, for instance) are not in flux, but all other kinds of pleasures and things in the sensible realm are. This would be akin to his argument from the Republic that intellectual pleasures have a higher ontological status because their objects are stable, true things (Rep. 585b–586b). If we go back to Socrates’ argument in the Philebus that the neutral state is the lack of perception of disturbances, which are constantly occurring in the body, all he needs in order to make this argument work is the claim that human organisms are always changing, a claim that is entailed by the broader assertion that everything in the sensible world is subject to flux. Even if it is only the human body that is in flux, this is enough for Socrates to conclude that the neutral state cannot be void of disturbances altogether; instead, it must be a (slightly) dynamic physiological state and void merely of perceptions of ongoing disturbances. Thus, Socrates does not have to reject the notion that human organisms are always in flux just because he might hold that some pleasures have an elevated ontological status. If one goes in for intertextual readings of Platonic dialogues, then Carone’s reading is undermined by the fact that Socrates appears to adhere to the flux

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theory elsewhere, a fact which may lend support to my view that he admits to it in the Philebus not solely for the sake of argument. The perennial Platonic distinction between the visible and intelligible realms rests on the notion that the former is changeable and rife with flux, as can be seen most readily in the Republic (509d–11e) and Timaeus. In the latter dialogue, we are told that what is intelligible is “stable and constant” (29b6), “unchanging” (28a2), “neither receives into itself another from another place, nor itself enters into another anywhere” (52a2–3), while what is perceived with the senses “comes to be and is destroyed but never really is” (28a3–4) and “is always borne along, coming to be in some place and then in turn coming undone from there” (52a6–7). Moreover, it is arguably the case that the Theory of Forms is a consequence of the flux theory: in the Cratylus (440a–d), the changes in the sensible world necessitate the existence of stable Forms, and at the end of Republic book 5, the objects of knowledge are said to be what really are, while the objects of opinion come to be. And for what it’s worth, Aristotle reports that in later years Plato still adhered to the Heraclitean view that all sensible things are in flux.28 Thus, I think Carone’s dismissal of the flux argument in the Philebus is unwarranted, and it remains plausible that the neutral state in the Philebus is a state void of perception of disturbances but not void of disturbances themselves. But what is the physiology behind the perception requirement? Earlier in the dialogue, before his treatment of false pleasure, Socrates maintained that perception occurs when both the body and soul are moved in their respective ways by one and the same affection (34a3–5)—“an agitation that is particular to each but also shared in common” (33d4–5). When an affection moves the body but does not penetrate the soul, the soul remains unmoved and thus takes no notice of what impinges on the body. In such circumstances, the condition is one of “non-perception” (ἀναισθησία, 34a1).29 In the discussion of the false pleasure of the neutral state, Socrates adds that only great changes cause pleasures and pains (43c4–6), a fact which coheres with the account of perception in the Timaeus: disturbances that are “gentle and small are unperceived, but the opposite is the case concerning the opposite” (τὸ δὲ ἠρέμα καὶ κατὰ σμικρὸν ἀναίσθητον, τὸ δ᾽ ἐναντίον τούτοις ἐναντίως, 64d2–3). This fact also jibes with the physiology Socrates explained early in the Philebus: if an affection must penetrate both body and soul in order to be perceived, then it is logical that large affections will be the ones that manage to reach the soul, and they, rather than smaller ones, will be perceived. Small changes, too weak to reach the soul, terminate in the body.30

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According to this updated account, pleasure is a perception of the process of being restored to the natural state.31 Socrates proceeds to use this modified description of pleasure to chastise those who call the state of freedom from pain pleasure. He acknowledges that such a state is indeed painless, but it is “without charm” (ἄνευ χαρμονῶν, 43c11); it is a third kind of life, between that of pleasure and that of pain (43d). Given the restoration model and the perception requirement, the neutral state of freedom from pain is not identical to pleasure; therefore, those who equate the two “hold a false opinion about pleasure” (ψευδῆ γε μὴν δοξάζουσι περὶ τοῦ χαίρειν, 44a9). To emphasize the point, Plato provides a metaphor involving three metals: if we have gold, silver and another substance that is neither, it would be impossible for the third to turn out to be either of the other two (43e1–6). Similarly, we have pleasure, pain and a third state, freedom from pain, which neither is nor can ever be either of the others; “being free from pain and experiencing pleasure—each has a separate nature (ἡ φύσις ἑκατέρου)” (44a9– 10). Socrates goes on to mention a group of people who are said to be clever at natural science, the so-called “enemies of Philebus” (πολέμιοι Φι λήβου) or “dour ones” (οἱ δυσχερεῖς), who claim there is no such thing as pleasure; what most people, including Philebus, call pleasure is in fact nothing more than escape from pain (ἀποφυγὴ λυπῶν, 44c1; παῦλα λυπῶν, 51a3).32 The dour ones’ view is inconsistent with Socrates’ position that pleasure is experienced in the process of restoring the body to its natural state,33 but he nevertheless uses them as “witnesses” (μάρτυρες) to prove that some things that are thought to be pleasure, such as the neutral state, are not in fact pleasant at all (51a4). The neutral state itself in the Philebus is a condition of harmony and health, a state in which there are no disturbances in the organism large enough to be noticed. Note that the neutral state is not simply a condition lacking perception of disturbances; perception of disturbance is absent precisely because the organism is not affected by any disturbances that are significant enough to penetrate both the body and soul and engender the awareness of being affected. Cases in which one is affected by large disturbances but one is nevertheless unaware of them—because of anesthetizing drugs, for instance, or because one’s mind is focused away from the disturbance—are not genuine cases of the neutral state, according to Plato, since sizable physical disruptions in the organism are still present. Consequently, health is not just a ‘state of mind’ or an attitude; importantly, it reflects certain physiological conditions in the organism. To be healthy is just to be without noticeable fluctuations in one’s system—to put an

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end, as far as possible, to the boundless movements of the unlimiteds—so that one can be free to focus on more important pursuits. This is of chief importance to the philosopher, who we learn in the Phaedo must try to distance herself from sensory pleasures and all things bodily (see 65cff ), apt as they are to deceive and distract. In this regard, it is telling that Socrates states early on in the Philebus that the life without pleasure and pain belongs to the philosopher and is the most godlike (33aff ).34 It is also significant that later in the Philebus Socrates criticizes people who attempt to generate great restorations and therefore great pleasures by cultivating large physical deficiencies (45bff ). Socrates expresses his disapproval of this habit when he asks Protarchus whether “someone wishing to know the greatest pleasure should look not to health but to sickness” (45c1–3); in other words, health does not manifest itself in sizable organic disruptions. Socrates expresses a similar view in the Gorgias (491e5ff ), where he rebukes Callicles’ view that the best life consists in dissolving one’s self-control and growing one’s appetites as large as possible. Socrates likens the appetites to leaky jars, the continual tending to which is extremely onerous since they can never be filled once and for all. He contrasts this life with that of disciplined and virtuous people, who fill their ‘jars’ and cease to bother with them. The profligate, however, achieves no happiness by cultivating large appetites, since they inevitably result in painfully large deficiencies. Given that the neutral state of painlessness is just the state of health, and given Plato’s insistence that the former is not pleasant, we can conclude that the state of health itself is not pleasant. This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that pleasure and health belong to separate metaphysical categories in the Philebus’ division of all things: recall that health belongs to the class of good mixtures, whereas pleasure is a member of the apeiron (25eff ). Pleasure nevertheless relates to health insofar as the former is experienced in the process of reestablishing the latter, as the restoration model shows. In order to achieve a healthy state, one’s organism must undergo some amount of corrective changes, the experience of which is the domain of pleasure. As we learn from the Philebus, depletion is a regular feature of human existence, and depletions must be remedied in order to achieve health.35 Since perceptible processes of restoring health are pleasurable, pleasure will, in varying degrees, be a regular feature of human existence. The philosopher correctly realizes that the goal is health itself, not the pleasurable, corrective processes that bring it about: on Plato’s view, the pursuit of such processes as ends in themselves entails an addictive attitude toward deficiencies, whose perceptible remedy is necessary

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for restorative pleasure. Although the philosopher does not prioritize restorative pleasures, he nevertheless understands that human beings cannot entirely avoid them: “necessary” (ἀναγκαῖαι) pleasures are allowed into the final mixture of elements in the good life at the end of the Philebus (62e9), but “the biggest and most violent pleasures” (τὰς μεγίστας ἡδονὰς . . . καὶ τὰς σφοδροτάτας, 63d3– 4) are barred, which suggests that genuinely healthy pleasures are defined not only in terms of their connection to restorative organic processes, but also in terms of their role in the lives of those who pursue them. It is reasonable to conclude that Plato believes we can have unhealthy attitudes toward healthy pleasures when we pervert the meaning of ‘necessary’ in ‘necessary pleasures’— that is, when we consider necessary pleasures to be absolutely essential instead of simply unavoidable. (Such perversion is typified, for example, by an exercise fanatic who toils repeatedly for the sake of a post-workout endorphin rush.) So although the state of health itself is not, strictly speaking, pleasant, Plato suggests in the Philebus that healthy processes can be pleasant. And he also suggests that we are better off when such processes form part of a healthy lifestyle, which is centered on limiting the physiological fluctuations to which our organisms are naturally subject. Against this one might point out that Socrates suggests near the end of the dialogue that there is a pleasure of health, one of the few pleasures he claims are compatible with the rational life. Speaking as the voice of “reason [νοῦς] and knowledge [φρόνησις]” in reply to the question of whether they have any need to associate with pleasure, he states, “as for the pleasures of health and of temperance [καὶ πρὸς ταύταις τὰς μεθ᾽ ὑγιείας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν] and all those that follow virtue as a whole just as they would a god, accompanying it in every way—mix these in” (63e4–7). Although Socrates does say “pleasures of health,” the phrase does not necessarily mean ‘pleasures enjoyed during the state of health’; it could merely mean ‘pleasures going along with health’ in the sense of ‘enjoyed in the pursuit of health’ or ‘associated with the process of attaining health.’ In any case, it is doubtful that Plato is attempting to make a technical distinction here between pleasurable processes and pleasurable states; rather, as Socrates’ subsequent comments show, the point of the whole passage is to distinguish moderate pleasures from immoderate ones. Immediately after Socrates mentions the pleasures of health and temperance, he contrasts them with “those following along with thoughtlessness [ἀφροσύνη] and other kinds of badness [ἄλλης κακίας],” the pursuit of which would be “totally absurd for anyone who wishes to discern the best and most unified mixture or blend”

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(63e7–64a1).36 As in earlier parts of the dialogue, Socrates aims to show that the best life is characterized by harmony and stability, not excess and volatility. The fact the pleasures related to health are allowed into the rational life at the end of the dialogue seems to be an admission on Plato’s part that philosophers must occupy changeable and corruptible bodies, whose needs are unavoidable. Philosophers will realize that restorative pleasures are inescapable, and they will make the best judgments about how to minimize inevitable disturbances to their psycho–physical organism. Plato’s application of the perception requirement to the neutral state ultimately plays a significant part in his efforts to diminish pleasure’s contribution to the good life. His description of the neutral state serves to clarify that the condition of freedom from pain is not identical to pleasure: he exposes freedom from pain as a spurious pleasure, and as a result he is able to eliminate one candidate from the pool of pleasures contending for inclusion in the good life. As I argue later, the Epicurean view that the state of health itself is pleasant serves as a plausible rebuttal to the notion that such a state has no hedonic value. However, Epicurus adopts a conception of health that looks very much like Plato’s: both agree that the most desirable and natural physiological condition is characterized by minimal physiological disturbances.

3

Plato’s Anti-Hedonistic Process Argument

As we saw in the previous chapter, the Philebus describes a major type of pleasure as the perceived restoration of an organism’s healthy state. Bound up with this description is the notion that pleasures are processes, works in progress rather than end states. In this chapter, I consider the restoration model’s role in an argument Socrates reports at Phil. 53c4–55c3 against pleasure as the good: all processes belong to the realm of becoming (γένεσις) rather than the realm of being (οὐσία) because they exist (in the loose sense) for the sake of the goal toward which they progress. Since the good belongs to the class of being, pleasures that are processes are, at best, instrumental to the good rather than good in themselves. This ‘process argument,’ as I shall refer to it, was a popular thread in the discussions about the nature of pleasure among members of the early Academy and in several of Aristotle’s works. These discussions centered on the connection between bodily pleasure and health: is bodily pleasure linked with the process of achieving a healthy state, the healthy state itself, or both? Plato’s answer in the first half of the Philebus—that bodily pleasure is more properly associated with change and movement—culminates in the process argument’s evaluation of the goodness of pleasure. The ontological and ethical problems with pleasure raised in these ancient debates are just the sort that Epicurus confronts when formulating his theories about pleasure’s goodness and its relation to motion and change. In this chapter, I evaluate the process argument in the Philebus as well as the role the argument plays in the debates among Platonists and Aristotelians about the nature and goodness of pleasure. I examine the disagreements concerning the nature of pleasure taking place in the early Academy between Eudoxus of Cnidus, a fourth-century mathematician and astronomer, and Speusippus of Athens, Plato’s nephew and successor as head of the Academy, and I consider the place of these disagreements in the Philebus and in Aristotle’s relevant writings.

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Since much ink has been spilled over Aristotle’s reaction to Plato’s various treatments of pleasure as well as over Speusippus’ and Eudoxus’ respective roles in Aristotle’s account of pleasure, I do not intend to treat these topics at length. However, since Aristotle occupies a significant place in the trajectory of healthrelated theories of pleasure in ancient thought, his work is quite relevant to this study. Several assumptions have been made about the process argument, each of which I examine in what follows: first, that it was propagated by Speusippus; second, that Aristotle, in books 7 and 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics, is noting his disagreement with the process argument; and third, that a section of the Peripatetic Magna Moralia echoes many of the issues with the process argument that Aristotle raises in the Nicomachean Ethics. What is at stake in these discussions is not so much the overarching hedonistic or anti-hedonistic ideology of which they are a part, but the definition of pleasure that underlies the claims about pleasure’s goodness. When Aristotle, for example, argues against hedonism in book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics, his target is not only what he believes to be the skewed ethical ideology of his opponents, but also the very definition of pleasure at the core of his opponents’ ethical positions. I begin this chapter by analyzing the details of Plato’s process argument in Phil. 53c–54d, and then I turn to Aristotle’s version of the process argument in the Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics. I consider whether the process argument in the Aristotelian texts coheres with the version of the process argument in the Philebus, as well as how the argument develops in light of Aristotle’s attempts to respond to Eudoxus’ hedonism and Speusippus’ anti-hedonism. Lastly, I analyze Aristotle’s response to the process argument in books 7 and 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics, as well as the Peripatetic response in book 2 of the Magna Moralia. The present chapter serves to provide some essential background for my later claim that Epicurean hedonism has philosophical roots in the fourth-century discussions among Academics and Peripatetics about pleasure’s definition and value.

The process argument: Phil. 53c4–55c3 After elucidating the kinds of true and false pleasures, Socrates further attempts to devalue pleasure by introducing the process argument, which he attributes to some “clever people” (κομψοί) who have tried to pass their doctrine on to

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others. Socrates tells Protarchus that they should be grateful to the κομψοί, whose theory, as becomes evident as the argument progresses, supports a claim regarding pleasure’s value to which he and Protarchus are already sympathetic: pleasure is not good in itself. Socrates begins his retelling of the argument by posing the rhetorical question to Protarchus, “Have we not heard about pleasure, that it is always a coming into being, and that there is no being at all of pleasure [ἀεὶ γένεσίς ἐστιν, οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ παράπαν ἡδονῆς]?” (53c4–5). Protarchus does not understand and begins to lose patience, so Socrates clarifies: there are two kinds of things, Socrates explains, “one kind is itself by itself, but the other is always longing for something else” (τὸ μὲν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτό, τὸ δ᾽ ἀεὶ ἐφιέμενον ἄλλου, 53d3–4); further, one kind is “the holiest” (σεμνότατον), while the other is inferior (53d6). After fessing up to a little joking around, Socrates seems to summarize his remarks: all things are either for the sake of something else or are that for which others come to be (53e5–7). Stated differently, if we have two things, the generation (γένεσις) of all things and being (οὐσία), the former exists for the sake of the latter. Protarchus mentions shipbuilding as an example: the craft is for the sake of ships, not the other way around. Near the end of the argument, Socrates loses the phrasing that might suggest he has any reservations about the views he has expressed: “I hold [φημί] that every process of generation [γένεσιν] comes to be for the sake of some particular being [οὐσίας], and that generations as a whole come to be for the sake of being in general” (54c2–4).1 Socrates’ final way of relating generation and being—the “for the sake of which” model—neatly sets him up to introduce the good: that for the sake of which something comes to be (e.g., being or ships) should be put into the class of things “good in themselves” (ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ), while those which come to be for the sake of others “must be counted as another class [μοῖραν]” (54c10–11). Socrates closes out the argument by claiming that pleasure, as a process of generation, comes to be for “some being” (ἕνεκά τινος οὐσίας, 54c6–7). As something that comes to be for the sake of another, pleasure is disqualified from membership in the class of the good, as Socrates goes on to remark: “But if pleasure really is a generation [γένεσις], will we be placing it correctly if we assign it to a different class [μοῖραν] than that of the good?” (54d1–2). Protarchus responds affirmatively. With this borrowed argument, Socrates seems to have succeeded in rejecting at least the pleasures of restoration from the ranks of the good. He accomplished this by means of a series of claims: first, on a general level all things exist in some

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sort of relation, and a thing’s place in the relation dictates whether it belongs to generation or being; next, what belongs to being are things good in themselves, while what belongs to generation are not; and, finally, since many pleasures are a perceived process toward an organism’s natural state, a good number of them are planted squarely in the class of generation rather than being, which means they cannot be the good. What is therefore crucial to the argument regarding the goodness of certain pleasures is their definition. If some pleasures are not a mere means or do not exist in relation to something “holier” or more “itself by itself,” they may have a chance at membership in the class of things good in themselves. But as it is, restorative pleasures can only be instrumentally good, since they are for the sake of the goal of health.2 Van Riel has suggested that Plato is more concerned with the definition of pleasure at play in the process argument than with the conclusion that pleasure is not good in itself: since the moral evaluation presupposes a definition of pleasure as a process, the latter is the real item of interest.3 I agree that Plato is very interested in the notion that pleasures (most of them, anyway) are bound up with the process of restoring health, but there is good reason to believe that he also attempts to further the ethical claims about pleasure that are embedded in the process argument. Socrates deems morally suspect those who favor processes over ends, as some do whom he ridicules in the Philebus. As he claims in his presentation of the process argument, the κομψοί are right to chide those who set as their ends processes of generation rather than the ends for which those processes take place. These foolish sorts “rejoice at generation as if it were pleasure, and they say that they would not wish to live if they could not thirst or hunger” (54e5–7). People who favor the means toward a good rather than the good itself are morally depraved, and pleasure’s status as an instrumental good is one of the main reasons it is ranked, at the end of the dialogue, so far down on the list of factors that contribute to the goodness of the good life. Thus, it seems to me that Plato’s worries about pleasure’s goodness are just as important to him as his worries about its nature. It is easy to see, then, why Socrates claims that he and Protarchus ought to be grateful to the κομψοί:4 all are of one mind that pleasure belongs to the class of becoming rather than being, and that pleasure is not good in itself. He tells Protarchus, “Therefore, as I said at the beginning of this argument, we ought to be grateful to the one who revealed that there is only a generation but no being whatsoever of pleasure. And it’s clear that this person is laughing at those who assert that pleasure is the good” (54d4–7).5 According to Socrates, the unnamed

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κομψοί deserve thanks because they have helped him and Protarchus find fault with pleasure—one of their stated goals in the dialogue6—and have done so with an argument whose premise Socrates and Protarchus have already adopted, namely, that many, if not at all, pleasures belong to the class of generation. We can see now how the restoration model Plato introduced earlier in the Philebus is crucial to the process argument. As we learn from the restoration model, organisms experience a major type of pleasure in the course of perceiving a restoration to health. For instance, when we enjoy the processes of sating hunger or warming up from the cold, we take pleasure in the perceptible path toward achieving a healthy state. The process argument capitalizes on the restoration model by excluding from the class of things good in themselves any pleasure that is bound up with a process. Regardless of whether restorative pleasures are perceptions or processes in themselves, they are nevertheless experienced in the course of an organism’s movement toward its goal of health, and they are perceived to have been generated by a palpable deficiency. The pleasure of becoming sated, for instance, is mixed with the pain of deficiency; in other words, it is impossible to separate the pleasure of filling from its corresponding lack when the pleasurable experience is defined in terms of the removal of pain. The process argument, then, applies to all restorative pleasures, but does it apply to other pleasures as well? It might be argued that the process argument also excludes from the ranks of the good any pure pleasure that is linked to a process of achievement, even if the deficiency preceding the process is unperceived. In the Philebus, Socrates describes pure pleasures as “those related to so-called beautiful colors and to shapes and to most smells and sounds and as many as have lacks that are unfelt and painless, but the fillings they provide are perceived and pleasant” (τὰς περί τε τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τῶν ὀσμῶν τὰς πλείστας καὶ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων καὶ ὅσα τὰς ἐνδείας ἀναισθήτους ἔχοντα καὶ ἀλύπους τὰς πληρώσεις αἰσθητὰς καὶ ἡδείας [καθαρὰς λυπῶν] παραδίδωσιν, 51b3–7). Although the text is unclear as to whether all pure pleasures are processes of filling, one could argue from Socrates’ examples of pure pleasures that some are not processes, while some are.7 Socrates describes the pleasure of sound, for instance, as the experience of pure tones that are beautiful in and of themselves (51d). Since the act of considering a perfect note does not seem to involve a process toward a separate end or state, it is difficult to see how the process argument could apply to such pleasures. However, an exception cannot be made so easily for pure pleasures of learning (τὰς περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἡδονάς), another one of Plato’s examples of pure pleasure in

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the Philebus (51e–52b). Socrates tells Protarchus they should exclude pleasures of learning that stem from the realization of ignorance, since such pleasures are painful and thus impure (51e7–52a3); however, Socrates calls learning a “filling with knowledge” (μαθημάτων πληρωθεῖσιν, 52a5), suggesting that the pleasure of learning is linked with the process of acquiring knowledge. If this is the case, then pleasures of learning are among those excluded by the process argument from the class of things good in themselves. The pleasures of smell will also be excluded if we consider that in the Timaeus smells are associated with painless replenishments. Although Timaeus does not call such pleasures ‘pure,’ he nonetheless describes their general class in the same way that Socrates describes pure pleasures in the Philebus. After Timaeus introduces the pleasures that are preceded by a felt disturbance, he turns to those whose preceding depletions go unnoticed: “All those bodies that undergo gentle depletions of and retreats from their natures, but also undergo overwhelming and large fillings, their depletions are unperceived, but their fillings are perceived. No pain is brought to the mortal part of the soul, but only the biggest pleasures. This is clear in the case of sweet smells” (65a1–6).8 Timaeus seems to apply the restoration model even to pleasures of fragrances, which means they can be subject to the process argument and excluded from the class of things good in themselves. As for the identity of the κομψοί, who are said to put forward the process argument, this topic has been treated so extensively elsewhere that I do not intend to enter into the debate here. I will only mention the usual view, since it bears on my later discussion of Aristotle’s response to the process argument. Many scholars believe that Plato has Speusippus in mind for the κομψοί9 and that Plato wrote the Philebus in response to debates within the Academy between Speusippus and Eudoxus, the latter of whom was noted for his arguments in favor of hedonism.10 It may be that Plato, taking Speusippus’ side, repeats his nephew’s argument to further the dialogue’s anti-hedonism. Related to the issue of the identity of the κομψοί is the controversial issue of whether Plato actually adheres to the view attributed to them that all pleasures are generations. It has been suggested that the phrasing of 54c–d indicates some doubt or tentativeness on Socrates’ part about describing pleasure as a generation. At 54c6 and 54d1, Socrates uses “if ” (εἴπερ) in his claims about the nature of pleasure—“if [εἴπερ] pleasure is a generation”—indicating, perhaps, that the conclusion that pleasure is not the good is meant only conditionally.11 In this vein, Carone advises the reader to “pay attention to the hypothetical mode in which the whole passage is put, and to the fact that Socrates does not

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express any commitment to that thesis” (2000: 265). Socrates is maintaining his distance, she claims, by putting this theory of the nature of pleasure into the mouths of the κομψοί. On Carone’s reading, Plato believes that at least one kind of pleasure is not a γένεσις, namely, pure pleasure,12 which may therefore qualify for membership in the class of things good in themselves. Note that two claims are under dispute here: (i) Plato does not believe that all pleasures belong to the class of generations, and (ii) Plato does not take the process argument of the κομψοί seriously. Although my claim here is only that at least the restorative pleasures belong to the class of generations (consistent with (i), above), there is good reason to believe that the process argument, as it is delivered in the Philebus, is meant seriously (against (ii), above). While it is true that Socrates does at first put the process argument in the mouths of others and that Frede’s translation of εἴπερ as ‘since’ rather than ‘if ’ does obscure some of the tentativeness of the passage’s phrasing, we know that at least the restorative pleasures are bound up with generations and are therefore subject to the process argument. And for what it’s worth, Socrates does not qualify his statement that all pleasures are a cominginto-being (γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν) or his remark that pleasure belongs in a class other than that of the good.13 As J. M. Rist comments, Plato has an opportunity to modify the views of the κομψοί so as to express whatever misgivings he may have about painting all pleasures with the same brush, but he does not take it.14 In the text, Socrates presents the premises and conclusion offered by the κομψοί without any stated modification. If he wanted to make major changes to the process argument of the κομψοί, he should have presented the argument himself instead of attributing it to another. A modified view along the lines Carone would like—that Plato believes neither that all pleasures are generations nor that no pleasure is the good—hardly resembles the view of the κομψοί as Socrates presents it. In addition, in the early metaphysical discussions of the dialogue (23c4–27c2) the language of becoming and being is used in reference to pleasure, indicating that Plato has not introduced the terminology γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν only at some later stage in the dialogue or borrowed it entirely from another source just for the sake of argument. We learn early in the Philebus that pleasure in itself belongs to the class of the unlimited, and that a particular pleasure comes to be in the class of things that are generated. There is a “coming-into-being” (γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν) when a member of the ἄπειρον is nailed down, such as when heat, a member of the ἄπειρον, becomes instantiated as a certain temperature. That Socrates later

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uses the same language of becoming in the process argument is evidence that he does take seriously the notion that some pleasures—at least the restorative pleasures of the body, the largest and most obvious class—are bound up with generations and are inferior to the ends toward which they progress.

The process argument in Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics An Epicurean would need to contend with Plato’s claim that the largest and most obvious class of pleasures, namely, the mixed pleasures of the body, are processes rather than ends and therefore do not belong to the class of things good in themselves. But even before Epicurus would grapple with the problem of whether pleasure is a process or an end, the process argument became a point of disagreement among Academics and Aristotle. As Van Riel notes, Aristotle’s target in the Nicomachean Ethics is not so much the ethical claims of hedonism or anti-hedonism, but the definitions of pleasure undergirding the ethical claims.15 Aristotle takes up the task of rejecting certain definitions of pleasure even though he does not entirely agree with claims put forth by prominent antihedonists of his time. In addition to reacting to the Philebus’ account of pleasure, Aristotle may be responding to his own account from the Rhetoric, parts of which echo many of Socrates’ discussions in the Philebus. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle describes pleasure and pain using a restoration model that includes a perception requirement: “We may lay it down that pleasure is a movement [κίνησιν], a restoration [κατάστασιν] by which the soul as a whole is consciously [αἰσθητήν] brought into its original nature [τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν], and that pain is the opposite” (1369b33–35).16 Aristotle seems to be saying that pleasure involves the awareness of the soul’s progression toward a state of normalcy and natural functioning, but David Wolfsdorf argues that the passage does not show that Aristotle believes the restored condition is necessarily a natural condition, since “original nature” (τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν) can be translated as “prevailing nature,” which may be a non-natural condition one develops as a result of habit.17 This might be cleared up by translating τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν as “normal state of being,” as does Roberts, but Wolfsdorf claims that here too nothing demands that the “normal state” be natural; one’s normal state might just as easily be a perverted condition, formed from habitually bad behavior. However, if that is what Aristotle means,

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then in what sense are the pleasures that lead to the perverted state restorations? They will be so only in the trivial sense that they reestablish a lost state of affairs, but this is inconsistent with Plato’s usage of κατάστασις in the Philebus, where the term refers to an organism’s return to its natural state (e.g., the process of drinking to remove thirst). Better sense is made of the Rhetoric passage if it is understood to mean that pleasure is associated with changes that restore an organism’s natural operation. The account of pleasure in the Rhetoric both resembles and substantially differs from that of the Philebus. The accounts are not exactly identical: Aristotle indicates that the restorative movement occurs in the soul, whereas Plato suggests that the movement can be in the soul, the body, or in both. In addition, as Rist notes, Aristotle treats all pleasures as restorations, whereas Plato treats only some as restorations (namely, the mixed pleasures). For this reason, Rist claims that Aristotle’s account is “a sloppy oversimplification” of the Platonic view (1974: 169). Rist might be right, or it might be the case that Aristotle’s report is evidence that the Philebus does in fact consider all pleasures to be restorations. At any rate, these potential differences are minor compared to the overwhelming similarities between Aristotle’s account and the Philebus’. For starters, Aristotle specifically mentions the perception requirement, which may indicate that he is borrowing from the Philebus’ account of pleasure rather than from the Republic’s, which conspicuously lacks any mention of perception’s role in pleasure. Secondly, in both the Rhetoric passage and the Philebus, one and the same term, κατάστασις, is used to indicate the process of restoration as opposed to the result. Furthermore, the Rhetoric contains discussions of pleasures of memories and expectations (1370a27–1370b6), which appear prominently in the Philebus but not in other Platonic treatments of pleasure. Lastly, Aristotle mentions pleasures related to the emotions, particularly anger (1370b10– 15), referencing the same passage from the Iliad (18.109) that appears in the discussion of the mixed nature of wrath in the Philebus (47e). Although the similarities between the Philebus and Rhetoric accounts of pleasure might suggest that in the latter Aristotle adopts aspects of the former, and then later, in the Nicomachean Ethics, comes to reject his earlier position, there is some uncertainty as to the dating of the Rhetoric, whether it precedes or follows the Nicomachean Ethics.18 The problem involves references in Rhetoric 2.23 to events that occurred relatively late in Aristotle’s life (such as the circumstances leading up to the Battle of Chaeronea, in 338 BCE), and 1.8 refers to the Politics, which postdates the Nicomachean Ethics in the Corpus Aristotelicum. The main

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reason I can see for rejecting the later dating of the Rhetoric is that it makes Aristotle’s thought process seem rather odd: he will have rejected the Platonic view of pleasure in all its forms (as κίνησις, γένεσις, or ἀναπλήρωσις) only to adopt the discarded Platonic view later.19 Although the converse—that in the Rhetoric and elsewhere Aristotle espouses the Platonic view20 and then later rejects it—also involves Aristotle in a reversal of thought, such a scenario seems more likely given that his remarks in the Rhetoric in favor of the Platonic account are not nearly as developed as his later remarks rejecting it: parts of two books of the Nicomachean Ethics as well as many passages in the Magna Moralia feature extensive arguments against the Platonic view, but Aristotle’s statements in favor of it are fleeting. From his presentation and rejection of the account of pleasure as a process, movement, and restoration, there is good reason to believe that his mature view is that the Platonic account is fatally flawed.21 It is also worth considering that Aristotle may not actually endorse the Rhetoric’s definition of pleasure. Given that the purpose of the work is to educate speakers on how to persuade audiences, it is possible Aristotle formulates definitions that he himself does not hold but are nevertheless useful for a speaker who is attempting to appeal to an audience’s beliefs. Early in the Rhetoric, Aristotle claims that “we must be able to employ persuasion, just as strict reasoning can be employed, on opposite sides of a question” (1355a29–30), not so as to mislead others but so as to determine when others may be misleading us, in which case we can prove them wrong. Later he asserts that all three types of orator—the political, the forensic, and the ceremonial—must have at the ready many sorts of propositions to employ during arguments (1359a15ff ), and much of the Rhetoric is dedicated to examining “the subjects regarding which we are inevitably bound to master the propositions relevant to them” (1359a26–7). But Aristotle warns us that rhetoric is a practical skill, not a science, and as such it deals with “words and forms of reasoning” rather than “definite subjects,” the full and exact treatment of which should be sought elsewhere than in rhetoric (1359b15–18). That caveat appears in the Rhetoric not long before the treatment of pleasure, the definition of which Aristotle introduces perhaps as a useful argumentative tool. If this is the case, then the Rhetoric is consistent with the Nicomachean Ethics and Magna Moralia in that all three works fail to endorse the sort of theory of pleasure offered in the Philebus. But what exactly is the account of pleasure Aristotle claims to reject? And what evidence is there that Aristotle is even aware of the process argument? In book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle responds to three distinct groups

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of anti-hedonists, whose views he describes as follows: (i) those who think no pleasure is a good, either in itself or incidentally (1152b8–9); (ii) those who think some pleasures are good but most are bad (1152b10–11); and (iii) those who hold that even if all pleasures are goods, the highest good cannot be pleasure (1152b11–12). Aristotle elaborates on each group’s justification for its respective position, but only the first and third groups concern us here since only those two feature the process argument in their rejection of pleasure. The position of the first group has a whiff of the Philebus about it: pleasure is not the good because “every pleasure is a perceptible process to a natural state, and that no process is of the same kind as its end [πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσίς ἐστιν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή, οὐδεμία δὲ γένεσις συγγενὴς τοῖς τέλεσιν], e.g. no process of building is of the same kind as a house” (1152b13–15). Although Aristotle does not explicitly attribute this view to Plato, clearly it bears a strong resemblance to the Platonic process argument.22 The reasoning of the third group echoes that of the first: “The reason for the view that the best thing is not pleasure is that pleasure is not an end but a process [οὐ τέλος ἀλλὰ γένεσις]” (1152b22–23). In short, both groups appeal to the process argument in support of some version of anti-hedonism. In book 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics, the anti-hedonistic attacks appear to be targeted directly against Eudoxus’ hedonism rather than against hedonism generally. In turn, Aristotle’s response is formulated as a defense of some of Eudoxus’ arguments for hedonism rather than as a defense of hedonistic arguments generally.23 In book 10, Aristotle recounts Eudoxus’ three main arguments for the claim that pleasure is the good (1172b9–25): First, all things, rational and irrational, aim at pleasure, which is an object of choice in itself and not chosen for the sake of something else, and what is most the object of choice—as pleasure is, since all things, even though they are different, move toward the same object—is the greatest good.24 Second, all things avoid pain; therefore, pain’s contrary, pleasure, must be an object of choice and hence the good.25 Lastly, all pleasure, when added to any good, makes the good more choiceworthy; goods can be made more choiceworthy only by the addition of pleasure.26 Aristotle goes on to explain that these arguments hold water because Eudoxus is considered to be a very unbiased source: his temperance and selfcontrol prove that he is not attempting to justify an immoderate, hedonistic lifestyle that he himself might possess. Rather, Eudoxus’ arguments are based on his belief that all facts point to the conclusion that pleasure is the good.27 It should be noted that although Aristotle does reject the process argument, he neither accepts hedonism nor entirely disagrees with some of the anti-hedonistic

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arguments against Eudoxus. For instance, Aristotle claims that Eudoxus’ third argument for pleasure—that when added to another good, pleasure makes that good more choiceworthy—shows only that pleasure is a good, not the chief good, since every good is more choiceworthy when it is added to another good (1172b26–28). Aristotle acknowledges that his point against Eudoxus recalls Plato’s argument in the Philebus (21b–d, 60b–e) that pleasure is not the good because, first, the pleasant life is more desirable with reason than without it; second, the mixture of pleasure and reason is better than the former taken alone; and third, “the good cannot become more desirable by the addition of anything to it” (NE 1172b31–32). It is interesting that Aristotle rejects Eudoxan hedonism even as he rejects the anti-hedonistic process argument. That Aristotle goes out of his way to refute the theory of pleasure as a γένεσις or κίνησις even though he ultimately agrees with its authors that pleasure is not the good shows that the definition of pleasure on which the process argument is based is, in itself and independently of the ethical ideology of which it is a part, of central importance to Aristotle’s discussion of pleasure in the Nicomachean Ethics. Despite his criticisms of Eudoxus, Aristotle aims to refute several arguments against Eudoxan hedonism in book 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle objects that it is nonsense to claim that the object of all our pursuits is not always good, as some have held, since everyone does seem to think that what is most the object of choice is the good (1172b36). Moreover, Aristotle objects to the anti-hedonist view that the opposite of evil is not good.28 Here again Aristotle appeals to appearances: “In fact people evidently avoid the one as evil and choose the other as good; that then must be the nature of the opposition between them” (1173a11–13). In addition, Aristotle considers an objection to Eudoxus that is motivated by the assumption that the good is complete, but movements (κινήσεις) and comings-into-being (γενέσεις) are incomplete (1173a30). This seems very much like the process argument, which Aristotle mentioned for the first time back in book 7 while evaluating the positions of certain groups of anti-hedonists. In book 10, Aristotle explains that some try to demonstrate that pleasure is a movement and a coming-into-being by appealing to another claim, which Aristotle attributes to “some people,” that “pain is the lack of that which is according to nature, and pleasure is replenishment [ἀναπλήρωσιν]” (1173b7–8). The similarity between the description of pleasure as a restoration attributed to “some people” at NE 1173b7–8 and the definition of pleasure as a perceived restoration to a natural state in the Philebus is no doubt striking,29 yet Aristotle does not name the source. Presumably, the author of the view is one and the

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same individual or group as the κομψοί, which brings us back to Speusippus, whom it has been argued is Aristotle’s target in books 7 and 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics.30 As John Dillon comments, Speusippus rejects the idea that pleasure is the good based on two claims: (i) pleasure is “a process, and an open-ended, disorderly one at that” and (ii) the good is a steady state of freedom from disturbance (1996: 104). Clement of Alexandria reports, “Speusippus, the nephew of Plato, declares that happiness is a perfect state in the area of what is natural, or the state of (possession of) goods, which is a state for which all men have a (natural) impulse, while the good aim at freedom from disturbance [ἀοχλησίας].”31 If Speusippus did reject pleasure in this way, it seems very likely that he is the target of Aristotle’s criticisms of those who associate pleasure with motion, a process, or a restoration.32 But, again, this is to say that Aristotle may have in mind Phil. 53c–54d, and Speusippus only indirectly.33

Aristotle’s reply to the process argument One of Aristotle’s main criticisms of the description of pleasure inherent in the process argument is that restorative processes are only incidentally pleasant rather than pleasant in themselves. As he explains in book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics, when an organism undergoes restoration, the locus of pleasurable activity is not the part of the organism being restored but the part that remains unimpaired (NE 1152b33–36). He claims that when someone is being cured, the curative activity arises from the part of the organism that remains healthy. People erroneously associate the process of being cured with pleasure because they see the two occurring simultaneously: “By things pleasant incidentally I mean those that act as cures [τὰ ἰατρεύοντα] (for because as a result people are cured through some action of the part that remains healthy, for this reason the process is thought pleasant)” (1154b17–19). That the activity of pleasure is found in areas of normal functioning rather than in areas of deficiency is evident, Aristotle points out, from the fact that there are painless pleasures that do not stem from appetite: “For there are actually pleasures that involve no pain or appetite (e.g. those of contemplation [θεωρεῖν]), the nature in such a case not being defective at all” (1152b36–1153a2). Aristotle’s critique of the process argument is part of his larger point, only briefly touched on in book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics, that pleasures are activities and ends. He argues that it is not the case that pleasure is inferior to

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something else in the way that processes are inferior to the ends toward which they are directed; as activities rather than processes, pleasures do not have ends different from themselves. In book 7, Aristotle is rather vague on the details of the difference between an activity (ἐνέργεια), a process (γένεσις), and a movement (κίνησις), but his general idea is that pleasure is the activity of natural functioning that carries on without impediment; it is not a process or movement that may be associated with such activity.34 Whomever he has in mind as his target—Speusippus, Plato, perhaps others—he picks at the formulation of pleasure found in the Philebus by revising its theory of the connection between pleasure and health. In book 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle lays out in more detail his notion of an activity and explains how it is opposed to a process and a movement. Because the book 10 account is an elaboration of a topic he introduces in book 7, there is much scholarly debate concerning the extent to which Aristotle’s treatments of pleasure differ throughout the Nicomachean Ethics. The topic has been covered extensively in the literature, so I do not wish to add significantly to it here. For my purposes, it is sufficient to note that in both books Aristotle is reacting to the view that pleasure is either a process or a movement; his disagreement with the process argument remains a constant theme. Nevertheless, I believe that Aristotle’s reaction to the process argument is more developed, for whatever reason, in book 10,35 for there he gives a more substantial formulation of his notion of an activity. As part of his task to flesh out his notion of an activity, Aristotle begins book 10 with arguments specifically against the descriptions of pleasure as a movement and a process, arguments that do not appear in book 7. Pleasure is not a movement, he argues, because speed and slowness are proper to movements but not to pleasure. We may become angry or pleased quickly or slowly, but we cannot be angry or pleased quickly; speed applies only to the process of achieving pleasure (or to the process of becoming angry, sad, etc.), but not to pleasure once achieved (1173b2–4). I cannot enjoy a great work of art quickly, but I can reach my state of enjoyment quickly or slowly. And this, Aristotle claims, is why pleasures differ from movements such as walking or growth: speed applies to these movements while they are being performed. His additional argument that pleasure is no more a process than a movement is closely linked to his subsequent denial that pleasure is a restoration or replenishment. According to Aristotle, those who say pleasure is a process give the following description of the nature of pleasure and pain: a thing does not come to be out of any random thing, but

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“a thing is dissolved into that out of which it comes into being; and pain would be the destruction of that of which pleasure is the coming into being” (1173b5–7).36 He suggests that such people are attempting to identify the object of pleasure’s coming-into-being and pain’s perishing, and he reports the belief that pleasure is the coming-into-being of an organism’s natural condition, whereas pain is the emptying of the natural condition (1173b7–8). Consequently, some people hold that pleasure is synonymous with replenishment (ἀναπλήρωσις) and pain is synonymous with destruction. Aristotle counters that if one claims that pleasure and pain are restorations and destructions, respectively, then both are bodily experiences, since the body is the locus of filling and emptying: “If then pleasure is replenishment with that which is according to nature, that which feels pleasure will be that in which the replenishment takes place, i.e. the body” (1173b9–11). But to this Aristotle flatly responds, “That is not thought to be the case” (1173b11); pleasures have a mental component, which means they are not completely under the purview of the body.37 Technically, this is not a revision of the Philebus, since Plato acknowledges some non-bodily pleasures, such as pleasures of hopes, memories, and emotions, all of which are distinctly mental, but Plato nevertheless emphasizes in the Philebus that the mixed pleasures of the body, such as those relating to nutrition, are “the most ordinary and well-known” group (31e3–4). Aristotle recognizes that the view of pleasure as a replenishment (and, thus, as a process) stems mainly from observations of pleasures and pains accompanying nutrition, that is, from “the fact that when people have been short of food and have felt pain beforehand they are pleased by the replenishment” (1173b14–15). In a further objection, Aristotle repeats one of his responses to the process argument from book 7, and he provides more examples of his point: not all pleasures involve the filling of a lack, and therefore not all pleasures involve pain. He elaborates: “For the pleasures of learning [μαθηματικαί], and among the sensuous pleasures, those of smell, and also many sounds and sights, and memories and hopes, do not presuppose pain [ἄλυποι γάρ εἰσιν]. Of what then will these be the coming into being [γενέσεις]? There has not been lack of anything of which they could be the replenishment [ἀναπλήρωσις]” (1173b16– 20). Interestingly, Aristotle’s examples of the pleasures of learning, smells, sounds, and sights are precisely those given by Plato in the Philebus as examples of pure pleasures, which suggests that Aristotle is responding directly to the Philebus. Frede, however, has argued otherwise. On her view, that Aristotle uses these same examples suggests that he is not thinking of the Philebus: if Aristotle has

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taken note of Plato’s use of the examples in the Philebus, then Aristotle should realize that Plato himself makes room for pure pleasures that do not presuppose pain.38 On the contrary, I think Aristotle includes these examples as part of his rebuttal of what he believes is Plato’s view that all pleasures are processes, including pleasures that do not presuppose pain. Aristotle is using Plato’s examples against him by arguing that such pleasures are not in fact processes; Aristotle’s point is that the pleasures Plato believes are processes are activities in the Aristotelian sense. As in book 7, Aristotle proceeds in book 10 to elucidate his own description of pleasure as an activity of healthy functioning. Aristotle’s complicated distinction between an activity (ἐνέργεια) and a process (γένεσις) or movement (κίνησις) rests on the claim that an activity is complete in the moment; unlike a process or movement, an activity is not a progression in stages in which some potentiality is gradually realized until it is actualized (1174a13ff ). At any point during a process of change (e.g., baking a cake), what is changing is different from itself: it is different from the end state it will become (e.g., a completed cake), any previous stages (e.g., mixing the batter), and any further stages (e.g., icing the top). Motions are parts of processes and are thus imperfect: considered individually, each constitutes just a segment of the overall construction process. But actions such as seeing actualize potentialities perfectly, that is, non-sequentially: unlike a process such as building, which reaches a terminal point gradually, seeing and other perfect actions are achieved as the activity is being performed. As Aristotle comments, seeing “does not lack anything which coming into being later will complete its form” (1174a15–16).39 Similarly, pleasure does not lack anything that could come to be later to complete it; longer duration will not add anything to pleasure’s form since it is already complete in itself. Inherent in this idea of completeness is the notion that activities, such as pleasure and seeing, are whole rather than divisible; if activities are without parts, there cannot be some other element that has yet to be completed when I engage in the activity. A task that is divisible into parts, such as building, takes time to complete and is for the sake of some end; it is a movement, complete only in its final moment when all its parts are put together.40 Aristotle writes of movement (κίνησις), “In their parts and during the time they occupy, all movements are incomplete, and are different in kind from the whole movement and from each other” (1174a21–23).41 He adds that pleasure cannot be a process for one of the same reasons it cannot be a movement: processes, like movements, apply only to divisible things, not to wholes (1174b10–12). He concludes, “Plainly, then, pleasure and movement

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must be different from each other, and pleasure must be one of the things that are whole and complete” (1174b6–7).42 Aristotle goes on in book 10 to define further the relation between pleasure, activity, and healthy functioning. Pleasure, according to Aristotle, completes an activity, but not just any activity: one that is performed by a “well-conditioned organ in relation to the worthiest of its objects” (1174b22–23). Aristotle understands every organ to be active in relation to something; an organ in good condition, operating at its best, acts in relation to the best of its objects (1174b30). When the organ is in tip-top condition and working with the finest objects, “this activity will be the most complete and pleasant [τελειοτάτη εἴη καὶ ἡδίστη]” (1174b19–20). On this account, pleasure arises when an organ is functioning well, doing what it should in the best way it can. As I mentioned earlier, there is much disagreement in the literature as to whether Aristotle believes pleasure is an element that supervenes on an activity or is identical to an activity.43 He appears to claim the latter in book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics, and many scholars believe he adheres to the former in book 10 due in large part to his claim that “pleasure completes the activity, not as the inherent state does, but as an end which supervenes as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower of their age” (1174b31–33).44 Translated in this way, Aristotle does appear to say that pleasure itself is not an activity; rather, it supervenes upon an activity. And although it has been argued that the passage says nothing about a “bloom of youth,” but actually reads “bloom in those who are vigorous” (as Van Riel has it),45 most still believe that Aristotle intends to describe pleasure as a supervenient element.46 I do not wish to enter into this controversy, as it does not bear directly on my claim that Aristotle relates pleasure to health and in so doing responds to the process argument of the Philebus, but I agree with most scholars that book 10 very likely represents Aristotle’s mature view, given the breadth of Aristotle’s treatment of the relation between pleasure and activity in book 10 as compared to book 7. The Peripatetic Magna Moralia features many of the same objections to the process argument found in the Nicomachean Ethics, and the former clearly states that pleasure belongs to the activity of healthy functioning but not to the process of attaining such functioning. It is stated again that some think pleasure is not part of the good because pleasure is incomplete, and it is reported that some say pleasure is “a conscious restoration to a normal state” (ἀποκατάστασις εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή, 1204b36–37).47 The Peripatetic response to these criticisms is very much along the lines of that found in the Nicomachean Ethics: there are

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pleasures that have nothing to do with processes of becoming, such as pleasures of thought, seeing, and smelling. In a bolder move than the Nicomachean Ethics, the author of the Magna Moralia asserts that no pleasure is a becoming, not even eating or drinking (1204b20ff ).48 The reasoning behind this reminds us of book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics: pleasure is an activity of the soul, which continues to operate as it should when the body is deficient. In other words, the locus of pleasure’s activity is not the body, which is depleted, but the area of the organism that remains healthy, in this case the soul. The author goes on to conclude, rather strangely, given his rejection of pleasures as becomings, that “there are pleasures both of a nature undergoing restoration and also of one in its normal state” (ἡ ἡδονὴ καὶ καθισταμένης τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας, 1205b21). The former are “satisfactions which follow upon deficiency”; the latter, which are the pleasures “of a nature in its normal state,” are exemplified by the pleasures of sight and hearing (1205b22–24). The author goes on to claim that both pleasures are activities (ἐνέργειαι) (1205b25). Now, if the author is following Aristotle’s rejection of the process argument from the Nicomachean Ethics, and if the author desires to maintain consistency within the Magna Moralia’s treatment of pleasure itself, then he cannot mean that one kind of pleasure is a process of restoration. The fact that the author claims that both kinds of pleasure—namely, those accompanying restoration and those of the normal state—are activities makes it clear that pleasure is not here being identified with a process. I think we should take the point to be that pleasure can arise when a deficiency is present— for example, when pleasurable activity occurs in healthy parts of an organism that is also experiencing some kind of deficiency—but it can also arise when no deficiency is present, such as when an organism experiences pleasures of contemplation and smell, which are Aristotle’s examples in the Nicomachean Ethics. As Van Riel comments, “Pleasure as such is not to be found in the repletion of a lack, but exclusively in the faculties or dispositions that function as they should” (2000b: 66). Given these two kinds of pleasure—one experienced during a deficiency, the other in the absence of deficiency—it makes sense for the author to claim that the latter kind of pleasure is preferable to the former, even though both consist in the natural, optimal activity of an organism; the experience of the former is more pure since it is untainted by pain. Thus, since both types of pleasure are activities, they are compared in terms of purity instead of their degree of change. Although the ideas presented in the Nicomachean Ethics and Magna Moralia are quite similar—the same process argument is introduced and rejected in both—

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the author of the Magna Moralia more clearly distinguishes pleasures associated with restoration from pleasures associated with a normal state of health. The crucial elements of the Aristotelian rejection of the Platonic process argument in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Magna Moralia are (i) the articulation in the former of the notion that pleasure is an activity of healthy functioning and (ii) the reiteration in the latter that even pleasures of restoration are activities of the healthy elements of an organism and are not any sort of process. As I noted earlier, the fact that the process argument in itself must have been of interest to Aristotle, and not just the anti-hedonist ideology that it furthered, is evident from the fact that he disagrees with the argument even though he does not entirely disagree with the anti-hedonism of its proponents. Although Aristotle does defend some of Eudoxus’ arguments for the position that pleasure is the good, Aristotle ultimately disagrees with the hedonist’s thesis, claiming that the goodness of a pleasure depends on the goodness of its associated activity; some pleasures, like some activities, are choiceworthy, but some are “bad” and “to be avoided” (1175b25). That Aristotle goes out of his way to rebuke those who hold that pleasure is a process, movement, or restoration, even though he agrees, at least in part, with their anti-hedonism, strongly suggests that the descriptions of pleasure under consideration were of interest in themselves and were not just cogs in a larger enterprise to devalue pleasure. As I discuss in later chapters, Epicurus’ conception of pleasure makes sense as a response to Plato’s description of pleasure as a process, as well as to Aristotle’s reply to Plato’s view. As we have seen, the main topic in the debates about pleasure and hedonism among Platonists and Aristotelians concerns the ontological and moral differences between pleasures of restoration and pleasures of conditions or states. These two conceptions of pleasure will end up corresponding quite closely to Epicurus’ two types of pleasure—the kinetic and the katastematic.

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Cicero’s De Finibus and Epicurean Pleasure

Undoubtedly, the absence of pain makes for an unusual pleasure. One who equates the two terms clearly has some explaining to do. It is unfortunate, then, that the extant texts of Epicurus—the most notorious proponent of such an equation—should complicate rather than clarify matters. In Epicurus’ texts we find him appearing to claim not only that pleasure is an overall condition of painlessness, but also that pleasure is associated with the experiences of sensory titillations such as taste, vision, and sex.1 Hence we have derisive reports such as Alciphron’s that the Epicurean Xenocrates experienced the highest Epicurean good—that is, the absence of pain—by embracing an unscrupulous dancing woman while ogling her lasciviously.2 The main text from which the apparent obscurity in Epicurus’ conception of the highest good derives is Cicero’s De Finibus. It is primarily from this text that we know of a distinction—purportedly Epicurean—between two genera of pleasure: one that involves change or motion, affecting our senses with an agreeable feeling (voluptas in motu), and one that is the condition of feeling no pain (voluptas in stabilitatem).3 These are often translated as ‘in-motion’ and ‘static,’ respectively,4 although scholars standardly refer to the former as ‘kinetic’ and the latter as ‘katastematic,’ which are quasi-transliterations of Epicurus’ own terms κατὰ κίνησιν and καταστηματικός. On Cicero’s account, Epicurean hedonism appears to consist, confusingly, in two opposed kinds of pleasure: one that is essentially sensory, and another that is defined solely in terms of what it lacks, such as bodily pain or anxiety. Interestingly, Cicero does not interpret Epicurean hedonism in terms of Plato’s conceptions of health: unlike Plato, Cicero does not emphasize any connection between the state of painlessness and a condition of optimal functioning. Instead, Cicero remarks on the difference between pleasure and health: at De Fin. 2.114 he claims, “Even in the realm of the body, there is much that is preferable to pleasure, for example strength, health [valetudo], speed, and good looks.” In

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addition, he fails to identify viable ways of fitting pleasures of physical and mental restoration into Epicurus’ ethical system, pleasures that were so prominent and problematic in Plato’s own treatments of pleasure. Because Cicero’s account of Epicurean pleasure in De Finibus is one of the main stumbling blocks to reading Epicurean hedonism through the lens of Plato’s treatments of pleasure and their attendant ancient debates, Cicero’s text demands thorough analysis here. Most scholars follow Cicero’s rendering of the distinction between katastematic and kinetic pleasure, and many of them are unsympathetic to the claim that Epicurean hedonism bears the marks of what look like Platonic concepts. In this chapter, I examine Cicero’s account of Epicurean pleasure in the first two books of De Finibus as well as the main Epicurean material that many scholars believe corroborates Cicero’s testimony. The bulk of my treatment of Epicurean texts appears in the following chapters. Presently, I contend that Cicero’s account of Epicurean pleasure in De Finibus creates more problems than it solves, particularly concerning the vexed distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasure. I aim to show that Cicero’s account problematically assumes that the two pleasures are distinguished based on the presence or absence of change: kinetic pleasures are characterized by changes and/or motions in one’s state, whereas katastematic pleasures involve no change and/or motion. Cicero’s prime examples of the former are bodily changes experienced by the sense organs, such as the physiological change that occurs when drinking while thirsty, and he tends to associate sensation with kinetic pleasures in general. In my view, this is a mistake. Any account that separates katastematic pleasure from sensation, motion, or change ends up distorting the Epicureans’ conception of the highest good. Consequently, I believe there is good reason to be cautious in our reliance on De Finibus for evidence of Epicurean doctrine.

Cicero’s account and critique of Epicurean pleasure In book 1 of De Finibus, Cicero has his Epicurean interlocutor Lucius Torquatus give the following description of what are purported to be two types of Epicurean pleasure: non enim hanc solam sequimur quae suavitate aliqua naturam ipsam movet et cum iucunditate quadam percipitur sensibus, sed maximam voluptatem illam habemus quae percipitur omni dolore detracto. nam quoniam, cum privamur dolore, ipsa liberatione et vacuitate omnis molestiae gaudemus, omne autem

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id quo gaudemus voluptas est, ut omne quo offendimur dolor, doloris omnis privatio recte nominata est voluptas. ut enim, cum cibo et potione fames sitisque depulsa est, ipsa detractio molestiae consecutionem adfert voluptatis, sic in omni re deloris amotio successionem efficit voluptatis. (De Fin. 1.37–38) We do not simply pursue the sort of pleasure that moves our nature with a certain sweetness and is perceived by the senses with a certain delight; rather, the pleasure we deem greatest is that which is perceived when all pain is removed. For when we are freed from pain, we rejoice in that very liberation and release from all that is distressing. Now everything in which one rejoices is a pleasure (just as everything that distresses one is a pain). And so every release from pain is rightly termed a pleasure. Just as when hunger and thirst have been removed by food and drink, this very removal of trouble brings pleasure as a consequence, so too in every case the removing of pain causes pleasure as a result.

Here Cicero has Torquatus attempt to distinguish two types of pleasure: pleasant sensations caused by stimulation of the sense organs, and joy at being without pain.5 According to Torquatus, then, kinetic pleasure is an agreeable sensation.6 This description is echoed by Cicero himself at 2.6, followed at 2.7 by a few examples from Epicurus’ lost text On the Telos (Περὶ τέλους) of what Cicero has called ‘pleasures in motion.’ As reported by Athenaeus, Epicurus says the following in On the Telos: “I do not know how I will conceive the good if I take away the pleasures of taste, if I take away sexual pleasures, if I take away pleasures of hearing, and if I take away the pleasant movements of form in vision.”7 Armed with this statement of the good, Cicero accuses Epicurus of twisting words. According to Cicero, Epicurus describes two different phenomena as if they were identical: a delightful feeling, which, according to Cicero, is what most Greek and Latin speakers call ‘pleasure,’ and the state of being without pain. Epicurus would be better off, Cicero argues, following the lead of either the Peripatetic Hieronymus of Rhodes, who equates absence of pain with the good yet not with pleasure, or Aristippus, the head of the Cyrenaic school, who equates the good with pleasure of the senses rather than with the absence of pain. A more reasonable approach for Epicurus, Cicero continues, would be to combine the views of Hieronymus and Aristippus so as to have two ultimate goods.8 Epicurus, Cicero argues, combines these two views into a single ultimate good, resulting in the difficulty of proving that the absence of pain is pleasure. This mistake manifests itself in the discrepancy between kinetic and katastematic pleasures: as Cicero has it, Epicurus combines them into a single good (‘pleasure’) despite the fact that they are completely dissimilar. According to Cicero, it is “absolutely impossible” to create a single ultimate good out of such disparate things (2.20).

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The description of Epicurean kinetic pleasure as an agreeable sensory stimulation appears again in book 2 of De Finibus, in the course of Cicero’s extended rebuttal of Epicureanism as Torquatus presented it in book 1. When questioning the Epicurean notion that once the complete removal of pain is reached there can be variation of pleasure but no increase, Cicero describes Epicurean pleasures as follows: ista varietas quae sit non satis perspicio, quod ais cum dolore careamus tum in summa voluptate nos esse, cum autem vescamur iis rebus quae dulcem motum adferant sensibus, tum esse in motu voluptatem, quae faciat varietatem voluptatum, sed non augeri illam non dolendi voluptatem, quam cur voluptatem appelles nescio. (De Fin. 2.10) The variation you are speaking of is rather unclear: you say that when we lack pain then we have the highest pleasure, and that when we taste those things that give a sweet motion to the senses, then we have pleasure ‘in motion.’ It is this sort of pleasure, you claim, that produces a variety of pleasure, but fails to augment the pleasure of not being in pain, though why you call the latter pleasure at all is a mystery to me.

Cicero’s criticism aside, he evidently believes that Epicureans define kinetic pleasures in terms of an agreeable sensation, and that they contrast such pleasures with the absence of pain. Later in book 2, Cicero argues that this purported bifurcation of pleasure complicates the Epicurean ‘cradle argument,’ which asserts that the telos is pleasure because infants and non-rational animals instinctively pursue it.9 On the Epicureans’ logic, we have a natural, instinctive desire for the telos. Cicero, however, wonders why a creature would desire to seek the absence of pain instinctively since according to him only kinetic pleasure can arouse an appetitive desire: “Only the caress of sensory pleasure has this effect” (at ille pellit qui permulcet sensum voluptate, 2.32). Since “the static condition of freedom from pain [status hic non dolendi] produces no motive force to impel the mind to act,” the telos cannot be the absence of pain (2.32). Evidently, Cicero believes that kinetic pleasures involve sensory stimuli, and that katastematic ones somehow do not. Since, according to Cicero, sensory stimuli are necessary to compel us to act, and since katastematic pleasures do not involve sensory stimuli, such pleasures have no motivational power. Cicero indicates several more times in book 2 that Epicureans believe kinetic pleasures involve the feeling of an agreeable stimulation of a sense organ: at 2.16 he claims, “[Epicurus] calls the sweet sensation ‘kinetic’ pleasure; the freedom from pain ‘static’ pleasure” (sic enim appellat hanc dulcem, in motu,

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illam nihil dolentis, in stabilitate). At 2.30, Cicero again mentions that “the pleasures in motion, he [Epicurus] calls agreeable and, as it were, sweet” (hanc in motu voluptatem sic enim has suaves et quasi dulces voluptates appellat). In his comparison of Epicureanism and Cyrenaicism, Cicero claims that pleasure involving sensory stimulation is the only phenomenon the Cyrenaics recognize as pleasure; they do not also recognize freedom from pain. He tells Torquatus, “Aristippus and all the Cyrenaics, who did not shrink from regarding pleasure as the supreme good—I mean the kind of pleasure that moves the senses with an intense sweetness [quae maxima dulcedine sensum moveret]—they had no time for that freedom from pain of yours [vacuitatem doloris]” (2.39). Evidently, active stimulation of the sense organs is one of the main criteria in terms of which Cicero differentiates kinetic from katastematic pleasure.10 After distinguishing among Epicurean pleasures in this way, Cicero neatly segues into one of his major objections, which he presents several times in the early sections of book 2: the common conception of the Greek word ἡδονή and the Latin voluptas correspond to Epicurean kinetic pleasure (as Cicero understands it), yet Epicurus insists that the highest pleasure is katastematic. Cicero’s belief that Epicurus’ conception of pleasure is entirely unconventional could not be plainer: “Everyone agrees that the Greek word ἡδονή and the Latin word voluptas refer to a delightful motion that gladdens the senses” (2.8).11 According to Cicero, Epicurus cheats by blatantly ignoring the accepted terminology when he uses a word that normally carries the connotation of an agreeable feeling—‘pleasure’—to describe a state that involves no such thing. Although Torquatus does not explicitly combine kinetic and static pleasure into a single ultimate end,12 he does maintain that the Epicurean summum bonum is a state of painlessness (1.37) while paradoxically defending Epicurus’ claim that some sensory pleasures, such as those of taste and hearing, are integral parts of the highest good (2.7). When pressed to explain further, Torquatus demands an end to questioning (2.17), thereby confirming Cicero’s complaint in book 1 of De Finibus that Epicurus is a failure at logic, having handed down “no system for conducting and concluding arguments” (1.22). In Cicero’s eyes, Epicurean hedonism is a broken enterprise, not least of all because its founder has no idea what pleasure really is (2.6). Many scholars of Epicurean ethics follow Cicero’s description of Epicurean kinetic and katastematic pleasure: all agreeable sensory stimulations (such as those of taste, sex, and hearing), which is to say all pleasures involving change, are kinetic, whereas states without pain are static.13 Consequently, Cicero’s view

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has led to readings that sharply dichotomize the two pleasures: Phillip Mitsis, for instance, claims that kinetic and static pleasures are “incommensurable and that kinetic pleasures are a matter of rational indifference to our overall happiness,”14 and Philip Merlan argues that the source of kinetic pleasure is an external stimulus, while the source of static pleasure is the organism itself.15 According to such Ciceronian readings, Epicurus distinguishes two classes of pleasure in order to differentiate the summum bonum—the katastematic pleasures of ἀταραξία (lack of disturbance in the soul) and ἀπονία (absence of pain in the body)—from the summum bonum of the profligate, namely, excessive sensory enjoyment. This interpretation of Epicurus’ motive is somewhat confirmed by the Letter to Menoeceus, where he explains that when he calls pleasure the telos he means ἀταραξία and ἀπονία rather than “the pleasures of the prodigal and the pleasures of sensuality” (τὰς τῶν ἀσώτων ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς ἐν ἀπολαύσει κειμένας, Ad Men. 131).

Problems with Cicero’s account What strikes one as odd about the distinction between kinetic and static pleasure is that, for all Cicero’s fussing, there is no description of it in Epicurus’ extant major works. In none of his known letters, his Kuriai Doxai, or the Vatican Sayings do we find an elaboration of the division of kinetic and katastematic pleasure that forms the basis of Cicero’s critique in De Finibus. The only known place where Epicurus’ own words on the distinction appear is a short quotation from one of his lost texts, On Choices (Περὶ αἱρέσεων), provided by Diogenes Laertius.16 Epicurus’ words are as follows: “Tranquility [ἀταραξία] and painlessness [ἀπονία] are katastematic pleasures [καταστηματικαί ἡδοναί], joy [χαρά] and gladness of mind [εὐφροσύνη] are seen to consist in motion [κατὰ κίνησιν] and activity” (DL 10.136).17 Right before this we are told that the Epicureans Metrodorus and Diogenes of Tarsus describe pleasure in two ways: “Pleasure pertaining to motion [κατὰ κίνησιν] and pleasure pertaining to a state [καταστηματικῆς]” (DL 10.136). Diogenes Laertius also reports, without quoting anything, that in contrast to the Cyrenaics Epicurus distinguishes not only between kinetic and katastematic pleasure but also between bodily and mental pleasure. According to Diogenes, these distinctions were found in Epicurus’ lost works On the Telos and On Ways of Life, and also in a lost letter to friends in Mytilene (DL 10.136).18 If Diogenes’ report is accurate, then some distinction between pleasures goes back

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to Epicurus, yet we have little evidence that Epicurus himself or his prominent followers classify certain pleasures as kinetic or katastematic in the way that Cicero describes. That is, we have little evidence from Epicurus or Epicureans that all sensory delights or changes in a perceiver’s state, such as those sensory delights described in On the Telos, are kinetic, or that katastematic pleasures are states lacking agreeable sensory stimulations or changes and defined generally in terms of what they are not (such as ‘absence of pain’ and ‘lack of disturbance’). Indeed, in Torquatus’ initial explication of Epicurean pleasure, at 1.37, he does not use the language of ‘kinetic’ and ‘static’; he introduces those terms later, after much goading by Cicero’s character (2.9). In support of Cicero’s reading of Epicurean pleasure, scholars point to several texts that they believe confirm Cicero’s equation of Epicurean katastematic pleasure with a changeless, motionless state of the absence of pain. I quoted one such text above: in On Choices, Epicurus claims that tranquility and painlessness are katastematic pleasures. Considerable emphasis is put on this passage by modern supporters of Cicero’s reading, since, as I mentioned, it is the only place where Epicurus himself uses the term ‘katastematic pleasure’ (καταστηματικαί ἡδοναί).19 I discuss this passage in considerable detail in Chapter 6, but I will say here that the passage is arguably one of the worst on which to ground any interpretation of Epicurean pleasure. For starters, the distinction between katastematic and kinetic pleasure in the passage is gummed up by its description of joy (χαρά): in On Choices, Epicurus appears to classify joy as kinetic, yet he usually classifies it as katastematic.20 This discrepancy makes it difficult to discern how the Epicureans are carving up the different pleasures. More importantly, the passage offers no description of tranquility and painlessness, and nowhere does it say, as Cicero problematically does, that tranquility and painlessness belong to a category that is opposed to sensory pleasure. Moreover, the passage’s examples of kinetic pleasures, which Cicero believes involve sensory stimuli, appear to have nothing to do with stimulation of the sensory organs: joy (χαρά) and gladness of mind (εὐφροσύνη) make more sense as mental pleasures. Some scholars also draw on KD 3 to corroborate Cicero’s interpretation.21 In KD 3, Epicurus establishes the limit of pleasure and the opposition between pleasure and pain: “The removal of all pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. Wherever pleasure is present, so long as it is present, there is neither pain nor distress, nor both together.”22 Here Epicurus does indeed say that pleasure cannot be increased beyond the absence of pain, but, again, this does not necessarily mean that the absence of pain involves no sensory stimulation of

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the sense organs. It could very well be that the absence of pain is characterized by painless sensory events (such as pleasing tastes unaccompanied by pain), an idea that Cicero fails to consider. In addition, KD 3 does not use the terms ‘katastematic’ or ‘kinetic.’ Consequently, it seems unreasonable to suppose that KD 3 confirms Cicero’s description of the two types of pleasure.23 If the Epicureans do describe kinetic and katastematic pleasure in the way Cicero claims, then they are in real trouble. If we believe, following Cicero, that Epicurus bifurcates pleasures into two incommensurable classes—that is, into classes whose descriptions bear no logical connection—it is hard to see beyond Cicero’s depiction of Epicurus as an illogical thinker who cared little for consistent argumentation. The first of many difficulties that arise if we follow Cicero is the obvious problem stressed in De Finibus that Epicurus’ conception of the summum bonum is at best very foggy. How can Epicurus describe the highest good as freedom from pain in the body and disturbance in the soul, as he does in his Letter to Menoeceus (131), yet also proclaim that he cannot conceive of the very same highest good without sensory delights such as those from taste and sex? Second, if we take it that the summum bonum is defined in opposition to sensory pleasures, we struggle to comprehend why Epicurus thinks of himself as a hedonist.24 Cicero is convinced that other ancient thinkers do not associate ‘pleasure’ with what he believes is Epicurus’ conception of the absence of pain,25 and we know of at least one figure, namely, Hieronymus of Rhodes, who denies that the absence of pain is pleasure yet has no problem designating the former as the highest good.26 Why would Epicurus bring pleasure into the equation at all? Cicero’s account leads us to ponder why Epicurus even bothered with the term ‘pleasure,’ and yet De Finibus gives us few resources with which to satisfy our wonder. A third difficulty concerns Epicurus’ so-called cradle argument, which, again, asserts that pleasure is the highest good based on the fact that infants and all animals seek pleasure and avoid pain.27 To Epicurus, infants and animals are reliable indicators of what is natural since they are not (yet) corrupted by false assumptions (ὑπολήψεις ψευδεῖς) about what is good and bad. But if katastematic pleasure, the summum bonum, is described as nothing more than the state of the absence of pain and contrasted with agreeable sensory stimulations, it is difficult to see how the first impulses of any creature could be directed toward katastematic rather than kinetic pleasure as Cicero describes these. This difficulty leads Cicero to quip, “Which sort of pleasure, static [stante]

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or in motion [movente] (to use the terminology we have learned from Epicurus, heaven help us), will the bawling infant use to determine the supreme good and evil?” (2.31).28 This is not to say that Torquatus makes no distinction between Epicurean pleasures: later on he talks of pleasure that “titillated the senses [titillaret sensus] and flooded them with sweetness [ad eos cum suavitate adflueret et inlaberetur]”29 as though it were different from the feeling of complete emancipation from pain (1.39). In the story of the hand, in book 1, Torquatus distinguishes the absence of pain from sensatory stimulation as he recounts the following syllogism that Chrysippus was said to have enjoyed: “ ‘Does your hand want anything, while it is in its present condition?’ Answer: ‘No, nothing,’—‘But if pleasure were a good, it would want pleasure.’—‘Yes, I suppose it would.’—‘Therefore pleasure is not a good’ ” (1.39). Torquatus claims that this argument tells against a Cyrenaic but not an Epicurean, since the former counts as pleasure only that which “titillated the senses and flooded them with sweetness” (1.39). Thus, the hand, which feels no pain, is indeed pleasureless according to the Cyrenaics, on whose behalf Cicero responds: “Neither the hand nor any other part of the body could be satisfied with the mere absence of pain without the delightful motion of pleasure [vacuitate doloris sine iucundo motu voluptatis]” (1.39). According to Torquatus, Epicureans sidestep Chrysippus’ argument because they believe that the absence of pain is the highest pleasure. The hand does indeed want nothing, since not even additional sensory pleasure can augment the pleasantness of the absence of pain, but it is wrong to say the hand is pleasureless.30 The Epicurean dodges Chrysippus’ criticism only if there is a difference between “the delightful motion of pleasure” and the pleasure associated with a painless condition. As Warren explains,31 the story of the hand puts the Epicureans in a real bind: if they admit that their highest pleasure differs from agreeable sensory stimulations, then they are guilty (according to Cicero) of using the term ‘pleasure’ to refer to a condition that no Greek or Latin speaker would associate with that word. But if the Epicureans believe their highest pleasure does not differ from agreeable sensory stimulations, then they are no different than the Cyrenaics, whose hedonism the Epicureans claim to reject. So the Epicureans are either wrong or unoriginal,32 and they have no way out of this dilemma if Cicero is right that they contrast the absence of pain with any sort of description of pleasure as sensation, motion, or change. The story of the hand creates an additional problem with Cicero’s account of Epicurean pleasure: as Clay Splawn has noted, if, as Cicero claims, pleasure is the absence of pain and nothing else, then even a state without conscious

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awareness, such as that of a dead body or a comatose patient, is the highest pleasure as long as such a state is painless.33 If the painless hand in Chrysippus’ syllogism experiences the highest pleasure, then so do corpses. But Epicureans vehemently claim that the dead experience neither pleasure nor pain. What Torquatus ought to have said is that pleasure belongs not to the painless hand itself, which has no capacity for conscious awareness, but to the subject who is aware of the hand’s painless condition.34 Cicero, however, repeatedly describes the highest Epicurean pleasure simply as the absence of pain (e.g., 1.38–39, 2.10, 2.16, 2.32), with no indication that conscious awareness is required for pleasure. Although Cicero does claim at 1.37 that the greatest Epicurean pleasure is to perceive (percipitur) no pain,35 this does not necessarily carry the sense that ‘x is having a feeling, which is that x has no pain.’ Rather, it may mean something like, ‘x is not feeling anything, and among the things x is not feeling is pain.’ This latter sense seems more likely given the high frequency of Cicero’s statements that the greatest Epicurean pleasure is painlessness itself. If Epicureans believe the summum bonum is just the absence of pain, as Cicero seems to think they do, this commits Epicureans to the absurd position that katastematic pleasure can be achieved by any unfeeling thing. If Cicero knows anything about Epicurean philosophy, and if his professed aim is to provide a faithful account of their summum bonum, then why does he have Torquatus contrast the absence of pain with enjoyable sensory stimuli? A charitable interpretation is that Torquatus, as the Epicurean spokesperson, wishes to press a point that Epicurus himself makes in the Letter to Menoeceus that if the pleasures of sensory stimulation are pursued without any mind to their limit (namely, the absence of pain), then unhappiness will ensue in the form of frustrated desires and an abused body. At 1.32, Torquatus mentions the Epicureans’ concern with overindulgence: “For no one rejects, hates, or avoids pleasure because it is pleasure, but because great pains ensue for those who do not know how to pursue pleasure rationally [ratione voluptatem sequi nesciunt].” A little later in 1.32, Torquatus claims that no one has the right to criticize a person “who wishes to have pleasure as long as no troubles ensue.” And at 1.33 he adds that Epicureans chastise men who are so entranced by pleasure and blinded by desire that they cannot foresee the pain that awaits them. Moreover, Torquatus’ stated goal at the beginning of his discussion of the highest pleasure is to help Cicero understand “that Epicurean philosophy is held to be sensual, luxurious, and soft, when it is serious, moderate, and austere” (ea quae voluptaria delicata mollis habeatur disciplina quam gravis, quam continens, quam severa sit ,

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1.37). One might argue, then, that Torquatus divorces the Epicurean highest good from pleasing sensory stimuli in order to create a clear divide between the telos of Epicureans and the telos of profligates. Along these lines, Torquatus may be attempting to guard against a pejorative view of Epicureans as wanton pursuers of sensory pleasure. As a way to explain Cicero’s presentation of the Epicurean position in De Finibus, it has been suggested that Cicero probably encounters the distinction between katastematic and kinetic pleasure in Epicureanism through Antiochus of Ascalon’s use of the divisio Carneadea, the Middle Academy’s classification of ethical doctrines according to ends.36 In this classification, Epicurus’ ethical doctrine is classified as a synthesis of the Cyrenaic conception of pleasures ‘in motion’ (i.e., pleasant sensory stimuli) and Hieronymus of Rhodes’ notion of the telos as the absence of pain. As we know from De Finibus, Cicero believes that Epicurean ethics is a failed attempt to combine bodily pleasure with the absence of pain—the ethical ends proposed by Aristippus and Hieronymus, respectively. If this is the case, then Cicero’s account may reflect the divisio Carneadea’s version of Epicurean ethics more than it does Epicurus’ own views, which is all the more reason for us to be conservative in relying on De Finibus. Although it seems likely that the divisio Carneadea looms large in Cicero’s background, it cannot be the case that the Carneadean classification is Cicero’s only source. We know that his other sources include lectures by contemporary Epicureans such as Phaedrus and Zeno of Sidon, whom Cicero heard in Rome and Athens, respectively,37 and some passages in De Finibus are paraphrases of Epicurus’ Letter to Menoeceus and various Kuriai Doxai.38 In addition, Sedley claims persuasively that the argumentative structure of Cicero’s presentation of Epicurean ethics in book 1 of De Finibus closely follows the argumentative structure of Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura and Epicurus’ presentation of physics in the Letter to Herodotus.39 According to Sedley, both the ethics and the physics follow the four key steps of (1) making general claims about the dyadic nature of something (e.g., atoms and void in physics; pleasure and pain in ethics); (2) defending those claims with analysis; (3) showing that the dyadic explanation is exhaustive; and (4) eliminating other explanations. It is clear from all of this that Cicero has access to some Epicurean texts and is familiar with the views of Epicureans of his time. Nevertheless, Cicero might not be working with many of Epicurus’ own texts: twice in De Finibus Cicero introduces the views of factions within Epicureanism, which may mean that he is drawing on their versions of Epicurean material rather than on Epicurus’ own words.40 And even if the methodology of the

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ethics parallels that of the physics, this in no way guarantees the accuracy of Cicero’s claims about Epicurean hedonism: although we may be able to discern in De Finibus the proper Epicurean procedure for proving foundational beliefs, Cicero’s version of those beliefs is not necessarily correct. For instance, we may imagine that in step one of the Epicurean argumentative procedure Cicero accurately reports the general Epicurean claims that pleasure is the summum bonum and pain is the summum malum, and that he then proceeds to support these claims, in step two, by drawing on the divisio Carneadea’s description of Epicurean pleasure. That Cicero presents the facts in a certain way does not guarantee that he gets the facts right. In addition, Sedley does not address whether Cicero knowingly follows the Epicurean order of exposition, an issue that is quite important. If Cicero is aware that he follows the Epicurean methodology, then his repeated claim that the Epicureans have no system for defending arguments is rather unfair, as is his insistence that Torquatus should address certain issues in a way that defies the standard order of Epicurean arguments (e.g., whether infants experience kinetic or katastematic pleasure).41 At any rate, my point is that Cicero’s version of Epicurean ethics may be colored by different interpretations of the place of Epicureanism in the history of ancient ethics, and this may account for some of the oddities in his presentation of the Epicurean material in the first two books of De Finibus. We must also keep in mind that Cicero is a hostile source. He takes issue with the Epicurean subordination of virtue to pleasure, claiming that any Epicurean should be shamed by Cleanthes’ portrait of the Virtues ministering to Pleasure, who is grandly attired and seated far above them (2.6). Furthermore, Cicero describes his discussion with Torquatus as a “contest” (certatio) between virtue and pleasure (2.44),42 and he claims in the opening remarks of the third book of De Finibus that “things said about pleasure are discussed neither sharply or profoundly” (3.2).43 So although De Finibus is our most complete source for Epicurean pleasure, it may not be our best. It is also possible, as Stefano Maso has argued, that Cicero knows the Epicurean material quite well but is nevertheless intentionally distorting it in order to refine and correct it.44 Maso shows quite effectively that this is the case for Cicero’s account of the swerve in Epicurean physics. According to Maso, Cicero is fully aware that his description of the Epicurean swerve is flawed: when Cicero’s account of the swerve is reconstructed from De Natura Deorum, De Fato, and De Finibus, it is evident that it follows Carneades’ criticisms of Epicurean physics and ignores Lucretius’ clarifications of the Epicurean position.45 Maso argues that something similar happens in Cicero’s

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account of Epicurean pleasure in De Finibus: Cicero has an excellent grasp of the fundamental Epicurean tenet that the highest pleasure is the opposite of suffering, but Cicero also wishes to press his own view (and that of Hieronymus of Rhodes) that suffering is opposed not to pleasure but to the absence of suffering. Consequently, according to Maso, Cicero both knows and distorts Epicurus’ views on the summum bonum. Yet Maso admits that Cicero’s account of Epicurean pleasure in De Finibus is confused: Cicero is attempting to grapple with the difficult Epicurean distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasure, and he ends up making some mistakes. According to Maso, kinetic pleasures are mere categories of katastematic pleasures, and so it makes little sense to separate pleasures into different classes, as Cicero attempts to do. Because Cicero tries to force Epicurean pleasure into the wrong framework, he inevitably gets it wrong: “Faced with the audacity of this line of thought, it is almost inevitable that Cicero’s understanding would be inadequate, especially if he aims, even with the best intentions, to distinguish kinetic pleasures from katastematic ones, or vice versa.”46 Even if we set aside our reservations about Cicero’s intentions, and even if we assume that he has spent considerable time studying Epicureanism, it may still be the case that he misunderstands Epicurean pleasure or interprets it largely through a nonEpicurean lens (such as the ethical system of Carneades).

Kinetic pleasures in De Finibus A final problem with building an account of Epicurean pleasure on De Finibus is that in its first two books Cicero switches between two conceptions of kinetic pleasure that are difficult to unify into a single description: in many of the passages I discussed earlier, he describes kinetic pleasure as a sensory stimulation that provides variation (version 1), but he also describes kinetic pleasure as the filling of a lack (version 2).47 The problem is that not all sensory variations are fillings: the pleasure of eating while hungry, for instance, is different from the pleasure of taste. The former presupposes a deficiency and occurs as the organism is in a process of changing from a deficient condition to a filled one. The latter, however, is not necessarily based on a deficiency and can occur even when an organism is not undergoing a process of restorative change. I can, for example, enjoy tasting my food even when I am not hungry, but clearly the same cannot be said for the pleasure of removing my hunger while eating. Even if I were to enjoy the taste of my food at the same time as I remove my hunger, the enjoyment of the taste is

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not necessarily a part of a process of fulfilment, as proven by the fact that I can continue to enjoy the taste of my food even after my hunger is satisfied. Although not all kinetic pleasures involve immediate stimulation of the sense organs—some kinetic pleasures are mental rather than bodily—Cicero tends to use sensory stimuli as examples of both versions of kinetic pleasure. The salient features of Cicero’s description of version 1 of kinetic pleasure are as follows: 1. Generally, it is sensory (permulcet sensum voluptate, 2.32) 2. More specifically, it causes, is accompanied by, or just is some sort of sweet/agreeable motion in: a. the senses (dulcem motum adferant sensibus, 2.10) b. our nature (suavitate aliqua naturam ipsam movet, 1.37) 3. It produces variety (esse in motu voluptatem, qui faciat varietatem voluptatum, 2.10) Note that Cicero describes pleasure in terms of sensory stimulation and variation throughout the first two books of De Finibus; what appears above are his statements that occur only in the context of his discussions of either kinetic pleasure specifically or the Epicurean classification of pleasures generally. It is clear that Cicero believes Epicurean kinetic pleasure (at least the bodily kind) involves sensory stimuli that are “agreeable” (suavis) or “sweet” (dulcis) to the perceiver, and that such pleasure provides some sort of variation. The exact nature of the variation is unclear to Cicero, who complains that the Epicureans do not seem to be talking about variation in the usual sense of differences in the sources of pleasure (2.10). Descriptions of the second version of kinetic pleasure are found throughout book 2, where it is first proposed by Cicero’s character and then later confirmed by Torquatus. At 2.9, Cicero has the following exchange with Torquatus: ‘estne, quaeso,’ inquam, ‘sitienti in bibendo voluptas?’ ‘quis istud possit’ inquit ‘negare?’ ‘eademne quae restincta siti?’ ‘immo alio genere; restincta enim sitis stabilitatem voluptatis habet,’ inquit ‘illa autem voluptas ipsius restinctionis in motu est.’ “Then tell me,” I said, “is there pleasure in drinking for a thirsty person?” “Who could deny it?” “Is it the same pleasure as having a quenched thirst?” “No indeed, it is a different kind. For a quenched thirst is a static pleasure, whereas the quenching itself is ‘in motion.’”

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Here pleasures are described in terms of filling a lack: kinetic pleasure is experienced while a lack is being filled, and static pleasure is experienced as a consequence of having one’s lack removed. Torquatus confirms that the two pleasures are indeed different (alio genere). Here at 2.9 and elsewhere, Cicero has adopted a new and different description of kinetic pleasure than that found in Torquatus’ initial description of pleasure at 1.37. At 1.37 and in the other passages of the first two books of De Finibus that I mentioned above, the description is given in terms of an agreeable sensory variation, whereas here in 2.9 Cicero frames the description of both kinetic and static pleasures in terms of lacks and their fillings. Immediately after Cicero suggests that kinetic pleasures are experienced in the process of filling a lack (2.9), he reverts back to Torquatus’ initial description of kinetic pleasure in terms of general sensory variety: at 2.10, part of which I quoted earlier, Cicero claims the Epicureans believe “that when we taste those things that give a sweet motion to the senses, then we have pleasure ‘in motion’ [quae dulcem motum adferant sensibus]. It is this sort of pleasure, you claim, that produces a variety of pleasure [varietatem voluptatum].” There is no indication on Cicero’s part that this description of kinetic pleasure, which echoes Torquatus’ from 1.37, is different from the one Cicero just gave at 2.9. Although there is evidently a discrepancy between Torquatus’ descriptions of kinetic pleasure in 2.9 and 2.10, Wolfsdorf argues that we should nevertheless understand the description in 2.10 to be Torquatus’ settled view: all pleasures are sensory variations, and none are restorations.48 Wolfsdorf supplies one piece of text in support of this reading of De Fin. 2.9–10: according to Epicurus’ KD 18, pleasure can be varied but not increased once the absence of pain is reached. Wolfsdorf, along with many scholars, believes the variations described in KD 18 refer to kinetic pleasure, and Torquatus’ description at 2.10 is therefore a genuine reflection of Epicurean views. To think otherwise, Wolfsdorf claims, would be uncharitable to Torquatus: “Consequently, although one may accuse Torquatus of speaking misleadingly or with inadequate precision when he refers to kinetic pleasure in the quenching of thirst, it would be uncharitable to interpret him to understand the cause of the kinetic pleasure as the process of being re-hydrated rather than the activity of the gustatory faculty” (2009: 249). Purinton likewise concludes that Torquatus must be talking about agreeable sensory variations in 2.9 (that is, the pleasure of taste experienced by the tongue as the thirst is quenched), “for everything else that Torquatus and Cicero say suggests that kinetic pleasure is the pleasure felt by the sense organs, e.g., by the tongue,

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eyes, or ears” (1993: 308). Erler and Schofield insist that Cicero’s description of pleasurable restorations at 2.9 “is an isolated text whose interpretation is fiercely contested” (2005: 655). I agree with Wolfsdorf that interpreters of De Finibus should try to save Torquatus from himself, but in this case I do not think it can be done. First, KD 18 does not obviously describe kinetic pleasure; nowhere does it use the term ‘kinetic,’ and one needs to read it with Cicero’s account in mind in order to suppose that the variations referred to are indeed kinetic. Kuriai Doxai 18 cannot support the claim that Torquatus believes all kinetic pleasures are sensory variations if KD 18 itself is being interpreted in light of Torquatus’ statements. Second, against both Wolfsdorf and Purinton, 2.9 is not the only place in De Finibus where kinetic pleasures are associated with restorations: the description at 2.9 is echoed at 2.17, where Cicero questions Torquatus about the distinction they have just agreed on between kinetic and static pleasure. Cicero asks, “So, when he who is not thirsty [non sitiens] mixes a drink for another, does he have the same pleasure [eadem voluptate] as the thirsty man who drinks it [eum qui illud sitiens bibat]?” (2.17). The most reasonable interpretation is that the pleasure of the thirsty person is a pleasure of restoration; if Cicero were talking about a pleasurable sensory variation that had nothing to do with filling a lack, there would be no reason to specify that the taster in question suffers from a deficiency. Indeed, there is no meaningful contrast between the state of having a quenched thirst and a sensory variation; rather, the natural contrast is between such a state and the process of quenching. Unfortunately, Cicero’s character never receives an answer: Torquatus requests an end to questioning, thereby confirming Cicero’s opinion that Epicureans cannot stand up to the rigors of philosophical discussion.49 Pleasures of restoration seem to be revisited a few paragraphs later, when Cicero claims that Epicurus would have to admit that the pleasure desired by a crying infant is kinetic rather than static (2.31). The infant cries because she suffers from some lack that requires filling, the restoration of which is accompanied by a kinetic pleasure. She may of course also enjoy the pleasure of taste in the process of being restored, but gustatory pleasure is surely not what Cicero aims to highlight in the case of infants, whose desires are driven by natural needs, or so Cicero claims Epicurus believes (2.31–32). Thus, the evidence does not stand in favor of the view that Torquatus understands kinetic pleasure to be caused only by sensory variations rather than restorations. Furthermore, scholars seem to have inherited Cicero’s confusion about whether kinetic pleasures are fillings of lacks or sensory stimuli. According to

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Cyril Bailey, for instance, Cicero associates kinetic pleasure with the motion involved in the process of satisfying our desires: Then, if the means of satisfying the desire is within our attainment, there follows another movement accompanying the process of satisfaction: this movement (κίνησις) is a kind of pleasure. As the result of the completion of the process there ensues a second kind of pleasure (ἡδονὴ καταστηματική), the static pleasure of the equilibrium (εὐστάθεια) or freedom from pain (ἀπονία) which the body now enjoys.50

As Nikolsky points out in his critique of Cicero’s account, Bailey evidently believes that Cicero means by ‘motion’ a change in the organism’s condition overall.51 However, scholars such as Rist and Diano believe that Cicero means by ‘motion’ a change in the state of individual sensory organs.52 In support of their position, Rist and Diano cite Lucretius, who explains in De Rerum Natura that pleasure ceases once food is no longer on the palate.53 Rist and Diano take this to mean that kinetic pleasure presupposes the existence of katastematic pleasure in the same organ, since Epicurus denies that pleasure and pain can be experienced simultaneously in the same location;54 on their view, pain must first be absent in the organ in order for kinetic pleasure to be experienced. But this is just to say that kinetic pleasure presupposes katastematic pleasure, since the latter is defined as the absence of pain. When one is eating and drinking, for example, the palate experiences pleasure while the stomach, which has not yet been sated, experiences pain. As food moves down to the stomach, kinetic pleasure ceases in the palate while the stomach enjoys the katastematic pleasure of having been satisfied. Rist and Diano conclude that kinetic pleasure is experienced when an individual organ (e.g., the palate) experiences some ‘extra’ phenomenon that adds to the painlessness already present. Contrast this reading with Bailey’s, which also relies on De Finibus yet treats ‘in motion’ as a change in the organism as a whole. One might argue, however, that it is reasonable to group pleasures of fulfilment in the same category as sensory variations that arise along with the fulfilment. This is the view of Michael Stokes, who claims that “the satisfaction of bodily needs is inevitably accompanied by an element of sensual pleasure” (1995: 166), as when one enjoys the taste of one’s food while sating hunger: “One’s delicious ripe fruit will both quench the thirst and titillate the palate” (1995: 158). On this reading, some agreeable sensory variations accompany fulfilments that are essential for removing pain, while some sensory variations do not; those that do are kinetic, and those that do not belong in a different class.

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Thus, according to Stokes, the Epicureans recognize three forms of pleasure: (i) katastematic pleasure, (ii) kinetic pleasure associated with filling a lack or satisfying a desire, and (iii) profligate sensual pleasures, which, if painless, will be pursued by Epicureans.55 This interpretation is problematic because it fails to classify the third group of pleasures (viz., the profligate) as either kinetic or katastematic, even though, according to Stokes, Epicureans do believe many pleasures in this group are choiceworthy. On his reading, profligate sensual pleasures are mere variants of kinetic and/or katastematic pleasures and thus belong to neither group. If, as Stokes suggests, Epicureans wish to distance their ethics from profligacy by associating kinetic pleasures with fillings of lacks and not just with (or instead of) agreeable sensory variations, it becomes difficult to see why Epicureans would believe profligate sensual pleasures were choiceworthy at all. This would leave them open to the charge that their hedonism consists in overindulgence. Furthermore, the Ciceronian text on which Stokes draws to show that Cicero’s voluptas in motu represent profligate sensual pleasures does not in fact equate voluptas in motu with profligacy: the text (De Fin. 2.10) says merely that the pleasure “gives a sweet motion to the senses” (quae dulcem motum adferant sensibus) and makes no mention of indulgence. While I agree with Stokes’ claim that not all sensory pleasures are kinetic,56 his solution of identifying a third group of pleasure that is neither kinetic nor katastematic, that is primarily sensory, and that is associated with profligacy seems unlikely. It is more plausible that Cicero is attributing to the Epicureans three types of pleasure: two types of kinetic pleasure—(i) filling a lack and (ii) agreeable sensory variations (but not sensual indulgence)—and one type of katastematic pleasure. In addition, just because some bodily satisfactions are “inevitably accompanied” by certain agreeable sensory variations is not reason enough to group these phenomena in one class. As I explained above, there is a difference between a pleasure of restoration and an agreeable sensory variation: they do not always occur together, and they do not share the same relation to deficiency and change. However, granting that the two versions of kinetic pleasure involve change in different ways, one might nevertheless argue that they should be grouped together because they involve some sort of change. This is the view of Warren, who claims that “in both these cases, the pleasure appears to be associated with some change in the perceiver’s state in the form either of the removal of pain or of the qualitative alteration of a present state” (2016: 47–48). As phenomena that involve change, kinetic pleasures might then be distinguished from pleasures that involve no alteration, such as the absence of

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pain. The difficulty with this interpretation is that it assumes painlessness itself cannot involve qualitative alteration. But why should this be impossible? Can we not experience different ways of being without pain, perhaps by experiencing various painless sensations? Perhaps this is exactly what Epicurus means when he says in On the Telos that he cannot understand the good without the pleasures of taste, sound, vision, and sex, all of which are painless sensory variations. It is plausible that he means there are different ways of experiencing painlessness, just as there are different ways of experiencing pleasures of restoration. I provide support for this theory in later chapters, but suffice it to say that the assumption that painlessness involves no qualitative change becomes less convincing if we do not buy into Cicero’s account of Epicurean katastematic pleasure. Given that Cicero appears to have no qualms about exposing any and all inconsistencies in the Epicurean conception of pleasure, it is a wonder that he forgoes an opportunity to lay bare what would seem to be grist for his antiEpicurean mill: a clear case of the Epicureans equivocating about the nature of pleasure—in this case, the kinetic variety in particular. As we saw, Torquatus suggests early on in De Finibus that the defining feature of such pleasures are agreeable sensory stimuli, while later in the text he confirms Cicero’s description of them as fillings of lacks. Why does Cicero fail to point out this shift and use it against Torquatus as evidence of Epicurean equivocation about the nature of pleasure? Perhaps Cicero himself is confused about Epicurean kinetic pleasure and may therefore be reluctant to point out the inconsistency between the two descriptions, lest he reveal his own uncertainty. Or perhaps he simply does not realize that the descriptions are different.57 A more charitable interpretation of Cicero’s intelligence may be that he is fully aware of the differences between the two versions of kinetic pleasure, but he lets the issue go because it has no bearing on his major complaint that the Epicureans are defining pleasure in a way that is completely out of touch with most people’s understanding of the term. According to Cicero, everyone except the Epicureans associates pleasure with an agreeable stimulation of the senses. Since both versions of Epicurean kinetic pleasure involve agreeable stimulation of the senses—either in the form of sensory variations or filling of lacks—both versions are consistent with the general population’s experience of pleasure. Cicero would therefore not serve his larger goal of showing just how unintuitive the Epicurean position is by pointing out that they equivocate about the definition of kinetic pleasure; his goal is better served by pointing out, as he does in most of book 2, that Epicureans equivocate about the nature of pleasure when they call the absence of pain the summa voluptas.

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Regardless of Cicero’s motives, I think the presence of these different descriptions of kinetic pleasure should make us wary of building so much of Epicurus’ ethical theory on the testimony of De Finibus. We cannot distill a clear picture of Epicurean pleasure from this text, and there is the fact that Cicero’s account may be influenced by non-Epicurean interpretations of Epicurean ethics. In addition, his hostility sometimes leads him to be unfairly dismissive: for instance, when the discussion turns to the meaning and logic of the crucial Epicurean equation of the absence of pain with pleasure, Cicero has Torquatus demand an end to questioning, leaving us with no explanation or defense of the main Epicurean ethical position. This is not to say, however, that there are no valuable clues to understanding Epicurean pleasure in Cicero’s account. On my view, the second version of kinetic pleasure, as the filling of a lack, and the description of static pleasure as the pleasure of having had a lack filled are compatible with the interpretation of Epicurean pleasure I will argue for in the following chapters. But I hesitate to use these parts of Cicero’s account in support of my reading given that there is a different description of kinetic pleasure at play in the first two books of De Finibus. But despite the presence of two different descriptions, there is a precedent in Cicero’s treatment of Epicureanism for linking pleasure with an organism’s restorative processes and with the results of such processes. This will be useful in later chapters for linking Epicurean pleasure with Platonic concepts.

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Epicurean Pleasures of Bodily and Mental Health

Plato’s moral and ontological evaluation of pleasure in the Philebus and the fourth-century debates surrounding it established the questions that any serious hedonistic ethical theory would have needed to address. Is pleasure a process or a state? How does pleasure relate to organic functioning, both mental and physical? How does pleasure’s nature affect its goodness and desirability? In this chapter I argue that Epicureanism wrestles with precisely these issues, and thus it earns its place in the trajectory of ancient hedonistic and anti-hedonistic theories that stem from concerns originally aired in the Old Academy about the nature and value of pleasure. In sorting out their seemingly obscure distinction between katastematic and kinetic pleasures, Epicureans consider whether pleasure is a process or a condition, how pleasure’s being either a process or a condition affects its goodness, and whether pleasure presupposes a lack in an organism that must be filled. Like the Academics, the Epicureans consider the connection between harmony and pleasure, centering their ethics on the attainment of natural functioning in the whole organism: Epicureans shun the practice of pursuing all available pleasures, and they avoid in particular those that are harmful to one’s physiological and psychological well-being. Both here and in the following chapter, I argue that Epicurus adopts a view similar to Plato’s that some pleasures are perceived processes of restoration, but, against a theory like Plato’s, he rejects the view that painlessness is not pleasant. In addition, Epicurus denies that pleasure belongs to the class of things that are only instrumentally good rather than good in themselves. While Plato uses the term κατάστασις to designate processes of restoration, Epicurus uses the related term καταστηματική to describe a condition of painless functioning. On Epicurus’ view, pleasure is associated with a perceived process of organic restoration as well as with the perceived condition of health, which itself is a

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dynamic pleasure that is experienced through and constituted by various bodily and mental activities. Epicurus’ arguments against the sorts of moral and ontological criticisms offered by Plato turn on the claim that the highest pleasure is the awareness of being without pain. In this way, painlessness is not a state of unfeeling or non-perception; it is a perceived condition of health, the enjoyment of which is a goal to be pursued in itself. According to Epicurus, pleasure is not a means to a separate, superior goal; it is an end (τέλος) and an activity (ἐνέργεια) in the Aristotelian sense. My task in this chapter is to argue that Epicurus defines katastematic pleasure in terms of the perception of the healthy functioning of a living organism. I take up the kinetic pleasures in the next chapter. Although, as I will explain, kinetic and katastematic pleasures are distinct phenomena, both types of pleasure are facets of organic harmony, which is the overarching concept in terms of which Epicureans understand all pleasure. However, before offering any interpretation of either type, I address the argument made by several scholars that Epicureans do not in fact distinguish between kinetic and katastematic pleasure. I analyze and ultimately reject this ‘Unitary View,’ as I call it, in the first section, which will also be useful for introducing some of the texts that will be revisited in later chapters. In the second section, I formulate a description of katastematic pleasure based on sources other than Cicero’s De Finibus, such as Epicurus’ writings themselves, Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura, Plutarch’s polemical works against Epicurus, and a few passages from works by minor figures. I deliberately avoid Cicero’s account from De Finibus not because I have any belief that it is inherently less reliable than the other sources but because the first two books of De Finibus are the source of much of the controversy about Epicurean pleasure.1 In this chapter’s final section, I address the objection that the notion of organic health is too bodily to account for the prominent role of mental health in the Epicurean best life.

Preliminary consideration: Are there two types of Epicurean pleasure? Although I think there is good reason to believe that Cicero misinterprets the Epicurean highest good, I think he has it right that Epicureans make some sort of distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasure. However, some scholars have argued that this is not the case. Gosling and Taylor, the most prominent

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proponents of what I will call the ‘Unitary View,’ contend that it makes no sense to distinguish different types of Epicurean pleasure, since Epicurus relates all pleasure to an organism’s natural functioning. On their view, one can identify different aspects of proper functioning, but the Epicureans nevertheless have only one general description of pleasure. Nikolsky, attempting to build on the work of Gosling and Taylor,2 shares their distrust of Cicero’s division of Epicurean pleasure into kinetic and katastematic kinds, and claims that “the authenticity of the classification may be called in question” (2001: 440). He also shares their desire to provide a single description of Epicurus’ notion of pleasure: for Gosling and Taylor, that single description is proper functioning; for Nikolsky, it is the impact of an external restorative force on the organism. These scholars’ distrust of Cicero goes hand in hand with their belief that Epicurus has a single description of pleasure: if Epicurus does in fact recognize a single phenomenon called ‘pleasure,’ and if all aspects of pleasurable experience can be explained with reference to this phenomenon, then Cicero’s division of pleasure into two opposing classes cannot be correct. The Unitary View is obviously problematic for any interpretation (such as my own) that attempts to carve out distinct descriptions of kinetic and katastematic pleasure. On the other hand, one might argue that the Unitary View looks rather like my own view: I did indeed state above that both types of pleasure are “facets” of organic harmony, and “facets” sounds suspiciously similar to Gosling and Taylor’s “aspects.” The Unitary View therefore needs to be addressed before any interpretation of katastematic or kinetic pleasure can be offered. Gosling and Taylor’s interpretation is based largely on a passage from Epicurus’ On the Telos, which Cicero quotes in the Tusculan Disputations (3.41–42) and in De Finibus (2.7). The first part of the quotation is Epicurus’ infamous statement that he cannot understand what the good is without the pleasures of taste, hearing, sex, and vision.3 Gosling and Taylor focus on the passages’ second half, where Epicurus adds the following: “Nor is it possible to say that gladness of mind is the only thing that is good. For as I understand it, what it means for a mind to be glad is for it to have an expectation of possessing, naturally and without pain, all those things which I have named.”4 According to Gosling and Taylor, Epicurus considers the absence of pain to be more than a mere condition free of distress; it is a condition of having sensory pleasure without pain.5 In other words, the Epicurean sees the pursuit of absence of pain as tantamount to the pursuit of painless sensory enjoyments. Since the telos just is a life of sensory pleasure unaccompanied by pain, Gosling and Taylor conclude that

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there is no inconsistency between Epicurus’ statement in On the Telos that he cannot imagine the good without certain sensory pleasures (which are usually characterized as ‘kinetic’) and his claim in the Letter to Menoeceus that the end is the absence of pain (‘katastematic’ pleasure). A major point of agreement between my interpretation and Gosling and Taylor’s is that an organism operates properly when it experiences sensory pleasure without pain (i.e., katastematic pleasure).6 They contend, as I too will do later in this chapter, that this reading is reinforced by Lucretius’ account of pleasure and pain in De Rerum Natura (2.963–72), where he explains that pain occurs when atoms are disturbed from their positions, and pleasure occurs when they return. They argue further that although Epicureans deny any form of biological teleology, Epicurus nevertheless describes pleasure as “having a nature that is akin to us” (πᾶσα οὖν ἡδονὴ διὰ τὸ φύσιν ἔχειν οἰκείαν ἀγαθόν, Ad Men. 129), and Diogenes Laertius attributes to Epicureans the belief that pain is “foreign” or “strange” (ἡδονὴν καὶ ἀλγηδόνα, ἱστάμενα περὶ πᾶν ζῷον, καὶ τὴν μὲν οἰκεῖον, τὴν δὲ ἀλλότριον, DL 10.34). According to Gosling and Taylor, Epicureans are claiming that pain is the consciousness of disturbance to an organism’s natural condition, and pleasure is the consciousness of proper organic functioning. On their view, katastematic pleasure, or sensory pleasure without pain, is the pleasure of an organism in proper condition. But once sensory pleasures that are unaccompanied by pain are shifted to the katastematic camp, what remains to be classified as kinetic? According to Gosling and Taylor, kinetic pleasures are those of movement, in the sense of replenishment or restoration of an organism’s natural state.7 Kinetic pleasures are understood as processes back toward the proper functioning of an organism that has been disrupted in some way. In this process of restoration, some part(s) of the organism begins to operate properly again, while other parts may still be deficient. For example, I gradually sate my hunger when I eat while hungry, and thus I gradually restore the natural balance of my body. Until my hunger is entirely sated, some part of the organism has not returned to its proper functioning, but there is a gradual increase in the overall natural functioning of my body. Kinetic pleasures on Gosling and Taylor’s view are linked to these movements toward proper organic functioning. By defining both kinetic and katastematic pleasure in terms of an organism’s natural functioning, the Unitary View claims that the two phenomena are not different kinds of pleasures: katastematic pleasures are those of the mind and body in proper condition, and kinetic pleasures are those linked to the

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movements toward that proper condition. Gosling and Taylor explain this as follows: First, kinetic pleasures are not a different kind of pleasure from katastematic ones; they too are sensory and are a matter of some part of the organism operating properly. When one quenches one’s thirst some parts of the organism are working naturally, some not, and there is a steady increase in the area of natural operation; but no different account of the nature of pleasure is needed. (1982: 374)

In other words, all pleasures are pleasant by virtue of the same thing, namely, their relation to the proper functioning of an organism. Whether a pleasure is sensory is not the criterion by which it is judged to be kinetic or katastematic; rather, the relevant criterion is the pleasure’s relation to proper functioning. Thus, their interpretation essentially rules out Cicero’s classification of Epicurean pleasures into sensory and non-sensory kinds. Although I think Gosling and Taylor are right that physiological functioning plays a significant role in the Epicurean account of pleasure, their arguments for the Unitary View are not convincing. One gets the gist of their interpretation from their chapter on the difficulty with Epicurus’ conception of pleasure, but many aspects of their interpretation either require further explanation or are not supported by the texts. For starters, they are consistently unclear about the nature of the distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasure: at times they attempt to redefine the terms—thereby admitting that Epicurus understands something by them—while at other times they argue that Epicurus is not distinguishing any phenomena, even when he gives them different names (κατὰ κίνησιν and καταστηματικαί), as he does in a passage from his On Choices, reported by Diogenes Laertius (DL 10.136).8 If the distinction between pleasures has no theoretical significance, it is crucial to explain why Epicurus bothers making it at all. In addition, we have evidence from non-Ciceronian texts confirming that a distinction goes back to Epicureans, such as the passage mentioned above from Epicurus’ On Choices, the statement from Metrodorus and Diogenes of Tarsus that precedes the quotation from On Choices in Diogenes Laertius’ doxography of Epicurus (10.136), and the many passages in Plutarch’s Non Posse where Epicurean pleasure is described using some form of the term ‘καταστηματικός.’ Although, as I have said, I agree with many aspects of Gosling and Taylor’s interpretation of Epicurean pleasure, they do not end up providing a clear account of the relation between the kinetic and katastematic types.

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What about Nikolsky’s case for the Unitary View? Like Gosling and Taylor, he begins his investigation of Epicurean pleasure with the problems created by De Finibus. He frames the Ciceronian distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasure in terms of “a state presupposing active stimulation of pleasant sensations, and secondly, a state negatively defined as the absence of pain and suffering” (2001: 441).9 For Nikolsky, the main shortcoming of Cicero’s account, and thus with modern interpretations that build on it, is its lack of a ‘positive’ description of the Epicurean summum bonum: all we can glean from Cicero is that the Epicurean highest pleasure and good is a state of lacks—lacking pain, lacking suffering, lacking disturbance. It would seem unlikely, Nikolsky argues, that someone unable to conceive of the good without pleasures of taste, hearing, etc., would give such a description of the summum bonum in terms of lacks or would have contrasted it with sensory pleasure. Yet Nikolsky recognizes that Epicurus and those writing about Epicureanism use several different terms to talk about pleasure, such as κατὰ κίνησιν, καταστηματική, ἀπονία, and τὸ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα. Wanting to avoid concluding that there is no common link between the terms, Nikolsky provides a general explanation of Epicurus’ conception of pleasure. This general explanation is a good statement of his overall interpretation of Epicurean pleasure: From my point of view, all the terms that are mentioned above—ἡδονή, κίνησις, ἀπονία, εὐσταθὲς κατάστημα/εὐστάθεια—serve to describe different characteristics of the same phenomenon, which consists in an impact on the organism of some force bringing it into a natural state, and which in the most general sense is referred to as ἡδονή. (2001: 453)

According to Nikolsky, Epicurus describes all pleasure as a restorative impact on an organism. This phenomenon has two aspects: first, the smooth motion of atoms as they penetrate the pores, which is the process of restoration and “defines the physical nature of pleasure—the penetration into the organism of atoms coming from the outside and their influence on the totality of atoms constituting a person’s organism”; and second, “the state of an organism that is experiencing pleasure,” which is the result of the process of restoration and is known as the εὐσταθὲς κατάστημα and εὐστάθεια (2001: 453). Nikolsky derives his description of the second aspect from Plutarch’s polemical treatise Non Posse (which I look at a bit later), where the Epicurean telos is described as the good state of the body, stability, and health. Nikolsky claims that Epicurus means by

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this good state of the body “such a state which is necessarily the effect of some external force restoring or supporting the organism” (2001: 447). Epicurus’ description of pleasure, then, consists in a single phenomenon: the impact of some external force that restores the natural condition of the organism (i.e., its good state or health). The result and the process of restoration are aspects of this single description of pleasure in terms of a restorative impact on the body: “Both ‘movement’ and ἀπονία are to Epicurus not different types of pleasure but, rather, different ways of describing one and the same pleasure” (2001: 465). Nikolsky suggests, I think quite rightly, that perhaps Epicurus conceives of pleasure in this way in order to respond to the argument familiar from Plato’s Philebus that pleasure is linked with the process of restoration rather than the result. Furthermore, Nikolsky contends that processes of restoration and their results are necessarily related: the good state of the body is directly caused by processes of physical restoration. In support of this position, Nikolsky cites SV 33, where Epicurus claims that the cry of the flesh is not to be hungry, thirsty, or cold, and whoever has these things and is confident of maintaining them in the future will rival the gods in happiness.10 The states of not being hungry, thirsty, and cold are the effects of some external force restoring the organism; for example, not being hungry comes about by eating, the process of restoring an organism’s lack. As Nikolsky explains, the situation is similar for not being cold: “Pleasure from the absence of cold, i.e., pleasure from warmth, is one of the pleasures caused by pleasant sensations in the sense-organs” (2001: 448). The εὐσταθὲς κατάστημα—the good state of the body—is causally related to the physical process of restoration that brings about the good state. Although Nikolsky makes a compelling case based on SV 33, he is not so compelling elsewhere. He cites Ad Men. 131, where Epicurus writes that the consumption of plain fare like bread and water confers the highest pleasure when hunger is present.11 By this Nikolsky takes Epicurus to mean the following: “Obviously, Epicurus means by this the state of satiety, but he does not in any way separate it from pleasure from eating and drinking that leads to this state” (2001: 447). Yet neither Ad Men. 131 nor SV 33 shows that Epicurus “does not in any way” differentiate the pleasure of the process of restoration from the result. In fact, as we just saw, Nikolsky attempts to argue by way of SV 33 that states such as satiety and warmth are logical results of the process of restoration, meaning that they must be divisible at least into cause and effect. While we may grant that Epicurus does not believe that the result (i.e., the good κατάστημα) is brought

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about independently of the process, we do not also have to grant that there is no difference between these phenomena. After all, Nikolsky has claimed that there are two aspects of pleasure, not just one. The question remains whether the process and the result are distinguishable. Uncertainty regarding this question persists in Nikolsky’s reading. When discussing a statement made by both Plutarch and Athenaeus concerning the Epicurean belief that the beginning and root of every good is a pleasure of the stomach,12 Nikolsky claims that what is meant by ‘pleasure of the stomach’ is satiety. In the same passage, Plutarch mentions a letter from Metrodorus in which the pleasure is understood to be from eating and drinking. From this Nikolsky concludes, “Thus, Plutarch does not differentiate between pleasure from eating and satiety” (2001: 447–48). But this does not necessarily follow. In the second passage, Plutarch (or Metrodorus) could very well be talking about a gustatory pleasure rather than a pleasure of satiety, in which case he may indeed be aiming to distinguish satiety from a pleasant stimulation of the sense organs. This is supported by the fact that Metrodorus specifically mentions drinking wine, which is presumably chosen for its taste rather than its nourishing properties. In addition, it is hard to square the claim that there is no difference between eating and satiety with Nikolsky’s position that there are two aspects of pleasure that are necessarily related as cause and effect: if eating causes satiety, then we’re dealing with two distinct, though related, phenomena. If Nikolsky believes that Epicurus—and Plutarch writing about Epicurus—does not distinguish between the good state of the body and the process of reaching it, we have a hard time understanding why Epicurus would mention two so-called aspects of pleasure whose difference is negligible. In short, it seems that Nikolsky vacillates between wanting to show that there is no distinction between the so-called kinetic and katastematic pleasures and wanting to redefine the terms of the distinction. However, the distinction can be redrawn only if a distinction exists in the first place. But what of Nikolsky’s main point that Epicurus considers all cases of Epicurean pleasure to be impacts on the body by a restorative external force? On his view, kinetic and katastematic pleasure are related because they are the process and result, respectively, of the organism’s being returned to its natural state. However, I think we have good reason to believe that Epicurus does not hold that all pleasure consists in the impact of a restorative external force. In the quotation from Epicurus’ On the Telos reported by Cicero and Athenaeus, the pleasures without which Epicurus claims he cannot conceive of the good— pleasures of taste, hearing, vision, and sex—need not have anything to do with

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the impact of a restorative force. The pleasures of taste, for example, need not be restorative since the external force that provides pleasure, namely food, may provide only gustatory pleasure; indeed, one can experience the pleasure of taste even if one lacks hunger. On Nikolsky’s reading, we are made to believe that Epicurus thinks a person who is full from her meal may as well lay down her fork since she can no longer experience the pleasure of taste. Not only is there no evidence from Epicurus to support such a claim, but our own experience tells against it. Moreover, experiences of non-restorative pleasures are surely what Epicurus is referring to when he claims that pleasure can be varied without being increased (KD 18). Yet Nikolsky treats pleasures like those Epicurus mentions in On the Telos as if they were the same as pleasures that actually do consist in the impact of an external restorative force. His view is evident in the following passage: Pleasures from tasting, hearing and contemplating can be explained in a way similar to what was said above concerning pleasure from warmth: a person experiences various external influences, which are pleasant or unpleasant; in the former case they give pleasure and ensure ‘the good state’ of the organism and in the latter, they result in a pain and loss of ‘the good state.’ (2001: 449)

Evidently, Nikolsky believes that Epicurus considers pleasures like those mentioned in SV 33—not being hungry, thirsty, or cold—to be pleasures in the same way as those mentioned in On the Telos, such as pleasures of taste and hearing. However, if Epicurus does define all pleasure in terms of restorative impact, then he cannot also hold that the pleasures mentioned in SV 33 are pleasures by virtue of the same thing as those mentioned in On the Telos, since the latter are not restorations of a lack. One may grant, however, that Nikolsky is right that the pleasures mentioned in On the Telos do consist in the impact of some external force on the body: for example, Epicurus does believe that the pleasures of hearing, taste, and vision involve the penetration by atoms through the pores of the body. Nevertheless, we need not also grant that the external force is always restorative. This is not just a semantic problem: the difficulty remains even if we excise ‘restorative’ from his account: as I mentioned previously, his argument that there is a necessary connection between the two aspects of the general description of Epicurean pleasure requires restoration to be a factor in that general description since he defines the aspects in terms of the process and the result of being restored. He gives us no other way to understand how, if the external force is not restorative, the process of being affected by an external force is inseparable from the result of being affected. Nikolsky’s reading of

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Epicurus’ general description of pleasure can account only for those pleasures that presuppose a lack in the organism; why Epicurus considers the pleasures of taste, hearing, etc., to be enjoyable remains a mystery.13 Thus, the arguments for the Unitary View seem rather weak. Although its proponents are right to draw on Epicurean views about the natural functioning of the organism, ultimately the Epicurean evidence suggests that Epicureans did distinguish between pleasures, if not in the way Cicero claims. It seems that the appropriate conclusion to draw from Cicero’s inaccuracies is not that there is no distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasure, but that there is simply a different distinction than the one he describes. It may be that the distinction matters less to Epicureanism than Cicero claims, but even then we would have to acknowledge that Cicero is right that Epicureans are dealing with two distinct phenomena.

Katastematic pleasure and organic health Epicureans and others who write about Epicurean ethics approach the connection between health and the Epicurean highest pleasure in various ways. In his own writings, Epicurus tends to stress this connection without providing a comprehensive description of health itself. Lucretius discusses pleasure and health in physiological terms, while also highlighting the role of perception in our hedonic experiences. Plutarch and Cicero also consider perception to be a factor in Epicurus’ account of the enjoyment of health, while adding their own substantial polemics. In the Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus draws a clear connection between the highest good and the health of the whole organism. After briefly elucidating the Epicurean classification of desires,14 he describes the benefits of living in accordance with his school’s taxonomy of needs and wants: “The steady consideration of these enables one to refer every choice and avoidance to the health of the body and tranquility of the soul [τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξίαν], since this is the end of the blessed life [τοῦτο τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν ἐστι τέλος]” (Ad Men. 128). He goes on to link these physical and mental goods with the highest pleasure: “So when we say that the end is pleasure . . . we mean that there is neither suffering in the body nor trouble in the soul” (Ad Men. 131).15 The telos, then, is considered in terms of the enjoyment of painlessness, which itself is a feature of mental and physical health.

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Based on Epicurus’ brief account of the highest pleasure in the Letter to Menoeceus, we might be inclined to sympathize with the ancient complaint that the Epicurean good life is not much of a life at all; Cicero is probably right that our minds do not tend to run to ‘painlessness’ (or even ‘health’) when we think about pleasure. And Epicurus does not help his own case terribly much when he contrasts the pleasure that should be the aim of life with ‘sensory pleasure,’ as he does in the following passage from the Letter to Menoeceus: “So when we say that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal or the pleasures of sensuality, as some believe who either are ignorant and disagree or willfully misunderstand” (Ad Men. 131).16 As he goes on to explain, these “prodigal” and “sensual” pleasures include those from binge drinking, excessive sexual activity, and luxurious meals (Ad Men. 132). However, it is evident from these statements that Epicurus is sensitive to a misconception of his time that his philosophy entails the pursuit of every immediate pleasure to excess; as a result, he contrasts his conception of pleasure with sensory pleasures in order to distance his ethics from polemical accounts that make it out to be a recipe for indulgence. His problem is not with sensory pleasures per se but with the immoderate pursuit of such pleasures. As he outlines in the Letter to Menoeceus, overindulgence is not in accordance with our natural needs and results in poor mental and physical health. Epicurus makes a more indirect connection between the highest good and organic functioning in SV 33, which, when supplemented with statements from Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura, indicates that Epicureans equate certain pains with disruptions of an organism’s natural state. Vatican Sayings 33, which we briefly considered earlier, reads, “The cry of the flesh: not to be hungry, not to be thirsty, not to be cold. For if someone has these things and is confident that he will have them, he might contend (with Zeus) for happiness.”17 Here, admittedly, Epicurus describes the best life in negative terms: it lacks various conditions of bodily distress and anxiety about one’s future bodily condition. But the particular conditions he mentions in SV 33—hunger, thirst, and being cold—are evaluated more substantially by Lucretius, who sheds light on their physiological underpinnings and their relation to pleasure and perception. According to Lucretius, these conditions involve the disruption of an organism’s painless functioning, as can be seen in his description of the nature of thirst and how it is quenched: glomerataque multa vaporis / corpora, quae stomacho praebent incendia nostro, / dissipat adveniens liquor ac restinguit ut ignem, / urere ne possit calor amplius aridus artus. / sic igitur tibi anhela sitis de corpore nostro / abluitur, sic expletur ieiuna cupido. (DRN 4.871–76)

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Health and Hedonism in Plato and Epicurus The numerous particles of heat, whose accumulation causes a burning in the stomach, are dispersed and quenched, like a fire, on the arrival of the moisture, so that the parching heat can no longer consume the frame. In this way, then, our body’s panting thirst is swilled away, and the craving of hunger satisfied.

On Lucretius’ view, thirst disrupts an organism’s painless state when the accumulated heat particles begin to burn the stomach and eventually the whole body. When quenching is complete, we are aware of the result, namely, no longer being thirsty; that is, we are aware that our organism is no longer in distress. The craving for liquid (i.e., thirst) involves the awareness that the body needs a drink; in other words, we cannot thirst without knowing it. Likewise, we cannot satisfy thirst unknowingly. Although we may restore a physical lack in the body without being aware of either the lack or the filling, we cannot satisfy a desire without knowing it has been fulfilled. For Lucretius, the perception of our physical condition is essential to our satisfaction. Lucretius also explains being cold in terms of the disruption of the organism’s natural state. He likens the cold penetrating the human body to great winds shaking the earth: “Even if the wind fails to burst out, its impetuosity and fierce force spread, like an ague, through the numerous pores of the earth and so cause a tremor, just as, when cold penetrates deep within our limbs, it shakes them and makes them tremble and shiver involuntarily [frigus uti nostros penitus cum venit in artus, / concutit invitos cogens tremere atque movere]” (DRN 6.591–95).18 On Lucretius’ reading, cold penetrates the body and disrupts its customary functioning: the body begins to shake unintentionally in response to the blows rained onto it by the cold. Lucretius’ explanation of hunger is along the same lines as thirst and cold: it too is a disruption of the natural functioning of the organism. Hunger occurs as a result of the body’s loss of nourishment through the pores in the form of sweat, breath, etc.19 Lucretius makes it evident that the loss of particles that leads to hunger cravings is a disruption of the constitution of the whole body: quod natura cibum quaerit cuiusque animantis. / quippe etenim fluere atque recedere corpora rebus / multa modis multis docui, sed plurima debent / ex animalibus. quia sunt exercita motu, / multaque per sudorem ex alto pressa feruntur, / multa per os exhalantur, cum languida anhelant, / his igitur rebus rarescit corpus et omnis / subruitur natura; dolor quam consequitur rem.  / propterea capitur cibus ut suffulciat artus et recreet viris interdatus atque patentem / per membra ac venas ut amorem obturet edendi. (DRN 4.860–69)

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For, as I have shown, many particles flow away and withdraw from things in many ways. But animals inevitably suffer the greatest loss of substance: being always restless and on the move, they exude many particles in sweat from deep within, and exhale many through the mouth when they pant from exhaustion. As a result of these losses the body becomes rarified and the whole constitution is undermined. Consequently nourishment is taken to support the frame and restore the strength by its diffusion throughout the limbs and veins, and to stop the gaping cravings for food.

According to Epicureans, we perceive that our bodies are compromised when we are aware of our hunger, our thirst, our being cold, or some other deficient bodily condition. We eat, for instance, to restore the organism’s painless functioning, which has been disrupted due to the outflow of particles from the body. And when we are replenished, we are aware of the lack of disturbance to our bodies because we no longer experience hunger. Since the Epicureans understand conditions like thirst, hunger, and being cold to be disruptions of the organism’s natural state, it makes sense that they would think of instances in which we are aware of not being thirsty, hungry, cold, etc., as instances of painless, natural functioning. For example, if hunger is a perceived disturbance to the natural condition of the organism, then perceiving a lack of hunger is synonymous with perceiving the absence of that disturbance to the organism’s natural condition. And to perceive an absence of disturbance is just to perceive that one’s organism is functioning naturally and painlessly with regard to a particular organic disruption, be it bodily or mental. I think Nikolsky correctly explains this rationale in terms of cold: “A person’s freedom from cold presupposes that this person is in the warm, i.e., not only is he experiencing no pain, but he is feeling pleasure from the environment’s pleasant influence upon him” (2001: 448). While it is true that one who rivals even Zeus for happiness is without various forms of distress, more fundamentally this person rivals Zeus because she perceives that her mind and body function naturally, without impediment or pain, which is to say that she enjoys a condition of organic health. According to this description of katastematic pleasure, an unperceived state of health is not pleasant. For instance, if my leg is perfectly healthy, this does not mean my leg experiences pleasure, which belongs more properly to the conscious mind that perceives the leg’s well-being. Similarly, a healthy person in a dreamless sleep experiences no pleasure. It is because of their ‘perception requirement’ for pleasure that the Epicureans are able to dodge the Cyrenaic complaint that the absence of pain resembles a state of unconsciousness.20 The

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Epicureans avoid the Cyrenaic criticism because they recognize the crucial role that conscious awareness plays in our experience of pleasure. The capacity for conscious awareness also seems to be a crucial factor in the Epicureans understanding of health itself: there is no evidence that Epicurus would say that people in a permanent state of unconsciousness are healthy, since they are unable to perceive their physical and mental conditions. Such people lead pleasureless (but not necessarily painful) lives, since all good and bad are given in perception, according to Epicurus.21 Although a dreamless sleeper is unaware of her condition, she has the capacity for conscious awareness; her mental and physical faculties are not deficient in the way a human vegetable’s are. A human vegetable cannot, for instance, experience a quenched thirst, reflect on past pleasure, or have confidence in future pleasure. Consequently, Epicureans would consider any life that lacks conscious awareness to be a life that lacks both pleasure and health. The connection between katastematic pleasure, health, and perception is reinforced by another passage in De Rerum Natura, where Lucretius elucidates the mechanics of pleasure and pain: So you will easily recognize that what is capable of affecting our senses pleasantly are composed of smooth and round atoms [levibus atque rotundis / esse ea quae sensus iucunde tangere possunt]; on the other hand, what is perceived as bitter and harsh [amara atque aspera cumque videntur] consist of an interlacement of more hooked atoms, and so are apt to tear open the passages leading to our senses [nostris sensibus] and to force their way through the body in effecting their entrance.22 (DRN 2.402–07, trans. modified)

On Lucretius’ account, pain occurs when atoms of a certain shape wreak havoc on the pores of the body as they move through them. As a result of this disfiguring of the pores, we perceive bitterness. The natural state of the organism is disturbed as barbs of some atoms “tear open” the pores of the body, forcing their way in and letting other atoms escape. In the case of pleasant sensations, there is no disruption of the organism’s painless functioning, since the atoms are of such a shape as to move easily through the channels of the body. In this way, the Epicurean physiological explanation of pain and pleasure is given in terms of the customary, harmonious functioning of the organism: in the case of pain, the natural state is disturbed by atoms tearing up the pores, causing a perceived, unpleasant sensation; in the case of pleasure, the body’s natural state persists without disturbance as atoms flow freely through, resulting in a perceived, pleasant sensation. What the Epicureans are getting at with their highest good

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is a condition in which a person is aware that her organism functions properly and painlessly. In addition, Plutarch confirms that the highest Epicurean pleasure is understood in terms of the perception of organic health, and he highlights the more mental aspects of pleasure, such as anticipating and reflecting on one’s well-being. In the course of contending in his Non Posse that any ethical theory that posits pleasure as the telos is just a recipe for constant debauchery, he gives the following description of Epicureanism: It is this, I believe, that has driven them, seeing for themselves these oddities, to take refuge in the ‘painlessness’ [ἀπονίαν] and the ‘stability of the flesh,’ [εὐστάθειαν τῆς σαρκός] supposing that the pleasurable life is found in thinking of this state as about to occur or as having been achieved; for the ‘healthy state of the flesh’ and the ‘trustworthy expectation’ of this condition contain, they say, the highest and the most assured joy for men who are able to reflect [τὸ γὰρ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἔλπισμα τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχει τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις]. (Non Posse 1089d)23

According to Plutarch, the Epicureans understand painlessness (ἀπονία) to have a couple of meanings: the stability of the flesh (εὐστάθεια τῆς σαρκός) and the healthy state of the flesh (εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα).24 In addition, they understand tranquility (ἀταραξία) as the well-founded expectation of this stable and healthy condition of the body. It is noteworthy that Plutarch uses the term κατάστημα (state) to describe Epicurean pleasure: doing so indicates that the Epicurean highest pleasure is a perceived condition (of healthy functioning) as opposed to a perceived process (toward such a condition). Furthermore, that Plutarch uses the term κατάστημα when reporting on Epicureanism lends support to the view that Epicurus himself is referring to the perceived health of the organism when he uses a variation of the term κατάστημα, namely, καταστηματική, in his On Choices, quoted in Diogenes Laertius’ doxography. A few lines later in Non Posse, Plutarch elucidates what Epicureans mean by ‘the stable condition of the body.’ Plutarch’s description appears in the context of his discussion of the Epicurean claim that criminals are miserable because they have no assurance they will escape detection; they are constantly troubled by the thought of being caught. Plutarch objects that contrary to what Epicureans say, people worry about maintaining the pleasure of the body to the same extent that criminals worry about being caught: neither maintaining pleasure of the body nor avoiding detection are sure things. On Plutarch’s view, then, the Epicureans

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are wrong to believe that pleasure of the body can be secured easily without worry: “We often enjoy in the body a ‘stable condition,’ that is, health, but it is impossible to acquire the confidence that it will remain” (1090d).25 Leaving aside the issue of whether Plutarch’s objection is telling against Epicureanism,26 what is important is that he thinks the Epicureans equate the stable condition of the flesh with health. And since the Epicureans equate the highest pleasure with the enjoyment of the stability of the flesh, we can infer that the Epicureans also understand “enjoyment of health” as a description of the highest pleasure. This coheres with Epicurus’ own description of the telos in the Letter to Menoeceus: recall that Epicurus claims that health of the body (τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν) and tranquility in the soul (ἀταραξία τῆς ψυχῆς) are key elements of the blessed life (Ad Men. 128). And, as I argued earlier, Epicurus’ statement in SV 33—that happiness consists in being without hunger, thirst, or cold, and the confidence that one will continue to be without these in the future—can be understood with the help of Lucretius to mean that Epicurus conceives of the good in terms of the perceived painless functioning of the organism and the well-founded expectation of the body’s future health.27 A final piece of evidence connecting katastematic pleasure with health and perception is Cicero’s testimony from the Tusculan Disputations on the nature of the Epicurean highest good. In book 5, Cicero presents an objection to Epicurus’ disciple and friend Metrodorus that is similar to Plutarch’s objection against Epicurus: one can never be assured that pleasures of the body will continue because misfortune can strike at any moment. Cicero argues as follows: But you, Metrodorus, who have stored away the Good in the depths and marrow of your body, and laid it down that the ultimate good consists in a healthy physical condition [summum bonum firma corporis adfectione] with a guaranteed prospect of it—have you blocked the lines of approach of Fortune? How? Even at this moment you could be robbed of that ‘Good’ of yours. (5.27)28

Again, we need not be concerned with the merits of Cicero’s argument;29 what is noteworthy for our purposes is that Epicureans, and here, notably, Metrodorus, Epicurus’ right-hand man, conceive of the highest good in terms of our reflection on the well-balanced state of the body and the hope that such a condition will continue. As both Cicero, who is apparently paraphrasing Metrodorus, and Plutarch mention, the pleasure of physical health has a mental aspect as well. We hear this from Epicurus himself when he claims in SV 33 that the mental pleasure of confidence plays a significant role in happiness. Confidence in the future

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painlessness of the body amounts to being aware that one is without worries and fears concerning one’s physical state.30 To be aware of no such mental pains is just to experience the healthy functioning of the mind, or mental katastematic pleasure. Unlike its physical counterpart, mental katastematic pleasure is not always defined in negative terms: for example, we have seen mental katastematic pleasure described as tranquility and confidence rather than simply as ‘absence of pain in the mind.’ Epicurus, Epicureans, and those writing about Epicureanism tend to describe mental katastematic pleasure in more positive (i.e., more substantive) ways than they do physical katastematic pleasure, which perhaps explains why the latter has been more prone to misinterpretation than the former.

Does organic health include mental pleasure? Although we have seen that several sources mention the mental aspects of health, one might object that health is too bodily a notion to characterize Epicurean pleasure. One might contend that my reading makes the Epicureans seem like new-age health nuts or exercise fanatics, focused on making their bodies as fit as possible. This would indeed be problematic because we know that Epicureans believe mental pleasure is essential for happiness: many of the texts I discussed earlier in this chapter make it clear that the mental pleasure of ataraxia is a major component of the highest good. The Epicureans hold that mental pleasures are greater than their bodily counterparts, since the former have a greater temporal range: the mind can take pleasure in past memories as well as future expectations, but the body is restricted to pleasures of the present moment.31 (For this same reason, mental pains are worse than bodily pains, a point of disagreement between Epicureans and Cyrenaics.32) If Epicureans believe that mental pleasure is vital to the best life, then is organic health the best characterization of their highest good? One might point out in response that all pleasures, even mental ones, are the product of the material workings of the organism.33 According to Epicureans, the mind, like the body, is corporeal, so one might argue that it makes little sense to distinguish non-bodily phenomena from bodily ones. But the Epicureans obviously believe there is some worthwhile distinction to be made between mental and bodily pleasures, even if it is technically the case that all pleasures (and everything everywhere) are caused by the motions of material atoms. Lucretius explains that there are differences between the mind (animus), which

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is located in the chest, and the non-rational spirit (anima), which is spread throughout the body: the former is the seat of emotion, thought, and belief, whereas the latter is responsible for non-rational perception.34 Because there are significant functional and compositional differences between the mind and the spirit, it makes sense to distinguish ‘mental’ activities from ‘bodily’ ones, even if everything is corporeal. But even if we grant that it makes sense for Epicureans to distinguish mental phenomena from bodily ones, it nevertheless seems to be the case that Epicureans believe mental pleasures depend on the body, not in the arguably trivial sense that mental pleasures are in fact corporeal, but in the sense that the mind’s pleasure involves reflecting on the condition of the body: Epicureans claim that we rejoice mentally when we feel confident that our bodily health will continue.35 It is not certain whether Epicureans believe that all mental pleasures refer somehow to the state of the body, but several texts do describe Epicurean mental pleasure this way. This is the case in the passages we looked at above from Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations, Plutarch’s Non Posse, and the Epicurean Vatican Sayings: Cicero and Plutarch both describe the mental pleasure of the “guaranteed prospect” and “trustworthy expectation” of a healthy body, and SV 33 mentions that happiness depends in part on one’s confidence that bodily deficiencies will be avoided in the future. Clement of Alexandria, in his comparison of the Cyrenaics and the Epicureans, notes, “Epicurus thinks that all joy of the soul is set over prior bodily affections.”36 Epicurus’ KD 18 confirms that the mind’s reflections on physical functioning play a large role in generating mental pleasure: Pleasure in the flesh [ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἡ ἡδονή] does not increase once the pain associated with want has been removed; but rather, it is only varied. The calculation [ἐκλόγισις] of these very things and things like them, which produce the greatest fears for the mind [τῇ διανοίᾳ], generates the limit of the mind’s pleasure [τῆς δὲ διανοίας τὸ πέρας τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν].

Although KD 18 does not say whether all of the mind’s pleasure stems from calculations concerning the state of the body, it does say that the mind’s pleasure cannot be increased beyond the enjoyment that is produced by removing fears about the body and calculating rationally about how to achieve the absence of pain in the flesh. Because the past, present, and future conditions of the body have significant effects on the condition and pleasure of the mind, it makes sense for bodily health to loom large in the Epicureans’ account of the highest good. This does

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not necessarily mean that happiness is impossible without bodily health, but Epicureans seem to believe that happiness will be unstable without confidence that physical suffering will be outweighed by future pleasure. This belief is implied by their claim that chronic pains will be mild and severe pains will be temporary (KD 4). This mantra—one part of their so-called fourfold cure (τετραφάρμακος)—aims to alleviate worries about the body’s condition by reminding the sufferer of the facts (unintuitive though they may be) of physical pain. But notice that this “cure” relies on the assumption that happiness can be maintained despite bodily pain precisely because such pain will either improve or be mild enough to manage. So how do we maintain happiness in the face of severe chronic pains? It seems the Epicureans must respond either that there are no such pains or that happiness simply cannot outlast persistent bodily disturbances. The former response may have been tenable during Epicurus’ time if severe pains tended to lead to death before they became chronic.37 This seems to have been the case for Epicurus’ own pains: he claims in a letter from his deathbed that he maintains his happiness in the face of severe bodily pain by recalling pleasant memories of time spent with friends.38 In a different example, Diogenes Laertius reports that the Epicurean sage’s happiness cannot be marred by physical pain: “Even when the wise man is stretched on the rack, he is happy [εὐδαίμονα]” (DL 10.118). It is probably the case that whoever is being stretched on the rack is not long for this world. So perhaps happiness can be maintained despite deathly physical pains, but the happiness is nevertheless temporary. This probably would not trouble Epicureans, however, since they claim to be uninterested in the duration of pleasure39 (and, therefore, in the duration of happiness, since the happy life just is the pleasant life), but we get the sense from Epicurean texts that their tools for maintaining happiness are useful mainly for dealing with manageable physical disturbances, and that larger disruptions to physical functioning are liable to have profound effects on our overall happiness. Consequently, we would be wise to pursue bodily health and avoid bodily pains as much as possible. Even if most of our Epicurean texts tend to consider health in terms of optimal physical functioning, optimal mental health is also a significant feature of the Epicurean best life. In the Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus explains the beneficial mental consequences of pursuing philosophy at any age: “Let no one hesitate to philosophize when young nor tire of it when old. For no one is too young or too old for the health of the soul [πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν ὑγιαῖνον]” (Ad Men. 122). Here Epicurus is referring to philosophy as the study of nature, a correct understanding of which engenders freedom from the mental pains caused by

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frustrated desires and fears of death and the gods. Similar connections between Epicurean philosophy and health are found in SV 54: “One should not pretend to philosophize, but actually philosophize. For we do not need to seem healthy, but to be truly healthy [οὐ γὰρ προσδεόμεθα τοῦ δοκεῖν ὑγιαίνειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν ὑγιαίνειν].” In all of these passages, philosophy seems to be modeled after a medical prescription: philosophy works like medicine to produce certain healthful effects in an organism. The medical model is more conspicuous in an unknown Epicurean text quoted by Porphyry: “Empty is that philosopher’s reasoning by which no human affliction is cured. For just as there is no benefit in the medical art if it does not cure the diseases of bodies, so there is no benefit in philosophy if it does not drive affliction out of the soul.”40 Just as the goal of medicine is to promote health in the body, the goal of philosophy is to promote health in the mind. The medical model is taken up further by Philodemus, who likens the therapeutic process to carving out mental problems with a scalpel.41 As a self-appointed ‘physician of the soul,’ Philodemus claims that therapy should be tailored to the fears and desires of each patient, with the goal of restoring a healthy condition to the mind.42 Mental health is therefore an important part of the Epicurean best life, so there is no reason to suspect that ‘health’ is too bodily of a characterization of the highest good. Since the Epicurean highest good is comprised of bodily and mental pleasure, and since Epicureans describe bodily and mental pleasure in terms of health, it is fitting to understand the goal of their best life as the healthy functioning of the mind and body. The notion of pleasure as a perceived condition of bodily and mental health connects in many ways with Plato’s accounts of pleasure in the Philebus and Republic and with Aristotle’s response to the Platonic position. Although, as I argued in earlier chapters, the Philebus claims that the state of health itself is neither pleasant nor painful, the dialogue’s description of health is helpful for understanding Epicurus’ own conception of an ideal physical state. In the Philebus, bodily health is described as a condition lacking disturbances large enough to register with the soul; because the disturbances go unperceived, the organism is without pain. Importantly, what matters for Socrates and Protarchus in the Philebus is why organic disturbances go unperceived in a healthy state: healthy organisms do not undergo significant processes of change or upheaval. Health, then, is not just a matter of perceiving a lack of disturbances; it is also a matter of not having any disturbances large enough to perceive. It is precisely because health involves no major physiological changes that Socrates claims it

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is neither pleasant not painful. For him, the most obvious sorts of pleasures are those connected to the physiological processes that restore healthy functioning in an organism. In the Republic, Plato is clear that psychological health, at least, is pleasant: the harmony engendered by an ordered soul, all of whose parts are functioning as they should, makes the philosophic life the most pleasant. The Republic describes mental health in terms of the balance the whole soul achieves when reason leads it toward the best goals. The healthy soul is not frustrated by unmanageable desires, and it makes rational decisions about what to pursue and avoid. Although one might argue that there seems to be some inconsistency among the Philebus’ and Republic’s accounts of the pleasantness of health—the former holds that health is not pleasant, while the latter holds that it is—the potential discrepancy may be accounted for by pointing out that in the Philebus Plato is thinking about health mainly in terms of the physiology of the body whereas in the Republic his concern is the health of the soul. It may be the case that Plato believes it is necessary to provide different accounts of the pleasantness of health, given his belief that not all types of health are equally choiceworthy. In both the Republic and the Philebus, the health of the body is important, but mainly as a means toward some other end: in both dialogues, care of the body is pursued for the sake of the soul’s philosophic activity. The most godlike life of philosophy is hindered by bodily distractions, which are minimized by keeping the body healthy and functioning without disturbance; the primary objective in pursuing bodily health is to support the health of the soul. Given the significant differences between bodily and mental health, it is unsurprising that the pleasantness of each type will differ as well. In any case, both dialogues agree that the condition of the absence of pain is neither pleasant nor painful, and both describe health in terms of ideal, undisturbed functioning. In addition, both dialogues are clear that a life free from disturbances, be they mental or physical, is the most godlike, even if the dialogues are not of one mind about the pleasantness of such a life. Aristotle, putting his own twist on the ancient debates about pleasure, describes as pleasant a condition that looks very much like the state of physiological health described in the Philebus: according to Aristotle, pleasure is associated with unimpeded functioning of the organism, and is an activity, complete in itself, rather than a motion toward an end different from itself. Aristotle, perhaps disagreeing with Plato’s claim in the Philebus that pleasure is associated primarily with processes rather than stable conditions, insists that pleasure is identified with an organism’s unhindered, natural operation.

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Like Plato, Epicurus believes that a healthy organism suffers no large disturbances, either bodily or mental; however, unlike Plato, Epicurus associates physiological health with pleasure. The body causes us the least trouble when its needs have been met—when it suffers no hunger, thirst, or cold, in the words of SV 33—and its desires cause no major disturbances in the organism. The organism is able to function at its best—in its most unimpeded state, to use Aristotle’s language—when it achieves the sort of balance that Epicurus might say Plato describes. For Epicurus, however, bodily health is not a means to some other end: since health is pleasant, and pleasure is the goal of life, health itself, whether physical or psychological, is choiceworthy. Although Plato and Epicurus may disagree about the pleasantness and choiceworthiness of bodily health, their descriptions of ideal physiological functioning are quite similar: both center on the idea that imbalance and excess are harmful to our well-being, and both contend that the condition of health itself differs from the processes that bring it about. Epicurus would certainly agree with Socrates’ negative assessment in the Philebus of a life spent cultivating large physical deficiencies just so one can fill them up again; precisely this sort of activity must be avoided if one wishes to achieve optimal functioning. Indeed, in a passage reminiscent of the leaky jars passage in Plato’s Gorgias (493a–94b), Lucretius praises Epicurus (rather lavishly) for realizing that the cause of humanity’s unhappiness was “the vessel [vas] itself, which by its own flaw corrupted within it all things, even good things, that entered it from without. He saw that this was partly because of the leaks and perforations, so that it was impossible for the vessel to be filled by any means at all” (DRN 6.17–21, trans. modified).43 Lucretius basically comes to the same conclusion as Socrates: a mind (that is, a “vessel”) that is never satisfied and seeks constant filling is polluted and tormented. In addition, Epicurean mental health resembles the psychic harmony and balance that Plato attributes to the just soul in the Republic. Although Epicureans do not have the concept of a Platonic tripartite soul, and although they do not agree with the Republic’s views on the intrinsic value of philosophy, both Epicurus and Plato focus on the benefits of possessing an untroubled psyche. As we know from Epicurus, an unhealthy mind is frustrated by various fears, unattainable desires, and false beliefs. The mind is therefore capable of frustrating itself: it causes its own suffering and hampers its ability to attain happiness. By removing false beliefs, understanding the nature of desire, and coming to learn what is appropriate for us and what is not, we can free ourselves from mental disturbance and achieve the confidence that our pleasure will persist. Plato essentially uses

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the same model for mental health, although it is made more complex by the addition of the tripartite soul. Just like the Epicurean mind, the Platonic soul frustrates itself with conflicting desires among the psychic parts and misleads itself with false beliefs about what is good and bad. When the soul is just and its parts function as they should, it achieves psychic health and is able to pursue its projects rationally, without holding itself back. Both Plato and Epicurus describe the soul’s experience of mental balance as pleasant; indeed, for Plato the pleasantness of the just person’s healthy state of mind is one of the selling points of the just life. In conclusion, several sources suggest that Epicureans have a very robust conception of the highest good. ‘The stable state of the body’ and ‘health’ that Epicurus, Plutarch, and others associate with katastematic pleasure is far more descriptive of the Epicurean highest good than ‘painlessness’; furthermore, ‘confidence in future bodily functioning and health’ is a more robust description of mental katastematic pleasure than ‘tranquility.’ Whereas ‘painlessness’ indicates merely a state of being without suffering, and ‘tranquility’ merely a state of not being disturbed, the descriptions of the highest pleasure mentioned by the sources discussed here are more constructive: they suggest that the Epicurean good is not the state of a corpse or a sleeper, a state in which no condition of the body or soul is perceived. Rather, the Epicurean good is the conscious awareness of one’s physical and mental health, which belongs to an organism that suffers minimal disturbance to its normal operations and remains confident that its painless state will continue.

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Pleasurable Restorations of Health in Epicurean Hedonism

In book 2 of De Finibus, Cicero asks his Epicurean interlocutor Torquatus whether a thirsty person who drinks experiences the same pleasure as a nonthirsty person who mixes the beverage (2.17). Assuming that Cicero is talking about a basic, nourishing drink rather than an Old Fashioned, the answer seems obvious: of course the thirsty person experiences a different kind of pleasure, since she remedies a physical deficiency that the drink’s maker is not currently undergoing. However, this is not Torquatus’ answer: he refuses to reply, chalking Cicero’s question up to “dialectical quibbling.” I contend in this chapter that Epicureans would answer Cicero’s question in the obvious way, and they would call the thirsty person’s pleasure ‘kinetic.’ As I argue in what follows, several texts give us good reason to believe that kinetic pleasure is directly caused by the processes that restore an organism to its natural state. The claim that Epicureans recognize restorative pleasures is not new,1 but most scholars have based their case on Cicero’s account of Epicurean pleasure in De Finibus. Although, as I argued in Chapter 4, Cicero does describe restorative pleasures as kinetic, he confusingly lumps them together with pleasurable sensory variations that are not restorative, such as the pleasures of hearing and vision. Because of this problem, I construct my interpretation of Epicurean kinetic pleasure without the account from De Finibus. The general plan for the chapter is as follows: in the first section, I contend that there are bodily as well as mental restorative pleasures, and that both are impure in the sense that they depend on the prior existence of a physical or mental deficiency. As I discuss, Epicurus’ restoration model of pleasure brings to mind Plato and Aristotle’s respective treatments of the ontological and ethical ramifications of pleasurable processes of replenishment. However, this reading of Epicurean kinetic pleasure must deal with a number of objections, which

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are the focus of the second section. In the chapter’s final section, I consider a controversial passage from Epicurus’ work On Choices (Περὶ αἱρέσεων), in which Epicurus himself uses the terms ‘kinetic’ and ‘katastematic’ and includes joy (χαρά) and gladness of mind (εὐφροσύνη) among the kinetic class. The passage might seem to fly in the face of my contention that kinetic pleasures are linked to restorations, since neither joy nor gladness of mind is usually understood to be restorative. I address several problems with other scholarly interpretations of this passage and attempt to provide a viable account of Epicurean joy as a mental pleasure of restoration. I leave until the next chapter my discussion of pleasures that seem to be neither restorations nor the results of restoration (that is, neither kinetic nor katastematic), such as the painless sensory pleasures of taste and sex.

Kinetic pleasure and restoring organic health It is often argued that the Epicureans describe kinetic pleasures as agreeable movements of the flesh and that they use this description to distinguish kinetic from katastematic pleasures.2 However, as Nikolsky points out, it is evident that Epicurus does not distinguish pleasures in this way from Plutarch’s discussion of the Epicurean good in Non Posse, where Plutarch writes that the Epicureans hold dear “every pleasing movement of the flesh that is sent up to give some pleasure and joy to the soul” (πᾶσα διὰ σαρκὸς ἐπιτερπὴς κίνησις ἐφ᾽ ἡδονήν τινα καὶ χαρὰν ψυχῆς ἀναπεμπομένη, 1087b).3 We can understand from Plutarch’s account that the Epicureans do not oppose the highest good to motion or to sensory pleasure (that is, an agreeable movement of the flesh), since Plutarch mentions all of these together without remarking on any fundamental distinction between them. Unless Plutarch is ignorant of what would have been an essential distinction in Epicureanism, the Epicureans hold that all pleasures are in motion and have some sensory aspect. This conclusion is echoed in Plutarch’s Adversus Colotem, where he discusses the Epicurean appeal to nature to justify the goodness of pleasure: “Without a teacher these fine, smooth and gentle movements of the body [τὰ κα λὰ ταῦτα καὶ λεῖα καὶ προσηνῆ κινήματα τῆς σαρκός] themselves summon, as they themselves claim, even one who altogether denies and disagrees that he is guided and appeased [μα λάσσεσθαι] by them” (1122e).4 According to Plutarch, Epicureans claim we need no instruction in order to realize that pleasure is the good, since we realize this fact inherently. As Nikolsky explains, if the Epicureans mean by this argument that the goodness of kinetic, as

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opposed to katastematic, pleasure is realized inherently, then they are guilty of equivocation, for the Epicureans would be claiming that the telos—katastematic pleasure—is realized innately, yet they would be using the description of an inferior kind of pleasure—the kinetic variety—to prove their point.5 Plutarch’s account reveals that the Epicureans do not consider a pleasure’s being a “smooth movement of the body” to be a sufficient criterion to classify it as either kinetic or katastematic; we must look elsewhere to discover what is distinctive about Epicurean kinetic pleasure. One might be tempted to turn to a more atomic explanation, in which kinetic pleasure is understood in terms of the movement of atoms in a part of or in the whole organism. However, because Epicurus’ entire theory of perception is explained in relation to the movement of atoms, it is difficult to distinguish the movement of atoms specific to kinetic pleasure from the movement of atoms occurring at all times in a living organism. We know from several sources that Epicureans believe that all atoms continually move, not just those that may be involved in kinetic pleasure. In the Letter to Herodotus Epicurus claims that “the atoms move continually forever,” either vibrating in their positions when they are bound by other atoms or recoiling as a result of atomic collisions (DL 10.43). This is confirmed by other sources: Lucretius claims, “If you suppose that the primary elements of things can stay still, and by staying still can produce new motions in compound bodies, you are straying far from the path of sound judgment” (DRN 2.80–82). And Sextus Empiricus writes of Epicurean physics, “the atom in itself is always moving.”6 Because Epicurus’ physics is in terms of the movement of atoms generally, both kinetic and katastematic pleasure involve atomic motion, making it difficult to distinguish the two pleasures atomically.7 Whether an atomic explanation of Epicurean pleasure can or ought to be given is controversial. A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, for example, deny that Epicurus’ physics has any bearing on his ethics: Contrary to what is often claimed, the details of Epicurus’ atomic theory do not appear to be presupposed by his ethics. Pleasure and pain are never identified with movements of atoms, even though Lucretius explains the differences between pleasant and painful tastes by the shapes of the ‘bodies’ that affect our mouth and palate. As ‘accidents’ of perceivers, pleasure and pain have no existence at the atomic level, but only at that of consciousness. (1987: vol. 1, 122)8

Several sources confirm that Epicurus thinks of pleasure and pain as accidents of perceivers: Sextus Empiricus, reporting the views of Epicurus according to

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Demetrius of Laconia, a first-century BCE Epicurean, writes that Epicurus thinks of pleasures and pains as accidents belonging to those who feel them.9 And Lucretius explains that bodies and void are all there is; everything else is either a fixed attribute or an accident of them, pleasure being the latter.10 However, others believe that Epicurus’ atomic theory is essential to his understanding of pleasure.11 Rist describes kinetic pleasures as those “deriving from a steady, though limited and temporary, change in the state of those atoms” and katastematic pleasures as those “deriving from a well-balanced and steady state of the moving atoms in a sensitive organ” (1972: 102).12 On Rist’s view, kinetic and katastematic pleasures are defined in terms of a change or lack thereof in the state of moving atoms. It is not clear on Rist’s view whether the change in the state of the atoms is a change in the motion of atoms themselves or a change in some other respect. Either way, there is no evidence that Epicurus distinguishes kinetic from katastematic pleasure based on a change in the motion of atoms or a change in the atoms themselves. Nowhere does he claim that kinetic pleasure derives from speedier or slower atoms or from any other atomic changes. According to Epicurus, all atoms are in motion, and he does not associate a certain motion of atoms with one kind of pleasure and a different motion with another. One might object, however, that composite bodies—for example, the organism as a whole or its individual organs—could be at rest even if its constituent atoms are always in motion. If this were the case, then motion and rest could be distinguished, at least on the macroscopic level. But what would such a distinction at that level look like? And what would it mean for the mind to be ‘at rest’ or for an organ to be ‘at rest,’ and why would that be pleasure? If one were to answer that a composite body at rest is one that does not change, this leaves unanswered the question of what it means for an organism to remain changeless. The answer could not be that the organism’s atoms remain motionless, for Epicureans claim that atoms are always moving. Neither could it be that some atoms are moving faster than others, since Epicurus does not associate a certain speed of atomic motion with a certain kind of pleasure. Motion and rest at the macroscopic level are caused by microscopic phenomena, but there is not sufficient evidence that Epicureans distinguish kinetic from katastematic pleasure based on microscopic phenomena. Although Long and Sedley are right to claim that Epicurus does not identify pleasure with the movement of atoms per se, Epicureans sometimes explain pleasure atomically. This is apparent in Lucretius’ appeal to atomic motion to describe kinetic pleasure as the perceived restoration of an organism’s painless

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state. He comments on the nature of pain and pleasure and why atoms can feel neither: Furthermore, since pain occurs when the particles of matter in the living flesh of the limbs are disturbed by some force and reel in their places within the body, and seductive pleasure is produced when they return to their position [praeterea quoniam dolor est ubi materiai / corpora vi quadam per viscera viva per artus / sollicitata suis trepidant in sedibus intus, / inque locum quando remigrant, fit blanda voluptas], it is evident that the primary elements are immune to pain and cannot feel any pleasure by themselves. The fact is that they do not consist of atoms whose displacements could cause them pain or bless them with pleasure, the sustainer of life. Therefore they cannot be endowed with sensation. (DRN 2.963–72)13

As the passage shows, the definition of pleasure and pain bears directly on the question of why atoms can feel neither: because pain and pleasure are understood in terms of the disruption and return of painless functioning, respectively, and since atoms themselves are not composed of smaller components that could be disturbed or rearranged by some force, they cannot feel pleasure or pain. Notice that although Lucretius’ explanation of pleasure and pain is atomic—pleasure is associated with the physical return of atoms to their positions, and pain with the corresponding disruption—he is concerned with the significance of the atomic motions rather than the motions per se. In other words, pleasure and pain are associated with the movements of atoms from one place to another, but the movements themselves are not the point of Lucretius’ explanation. Rather, the point is that pleasure and pain are perceived restorations and disturbances, respectively, of the natural functioning of the organism. The motions are insignificant, divorced from the second-order explanation of them as perceptions of restorations and disturbances. Plutarch’s statement I addressed earlier (1087b) also bears this out: the κίνησις of the flesh is perceived by the soul. Additionally, a passage in the Letter to Menoeceus implies that pleasure is experienced in the process of removing pain: after denying that extravagance leads to more pleasure than a simple lifestyle, Epicurus adds, “and a barley cake and water yield the greatest pleasure whenever someone in need takes them” (DL 10.131).14 Epicurus seems to be claiming that the pleasure that accompanies the removal of a deficiency is more pronounced when the deficiency is more severe. Phenomenologically, this makes perfect sense: barley cakes and water tend to yield very little pleasure for someone who is already full; however, that same fare will be highly pleasurable for someone whose stomach is rumbling.

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Note that in the case of pleasures of restoration, the deficiency that precedes them is perceived; the pleasure derives from the perception that the lack is being replenished. Some scholars, however, deny that Epicurus’ statement about bread and water says anything about restorative pleasure. Wolfsdorf, for instance, claims Epicurus is saying that restorations lead to the katastematic pleasure of painlessness, but restorative processes themselves are not experienced as pleasant.15 Since Epicurus says that bread and water yield the highest pleasure, and since the highest pleasure is katastematic pleasure, Wolfsdorf concludes that bread and water must be productive of a katastematic condition rather than a restorative pleasure.16 David Konstan, agreeing with Wolfsdorf, adds, “Epicurus’ point here is not that the pleasure increases with the need, but that the simplest and most available foods can provide as much pleasure as the most elaborate and expensive; of course, there is no gain in pleasure from eating if one is already full” (2012: 15).17 Although the passage might be read in the way Wolfsdorf suggests, I think it makes more sense if it means that barley cakes and water bring the highest pleasure of their kind, namely, restorative pleasure, when one in need consumes them. What Epicurus says in the barley cakes passage is that pleasure is produced ἐπειδάν (‘whenever’ or ‘once’) the food and drink in question is taken by someone who needs them; it does not say, as Wolfsdorf ’s interpretation seems to require, that they produce pleasure later. The highest pleasure of painlessness is not achievable in the moment someone ingests the food, but only later, once the pain is removed. Before then, while the pain is still in the process of being removed, the pleasure is caused by the replenishment. Thus, I think Epicurus’ point is just what Konstan denies: the size of a deficiency does indeed affect the pleasure that results from it. But note that this holds only for restorative pleasures: the size of pleasures of painlessness (i.e., katastematic pleasure) does not vary according to the size of a deficiency since such pleasures are not directly caused by replenishment itself but by the organism’s painless and healthy functioning. As for Konstan’s claim that Epicurus’ point is that simple fare is just as pleasant as more extravagant offerings, I think my own claim is consistent with this view. If the passage concerns restorative pleasure, then it makes sense for Epicurus to say that, for a hungry person, the process of being replenished by barley cakes is just as enjoyable as the process of being replenished by fancy cupcakes; the quality of the food taken for restoration does not increase the size of the restorative pleasure. In a way, then, I agree with Konstan that there is no pleasure to be gained once a hungry person is full; however, I think this

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means there is no restorative pleasure to be gained, since the body cannot be filled any further. What Konstan seems to miss is that Epicurus may be saying both that pleasure increases with need and that extravagant fare is unnecessary for satisfying one’s needs. In addition, Plutarch seems to base one of his criticisms in Non Posse on the assumption that Epicurus recognizes restorative pleasures of the body. According to Plutarch, Epicurus limits the magnitude of pleasure to the removal of all pain, which means that pleasure can be increased only during the short period in which pain is in the process of being removed. Plutarch contends that Epicurus, recognizing just how hedonically stingy this position is, tacks on the idea that pleasure continues in the soul once the body’s pleasure has been exhausted: Epicurus has imposed a common limit to them [pleasures], namely, the removal of all pain, since nature, increasing the pleasure as far as the dissolution of pain, does not permit it to increase [προελθεῖν] further in magnitude [κατὰ μέγεθος]; rather, it accepts some non-necessary variegations when it is not suffering distress. The journey toward this, accompanied by desire, is the measure of pleasure [ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦτο μετ᾽ ὀρέξεως πορεία, μέτρον ἡδονῆς οὖσα], and is quite short and compact. For this reason, when they notice their parsimony here, they transfer the goal [τέλος] from the body to the soul. (Non Posse 1088c–d)

According to Plutarch, Epicurus recognizes that some pleasures are experienced during the process or “journey” (πορεία) toward complete removal of pain. Moreover, such pleasures increase over time, and they are accompanied by desire (ὄρεξις). The last of these points is especially noteworthy since it shows that Epicurus is grounding pleasurable restorations not in deficiency simpliciter but in the psychological recognition of a deficiency. The psychological recognition takes the form of a desire for replenishment, the satisfaction of which is perceived as pleasant. As I argued in the previous chapter, a desire cannot be satisfied unknowingly, even if a deficiency can. When a deficiency generates a desire for filling, restorative pleasure can occur when the process of restoration is perceived, that is, when the psychological desire for replenishment is in the process of being satisfied. Epicurus’ conception of kinetic pleasure as the perception of an organism’s movement toward painless functioning (or, stated differently, the perceived restoration of an organic deficiency)18 fits easily among Plato and Aristotle’s respective treatments of restorative pleasure. According to the Philebus, the experience of the physical process of replenishment is the paradigm case of pleasure. Socrates explains that such pleasures are characterized by change in an

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organism, and they consist in movements toward a state of natural functioning (γένεσις εἰς φύσιν). Socrates’ problem with this sort of pleasure in the Philebus is both moral and ontological: by nature, processes are a means to a different end, so a life centered on the satisfaction of pleasurable processes is aimed at an interim goal rather than the highest one. In the Republic too, Socrates claims that most people call ‘pleasure’ the feeling they have when pain is being removed. Even though the Socrates of the Republic doubts that such pleasures are actually pleasures at all, he does claim that pleasure is a motion (Rep. 583e9–10) and that it is associated with fillings. In addition, it’s clear from Aristotle’s many treatments of pleasure that the restoration model was one of the most prominent, if not the most prominent, ways of describing pleasure in the philosophical schools of his time. As I explained in Chapter 3, much of Aristotle’s own account of pleasure makes sense as a response to the debates in the Platonic Academy about pleasure’s status as a process or an end state. Although it seems that Aristotle ultimately moves away from the restoration model, the fact that in all of his treatments of pleasure he considers it to be the main theory to be reckoned with suggests that it was a significant way that ancient Greek philosophers conceptualized pleasure. Against this backdrop, Epicurean kinetic pleasure certainly makes sense as a perceived process of organic replenishment. The main difference, as I argued in the previous chapter, is that Epicurus, unlike Plato, believes that the painless and healthy organic condition that results from processes of restoration is pleasant too. This is an interesting result, given that Plato and Epicurus describe the physiology of the healthy state in basically the same way. However, can the restoration model account for mental pleasures? It is true that restorations are usually understood as physical processes rather than psychological ones, and all of the examples of kinetic pleasure I have considered so far involve only bodily restorations, such as the replenishment of food and drink. This objection resembles that from last chapter regarding mental katastematic pleasure: both objections stem from the suspicion that an account of pleasure based on physiological functioning cannot make sense of mental enjoyment. This problem was easier to deal with in the case of katastematic pleasure, since we have a few texts that provide a fairly clear description of the katastematic pleasure of mental health, such as Plutarch’s discussion of the Epicurean pleasure of the κατάστημα. Unfortunately, textual evidence for the Epicureans’ description of kinetic pleasure, mental or otherwise, is rather scant. This creates problems for any interpretation of Epicurean kinetic pleasure, not just mine. In

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a sense, then, I share the worry that there are no texts that unambiguously describe mental kinetic pleasure as restorative. However, the reality of the situation is that there are no texts that unambiguously describe kinetic pleasure as anything. As I have mentioned several times, the only known place where Epicurus himself uses the term ‘kinetic’ (κατὰ κίνησιν) is a short selection from his lost text On Choices, in which joy and gladness of mind are identified as kinetic (DL 10.136). I examine this passage in detail later in this chapter, where I argue that joy can be interpreted as a kinetic pleasure of mental restoration. However, as I discuss there, the messiness of the passage has made it the subject of significant scholarly disagreement. And there is just not enough of it on which to base an entire interpretation of Epicurean pleasure. (This is what makes Cicero’s account of Epicurean pleasure in De Finibus so alluring: there is just so much of it.) But as I have argued here, it is possible to piece together a plausible account of kinetic pleasure despite the problems with De Finibus and despite the scarcity of Epicurean texts on this topic; yet, it is true that none of the texts we have sheds much light on mental kinetic pleasure, no matter how it is interpreted. So what can be said about mental pleasures of restoration? I suggest we think about them in the context of the medical model of philosophical therapy described by Philodemus. This model was useful in the previous chapter for understanding mental health, and it will be useful here for understanding mental restoration. The Epicurean therapist is a ‘physician of the soul,’ who employs therapy in the way a physician employs medicine: various treatments are prescribed to the ‘patient’ to restore painless functioning.19 The therapist must first diagnose the problem and then decide on an appropriate remedy. Just as the process of being healed in the body can cause pleasure in a patient who is physically ill, the process of removing mental pains can cause pleasure in a patient who is mentally disturbed. Philodemus describes numerous psychic ‘diseases,’ chief among them inappropriate anger, the fear of death, obsessive love, and the excessive desire for wealth. In general, diseases stem from character flaws (e.g., arrogance) and unhealthy emotions, which in turn often stem from false beliefs. The treatments for these ailments are varied, and they include giving patients a frank talking-to about their errors, having them memorize and recite important bits of Epicurean doctrine (such as the Kuriai Doxai), helping them learn to cast a situation in a different light, and emphasizing the importance of accurate hopes for future well-being. As Tsouna explains,20 many of these tactics aim at encouraging a patient to be more self-reflective and self-corrective, while

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others aim at maintaining a patient’s therapeutic gains. In cases where the error involves not only false beliefs but also harmful emotions, the therapy may need to employ rational arguments (to eradicate the false beliefs) as well as nonrational means of persuasion (to alter the emotional response). According to Philodemus’ therapeutic model, mental healing occurs in stages, beginning with the recognition of error, followed by various treatment methods and reinforcement techniques, and ending in the removal of the disturbance. It seems likely that some of the earlier stages, and not just the last one, will be accompanied by pleasure. This is plausible even if the initial stage of realizing one’s errors is accompanied by pain: it may be painful to own up to one’s own character flaws and false beliefs, but the process of correcting one’s flaws, changing one’s attitudes, and replacing false beliefs with true ones can nevertheless be enjoyable. This seems especially plausible for psychological diseases that involve tenacious false beliefs and excessively harmful emotions, such as the fear of death. The psychological treatment for this disease serves as a good illustration of how the process of removing fears may result in a restorative mental pleasure. According to Epicureans, a number of false beliefs can motivate the fear of death, particularly misconceptions about the afterlife, the painfulness of the process of dying, and the importance of duration to one’s happiness.21 And false beliefs are often accompanied by feelings of terror and anxiety, which are likely what motivates a patient to seek therapy. As Philodemus explains in On Death, rational arguments can be employed to eradicate groundless assumptions about death, pain, the process of dying, and many other aspects of mortality. For instance, the false belief that the afterlife will be painful can be eradicated by means of the Epicurean argument that being dead involves no perception and is therefore neither pleasant nor painful. If the patient completely buys this argument, then it is possible that her mental suffering will dissipate immediately and in toto. However, let’s say she struggles with the argument: she wants to believe its conclusion that death is not painful, but perhaps she does not fully understand or does not fully accept the Epicureans’ atomic justification for it. At this point, her Epicurean therapist might present additional arguments or employ other types of therapeutic tactics. Over time, it seems plausible that the patient will, little by little, replace her mental pain with mental pleasure, which she experiences as a result of restoring the mind’s healthy state. And once she perceives that her mind is no longer plagued by fears and anxiety, she achieves mental katastematic pleasure. Note that this scenario applies equally well to the case in which fears of death are motivated by several false beliefs: one may

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experience relief in the process of removing the false beliefs one by one and gradually restoring the mind’s ability to function without anxiety and fear. Consider also the restorative pleasure that may be derived from the diagnosis of a disease, in the first stage of therapy. Although the realization of one’s own faults can be difficult to bear, it may also be pleasing to realize that one’s problems have an identifiable and treatable cause. This realization may produce pleasure in the form of hope that suffering will soon end. In other words, hopeful thoughts may begin to restore the mind by alleviating some of its psychological pains. Some evidence of a connection between therapy and hope is found at the very end of Philodemus’ On Choices and Avoidances (23.1.11): And whenever he [i.e., the Epicurean] encounters whatever can lead to an improvement, he spares no effort in the hope [προσδ[ο]κίαι] of surviving for a while. Indeed, he takes the greatest care of his health. And feeling confidence against illness and death, he endures with strength the therapies that can remove them [καὶ τεθαρρηκὼς πρὸς | ἀρρωστίας κα[ὶ] θάνατον εὐ | τόνως ὑπομένει {ει} τὰ δυ | νάμενα τούτων ἀπαλ | λάττειν].22

Thus, one of the things we can say about mental kinetic pleasure is that, like all kinetic pleasures, it arises from some perceived disturbance in functioning and continues until the restoration is complete and a healthy state is achieved. When we understand kinetic pleasures in this way, it becomes clear why the Epicureans subordinate them to katastematic pleasures: the latter do not directly depend on any prior deficiency, whereas the former are always mixed with pain in the sense that they presuppose a disruption to the organism’s natural functioning.23

Response to objections There are a number of objections against the view that kinetic pleasure is caused by restoration, and almost all of them depend on the claim that Epicureans do not recognize the existence of any restorative pleasures. As I mentioned in my discussion of the barley cakes passage, Wolfsdorf and Konstan defend such a claim, as do others.24 As I see it, there are six major objections (minor objections will be dealt with in the notes), most of which I address here, but some will require support from my arguments in the following chapter. I proceed by giving at least an overview of my response to every objection, and I return in the next chapter to those responses needing further support from my later arguments.

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(i) One of the most significant objections against the view that kinetic pleasures are caused by restorations is that Epicurus seems to deny that pleasure and pain can coexist in the same location. Since pleasures of restoration, by definition, occur alongside deficiencies, it would seem that Epicurus must deny that restorations are pleasurable. Epicurus’ clearest denial that pleasure and pains can coexist is found in KD 3: “The removal of all pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. Wherever the feeling of pleasure is present, so long as it is present, there is neither pain nor distress, nor both together.”25 Because of KD 3, several scholars, such as Purinton, Rist, Diano, and Wolfsdorf, believe that every kinetic pleasure requires an antecedent katastematic pleasure in the same organ. On their view, since pleasure and pain cannot coexist, there must already be a state of painlessness (that is, katastematic pleasure) in the location of kinetic pleasure.26 For example, in the case of eating while hungry, the presence of kinetic pleasure in the palate presupposes the presence of katastematic pleasure in the same location. This entails that pain is located in an entirely different organ: the stomach. However, if kinetic pleasures are perceived restorative processes toward health, we avoid the conclusion that pleasure and pain coexist. When we perceive that the body is being restored, we are not immediately aware of a deficiency. In the process of restoration, the source of pain is present—that is, there is a physical deficiency of some sort in the body—but the physical phenomenon alone does not properly count as pain if the deficiency is not perceived.27 Experience bears this out: when we eat while hungry, we are not aware of our physical deficiency at every moment; it is not the case that we feel hungry while our hunger is being satisfied, but we do feel the hunger before we begin to fill ourselves. Since we do not actually perceive a lack while it is being filled, we do not experience kinetic pleasures and pains at once.28 One might nevertheless object that my explanation is complicated by the fact that Epicurus seems to say that when pain is counteracted by some pleasure, the physical disturbance to the body may still be perceived. Diogenes Laertius reports that Epicurus believes the sage will remain happy on the rack even though he “will moan and wail” (DL 10.118). Presumably, the sage cannot moan and whimper while at the same time remaining unaware of disturbances in his own body; he seems to perceive pleasure and pain at once. In response, we should note that if the issue of counteracting pain complicates my own position, it will also tell against Epicurus’ own position in KD 3 that we cannot experience pleasure and pain simultaneously.29 This doctrine is

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problematic anyway since it contradicts KD 4, where Epicurus discusses one of the four Epicurean ‘cures’: terrible pains will be short-lived and chronic pains will usually be mild. He then states, “what merely exceeds pleasure in the flesh does not last many days. And prolonged sicknesses admit of more pleasure in the flesh than pain.”30 One could take Epicurus to mean by this that pleasure and pain coexist in the same place (namely, the flesh) during periods of illness, and pleasure usually comes out on top. So either Epicurus does not cling too firmly to his belief that pleasure and pain cannot coexist—in which case the objection of Purinton, Rist, Diano, and Wolfsdorf is unnecessary—or he does believe pleasure and pain can coexist, and he (possibly) contradicts himself with the example of prolonged sickness. Either way, this seems to be a problem with the content of the texts themselves and not necessarily with my reading. Nevertheless, we can try to reconcile the sage’s awareness of his pain with my contention that we do not actually experience pain when we perceive a lack being filled. For one thing, the cases are qualitatively different: in the case of the sage, his body is being tortured rather than restored to healthy functioning. As such, the sage’s situation does not present us with the same problem as that of the person being restored, for in the sage’s case we would not say that he experiences a lack and a restoration simultaneously; that would be like saying one knows one is both hungry and not hungry at the same time. The sage’s perception that his body is disturbed does not directly conflict with his pleasure, which is present because he has memories of past pleasures and the confidence that he will be fine in the future. What would be a problem— and what would be the analog of the case of the person being restored—is if the sage were to perceive both that his body is being disturbed and that he is painless (ἀπονία). We would have to conclude that if the sage is aware of a disturbance in his body, he must not be aware simultaneously that his body is without disturbance. And this is just what we find, for when the sage is tortured he perceives that his body is not functioning healthily, meaning that he does not also perceive that his body is without disturbance (i.e., he does not have ἀπονία). His pleasure is not the perceived healthy functioning of his body (ἀπονία); rather, his pleasure stems from his memories and the confidence that his circumstances will improve (ἀταραξία).31 Thus, in the sage’s case there is not a direct conflict between his pleasure (ἀταραξία) and his awareness of disturbances in his body. There will be a conflict only if Epicurus were to claim that the sage is without pain in his body (i.e., he has achieved ἀπονία) even as he moans and groans.32

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(ii) An additional objection concerns pleasures based on unnatural and empty desires, which, it has been suggested to me,33 do not seem to fit in either the kinetic or the katastematic classes as I have described them. In the Letter to Menoeceus (127), Epicurus calls such desires ‘groundless’ (κεναί), and a scholiast to KD 29 mentions as examples “desires for crowns and the dedication of statues [to oneself].” Despite the fact that pleasures stemming from unnatural and unnecessary desires should never be chosen, the pleasures are nevertheless good qua pleasures, according to Epicurus (Ad Men. 129). The objection, then, is that some pleasures—that of fame, for example—are connected neither to processes of restoring painless functioning nor to painless functioning itself, meaning they are neither kinetic nor katastematic. And if that were the case, then we would have a group of pleasures that are not actually pleasures, which is inconsistent with Epicurus’ claim that even unchoiceworthy pleasures are still pleasures. As I see it, the pleasures stemming from groundless desires are kinetic when they restore painless functioning, and katastematic when they consist in painless functioning. But just because the pleasure of fame can be related to painless functioning does not make it choiceworthy. For example, I may have an intense desire to be famous, a desire that causes me great anxiety since I am at the mercy of other people’s opinions. Fame is not entirely in my control, and so I worry about attaining it; it greatly disturbs my mind, which is to say it brings me mental pain. In the process of making myself known to and honored by others, I may relieve my mental pain and thus come to have a kinetic pleasure. If and when I finally do become famous, I have, in a sense, reached a temporary condition that is free of the anxieties involved in achieving fame; I feel pleasure at being without the worry that people do not know who I am, and I need not be anxious about getting people to honor me. If I am experiencing the pleasure of fame, I cannot also be experiencing anxiety about becoming famous; my mind is free of disturbance with respect to becoming popular. However, this does not mean that Epicurus would encourage us to pursue this sort of pleasure: even though all pleasures are good, not all are choiceworthy. If I enjoy fame now I will start to worry about maintaining my fame in the future, resulting in more anxiety and thus more pain. This very likely chain of events is the reason I should have rejected my desire for fame in the first place, but the negative consequences of fame have no bearing on the goodness of the pleasure qua pleasure or on whether what I experience is in fact a pleasure. In itself, the pleasure of having fame is a state that can involve (at least momentarily) the mind functioning

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without mental pains, which is to say it could be katastematic. And such a state may be preceded by the process of removing my anxiety, which is to say that the pleasure of becoming famous could be kinetic. Perhaps, though, we should say that the katastematic pleasure is not of fame per se but is a pleasure of mental calm caused by my having become famous. Similarly, the katastematic pleasure I achieve as a result of having removed my hunger is not the katastematic pleasure of eating per se; rather, it is the pleasure of having a stable, functioning body, an experience that has been caused by my eating. In any case, Epicurus is highly skeptical that the pleasure of fame will lead to any good in the long run, which is why we should not satisfy our desires for it. But one might still object that although fame may be linked to painlessness, either in the process of removing anxiety about becoming famous or as a result of having removed the anxiety, fame is not also linked to health. If that is the case, the objection might continue, then kinetic and katastematic pleasures are not pleasures by virtue of their relation to the proper and natural functioning of the organism. In response, I contend that in every pleasure there is some aspect of healthy functioning, and this is what makes every pleasure good in the eyes of Epicureans. Even pleasures that should never be pursued have some connection to wellbeing, if only minutely and temporarily.34 Some pleasures are unchoiceworthy because of their inevitable painful consequences, but this does not mean that the pleasures have no healthful aspects; it simply means that the negatives outweigh the positives. For instance, although my desire for fame always leads to pain, it is also pleasurable insofar as it temporarily (and ‘temporarily’ is the key word here) displaces my anxiety about becoming popular. And when this anxiety is removed, my mind can be said to function better since for the moment I am not dogged by this particular mental pain. I am likely to be dogged again later by this pain, which is why I should not bother pursuing the pleasure of fame, but I am nevertheless experiencing a moment of healthy mental functioning as I enjoy the painless workings of my mind while it operates without anxiety. In other words, I am not mistaken about the fact that I (temporarily) feel better when I satisfy my desire to be famous and overcome my crippling anxiety about getting others to recognize me. I feel better because I am better; my mind is momentarily untroubled by pain, and this is healthy and good. However, this pleasure should be avoided, not because the pleasure itself is bad (since no pleasures are bad, according to Epicureans) but because its consequences are guaranteed to be painful.35

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But how is it the case that all pleasures, even unchoiceworthy ones, have some healthy aspect? One explanation, which draws on Julia Annas’ interpretation of Epicurean hedonism, is that all desires, including groundless ones, are based on fundamental and natural human needs.36 As Annas has argued, natural and necessary desires—such as those for basic food, shelter, and drink—are inevitable and generic; we cannot avoid having these desires, which have no painful consequences when satisfied. We make mistakes and experience pain when we add false beliefs to our basic wants—when, for instance, we take our desire to eat and add to it the belief that the only good thing for me to eat is caviar. I may enjoy the caviar without causing myself pain if I understand that caviar is not necessary for my happiness and if I suffer no pain when all I have is plainer fare, which is to say that I may pursue unnecessary variations of my necessary desires as long I have the proper beliefs about what is good for me. What separates reasonable from groundless desires, then, is not the desire itself but our attitudes toward the objects we believe will satisfy our desires. Drawing on an example provided by Philodemus, Annas explains that anger is based on the inevitable human desire for retaliation, a desire that is natural and necessary.37 What is natural but unnecessary is a particular retaliatory action (i.e., anger) that is accompanied by true beliefs about the severity of the offense and the appropriate punishment. When beliefs about these matters are false, the desire is both unnatural and unnecessary. In other words, the desire to retaliate is natural and unavoidable, but the form the retaliation takes—that is, the way we express our anger—can be unnatural when it is infected by false beliefs. As Annas concludes, “Thus in any given activity, of whatever kind, there is an aspect which is natural and one which need not be. Even the faulty and wicked cannot avoid acting naturally in that they have to fulfill their basic needs; but the particular way they do this can involve empty beliefs, and hence empty, unnatural desires” (1993: 195–96). To return to the example of fame, my wish to be popular is based on a fundamental desire that I cannot avoid having, and in this sense I am doing something (ever so slightly) healthy when I attempt to satisfy my desire to become famous. According to Epicurus, people who pursue fame are motivated by the desire for security against others, which is natural and necessary.38 Those who hope to become famous mistakenly believe they stand a greater chance of being protected from harm if they are publicly recognized and honored. The more popular they are, the more they may believe their success will be wished for by the public, in much the same way that communities in the present day

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often wish well for locally famous Olympians. The desire for fame, then, is a manifestation of the natural and necessary desire to avoid harm, coupled with the false belief that fame brings security. The same could be said of the desire for excessive wealth, one of the “alien” desires mentioned by Philodemus:39 one may mistakenly believe that money will ensure one’s safety, or even that fame will lead to money, which in turn may bring security. Epicurus does in fact claim, in KD 14, that prosperity can provide some security, but the very next saying explains that the pursuit of prosperity becomes problematic when it is accompanied by the false belief that wealth has no limit (KD 15). In addition, one of the Vatican Sayings (81) suggests that the problem with wealth and fame may be that their causes are indefinite (ἀδιορίστους). The idea, then, is that although our actions sometimes take a wrong turn when our judgment is compromised, all of them are nevertheless natural to some extent, grounded as they are in unavoidable desires for necessities. Although there is definitely something unhealthy about certain desires and their resulting pleasures, even unhealthy behavior reflects our underlying healthy tendencies to secure survival and happiness. (iii) Several ancient authors compare the Epicureans with the Cyrenaics, noting that the latter recognize only kinetic pleasure, while the former recognize kinetic as well as katastematic kinds.40 Plutarch reports that the Epicureans use the phrase “smooth and agreeable movements of the flesh” (λεῖα καὶ προσηνῆ κινήματα τῆς σαρκός) when describing pleasure (Adversus Colotem 1122e), which echoes Diogenes Laertius’ description of the Cyrenaic conception of pleasure as a “smooth change” (λεία κίνησις, 2.86). Given that the Epicureans and the Cyrenaics employ nearly identical terminology to describe a pleasure that is or involves some sort of movement, we should expect the two schools to have similar conceptions of kinetic pleasure, whose name, of course, derives from the word κίνησις. However (and here is the objection), many scholars believe there is no evidence that the Cyrenaics recognize pleasures of restoration.41 In response, it should be noted that this objection hinges on whether Epicureans and Cyrenaics understand ‘smooth motions’ in the same way. In other words, while both schools may use some version of the phrase ‘smooth motion,’ the objection relies on the claim that they agree about what makes a pleasure ‘smooth’ and what sort of movement the pleasure involves. However, at least one scholar who puts forward this objection claims that the Epicureans’ and Cyrenaics’ respective descriptions of ‘smooth motion’ are different enough that only a vague conception can be applied to both. Wolfsdorf, for instance,

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claims that for the Epicureans “the smoothness of the motion of kinetic pleasure primarily refers to or derives from the smoothness of the atoms constitutive of the bodies that impact the sense-perceptual (or, in the case of mental kinetic pleasure, mental) faculties” (2013: 157). As he rightly notes, this description does not apply to the Cyrenaics because they are not atomists and they have no interest in natural science. Instead, according to Wolfsdorf, the Cyrenaics understand ‘smooth motion’ as “experience that involves absence of psychic resistance. That is, one is subjectively qualitatively altered in a way that one welcomes rather than resists” (2013: 155). So what unites the Cyrenaic and Epicurean views? Only a vague notion of ‘smooth motion,’ such as Wolfsdorf offers: “We can say that both Epicureans and Cyrenaics hold that the smoothness of change or motion involved in pleasure entails conformity to nature (and the roughness of change, non-conformity with nature)” (2013: 158). Thus, when we dig deeper into the Epicureans’ and Cyrenaics’ respective descriptions of ‘smooth motion,’ we discover that the description supposedly shared between them is general enough to accommodate a number of interpretations of Epicurean kinetic pleasure, including the view that such pleasure is caused by processes of restoration. It is not difficult to see that an organism’s processes of replenishment involve “conformity to nature”; as I have argued at length, the Epicureans have a conception of an organism’s natural, optimal functioning, movements toward which are natural and healthy because they promote good functioning. Thus, it is plausible that the Epicureans and Cyrenaics characterize ‘smooth motion’ differently, even if they do share a vague description of it. In addition, there is some scholarly disagreement about whether the Cyrenaics recognize pleasures of restoration. Although Purinton is right that the Cyrenaics never explicitly associate kinetic pleasure with processes of restoration,42 it is also the case that they never explicitly deny it. I suspect that the lack of a clear Cyrenaic position on the status of restorative pleasures accounts for the variety of scholarly opinions on this point. Konstan, for instance, claims that Cyrenaic hedonism is based on Plato’s view that pleasure is a process of restoration: the Cyrenaics, according to Konstan, “adopted Plato’s view of pleasure wholesale. Pleasure, they maintained, consists precisely in restocking the depleted resources of the body” (2012: 14).43 Long and Sedley agree that the Cyrenaics recognize pleasures derived from the process of removing pains.44 Compare these views to that of Erler and Schofield, who insist that Epicurus’ conception of kinetic pleasure probably stems from the Cyrenaic notion of pleasure as a variation.45

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Evidently, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that the Cyrenaics thought there were no restorative pleasures. (iv) Some scholars believe that a passage in Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura shows that eating does not provide a pleasure of restoration but only a pleasure of taste—that is, only a pleasant stimulation of the sense receptors in the palate. Here is the passage: deinde voluptas est e suco fine palati; / cum vero deorsum per fauces praecipitavit,  / nulla voluptas est, dum diditur omnis in artus. / nec refert quicquam quo victu corpus alatur, / dummodo quod capias concoctum didere possis / artubus et stomachi umidulum servare tenorem. (DRN 4.627–32) Next, the pleasure from taste extends as far as the palate; but when it has passed down through the throat, there is no pleasure, since it is all distributed into the limbs. Nor does it matter by which food the body is nourished, so long as what you take in, when it has been cooked, you are able to distribute to the limbs and to preserve the moist character of the stomach. (Trans. mine)

Now, no one disputes that Lucretius means it is specifically the pleasure of taste that ceases once the particles of food move off the palate and down the throat. What is disputed, however, is Lucretius’ motivation for pointing this out. Wolfsdorf suspects that Lucretius wants to drive home the point that it is the organs of taste, rather than the replenishments of the stomach, that are responsible for the pleasure of eating; the alternative—that there is no pleasure of taste when there is no food in our mouth—“is too obvious to warrant stating” (2009: 250). Purinton agrees: “Lucretius states unambiguously that the pleasure felt while one is eating is felt in the palate, not in the belly” (1993: 307). Compare this with Gosling and Taylor’s view that the passage mainly concerns the mechanics of perception, so that “the mention of pleasure is purely incidental” (1982: 376).46 I think a good case can be made that Lucretius is indeed saying nothing more than that the pleasure of taste is confined to the palate. As Gosling and Taylor suggest, the context of the passage is important: Lucretius’ discussion of taste occurs in the midst of his treatment of the highly particular mechanics of different sensory faculties, including hearing and smell. As he states at the beginning of his treatment of the different sensory faculties, he aims to explain “by what means each perceives its own objects,” which suggests that he intends to focus on nothing more than the specifics of the physical workings of each sense (4.522–3). Moreover, he states that such things will be easy to explain—the

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task is “not at all rough” (haudquaquam . . . scruposa, 4.523)—and the account of taste in particular will be “even more reasonable” (plusculum habent in se rationis, 4.616). It seems likely that the explanation is so easy and so reasonable precisely because it is so obvious, in which case we should expect Lucretius to state very obvious things, such as the fact that the pleasure of taste remains on the palate only as long as there is food in the mouth. In addition, if Lucretius’ point is that eating causes only a gustatory pleasure, it is hard to make sense of the Epicurean view that eating can bring about the absence of pain. Obviously, eating is the only way to bring about the condition of having no hunger, and SV 33 claims that such a condition is pleasant. If eating generates only a gustatory pleasure, then Epicureans are saddled with the nonsensical claim that one can enjoy the pleasure of a painless body without ever having eaten anything. (v) Epicurus says in KD 18, “Pleasure in the flesh does not increase once the pain associated with want has been removed; but rather, it is only varied.” This is echoed by Torquatus in De Finibus (2.10), who seems to be on solid Epicurean ground here, and by Plutarch in Non Posse (1088c). Most scholars assume that the variations Epicurus refers to are kinetic rather than katastematic.47 But pleasures of restoration cannot provide any variation since it is impossible to be replenished when one is already in a painless state. Thus, according to this objection, kinetic pleasures are not derived from restorations. I respond to this objection at greater length in the following chapter, so my comments here will be brief and aimed at explaining why a full response must wait until then. In short, the objection wrongly assumes that the variation Epicurus refers to in KD 18 is kinetic. The main reason to assume KD 18 refers to kinetic pleasure is that Cicero associates this pleasure with painless sensory variation, but we have already seen that Cicero is not at all clear on this point. Indeed, he associates kinetic pleasures not just with painless sensory variations, but also with restorations. The solution, as I argue in the following chapter, is that the variation is katastematic: the state of painlessness itself admits of variations, which can be understood as different ways of experiencing a lack of physical and mental pain. This interpretation obviously needs to be supported, but doing so now will distract us from our present consideration of restorative pleasure. The point I wish to make for the moment is just that kinetic pleasures can be derived from restorations if the variations referred to in KD 18 are katastematic. (vi) If kinetic pleasures are derived from restorations, then how do we classify the non-restorative sensory pleasures, such as those without which

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Epicurus clams he cannot conceive the highest good (e.g., pleasant tastes and sounds)? Since there seems to be no place to put such non-restorative variations, several scholars have rejected the view that kinetic pleasures are associated with processes of replenishment. Striker articulates this objection succinctly: “Eating when not hungry, admiring a beautiful statue, or enjoying a surprise party are not cases of replenishment or satisfaction of antecedently felt desires, but they also do not seem to be states of relief or contentment” (1996: 206). On her view, non-restorative pleasures are not katastematic, which means they must be kinetic. But they cannot be kinetic because they are not derived from processes of restoration. She also points out that Epicurus calls joy a kinetic pleasure in his On Choices (DL 10.136), but “there is no good reason to think that joy is necessarily tied to the removal of pain” (1996: 206). Purinton too claims that kinetic pleasures are not restorative because there are non-restorative pleasures that are supposedly kinetic.48 I will revisit this objection later, since it relates to my argument about KD 18; for now, I will say that this objection, like the previous one, wrongly assumes that non-restorative sensory pleasures are kinetic. Again, scholars reject the view that non-restorative sensory pleasures are katastematic on the grounds that this contradicts Cicero’s account in the second book of De Finibus, where such pleasures are described as kinetic.49 I will not say more here about the problems with Cicero’s interpretation, since I have already addressed this in my response to the previous objection and extensively in Chapter 4, but I will take up Striker’s puzzle about joy momentarily. Epicurus’ statement in On Choices that joy is a kinetic pleasure is fairly odd given that he tends to associate joy with katastematic pleasure. A plausible explanation, as I will argue, is that Epicurus describes joy in multiple ways.

Joy as a mental restorative pleasure Diogenes Laertius provides a quotation, purportedly from Epicurus’ lost work On Choices (Περὶ αἱρέσεων), that includes examples of kinetic and katastematic pleasure (DL 10.136). At first glance, it appears that these examples paint a different picture of pleasure than the one I have attributed to Epicurus. In particular, it is not clear how his purported examples of kinetic pleasure, namely, joy (χαρά) and gladness of mind (εὐφροσύνη), map onto the description of kinetic pleasure as the perception of the restoration of painless organic

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functioning. Furthermore, any attempt to claim that joy and gladness of mind are kinetic pleasures, no matter the definition of ‘kinetic,’ must confront the fact that elsewhere Epicurus usually describes joy as katastematic. In sorting out the problems with this passage, I aim to make it clearer how a mental pleasure can be derived from a process of removing pain in the mind. As I will argue, the mental pleasure of joy can be understood as a restorative pleasure. The passage from On Choices runs as follows: (1) ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Διογένης ἐν τῇ ι ζ τῶν Ἐπι λέκτων καὶ Μητρόδωρος ἐν τῷ Τιμοκράτει λέγουσιν οὕτω· “Νοουμένης δὲ ἡδονῆς τῆς τε κατὰ κίνησιν καὶ τῆς καταστηματικῆς”. (2) ὁ δ᾽ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ αἱρεσεων οὕτω λέγει· “Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία καταστηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναί· ἡ δὲ χαρά καὶ ἡ εὐφροσ ύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται.” (DL 10.136, numerals added)50 (1) Similarly Diogenes in the seventeenth book of his Epilecta, and Metrodorus in his Timocrates say the following: “Pleasure being considered as both kinetic and katastematic.” (2) Epicurus, in his On Choices, says the following: “for on the one hand, tranquility and painlessness are katastematic pleasures, and on the other joy and gladness of mind are seen to be kinetic and in activity.”

Before I treat the sections individually, a few general comments are in order. First, any interpreter of Epicurean pleasure must deal with the fact that DL 10.136 presents us with evidence that Epicurus himself and his prominent pupil Metrodorus use the terms ‘kinetic’ and ‘katastematic.’ Any reading that denies that Epicurus gives descriptions of these terms is problematic since we have no reason to doubt the legitimacy of these quotations. Second, controversial among interpreters of DL 10.136 is how to translate κατὰ κίνησιν and καταστηματικαί; one’s choice of translation is inevitably governed by one’s interpretation of Epicurus’ ethics. For example, if one follows Cicero’s reading, one is inclined to translate κατὰ κίνησιν as ‘a motion of the senses,’ following his movens and in motu, and to translate καταστηματικαί as ‘states which consist in rest,’ following his stabilis, in stabilitate, and stans. These are the translations favored by most, including Hicks ([1925] 2000) and Long and Sedley (1987).51 In my translation, I have quasi-transliterated the Greek for κίνησιν and καταστηματικαί so as to disconnect the terms from the interpretations that usually accompany them. My aim here is to show that although I am rejecting the traditional rendering of kinetic and katastematic pleasure as the movement of the senses and a state of rest, respectively, my reading of the kinetic/katastematic distinction in Epicurean ethics is not at odds with DL 10.136.

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In the first section of the passage, Diogenes Laertius provides what appears to be a single quotation from two sources: the Epicureans Diogenes of Tarsus and Metrodorus. We can gather from the quotation that Epicureans believe there is some pleasure called ἡδονὴ κατὰ κίνησιν and another called ἡδονὴ καταστηματική. Since neither Diogenes of Tarsus nor Metrodorus defines these terms, this first section of 10.136 neither rules out nor confirms any particular interpretation of Epicurean pleasure, except, of course, one denying that Epicureans recognize pleasures called kinetic and katastematic—that reading appears to be entirely inconsistent with the passage.52 That said, my reading of kinetic and katastematic pleasure does not conflict with the quotation since I acknowledge that Epicurus recognizes both kinds. Furthermore, the sense of the quotation rendered by my translation is in line with that of most others: I too am claiming that the quotations report the fact that Epicurus believes there are two kinds of pleasure. My reading differs from most others, however, on the issue of how Epicurus understands the two pleasures. But since the passage does not reveal anything about how Epicurus defines kinetic and katastematic pleasure, the quotation itself does not prove or disprove any particular interpretation of the difference between them. The second part of the passage appears to show that Epicurus considers tranquility (ἀταραξία) and painlessness (ἀπονία) to be katastematic pleasures, and joy (χαρά) and gladness of mind (εὐφροσυνή) to be kinetic pleasures.53 A difficulty arises with the quotation from On Choices when it is compared with other known Epicurean statements about χαρά. Other texts indicate that Epicurus usually means by χαρά (and its related verb, χαίρειν) katastematic rather than kinetic pleasure, since he is known to have associated it with ἀταραξία, a mental katastematic pleasure and the highest good.54 For example, in Plutarch’s Non Posse Theon ponders what absurdity the Epicureans enter into “when you hear them protesting and shouting that the soul is disposed to rejoice and be tranquil [χαίρειν καὶ γαληνίζειν] in nothing save pleasures of the body, either present or expected, and that this is its good [τοῦτο αὐτῆς τἀγαθόν ἐστιν]” (1088e). Here χαίρειν is used as a synonym for γαληνίζειν, ‘to be calm,’ which in turn is reminiscent of ἀταραξία. A little later, Plutarch quotes a fragment of Epicurus’ lost text On the Telos, where χαρά is again juxtaposed with katastematic pleasure. Theon reports that the Epicureans believe that “the healthy condition of the flesh and the trustworthy confidence in it contain the highest and most certain joy for those who are able to reason” (τὸ γὰρ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἔλπισμα τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχει τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις, 1089d). That χαρά is

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here being associated with a state or condition—a κατάστημα—suggests that Epicurus means to associate χαρά with katastematic pleasure. Again in Non Posse, Plutarch describes the most blessed state for Epicureans using the verb χαίρειν: Theon exclaims, “Oh the great pleasure and bliss which these men enjoy when they rejoice at neither suffering ill nor being pained nor feeling distressed” (φεῦ τῆς μεγάλης ἡδονῆς τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ μακαριότατος, ἥν καρποῦνται χαίροντες ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ κακοπαθεῖν μηδὲ λυπεῖσθαι μηδ᾽ ἀλγεῖν, 1091b). Here too we find χαρά appearing in the same context as the katastematic pleasures of ἀταραξία and ἀπονία. In addition, Cicero uses the verb gaudere, which is similar to χαίρειν, to describe what appears to be katastematic pleasure. At De Finibus 1.56, Cicero has his Epicurean interlocutor Torquatus claim, “We rejoice in the removal of pain, even if pleasure that moves the senses does not follow” (gaudere nosmet omittendis doloribus, etiam si voluptas ea quae sensum moveat nulla successerit).55 Cicero, believing that the Epicureans classify as kinetic those pleasures that arouse the senses and as katastematic those that involve simply the absence of pain, has Torquatus associate the latter with joy. Lastly, Epicurus, in a letter to his mother, uses the term χαίρειν to describe the gods,56 whose pleasure Epicureans often associate with the katastematic variety.57 That tranquility and joy are both attributed to the gods suggests that Epicureans may use the two terms interchangeably. This will mean that Epicurean joy, like tranquility, is the painless functioning of the mind when it reflects on the current and future state of the body.58 These passages indicate that it is fairly odd that Epicurus should be associating χαρά with kinetic pleasure, as he does in our quotation reported by Diogenes Laertius at 10.136.59 But since it seems that Epicurus is associating χαρά with kinetic pleasure in DL 10.136, it remains to be explained what joy would look like as kinetic, meaning, what joy would look like as a mental pleasure of restoration.60 There is evidence that in at least one prominent circumstance Epicurus considered joy to be a pleasure of restoration. In the letter he writes on his deathbed to Idomeneus, Epicurus claims that his joy is buttressing his tranquility: στρ αγγουρικά τε παρηκολούθει καὶ δυ σεν τερικὰ πάθ η ὑπερβολὴν οὐκ ἀπολείποντα τοῦ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μεγέθους· ἀντιπαρετάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν γεγονότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμῃ. (DL 10.22, 52 A) My sufferings from strangury and dysentery have followed me closely, never ceasing, and are beyond great in their magnitude. But standing in array against all these things has been the joy in my soul from the memory of our past debates.

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We need to be wary of concluding from this passage that Epicurus is actually counteracting his bodily pains, rather than his mental ones, with his joy, as Merlan has claimed.61 If Merlan means that Epicurus no longer feels bodily pain as a result of setting his “joy of mind” against his poor condition, then I believe we must reject Merlan’s reading. In a letter reported by Philodemus, Epicurus writes that he feels bodily pain: “As I am writing this, it is the seventh day that I have not urinated and have had pains that lead to one’s last day.”62 He does not counteract his pain in any physical way—he still feels pain—just as the sage on the rack still feels the hurt in his body; in other words, Epicurus has lost his ἀπονία—the healthy, painless condition of his body—but he maintains his ἀταραξία, his tranquility and calmness about death.63 Epicurus does not describe exactly how he manages to assuage his mental pain, but his χαρά is a pleasure of restoration in that it functions to bring about the lack of disturbance in his soul that has been lost through sickness. His usage of the term ‘joy’ here does not seem to correspond to his usage when describing tranquility and a condition of painless mental functioning; here, joy involves no reflection on the current or future state of his body that would have enabled him to dispel worries about his condition. Here his joy from his pleasant memories may serve to distract him from his present physical pain and allow him to avoid worrying about his body. One might contend that this explanation leaves untouched the problem that Epicurus usually considers joy to be katastematic but in our passage at DL 10.136 he claims that joy is kinetic. Some scholars have attempted to resolve this inconsistency by questioning whether Epicurus believes there is a distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasure at all. The most provocative interpretation of the passage belongs to Gosling and Taylor, who argue that Epicurus does not intend to distinguish χαρά and εὐφροσύνη from ἀταραξία and ἀπονία. They claim that with the phrase κατὰ κίνησιν Epicurus is not referring to a different type of pleasure from the katastematic variety; rather, he is merely pointing out with his examples of kinetic pleasures aspects of ἀταραξία and ἀπονία. They comment, “In fact ‘chara’ and ‘euphrosunē’ seem to correspond to ‘ataraxia’ and ‘aponia’ in being their positive counterparts,” that is, further glosses on what it means to be tranquil and without pain (1982: 389). On their reading, Epicurus means to describe ἀταραξία and ἀπονία as the experiences of χαρά and εὐφροσύνη. So as to avoid claiming that Epicurus posits two kinds of pleasure, Gosling and Taylor translate the first part of the passage (the quotation from Diogenes of Tarsus and Metrodorus) as follows: “But with both kinetic and katastematic pleasure being apprehended by the mind” (νοουμένης δὲ

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ἡδονῆς τῆς τε κατὰ κίνησιν καὶ τῆς καταστηματικῆς). On their translation, the participle νοουμένης expresses the apprehending activity of the mind, meaning that Epicurus is claiming that both kinetic and katastematic pleasures, and the latter in particular, are experienced by the soul and are therefore not negative states of ἀπάθεια. On their view, the passage does not show that Epicurus or his followers believes there are two distinct kinds of pleasure.64 Nikolsky takes up their cause, adding that in DL 10.136 χαρά and εὐφροσύνη, far from being kinetic pleasures and wholly distinguishable from the katastematic set, are emotional responses of the soul to certain states of the mind and body, namely, ἀταραξία and ἀπονία.65 He believes there is no classification of pleasures in the passage: ἀταραξία, ἀπονία, χαρά, and εὐφροσύνη are definitions of “two coexistent aspects of any pleasure,” namely, states and their respective emotional responses (2001: 456).66 And since there is no classification of pleasures in the passage, he, along with Gosling and Taylor, concludes it is futile to quibble about where χαρά belongs. Their reading, however, is not borne out by the construction of the passage. That Epicurus means to mark a contrast between two groups of pleasures is indicated by the μέν/δέ construction in the passage’s second part (viz., the quotation from On Choices). This construction indicates that Epicurus is claiming that, on the one hand, there is one kind of pleasure, and, on the other, a second kind of pleasure. The sense of the μέν/δέ construction is lost on Gosling, Taylor, and Nikolsky’s interpretation, which erodes the contrast between the two types of pleasure. Furthermore, their reading does not fit the overall context of Diogenes Laertius’ discussion of the passage. Just before 10.136, Diogenes Laertius had been comparing the Epicureans and the Cyrenaics, noting that the latter are concerned only with kinetic pleasure while the former are concerned with both kinetic and katastematic pleasures. The quotation from Diogenes of Tarsus and Metrodorus at 10.136 is meant as proof of this difference between the schools since it attests to the fact that Epicureans are concerned with both kinds. In this context, Gosling and Taylor’s version of the first part of the passage is a nonsequitur: it provides an explanation of an issue that is not raised, namely, how Epicurus understands kinetic and katastematic pleasure (and their answer is that both are apprehended by the soul). But the issue that is raised in the passage is simply that Epicurus is concerned with both kinetic and katastematic pleasures; the quotation from Diogenes of Tarsus and Metrodorus is presented as proof of this fact. For these reasons, it seems likely that Epicurus intends to distinguish two pleasures—kinetic and katastematic—and means to classify joy among the former. Consequently, the problem remains of how to understand joy as kinetic.

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Others have offered a different strategy: Purinton argues that Epicurus does not consider joy to be a pleasure at all but an intentional state whose object is pleasure.67 According to Purinton, Epicurus distinguishes joy (χαρά) from its object (τὸ χάρτον), namely, pleasure, which means that in the quotation reported at DL 10.136 Epicurus could not be making the point that joy is a pleasure. Rather, on Purinton’s reading Epicurus is claiming that we take χαρά and εὐφροσύνη in both kinetic and katastematic pleasure, but it is only the χαρά and εὐφροσύνη we take in kinetic pleasure that are experienced in activity; those which we take in katastematic pleasure do not arise in activity. He claims that although Diogenes Laertius’ intention is to provide evidence of Epicurus’ belief that there exist both kinetic and katastematic pleasures, Diogenes mentions kinetic pleasures only indirectly, that is, as the intentional object of “joy and delight in motion.”68 Conveniently, we are not confronted with the problem of how Epicurus classifies joy at DL 10.136 since, according to Purinton, Epicurus does not consider joy to be a pleasure at all but an intentional state whose object is pleasure. There are several difficulties with this reading.69 If Diogenes Laertius’ intention in quoting Epicurus is to provide evidence of two kinds of Epicurean pleasure, why would he pick a passage that shows this only indirectly? What Purinton’s reading of the passage ends up showing is not that Diogenes Laertius intends for the passage to illustrate that Epicurus believes there are two different kinds of pleasure, but that Diogenes intends it to describe different kinds of Epicurean χαρά and εὐφροσύνη: one arising in activity and one not. And thus, like Gosling, Taylor, and Nikolsky’s interpretation, Purinton’s seems out of sync with the intent of the passage overall, which is to show that Epicurus believes there are two kinds of pleasure. As we can see, scholars have tended to show either that Epicurus assimilates χαρά to ἀταραξία and ἀπονία (Gosling, Taylor, and Nikolsky), or that he does not consider χαρά to be a pleasure at all (Purinton). Several other scholars have passed over the text, treating it as mostly comprehensible despite the textual inconsistencies between it and other Epicurean material.70 However, all of these options leave unresolved the problem of how to understand Epicurus’ use of χαρά in the passage. A better solution is that Epicurus is using one word— χαρά—to designate two different types of pleasure: one kinetic, the other katastematic. We have seen evidence that Epicurus often equates joy with the katastematic pleasure of tranquility, but there is also evidence that he equates joy with gladness of mind (εὐφροσύνη), the second example of kinetic pleasure in the passage at DL 10.136.71 Several passages suggest that joy and gladness of mind are simply two

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words for the same thing.72 For example, at Non Posse 1092d, Plutarch has Theon say, “The merriment of the mind concerning the flesh and the comfort of the flesh . . . someone would not consider to be either ‘mental’ [ψυχικὰς] or a ‘joy’ [χαράς]” since this is not “what is worthy and right to be considered gladness of mind [εὐφροσύνας] and joy [χαράς].”73 Here Plutarch uses the terms as if they were synonyms. At Non Posse 1097f, Theon states that nobody would consider such things as very small comforts to be “true gladness of mind [εὐφροσύνας] or joy [χαρὰς] belonging to healthy people,” again suggesting that the terms are equivalent. Theon adds the following a little later, while discussing the memories of the accomplishments of great men: “So we may conceive how great was the gladness of mind [εὐφροσύνη] and joy [χαρά] and delight [γηθοσύνη] present in their lifetimes to those actual authors of deeds the memory of which, after five hundred years and more, has not lost its cheer [τὸ εὐφραῖνον]” (1099f). Here too gladness of mind goes undistinguished from joy. There is also Non Posse 1101a, where Aristodemus says that the Epicurean treatment of providence and divination “does not allow gladness of mind or joy [εὐφροσύνη δὲ καὶ χαράν] from the gods,” since it “causes us to be thus with respect to the gods: neither being troubled [ταράττεσθαι] nor rejoicing [χαίρειν].” Again, gladness of mind and joy appear to be two words for the same thing.74 There is evidence, then, that Epicurus equates joy with gladness of mind, a kinetic pleasure, and also with tranquility, a katastematic pleasure. So one explanation, however unattractive it may be, is that he uses the same word to mean different things. Arguably, this interpretation is preferable to the others in that it preserves the most straightforward sense of the passage (viz., that Epicurus is distinguishing two kinds of pleasure), without diminishing χαρά as a pleasure or failing to explain what Epicurus could mean by calling χαρά kinetic. In conclusion, it is the case that reasonable interpretations of Epicurean pleasure can be constructed without the help of De Finibus, a text whose opinions have tended to be read into much Epicurean material. If we were to follow Cicero’s belief that all sensory pleasures are kinetic and none are katastematic, as may be inferred from De Fin. 1.56, then other passages begin to take on a Ciceronian hue, particularly DL 10.136 and other important texts I discuss in the following chapter. Cicero is not wrong that Epicureans use the terms ‘kinetic’ and ‘katastematic,’ but Epicurean and non-Epicurean sources alike describe both types of pleasure using concepts that are largely missing from or confusingly presented in De Finibus. In particular, Cicero fails to stress the connections between pleasure, health, and perception, concepts that I have argued here are essential for understanding Epicurean hedonism.

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Epicureans on Taste, Sex, and Other Non-Restorative Pleasures

In the previous chapters, I argued that kinetic pleasure is the perceived movement toward painless functioning, that is, the perception of the organism’s restoration to a healthy state; katastematic pleasure is the perceived painless state itself, and this is understood as the perception of the healthy, stable condition of the organism. At first glance it is unclear how this classification can accommodate what appears to be a third type of pleasure: non-restorative, painless sensory variations (which I hereafter call ‘non-restorative pleasures’), such as those of taste, sex, vision, and hearing. Epicurus is on record as saying that such pleasures are important to his conception of the highest good (Tusc. Disp. 3.41–42), no doubt fueling the polemical charge that Epicureanism is profligacy disguised as a serious philosophical theory. Hence Cicero’s humorous quip, “Epicurus appears to be looking for disciples, so that those who wish to be dissolute first become philosophers” (De Fin. 2.30). Most scholars classify the non-restorative pleasures as kinetic, following Cicero.1 The exceptions are Gosling and Taylor (1982) and Nikolsky (2001), whose general interpretation of non-restorative pleasure I develop here.2 Contrary to the dominant scholarly view, I argue that there is good reason to avoid classifying non-restorative pleasures as kinetic since they are not derived from movements toward painless, healthy functioning. In this chapter I contend that pleasures from taste, sex, sound, etc., are painless in themselves and are therefore katastematic; no matter whether they occur in the midst of pain (such as when we enjoy tasty food when hungry) or are isolated from pain (when we enjoy dessert after filling up on dinner), they are perceptions of the painless workings of the organism. Naturally, the view that non-restorative pleasures are katastematic is not without potential problems. The first of these problems concerns Epicurus’

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assertion in KD 18 that pleasure can only be varied but not increased beyond the removal of all pain. Because the passage seems to contrast certain pleasures that do not contribute to the ultimate end of absence of pain with the absence of pain itself, many scholars conclude that KD 18 presents strong support for the view that non-restorative pleasures, such as those of sex and taste, are kinetic rather than katastematic.3 In response to this objection, I contend that my reading of Epicurean pleasure has more success at resolving several interpretive problems with KD 18 than does the view that non-restorative pleasures are kinetic. In any case, the objection collapses if non-restorative pleasures are in fact katastematic. Secondly, I address possible challenges to my reading that might arise from several passages in the works of the Epicureans Philodemus and Diogenes of Oinoanda, both of whom discuss non-restorative pleasures, usually in the context of attacking Cyrenaic views. Some scholars contend that Philodemus and Diogenes of Oinoanda believe non-restorative pleasures are kinetic, but I will argue that this is unlikely. Before turning to Epicurean descriptions of non-restorative pleasures, one might wonder what precludes the kinetic class from including both restorative and non-restorative pleasure. Indeed, Cicero describes both as kinetic, as we saw in Chapter 4: kinetic pleasures include not only that which one experiences in the process of quenching a thirst but also that which varies one’s experience of the painlessness achieved after thirst is quenched. The main proponents of this view are Long and Sedley: “Hence Epicurus firmly subordinates kinetic to static pleasure, treating the former either as a stage on the way to the ultimate goal of absence of pain, or as a variation of that condition when achieved” (1987: vol. 1, 123).4 They contend that Cicero was surely right to include pleasures of restoration in the kinetic class, and that Epicurus aimed to distance his hedonism from that of the Cyrenaics by subordinating the latter’s ‘kinetic’ pleasure to the katastematic variety. According to Long and Sedley, “Epicurus appears to have used ‘kinetic’ pleasure to designate all experience which consists in the active stimulation of enjoyable bodily feelings or states of mind” (1987: vol. 1, 123). Since the Epicureans presumably follow the Cyrenaics in considering all sensory variations to be kinetic (i.e., ‘in motion’), there is no reason to classify nonrestorative pleasures as katastematic. I think there are several problems with this interpretation. First, as I discussed in earlier chapters, Cicero’s account of Epicurean pleasure is troubled. That he describes both restorative and non-restorative pleasures as kinetic is not proof that Epicureans did so: Cicero seems to be unaware in his attack on

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Epicurean hedonism that he switches between the two conceptions of so-called kinetic pleasure, which suggests that he may be confused about the Epicurean classification and is not deliberately grouping restorative and non-restorative pleasures into the same class. Of course, it might be the case that Cicero has it right regardless of his confusion, but his account of Epicurean kinetic pleasure would need to be corroborated by Epicurean texts, which I have argued do no such thing. Second, if the kinetic class were to include both restorative and nonrestorative pleasures, it would be something of a hodgepodge, for what would unite all the pleasures in such a class?5 We might be tempted to turn to Long and Sedley’s general description of kinetic pleasure as “the active stimulation of enjoyable bodily feelings or states of mind” or John Cooper’s idea of ‘in movement’ as “pleasant activities . . . which, in themselves, involve movement and active employment of one’s bodily and mental faculties” (1999: 513),6 but both of these descriptions make katastematic pleasure seem all the more lifeless in comparison. How would Epicureans dodge the charge that their best life resembles the state of a corpse? These descriptions encourage us to agree with anti-Epicurean polemicists that katastematic pleasure is a passive, inactive state: katastematic pleasure seems characterized by inactivity and lifelessness when it is contrasted with bodily movements and the exercise of one’s faculties. I think better sense is made of the distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasure if we understand the members of the kinetic class to have in common their association with the removal of pain, while members of the katastematic class to have in common their association with painlessness itself. This would unify each type of pleasure and prevent the kinetic class from turning into a motley assortment of things that are grouped together simply because they do not fit anywhere else. Third, Long and Sedley refer to the Stoic notion of ‘in process’ (ἐν κινήσει) to explain the Epicurean conception of kinetic pleasure,7 but it’s not clear that the Stoic view encompasses both restorative and non-restorative pleasure. The Stoic passage in question comes from Stobaeus: “Of goods, some are ‘in process,’ others ‘in state.’ Among the former types are joy, delight, modest socializing; of the latter type are well-organized leisure, undisturbed stability, manly concentration.”8 What exactly is the meaning of ἐν κινήσει in this passage? It is unlikely that it means ‘restorative’ since the examples do not obviously have this sense. Although it is conceivable that joy, delight, and socializing might be restorative in some way, to make this work we would have to conclude that the

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Stoics chose their examples very poorly, which seems unlikely given the large number of obvious examples they could have chosen instead (such as eating when hungry).9 Perhaps ἐν κινήσει means something like Long and Sedley’s “active stimulation of enjoyable bodily feelings or states of mind,” which would make sense given that the Stoics describe joy and delight as ‘good feelings’ (εὐπαθεία).10 But if this were the case, it is unclear why “well-organized leisure” is an example of a good “in state” since it could just as easily be described as an active stimulation of a feeling. Similarly, it’s unclear why “socializing” is an example of a good ἐν κινήσει since it does not seem to be a feeling. The Stoics’ notion of ἐν κινήσει, then, does not add much to our understanding of the Epicurean classification of pleasure. Thus, the evidence that Epicureans classify both restorative and non-restorative pleasures as kinetic seems rather weak. It remains to be explored how Epicureans describe non-restorative pleasures and what evidence there is for the view that such pleasures are katastematic. I turn now to these tasks.

Health and non-restorative pleasures In a famous passage from what is evidently one of Epicurus’ most comprehensive works, we find mention of non-restorative pleasures.11 The fullest version of the passage appears in the Tusculan Disputations, where Cicero, who claims to be translating Epicurus’ exact words about this group of pleasure, points out what he believes is an inconsistency in Epicurus’ statements about the good.12 Cicero quotes Epicurus as follows: [1] nec equidem habeo, quod intellegam bonum illud, detrahens eas voluptates quae sapore percipiuntur, detrahens eas quae rebus percipiuntur veneriis, detrahens eas quae auditu e cantibus, detrahens eas etiam quae ex formis percipiuntur oculis suavis motiones, sive quae aliae voluptates in toto homine gignuntur quolibet sensu. [2] nec vero ita dici potest, mentis laetitiam solam esse in bonis. laetantem enim mentem ita novi: spe eorum omnium, quae supra dixi, fore ut natura is potiens dolore careat. (Tusc. Disp. 3.41)13 [1] Indeed, I do not know how to understand the good, if you take away the pleasures that are experienced through taste, and the pleasures experienced in sex, and the sweet motions which are experienced by the ears through music and by the eyes through forms, and the other pleasures which are generated in the whole person by any of the senses. [2] Nor is it possible to say that mental delight

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is the only thing that is good. For as I understand it, what it means for a mind to be delighted is for it to have an expectation of possessing, naturally and without pain, all those things which I have named.14

Several other sources provide at least the first part of this quotation, where Epicurus seems to extol certain bodily pleasures. Athenaeus gives a version that is slightly different in wording and length but is essentially the same in content;15 Diogenes Laertius gives a shorter version of the first part, and attributes it to Epicurus’ lost text On the Telos;16 and, interestingly, Cicero himself gives only the first part in De Finibus.17 Cicero and others who provide the quotation usually introduce it to facilitate the argument that Epicureanism is synonymous with profligacy: taken out of context, the first part of the quotation, regarding certain bodily pleasures, is used to show that Epicurus is really only interested in grand feasts, lasciviousness, and other sordid affairs. The first part is also used to show that Epicurus himself does not know what pleasure is, given that he also argues that the highest good is to be without pain and disturbance. On the face of it, Epicurus’ claim regarding the importance of certain bodily pleasures to the good life does seem at odds with his claim that the telos is the absence of pain.18 Stated differently, the position that the highest good is katastematic pleasure does not square with the claim that certain pleasures that are usually classified as kinetic, such as taste, hearing, etc., comprise the best life. But, notably, not all of the ancient philosophers who comment on Epicurean ethics understand there to be a problem: neither Lucretius nor Plutarch mentions Epicurus’ claim that he cannot imagine what the good is without certain nonrestorative pleasures. Presumably, if there were a serious discrepancy in the Epicurean highest good, there would be some mark of it in Lucretius, and Plutarch certainly would have added it to the list of ways in which Epicurus “makes a pleasant life impossible.” This may mean that reconciling the highest good as the absence of pain with the highest good as bodily pleasure is a problem only for Cicero—a problem that was subsequently passed down to scholars who base their interpretations of Epicurean ethics on De Finibus. On my view, it has been difficult to reconcile painlessness with bodily pleasure in Epicurean ethics because non-restorative pleasures have been wrongly classified as kinetic, following Cicero, and because their function in Epicurus’ ethical system has not been fully understood. Instead of following Cicero, we should take our cue from Lucretius and Plutarch and reject the belief that there is some great gap to be bridged between non-restorative pleasures and katastematic pleasures (i.e., between pleasurable sensory variations and

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the absence of pain). Unfortunately, neither Lucretius nor Plutarch tells us how Epicurus might have considered non-restorative pleasures to be katastematic; nevertheless, non-restorative pleasures cannot be kinetic if kinetic pleasure is understood as the perception of the restoration of painless, natural functioning. All of the pleasures Epicurus mentions in the infamous passage quoted in the Tusculan Disputations are non-restorative: the pleasures of sex, hearing, and vision are not replenishments of any lack, and all of them can be experienced when the organism is already in a painless state. And if non-restorative pleasures are not kinetic, then they must be katastematic. We get an idea of how Epicureans may have considered non-restorative pleasures to be katastematic from Lucretius’ explanation of taste, which involves smooth and round atoms moving through the pores of the mouth. We considered this passage in Chapter 5, where it helped establish a connection between perception and the katastematic condition of health. Here it is once more: So you will easily recognize that what is capable of affecting our senses pleasantly are composed of smooth and round atoms [levibus atque rotundis / esse ea quae sensus iucunde tangere possunt]; on the other hand, what is perceived as bitter and harsh [amara atque aspera cumque videntur] consist of an interlacement of more hooked atoms, and so are apt to tear open the passages leading to our senses [nostris sensibus] and to force their way through the body in effecting their entrance. (DRN 2.402–07)

According to Lucretius, smooth atoms travel seamlessly through the passages leading to the senses, causing no discomfort on their way. The rough and barbed atoms involved in unpleasant tastes, on the other hand, catch on the sides of the passageways, tearing them and causing pain. On this explanation, the pleasure of taste is the perceived, painless working of a part of the organism—in this case the palate. The other pleasures Epicurus mentions in the passage from On the Telos, quoted in the Tusculan Disputations, can be explained in the same way: the pleasures of hearing, vision, and sex are painless, healthy happenings in the organism. Many similar pleasures fit this same description: having an enriching conversation, reading a good book, and spending time with a friend are in themselves painless ways of interacting with the world. In other words, sensory pleasures are manifestations of the absence of pain; they are the ways in which we experience a healthy, unimpeded state. The only difference between nonrestorative katastematic pleasures and katastematic pleasures generally is that an organism perceives the former in a part of the organism, such as the palate or

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the ear, rather than in the organism as a whole. But the basic description is the same: non-restorative pleasures, like all katastematic pleasures, are perceptions of healthy, painless workings of (some part) of the organism. Unlike kinetic pleasures, non-restorative pleasures do not presuppose a lack that needs to be filled. On this view, the absence of pain is a robust condition of health and proper functioning, which can be realized by means of various painless lived experiences we have in the course of everyday life. Another passage from Lucretius suggests that some sensory pleasures may not only be manifestations of organic health and painlessness but also presuppose a good state. In other words, it may be impossible for someone to experience certain pleasures of the senses if her organism is somehow compromised. For example, when we are ill we fail to derive pleasure from foods that we normally find agreeable: it becomes more difficult for us to enjoy pleasures of taste when our organism is disturbed. The following passage from Lucretius confirms that Epicureans believe that unhealthy functioning impedes the experience of certain sensory pleasures: Thus when fever has assailed someone through excess of bile, or when a violent disease has been provoked by some other cause, the whole body is at once disordered and the positions of the principal elements are all changed [perturbatur ibi iam totum corpus et omnes / commutantur ibi positurae principiorum]. Consequently, the particles that previously suited the person’s taste are now unsuitable to it; others are more appropriate, and these are able to penetrate and produce a bitter sensation. (DRN 4.664–70, trans. modified)

According to Lucretius, certain particles bring pleasure when they harmonize with a certain atomic arrangement in the body. When the atomic arrangement is disturbed, certain pleasure-inducing particles do not coalesce with the new arrangement, impeding our experience of pleasure. Lucretius is clear that we do not experience a different pleasure as a result of the disorder; rather, we experience no pleasure. In his example, the taster who is wracked by fever senses bitterness rather than a pleasant taste because she is not healthy; the displacement of atoms from their usual positions that occurs when an organism is imbalanced impedes the experience of non-restorative pleasures. This same explanation applies to many of the other non-restorative pleasures Epicurus mentions: in the case of sex, a bodily disturbance can result in an inability to physically engage in, and thus enjoy, intercourse; in the cases of hearing and vision, we often find ourselves unable to enjoy or pay attention to a concert or a play if we have the flu or are extremely hungry.

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Thus, non-restorative sensory pleasures can consist in the perception of healthy, painless functioning, such that they are manifestations of well-being and painless operation, but they can also indicate a condition of underlying health in the organism overall. In this way, sensory pleasures are constituent of, but also made possible by, organic health. This is not to say that all sensory pleasures presuppose painless functioning in the organism as a whole: one can, of course, experience a non-restorative pleasure while suffering from some deficiency (as when a hungry person enjoys the taste of her food), but such non-restorative pleasures are in themselves perceived painless workings of some part of the organism, even if they occur in the midst of some deficiency. In general, non-restorative pleasures do sometimes indicate the presence of overall organic functioning, but not necessarily. Despite their variety, all nonrestorative pleasures are painless experiences that presuppose no lack and are not restorations, which is to say they are katastematic. Moreover, there is ample evidence that Epicureans are not opposed to the pursuit of non-restorative pleasures per se. Several texts suggest that Epicureans have no qualms about enjoying the pleasures of taste and sex, for instance, as long as they do not undermine the painless functioning of the organism.19 In themselves such pleasures pose no threat to happiness; they become detrimental to the good life when they are pursued to excess and lead to pain. This is supported by SV 21, where Epicurus claims, “One must not force nature but rather persuade it. And we will persuade it if we fulfill the necessary desires, and also the natural ones if they do not harm, but harshly censure the harmful ones.”20 Based on a scholium to KD 29, it is likely that Epicurus would classify painless non-restorative pleasures as the objects of natural but non-necessary desires, which are varieties of painlessness but not necessarily causes of it.21 The scholiast’s example of this type of desire is that for expensive food, which is something we pursue primarily for the pleasure of taste.22 The view of both SV  21 and the scholium to KD 29 is that non-restorative pleasures are choiceworthy when they are painless, but they should be avoided otherwise. If, for example, I am confident that eating a piece of chocolate cake will bring me no pain now or in the future—that is, I am not allergic to chocolate, I have not already eaten too much, and eating this cake will not fuel my chocolate addiction and lead to insatiable cravings and despair in the future—then I am not likely to jeopardize my happiness by consuming it, and thus I have no reason to reject my desire for the cake. According to Epicurus, what we are after is pain-free pleasure, which can be described as the awareness that our organism functions without

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any disturbance. And according to Epicurus, one way of experiencing this is by means of painless non-restorative pleasures. In addition, a fragment describing the Epicurean best life mentions sensory variations alongside painlessness, which suggests that the variations are katastematic: “Happiness and blessedness are not brought about by a great amount of money, a pile of possessions, offices, or power, but by freedom from pain, gentleness of sensations, and a disposition of the soul that arises by marking the boundaries of nature” (τὸ εὔδαιμον καὶ μακάριον οὐ χρημάτων π λῆθ ος οὐδὲ πραγμάτων ὄγκος, οὐδ᾽ ἀρχαί τινες ἔχουσιν, οὐδὲ δυνάμεις, ἀ λ λ᾽ ἀ λυπία καὶ πραότης παθ ῶν καὶ διάθεσις ψ υχῆς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ὁρίζουσα).23 The fragment lists three essential components of the happy life, two of which are obviously katastematic: freedom from pain (ἀ λυπία) and a mental disposition (διάθεσις ψ υχῆς) that accords with nature. One might assume, as does Wolfsdorf,24 that the third component—the gentleness of sensations (πραότης παθ ῶν)—refers to kinetic pleasure. However, this makes sense only if one accepts Cicero’s claim that all sensory pleasures are kinetic; on its own, the fragment does not say that gentle sensations are kinetic. Granted, neither does the fragment say that the gentle sensations are katastematic, but I think this is the likelier meaning given two features of the context. First, if Epicurus thinks sensory variations are kinetic, it’s unclear why he sandwiches them between two obvious descriptions of katastematic pleasure. Second, why would he say that kinetic pleasure is a component of the happy and blessed life? Although kinetic pleasures are good qua pleasures and are not antithetical to happiness, presumably they are not the sorts of pleasures an Epicurean will tout as the best components of the blessed life, especially if the point is to contrast the things that engender happiness with things that do not. The contrast is more successful when it pits what is obviously incompatible with happiness against what is obviously constitutive of it, such as katastematic pleasures. However, one might object that at De Fin. 1.56 Torquatus flatly denies that the absence of pain arouses the senses, which would seem to problematize my claim that Epicureans consider some pleasures of the senses, such as the painless nonrestorative variety, to be katastematic. Indeed, Purinton takes De Fin. 1.56 as evidence that Epicurus could not have held that katastematic pleasure involves the senses.25 Let’s look at the passage: non placet autem detracta voluptate aegritudinem statim consequi, nisi in voluptatis locum dolor forte successerit, at contra gaudere nosmet omittendis

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doloribus, etiamsi voluptas ea quae sensum moveat nulla successerit, eoque intellegi potest quanta voluptas sit non dolore. (De Fin. 1.56) But we do not hold that when pleasure is removed distress immediately follows, unless pain happens to follow in the place of pleasure. Rather, we enjoy letting pain go even if a pleasure that moves the senses does not follow. One can see from this the extent to which pleasure consists in the absence of pain.

Judging from Torquatus’ assertion that there may be moments when we experience neither distress nor pleasure, it seems he believes there is a middle state between pleasure and pain—some type of third condition that is neither of the other two. Alternatively, Torquatus might not be arguing for a third state but claiming instead that there are two kinds of pleasure: one that arouses the senses and one that does not (namely, the absence of pain). Whether he is arguing for three different conditions (pain, pleasure, and a middle state that is neither) or two (pain and pleasure, the latter understood to be bifold), his point is the same: the absence of pain is not the kind of pleasure that arouses the senses.26 While there is no disputing that Torquatus, or at least Cicero using Torquatus as a mouthpiece, believes that the absence of pain is non-sensory, doubts emerge concerning the statement’s accuracy when it is compared with other statements Torquatus makes about Epicurean pleasure and with standard Epicurean doctrine. For starters, if pain does not flow in when pleasure is removed, as Torquatus claims, then presumably an intermediate state must obtain in such circumstances, which contradicts the basic Epicurean tenet that there is no neutral state between pleasure and pain. Strangely, Torquatus himself reports this tenet at De Fin. 1.38 (“In this way, according to Epicurus there is no intermediate (medium) between pain and pleasure”), and then goes on to deny the existence of a neutral state by claiming that any conscious individual is feeling either pleasure or pain.27 In addition, the Epicureans repeatedly claim that good and bad are given in perception, 28 which would be nonsensical if their highest pleasure, the absence of pain, were somehow non-sensory. Torquatus might defend himself by arguing that when pain recedes, pleasure, rather than a neutral state or a sensory pleasure, emerges in the form of absence of pain. But Torquatus cannot claim both that the absence of pain is different from sensory pleasure and that there is no neutral state. In order for his statement at De Fin. 1.56 to make sense, the absence of pain has to be sufficiently different from ‘sensory’ pleasure; if this were not the case, Torquatus would have to

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admit that when pain exits, the sensory kind of pleasure enters. But his point is precisely that it is not the sensory kind of pleasure that enters when pain recedes; it is another kind, namely, the absence of pain. Torquatus must concede either that there is some third, neutral state or that pleasures are not divided into those that arouse the senses and those that do not. Since no Epicurean would admit the former,29 there is good reason to be skeptical of his claim that the absence of pain is somehow non-sensory.

Are variations in painlessness kinetic or katastematic? An advantage of the reading of Epicurean pleasure I have proposed so far is that it makes sense of a part of KD 18 that scholars usually take to be rather enigmatic. Some scholars refer to KD 18 to show that Epicurus understands the pleasures of taste, sex, etc., to be kinetic rather than katastematic.30 The relevant part of KD 18 reads as follows: “Pleasure in the flesh does not increase once the pain associated with want has been removed; but rather, it is only varied” (οὐκ ἐπαύξεται ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἡ ἡδονή, ἐπειδὰν ἅπαξ τὸ κατ᾽ ἔνδειαν ἀλγοῦν ἐξαιρεθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνον ποικίλλεται). This saying is echoed by Torquatus in book 1 of De Finibus31 and revisited in book 2, where Torquatus refers Cicero back to their earlier discussion: “‘Do you not remember,’ [Torquatus] replied, ‘what I said a little earlier, that once all pain is removed, pleasure can be varied but not increased [omnis dolor detractus esset, variari, non augeri voluptatem]?’” (2.10).32 Cicero’s response, on which modern interpretations of KD 18 are based, is that kinetic pleasure provides variation but fails to add to the pleasure of being free from pain. And since non-restorative pleasures provide variation without removing pain, Cicero classifies them as kinetic. To respond to this, we must first ask why Epicurus claims there is an upper limit to pleasure. Nikolsky’s answer is compelling: Epicurus is probably trying to avoid arguments like that found in Plato’s Gorgias against hedonism, where the hedonist is likened to someone continually filling leaky casks.33 As Nikolsky describes the Academic argument, “If pleasure consists in the satisfaction of desires . . . then hedonists should provoke desires and avoid their complete satisfaction, making themselves like someone compelled night and day to fill leaky casks; their desires prove to be insatiable and the satisfaction of these desires has no limit” (2001: 451). To combat this sort of argument, Epicurus would want to set some limit to pleasure. Kuriai Doxai 18 simply establishes that the limit is the absence of pain. Once this limit has been reached, the Epicurean

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hedonist knows that more is not always better—that eating more or having a few more drinks will not increase her pleasure. She can eat more or have a few more drinks but only if doing so will not jeopardize her good state. Epicurus’ intent in KD 18 may therefore be to indicate how his philosophy stands up to arguments like the leaky cask rather than to differentiate kinetic from katastematic pleasures in the way Cicero suggests. Furthermore, if Epicurus holds that kinetic pleasures are perceptions of the organism’s restoration to health, there is nothing inconsistent about the claim that once the organism’s natural functioning is restored, kinetic pleasures do not augment natural functioning. On the other hand, it would be odd for Epicurus to claim that when the state of absence of pain is achieved, kinetic pleasures, which before had been linked to movements toward this state, become mere variations; how does a pleasure transform from a restoration into a nonrestorative variation? Kuriai Doxai 18 makes more sense if it does not concern kinetic pleasure at all, which means that what varies is katastematic pleasure itself. But what does it mean for katastematic pleasure to vary? This is easily answered if Epicurus considers non-restorative pleasures to be katastematic: as we know from On the Telos, Epicurus recognizes several varieties of non-restorative pleasure, such as the painless pleasures involved in sex, hearing, and vision. And although these pleasures are different insofar as they originate in different sensory organs, they do not differ quantitatively from each other, and their presence indicates one and the same condition: the painless, optimal state of some part of the organism. Their variations, then, are inessential, as Plutarch reports. However, one might point out that in several passages where mention is made of variation in pleasure, the pleasure that is varied appears in the singular,34 which is inconsistent with my claim that katastematic pleasure comes in several varieties. But notice that this objection also applies to the view that variations are kinetic: there are numerous kinetic pleasures, not just one. My interpretation of KD 18 is based partly on Cooper’s explanation of the relation between katastematic and non-restorative pleasure.35 According to Cooper, the fully functioning state of the body is experienced through the pleasures of an organism’s various capacities, such as taste. He comments, “In order to experience our organism (including in that, of course, our minds) as it is when in this tip-top condition we need to exercise some or other of our various capacities of mind and body: it is only in such activity that we can experience it at all, or at least experience it fully” (1999: 513).36 In other words, healthy

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functioning can be made known to us through our experiences of various physical and mental pleasures, such as those Epicurus mentions in On the Telos. With this reading in mind, Cicero’s interpretation of KD 18 seems rather dubious. According to Cicero, Epicurus believes that pleasures ‘in movement’ and pleasures from the absence of pain are two species of the common genus ‘pleasure.’ Epicurus is seriously confused about his own project, Cicero continues, because he actually introduces two distinct divisions of pleasure. As Cooper comments, “Now, for purposes of criticism, Cicero makes Epicurus’s distinction one between two genera of (alleged) pleasure—in fact he is talking about two totally different things which, Cicero argues, he arbitrarily and unjustifiably decides to treat as two species of the same broader kind, pleasure” (1999: 511). Cooper rightly argues that if Epicurus thinks pleasures in movement (what I am calling ‘non-restorative pleasure’) and pleasure from the absence of pain are distinct species of one genus, then Epicurus will have a difficult time explaining how it is that one distinct phenomenon varies a completely different phenomenon. Cicero’s account of the idea expressed in KD 18 is therefore misleading, since it makes it seem as if Epicurus is offering the senseless claim that one kind of pleasure varies a completely different kind of pleasure. Cooper concludes that what varies must be the katastematic condition of painlessness itself: “Cicero tells us, quite believably, that it is by pleasures ‘in movement’ that a happy man is to vary his ‘katastematic’ pleasure. This has to be understood as the actual variation of that pleasure itself, not as the addition of some pleasures of one kind by bringing them into the presence of pleasure of another kind” (1999: 511). However, that katastematic pleasure itself can vary is controversial. Rist, taking over Diano’s position, argues for the homogeneity of katastematic pleasure based on KD 9.37 Here is KD 9 based on Arrighetti’s text, which relies on Diano’s version: Εἰ κατεπυκνοῦτο πᾶσα ἡδονὴ τῳ καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ περὶ ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα ὑπῆρχεν ἢ τὰ κυριώτατα μέρη τῆς φύσεως, οὐκ ἄν ποτε διέφερον ἀλλήλων αἱ ἡδοναί. If every pleasure were condensed with respect to place and time and were present in the whole compound or in the most important parts of our nature, pleasures would not ever differ from one another.

How does Rist understand ‘condense’ (καταπυκνόω) in this context, and how does he deduce the homogeneity of specifically katastematic pleasure from KD

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9? Rist’s understanding of ‘condense’ derives from the following Greek usage: the comic poet Damoxenus says that Epicurus condenses pleasure by chewing carefully.38 Rist believes that ‘condensing’ implies “squeezing out the maximum of pleasure, getting the highest possible amount of pleasure” (1972: 115). And based on different evidence, Rist argues that only katastematic pleasure is condensed: according to Alciphron, the Epicurean Xenocrates claimed he attained freedom from bodily pain while lewdly embracing and ogling a dancing woman, and this was condensed pleasure.39 From these passages, Rist argues that condensation is getting the maximum amount of katastematic pleasure, since Alciphron’s Xenocrates is talking about freedom from pain, the highest Epicurean pleasure. Rist goes on to explain that the condensation of katastematic pleasures points to their homogeneity: [Epicurus] says that, if all pleasures are condensed, that is, maximized and spread over the whole organism, then pleasures will not differ from one another. This means that the katastematic pleasure of touch and the katastematic pleasure of taste or sight do not differ with respect to quality. Qua pleasure they are equally pleasurable, in so far as they all equally consist in an absence of pain. (1972: 115)

There are several problems with this reading. First, Rist himself admits that KD 9 has “serious textual difficulties,” noting that Diano’s text, on which Rist relies, is “arbitrary” (1972: 114n2). The main difficulty concerns the meaning of ‘condense’: some manuscripts have it in the middle/passive (κατεπυκνοῦτο), others in the active (κατεπύκνου), making it difficult to determine what is doing the condensing and what is being condensed. If the verb is in the active, then pleasure itself is doing the condensing rather than being condensed, in which case pleasure is not being maximized and spread throughout the organism. One interpretation along these lines is that the atoms are being condensed, eliminating as much as possible the void between them.40 If the movements of atoms were limited, then pleasures would indeed never vary (or not very much) since, as we heard from Lucretius, pleasurable perceptions are produced by the movement of different shapes of atoms through the sensory pathways. Pleasures do not vary without movement since there is no pleasure at all without movement. Another major textual difficulty concerns the phrase that Diano renders as “with respect to place and time”: Diano has τῳ καὶ χρόνῳ (1935: 243); the manuscripts contain various versions, including καὶ χρόνω, τῶ καὶ χρόνω, and τω . . . χρόνω;41 and other scholars emend in additional ways, including τῷ χρόνῳ (Arndt and Steckel), καὶ χρόνῳ (von der Muehll), and καὶ

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καὶ χρόνῳ (Crönert). Practically every commentator has a version, and Diano’s is the only one in which the condensing is said to occur spatially as well as temporally. The mention of spatiality is warranted only if one assumes that Epicurus is saying that pleasure is being condensed throughout the organism, an assumption which is uncertain. Because of its many textual problems, KD 9 is not the clearest piece of evidence on which to build an argument for the homogeneity of katastematic pleasure. In addition, the passage from Damoxenus does not say anything about absence of pain, which means Rist’s claim that katastematic pleasure is condensed is supported only by the account from Alciphron. As for that little vignette, I agree with Gosling and Taylor that Alciphron’s report is not to be taken as a serious account of Epicurean pleasure; it is clearly meant to be a joke. As Gosling and Taylor explain, “There is obvious irony in describing the lecher as free of disturbance of the flesh, and again the reference to condensation is either just picking on an Epicurean phrase for ironic purposes for a situation when a man’s limbs are obviously loosed, and/or is suggesting erection of the penis” (1982: 379–80). One should not base the serious claim that katastematic pleasure is homogenous on a report that is fairly obviously intended as comedy. Gosling and Taylor bring up the additional objection that Rist’s interpretation entails the negative view that katastematic pleasure is nothing more than the absence of pain. Such a view leaves Epicurus vulnerable to the charge that he is ignorant of the ‘real’ meaning of pleasure (as Cicero understands it), namely, a pleasure of the senses. This leads Gosling and Taylor to conclude, “It is not, then, clear why Epicurus would want to hold that katastematic pleasure is homogeneous except on this negative thesis” (1982: 378).42 Even if one denies that Epicurus describes katastematic pleasure in terms of organic health, one would still have to reject Rist’s view on the grounds that Epicurus’ texts indicate that there are at least two katastematic pleasures: ἀπονία and ἀταραξία. If we take KD 9 out of the equation, we have no reason to believe that KD 18 insists on the homogeneity of katastematic pleasure. Thus, it is plausible that KD 18 concerns variations in katastematic pleasure itself rather than variations in kinetic pleasure. Moreover, if Epicurus considers non-restorative pleasures, such as those of taste and sex, to be katastematic, it makes sense that they supply the variation Epicurus mentions in KD 18. This means that Epicurus is probably not talking about a distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasure at all in KD 18; rather, he is attempting to set limits to pleasure in order to distance his ethical goal from that of profligates, who frustrate their hedonistic pursuits by cultivating unlimited, insatiable desires.

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Other Epicureans on non-restorative and kinetic pleasures One of the main obstacles to understanding non-restorative pleasures as katastematic is the view that some later Epicureans, particularly Philodemus and Diogenes of Oinoanda, refer to non-restorative pleasures as kinetic.43 It has been suggested that these Epicureans classified non-restorative pleasures as kinetic in an attempt to distinguish their ethics from that of the Cyrenaics, whose ‘presentist’ view entailed that pleasure consists only in the current experience of a pleasant sensation, which the Cyrenaics described as a ‘smooth change’ (λεία κίνησις, DL 2.85).44 The Epicureans, the argument goes, counted as pleasures not only the so-called kinetic enjoyments of the Cyrenaics but also the longerterm pleasures derived from memory and anticipation. If the Epicureans did oppose their theory of pleasure to that of the Cyrenaics in this way, then it seems unlikely that non-restorative pleasures are katastematic. However, there are several problems with the view that Philodemus and others classify non-restorative pleasures as kinetic, even if it is the case that Epicurean hedonism is responding in many ways to Cyrenaic ethics. First, it is not at all clear that Philodemus and Diogenes of Oinoanda do in fact classify non-restorative pleasures as kinetic; the passages that are usually cited as proof of this classification do not refer unambiguously to kinetic pleasure. For instance, ‘kinetic pleasure’ is often read into the following text provided by Philodemus, which may be a passage from Epicurus’ On the Telos:45 ὡς γὰρ | ἐλπίδος ὁ καιρὸ[ς ἐ]ψιλώθη | καὶ τῆς κ[ατ]ὰ σάρκα ἡδονῆς | καὶ ἐπιμό[νως] ἀ[π]ελείφθη| τῆ[ς τῶν γεγονότ]ων χάρι|τος, ἆρ᾽ [ἄν ἔτι τη]ρήσαιμι, ᾦ | Μητ[ρόδωρε, τοιοῦτ]ον κατάστη|μα ψυ[χῆς; . . .]. (De Epic.; PHerc. 1232, 18.10–17) If circumstances take away your hope and pleasure of the flesh and deprive you of the persistent memories of past pleasant things, will you be able to maintain, oh Metrodorus, something like a natural soul katastēma? (Trans. mine)

Several scholars believe this passage refers to the Epicurean view that the goal of life is katastematic pleasure rather than kinetic pleasure,46 but this is dubious for several reasons. The passage does not use the term κίνησις or any variation thereof, and the distinction Epicurus appears to be making is not between kinetic and katastematic pleasures but between mental and bodily pleasures—the “pleasures of the flesh” versus the stable condition of the soul. Indeed, since there are bodily katastematic pleasures (aponia, for one) and

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mental kinetic ones,47 the passage would make little sense if Epicurus meant ‘kinetic pleasure’ when he says “pleasures of the flesh.” He does use the term κατάστημα, but that in itself is not sufficient evidence of a distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasures since his point need not have anything to do with how they differ. Rather, his point may be that we are unlikely to succeed at maintaining pleasure in the long run if we are unable to recall past pleasures and hope for future ones; some intellectual components are necessary to achieve and maintain the highest good. Epicurus could have made this same point about katastematic pleasures alone: without reflection on one’s current and past pleasures, bodily katastematic pleasure is not a sufficient condition for mental katastematic pleasure. Understood in this way, the passage makes sense as a response to Cyrenaic presentism: the Cyrenaics claim that the past and future are of no hedonic interest, and Epicurus would be responding that in fact past memories and future hopes are crucial parts of a successful hedonistic lifestyle. We should notice also that the passage, as I have interpreted it, makes sense against the background of the Philebus, one of the main topics of which is the role of reason and reflection in the pursuit of pleasure. Socrates’ interlocutors are eventually convinced by his argument that without memory, calculation, and knowledge, a hedonist would be unable to maximize pleasure or even realize she was experiencing it (Phil. 21b–d). Epicurus seems to be making the point, in line with Plato and against the Cyrenaics, that reflection is necessary for the life of pleasure, particularly for pleasures of the soul. And this is consistent with the view that non-restorative pleasures are katastematic. We can interpret another passage from Philodemus along the same lines. In the opening columns of On Choices and Avoidances (De elect.; PHerc. 1251, 1–3), Philodemus refers to several doctrines that bear a strong resemblance to Cyrenaic positions, the most relevant of which to our study is the view that pleasure is not derived from anticipations of the future.48 Philodemus describes his opponent’s view as follows: “It is not possible that the joys arise in us in the same way and all together, in accordance with some expectation.”49 One might hypothesize that the Epicureans responded to this claim by positing a longer-lasting pleasure, namely, the katastematic kind, as the highest pleasure, and then they classified as kinetic the short-term pleasures favored by the Cyrenaics, such as those from eating, drinking, and sex. But this need not have been the Epicurean reply; in this passage, as was the case in the previous one, the Epicurean response to Cyrenaic presentism may have been to say that pleasures of the mind as well as those of the body are part of the good life. Tsouna confirms

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that Philodemus’ main gripe against the Cyrenaics in On Choices and Avoidances concerns their anti-rationalism: “His claim is, I think, that the epistemological views of the Cyrenaics dictated a kind of hedonism which precluded rational choice and rational justification of one’s action” (1998: 147).50 In response, the Epicureans proposed a (more) rational hedonism, which did not reject all nonrestorative pleasures from the katastematic class. Lastly, there are a couple passages from Philodemus’ On the Gods that, when taken together, have led some scholars to assume that Epicureans classify nonrestorative pleasures as kinetic. Philodemus claims that the gods engage in activities such as eating, drinking, and conversing,51 and in a different passage he asserts that “the happiness of the gods would not be complete if they did not receive advantages that they provide to each other.”52 Rist takes these passages to mean that the gods’ lives are “complete” because they include both katastematic and kinetic pleasure; further, he thinks the latter class includes pleasures from eating and drinking, which he claims merely vary but do not increase the underlying katastematic pleasure.53 I will add that since the lives of the gods are entirely untroubled and painless,54 their pleasures from eating and drinking are presumably unconnected to restoration, which involves the presence of a painful deficiency. On Rist’s interpretation, it is the kinetic rather than the katastematic pleasures that complete the gods’ lives, but this turns out to be rather backward: we know that the Epicureans believe the latter is more crucial than the former for living happily. In addition, as Merlan points out, the view that the gods experience kinetic pleasure (proven, in his mind, from the fact that they eat and drink) is complicated by texts suggesting that the gods’ pleasure is largely (and perhaps only) katastematic.55 This led Merlan to conclude that Epicurean theology was rife with unresolvable difficulties. Regardless of whether the gods’ lives includes kinetic pleasures, it must be noted that these passages from On the Gods do not unambiguously describe kinetic pleasures; it is only if one already considers non-restorative pleasures such as eating and drinking to be kinetic that one arrives at the conclusion that the pleasure the gods take in such activities must be kinetic. But if nonrestorative pleasures are katastematic, there is no problem explaining how the gods can enjoy them: as painless beings, the gods enjoy many variations of their painlessness, including pleasures that do not presuppose a deficiency that needs to be filled, such as those from taste and enriching conversations. We hear something similar from Diogenes of Oinoanda: the Cyrenaics have overlooked the pleasures of the mind in favor of the body, and they do not discriminate among pleasures, choosing always the most immediate ones. This

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is Diogenes’ main message in a passage in which it may seem that he assumes non-restorative pleasures are kinetic: [εἰ] δ᾽ [οὖν], τοὺς Ἀριστίππου προς[έ]χοντες λόγους, τοῦ μὲν [σώ]ματος ἐπιμελησόμεθα, πᾶν τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐκ ποτῶν, σείτων καὶ γεν[νη] μάτων καὶ ἁπλῶς δὲ ἁπάντων τῶν οὐκέτι [ἀπόλαυσιν ἀποδιδόντων μετὰ τὸ γενόμενον αἱρούμενοι, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἀμελήσομεν, τῶν μεγίστων ἡδονῶν στερησόμεθα.] (Fr. 49, Smith 1993) [So if] through paying attention to the arguments of Aristippus, we take care of the body, [choosing] all the pleasure derived from drink, food and [sexual acts] and indeed absolutely all the things which no longer [give enjoyment after the happening, but neglect the soul, we shall deprive ourselves of the greatest pleasures].56

According to Diogenes, the Cyrenaics go wrong because they focus only on bodily pleasures, which are more fleeting than pleasures of the soul. That he considers the pleasures of eating, drinking, and sex to be short-lived is confirmed by another fragment, this one against the Stoics, where Diogenes claims that the Stoics fail to understand that virtue is coincident with pleasure, just as eating, drinking, and having sex are simultaneous causes of their respective pleasures: “Rather the action brings about these pleasures for us immediately, [without awaiting] the future.”57 Presumably, Diogenes, like Philodemus, believes the Cyrenaics have ignored the pleasures of memory and anticipation, which secure longer-lasting enjoyment. The contrast he draws, then, is between mental and bodily pleasures, and in his mind this is a contrast between pleasures of long and short duration. This does not necessarily mean that non-restorative pleasures like those he mentions in the passage are kinetic; rather, it may mean merely that some non-restorative pleasures differ from and do not always add to mental pleasure. That Diogenes uses his argument regarding the instantaneity of certain pleasures against both the Stoics and the Cyrenaics suggests that his target may not be the Cyrenaics’ theory that sensory pleasures such as those of eating, drinking, and sex, are ‘smooth motions’ (i.e., kinetic). It is entirely plausible that his target is the Cyrenaics’ anti-rationalism, which led them to pursue any pleasure of the body that presented itself, including those that may lead to pain. In contrast to the Cyrenaics, then, the Epicureans seem eminently rational: the latter choose pleasures that are likely to lead to the least pain in the long run, and this requires shrewd consideration of not only the nature of one’s pleasures and current motivations—which desires a pleasure satisfies, whether the pleasure is attractive because of false beliefs, etc.—but also one’s future good.

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Epicureans must be able to assess accurately and honestly whether a certain pleasure is good for them now as well as later, and whether the pleasure may be particularly helpful or harmful in times of future pain. According to Epicureans, mental pleasures will be more useful than bodily pleasures when it comes to compensating for pain, as Epicurus showed on his deathbed when he set pleasant memories of good conversation against his bodily suffering (DL 10.22). Bodily pleasures too, especially painless ones, will be useful for Epicureans in the long run, since memories of physical enjoyment can be recalled in times of need. In contrast, the Cyrenaics risk compounding the pain of a bad choice when they pursue all pleasure regardless of the consequences: they must suffer not only the immediate pain of an ill-chosen pleasure but also its memory. In short, all kinds of pleasure are useful for Epicureans, who have rational means of adjudicating between their desires. However, what they will pursue in the long run for the sake of their present and future selves are pleasures that are most conducive to physical and mental health.

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Conclusion: Health and Hedonism in Plato and Epicurus

The purpose of this book has been to demonstrate that Epicurean hedonism is part of a noticeable trend in antiquity to consider pleasure in terms of organic functioning. This trend begins with the ancient debates in the Old Academy about the nature and goodness of pleasure, topics which Plato considers at length in the Philebus and to a lesser, though significant, extent in the Republic. The trend continues on in Aristotle’s implicit critique of the Academic account of pleasure. This critique is most apparent in the view found in both the Nicomachean Ethics and the Magna Moralia that pleasure is an activity rather than a process. As for the Platonic influence on Epicurus, there are noteworthy similarities between Epicurus’ conception of kinetic pleasure and the Philebus’ description of restorative pleasure. Both Epicurus and Plato describe pleasures according to a model of replenishment, in which an organism enjoys the process of removing deficiencies and progressing toward a state of harmony. Furthermore, we find Epicurus considering the merits of a thesis that looks very much like Plato’s claim in the Philebus that it is properly the results of processes of restoration, rather than the processes themselves, that are the good. In addition, Epicurus’ notion of pleasure shares the Philebus’ emphasis on the perception requirement for pleasures and pains. For Epicurus, we realize the highest good of painlessness, also described as health, through our perceptions of the painless workings of the mind and body; the perception of our condition is essential to living the best life. In Epicurean hedonism, we also see signs of the Philebus’ distinction between ‘mixed/impure’ pleasures of the body and ‘unmixed/pure’ ones: the former depend on the perception of a prior deficiency, whereas the latter are not directly connected to a prior felt lack. As I have argued, there is good reason to believe that Epicurus understands the nature of mixed pleasure in the same way as Plato and classifies such pleasure

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as kinetic. In addition, Epicurus classifies painless pleasures as katastematic, which are not preceded by a perceived lack and are not defi ned in terms of the replenishment of a perceived deficiency.1 Although Epicurus’ theory of the nature of pleasure resembles Plato’s in the Philebus in many ways, they diverge sharply in their accounts of the hedonic status of painlessness, which Epicurus identifies as the highest pleasure and Plato denies is a pleasure at all. Whereas Plato considers most pleasures to be perceived processes toward restoration, rather than conditions that result from such processes, Epicurus holds that a condition of perceived painlessness is a pleasure in its own right too. Such a condition is Epicurean katastematic pleasure, and it is what Plato claims is neither a pleasure nor a pain since it does not involve a perceived restoration or deficiency. Epicurus’ formulation of the notion of katastematic pleasure, when understood as the perception of painless functioning, or health, makes sense as a critical response to Plato’s insistence in the Philebus that painlessness is a neutral state. Epicurus is claiming that some pleasures are not processes, and restorations and depletions are not the only phenomena whose perception counts as pleasure; just because one is not perceiving the processes of restoration and depletion does not necessarily mean that one occupies a neutral state between pleasure and pain. For Epicurus, to perceive a condition without pain is to experience the highest pleasure of health, a condition that is not hedonically neutral. Moreover, we can experience the state of health through various painless sensory stimuli and mental activities, such as good tastes, sounds, and conversations with friends. Because healthy functioning involves painless stimulation of both the body and the mind, we are on solid ground in rejecting the view that Epicurus, like Plato, mistakenly divorces sensation from the absence of pain, as Urmson claims.2 While Plato might have been guilty as charged, Epicurus was not. Epicurus’ rejection of significant parts of a process theory of pleasure goes hand in hand with his rejection of the consequences of the process theory for pleasure’s goodness and its role in the best life. Although Epicurus, like Plato, describes some pleasures as perceived processes of restoration, he does not conclude that their status as ‘generations’ (geneseis) excludes them from the class of things good in themselves, a conclusion Plato reaches in the Philebus courtesy of his process argument for pleasure and pain (Phil. 53c–54d). Epicurus rejects this sort of argument by responding that some pleasures—the highest ones— are actually perceptions of a painless condition, and all pleasures are good qua pleasures. The Epicureans may have reasoned that if pleasure is experienced

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not only during processes of restoration but also when we achieve mental and physical well-being, then at least some pleasure qualifies as good despite the Platonic process argument. Epicurean kinetic pleasure is vulnerable to the process argument nonetheless, but Epicurus would have been able to respond that Plato’s view in the Philebus is compatible with the claim that non-restorative pleasures should be included in the class of things good in themselves. In any case, Epicurus insists that restorative pleasures are intrinsically good too, since, like katastematic pleasures, they are linked to healthy functioning. So, on the one hand Epicurean hedonism is at odds with many of the most significant ontological and ethical features of Plato’s treatment of pleasure, but on the other, it is suffused with concepts that seem remarkably Platonic, such as the idea found in the Philebus and the Republic that pleasure as a whole is to be understood in terms of the mental and physical functioning of a living thing, as well as the Philebus’ notion that pleasure involves perception. One might hazard to say that it seems as though Epicurus was attempting to argue against Plato’s anti-hedonism on Plato’s own terms. Surprisingly, few scholars have noted a connection between Epicurean and Platonic philosophy,3 and those who have mainly do so in passing. Frede, for instance, remarks briefly on the connection between the Philebus and Epicureanism in her discussion of the dour ones (οἱ δυσχερεῖς) and the neutral state of freedom from pain. She claims that Plato finds it problematic when people argue for the existence of a pleasureless state of non-disturbance and then attempt to claim, based on the existence of such a state, that pleasures of restoration are fictitious. According to Frede, this is precisely the strategy of the dour ones, the true enemies of Philebus’ crude hedonism. In making her point about their strategy, Frede comments that the distinction between pleasures of restoration and pleasures of states, a distinction that is inherent in both the dour position and Plato’s own approach in the dialogue, is precisely the distinction Epicurus himself makes between kinetic and katastematic pleasures.4 Striker too comments briefly on the plausibility that Epicurus’ distinction goes back to the Philebus. In reference to Gosling and Taylor’s position, she remarks that if the difference between Epicurean katastematic and kinetic pleasures is that the former are connected to replenishments and the latter occur as part of a condition of optimal functioning, then “the distinction coincides with Plato’s distinction between ‘mixed’ and ‘unmixed’ pleasures in the Philebus” (1996: 206n11).5 While I agree with their suggestions, more work has been needed to show how Epicureans transmogrified terminology that seems very Platonic, and

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how their ethics might have served as a sophisticated, critical response to Plato’s anti-hedonism. Epicurus’ hedonism also bears the marks of Aristotle’s treatment of pleasure, which itself bears the marks of Plato’s account of pleasure in the Philebus. As I have argued, Aristotle eventually rejects Plato’s description of pleasure as a movement or a restoration and favors instead the view that pleasure is an activity, which is not dependent on a lack or characterized by movement toward some other condition. For Aristotle, pleasure needs nothing more to complete it, not even time; similarly, for Epicurus unlimited duration does not yield greater pleasure.6 In addition, both Aristotle and Epicurus attempt to show that pleasure is associated with an organism’s healthy functioning. In this way, both the Aristotelian and the Epicurean response to an approach like Plato’s in the Philebus are characterized by an emphasis on the connection between pleasure and a condition of unimpeded functioning—the activity of an organism that is healthy and balanced, as opposed to the process of attaining health and balance. Some have argued that Epicurus’ katastematic and kinetic pleasure map onto Aristotle’s ‘pleasure in rest’ and ‘pleasure in motion’ mentioned in book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics.7 Although I believe there are several viable connections between Aristotle’s philosophy and Epicurus’ attempts to formulate a coherent hedonism, I do not believe this is one of them. In the part of the Nicomachean Ethics in question, Aristotle is not identifying two kinds of human pleasure; rather, he is distinguishing human pleasure from divine pleasure, a project much different from Epicurus’. Aristotle explains that god’s pleasure is single and simple because god’s nature is single and simple; one thing is always pleasant to god, and this is found “more in rest than in movement” (μᾶλλον ἐν ἠρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν κινήσει, 1154b28). In contrast, there is no one thing always pleasant to humans, since their nature is complex rather than simple (1154b20–24): one element in us may find an action to be pleasant, while another element may find that same action to be unnatural. Human pleasure is an activity of movement rather than a single unchanging activity; as Aristotle claims, “there is not only an activity of movement, but an activity of motionlessness” (οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινησίας, 1154b26–27). Here Aristotle is not distinguishing movement from a state of rest; rather, he is describing two kinds of ἐνέργεια: an ἐνέργεια of immobility and an ἐνέργεια of movement. Thus, the intent of this passage is not to differentiate two kinds of human pleasure; rather, its goals are (i) to describe the different kinds of pleasure associated with different kinds of existence, (ii) to note that each of those is an activity, and (iii) to make a

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qualitative statement about those pleasures. And overall, the point of the passage is to show that divine pleasure is different from and superior to human pleasure. To claim that Epicurus draws on this passage to formulate his notion of the nature of kinetic and katastematic pleasures would seem to require us to read into Aristotle’s discussion what is not there, namely, a distinction between kinds of human pleasure based on motion and rest. However, this is not to say that Epicurus might not have been influenced in other ways by Aristotle’s comparison of divine and human pleasure, especially Aristotle’s attribution of pleasure to the divine. Epicurus too claims that the gods experience pleasure,8 a move that aligns him with Aristotle but distances him from Plato: in the Philebus Socrates agrees with Protarchus’ conjecture that it is “not likely that the gods experience either pleasure or the opposite” (33b). Epicurus tends to mention the divine life as an example of superlative pleasure and happiness, much as Aristotle does in the passage I discussed above from book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics. Given that the Epicureans stress how important health and the awareness of it is to happiness, one lingering question is why they do not identify health rather than pleasure as our highest and innate good. Why factor hedonism into the equation at all? It seems they could have gone the route of Plato’s Republic and claimed that although the best life is pleasant, our aim should be the internal harmony that engenders the pleasure rather than the pleasure itself. Perhaps this is just a version of Cicero’s objection that the Epicureans seem to propose two distinct goals: pleasure and the absence of pain. If the Epicureans understand the absence of pain in terms of health, then why not say that the end is health rather than pleasure? Perhaps the Epicureans do not stop at health because they are interested in describing the telos in terms of human feelings: that is, even if health were ontologically or epistemologically the best condition for humans, Epicureans would not be interested unless health also felt the best. We get the sense that in Plato’s eyes the just life will still be the best even if it is not the most pleasant: a just soul is always ontologically better than an unjust one. But the goal of Epicureanism is to help people feel better—to lessen their anxiety, help them avoid frustrated desires, and enable them to enjoy their lives. To say that health itself is the goal, divorced from our perceptions of how health feels, would be nonsensical to Epicureans, who would argue that health is worth talking about at all only because of its connection to the feeling of pleasure. I think this point is related to Epicurus’ rejection of philosophy as an end in itself. For the most part, Epicurus advises us to concern ourselves with

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philosophy insofar as it will lead to pleasure. This position is expressed in an Epicurean work of unknown origin, reported by Porphyry: “Empty is that philosopher’s reasoning by which no human affliction is cured. For just as there is no benefit in the medical art if it does not cure the diseases of bodies, so there is no benefit in philosophy if it does not drive affliction out of the soul.”9 According to Epicureans, we should learn the truth about the gods, the limits of pain, and our abilities to get what we desire because having this knowledge enables us to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. We will have no use for philosophy if it should fail to bring about painless mental and physical experiences, and we will have no use for health if it should fail to do the same. This is not to say that Epicureans envision a contingent connection between health and pleasure; they argue, as I have tried to show in this study, that our experience of health—either in the process toward achieving it or in the condition itself—is intrinsically related to pleasure. Nevertheless, Epicureans would say that were health not linked to pleasure in this way, there would be no reason to care about health’s ontological credentials. When we frame Epicurean hedonism against the backdrop of the fourthcentury debates about pleasure, the interpretation I have developed in this book becomes more plausible. Given the nature of the concerns and the theories of pleasure being considered by Platonists and Aristotelians during that time, it makes sense that Epicurus would formulate the kind of theory of pleasure that I have argued he does. It makes sense that he would associate kinetic pleasure with restoration of a lack, that he would articulate how perception factors into pleasure, and that he would center his entire hedonism on the notion of natural and harmonious functioning, given that these were all foci of prominent philosophical discussions of the time. Understood in the way I have argued for here, Epicurean hedonism forms part of a nexus of ideas in the ancient world about the nature of pleasure and health, a nexus that begins with Plato and the debates within the early Academy and extends on through Aristotle and the Hellenistic period.

Notes Introduction 1 2 3 4

Most notably by Gosling and Taylor (1982) and Van Riel (2000b). Nikolsky 2001: 447. Nikolsky 2001: 446. For further discussion of Plato’s hedonism and anti-hedonism, see Moss (2006: 503n2) and Shaw (2015). 5 Diogenes Laertius reports that Hermarchus, Epicurus’ pupil and successor, authored the works “Against Plato” and “Against Aristotle” (DL 10.25). For further discussion, see Warren 2014: 84. 6 Although this book’s arguments for the existence of a philosophical connection between Epicurean and Platonic thought may serve to support arguments for the existence of a historical connection, I do not intend to establish the former by arguing for the latter.

Chapter 1 1 καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἡμῶν τοῦτο ἄρχει, ὁ τούτου βίος ἥδιστος. 2 Some scholars have neglected this point. For instance, although Gosling and Taylor (1982) have a comprehensive chapter on the problems with Republic 9, they do not address Plato’s suggestion that the philosophic life is the pleasantest because such a life affords the whole soul pleasure. Murphy (1951) also neglects this point. 3 Moss (2006: 503–35) has argued that Plato believes the desire for pleasure is distinctive to appetite. While the other two parts of the soul might experience pleasure, appetite is the only part that desires pleasure qua pleasure. She argues further that appetite’s desire for pleasure is a desire for what appears good rather than what is actually good. Thus, appetitive desires, including and especially the desire for pleasure, are always bound up with illusion. Although I agree with much of her argument, I worry that the Philebus complicates Plato’s view. In that dialogue, it is arguably the case that pleasure is not always bound up with illusion: some (genuine) pleasures are the result of physiological changes in the organism. However, one might argue that the moral psychology of the Philebus is far more rudimentary than that found in the dialogues Moss considers.

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4 As Annas (1999: 151n39) has noted, these three criteria are not impartial: Plato specifies a certain kind of experience and reason that is particular only to the rational part. White (1979: 51) notes that it may be impossible for a non-philosopher to accept reason’s judgment about the hedonic superiority of the philosophic life since the non-philosopher is just that, a non-philosopher. While it may be true that the non-philosopher is bereft of experience, reason, and argument, I don’t see that Plato thinks non-philosophers must understand why the philosophic life is pleasantest. Moreover, if we translate λόγος as ‘discussion,’ as Butler does (1999: 38), then it’s arguably the case that non-philosophers can engage in λόγος. 5 White (1979: 227) claims that the philosopher extrapolates from her ‘taste’ of nonphilosophic pleasures in order to judge that the philosophic life is most pleasant. Annas rightly claims, pace White, that the philosopher’s judgment is not based on having actually gone out and tasted the lower pleasures. The philosopher has enough life experience to know what the lower pleasures are all about (just as a reasonable person prefers not to be a drug addict even though she has never been one). For the problems this raises with Plato’s conception of the philosopher in Republic 9, see Annas 1981: 311–12 and Irwin 1995: 293. 6 Cross and Woozley (1964: 266) point out that the philosopher is in no better position than any other individual to judge which life is most pleasant, since such an evaluation depends on the preferences of the individual making the judgment: “If the business-man says he enjoys his life, and appears to enjoy it, the philosopher has no right to say that it is less pleasant than his own—except in the sense that he would not choose to live it.” This view of the text is fairly common among scholars, but I think it sidesteps the real problem with Plato’s argument, which, as I discuss, is its incompleteness: if we knew why rational pleasures were the best, then presumably it would be easy to argue that the philosopher is the best judge of the pleasantest life, since to his life belong the best pleasures. The problem is not that Plato’s point about the philosopher’s better judgment is wrong; rather, the argument is simply in need of further proof. For arguments against the criticism expressed by Cross and Woozley, see Annas 1981: 307–10; Russell 2005: 121–16; and Irwin 1995: 292. 7 Murphy (1951: 214) notes that by the term τὰ ἐσκιαγραφημένη Plato does not mean ‘unreal’; according to Murphy the word ought to be taken to mean “‘altered in proportion, or colouring,’ exaggerated or diminished by perspective.” However, it is difficult to square this interpretation with Socrates’ other statements about these sorts of ‘pleasures,’ such as when he calls them “illegitimate” (νόθος, 587b14–c1) and claims that all pleasures that arise from pain (the ἐσκιαγραφημένη) are actually the state of ἡσυχία. 8 At 583e9 he explicitly calls the coming into being of pleasures and pains “motions” (κινήσεις).

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9 It is noteworthy that Socrates never uses the term ἡσυχία to describe the neutral state in the Philebus. If my analysis is right, ἡσυχία is not the right term for the Philebus because in that dialogue the neutral state is not actually a state of calm in the sense of motionlessness; fillings and depletions continue to affect the body even when the soul is unaware of them. 10 Van Riel (2000b: 25) takes a similar line: “As we have seen, in the Republic he indicated that this intermediate state, between pure pleasure and pleasure that is always mixed with pain, cannot itself be pleasure.” 11 αὗται γὰρ οὐ προλυπηθέντι ἐξαίφνης ἀμήχανοι τὸ μέγεθος γίγνονται, παυσάμεναί τε λύπην οὐδεμίαν καταλείπουσιν. 12 “There are plenty of other examples as well” (Rep. 584b5). 13 With regard to pseudo-pleasures, Frede (1985: 159) claims that Plato “does regard them as pleasures albeit impure ones.” Gosling and Taylor (1982: 108) claim that Plato “clearly thinks of unreal pleasures as having some relation to real ones. They are at least distorted representations of the real thing (586b7–8).” But consider also Annas (1999: 150): “The virtuous person’s pleasures are said to be real, whereas the vicious person’s are unreal.” 14 Frede 1992: 435–37. See also Taylor (2003: 9): “The claim that most bodily ‘pleasures’ are not in fact instances of pleasure, since in those cases the process of getting rid of the distress arising from bodily deficiency is mistaken for genuine pleasure, appears to embody a confusion.” 15 Trans. modified. 16 For more on this view, see Shaw 2016: 377–78. 17 Warren (2011: 134) has argued that the inconsistencies among Socrates’ accounts of pure pleasure can be chalked up to the fact that Socrates’ arguments are directed at different audiences. It might therefore be the case, Warren asserts, that Socrates does not fully endorse all of his own claims (e.g., that the pleasure of smell is a pure pleasure). If Warren is right, then I think this strengthens my claim that the final pleasure argument of book 9, based on the health and pleasure of the whole soul, is the most convincing. That argument, as I discuss in this chapter, draws on Plato’s major claims about health and justice from earlier parts of the Republic; it does not seem to have been formulated for the sake of arguing against a particular audience. 18 Perhaps this is accomplished by the affinity argument for the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo (78b–80d): the soul is more akin to the invisible world of the Forms than to the sensible world of visible things. Unfortunately, as is widely recognized, the affinity argument is extremely weak. 19 See also Rep. 440c–441d, where Socrates describes spirit as capable of distinguishing justice from injustice; 442c1, where spirit is said to be able to “preserve” (διασῴζῃ) what reason tells it about what is fearful; and 442c9–d2, where belief about who should rule is attributed to all parts of the soul (ὁμοδοξῶσι).

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20 See Diotima’s claim in the Symposium that “not only does one branch of knowledge come to be in us while another passes away and that we are never the same even in respect of our knowledge, but that each single piece of knowledge has the same fate” (207e5-208a2; trans. Nehemas and Woodruff 1997). 21 Ἄγνοια δὲ καὶ ἀφροσύνη ἆρ᾽ οὐ κενότης ἐστὶ τῆς περὶ ψυχὴν αὖ ἕξεως; . . . Οὐκοῦν πληροῖτ᾽ ἂν ὅ τε τροφῆς μεταλαμβάνων καὶ ὁ νοῦν ἴσχων; (Rep. 585b3-7). 22 For more on the failings of the fillings argument, see Wolfsdorf 2013: 70–74. 23 Shaw 2016: 376–77. 24 I therefore disagree with Shaw that “Socrates overstates his view about bodily pleasures at first” (2016: 377). On my view, Socrates holds one position about bodily pleasures throughout 583b–586e, namely, that they are not genuine pleasures. I hold that this differs from the Philebus (again pace Shaw), where all bodily pleasures except that of the neutral state are genuine. However, see Shaw’s convincing argument that Republic 10 addresses genuine, mixed pleasures of the soul (2016: 382–86). 25 When the freed prisoner looks into the light, his eyes “hurt” (ἀλγεῖν τε ἂν τὰ ὄμματα, 515e2); he finds himself “pained” (πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ποιῶν ἀλγοῖ, 515c8); he is willing to “suffer anything” in his quest to replace his ignorance with knowledge (καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἂν πεπονθέναι, 516d6). And in book 7, Socrates and Glaucon consider the “toil” (πόνος) involved in hard study (535b6–8). 26 For additional critique of Warren’s view, see Arenson 2016b: 27–30 and 2016c: 60–62. 27 I am not concerned here with the rational part’s motives or qualifications for maintaining order in the soul. For a discussion of these points, see Irwin (1995: 291–94), who argues that reason has concerns for the welfare and order of the other two parts of the soul that they do not have for it, and that reason’s “holistic outlook” is part of its rational activity and so does not necessarily detract from its theoretical activity. 28 However, the Phaedrus depicts just this sort of domination: reason inflicts pain on appetite so as to bring about the former’s desire to have a philosophic, rather than a sexual, relationship with the beloved. See Phdr. 253d–254e. For further discussion of this, see Nussbaum 1986: 213–23; Gerson 2003: 141; and Arenson 2016b: 30–39. 29 For more on the connection between these concepts in the Republic, see Russell (2005: 120–37), who comments that pleasure is an identifying feature of a soul’s health, and, thus, of a soul’s virtue. 30 This same point applies to the city’s happiness, as White (1979: 114) argues: “When Plato calls his city happy, he does not take its happiness to consist simply in the happiness of its citizens” (see also White 1979: 15, 23, 27). But, White thinks the issue is less clear in the case of the soul’s happiness and goodness. I address this point in what follows. Annas (1981: 179) argues for the opposite view: “The city’s

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happiness is just the happiness of all the citizens.” Plato might ascribe virtues to the city as a whole—pronouncing it brave or wise, for instance—but this does not, on her reading, render the state distinct from its citizens: “[Plato] clearly subordinates individual desires and interests to the common good, but the common good is just the collective harmonization of the desires and interests that individuals ought to have, those they would have if they were ‘doing their own’” (1981: 180). It’s unclear whether she believes justice in individual souls is similarly reducible to the justice of individual psychic parts (see in particular her discussion at 1981: 32). On my view, although the virtues of bravery and wisdom can be reduced to the activity of (one of) the soul’s or city’s parts, justice cannot be identified with any particular activity of one or all of the psychic or civic elements. Each part doing its own job is certainly a condition of justice, but this cannot adequately capture what it means for the soul to be harmonious when it is just. Indeed, at 443d4–e2, which I discussed above, Socrates ascribes justice to the whole person, who binds the individual elements together. I am indebted to Bill Prior for this example. See the hydra image near the end of book 9, where Socrates states that the human “should take care of the many-headed beast as a farmer does his animals, feeding and domesticating the gentle heads and preventing the savage ones from growing” (589b1–4). The discussion of manual workers at the end of book 9 might complicate his point: there, Socrates states that the souls whose better parts are weak—as are those of manual workers, he says—should be enslaved to souls whose better parts are dominant (590c–d). But enslavement, he explains, is intended not to harm the slave but to help everyone, since everyone is better off when they are ruled by divine reason (590d3–4). Incidentally, this shows that harmony does not entail maximizing the satisfaction of each individual psychic part. White (1979: 59) makes this same point in relation to the city: the rulers are trying to satisfy all parts of the city, “but not so much as to provide them with as much satisfaction as they are capable.” He claims, I think rightly, that satisfaction of individual parts of the city and soul is tempered by the need to maintain harmony and avoid disorder. See also White 1979: 26, 60, and 118. White 1979: 27 and 1979: 224. Nevertheless, White believes that Plato does not explicitly address whether psychic happiness is the sum of the happiness of individual parts of the soul. See Annas (1981: 155): “It is a mistake to take the analogies of health and harmony to suggest that justice, conceived of as psychic harmony, is being thought of as a static state of feeling good.” Warren (2014: 43–44) adds that Plato’s account of pleasure in book 9 does not include the claim that the philosophic life is maximally pleasant at every moment. On this point see also Russell 2005: 123.

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37 Russell’s evaluation of the characteristics of the pleasure of the whole soul is quite helpful here. He emphasizes that what Plato is talking about is an agent’s life, to be pleased with which “is to see one’s projects as worth spending time on, to see those projects as intimately bound up with an identity that one prizes, and in general to have one’s emotions resonate with those projects, seeing them as part of a whole life that one takes to be satisfying and worth living” (2005: 125). The virtuous soul’s pleasure, he continues, is “evidence for its fulfillment, integration, and harmony” (2005: 135). I share Russell’s thinking about pleasure in terms of a whole person. On this point see also Annas 1981: 132–33. 38 Aristotle makes similar statements regarding virtue: an agent’s taking pleasure in acting virtuously is a sign that he or she is virtuous and is not performing the action for the wrong reason. See Nicomachean Ethics 1104b3ff. 39 In this passage, Socrates likens souls to jars: the jars of a fool must be continually refilled because they are leaky and filled with water carried in a leaky sieve; the jars of the self-disciplined person are sound and filled only once, allowing her to “relax over them” (493e5–6).

Chapter 2 1 As Socrates reminds Protarchus, at 27d1–2: “We established that the mixed life of pleasure and knowledge was the winner. Did we not?” 2 Strangely, this route resembles one of the investigatory methods that Socrates rejects early in the dialogue, namely, “asking whether there are or are not kinds [εἴδη] of pleasure, and how many there are, and of what sort” and doing the same for knowledge (19b2–3). 3 See the discussions at 31d4ff and 42c9ff. I will look at these passages and others in detail in what follows. As Taylor notes ([1956] 1972: 56), the restoration model can be traced to Alcmaeon of Croton, a younger contemporary of Pythagoras, who claimed that health is a condition of ἰσονομία of opposing powers in the body. 4 Those who argue in favor of the view that the restoration model underlies all pleasures in the Philebus include the following: Frede 1992: 425–63; Frede 1993: xii–lxxx; Frede 1997: 229–318; Tuozzo 1996: 495–513; Van Riel 2000b: 17–29; and Wolfsdorf 2013: 101. For the contrasting view, see Carone 2000: 267–70; Fletcher 2014: 115–20; Gosling 1975: 122, 213; and Gosling and Taylor 1982: 136, 140. Carpenter’s view (2011: 85–91) is somewhere in between: not all pleasures are restorations, but the restoration model is useful for understanding how all pleasures depend on cognitive functions, such as perception and desire. 5 The importance of the perception requirement in Plato’s treatment of the neutral state is sometimes overlooked in the literature. Frede (1993: xlix), for instance,

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writes, “To call a state of undisturbance ‘pleasure’ clearly violates Plato’s definition of pleasure as the restoration of a disturbance.” But what is actually violated is the perception requirement: it is incorrect to call a state of undisturbance ‘pleasure’ because such a state does not involve the perception of either restorations or disturbances. In other words, one must be aware of organic changes in order to experience pleasure. Consequently, I also disagree with Rudebusch’s claim (1999: 71) that “finally, it is noteworthy that the Philebus, though a later dialogue, assumes that one can coherently talk of a person unconsciously enjoying pleasure (Phlb. 21a–b).” For more on this issue, see Arenson 2011: 191–209. This claim is particularly odd in light of Socrates’ assertion elsewhere in the Philebus that the life of reason lacks pleasure and pain (33b). He had suggested earlier that such is also true of the lives of the gods (22c–d). Perhaps he means only that the life of reason as it is lived in the ideal way (i.e., without a body) involves no pleasure. For more on this problem, see Carone 2000: 257–83; Evans 2007: 337–63; and Fletcher 2014: 135–40. On the applicability of the divine method to pleasure, see Fletcher 2017: 195–202. It is unclear, however, how a thing’s being endless renders it unlimited, for something could be constantly shifting within definite limits. We can ameliorate this difficulty by translating ἄπειρον as ‘indefinite’ rather than as ‘unlimitedness,’ or by thinking of ‘unlimitedness’ as lacking a definite limit rather than lacking limit altogether. The translation ‘indefinite’ fits better with Socrates’ pronouncement that the more/less and stronger/gentler “do not permit there to be a definite quantity” (οὐκ ἐᾶτον εἶναι ποσὸν ἕκαστον, 24c3). For discussions of the many difficulties with the combination of πέρας and ἄπειρον in 23c4–27c2, see especially Frede 1993: xxxiii–xxxix and Letwin 1981: 187–91. For a discussion of the relation between the “divine method” of collection and the fourfold division, see Moravcsik 1979: 81–104. Carpenter 2011: 82–85. This is a revision of the earlier discussion of opposites, or, at the very least, a further elucidation of the kinds of opposites that are harmonized in the mixture. For another statement of this, see 28a1ff. That pleasure is always in flux no doubt contributes to Socrates’ rejection of it as a candidate for the good in the so-called process argument attributed to certain κομψοί at Phil. 53c4: since pleasure is a process of generation (γένεσις), it necessarily comes to be for the sake of something else, and it is this ‘something else’ that should properly be said to be the good since it is being (οὐσία) rather than becoming. I address the process argument in the following chapter. See KD 3, 18, 19, and 20. See also Philodemus, On Choices and Avoidances (De elect.) 4.1–4. See KD 15.

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15 All translations of the Timaeus are my own. 16 For example, Socrates claims in the discussion of the mixed pleasure of scratching an itch, “pain mixes with pleasure, toward whichever turns the scale” (46e3–4). 17 At 46b5 Protarchus suggests, “So then let us consider the relatives of these [ἐπὶ τὰς τούτων συγγενεῖς],” to which Socrates responds, “You’re talking about the ones that have mixture in them?” (τὰς ἐν τῇ μείξει κοινωνούσας λέγεις; 46b6). 18 I therefore agree with Waterfield (1982), who groups the two passages together. He notes that the first passage does not include the language of ‘mixed’ because “the purpose of this part of the discussion is to establish a general model for pleasure. It follows from this general model that these and most other pleasures are mixed, and this is brought out in the case of physical pleasures in 46a-47c” (1982: 18). 19 Plato’s reference to ‘forms’ of pleasure and pain here and elsewhere in the Philebus has led to disagreements about whether there is a general description of pleasure in the dialogue and whether such a description is the restoration model. (For sources, see p. 168 n.4) Nevertheless, those who deny that there is a general theory of pleasure in the Philebus believe Plato has the restoration model in mind for at least the mixed physical pleasures of the body. See, for example, Gosling and Taylor 1982: 136. 20 According to Plato, experiences like thirst, hunger, etc., are desires for filling with a particular object (and not, as Socrates makes clear, desires for an object per se without reference to its filling function; e.g., desires not just for food but for filling with food). When we are thirsty, we desire to be filled with liquid; when hungry, with food, and so on and so forth. As Russell (2005: 175n14) points out, Plato makes the same qualification elsewhere: “Cf. the similar point at Euthydemus 280c that to desire something is not, in fact, to desire that thing, simpliciter, but to desire to engage in some activity with respect to it. Plato’s argument at Gorgias 466a-468e relies on this point as well. The object of desire, in other words, is not strictly a thing but an action.” 21 Although Socrates’ query about the nature of the state ascribed to animals when they are neither destroyed nor restored is prefaced by the conditional statement, “If it is true, as we said [εἴπερ ὄντως ἔστι τὸ λεγόμενον], that their disintegration is pain, but restoration is pleasure” (32d9–e2), their ensuing discussion suggests that such a state is not hypothetical. Plato has Protarchus answer affirmatively to the question, “There is, then, such a condition, a third one [Οὐκοῦν ἔστι τις τρίτη ἡμῶν ἡ τοιαύτη διάθεσις], besides the state of being pleased and the state of being in pain?” (32e9–33a1). 22 Scholars often overlook the fact that Socrates does not frame his first discussion of pleasure and pain in terms of perception. Hampton (1990: 53–54), for instance, writes, “He notes that the processes of depletion and replenishment are not necessarily accompanied by pain and pleasure respectively. One may not experience

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either pain or pleasure and thus participate in the life of the mind, which perhaps is the most divine of lives (32E-33C).” In Plato’s first discussion (32d–33c), the neutral state is described as lacking restorations and disturbances altogether, so the issue is not that these processes are going on without our knowledge (as Hampton suggests), but that they are not going on at all. Many scholars believe there are four different types of false pleasure in the dialogue: those of anticipation, those of size, those of the neutral state, and those intrinsically mixed with pain. For this view, see Frede 1993: xlv–liii; Irwin 1995: 328–29; Russell 2005: 176n17, 188n42; and Shaw 2016: 391. Others have claimed that only the first three count as false pleasures, but the last—mixed pleasures—are not false: see Hackforth 1945: 85–97; McLaughlin 1969: 58; and Waterfield 1982: 22–25. Damascius, who mentions only three false pleasures, leaves out mixed pleasures (see Westerink 1959: §171). Wolfsdorf claims there are seven types of impure, false, or untrue pleasure, and three pure ones (2013: 76). I tend to agree with Hackforth, et al., since the mixed pleasures, but not really the three false pleasures, seem to be the ones Plato directly contrasts with unmixed pleasures. Of course, ‘pure’ (or ‘unmixed’) comes to be associated with ‘true’ later in the dialogue (cf. 63e), such that it would seem that pure pleasures are being contrasted not only with the mixed pleasures but also with all false pleasures. Yet it seems that purity is the standard by which Plato accepts or rejects pleasures in the ranking of goods at the end of the dialogue, implying that impurity is a more significant criterion in the dialogue’s ranking than falsity. This suggests that mixed pleasures ought to be distinguished from the false pleasures. For an explanation of the ontological and epistemological difference between purity and truth in the Philebus, see Cooper 1999: 155. It is widely acknowledged that Plato is using several different senses of ‘false’ in his discussion of the different types of false pleasure. Gosling (1975: 212), for instance, claims, “It seems impossible to acquit Plato of the charge of rank equivocation.” In the ancient literature, Damascius (Westerink 1959: §168) claims that pleasure is false in each of the three senses of falsehood held by Theophrastus. Frede (1985: 161) also points out Plato’s many senses of ‘false,’ but she argues that Plato is fully aware of his own equivocation and “distinguishes carefully between the different meanings.” For a helpful description of the different senses of ‘false’ see Frede 1993: xlv–liii. In my comparison of the Republic and the Philebus, I assume that the Philebus is the later of the two dialogues. I agree with Gosling and Taylor (1982: 128), Frede (1997: 383–89), and Hackforth (1945: 1–4) that the Philebus is among Plato’s latest dialogues and therefore postdates the Republic. For the opposite view, see Waterfield 1982: 11. For a contrasting view, see Taylor ([1956] 1972: 96), who denies there is a real difference between the Republic and Philebus accounts of pleasure, noting that the

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Notes latter “has nothing in principle to add” to the repletion-depletion theory in the former. Granted, Frede is speaking generally about Plato’s theory of pleasure, but this is another case in which the importance of perception in the theory of pleasure in the Philebus is overlooked. Metaphysics 987a29–b1. With this term, Socrates corrects his earlier labeling of such a condition as “obliviousness” (λεληθέναι, 33d–e). Obliviousness might be linked to forgetting, which he doesn’t want to associate with the situation in which an affection does not penetrate all the way to the soul. In the latter situation, the memory “has not yet come to be” (33e4), and so a new name should be given, namely, non-perception (ἀναισθησία), that has no association with forgetting. An interesting question is whether Plato would call a condition in which disturbances in an organism fail to penetrate both the body and the soul one of non-perception. Such a condition is impossible for humans given that they are always subject to restorations and disturbances, but presumably it is possible for the gods, who are not subject to such bodily changes: neither their bodies nor their souls are disturbed one way or the other. Gosling and Taylor (1982: 179) point out a difficulty with this sort of account of pleasure as a perception. They claim that even though perception is a necessary condition for pleasure, it remains unclear what the nature of pleasure actually is: a form of perception or a category of physical replenishment, “rather as taxis form a subset of motor-cars, those that carry passengers for a fare.” They lean toward the former option while denying that in the passages under discussion Plato believes what is perceived is a feeling. They wonder, then, of what exactly bodily pleasure is a perception, and they answer that it must be the replenishments. Yet even here they are tentative, noting that “Plato’s own language is ambivalent” as to whether replenishments are the objects of perception or are the causal conditions for perception (1982: 182). On my view, even if pleasure is a category of physical replenishment, the key feature of pleasure is the perception of the underlying restoration. That Plato reformulates his position on the neutral state in light of the perception requirement and makes this requirement a central component of his description of pure pleasures suggests that a restoration’s being perceived is not a mere minor quality of pleasure. I bow out of Gosling and Taylor’s discussion of the objects of perception versus its causal conditions since one can hold that Plato has a theory of pleasure on a restoration model without settling the issue. For more on the relation between pleasure and perception, see Tuozzo 1996: 502–04. The identity of these enemies is much disputed. The usual suspect is Speusippus, about whom see Dillon 1996: 99–114 and Schofield 1971: 2–20. Other suspects include Archytas of Tarentum and perhaps Socrates himself from other dialogues

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in which he holds positions strikingly similar to the ones he attacks in the Philebus. For a run-down of the debate, see Frede 1997: 273n77. Frede (1997: 273n83) assumes that the dour ones believe pleasure is at least one thing, namely, the absence of pain: “In Platons Augen liegt aber ein theoretischer Irrtum darin, diesen angenehmen Zustand als Lust zu bezeichnen und als Grund für die Nichtexistenz der Wiederherstellungslust zu verwenden.” It is on account of this statement and Plato’s other discussion of a similarly pleasureless and painless life at 43c that I disagree with Butler’s assertion (2003: 111) that according to Plato in the Philebus, “intelligence is superior to pleasure for the hedonistic reason that intelligence is better at producing the most pleasant life.” As I read the Philebus, the most desirable life lacks pleasure and pain altogether (as far as this is possible for humans). For further discussion, see Arenson 2011: 191–209. According to Carpenter (2011: 90–91), it is this feature of human existence that explains Socrates’ frequent appeal to the restoration model to explain pleasure, even though some pleasures do not obviously conform to the model. πολλή που ἀλογία . . . τὸν βουλόμενον ὅτι καλλίστην ἰδόντα καὶ ἀστασιαστοτάτην μεῖξιν καὶ κρᾶσιν . . . .

Chapter 3 1 Carpenter (2011) argues that it is a mistake to take the ‘means–end’ or ‘process– product’ relation (exemplified by ships/shipbuilding as well as by processes of restoration/states) as the main relation between genesis and ousia. Rather, she claims that the main relation is one of metaphysical and normative dependency; restorative processes exhibit one form of this dependency, but not all forms of dependency can be modeled on restorative processes. I agree with her view that all of Socrates’ descriptions of the relation between genesis and ousia in the argument from 53c–55d (the ‘process argument’) can be united under the umbrella of ‘dependency,’ but I think she downplays the significance of the ‘process–product’ relation in the argument. The whole process argument is immediately followed by a return to the discussion of processes of restoration, at which point Socrates attempts to tie the argument together with his earlier discussion of the dour ones’ concern with processes of removing pain. Socrates thinks the dour will be right to laugh at people who set their sights on processes of generation, such as curing hunger and thirst, since it’s perverse for anyone to value such things. The processes of eating and drinking are clearly meant as additional examples of the process–product relation (e.g., eating and being full), and Socrates mentions them to reinforce the process argument’s conclusion that pleasure is not good in itself. So although the

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process–product relation does not unify all of the relations between genesis and ousia in the process argument, Socrates nevertheless seems to pay this relation in particular the most serious attention, and he seems to think of the process argument as a part of his earlier and later arguments that pleasurable processes can be morally problematic. Importantly, the process argument does not imply that pleasure is morally bad just because it does not belong to the class of things good in themselves: as a γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν, pleasure leads to something Plato would consider good, namely, οὐσία. Frede (1997: 314) describes pleasure in this context as “ein Hilfsgut.” Carpenter (2011) argues that all pleasures are geneseis, and so none of them are good in themselves. Van Riel (2000b: 47) comments, “Whoever is meant here, it is not the thesis of the subtle thinkers itself that is crucial, but rather the definition upon which it is built: one can accept that pleasure is not an end only if one agrees that it is defined as a kind of movement towards an end, viz. ‘a perceptible process towards a natural state.’” Which he claims twice, once at the beginning of the argument (53c7) and again at the end (54d6). Οὐκοῦν ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος εἶπον τούτον τοῦ λόγου, τῷ μηνύσαντι τῆς ἡδονῆς πέρι τὸ γένεσιν μέν, οὐσίαν δὲ μηδ᾽ ἡντινοῦν αὐτῆς εἶναι, χάριν ἔχειν δεῖ δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὗτος τῶν φασκόντων ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καταγελᾷ. At 55c6–7, Socrates tells Protarchus that they should be sure to give reason and knowledge the same scrutiny as pleasure: referring to both pleasure and knowledge, he proclaims, “Let us rather strike them valiantly all around, to see if there is some fault anywhere.” Carone (2000: 264–70) argues that only some pure pleasures are perceived restorations. She bases this on an argument against Frede’s translation of 51b3–7, where Socrates responds with a list of examples after Protarchus asks him which pleasures are true. On Frede’s translation, all of the examples specify instances of a general definition of pure pleasure that is listed last, namely, perceived restorations of painless lacks. Frede translates as follows: “Those that are related to so-called pure colors and to shapes and to most sounds and in general all those that are based on imperceptible and painless lacks, while their fulfillments are perceptible and pleasant.” Carone contends that Plato understands the general description given at the end of the passage to be a separate case of pure pleasure, rather more like another example but not representative of pure pleasures in general. She bases this on her claim that the phrase “in general” is not required by the Greek, and that the repetition of καί in the passage indicates that the list is just “a simple enumeration of examples” (2000: 267n19). For support of Carone’s view, see Fletcher 2014: 121–22. See also Taylor (1972: 79–80) for the argument that Plato does not believe pure pleasures are processes.

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8 ὅσα δὲ κατὰ σμικρὸν τὰς ἀποχωρήσεις ἑαυτῶν καὶ κενώσεις εἴληφεν, τὰς δὲ πληρώσεις ἁθρόας καὶ κατὰ μεγάλα, κενώσεως μὲν ἀναίσθητα, πληρώσεως δὲ αἰσθητικὰ γιγνόμενα λύπας μὲν οὐ παρέχει τῷ θνητῷ τῆς ψυχῆς, μεγίστας δὲ ἡδονάς∙ ἔστιν δὲ ἔνδηλα περὶ τὰς εὐωδίας. 9 The κομψοί could be a single person or a group: in the passage containing the process argument (53c–55c) Plato refers to the author(s) of the argument in both the singular and the plural. At 53c6 the author is plural (κομψοὶ γὰρ δή τινες), whereas at 54d5 and 54e1 the author is singular (τῷ μηνύσαντι, αὑτὸς οὗτος). 10 See Nikolsky 2001: 458 and Taylor 1972: 24–25. Gosling (1975: 114, 166) notes that Philebus probably does not represent Eudoxus, but the dialogue is most likely Plato’s formulation of his own ideas in relation to Eudoxus’. The main critic of this view has been Frede, who argues that Plato is referring to himself, as proven by the fact that he refers to himself as κομψός in other dialogues (Phaedo 105c; Rep. 525d; and Theaetetus 156a). She believes that Plato is committed to the premises and conclusion of the process argument since he is, in fact, its creator, and also that Eudoxus probably does not play much of a role in Plato’s formulation of the dialogue except to act as its “catalyst.” This seems probable, Frede argues, because Eudoxus was not a philosopher of ethics or even a philosopher at all. On her view, Plato rethinks his own theory of pleasure not because of the views of Eudoxus or Speusippus, but because his own account of pleasure in the Republic was underdeveloped. See Frede 1993: lv, lxxi, 63n3 and Frede 1997: 307–08. Van Riel (2000b: 47) is inclined to accept her view. Gosling and Taylor (1982: 152–57, 231–34) express skepticism about Speusippus’ presence in the dialogue without coming to any definite conclusions. 11 At 54c6, Frede (1993) translates εἴπερ as “since,” thus rendering the passage as follows: “Now, pleasure, since [εἴπερ] it is a process of generation, necessarily comes to be for the sake of some being.” Carone (2000: 265n17) calls Frede on this translation of εἴπερ, noting that it “suggests commitment” on Plato’s part to the views of the κομψοί. Hackforth (1945: 105–07) has also commented that the conditional phrasing of some of the lines in the process argument suggests that Plato does not support the conclusions of the κομψοί. As I see it, Frede (1997: 307n130) is right to chastise Hackforth for this view, given the fact that he has no explanation for why Plato would put so much stock in a theory whose premises he does not accept. 12 In this she agrees with Taylor (1972: 79–80), who contends that Plato does not commit himself to the view that all pleasure is a γένεσις; in Taylor’s opinion, this may be true of mixed pleasures but not pure pleasures. Gosling and Taylor (1982: 153–54) have also argued that Plato is probably not applying the γένεσις account to all pleasures. 13 See Frede (1993: lv), who claims that Plato thinks “all pleasures have in common one feature, that rules out the possibility that any of them can be an unqualified

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Notes good, namely, that pleasure by its very nature is always becoming (aei genesis estin) and has no being (ousia).” See also her view (1997: 314) that Plato does not make any exceptions to his claim that pleasure is a process, not even for pure pleasures, and her claim that Plato does not treat the κομψοί with irony (1997: 307). Rist (1974: 168n4) claims, “At Phlb. 53c 4-7 it is suggested that the identification of pleasure as a γένεσις is a theory of the κομψοί to which, by implication, Socrates is not committed. Thus it looks as though the path may be open for the suggestion that only one type of pleasure is a γένεσις; but whether that path is intended to be open or not, Plato does not go along it.” Van Riel 2000b: 46–48 and Van Riel 2000a: 119–38. All translations from the Rhetoric are W. Rhys Roberts’s (1983), with minor revisions. The Greek text is from Ross’s Oxford edition ([1959] 1964). Wolfsdorf 2013: 108–09. Gosling and Taylor (1982: 196–98), for instance, conclude that whatever the dating of the Rhetoric, Aristotle need not have been committed to its account of pleasure. Urmson (1984: 215) argues for a late dating of the Rhetoric (viz., 335 BCE). Van Riel claims that in the Rhetoric Aristotle does not support the Platonic view that pleasure is a process, even though Aristotle does not explicitly reject the Platonic view. According to Van Riel (2000b: 51n53), “this can be explained, however, as a reference to the ‘scholastic’ definition that circulated in the Academy.” In both the Posterior Analytics and the Physics, pleasures are said to be changes. Posterior Analytics 87b5–6 reads, ὁ γὰρ ἡδόμενος κινεῖται καὶ τὸ κινούμενον μεταβάλλει. Physics 247a16–17 reads, αἱ δ᾽ ἡδοναὶ καὶ αἱ λῦπαι ἀλλοιώσεις τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ. However, we find a different account in De Anima 431a10–11, which leads Wolfsdorf (2013: 113) to claim that Aristotle’s early view of pleasure was evolving. In any case, the exact chronology of the texts is irrelevant to my overall goal of identifying the philosophical influences on Epicurus’ hedonism. No matter whether Aristotle’s mature view on pleasure lies in the Rhetoric, the Nicomachean Ethics, or the Peripatetic Magna Moralia, the content of these texts would have been in circulation among various philosophical schools by Epicurus’ time. Aristotle merely says, “it seems to some” (τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ) that no pleasure is (a) good (1152b8). I therefore disagree with Hampton’s view (1990: 74) that Aristotle attributes this theory to Plato: “According to Aristotle, Plato believed the end to be superior to the process of reaching it, so that the genesis of pleasure cannot be an end or good any more than building a house, as opposed to the house itself, can be an end (Nicomachean Ethics, 1152B12-15).” While it is true that Plato does espouse this view, Aristotle does not expressly attribute the theory to him at NE 1152b12-15. As I discuss later, Aristotle is both sympathetic to and critical of Eudoxan hedonism. He is sympathetic to the Eudoxan idea that pleasure is related to the good, but not to the notion that pleasure is the good. In this way, Aristotle neither defends nor rejects Eudoxan hedonism or Speusippan anti-hedonism.

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24 “Thus the fact that all things moved towards the same object indicated that this was for all things the chief good (for each thing, he argued, finds its own good, as it finds its own nourishment); and that which is good for all things and at which all aim was the good” (1172b12–15). See also Diogenes Laertius’ report that Eudoxus believes pleasure is the good (DL 8.88). 25 “He believed that the same conclusion followed no less plainly from a study of the contrary of pleasure; pain was in itself an object of aversion to all things, and therefore its contrary must be similarly an object of choice” (1172b18–20). 26 “Further, he argued that pleasure when added to any good, e.g. to just or temperate action, makes it more worthy of choice, and that it is only by itself that the good can be increased” (1172b23–25). 27 “His arguments were credited more because of the excellence of his character than for their own sake; he was thought to be remarkably temperate, and therefore it was thought that he was not saying what he did say as a friend of pleasure, but that the facts really were so” (1172b15–18). 28 Aristotle attributes a similar view to Speusippus in book 7 (1153b4–7). From Aristotle’s report there, Speusippus attempts to show that pleasure is not the good based on the analogy that pleasure and pain are opposed to the good in the same way that the lesser and the greater are opposed to the equal. Neither the lesser nor the greater is the same as the equal, even though they are opposites; similarly, neither pleasure nor pain is the good, even though pleasure and pain are opposites. Speusippus’ point, apparently, is that pleasure is not the good even though it is opposed to the bad. This reference to Speusippus is supported by a passage in NE book 10 (1173a5–28) where he is not named but the view described fits with that expressly attributed to him in book 7. In the book 10 report, pleasure and pain are both described as being opposed to a neutral state, and Speusippus is known to have held that the good is a state of freedom from disturbance (ἀοχλησία) (cf. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 2, 22.133.4, which I discuss in this section). Tarán (1981: 483–43) argues convincingly that Speusippus is meant in both the book 7 and the book 10 passages. 29 I agree with Irwin (1999: 303n3 in section §4) that Aristotle is probably responding to Phil. 53c–54c, but it should nevertheless be noted that Aristotle can have the Philebus in mind only for the argument that pleasure is a γένεσις but not that it is a κίνησις, since Plato never explicitly describes pleasure as a κίνησις in the Philebus. Plato does explicitly describe pleasure as a κίνησις in the Republic (583e9–10), leading me to believe that Aristotle is rejecting all of Plato’s attempts to bring pleasure under the heading of change (either as a γένεσις or κίνησις). 30 See Dillon 1996: 100–06. 31 Stromata 2.22.133.4 (Tarán fragment 77), trans. Dillon (1996). 32 As Dillon claims (1996: 111n42). Gosling and Taylor (1982: 239) argue otherwise, claiming there is insufficient evidence to associate Speusippus with the arguments

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Notes against pleasure as a process or a motion in either NE 7 or 10. But here is Van Riel (2000b: 71): “There is no reason to deny that Aristotle’s objections might just as well be directed against Speusippus’ theory of pleasure.” For additional discussion, see Van Riel (2000a: 119), who claims that Aristotle’s treatment of pleasure “is a direct reaction against this particular Platonic text [viz., the Philebus].” The crucial passage is 1153a7–15: “Again, it is not necessary that there should be something else better than pleasure, as some say the end is better than the process; for pleasures are not processes nor do they all involve processes—they are activities [ἐνέργειαι] and ends; nor do they arise when we are becoming something, but when we are exercising some faculty; and not all pleasures have an end different from themselves, but only the pleasures of persons who are being led to the completing of their nature. This is why it is not right to say that pleasure is a perceptible process [τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν], but it should rather be called activity of the natural state [ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως], and instead of ‘perceptible’ ‘unimpeded [ἀνεμπόδιστον].’” In this I agree with Irwin (1999: 271n13 in §2), Van Riel (2000b: 52–53), and Urmson (1968: 323). They argue that Aristotle’s position vis-à-vis the process argument is more clearly laid out in book 10. δοκεῖ γὰρ οὺκ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος τὸ τυχὸν γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ οὗ γίνεται, εἰς τοῦτο διαλύεσθαι· καὶ οὗ γένεσις ἡ ἡδονή, τούτου ἡ λύπη φθορά. I agree with Irwin (1999: 303n3 in §6) that “Aristotle assumes that pleasure is a condition of the soul, not a purely bodily condition, since it requires awareness (and Plato recognizes this, Phil. 34a).” Frede (1997: 422–23): “Aristoteles wendet nämlich einerseits ein, daß diese Erklärung nur auf körperliche Vorgänge zutrifft, andererseits verweist er auf Freuden, die keinen Schmerz voraussetzen, wie etwa die Freude am Lernen, an Gerüchen oder an schönen Tönen. Diese Einwände zeigen, daß er weder Platons Gründe für die Einbeziehung geistiger Freuden zur Kenntnis genommen hat, noch auch seine Erklärung für die reinen Arten von Lust kennt, sonst hätte er nicht Platons eigene Beispiele gegen ihn zitiert.” Ackrill (1965: 127) suggests that activities can be distinguished from movements based on the following test: if the perfect tense is applicable to a point in time of the object in question, it is an activity. For example, “is gazing at the statue,” entails “has gazed at the statue,” and thus Aristotle would consider “gazing at a statue” to be an activity. In contrast, “‘is building the house’ is inconsistent with ‘has built the house,’” and so it is not an activity. As Bostock (1988: 251–72) notes, Aristotle’s claim that pleasure is or completes an activity is problematic because it precludes processes from being pleasurable (e.g., taking pleasure in building). To resolve this, Bostock suggests that Aristotle

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may mean that what is pleasurable about processes is not the process itself but the perception of it. But, as Bostock comments, this interpretation is accompanied by its own problem: it may be that perceptions themselves are processes. ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέρεσι καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς, καὶ ἕτεραι τῷ εἴδει τῆς ὅλης καὶ ἀλλήλων. δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἕτεραί τ᾽ ἂν εἶεν ἀλλήλων, καὶ τῶν ὅλων τι καὶ τελείων ἡ ἡδονή. See Owen (1986: 334–46), who believes that the theses of books 7 and 10 are not answers to one question but to two different ones, namely, what all pleasures possess in common and what it means to ‘enjoy.’ On his view, because the passages are addressing entirely different questions, it is fruitless to ask whether they present the same definition of pleasure. Van Riel (2000b: 43) contends that although the two passages cannot belong to the same work because of the lack of cross references, “there is no essential difference of opinion between them.” Gosling and Taylor (1982: 204–24) give an extensive rebuttal of Owen. Taylor’s own view (2003: 18–20) is similar to but importantly different from Owen’s. Wolfsdorf (2013: 131–33) claims that Aristotle changed his mind (with good reason). τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἕξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ ὡς ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα. Irwin (1999) translates very similarly: “Pleasure completes the activity—not, however, as the state does, by being present [in the activity], but as a sort of consequent end, like the bloom on youths.” Ostwald’s translation (1962) is similar. Van Riel 2000b: 57. He claims that ὥρα means a ‘flourishing’ that does not necessarily occur in youth, since ἀκμαίοις, derived from ἀκμή, refers to a ‘vigor of life’ that Aristotle describes as occurring closer to middle age (Rhet. 1390b9–11). Thus, although ὥρα can mean ‘bloom of youth,’ such meaning makes little sense in this context. See Irwin 1999: 271n13 in §2; Owen (1971) 1986: 334–46; Urmson 1968: 323; Van Riel 1999: 211–14; and Van Riel 2000b: 52–58. Unless otherwise noted, all translations of the Magna Moralia are those of St. G. Stock (1983), and the Greek text is from F. Susemihl’s edition (1883). “But generally no pleasure is a becoming [γένεσις]. For even the pleasures of eating and drinking are not becomings, but there is a mistake on the part of those who say that these pleasures are becomings” (1204b20–23).

Chapter 4 1 See DL 10.6; Athenaeus Deipnosophistae 12.546e (22.1 A); and Cicero Tusc. Disp. 3.41–42. 2 Alciphron Epistularum 3.55.8 (432 U).

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3 At De Fin. 2.9, Cicero has Torquatus say that one pleasure is alio genere from the other. The description of pleasure as an agreeable feeling is given by Torquatus and echoed by Cicero himself later. See, for example, De Fin. 1.37 and 2.6–8. For the term voluptas in motu, see 2.9, 2.16, 2.32, and 2.75. Cicero refers to the agreeable feeling also as movens (2.31). At 1.37, Torquatus describes the other kind of pleasure as a condition of feeling no pain. At 2.9 and 2.16 he calls it voluptas in stabilitate. He also refers to it as stans (2.31), status (2.28, 2.32), and stabilis (2.32, 2.75). 4 As do Rackham (1914) and Woolf (2001). 5 It is irrelevant to my present argument whether Cicero is describing the Epicureans’ highest pleasure as the process of removing pain or as the state of being without pain. My point is that Cicero has Torquatus contrast the greatest pleasure, however it is defined, with pleasure caused by stimulation of the sense organs. In any case, Cicero’s account lacks some precision: if pleasure “is perceived by the senses with a certain delight,” then what defines ‘delight’? 6 Warren (2016: 51) argues that 1.37–38 describes kinetic pleasure both as a restoration and as an agreeable sensory stimulation, and that physical restorations are the paradigm case of kinetic pleasure according to Epicureans. I am inclined to agree with Wolfsdorf (2009: 251–52), against Warren, that 1.37–38 does not obviously describe kinetic pleasures as restorations. As Wolfsdorf argues, Torquatus claims that replenishments (e.g., drinking when thirsty) can cause painlessness, but this does not necessarily mean that the replenishments themselves are accompanied by pleasure. Although I agree with Wolfsdorf in this case, I disagree with his general claim that Torquatus never understands kinetic pleasures to be caused by replenishments; I think Torquatus does associate pleasure with replenishment elsewhere in De Finibus. I discuss this point later in this chapter. 7 Athenaeus Deipnosophistae 12.546e (22.1 A): Οὐδε γὰρ ἔγωγε ἔχω τί νοήσω τἀγαθὸν ἀφαιρῶν μὲν τὰς διὰ χυλῶν ἡδονάς, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ τὰς δι᾽ ἀφροδισίων, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ τὰς δι᾽ ἀκροαμάτων ἀφαιρῶν δὲ καὶ τὰς διὰ μορφῆς κατ᾽ ὄψιν ἡδείας κινήσεις. Cicero repeats a version of this at De Fin. 2.7: quippe qui testificetur ne intellegere quidem se posse ubi sit aut quod sit ullum bonum praeter illud quod cibo et potione et aurium delectatione et obscena voluptate capiatur. 8 At De Fin. 2.19, Cicero gives examples of this practice of combining two ends while retaining their distinctness: Aristotle combines virtue with prosperity over a complete lifetime; Callipho, pleasure and moral worth; and Diodorus, moral worth and freedom from pain. 9 On the cradle argument, see Brunschwig 1986: 113–44 and Sedley 1998: 136–38. 10 In all, Cicero describes Epicurean kinetic pleasure in terms of sensory stimulation at De Fin. 1.37, 2.10, 2.16, 2.30, and 2.32. Elsewhere, he describes pleasure as sensory without specifying that he is talking about kinetic pleasure or the Epicurean classification of pleasures (e.g., 2.6, 2.8, 2.13, 2.39).

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11 omnes enim iucundum motum quo sensus hilaretur Graece ἡδονήν, Latine voluptatem vocant. Cicero repeats this critique elsewhere: at 2.14 he claims that most Latin speakers understand by voluptas “the enjoyment of a delightful stimulation of one of the senses” (in eo autem voluptas omnium Latine loquentium more ponitur, cum percipitur ea quae sensum aliquem moveat iucunditas). 12 In fact, he claims the opposite at 2.9, thereby facilitating Cicero’s argument that kinetic and static pleasures are totally dissimilar. 13 Giovacchini 2008: 70; Glidden 1980: 189; Konstan 2012: 13–16; Long and Sedley 1987: vol. 1, 121–22; Merlan 1960: 2–4; Mitsis 1988: 45–51; Purinton 1993: 292–320; Rist 1972: 100–09; Warren 2016: 48; and Wolfsdorf 2013: 159. 14 Mitsis 1988: 49n99. Kinetic pleasures are indifferent to overall happiness, he claims, because they merely vary but do not increase our overall pleasure (47–49). He also claims, pace Gosling and Taylor, that De Finibus offers “a helpful and often extremely reliable theoretical backdrop for reconstructing and understanding the arguments that Epicurus actually used to support his ethical doctrines.” 15 Merlan 1960: 2. 16 The term κατάστημα is mentioned also by Philodemus (PHerc. 1232, XVIII.10– 17), quoting a text that may be a letter from Epicurus to Metrodorus or may be from Epicurus’ own On the Telos. Tepedino Guerra (1987: 85–88) argues that Philodemus’ source is On the Telos; Purinton supports her suggestion (1993: 298n29). The term κατάστημα also appears in two places in Plutarch’s Non Posse (1089d and 1090a), but it is not entirely clear if Plutarch is quoting directly from an Epicurean source, given that he does not cite a text or Epicurean authority. 17 I leave aside for the moment discussion of the various textual difficulties with this passage. My translation here is meant to show only that Epicurus does evidently use the terms καταστηματικαί and κατὰ κίνησιν to describe pleasures. I discuss this passage in detail in Chapter 6. 18 Διαφέρεται δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Κυρηναικοὺς περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς. οἳ μὲν γὰρ τὴν καταστηματικὴν οὐκ ἐγκρίνουσι, μόνην δὲ τὴν ἐν κινήσει. ὃ δὲ ἀμφότερα, ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος (DL 10.136). 19 See Konstan 2012: 11; Maso 2015: 156; and Rist 1972: 101. Compare Warren 2016: 48. 20 I provide evidence for this view in Chapter 6. 21 See Konstan 2012: 11; Long and Sedley 1987: vol. 1, 122; and Maso 2015: 153. 22 Ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις. ὅπου δ᾽ ἂν τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐνῇ, καθ᾽ ὃν ἄν χρόνον ᾖ, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἢ λυπούμενον ἤ τὸ συναμφότερον. See a similar idea in KD 18, which claims that pleasure reaches its limit once pain has been removed. 23 See, in particular, Konstan (2012: 13), who claims KD 3 confirms that “static pleasure consists in the absence of pain or perturbation.”

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24 Hossenfelder (1986: 250n3) argues that anyone who equates freedom from pain with pleasure is not really a hedonist but is attempting to accommodate hedonism to some other agenda. In Hossenfelder’s opinion, the agenda in Epicureanism is the Stoic and Pyrrhonian ideal of making the individual independent of everything unattainable. 25 Cicero does not name names, but he must mean at least the Cyrenaics, who believe that pleasure is some sort of agreeable sensory stimulation. 26 Another figure may be Speusippus, although this is less clear. Clement of Alexandria (Stromata 2.22.133) claims that Speusippus identifies the good with ἀοχλησία: not being bothered or overwhelmed. And in book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle attributes to Speusippus the view that pleasure is not the good (NE 1153b4–6). See my previous chapter for discussion of Speusippus. 27 At De Fin. 1.30, Torquatus reports that Epicurus makes use of such an explanation. The argument appears in several other places: cf. Plutarch, Adversus Colotem 1122d–e; DL 10.137; Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes 3.194 (398 U) and Adversus Mathematicos 11.96 (398 U). 28 Stokes (1995: 147) claims that although “it is not for a moment credible that Epicurus meant to argue as Cicero thus depicts him,” Cicero arrived at his account of the Epicurean cradle argument by means of reasonable assumptions about and deductions from Epicurean doctrine. Cicero is not misrepresenting Epicurus’ account, Stokes argues, for his “dialectical tactics are transparent enough” (150). Even so, if Cicero’s account of Epicurean hedonism, though fair, is flawed (as Stokes admits many of Cicero’s claims are), this should lead us to be cautious when considering the account of Epicureanism in De Finibus. 29 Reading et inlaberetur with Madvig (1839) rather than ei inlaberetur with Reynolds (1998). 30 For a thorough discussion of the hand passage, see Warren 2016: 56–59. 31 Warren 2016: 60. 32 Of course, Cicero thinks the Epicureans are wrong in any case: even if they agree with the Cyrenaics that all pleasures are agreeable sensory stimuli, as hedonists they still make the mistake of thinking that pleasure is the highest good. 33 Splawn 2002: 474. 34 On this point I agree with Gosling and Taylor (1982: 374): “There is no reason for Epicurus to hold, in Cicero’s example . . . that a hand without pain experiences pleasure, only that an organism which is perceiving and without pain experiences pleasure.” 35 For more on perception in De Fin. 1.37, see Erler and Schofield 1999: 654. 36 See Nikolsky 2001: 462–65. This explanation seems more likely than Gosling and Taylor’s (1982: 385) that Cicero misconstrues the contrast between kinetic and katastematic pleasure because he understands very little about Epicurean hedonism. Lévy (1984: 115–17) claims that Cicero’s dialectic in book 2 of De Finibus reflects

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Carneades’ Platonic approach to Epicureanism. Therefore, Cicero is not being abusive when he criticizes Epicureanism; rather, “il fait sienne la longue tradition de polémique antiépicurienne de son école” (1984: 123). See De Fin. 1.15 and De Natura Deorum 1.59. Tsouna (2007: 14n4) claims that Cicero derives his account of Epicurean ethics most likely from the teachings of Zeno of Sidon, but she has also argued that Philodemus could be the source (2007: 14n3). See also Tsouna 2001: 159–72. For more on Cicero’s contact with Roman Epicureans, see Maso 2015: 15. See, for instance, De Fin. 1.16, 1.33, 1.40, 1.45, 1.57, 2.20. Sedley 1998: 129–50. See De Fin. 1.31, on whether we have an innate conception of pleasure, and 1.66–70, concerning various Epicurean views on friendship. See Sedley 1998: 135–42. He continues this language into the opening chapters of book 3: the previous books would have compelled pleasure to “give up” were it not for her “tenacious defenders” (3.1); pleasure would be shameless “to resist virtue any longer” (3.1); he and Brutus “did not surrender” in their discussion with Torquatus, and they should be prepared for an even fiercer (acrior) debate with the Stoics (3.2). I am inclined to accept Charles Brittain’s claim (2016: 34–38) that Cicero’s “ordinary-life commitment to the goodness of virtue” in Roman society explains his rejection of Epicureanism in De Finibus. According to Cicero, the Epicureans wrongly insist that the virtues are not choiceworthy in themselves but are mere instruments of pleasure: “All non-complex positions that leave no room for virtue are to be eliminated from philosophy altogether” (De Fin. 2.39). Concerning Cicero’s rejection of Epicureanism because of its supposed incompatibility with virtuous Roman life, see also Inwood (1990: 163), who argues that one of Cicero’s goals regarding Epicureanism is “to kill its influence in Rome.” Similarly, Prost 2003: 93 (“la position épicurienne est intenable à Rome”) and Maso 2015: 103–15. Maso 2015: 14. This view is shared by Inwood (1990: 152–53), who argues that Cicero understands Epicureanism but deliberately misconstrues it because he hates hedonism. Inwood persuasively shows that Cicero is interested in persuasion rather than truth, and that Cicero aims to accomplish the former by means of various rhetorical devices, for example, ad hominem arguments, excessive numbers of examples, and linguistic flourishes. Maso 2015: 72–80. Incidentally, this is further evidence against Sedley’s view that Cicero accurately recounts Epicurean philosophy. Maso 2015: 159–60. Strangely, Maso concludes that Cicero’s account of Epicurean pleasure is “reliable and excellent” (162). On the contrary, I think Maso’s investigation shows that Cicero’s account is reliable only insofar as it reliably misinterprets or misunderstands important pieces of Epicurean doctrine.

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47 On Cicero’s confusion on this point, see also Giannantoni (1984: 37), who claims that although Cicero confirms that Epicureans believe there is something called ‘kinetic pleasure,’ his account is not very helpful because it fails to make clear whether kinetic pleasure follows or precedes katastematic pleasure: “La polemica ciceroniana . . . manifesta un’incertezza sul posto e sul ruolo che al piacere cinetico devono essere assegnati.” 48 Wolfsdorf 2009: 248–49. 49 At De Fin. 1.22, Cicero criticizes Epicurus’ (alleged) ignorance of logic and argumentation: “Now in regards to the other part of philosophy, concerning inquiry and argument, which is called ‘logic,’ it seems to me that your teacher is clearly defenseless and exposed. He abolishes definitions, and teaches nothing about dividing and distinguishing. He does not say how an argument is to be executed or concluded, and he offers no method for eliminating fallacies and disentangling ambiguities.” 50 Bailey (1928) 1964: 492. Rosenbaum’s view (1990: 24) is along the same lines as Bailey’s. 51 See Nikolsky (2001) for an extensive critique of Cicero’s account of Epicurean pleasure. 52 See Rist 1972: 109–11 and Diano 1974: 67–128. 53 DRN 4.627–29. I treat this passage and Diano and Rist’s interpretations of it in more detail in Chapter 6. 54 See KD 3, where Epicurus says that there is no pain wherever pleasure is present. 55 “It would be convenient for Epicurus to distinguish terminologically between katastematic pleasures of the satisfied state, kinetic pleasures of the process of satisfaction or the removal of pain, and (thirdly) those pleasures which merely titillate the senses, vary (so far as I can see) either kinetic or katastematic pleasure, and are due only to pleasing motions of or in the vicinity of the actual organs of sense. Epicurus’ phrase for the third class, called above ‘sensual,’ is, at KD 10, ‘the pleasures concerning the profligates’” (Stokes 1995: 162). 56 Stokes 1995: 146. 57 For support of this view, see Stokes 1995: 158.

Chapter 5 1 See Chapter 4 for the difficulties with Cicero’s account of Epicureanism in De Finibus. Nikolsky (2001: 444) claims that Plutarch is prima facie a more reliable source than Cicero, but I believe we have no reason to believe this is true, especially given that Plutarch’s expressed intent is to be polemical. Plutarch’s hostile attitude is made plain by the title of his main work against Epicureanism, That Epicurus

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Actually Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible, and by the opening chapters of that work, where Plutarch and his interlocutors make jokes about their forthcoming rebuttal of Epicureanism. Plutarch exclaims to his comrades, “‘Oh!’ I said laughing, ‘You seem like you will leap upon the bellies of those men and make them run for their flesh’” (1087b). Of course, Cicero’s account is also polemical, but not prima facie more polemical than Plutarch’s. That said, Plutarch’s texts concerning Epicureanism have not sparked as much controversy nor caused as much confusion as Cicero’s De Finibus. I argue later that Plutarch’s account of Epicureanism is ultimately more accurate than Cicero’s; my point here is that we shouldn’t assume at the outset that this is the case. “Many of their arguments seem to me quite convincing and will be used in this article. The hypothesis advanced by Gosling and Taylor, who deny the authenticity of the division of pleasures, has not been properly appreciated. In my view, however, the possibilities of argumentation in its favour have not yet been exhausted” (Nikolsky 2001: 441n4). I look at this passage in detail in Chapter 7. I briefly mention it here in order to elucidate Gosling and Taylor’s view. The text of Cicero’s Latin translation of the quotation at Tusc. Disp. 3.41 is as follows: nec vero ita dici potest, mentis laetitiam solam esse in bonis. laetantem enim mentem ita novi: spe eorum omnium, quae supra dixi, fore ut natura iis potiens dolore careat. The English translation of the Latin is Graver’s (2002). Long and Sedley (1987: vol. 1, 117) translate similarly, as do Gosling and Taylor (1982: 368) with the exception of spe eorum omnium, which they translate as “hope of all those things . . .” rather than “expectation . . . of all those things.” Unless otherwise noted, the Latin text of all quotations from the Tusculan Disputations is from Pohlenz’s edition (1918). Gosling and Taylor 1982: 371. Gosling and Taylor 1982: 404–05. Gosling and Taylor 1982: 373. I address this problem in Gosling and Taylor’s account in more detail in Chapter 6. Nikolsky (2001: 449n35) claims he disagrees with Gosling and Taylor about one issue, namely, a translation of a passage from the Tusculan Disputations. Σαρκὸς φωνὴ τὸ μὴ πεινῆν, τὸ μὴ διψῆν, τὸ μὴ ῥιγοῦν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχων τις καὶ ἐλπίζων ἕξειν κἄν ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας μαχέσαιτο. καὶ μᾶζα καὶ ὕδωρ τὴν ἀκροτάτην ἀποδίδωσιν ἡδονήν, ἐπειδὰν ἐνδέων τις αὐτὰ προσενέγκηται. Plutarch Non Posse 1098c–d; Athenaeus Deipnosophistae 12.546f (227 A). Granted, Nikolsky (2001) does state, ambiguously, that the external force can “support” (447) or “ensure ‘the good state’ of the organism” (449), which may suggest that restoration is not the only link between a kinetic pleasure and a

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Notes katastematic one. I see two major problems with this move: first, nowhere does he explain what it would mean for an external force to “support” the good state of the organism; secondly, Nikolsky explicitly states that Epicurus’ general description of pleasure is in terms of the impact of a restorative force (453). According to Epicurus, we ought to pursue the objects of natural and necessary desires, an example of which, as provided by the scholiast to KD 29, is drinking when thirsty. We may also pursue natural and unnecessary desires, like costly food, as long as doing so does not bring us pain. But, naturally, the profligate does not mind the limit to pleasure, namely, the absence of pain, and overdoes it. Epicurus rejects outright the pursuit of unnatural desires, for example, the desire for fame. Philodemus mentions as examples of the “most alien desires” (τῶ[ν] ξε|νοτάτων) the desire for a brilliant reputation, sovereignty, and massive wealth (On Choices and Avoidances, PHerc. 1251, 5.2). Ὁταν οὖν λέγωμεν ἡδονὴν τέλος ὑπάρχειν . . . τὸ μήτε ἀλγεῖν κατὰ σῶμα μήτε ταράττεσθαι κατὰ ψυχήν. Ὁταν οὖν λέγωμεν ἡδονὴν τέλος ὑπάρχειν, οὐ τὰς τῶν ἀσώτων ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς ἐν ἀπολαύσει κειμένας λέγομεν, ὥς τινες ἀγνοοῦντες καὶ οὐχ ὁμολογοῦντες ἤ κακῶς ἐκδεχόμενοι νομίζουσιν. Σαρκὸς φωνὴ τὸ μὴ πεινῆν, τὸ μὴ διψῆν, τὸ μὴ ῥιγοῦν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχων τις καὶ ἐλπίζων ἕξειν κἄν ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας μαχέσαιτο. Lucretius explains being cold in terms of the disruption of the natural state also at DRN 4.256–64, where he describes the body being bashed about: “In this connection, you should not consider it strange that, although the images that impinge on our eyes are individually invisible, the objects themselves are visible. After all, when the wind whips us with fitful blasts, and when biting cold flows upon us, we do not feel the individual particles of wind or cold, but rather their combined effect; and we then perceive that blows are falling upon our body, just as if some external force were whipping us and giving us the sensation of its body.” The Epicureans believe that living things eventually disintegrate and die because they are constantly losing more particles than they can replenish and because particles hammer them with external blows. See DRN 2.1120–50 and 4.860ff. For the Cyrenaic complaint, see Diogenes Laertius’ doxography of Aristippus (DL 2.89). See Ad Men. 124. Although Epicureans claim that there is no neutral state between pleasure and pain, it is not the case that all pleasureless states are painful: for instance, death is both pleasureless and painless, since it involves no perception. This passage is often read as a description of kinetic pleasure since it refers to sensory pleasure. See Wolfsdorf 2013: 156. Note, however, that the passage does not obviously describe kinetic pleasure; it could just as easily describe katastematic pleasure. For related passages, see DRN 4.615–32 and 2.440–75.

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23 Translations of Non Posse are adapted from Einarson and De Lacy (1967), with many revisions. The Greek text is from Arrighetti’s second edition (22.3 A), unless otherwise noted. 24 Aulus Gellius gives an identical description: “Epicurus posits that pleasure is the summum bonum; however, he defines it thus: τὸ εὐσταθὲς κατάστημα τῆς σαρκός” (Noctium Atticarum 9.5.2 [68 U]). 25 εὐσταθεῖν μὲν γάρ ἐστι καὶ ὑγιαίνειν τῷ σώματι πολλάκις, πίστιν δὲ λαβεῖν περὶ τοῦ διαμένειν ἀμήχανον. 26 Plutarch may very well be right that confidence is something that is separable from and not identical to katastematic pleasure, but this is his own prejudice against the Epicurean position. Nevertheless, Plutarch’s objection is useful because it highlights the fact that Epicureans do consider confidence to be an essential part of mental katastematic pleasure, and confidence is something that requires conscious awareness. 27 I therefore agree with Long (1974: 64) when he says, “It is possible in English to speak of ‘enjoying’ good health, and we may also call this something gratifying or something a man rejoices in. Epicurus’ use of the word pleasure to describe the condition of those who enjoy good physical and mental health is not therefore purely arbitrary.” 28 Trans. Douglas (1990). 29 Although I am not concerned with the merits of this objection, Epicurus’ response to this sort of complaint is interesting nonetheless. Epicurus is clear that we do not have complete control over the future, as he states in the Letter to Menoeceus: “One must remember that the future is neither completely ours nor completely not ours, in order that we may not expect that it assuredly will be nor that we may despair that it will assuredly not be” (127). But even though the future is not entirely predictable, Epicurus believes that we can mitigate the risk of being vulnerable to misfortune. For instance, we can accustom ourselves to getting by on very little so that we will not suffer disappointment when we lack much, and we will be less likely to overindulge when faced with a bounty. Furthermore, we should understand that death will not be a painful experience (since it will not be an experience at all), the gods will not strike us down, and severe pain will not last long. By removing these fears, there is little of consequence left to worry about. So although Cicero and Plutarch might be right that misfortune may strike tomorrow, Epicurus would say that his philosophy provides effective damage control. 30 Admittedly, confidence is a tricky example of mental katastematic pleasure since in some sense confidence is a cause of painless mental functioning (e.g., if I have confidence, then I will not be beset by mental pains) and it is constituent of painless functioning itself (confidence just is a state of being without the mental pain of anxiety). Epicurus and those writing about Epicureanism, such as Plutarch, describe confidence both ways.

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31 See DL 10.137 and 2.8–90, and Diogenes of Oinoanda 38.1.8–3.14 (in Chilton 1971). 32 This difference between the schools is made clear in Diogenes Laertius’ account of Cyrenaic hedonism at 2.89: the Cyrenaics are said to have pointed out that bodily pains must be worse than mental ones because criminals are punished with the former rather than with the latter. Epicureans might respond that bodily punishment will of course be painful, but it might not be as bad as the dreadful expectation of the punishment and the disturbing memories that persist long after the physical punishment is over. 33 Wolfsdorf (2009: 224) frames this differently: “Indeed, for Epicurus perception and feeling are functions of the soul. Consequently, so-called somatic pleasures such as those of eating and drinking, which are or involve perceptions or feelings, are psychological. In this respect, the distinction between somatic and psychological pleasures collapses.” 34 See DRN 3.94–322, the scholium to DL 10.66, and Aetius 4.4.6 (315 U). 35 See Inwood 1990: 150 and Gosling and Taylor 1982: 462. 36 Stromata 2.21 (451 U): ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος πᾶσαν χαρὰν τῆς ψυχῆς οἴεται ἐπὶ πρωτοπαθούσῃ τῇ σαρκὶ γενέσθαι. 37 On this point see De Fin. 2.93. According to Cicero, it makes no sense to claim that severe pains will be short-lived unless the pains in question are of the sort that leads to death. See also Diogenes of Oinoanda fr. 47 (Smith). 38 Philodemus Pragmateiai 31.5–10 (78 A) and DL 10.22. 39 See KD 19, KD 20, and SV 42. 40 Trans. mine. Porphyry, To Marcella 31 (221 U, 247 Α). κενὸς ἐκείνου φιλοσόφου λόγος ὑφ᾽ οὗ μηδὲν πάθος ἀνθρώπου θεραπεύεται. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἰατρικῆς οὐδὲν ὄφελος εἰ μὴ τὰς νόσους τῶν σωμάτων θεραπεύει, οὕτως οὐδὲ φιλοσοφίας εἰ μὴ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκβάλλει πάθος. 41 Philodemus, On Frank Criticism, 17a (Konstan et al. 1998). 42 Philodemus’ medical model of therapy has been covered extensively in the literature. See especially Tsouna 2007: 60–68 and Nussbaum 1994: 102–39. I return to this topic in Chapter 6. 43 On the leaky jar metaphor in DRN, see especially 3.1003–10.

Chapter 6 1 See Bailey (1928) 1964: 492; Bignone 1936: 3–28; Long and Sedley 1987: 123; Mitsis 1988: 45–47; Morel 2009: 194–98; O’Keefe 2010: 119–20; Rosenbaum 1990: 24; and Warren 2016: 65–71. 2 As we saw in the previous chapter, Cicero is a proponent of such a view, as are many scholars. Along these lines, it has been argued (Purinton 1993: 282–87) that

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Epicurus formulates his notion of katastematic pleasure in response to the Cyrenaic conceptions of the telos and the nature of pleasure: “The telos is the smooth motion [τὴν λείαν κίνησιν] delivered to sensation” (DL 2.85). I do not deny that Epicurus was influenced by Cyrenaic doctrine and that he may have formulated his theory of pleasure with it in mind. However, I think we should avoid the conclusion that the Cyrenaics are the only group, or even the main group, by which Epicurus, in formulating his particular brand of hedonism, was influenced. I address the Cyrenaics later in this chapter and in Chapter 7. Nikolsky 2001: 452. Translations from Adversus Colotem are mine. Unless otherwise noted, the Greek text of Adversus Colotem is from Einarson and De Lacy (1967). Nikolsky 2001: 452. He draws our attention to Rist’s confusion about this passage. Rist, who believes that Plutarch is talking about kinetic as opposed to katastematic pleasure in the passage, sees no way to mesh the Epicurean argument that humans desire pleasure naturally as their good with what Rist believes is a description of kinetic pleasure, namely, “the agreeable movements of the flesh” (Rist 1972: 102n9). Rist concludes that Plutarch was simply mistaken: he should have referred to katastematic rather than kinetic pleasure. I agree with Nikolsky that the better conclusion is that Epicurus does not use the criterion of “agreeable movements of the flesh” to distinguish kinetic pleasure from the katastematic kind. Adversus Mathematicos 10.219 (164 A). Perhaps Epicurus is looking back to the flux theory of the Philebus (42d–43a). Purinton (1993: 304) shares their opinion: “Epicurus’ hedonism, so far as I can see, is entirely independent of his atomism.” Stokes (1995: 157–58) claims that even though the Epicureans believe all motions are atomic, there is nevertheless a place in their system for macroscopic motions: kinetic pleasures of restoration are best understood in terms of macroscopic movements of an organism toward satisfaction, whereas kinetic pleasures of sensory variation are indeed describable in terms of atomic motions (e.g., smooth motions of atoms interacting with the sense organs). “As for presence and absence of feelings, these are either pains or pleasures, and hence they are not substances, but accidents of those who feel pleasant or painful— and not timeless accidents.” Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 10.219–27 (164 A), trans. Long and Sedley (1987: vol. 1). “Therefore, apart from void and matter, no third constituent with a separate existence can be allowed to remain in the aggregate of things, such as might at any time be perceived by our senses or apprehended by the exercise of reason. You will find that all predicable things are either properties [coniuncta] or accidents [eventa] of matter and void. A property is what cannot under any circumstances be severed and separated from a body without the divorce involving destruction: such is the

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Notes relationship of heaviness to rocks, heat to fire, liquidity to water, touch to all matter, intangibility to void. On the other hand, to slavery, poverty and wealth, freedom, war, concord, and all other things whose coming and going does not impair the essential nature of a thing, we regularly apply the appropriate term accidents” (DRN 1.445–58). See, for instance, Rist 1972: 102. Glidden (1980: 184) claims, “And his [Epicurus’] confidence in our ability to detect the feelings, or pathē, of pleasure and pain does not rest on the certainty of a Cartesian self-consciousness, but rather on the material identity of these pathē with atomic motions in our bodies, understanding these psychophysical experiences, with Freud, in mechanical terms.” Others have disagreed. Mitsis (1988: 46n93), for instance, argues that Epicurean pleasure cannot be understood as a strictly atomic phenomenon, for there are features of pleasure that require an explanation in terms of our subjective states, intentions, and wants. For additional problems with such a view, see Wolfsdorf (2013: 154), who argues that it makes no sense to characterize the ‘smoothness’ of pleasure as the uniformity of atomic motions, since even uniform motions can be painful (e.g., having one’s limbs gradually torn from one’s body). DRN 4.664–70, where Lucretius associates pain with the dislocation of atoms from their natural positions, is also helpful: “Thus when fever has assailed someone through excess of bile, or when a violent disease has been provoked by some other cause, the whole body is at once disordered and the positions of the principal elements are all changed [perturbatur ibi iam totum corpus et omnes / commutantur ibi positurae principiorum]. Consequently, the particles that previously suited the person’s taste are now unsuitable to it; others are more appropriate, and these are able to penetrate and produce a bitter sensation” (DRN 4.664–70, trans. modified). καὶ μᾶζα καὶ ὕδωρ τὴν ἀκροτάτην ἀποδίδωσιν ἡδονήν, ἐπειδὰν ἐνδέων τις αὐτὰ προσενέγκηται. A similar statement is reported by Stobaeus (Anthology 3.17.33, 124 A): “I revel in the pleasure of my poor body, employing water and bread [βρυάζω τῷ κατὰ τὸ σωμάτιον ἡδεῖ, ὕδατι καὶ ἄρτῳ χρώμενος]. And I spit upon the pleasures of great expense, not on account of themselves, but rather on account of the difficulties that result from them” (trans. mine). Wolfsdorf 2009: 252. “[Epicurus] means any nutritious diet, regardless of its refinement, will restore the nutritive faculties to their katastematic condition, which is the highest possible pleasure” (Wolfsdorf 2009: 252). Konstan claims that any pleasure experienced in the process of being restored “derives from the partially replenished state of the organ in question” rather than from the process of replenishment itself (2012: 15). During the process of emptying and filling, “the pleasure never dwindles to zero” (2012: 15). However, he provides no evidence for this view, and even if it were correct, it would mean that we would be in katastematic pleasure all the time, which does not seem to be Epicurus’ view.

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18 Since I think Epicurus believes that processes of restoration are not pleasant independently of our conscious awareness of them, then technically I agree with Rist’s claim (1974: 173) that in the works of Epicurus “pleasure is never identified as a restoration (κατάστασις) or as a process (γένεσις).” However, Rist means that Epicurus does not associate pleasure with processes of restoration at all, a view with which I do disagree. Rist believes that Epicurus, like Aristotle, holds that pleasure is complete in every moment, and that both thinkers divide pleasures into those ‘in rest’ (ἐν ἠρεμίᾳ) and those ‘in motion’ (ἐν κινήσει). Long (1974: 62) also believes that Epicurus follows the Aristotelian division. 19 For an extensive account of the theory and practice of Philodemus’ therapy, see Tsouna 2007. On therapeutic models employed across several ancient philosophical schools, see Nussbaum 1994. 20 Tsouna 2007: 80–87. 21 Comprehensive analysis of the many varieties of fear of death and their respective treatments can be found in Tsouna 2007: 239–311 and Warren 2004. 22 Trans. Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan 1995. 23 In this I agree with Morel (2009: 198): “Seuls les plaisirs catastématiques sont parfaitement indépendants de toute douleur antécédente, et seuls ils sont identifiables au telos.” 24 See Diano 1974: 23–128; Giannantoni 1984: 39–41; Konstan 2012: 13–17; Purinton 1993: 304–07; Rist 1974: 173–74; Wolfsdorf 2009: 243–53 and 2013: 152–63. Erler and Schofield (2005: 655) seem to hedge their bets: “Perhaps Epicurus himself never indicated how he would classify pleasures of restoration of the body’s natural state: understandably, if the main thrust of the distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasures was to insist that there is another form of pleasure beside kinetic pleasure understood as Aristippus had defined it.” 25 Ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις. ὅπου δ᾽ ἂν τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐνῇ, καθ᾽ ὃν ἄν χρόνον ᾖ, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἢ λυπούμενον ἤ τὸ συναμφότερον. 26 Purinton (1993: 306), drawing on Rist and Diano, argues, “Hence, wherever there is kinetic pleasure (e.g., in the tongue as one chews), there is no pain. But painlessness is a katastematic pleasure. So, wherever there is kinetic pleasure, there is also katastematic pleasure.” Giovacchini’s view (2008: 70) is similar: “La ‘chatouille’ agréable n’est pour les épicuriens qu’un plaisir de second ordre, qui ne peut être ressenti que lorsque le corps est déjà exempt de douleurs . . . .” See also Diano 1935: 260–66 and Rist 1972: 110–11. Incidentally, they go along with Cicero in defining kinetic pleasure as sensory variation. See also Maso (2015: 152–62), who draws heavily on Diano; Wolfsdorf 2013: 162, 170; and Wolfsdorf 2009: 246–53. 27 Even Rist’s position (1972: 110–11) requires this: “Similarly when Epicurus said on his last day that, although his bodily pains were now intense, yet he was still enjoying happiness, he must have meant, in terms of the atomic theory,

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Notes that, although he was suffering in some of his bodily structures, yet the atomic compounds in his mind and in the rest of his body, the vast majority, that is, of his atomic structures, were free from pain and thus enjoying the supreme happiness.” Rist, who denies the coexistence of pleasure and pain, admits that pleasure can be present in the face of pain. So, since pleasure and pain cannot coexist, any disturbance that is present, no matter how insignificant, must not be perceived. This explanation parallels Purinton’s (1993: 293–94) in a way: “[Epicurus] advises us to endure pains by focusing our minds elsewhere, implying that we can become oblivious to our pains without implying that these pains are made thereby to cease to exist.” The main difference between our positions is that he believes it is pains that can go unperceived, whereas I hold that it is disturbances. Regarding KD 3 and Epicurus’ take on the sage’s pain, Rist (1972: 111) argues that “the two statements can be fitted together only if we realize that the happiness of the wise man is the happiness of the largest groups of his bodily and especially of his mental constituents, while the pain is experienced in atomic structures composed of smaller numbers of atoms.” This view, however, does not solve the problem, for we still have pleasure coexisting with pain—just very little pain alongside a lot of pleasure. τὸ δὲ μόνον ὑπερτεῖνον τὸ ἡδόμενον κατὰ σάρκα οὐ πολλὰς ἡμέρας συμβαίνει αἱ δὲ πολυχρόνιοι τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν πλεονάζον ἔχουσι τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἤπερ τὸ ἀλγοῦν. In this sense, his ἀταραξία is more essential to his happiness than his ἀπονία, meaning that he can be happy even without ἀπονία. However, as I discussed in Chapter 5, the mind’s painlessness is likely to be temporary without some assurance that the body will be pain-free in the future. This leads one to wonder whether the sage can ever lose his ἀταραξία. A discussion of this here would be a digression, but there is evidence, albeit from De Finibus, that Epicureans believe rational suicide is an acceptable option for the wise man who can no longer fend off pain. Cf. De Fin. 1.49 and 1.62. I owe this objection to Tim O’Keefe. I thus agree with Striker when she claims, “The contrast is not between different types of pleasures, but rather between different conceptions of the greatest pleasure—the misguided one of the luxury-seekers and the correct one of the Epicureans. Even the profligates are ultimately seeking freedom from pain and trouble, according to Epicurus; they just have the wrong idea about how this is to be achieved” (1996b: 205). An anonymous referee suggests that empty desires do produce pleasure as a result of remedying some deficiency (e.g., one’s feeling that one needs fame), but the deficiency itself is unnatural. The goal of Epicurean therapy is to remove the belief that the deficiency is worth remedying. I think this is consistent with

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my interpretation of empty desires, but I would add that there is nevertheless something healthy about remedying unnatural deficiencies, since one does temporarily alleviate a present pain. But, Epicureans want to distinguish between a temporarily healthy moment and long-term health; the latter is the goal and is based on correct decisions about what will bring more pleasure than pain in the long run. One might object that it makes no sense to say that a pleasure (such as that of fame) is both unnatural and healthy (even if only temporarily), but I would respond that according to Epicureans what is unnatural is the desire, not the pleasure. Annas 1993: 190–96. Philodemus, On Anger, cols. 37–42, in Indelli (1988). See KD 7. For more on the desire for safety as natural and necessary, see Austin 2012: 109–29. On Choices and Avoidances, PHerc. 1251, 5. 2. See, for instance, DL 10.136–37 and 2.89–90; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 2.21 (450 U). For this objection, see Erler and Schofield 2005: 654–55; Purinton 1993: 305; and Wolfsdorf 2013: 160. Purinton 1993: 305. Interestingly, Konstan goes on to deny that Epicureans recognize pleasures of restoration (2012: 14–15). Long and Sedley 1987: vol. 1, 123: “Epicurus plainly recognized that we derive pleasure from the process of satisfying desires, i.e., removing pains. What he is anxious to combat is the Cyrenaic thesis that a truly pleasurable life consists solely in a constant succession of such enjoyments.” Giovacchini (2008: 70) claims that the Cyrenaics believe pleasant stimulations counterbalance painful ones: “Ceux-ci font également du plaisir l’objet principal de l’existence et la condition du bonheur; mais tandis que les Cyrénaïques conçoivent le plaisir comme un ébranlement du corps, obtenu grâce à des stimulations, qui vient contrebalancer le mouvement de la douleur, les épicuriens en font la conséquence de l’état de bonne santé et de bon équilibre du composé âme-corps.” However, she thinks the Epicurean response to the Cyrenaic position is that sensory pleasures presuppose no pain, which is inconsistent with my view that Epicurus recognizes pleasures that are mixed with pain (i.e., restorative pleasures). Erler and Schofield 1999: 654–55. On their view, the Cyrenaics’ term “pleasure in motion” implies sensory variation rather than a process of replenishment, but they provide no evidence to support this. This is affirmed by Long and Sedley (1987: vol. 2, 125): “The pleasure of taste is obviously not something that is registered by the stomach; but the removal of hunger pain from the stomach would not be something registered by the palate.

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Notes nulla voluptas, 629, should mean no pleasure of taste, which is Lucretius’ topic here. It implies nothing about the pleasure of actually replenishing one’s stomach, to which taste makes no difference, 630-2.” See especially Purinton 1993: 305 and Wolfsdorf 2013: 161–62. Purinton 1993: 305–06. See, for instance, Striker 1996: 206. I read ἐνεργείᾳ with Arrighetti (7 A). Long and Sedley emend to ἐνέργειαι (1987: vol. 2, 124–25), such that the relevant clause reads, “joy and delight are regarded as kinetic activities” (1987: vol. 1, 118). Purinton (1993: 288n11) argues against the emendation. See also Wolfsdorf ’s (2009: 237–39) detailed discussion of the complexities of the passage. Long and Sedley leave κίνησιν as ‘kinetic’ and translate καταστηματικαί as ‘static’ (1987: vol. 1, 118). Inwood and Gerson (1994) translate κίνησιν and καταστηματικαί as ‘kinetic’ and ‘katastematic.’ But see Giannantoni (1984: 28), who points out that the passage does not actually say that joy and gladness of mind are pleasures; it says only that they are κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται. He suggests that Epicurus may have been trying to make a polemical point against those who think the highest pleasures are found in joy and intellectual achievement. Giannantoni claims that Epicurus might have had Aristotle’s Protrepticus in mind. Most scholars read the examples this way (see in particular Long and Sedley 1987: vol. 1, 125). Gosling and Taylor (1982) and Nikolsky (2001) are the exceptions, as I discuss in what follows. See Gosling and Taylor (1982: 386–87), whose view on this point I support. Although I do not think this passage from Cicero is a correct description of Epicurean pleasure, the claim that katastematic pleasure is associated with joy is corroborated by Plutarch. The letter is found among the works of Diogenes of Oinoanda, Smith 1993, fr. 125 (Chilton 1971: 52; 72 A, lines 38–40): ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ζῶμεν, ὁμοίως τοῖς θεοῖς χαίρομεν. For discussion of the authorship of this letter, see Smith (1993: 555–58). In KD 1 Epicurus says, “A blessed and eternal being neither has troubles himself nor gives them to another” (τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει). Lucretius writes about the need to reject false beliefs about the gods and to understand that the gods experience utter tranquility: “Unless you expel such notions from your mind and put far from you all thoughts unworthy of the gods and incompatible with their peace, their sacred persons, thus disparaged by you, will often do you harm” (quae nisi respuis ex animo longeque remittis // dis indigna putare alienaque pacis eorum, // delibata deum per te tibi numina sancta // saepa oberunt, DRN 6.68–71). A few lines later he refers to the gods as “those calm beings blessed with placid peace” (placida cum pace quietos, 6.73). See also DL

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10.121, where we are told that the gods’ pleasure does not increase or decrease, a feature I have argued belongs to katastematic pleasure, which cannot be increased but only varied: τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν διχῇ νοεῖσθαι· τήν τε ἀκροτάτην, οἵα ἐστὶ περὶ τὸν θεόν, ἐπίτασιν οὐκ ἔχουσαν, καὶ τὴν προσθήκην καὶ ἀφαίρεσιν ἡδονῶν. Thus, I do not agree with Maso (2015: 157n18) that joy is connected to bodily rather than mental pleasure. I therefore disagree with Diano’s assertion (1974: 129–280) that joy always designates kinetic pleasure. In my opinion, that assertion is contradicted by the passages I mention. Morel (2009: 196) claims that joy is a mental pleasure that follows moments of fear or anguish, and he compares it to the pleasure of drinking when thirsty. This comparison suggests that Morel thinks Epicurean joy is experienced in the process of removing anxiety, just as pleasure is experienced in the process of removing thirst; however, he does not explain how this would work in the case of joy. “And when he reports to Idomeneus of his last day (fr. 138 Us = fr. 153 Diano), he writes that his bodily pains are counteracted by τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον” (Merlan 1960: 14n5). Philodemus Pragmateiai 31.5–10 (78 A). ἑβδόμη[ι] γὰρ ἡμέραι, φησίν, ὅτε ταῦτ᾽ ἔγραφον, οὐχὶ ἀπο[κεχ]ώρ[η]κεν κα[τὰ] τὴν οὔρησιν [ἐ]μοὶ οὐθέν, καὶ ἀλγηδόνες ἐνῆσαν τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν τελευταίαν ἡμέραν ἀγουσῶν. This passage is also reported by Diogenes Laertius (10.22). Incidentally, I believe this passage is one of the main reasons the view of Diano, Rist, et al., that kinetic pleasure depends on katastematic pleasure, is flawed; on his deathbed, Epicurus has lost a large chunk of his katastematic pleasure, yet he is able to experience kinetic pleasure. Gosling and Taylor comment on the passage’s wording, noting the strangeness of a single quotation attributed to two authors and appearing in the genitive absolute. Because of this odd grammatical construction, they interpret the passage in a way that avoids attributing it to anyone. Nikolsky 2001: 456. He thinks ἐνεργείᾳ in the passage indicates an “activity of the soul responding to the states of ἀπονία and ἀταραξία” (2001: 456). He reports a historical precedent for such a reading: Plato thinks pleasure is a motion of the soul, calling it joy (cf. Rep. 583e), and Aristotle similarly considers pleasure to be a psychic motion (cf. Rhetoric 1369b33-1370a1). Purinton 1993: 284–87. In support of his reading he cites several lines from Plutarch’s Non Posse (1089d; 1091a–b), including a quote reported therein from Epicurus’ lost work On the Telos, where pleasure appears to be equated with the object of joy, or, stated differently, with what provides joy. He also cites a passage from Cicero’s De Finibus (1.37), where Torquatus reports Epicurus’ argument for

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Notes the equation of painlessness and pleasure and remarks, “Everything in which one takes delight is a pleasure” (omne autem id, quo gaudemus, voluptas est). Purinton believes that we should “assume that Cicero has Torquatus accurately report Epicurus’ argument for the thesis that painlessness is a pleasure” (285), since “Cicero promises to provide as accurate an account of the Epicurean position as any presented by the Epicureans themselves. It would be surprising, then, if he then proceeded to have Torquatus formulate so fundamental an argument incorrectly” (284). In addition, he cites Clement of Alexandria (Stromata 2.21.130 = 451 U), who reports that the Epicureans rejoice in pleasure. Purinton 1993: 291n20. “Joy and delight in motion” is Purinton’s translation of χαρά καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν. I express my reservations about Purinton’s reading of DL 10.136 in particular above, but I also have several misgivings about his interpretation of Epicurean joy in general. I am concerned that Purinton’s analysis involves very little material from Epicureans themselves and instead relies mainly on passages from Cicero, Plutarch, and other non-Epicureans. This is particularly troublesome since the quotation reported at DL 10.136 contributes nothing to Purinton’s claim that Epicurus does not consider joy to be a pleasure; this point is read into the passage from other sources. In this group are, notably, Annas and Rist. Annas (1993: 336n9) writes, “Unfortunately the clause that should give us examples of kinetic pleasures seems to give us the wrong examples. The claim of the first clause is unaffected, however.” Although she recognizes a problem, she does not offer a way to make sense of the examples of kinetic pleasure. Rist (1972: 103n3) goes the same route: “There is a textual problem and a slight inconsistency in Diogenes’ account of pleasure in 10.136, but the meaning is clear enough.” There is an interesting problem with εὐφροσύνη in DL 10.136, having to do with how Epicurus’ examples map onto his schema of bodily and mental pleasures. In the passage, Epicurus lists ἀταραξία and ἀπονία as examples of mental and bodily pleasures, respectively, and one assumes that the examples of kinetic pleasure follow suit, such that χαρά is the mental and εὐφροσύνη the bodily example of kinetic pleasure. However, some have noted that εὐφροσύνη is normally used to indicate mental rather than bodily pleasure. Nevertheless, other scholars claim that εὐφροσύνη is a kinetic bodily pleasure. Merlan (1960: 6), for example, writes, “It is true that some scholars interpret εὐφροσύνη as designating corporeal pleasure. Such an interpretation can be hardly ruled out.” According to Merlan, Prodicus, who claims in Plato’s Protagoras (337c) that εὐφροσύνη should designate only mental pleasures, might have so insisted if it was common practice to consider εὐφροσύνη as both a mental and a bodily pleasure. Wolfsdorf (2009: 233), drawing on Diogenes of Oinoanda, argues that εὐφροσύνη is a bodily pleasure in DL 10.136,

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and that “Plato is the only author prior to Epicurus who uses ‘εὐφροσύνη’ to refer to rational pleasures.” Bignone too holds that εὐφροσύνη is a bodily pleasure ([1936] 1973: 291–328). Others have commented that εὐφροσύνη probably only describes mental pleasure, given its derivation from φρήν, the heart or seat of thought. For more on this problem, see Diano 1974: 179; Nikolsky 2001: 455; and Wolfsdorf 2009: 226–37. 72 In this I agree with Purinton 1993: 290n17. 73 Theon explains that what properly deserves to be considered εὐφροσύνη and χαρά is pure of the taint of its opposite and involves no element of pain or regret. 74 Purinton (1993: 290n17) has an extensive list of additional passages along these lines, for example, DL 10.120; Diogenes of Oinoanda, fr. 43 Smith (1993); Athenaeus Deipnosophistae 12.513a-b; and Hippolytus (359 U).

Chapter 7 1 See Chapter 6 for my analysis of other scholars’ views on kinetic pleasure. 2 The precise nature of kinetic and katastematic pleasure is difficult to work out in Nikolsky’s interpretation, however, since he denies that the Epicureans make any distinction between them. Gosling and Taylor claim there is a distinction, but they deny that it is important to Epicurean hedonism. Since I think Epicurus does distinguish between kinetic and katastematic pleasure, my views in this chapter are closer to those of Gosling and Taylor than to those of Nikolsky. See Chapter 5 of this volume for my evaluation of their overall interpretations of Epicurean pleasure. 3 See Purinton 1993: 305–06 and Striker 1996b: 206. 4 O’Keefe concurs (2010: 119–20): “Bodily kinetic pleasures are associated with some sort of active titillation of the senses, for example the savoury, greasy taste of a sausage slathered with mustard as it caresses my tongue. They also seem to be associated with the process of satisfying some desire. For example, I am hungry, and this hunger is painful. But then, as I chew the sausage and swallow it, I am in the process of satisfying my desire for food and replenishing myself, and this process would be a bodily kinetic pleasure.” He explores, but does not reject, the alternative view I present in this chapter. See also Sedley (1998: 130): “Kinetic pleasure is the process of stimulation by which you either arrive at static pleasure, such as by drinking when thirsty, or ‘vary’ it, such as by drinking when not thirsty.” 5 For more on this, see my discussion in Chapter 4 of Warren’s view of kinetic pleasure in De Finibus. 6 Cooper’s reading is problematic for the reason I discuss here, but it is also problematic because non-restorative pleasures are not ‘in motion’ in the same way that restorative ones are, yet Cooper groups both kinds under the umbrella of ‘in

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Notes movement.’ As he notes, the non-restorative pleasures are ways in which “we vary our constitutional pleasure when in the pain- and distress-free state,” whereas the restorative ones occur alongside pains (1999: 513). Thus, Cooper’s interpretation has the same problem as Long and Sedley’s: nothing unifies all pleasures in the kinetic class. Long and Sedley 1987: vol. 1, 123. ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἐν κινήσει, τὰ δὲ ἐν σχέσει. ἐν κινήσει μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, χαράν, εὐφροσύνην, σώφρονα ὁμιλίαν∙ ἐν σχέσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, εὔτακτον ἡσυχίαν, μονὴν ἀτάραχον, προσοχὴν ἔπανδρον (Anthology, vol. 2, 73.1–4 Wachsmuth and Hense, trans. Long and Sedley). Although I argued earlier that the Epicureans believe joy can be restorative, they do not present joy as an obvious example of a restorative pleasure, as the Stoics would have to be doing here if the passage concerns restorative pleasure. DL 7.116. In the same passage, however, Diogenes Laertius reports that the Stoics claim that joy is opposed to pleasure. Nevertheless, the examples of joy and delight are striking, since Diogenes reports that the Epicureans consider them to be kinetic (DL 10.136). Cicero claims that the description of such pleasures appears “in that very book which contains the whole of your teaching” (Tusc. Disp. 3.41). Normally, this would mean On Nature, which is listed first in Diogenes Laertius’ record of Epicurus’ works and is said to have totaled thirty-seven books (see DL 10.27). However, as I mention in a note below, a shorter version of the description of the highest good at Tusc Disp. 3.41 is said to have appeared in Epicurus’ On the Telos. Perhaps by “that very book which contains the whole of your teaching” Cicero is referring only to ethical teachings, which means he probably has in mind On the Telos. Cicero says, “for I will now turn myself into a translator, so that no one will think I invented this” (Tusc. Disp. 3.41). The Latin text is from Long and Sedley 1987: vol. 2, 122. Trans. Graver, modified. Deipnosophistae 12.546e (22.1 A). Athenaeus’ version includes the following: καὶ τὰς διὰ μορφῆς κατ᾽ ὄψιν ἡδείας κινήσεις. See another version given by Athenaeus at Deipnosophistae 7.278f (67 U). DL 10.6: “I do not know how to conceive of the good if I take away the pleasures of taste, if I take away sexual pleasures, pleasures of hearing, and pleasures of form.” This fact is interesting because it is clear from the Tusculan Disputations that Cicero is aware of both parts. Nikolsky (2001: 448–49) makes much of the omission: in his mind, it shows that Cicero has Epicurus wrong and that we should not base interpretations of Epicurean ethics on Cicero’s testimony in De Finibus. It could be argued that Epicurus’ statement about the importance of pleasures of taste, sex, etc., to the good life is an epistemological point; that is, Epicurus means

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he is able to know the highest good through these kinds of pleasures, not necessarily that they are the highest good. (I am indebted to the late Steve Strange for this point.) I agree that the statement may be making an epistemological point, but I do not think Epicurus is making the stronger point that we know of the highest good only through these sorts of pleasures. As I argue in this section, non-restorative pleasures can be ways in which we experience the healthy, painless functioning of the organism, but we can be aware of painless functioning in an additional way, namely, when we perceive the organism’s healthy functioning on its own. I argued earlier based on SV 33 that Epicurus believes we experience healthy functioning when we perceive that our organism is not disturbed. Therefore, I think Epicurus may be making an epistemological point in his statement about pleasures of taste, sex, etc., but we should not take him to mean that these are the only experiences through which we can perceive the highest good. 19 Epicurean views on sex are complicated. Diogenes Laertius reports that Epicureans claim, “intercourse never benefited anyone, and one must be content if it did no harm” (DL 10.118). But this might not mean that Epicurus disapproves of sex itself. Rather, it could mean that he disapproves of the troubles he believes are brought on by romantic love, such as making oneself vulnerable by becoming dependent on sexual enjoyment, neglecting other duties, etc. Lucretius speaks disparagingly of romantic love but does not claim there is anything inherently harmful about sexual intercourse itself. In fact, Lucretius recommends casual sex as an outlet for sexual desire: “You should ejaculate the accumulated fluid into any woman’s body rather than reserve it for a single lover who monopolizes you and thus involve yourself in inevitable anxiety and anguish” (DRN 4.1065–67). For more on the complexities of Epicurean sex lives, see Arenson 2016: 291–311. 20 Οὐ βιαστέον τὴν φύσιν ἀλλὰ πειστέον· πείσομεν δὲ τὰς ἀναγκαίας ἐπιθυμίας ἐκπληροῦντες, τάς τε φυσικὰς ἂν μὴ βλάπτωσι, τὰς δὲ βλαβερὰς πικρῶς ἐλέγχοντες. 21 I therefore disagree with the view that only kinetic pleasures are associated with the satisfaction of natural, non-necessary desires (see, e.g., Giannantoni 1984: 40–44 and Konstan 2012: 16). On my view, the division between kinetic and katastematic pleasure does not cut cleanly across Epicurus’ taxonomy of desires (against Giannantoni’s claim that “il sistema dei piaceri diventa perfettamente simmetrico a quello dei desideri” [1984: 44]). Kinetic pleasures are mixed with pain, as are satisfactions of some necessary desires and some non-necessary desires; katastematic pleasures are painless, as are satisfactions of some necessary desires and some non-necessary desires. However, one might wonder how the satisfaction of a necessary desire can be painless. The answer lies in the fact that we can desire something that is important for our continued well-being even if we currently have the thing we desire. This is exemplified by the following case of the desire for friendship: if I already have friends who keep me safe and happy, I may desire to

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Notes retain them, but my desire does not stem from a lack of safety or companionship. On the other hand, if I desire friends because I’m lonely and I currently fear for my safety, then my desire is mixed with pain. In the former case, the pleasure is katastematic and satisfies a necessary need; in the latter case, the pleasure is kinetic and also satisfies a necessary need. This explanation might be unsatisfying because it seems to put kinetic pleasures on the same plane as katastematic pleasures insofar as both are satisfactions of natural needs, but I think the Epicureans would respond that the katastematic pleasure is preferable to the kinetic one because the former is not mixed with pain. For the many complexities concerning the Epicurean taxonomy of desires, see Annas 1993: 188–200. KD 29: “Epicurus regards as natural and necessary those which bring relief from pain, like drink during thirst; while he regards as natural but not necessary those that only vary the pleasure without removing the pain, like very expensive food; he regards as neither natural nor necessary those like desires for crowns and statues erected for oneself.” Plutarch ad aud. poet. 37a (144 A), trans. mine. Wolfsdorf 2009: 246. Purinton (1993: 303) brings up this point in order to refute Gosling and Taylor’s interpretation. Purinton (1993: 303) reads the passage with the ‘kinetic’/’katastematic’ language built into it: “Torquatus says . . . ‘we rejoice in the removal of pains, even if that pleasure which moves the senses does not follow,’ i.e., even if the painless state is not varied by any kinetic pleasure.” Note, however, that the passage makes no mention of kinetic versus katastematic pleasures; it describes pleasures in terms of the presence or absence of sensory arousal. De Fin. 1.38: “For whoever is perceiving how he is feeling must be either in pleasure or in pain.” See Ad Men. 124: Συνέθιζε δὲ ἐν τῷ νομίζειν μηδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἶναι τὸν θάνατον· ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ἐν αἰσθήσει. See also Ad Hdt. 64–66 and KD 2. Diogenes of Oinoanda reports that when pain is removed pleasure does immediately follow: “When the feelings that disturb the soul have been removed, pleasant things are supplied in turn (τῶν ὀχλούντων τὴν ψυχὴν παθῶν ὑπεξαιρεθέντων τὰ ἥδοντα αὐτὴν ἀντιπαρέρχεται)” (Smith 1993: fr. 34, trans. mine). See Purinton 1993: 205; Rist 1972: 106–08, 170; and Wolfsdorf 2013: 161–62. De Fin. 1.38: “But Epicurus believes that the privation of all pain is the ultimate limit of pleasure. After that, pleasure can be varied and separated, but it cannot be increased or expanded” (omnis autem privatione doloris putat Epicurus terminari summam voluptatem, ut postea variari voluptas distinguique possit, augeri amplificarique non possit). Note that mention of ‘kinds’ of pleasure is not made in the Latin or in the original Greek of KD 18, from which Cicero is presumably drawing this statement. Compare

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Woolf ’s translation of De Fin. 2.10: “Once all pain is removed, pleasure can vary in kind but not be increased.” Gorgias 491e5ff. On this point see also Morel 2009: 186. In KD 18, ἡ ἡδονή is varied; at De Fin. 1.38 it is voluptas; and in Non Posse, Plutarch uses the singular when reporting Epicurus’ views: “For nature increases pleasure [τὸ ἡδύ] as far as doing away with pain, and it does not force pleasure to go on further in magnitude, but rather the pleasure, when there is no pain, admits of some unnecessary variations” (1088c). Although I agree with Cooper’s reading of KD 18, I am skeptical of his general reading of Epicurean pleasure. According to Cooper (1999: 512), kinetic and katastematic pleasure are not different phenomena: “The distinction between pleasures ‘in movement’ and katastematic pleasure is a distinction based on the objects or causes of that phenomenon under different conditions, not a distinction of kind at all within the phenomenon in question itself.” On Cooper’s reading, Epicurus understands all pleasure to be “a certain state of consciousness or perception”; in other words, pleasure is the delightful perception that we are free from pain, so pleasure is not the absence of pain as such (511). The greatest Epicurean pleasure is found in what follows the absence of pain, which Cooper calls “pleasurable consciousness.” In my opinion, this leaves unanswered the question of what counts as “pleasurable consciousness.” Furthermore, the claim that pleasure is just a belief about one’s bodily and mental situation merely avoids, rather than sorts out, Epicurus’ important notion of the absence of pain. We should keep in mind that Cooper considers the activities “of our various capacities of mind and body” to be “in motion,” that is, kinetic. (See my criticism of his view earlier in this chapter.) I think they are katastematic. Rist 1972: 114–15. See also Wolfsdorf (2013: 162), who denies that katastematic pleasures can vary. Ἐπίκουρος οὕτω κατεπύκνου τὴν ἡδονήν, ἐμασᾶτ᾽ ἐπιμελῶς. Damoxenus, fr. 2 Kock (Rist 1972: 114). τὸ τῆς σαρκὸς ἀόχλητον. Alciphron Epistularum 3.55.8 (432 U). See Bollack 1975: 267–72. For manuscript sources, see Arrighetti 1973: 123. Long and Sedley (1987: vol. 2, 118) agree with Gosling and Taylor that KD 9 is not saying pleasure is homogeneous. See Purinton 1993: 298 and Tsouna 2007: 16. Evidence of Cyrenaic presentism can be found especially in Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae 544a–b, and Aelias, Varia Historia 14.6. For discussion of the disparities between these two passages, see Lampe 2015: 64–73. The Greek text is from Tepedino Guerra (1987: 86), who argues that the passage is from Epicurus’ On the Telos. Arrighetti (73 A) and Usener (146 U), however, believe it is a letter from Epicurus to Metrodorus.

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46 Tsouna (2007: 16), for instance, claims, “The ideal Epicurean is a person who lives in a stable and joyful condition, not in a swirl of kinetic pleasures. Indeed, Philodemus attributes to Epicurus a related belief. On the one hand, our active enjoyment of life depends on our continuing capacity to savour and store memories of bodily pleasures (De Epic.; PHerc. 1232, XVIII.10–17); on the other hand, the sage would not be in a position to do so if his mind were not untroubled in the first place.” See also Purinton 1993: 298–99. 47 See DL 10.136 and my discussion of it in Chapter 6. 48 I assume, along with Indelli and Tsouna, that Philodemus is probably the author of On Choices and Avoidances. For their arguments in favor of attributing the text to him and more on the views Philodemus reports in the first three columns of On Choices and Avoidances, see Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan 1995: 61–70, 113–26. 49 De elect. 2.13–14, trans. Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan (1995). 50 For further discussion of Epicurus’ critique in this passage of the anti-rationalism of the Cyrenaics, see Warren 2014: 205–06. On this point see also Giannantoni, who claims that the main disagreement between the Cyrenaics and Epicureans concerns mental versus bodily pleasures, not kinetic versus katastematic ones (1984: 30). 51 De Dis 3, fr. 77 Diels (1917); De Dis 3, col. 13, 36–39 Diels. 52 De Dis 3, fr. 84, 1–4 Diels (1917): αὐτοὺς λε[. .] ἀλλήλων [. . . . . . . . κ]αθ᾽ ὅσον [τ]ὰς ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων κομίζ[ον]ται χρείας ἃς εἰ μὴ ἀπελάμβανον, οὐκ ἂν ἦσαν τέλειοι κατ᾽ εὐδαιμονίαν. 53 Rist 1972: 154. 54 See KD 1, where the gods are said to be without trouble (πράγματα). Lucretius adds a similar description at DRN 3.18–24. Diogenes of Oinoanda claims that the gods “are in need of nothing” (μηδ[ενὸς ἐνδεὲς] ὄν) and are “tranquil” (ἡσυχάσας), which suggests that they do not need to rely on things outside of themselves to add to their happiness (NF 127.4, Smith 2003: 81–82). 55 Merlan 1960: 17–18. See Chapter 6 for the evidence that the gods’ pleasure is katastematic. 56 Trans. Smith (1993). 57 Smith 1993, Fr. 33: ἀλλὰ μὴν πάραυ[τ]α ἡ πρᾶ[ξ]ις [ἀ]ν[ύ]τει ταύ[τας τὰς] ἡδονὰς ἡμεῖν, [οὐ] τὸ ἐσόμ[ε]νον [μένουσα.

Chapter 8 1 The term ‘unmixed’ appears in KD 12: “And so, without an inquiry into nature there was not the taking of unmixed pleasures” (ὥστε οὐκ ἦν ἄνευ φυσιολογίας ἀκεραίους τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀπολαμβάνειν). 2 “One worry we should have about Epicurus . . . is his insistence on sensory pleasure as playing a vital role but defining pleasure in terms of aponia. . . . In doing so he

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203

seems to be making the same mistake as Plato made in the Republic and Philebus but drawing the opposite moral” (Urmson 1984: 219). There are few treatments of the influence of the Republic, Philebus, and the ancient debates concerning the Philebus on Epicurus’ hedonism. Frede and Striker’s suggestions, which I discuss here, appear in footnotes to their works and are not developed. Gosling and Taylor (1982: 373–74) and Nikolsky (2001: 446) take the Platonic connections seriously, but their interpretations are problematic. Frede 1997: 273n83. Striker is skeptical of this position, but she notes that it is possible. See KD 18, 19, and 20. NE 1154b22ff. Rist (1972: 102) claims, “There is little doubt that these distinctions of Aristotle form at least part of the background for the distinction between what Epicurus calls ‘katastematic’ pleasures and ‘kinetic’ pleasures or pleasures in movement (ἐν κινήσει, κατὰ κίνησιν).” He makes a similar point in Rist 1974: 174. See also Long and Sedley (1987: vol. 1, 123), who claim that Epicurus “would have found general support” in Aristotle’s notion that there are pleasures of both rest and motion. For the opposing view, which I defend here, see Nikolsky 2001: 455. See a letter from Epicurus to his mother (72 A, lines 38–40) and DL 10.121. Porphyry, To Marcella 31 (247 A). For similar sentiments, see KD 11, 12, and 13.

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General Index absence of pain 6, 8, 30, 34, 65–75, 79, 81–4, 87–90, 97, 101–2, 105, 128, 132, 138, 141–51, 158, 161. See also ataraxia and aponia Ackrill, J.L. 178 n.39 Alcmaeon of Croton 168 n.3 anima. See spirit Annas, J. 27, 124, 164 n.4, 164 n.5, 165 n.13, 166 n.30, 167 n.36, 196 n.70 anti-hedonism 1, 4, 45–63, 55–6, 85 apeiron 32–4, 42 aponia 70–1, 133, 152 appetite 12, 16–17, 57, 163 n.3 Aristippus 67, 69, 75, 155 Aristotle chronology of treatments of pleasure 53–4 energeia 58–61, 86, 160 and Eudoxus 3, 50 55–6, 63, 176 n.23 and Philebus 53–4 ataraxia 70, 99–100, 121, 131–5, 151, 192 n.31, 192 n.32, 196 n.71 atoms 88, 90, 93, 98, 111–13, 126, 142–3, 150 Bailey, C. 81 Bostock, D. 179 n.40 Brittain, C. 183 n.43 Butler, J. 164 n.4, 173 n.34 Callicles 28, 42 Carone, G. 38–9, 50–1, 174 n.7 Carpenter, A. 32, 173 n.1 chara. See joy city 22–3, 166 n.30, 167 n.34 confidence 98, 100–3, 106–7, 121, 131, 187 n.26, 187 n.30 Cooper, J. 139, 148–9, 201 n.35 cradle argument 68, 72, 182 n.28 Cross, R.C., and A.D. Woozley 164 n.6 Cyrenaics anti-rationalism 155, 202 n.50

conception of pleasure 75, 125–7, 153, 182 n.25, 188 n.32 and Epicureanism 5, 69–70, 73, 97–8, 101, 125–7, 134, 138, 152, 154–6, 188 n.2, 188 n.32, 193 n.44 presentism 153, 201 n.44 Damoxenus 150 death 103–4, 117–19, 133, 191 n.21 Demetrius of Laconia 112 desire in Epicureanism 68, 81–2, 96, 115, 122–5, 144, 199 n.21 in Plato 25, 36, 163 n.3, 170 n.20 Diano, C. 81, 120–1, 150 Dillon, J. 57 Diogenes of Tarsus 70, 89, 131–4 divisio Carneadea 75–6 enemies of Philebus 41, 159, 172 n.32 energeia. See under Aristotle Erler, M. and M. Schofield 79, 126, 193 n.45 eudaimonia 4, 42, 57, 70, 91, 95, 97, 100–3, 118, 144–5, 161, 166 n.30, 167 n.35, 181 n.14, 192 n.31 Eudoxus. See under Aristotle euphrosunē. See gladness of mind fame 122–5, 192 n.35 flux theory 32–3, 38–40, 189 n.7 fourfold cure (tetrapharmikos) 103 fourfold division of beings 31–3 Frede, D. 14, 15, 38, 59, 159, 165 n.13, 169 n.5, 175 n.10, 175 n.11 friendship 199 n.21 Giannantoni, G. 184 n.47, 194 n.52, 199 n.21, 202 n.50 Giovacchini, J. 191 n.26, 193 n.44 gladness of mind (euphrosunē) 71, 110, 129–36, 196 n.71

General Index Glidden, D. 190 n.11 god 132, 136, 154, 160–1, 169 n.6, 172 n.30, 194 n.57, 202 n.54 Gosling, J.C.B. 175 n.10 Gosling, J.C.B. and C.C.W. Taylor 4, 86–90, 126–7, 133–7, 151, 159, 163 n.1, 163 n.2, 165 n.13, 172 n.31, 182 n.34, 182 n.36

Moss, J. 163 n.3 Murphy, N.R. 163 n.2, 164 n.7 neutral state 29, 31, 33, 35–7, 39, 41, 43 Nikolsky, B. 4, 81, 87, 90–4, 97, 110–11, 134, 137, 147, 185 n.13, 184 n.1 Owen, G.E.L.

Hackforth, R. 171 n.23, 175 n.11 Hampton, C. 170 n.22, 176 n.22 happiness. See eudaimonia harmony 6, 15, 23–4, 27–8, 32, 37, 98, 162 psychological 11–27, 106, 167 n.36 Hermarchus 163 n.5 Hicks, R.D. 130 Hieronymus of Rhodes 67, 72, 75, 77 Hossenfelder, M. 182 n.24 illness 13–14, 117, 119, 121, 132–3, 143 Indelli, G. and V. TsounaMcKirahan 202 n.48 Inwood, B. 183 n. 43, 183 n.44 Inwood, B. and L. Gerson 194 n.51 Irwin, T. 166 n.27, 177 n.29, 178 n.37 joy (chara) 7, 67, 70–1, 99, 102, 110, 117, 129–36, 139–40, 153 Konstan, D.

114–15, 119, 126, 190 n.17

Long, A.A. 187 n.27 Long, A.A. and D.N. Sedley 111–12, 126, 130, 138–9, 193 n.44, 193 n.46, 194 n.50, 194 n.51, 201 n.42, 203 n.7 Maso, S. 76–7 memory 19–20, 36, 132, 152–3, 155–6 mental health 23, 28, 85–7, 89, 91, 93, 95, 97, 99, 101, 103–7, 116–17, 156 Merlan, P. 70, 154 Metrodorus 92, 100, 130–1, 181 n.16, 201 n.45 mind (animus) 101–2 Mitsis, P. 70, 190 n.11 Morel, P. 195 n.60

211

pain

179 n.43

7, 13–14, 17, 19–20, 22, 25, 33–5, 37–8, 49, 52, 56, 59–62, 81, 88, 98, 103, 111–13, 118, 132–3, 142–4, 156. See also absence of pain peras 32–3 perception 37, 40–1, 94–102, 111, 114–15, 121, 127, 146, 158, 170 n.22, 172 n.31. See also perception requirement perception requirement 6, 17, 30, 36, 38–41, 44, 52–3, 97, 157, 168 n.5 pleasure bodily 16, 18, 34, 59, 75, 78, 94–100, 152–3 (see also aponia) coexistence with pain 120–2, 191 n.27 false 14–16, 18, 37, 46, 165 n.13, 171 n.23 goodness of 33–4, 45–6, 48, 63, 85, 110, 122, 158 impure 7, 8, 18, 30, 35–6, 52–3, 59, 157, 165 n.13, 170 n.16, 170 n.18, 170 n.19, 171 n.23 katastematic 1, 4–8, 63, 65–77, 81–94, 97–101, 107, 110–25, 128–54, 158–61 (see also ataraxia and aponia) kinetic 1, 4–8, 63–72, 75–90, 109–12, 115–48, 151–62 limit of 34, 71, 74, 115, 120, 128, 147, 186 n.14 mental 4–6, 11, 23, 26, 70–1, 100–2, 104, 110, 11–18, 130, 132, 149, 155–6 (see also ataraxia) mixed (see impure under pleasure) non-restorative 7–8, 93, 129, 137–56 profligate 75, 82 pure 14–16, 30, 38, 49–50, 59–60, 159, 171 n.23, 172 n.31, 174 n.7, 175 n.12, 176 n.13

212

General Index

restorative 78, 43–4, 48–52, 93, 109, 114–15, 119, 126–9, 137–45, 159 variations of 77–83, 128, 145, 147–54 Purinton, J. 79, 120–1, 126–7, 135, 145, 196 n.69, 192 n.28

Stoics 73–4, 139–40 Stokes, M. 81–2 Striker, G. 129, 159, 192 n.34, 203 n.5 summum bonum 69–70, 72, 74, 76–7, 90, 100

restoration model 6, 9, 29–31, 34–7, 41–2, 45, 49–50, 52, 109, 116 Rist, J. 51–2, 81, 112, 120–1, 149–50, 154, 189 n.5, 191 n.18, 191 n.27, 192 n.29, 196 n.70 Rudebusch, G. 169 n.5 Russell, D. 168 n.37, 170 n.20

Taylor, A.E. 168 n.3 Taylor, C.C.W. 165 n.14 telos 68, 70, 75, 87–8, 90, 94, 99–100, 111, 141, 161, 188 n.2 tranquility. See ataraxia Tsouna, V. 117, 154–5

Sedley, D. 75–6 sex 12, 17, 18, 69, 137–8, 143, 153, 155, 199 n.19 Shaw, C. 17–18, 166 n.24 Speusippus 3, 46, 50, 57, 172 n.32, 176 n.23, 177 n.28, 182 n.26 spirit (anima) 102 spirit (thumos) 12, 25, 165 n.19 Splawn, C. 73–4 static pleasure. See katastematic under pleasure

Urmson, J.O. 158 Van Riel, G. 48, 61–2, 165 n.10 virtue 15, 18, 23, 43, 76, 155, 183 n.43 Warren, J. 18–20, 73, 82, 165 n.17, 180 n.6 Waterfield, R. 170 n.18 White, N. 26, 164 n.4, 164 n.5 166 n.30, 167 n.34, 167 n.35 Wolfsdorf, D. 52, 79–80, 114, 119–21, 125–7, 145, 171 n.23, 180 n.6, 190 n.12 Zeno of Sidon 183 n.37

Index Locorum Alciphron Epistularum 3.55.8

65, 179 n.2

Aristotle De Anima 431a10–11

176 n.20

Magna Moralia 1204b20 1204b3637 1205b21 1205b22–24 1205b25

62 61 62 62 62

Metaphysics 987a29–b1

40

Nicomachean Ethics 1104b3 168 n.38 1152b8–9 55 1152b10–11 55 1152b11–12 55 1152b13–15 55 1152b22–23 55 1152b33–36 57 1152b36–53a2 57 1153b4–7 177 n.28 1154b17–19 57 1154b20–24 160 1154b26–27 160 1154b28 160 1172b9–25 55 1172b26–28 56 1172b31–32 56 1172b36 56 1173a5–28 177 n.28 1173a11–13 56 1173a30 56 1173b2–4 58 1173b5–7 59 1173b7–8 56, 59

1173b9–11 1173b14–15 1173b16–29 1174a13 1174a15–16 1174a21–23 1174b6–7 1174b10–12 1174b19–20 1174b22–23 1174b30 1174b31–33

59 59 59 60 60 60 60–1 60 61 61 61 61

Physics 247a16–17

176 n.20

Posterior Analytics 875b5–6 176 n.20 Rhetoric 1355a29–30 1359a15 1359a26–7 1359b15–18 1369b33–35

54 54 54 54 52

Athenaeus Deipnosophistae 12.546e 67, 141, 180 n.7 Aulus Gellius Noct. Att. (Attic Nights) 9.5.2 187 n.24 Cicero De Finibus 1.22 1.32 1.33 1.37 1.37–8 1.38

69 74 74 69, 74, 78 66–7 146

214 1.39 1.56 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 2.16 2.17 2.19 2.20 2.30 2.31 2.32 2.39 2.44 2.114 3.1 3.2

Index Locorum 73 132, 145 67, 69, 76 67, 69, 87 69 71, 78–80, 180 n.3 68, 78–9, 82, 128, 147 68 69, 80, 109 180 n.8 67 69, 137 72–3, 80 68, 78 69, 183 n.43 76 65 183 n.42 76, 183 n.42

Tusculan Disputations 3.41 198 n.11 3.41–2 87, 137, 140 5.27 100 Clement of Alexandria Stromata 2.21 102 2.22.133.4 57, 102 Damascius Lectures on Plato’s Philebus §168 Westerink 171 n.24 §171 Westerink 171 n.23 Diogenes Laertius 2.85 152, 189 n.2 2.86 125 2.89 188 n.32 7.116 139 10.22 103, 132, 156 10.25 163 n.5 10.34 88 10.118 103, 120, 199 n.19 10.121 195 n.57 10.136 70, 88, 117, 129–36 Diogenes of Oinoanda Fr. 33 Smith 155 Fr. 34 Smith 200 n.29

Fr. 49 Smith Fr. 125 Smith Epicurus Kuriai Doxai 3 4 9 12 14 15 18 29

155 132

71, 120 103, 121 149 202 n.1 125 125 79–80, 93, 102, 128, 137, 147–8 122, 144, 186 n.14

Letter to Herodotus 43 111 Letter to Menoeceus 122 103 127 122, 187 n.29 128 94, 100 129 88, 122 131 70, 91, 94–5, 113 132 95 Vatican Sayings 21 144 33 91, 95, 100–1, 128 54 104 81 125 Lucretius De Rerum Natura 1.445–58 112 2.80–2 111 2.402–7 98, 142 2.963–72 88, 113 4.256–64 186 n.18 4.552–3 127–8 4.616 128 4.627–29 81 4.627–32 127 4.664–70 143, 190 n.13 4.860–69 96–7 4.871–76 95–6 4.1065–67 199 n.19 6.17–21 106 6.68–71 194 n.57 6.591–95 96

Index Locorum Philodemus On Anger 37–42

124

On Choices and Avoidances 1–3 153 5.2 125, 186 n.14 23.1.11 119 On Epicurus 18.10–17

152, 181 n.16

On Frank Speech 17a

104

On the Gods 3, col. 13, 36–39 Diels 3, fr. 77 Diels 3, fr. 84, 1–4 Diels

154 154 154

Pragmateiai 31.5–10

133

Plato Cratylus 440a–d

40

Gorgias 491e5 493a–94b 493e5–6

42, 147 106 168 n.39

Phaedo 65c 78b–80d

42 165 n.18

Phaedrus 253d–54e

166 n.28

Philebus 19b2–3 21b–d 21d–e 22c–d 23c4–27c2 24b10–d7 24c3 25a2–3 25a6–b3 25e

168 n.2 56 31 169 n.6 32, 51 32 169 n.8 32 32 32

25e1 25e7–26c2 27a5–b2 27e7–9 28a1 31a8–10 31b2–4 31d4–6 31d8–9 31e 31e3–4 32a 32a6–8 32a9–b1 32b6 32d9–e7 32e9–33a1 33a 33a3–5 33b 33d4–5 34a1 34a3–5 35b6–7 42c5 42c9–d3 42d5–7 42d11 42e9 43a3 43b2–4 43b5–6 43b7–9 43c1 43c4–6 43c11 43d 43e1–6 44a9 44c1 45b 45c1–3 46c6–7 51a3 51a4 51b3–7 51d 51e–52b 51e7–52a3 52a5

215 32 32–3 33 33 33 33 29 34 34 35 59 35 35 33 36 36 36 42 36 161, 169 n.6 40 40 40 36 36–7 34 34 37 37 37, 39 37 37 39 39 40 41 41 41 41 41 42 42 35 41 41 49 49 49–50 50 50

216

Index Locorum

53c–54d 53c–55c 53c4–5 53c4–55c3 53d3–d4 53d6 53e5–7 54c2–4 54c6 54c6–7 54c10–11 54d1 54d1–2 54d4–7 54e5–7 60b–e 62e9 63d3–4 63e4–7 63e7–64a1

158 175 n.9 47 45 47 47 47 47 50 47 47 50 47 48 48 56 43 43 43 43–4

584e–85a 584e8–9 585a8–b1 585b3–4 585b3–6 585b9–c5 585b11–c6 585d11 586a2–5 586b7–c1 586d4–87a2 586d5–6 586e6–87a1 587a4–6 587b14–c1 587c1 587e 588e 589a2–4 589b5 590c–d

14 14 37 37 16 15 16 15, 37 17 17 21 16 26 24 164 n.7 13 26 24 24 24 167 n.33

Republic 443d4–e2 444d3–4 444d13–e1 462a–c 462d8–e2 515c8 515e2 516d6 535b6–8 577d13–e2 580d 581d2 582a10vb1 582c7–8 583a2–3 583a4–5 583b5 583c–84d 583c7–8 583e 583e9 583e9–10 584a9–10 584b5 584b5–6 584b6–7 584b9–c1 584d6–9

23, 167 n.30 23 23 22 22 166 n.25 166 n.25 166 n.25 166 n.25 24 12 18 18 18 11 13 13 14 13 13 164 n.8 37–8, 116 13 165 n.12 16 14 14 13

Symposium 207e5–208a2

166 n.20

Timaeus 28a2 28a3–4 29b6 52a2–3 52a6–7 64a2–3 64b 64c 64c8–d2 64d2–3 64e5–65a1 65a1–6

40 40 40 40 40 40 35 35 35 40 35 50

Plutarch Adversus Colotem 1122e 110, 125 De Aud Poet. 37a

145

Non Posse 1087b 1088c 1088c–d

110, 113, 185 n.1 128 115

Index Locorum 1088e 1089d 1090a 1090d 1091b 1092b 1097f 1099f 1101a

131 99, 131, 181 n.16 181 n.16 99–100 132 136 136 136 136

Porphyry To Marcella 31

217

104, 162

Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos 10.219 111 10.219–27 111–12