Handbook on Democracy and Security 1839100192, 9781839100192

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HANDBOOK ON DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY

Handbook on Democracy and Security Edited by

Nicholas A. Seltzer Associate Professor, University of Nevada Reno, USA

Steven Lloyd Wilson Assistant Professor, Brandeis University, Massachusetts, USA

Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA

© Nicholas A. Seltzer and Steven Lloyd Wilson 2023

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited The Lypiatts 15 Lansdown Road Cheltenham Glos GL50 2JA UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. William Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Control Number: 2022948514 This book is available electronically in the Political Science and Public Policy subject collection http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9781839100208

ISBN 978 1 83910 019 2 (cased) ISBN 978 1 83910 020 8 (eBook)

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Contents

List of contributorsvii Introduction to the Handbook on Democracy and Security xi Nicholas A. Seltzer and Steven Lloyd Wilson POLITICS NOT AS USUAL

PART I 1

Democratic Whack-a-Mole: the implications of militant democracy Mika Hackner

2

Does globalization hurt liberal democracy? An application of saliency theory to the globalization–democracy nexus Nataliia Kasianenko

3

The regional adoption of elite rejection and populism Keely Eshenbaugh

31

4

The impacts of water scarcity on the security of democracies Elizabeth A. Koebele and Karen Simpson

45

PART II

2

16

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

5

International threat and democratic breakdown in new democracies Michael Masterson

65

6

Democracy assistance by international organizations Inken von Borzyskowski and Mert Kartal

84

7

Democracy promotion and democracy assistance: approaches from the north and alternatives from the south Luiza Rodrigues Mateo

8

Authoritarian media abroad: the case of Russia and RT News Megan MacDuffee Metzger

112 126

PART III COMPLEXITY AND CHANGE IN THE ELECTORATE 9

The parliamentarian democracy and its digital enemies: how democracy is facing three challenges from digitalisation Volker Boehme-Neßler

10

Hyper-polarization and the security of democracy Jennifer McCoy

v

142 165

vi  Handbook on democracy and security 11

Attitudes towards immigrants and refugees in Europe Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca and Sandra Horvath

12

Why do populists flip-flop on soldiers? The drug war’s civil–military commitment problem Ned Littlefield, Omar O. Dumdum and Oliver Lang

188

211

PART IV EVOLVING MEDIA AND INFORMATION-SCAPES 13

Broken-windows journalism: a rationale for democratic repair and media reform Michael McDevitt

14

The rise of cable news Dimitri Kelly

252

15

Internet policy in South Korea: liberal imperialism and paradox Julia Eggleston and Steven Lloyd Wilson

271

16

Conspiracy thinking April A. Johnson

289

PART V

232

UNCONVENTIONAL PERSPECTIVES

17

Democracy and health Robert L. Ostergard, Jr.

18

Leadership, democracy, and security in sub-Saharan Africa: insights from the Republic of Uganda Jeffrey A. Griffin

19

Terrorism and threats to democracy Susanne Martin

310

329 344

Index360

Contributors

Volker Boehme-Neßler is University Professor of Public Law at the Carl von Ossietzky University in Oldenburg. His research and teaching focus on the role of law in the digitalized world. Most recently, he has published two books on the question of how digitalization is changing democracy. He studied law (Dr. iur. utr. 1993) and political science (Dr. rer. pol. 1997) in Berlin and Heidelberg. In 2008 he habilitated at the University of Kassel (Dr. jur. habil.). From 1993 to 1999 he was a lawyer. Inken von Borzyskowski is Associate Professor of Global Policy and International Relations at University College London. Her research focuses on international democracy assistance, the causes and consequences of election violence, and international organizations’ membership politics (withdrawals and suspensions). Her work has been published in International Studies Quarterly, British Journal of Political Science, Journal of Peace Research, and Review of International Organizations, and by Cornell University Press. Omar O. Dumdum is a PhD candidate in Mass Communication, double minoring in Political Science and Global Studies, at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. His research broadly investigates the relationship between the news media and understudied elites in political communication, such as international organizations, police and the military, political clans, and other privileged groups that influence/are influenced by the press, with a focus on the Philippines. Julia Eggleston is a PhD student at SUNY Binghamton, and received her MA in Political Theory from Virginia Tech, where she focused on the geopolitics of knowledge as well as the intellectual history of new materialism. Her previous work also includes critiques of neocolonial rhetoric in Internet freedom reporting as well as explorations of decolonial onto-epistemologies. Keely Eshenbaugh is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Reno. With a regional focus in Western Europe, she has research interests in political economy, industry divisions, and narrative dissemination. Her dissertation work analyzes firms’ puzzling stances on predicted economic utility and transparency about policy decisions to their membership. Jeffrey A. Griffin is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Reno. His interdisciplinary research program integrates international relations, comparative politics (with a concentration on sub-Saharan Africa), and public policy decision-making. Specifically, he examines and explores political leadership decision-making calculations and the impact of risk and perception in shaping public policy responses to long-term threats regimes face. His work has been applied to chronic societal problems, particularly health epidemics and democratic stability.

vii

viii  Handbook on democracy and security Mika Hackner is a PhD candidate at Brandeis University. Her research is on militant democracy, focusing on party banning, and democratic breakdown and persistence. Her dissertation analyzes political party bans from an institutional perspective. Mika holds an MA in Politics from Brandeis University, an MA from the University of Haifa in Peace and Conflict Management, an Honors degree from the University of Cape Town in Justice and Transformation, and a BA from the University of Auckland in Politics and History. Sandra Horvath is a Research Assistant at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center and a Research Assistant to Professor Richard Rose (University of Strathclyde). She completed her bachelor’s and master’s degrees in Social Science at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Her research interests include parties and elections, comparative political behavior, and quantitative methods. Dr. April A. Johnson is Associate Professor of Political Science at Kennesaw State University. Her research focuses on the psychology of political attitudes and behaviors. Mert Kartal is Assistant Professor of Government at St. Lawrence University. Previously, he was Assistant Professor at the University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point and visiting researcher at Gothenburg University’s Quality of Government Institute. His research focuses on the interplay between international organizations and domestic politics, and he has extensively studied the impact of the European Union on good governance. His work has appeared in venues including Comparative European Politics, Journal of European Integration, and Journal of European Public Policy. Nataliia Kasianenko is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at California State University, Fresno. Her research focuses on nationalism, identity politics, and human rights in the countries of the former Soviet Union. Nataliia’s work has been published in Nationalities Papers, Ethnopolitics, Ideology and Politics Journal, and East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies. Her latest research projects examine the issues related to statelessness and national identity in eastern Ukraine. Dimitri Kelly is Associate Professor of Political Science at Linfield University. His research focuses on the causes and consequences of media bias. Dr. Elizabeth A. Koebele is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and affiliate faculty in the Graduate Program for Hydrologic Sciences at the University of Nevada, Reno. Broadly, she researches environmental policymaking processes, with a focus on those governing water in the western United States, as well as disaster resilience policy. She is particularly interested in how collaborative approaches to environmental governance shape both the policy process and socio-environmental outcomes. Oliver Lang is a PhD student in Political Science at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. His core research interests lie in the political origins and consequences of “soft” news and entertainment media. He also has ongoing projects which explore the role of the media in reducing prejudice. Ned Littlefield is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of Wisconsin– Madison. His dissertation examines how the militarization of law enforcement comes to an end, focusing on the Brazilian Army’s 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro. His general research interests concern civil–military relations, national identity, and race in Latin America.

Contributors  ix Susanne Martin, PhD, is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Reno. Professor Martin works on questions relating to political violence with a focus on violent political groups, including insurgent and terrorist groups, and their use of violent and nonviolent tactics. Professor Martin is coauthor (with Leonard Weinberg) of The Role of Terrorism in Twenty-First-Century Warfare (Manchester University Press, 2016). In this work the authors explore patterns in the timing of terrorism within wider-scale warfare. Michael Masterson is a Rosenwald Postdoctoral Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy and International Security at Dartmouth College and an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Missouri State University. His current book project examines when political leaders use national humiliation narratives as a political strategy and the unintended effects of these narratives and the emotions they evoke on foreign policy. He completed his PhD at the University of Wisconsin–Madison and his undergraduate and master’s degrees at the University of Oklahoma. Professor Luiza Rodrigues Mateo holds a PhD in International Relations from the São Paulo State University, teaches in the International Relations undergraduate program at Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo, and the graduate program Global Governance and International Politics Formulation at the same university. She develops research at the National Institute of Science and Technology for Studies on the United States, mostly on American foreign policy. Jennifer McCoy is Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University and a Nonresident Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She is a specialist on democratic erosion, pernicious polarization, election integrity, and Latin American politics. Her current research is on behavioral and institutional solutions to the intergroup conflict dynamics of political and societal polarization. Her most recent edited volume, with Murat Somer, is Polarizing Polities: A Global Threat to Democracy (2019). Michael McDevitt is Professor of Communication and Journalism at the University of Colorado Boulder (CU). His research interests include political communication, political socialization, and journalism studies. He joined the CU faculty in 2001 after teaching at the University of New Mexico. Prior to his teaching career, he worked as a reporter and editorial writer for newspapers in the San Francisco Bay Area. He is the author of Where Ideas Go to Die: The Fate of Intellect in American Journalism (Oxford University Press, 2020). Megan MacDuffee Metzger is a Political Scientist whose work focuses on the intersection of politics, technology, and human rights. She completed her PhD at New York University, where she wrote a dissertation about social media and political protest using data from Ukraine. She went on to complete a postdoctoral fellowship in Russian Studies at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, before joining Stanford’s Global Digital Policy Incubator (part of the Cyber Policy Center) as a Research Scholar. Dr. Robert L. Ostergard, Jr. received his BA in Political Science and Economics in 1992 from the University of Massachusetts, and his MA (1996) and PhD (1999) in Political Science from Binghamton University. He is currently Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Reno. His general areas of research are in national and international security issues, with a specific focus on sub-Saharan Africa. His current research includes projects on the security implications of the HIV/AIDS and Ebola epidemics, human rights and

x  Handbook on democracy and security health, climate and health, and state security responses to global health crises. His website can be found here: http://​robertostergard​.us. Dr. Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca is an Associate Professor at the Australian National University. Previously, she was a Research Fellow at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center and served as Postdoctoral Researcher at the V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg. She obtained her PhD at the University of Mannheim. Her research focuses on democracy, political representation, immigration, and survey research. Dr. Nicholas A. Seltzer received his PhD from Stony Brook University, and is currently an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Reno. His research focuses on social responses to climate change and non-traditional security. Karen Simpson is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Reno. They have a background in international relations and economic development. Currently, they are studying climate adaptation and water policy, with an emphasis on climate adaptation in developing countries and the science–policy interface. Research interests include change in complex systems, multi-level governance, and inclusive development. Steven Lloyd Wilson is an Assistant Professor of Politics at Brandeis University, project manager for the Varieties of Democracy Institute, and co-Principal Investigator of the Digital Society Project. His research focuses on comparative democratization, cyber-security, and the effect of the Internet and social media on authoritarian regimes, particularly in the post-Soviet world.

Introduction to the Handbook on Democracy and Security Nicholas A. Seltzer and Steven Lloyd Wilson

It has been more than three decades since the Soviet Union collapsed and Francis Fukuyama summarily declared “the end of history”; the last and greatest ideological conflict appeared settled, and there no longer existed a credible legitimate alternative to liberal democracy. In the years that followed, the proportion of the world’s population living in democracies spiked over 50 percent. A new “wave” of democratic optimism rolled through Africa and then the Middle East. Yet in 2022, the majority of the world’s population once again dwells under conditions of autocracy or severely impaired democracy. The optimism of the Arab Spring proved short-lived, and the Middle East’s autocrats have not only persisted, but appear to have consolidated their power further. And what of China? In the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, the democratic world thought it saw the inevitable consequence of China’s post-Mao liberal economic reforms: the first stirrings of democracy in the East even as the Soviet empire fell across Eurasia. The Clinton administration welcomed China to Most Favored Nation status, paving the way for China’s admittance to the World Trade Organization, predicting that this would translate over time into expanded human rights and political liberty. Yet thirty years later China not only remains autocratic, but in some ways has become even more so: the regime of Xi Jinping appears to be doing away with the established convention of term limits for its paramount leader that provided at the very least for occasional peaceful transitions of power from one technocratic official to the next. Whereas the advent of the digital age initially fueled hopes that Internet-enabled Chinese voices would overcome the Chinese Communist Party’s stranglehold on truth, the Chinese state has merely found new means to control information, surveil its population, and ultimately reinforce its authority. Alas, the march of democracy has stalled. More worryingly, democracy may be in retreat. In large cross-country measures of democracy such as Polity, Freedom House, and the V-Dem project, we are seeing a decline in support for democratic values. Even in the most consolidated democracies, fears of democratic backsliding are all too real. The fears seem well founded in many dimensions: the resurgence of right-wing populism, the backlash against Western-led globalization, the emergence of identity politics and ethnic conflict, the decline of independent mass media, elite rent-seeking at the expense of democratic institutions, and the kaleidoscope of complications created by the rise of the Internet and social media. And yet the terrifying erosion of public confidence in democracy is historically strange in that it is unaccompanied by ideological challengers or external existential threats. Democracy, in short, seems on the verge of devouring itself from within. This volume is an exciting new interpretation that reframes the challenge to preserve democratic institutions, not in the face of competing ideologies, but from erosion within. This volume endeavors to explore the security of democracy in all the dimensions required to secure democracy’s institutions and norms. In the coming chapters, an exceptional set of authors focuses on this analysis, reflecting on the spectrum of threats to the security of democracy that exist in the 21st century. Chapters will explore new concepts of militant democracy xi

xii  Handbook on democracy and security and hyper-polarization, as well as delving into complex issues such as anti-globalization movements and the reemergence of reactionary politics. We will critically examine and evaluate the threats to democratic institutions, as well as opportunities to strengthen those institutions, that arise from within politically, socially, and economically challenging policy choices which must be made surrounding the mitigation of climate-induced scarcities and the spread of infectious disease. We have grouped contributions to this volume into five thematic parts. In the first part, contributors address a range of subjects in the realm of democratic politics, but distinctly not democratic politics as usual. Chapter 1, Mika Hackner’s “Democratic Whack-a-Mole: the implications of militant democracy”, presents militant democracy as a phenomenon challenging contemporary democratic norms. Militant democracy argues that, to preserve democratic norms and institutions, democracies have the right to limit the participation of anti-democratic actors. This chapter examines whether strategies of militant democracy buttress key norms of democracy or contribute to their erosion, and whether these strategies encourage healthy political participation or not. The chapter begins by describing militant democracy, placing the theory within its historical context, before describing its more salient strategies and providing contemporary examples of their use. The chapter demonstrates the challenges of successfully applying militant democracy strategies, particularly the difficulty of inter-institutional decision-making and coordination in banning political parties. Examining relevant cases across Europe and Israel, the chapter demonstrates that common strategies of militant democracy could only have limited or short-term consequences for ostracized or banned parties but that these parties are sometimes able to reform or are able to influence the political arena in new, often more challenging, ways. Chapter 2, Nataliia Kasianenko’s “Does globalization hurt liberal democracy? An application of saliency theory to the globalization–democracy nexus”, addresses how globalization impacts the prospects of democracy. The rise of populism, far-right nationalism, and isolationism has recently manifested itself in liberal democracies around the world. This retreat of democracy has occurred despite the ongoing globalization, which is associated with greater interconnectedness among states and the spread of democratic ideas across state borders. The literature on the globalization–democracy nexus is contradictory, suggesting that globalization may have positive or negative effects on democratization and democratic consolidation. This chapter examines the nature of globalization and its impact on democratic stability in established liberal democracies. Specifically, it applies saliency theory to explore how political elites may manipulate the saliency of issues associated with globalization to advance to power or maintain their legitimacy in times of rapid change. The chapter provides specific examples of elite rhetoric and public opinion data to highlight how different dimensions of globalization may become so politically salient that they erode democratic stability. Chapter 3, Keely Eshenbaugh’s “The regional adoption of elite rejection and populism”, explores how the rejection of elites and spread of right-wing populism is a threat to democracy. This chapter discusses Brexit, the UK’s referendum that terminated their European Union (EU) membership, to demonstrate how narratives of institutional arrangements, policy transparency, and the dismissal of elites have captured the attention of labor and business organizations in the UK. In order to discuss the dangers that Brexit poses to democracy, it is foundationally important to understand who the elites are and why the public is critical of elites in populist social movements. Narratives from UK labor unions and businesses posted

Introduction  xiii on Twitter display grievances of institutional arrangements that threaten the UK as a longstanding leader of democracy. From economic stresses to changing patterns of migration, in Chapter 4 Elizabeth A. Koebele and Karen Simpson consider with “The impacts of water scarcity on the security of democracies” some of the pressures societies can face in the event of acute water scarcities, which are projected to increase as the planet warms. The authors emphasize that full, stable democracies tend to possess the requisite institutional capabilities for managing these challenges, and so face little threat to their form of government, but partial or unstable democracies and newly democratizing regimes could struggle. For example, absent inclusive participatory processes for allocating scarce water resources, planning water infrastructure improvements, and easing the pain of economic losses, even well-intentioned regimes run the risk of stoking domestic conflict. Additionally, they argue that the technocratic nature of water governance leads to centralized, top-down decision-making on water allocation and infrastructure investment, which must be offset by democratic institutions incorporating the needs of marginalized peoples into design requirements. The authors conclude by outlining approaches for coping with water scarcity while safeguarding and enhancing democracy. In the second thematic part, we take a comparative politics approach, examining the horizons of democracy from cross-national, cross-hemispheric perspectives, and from the perspective of international institutions. Chapter 5, Michael Masterson’s “International threat and democratic breakdown in new democracies”, reviews how international threats influence democratic stability. Many scholars have theorized that international threats can contribute to democratic breakdown by increasing public support for centralizing power. Others suggest that international threats might prevent breakdown by decreasing the likelihood of coups or increasing public participation. This chapter constructs and tests a theory that international threats cause democratic breakdown only in new democracies because citizens face unique coordination problems resisting authoritarian takeovers in an environment of international threats. The first such problem is that new institutions lack a precedent for restraining leaders during a crisis and may be reluctant to do so, depriving citizens of a focal point for resistance. The second is that citizens’ lack of experience of previous military crises under democracy deprives them of the ability to tell the difference between elite actions that are acceptable during a crisis and actions that threaten democracy. Chapter 6, Inken von Borzyskowski and Mert Kartal’s “Democracy assistance by international organizations”, analyzes the current state of democracy assistance and discusses its prospects for the future. It focuses on two of the most active multilateral actors in democracy assistance, the United Nations and the EU, and addresses four questions: What type of democracy do these actors promote? Where do they promote democracy? How do they promote democracy? How effective have their efforts been and which constraints have they faced? It shows that both actors seek to promote electoral democracy in countries around the world, except for advanced democracies, and they do so primarily through support to elections and civil society, state-building, sanctions, and (in the case of the EU) membership conditionality. It argues that the current scholarship assessing the effectiveness of these efforts has suffered from several challenges, and the authors conclude with suggestions for future research. Chapter 7, Luiza Rodrigues Mateo’s “Democracy promotion and democracy assistance: approaches from the north and alternatives from the south”, presents an illuminating discussion of the global agenda for democratization since the 1990s. Crucially, she emphasizes the

xiv  Handbook on democracy and security outsized role of a “northern axis”—constituted principally of the United States and Europe— in establishing its terminology and models for implementation. Not surprisingly, the agenda tends to reflect their own demands and orientations, which are embodied in specific practices of good governance, supporting elections, combating corruption, and enhancing civil society. She presents an analysis of how the north’s agenda for democratization meets southern experiences. Finally, she identifies convergences and divergences from emerging alternative approaches to democratization rooted in south–south cooperation. Chapter 8, Megan MacDuffee Metzger’s “Authoritarian media abroad: the case of Russia and RT News”, explores how state-funded news abroad functions as part of a state’s broader information strategy, using the Russian news channel RT as a case study. Information is the foundation on which democracies are built. Citizens’ ability to decide who should govern them, which laws to support and oppose, and when to resist changes and when to embrace them, is only as good as the available information. That is why the free press and freedom of information are so central to democratic governance. For this reason, deceptive information practices on the part of adversarial states pose a threat to the security of democracy and to democratic institutions. This chapter situates Russian state-funded media abroad historically, before exploring how it has been adapted to the digital age, considering what we know about what RT does, how it attempts to influence the information environment, and whether it is effective or not. In the third thematic part, contributors address complexity and change in the electorate. In a forward-thinking piece entitled “The parliamentarian democracy and its digital enemies: how democracy is facing three challenges from digitalisation” (Chapter 9), Volker Boehme-Neßler takes on what he calls the “fundamental effects of digitisation on democracy.” He contends that the pervasiveness of digitization threatens core aspects of democratic culture. In particular, the advent of big data and related technologies makes it increasingly difficult to guarantee privacy and private spaces that are necessary for individuals to identify, develop, and find expression for their ideas. He also points to a “discussion culture”, often crude, aggressive, and shallow, that supplants the richer, deeper public deliberation that democracy thrives on. Further, as algorithms increasingly control what people see and ultimately come to believe, representative bodies are susceptible to a reflexive impact as elected officials find themselves constrained by increasingly radical, uncompromising, and righteous publics. In “Hyper-polarization and the security of democracy” (Chapter 10), Jennifer McCoy considers the complex relationship between political polarization and democracy. She delves into the evolution of new concepts and measures that are the terms of this debate, including affective, identity-based, and pernicious types of polarization. So equipped, she discusses current theorization on the consequences of hyper-polarization for the security of democracy, highlighting what is best supported by empirical research. Chapter 11, Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca and Sandra Horvath’s “Attitudes towards immigrants and refugees in Europe”, investigates the effects of immigration on European democracies. After taking stock of the impact of international migration on European societies, it examines how such demographic processes relate to political and economic developments. Furthermore, the analysis sheds light on changes in public opinion over time, describes differences and similarities across countries, and examines the effects of the 2015 immigration and refugee crisis. It also shows that there is a relationship between democracy, politics, and the economy, and preferences regarding immigrants, the regulations of immigration, and refugee policies.

Introduction  xv Chapter 12, Ned Littlefield, Omar O. Dumdum, and Oliver Lang’s “Why do populists flip-flop on soldiers? The drug war’s civil–military commitment problem”, explores populism’s civil–military commitment problem, or the populist leader’s inability to make a credible commitment to enact their policy preferences (as stated on the campaign trail) vis-à-vis the armed forces. This phenomenon rests on the assumption that militaries are prominent members of emergent democracies’ governing coalitions who can defect to coup coalitions and prefer a more stable status quo and more domestic roles and resources. As the authors show in four cases, left-wing populists in Bolivia and Mexico campaign against “drug war” militarization, only to sustain or deepen it once in office. Conversely, right-wing populists in Brazil and the Philippines could only sustain or even curtail militarization of the “drug war” once in office because expanding the “drug war” involves risks for the armed forces. Understanding these puzzles has practical importance for democratic governance and theoretical value for conceptualizing populism and civil–military relations. In the fourth part, this volume assesses challenges arising from and within the evolving mediascape and information age. Chapter 13, Michael McDevitt’s “Broken-windows journalism: a rationale for democratic repair and media reform”, interrogates the role of the news media as a political institution in a democracy. Critically examining the practice of journalism, he contends that the news media fails to acknowledge its power to shape policy agendas and frame conversations. Rather, news media strives to affirm its competence by achieving “homogeneity” within itself, and defaults to a position of “objectivity” as if to establish it as being above politics, as a mere spectator. But this is not without consequences: eschewing the intellectual work—and implied position taking—of actively shaping conversations, but merely reporting the news that political actors create via sound bites, tweets, and press releases and unintentionally funneling generative ideas into static, partisan binaries. Accordingly, he argues that the media should embrace their intellectual autonomy and take responsibility for the news as its own jurisdiction. Chapter 14, Dimitri Kelly’s “The rise of cable news”, explores how the explosion of cable news over the last generation has influenced democratic stability in the United States. Extreme polarization is inimical to democratic governance, undermining social cohesion and inhibiting compromise. This chapter highlights the role of cable news in the story of U.S. political polarization, emphasizing the twin mechanisms of news avoidance and selective exposure. While the Internet broadly, and social media specifically, is the sexy topic de jour, the rise of cable news shifted the contours of the U.S. political system in ways the scholarly community is still working to fully understand, with implications extending beyond the U.S. Throughout, the chapter outlines potential areas for future research as well as some of the methodological challenges to be overcome. Chapter 15, Julia Eggleston and Steven Lloyd Wilson’s “Internet policy in South Korea: liberal imperialism and paradox”, analyzes how Internet policy in South Korea has attracted criticism for its seeming incompatibility with consolidated democracy. The chapter presents a pair of qualitative case studies examining Internet censorship in the context of recent major protest movements in South Korea: the 2015 textbook protests and the 2017 impeachment demonstrations. Further, over a six-year period, the project collected 30 million South Korean tweets, and daily data from South Korea’s primary blogging platform (Naver Blog) on political speech. By comparing discussion of politics, North Korea, and censorship on the two platforms (one theoretically censorable by the South Korean government, the other not) the chapter concludes that censorship is not a major factor in South Korean Internet speech.

xvi  Handbook on democracy and security Chapter 16, April A. Johnson’s “Conspiracy thinking”, takes on the apparently growing prevalence of fanciful conspiracy theories in public discourse, examining the psychological roots of conspiratorial thinking. Root causes emerge from a basic human need for certainty, as well as individual-level correlates for which there is substantial variation from person to person. She also considers how some issues, such as intergroup conflict, often tie in to matters of power and control—government and authority—and consequently encourage conspiratorial thinking. However, conspiratorial beliefs are not in and of themselves a hindrance to democratic functioning and are in some ways reflective of democratic ideals. In the final thematic part, we have a collection of scholars who consider threats to democracy from unconventional angles. Chapter 17, Robert L. Ostergard, Jr.’s “Democracy and health”, explores a question on the cutting edge of the study of democracy and its long-known relationship with rising public health outcomes. Interrogating the reciprocal impacts on democracy from decreasing health outcomes, he contends that how citizens think about issues affecting their health can translate into the erosion of public trust in both medical as well as democratic institutions. Digging deeply into history, this chapter argues that a legacy of medical misdeeds has contaminated trust in medical institutions. In times of acute public health threats—as in the recent pandemic—mistrust may be transferred to the democratic institutions that stand behind those medical institutions. While the discourse, and by extension the present volume, tends to focus on system factors impacting the security of democracy in the 21st century, Jeffrey A. Griffin deviates from this approach in order to examine the role of individuals and political leadership in the maintenance of democratic stability. In “Leadership, democracy, and security in sub-Saharan Africa: insights from the Republic of Uganda” (Chapter 18), he explores this question through a recent political history of Uganda; specifically, he interrogates how long-time leader Yoweri Museveni’s leadership style, personality, and perceptions shaped crucial outcomes, including those in the domain of democratic stability. The final chapter, Susanne Martin’s “Terrorism and threats to democracy”, considers the threat terrorism is often believed to present for democratic institutions. Offering a spot of optimism against the wider backdrop of this volume, she argues that most terrorism tends to occur in non-democratic countries, especially where states are weak and may be experiencing other sources of instability. On the contrary, citizens of consolidated democracies tend to reject the tactic and those who use it, and are less likely to be moved by the extreme ideologies motivating them. At the same time, democracies offer greater opportunities for political participation through conventional means. Not simply a form of government, democracy is an idea. The security of an idea is not subject to the physical threats that we social scientists tend to associate with security as a concept. The security of democracy is based upon the security of its place in the minds of people as a mythology, a set of norms and values, an ideal, a dream. This volume attempts to define and explore those dimensions of democracy’s security.

PART I POLITICS NOT AS USUAL

1. Democratic Whack-a-Mole: the implications of militant democracy Mika Hackner

The French government, in a bid to reduce the influence of Islamist ideology within its borders, shut down domestic Islamist organizations and published, in late 2020, a Charter of Republican Principles, emphasizing the secular character of the state.1 In 2016, the British government proscribed the far-right group National Action as a terrorist organization (Macklin, 2018). In late 2020, Germany banned the pro-Nazi group Sturmbrigade 44, with the spokesman for the Interior Minister stating: ‘Anyone who fights against the basic values of our liberal society will feel the decisive reaction of our constitutional democracy.’2 It does not take any particular insight to note that, in recent years, liberal democracies have been seriously challenged by illiberal groups. The most serious threat to the security of democracy, however, may come not from its challengers but from the very measures taken to combat them. The strength and security of democratic institutions and norms depends enormously on how liberal democracies choose to deal with illiberal or anti-democratic groups within their borders. Militant democracy employs legal means to repress undesirable political expression and participation. A key element of liberal democracy is the freedom of political participation – signified most crucially by the ability of political parties to participate freely and equitably in the electoral arena. It stands to reason that strategies which limit the ability of political parties to participate in the electoral arena would only be used under extraordinary circumstances, and yet these strategies are implemented or attempted more often than one might suppose. In recent years, Germany, Belgium, Israel, Spain and the Czech Republic, among others, have banned or attempted to ban political parties. Restricting the democratic rights of parties within a democracy is, perhaps, the most extreme strategy of militant democracy. As anti-system actors and parties are on the rise, the question of militant democracy will endure. We need to explore the question of what constitutes a bigger threat to the security of democracy. Is it the anti-liberal, anti-democratic extremists? Or is it the ‘militant’ responses to such extremism? This chapter will suggest answers to this question. I will focus on how these strategies are used against political parties to determine the consequences of these strategies for the security of democracy. In order to answer this, I will first discuss the theoretical underpinnings of militant democracy before moving on to a review of its associated strategies. Then, I will discuss three cases where the key militant democracy strategies have been applied. Finally, I will suggest areas of further research.

1 https://​www​.reuters​.com/​article/​us​-france​-security​-organization/​france​-bans​-islamist​-group​-after​ -killing​-of​-teacher​-government​-spokesman​-idUSKBN2761PQ; https://​www​.politico​.eu/​article/​france​ -political​-islam​-charter​-imams​-fight/​. 2 https://​www​.dw​.com/​en/​germany​-bans​-far​-right​-extremist​-group​-sturmbrigade​-44/​a​-55780833.

2

Democratic Whack-a-Mole  3

MILITANT DEMOCRACY Before I can begin to consider whether strategies of militant democracy present a greater challenge to the security of democratic regimes – that is, whether strategies of militant democracy present as great or a greater threat to democratic norms and institutions than extremist parties or groups – I first need to illustrate what is meant by ‘militant democracy’. In so doing, we will have a better understanding of the problems associated with militant democracy – both in terms of how the concept is understood and in terms of how it is implemented. ‘Militant democracy’ describes a democratic regime which takes pre-emptive and protective measures to safeguard democratic institutions and democratic norms from anti-democratic parties. Karl Loewenstein developed the concept of militant democracy in 1937 as a response to the proliferation of Fascist parties and governments throughout Europe. Militant democracy was an area of inquiry which seemed to die out with the Fascist regimes which gave birth to it. Recently, however, it has re-captured the imagination of scholars (Bale, 2007; Bourne, 2012, 2018; Capoccia, 2001; Pedahzur, 2002). This is as a result, perhaps, of the pressing concerns facing democracies with which militant democracy grapples – concerns of the growth of populism, extremism on both sides of the political spectrum, and, particularly in Europe, a migration crisis which has stoked these fires and brought a host of new challenges to a political system in which the cleavages which dictated party structures were previously assumed to be stable, or ‘frozen’ (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). ‘Militant democracy’ is a broad term which can encompass all manner of state responses to anti-system parties (Bourne, 2012).3 It is generally understood as dealing with Popper’s paradox of tolerating the intolerant (1945) – the legitimacy of banning anti-system parties and the impact this may have on the democracy itself. Bourne criticizes ‘militant democracy’ as a catch-all term which cannot take into account the differing mechanisms which regimes may use to solve this ultimate democratic dilemma beyond legal and political repression. Some, like Capoccia (2001) and Pedahzur (2002), prefer the term ‘defending democracy’, which takes into account strategies of ‘defending’ democracy which are more long-term and less immediately repressive. It is less responsive and more preventive in focus. The literature on militant democracy can be divided, broadly, into two camps: conceptualization and implementation. The first camp, mostly the domain of political theory, considers whether it is legitimate to ban parties in a democracy at all. The debate over conceptualization in the literature thus far has been about whether democracies should adopt a pre-emptive model of militant democracy (Loewenstein, 1937a, 1937b) which would ban anti-system parties outright or a self-limiting version (Kirshner, 2014) which would allow anti-system parties to participate within the political system as long as their participation does not lead to the impediment of the rights of others.

3 ‘Anti-system parties’ is a term coined by Sartori to denote parties which have an ideological difference relational to the dominant ideology shared by the mainstream parties in the political system and which may have a delegitimizing impact on the regime itself via its actions and platform (Capoccia, 2001; Sartori, 1976). However, its common usage in the literature denotes a party as being anti-system on the basis of its ideology and does not include the relational aspect of its ideological distance from the other parties in the system. Anti-system parties are broadly viewed as a threat to the democratic regime.

4  Handbook on democracy and security The second camp, most commonly the domain of comparative politics, is concerned with evaluating which strategies are more effective in dealing with anti-system parties while maintaining or protecting democratic norms and institutions.

STRATEGIES OF MILITANT DEMOCRACY This section will illustrate the attempts in the literature to provide a typology of militant democracy strategies. I can then more easily evaluate the similarities and differences of the typologies offered in the literature as well as identifying which of these strategies have been employed in our cases and to what effect. Political scientists tend to group militant democracy strategies in either long- or short-term categories. Scholars like Giovanni Capoccia, William Downs and Ami Pedahzur outline both long- and short-term strategies used by democracies in response to anti-system parties. Capoccia argues that strong anti-system parties have a ‘twofold negative effect’ on democratic stability – they present an ideological challenge which reduces the legitimacy of the democratic system and, at the same time, they make coordination and cooperation among mainstream parties more difficult. The case studies we will examine in the next section make clear how these two effects play out. Capoccia outlines four strategies, which combine longand short-term strategies. These are ‘militancy’ (short-term), ‘incorporation’ (short-term), ‘purge’ (long-term) and ‘education’ (long-term). In turn, these four strategies fit into either exclusion-repression or inclusive-educational strategies. Inclusive-educational strategies relate to long-term processes which do not clearly map onto the idea of militant democracy as Loewenstein describes it. The long-term strategies are incorporation, in which the extremist opposition is encouraged to participate in the political system, thus strengthening its support of the regime; and education, which seeks to emphasize and strengthen society’s democratic values.4 Downs highlights the importance of different conceptions of democracy (whether procedural or substantive5) in explaining how democratic regimes respond to anti-system parties. His approach to the question emphasizes that historical context, institutions and these different conceptions of democracy are crucial factors in determining which strategy a state may choose. He argues that the expectations of democracy which result from these different factors will result in different strategic choices. These different strategic choices result in different outcomes. He aims to construct a theoretical framework to explain the strategic responses of democracies to threats from anti-system parties. Downs builds upon the strategic typologies developed by Capoccia. He examines the strategies of militant democracy employed across a variety of cases to determine which strategies had been relatively successful or unsuccessful. He identifies five strategies of militant democ-

‘Militancy’ refers to strategies which restrict the civil and political rights of certain groups based upon actions or political affinities which are deemed harmful to democracy. ‘Purging’ refers to actions of new democracies to prosecute old regime members or ‘architects’ of anti-democratic hate. 5 Procedural conceptions of democracy emphasize that procedures of democracy, such as elections, are the basis of democratic legitimacy, whereas substantive conceptions of democracy argue that the legitimacy of democratic regimes stems from the idea that all groups in society have equal rights and access to political participation. 4

Democratic Whack-a-Mole  5 racy6 and utilizes case studies to demonstrate how each approach has been implemented in different cases. He argues that ‘historical memory’ plays a key role in which strategy is chosen. As well as differing conceptions of democracy, Downs emphasizes the importance of historical context and institutional settings in determining which strategies democracies employ to meet the challenge of anti-system parties. He argues that it would be foolhardy and futile to examine strategic choices in ‘a vacuum’, but that historical context, as well as institutional structure and understanding of democracy, should be taken into account. Downs argues that historical context plays a role in perception of threat. Countries with a Fascist past, for example, will be warier of neo-Fascist parties rearing their heads. For Downs (2012, p. 3), agential factors such as ‘individual level perceptions, preferences and choices’ are important insofar as they complement historical factors and the structure of the regime. Pedahzur (2002) argues that militant democracy strategies are on a continuum. They range from the most ‘belligerent’ approach, ‘militancy’, to the least, ‘immunized’. ‘Militancy’ entails short-term strategies to deal with immediate threats, such as banning. ‘Immunized’ strategies are a long-term project to instill democratic values within society through education and civil society. He sees the mechanisms of militant democracy strategies as ranging beyond the political arena because the targets of these strategies can include social movements and individuals. He outlines mechanisms of militant democracy within the judiciary, administration and intelligence, education and society. Social mechanisms, for example, include informational campaigns from civil society organizations; educational mechanisms include a syllabus which teaches civic and democratic values. Downs, Pedahzur and Capoccia present differing approaches to the study of militant democracy – one approach which employs a short-term lens focusing on immediate strategies and one which employs a longer lens with an eye to the longer-term consequences of various strategies. The longer-term strategies, particularly of education, fit more comfortably into Pedahzur and Capoccia’s advocacy of defending democracy. However, this brief overview demonstrates that there are commonly identified strategies of militant democracy. Indeed, while Capoccia, Downs and Pedahzur may give their strategies different names, the essential similarities remain. Downs’ identified strategies of militant democracy would fit well into Pedahzur’s notion of ‘militancy’; while Pedahzur’s ‘immunized’ strategy is similar to Capoccia’s ‘education’. Likewise, Capoccia’s ‘incorporation’ may fit with Downs’ strategies of collaboration or co-optation. While some scholars, mostly notably Angela Bourne,7 have grappled with the question of when such strategies are applied, this is still an undeveloped area of inquiry. The literature on militant democracy must grapple with the unequal application of militant democracy strategies within countries too – why is it that some strategies are applied and not others? As I will demonstrate in my cases, co-option and ‘ignoring’ are not commonly used. And indeed, why is it that some parties are targeted and not others? The final sections of the chapter will discuss this and suggest further avenues of research.

6 Isolate: applying a cordon sanitaire, ignore, co-opt: to co-opt the policy positions of targeted parties to appeal to their base and reduce the salience of these parties, collaborate and ban. 7 Angela Bourne (2018) argues that democracies ban particular parties when (1) anti-system parties have been ‘securitized’ as an existential threat, (2) veto players prefer proscription, (3) anti-system parties do not unambiguously reject violence, (4) alternate forms of marginalization are not effective and (5) veto players do not need to cooperate with them to win and maintain office or achieve policy goals.

6  Handbook on democracy and security

PARADIGM CASES In this section, I will discuss cases of militant democracy which provide an overview of its chief strategies – party ostracism and party banning. I can then begin to draw some conclusions about the merits of these strategies. These cases have been selected because they give a good overview of the strategies commonly employed against political parties and they demonstrate the varying degrees of success of these strategies. Since the end of World War II, there have been approximately forty successful party bans in Europe alone, almost half of which occurring within the last twenty-five years (Bourne and Bértoa, 2017). Roughly half of all European countries have banned at least one political party (Bourne and Bértoa, 2017). This does not take into account the practice of party banning outside of European democracies, nor does it take into account the unsuccessful attempts to ban parties. Further, it does not take into account the alternate strategies that states might implement to lessen the influence of undesirable political actors before they ultimately ban the party. The cases I examine in this chapter – Belgium, Germany and Israel – are useful because they each provide clear examples of the varying tactics of militant democracy, not only party banning. These are the formal and informal cordon sanitaire, legal penalties, banning parties from taking part in elections or banning them altogether, and precluding particular individuals from contesting elections. Further, these cases demonstrate variation in the outcomes of each of these strategies – outcomes which present a mixed picture about the usefulness of these strategies for ‘securing’ democracy. The German and Israeli cases illustrate the delicate balance which must be struck between the judiciary and the legislature, and that efforts to ban parties may result in galvanizing that party’s constituency. Belgium clearly demonstrates that the cost of banning parties may be felt heavily by mainstream political parties – both in their ability to find suitable coalition partners and in that the banned party may simply reform under a more moderate platform. Similarly, the cases of party banning or individual proscription in Belgium and Israel highlight that the short-term gain of party banning may be offset by the ability of parties and individuals to form new parties and take their constituents with them. The evidence presented shows that targeted parties often suffer only a small, and limited, dip in their popularity among the electorate. The first case takes us to Belgium, where in 2004 the Vlaams Blok, a party characterized as far-right with a platform that highlighted anti-immigration policies and a demand for Flemish autonomy, dissolved itself. The dissolution of the party came after a court ruling which found that the party had breached anti-racism laws.8 The ruling threatened its supporters with prosecution for supporting a racist organization.9 Most crucially the ruling banned the Vlaams Blok from using state funding – such a ruling was effectively a ban as without state funding the Vlaams Blok had no choice but to dissolve. At the time of its dissolution, the Vlaams Blok had growing support in the Flanders’ regional elections, eventually winning 23.4 percent of the vote (Bale, 2007). It had also been the largest political party in Antwerp10 and in 2001 had The Vlaams Blok had called for an amnesty for World War II collaborators, repatriation of non-European foreigners in Belgium and the immediate deportation of any immigrant who was unemployed for more than five months. 9 https://​www​.wsj​.com/​articles/​SB110012769222770701. 10 https://​www​.wsj​.com/​articles/​SB971038047779867630. 8

Democratic Whack-a-Mole  7 15 of its members in the national Chamber of Representatives – one of the two chambers of Belgium’s federal parliament (Downs, 2001). As I shall show across my cases, these parties often have significant support and so banning them or causing their dissolution is a blow to their supporters’ ability to exercise their democratic right – voting for or joining the party that best represents their policy needs and goals. However, it was not long before the Vlaams Blok reformed itself as the Vlaams Belang – a party with the same leadership and many of the same political goals of the Vlaams Blok. The key difference between the two was that the Vlaams Belang adopted softer language regarding immigration. However, the Vlaams Belang still advocates for secession from Belgium as well as repatriation of immigrants who do not respect Flemish culture or Western values. Detractors might argue that the Vlaams Belang is simply the Vlaams Blok in a newer, user-friendly guise. Another set of detractors might argue that the strategies of militant democracy are themselves anti-democratic, removing choice from the electorate. Proponents would argue that the tools of militant democracy worked in this case. The dissolution of the Vlaams Blok resulted in the moderation of an anti-system party. The newly formed Vlaams Belang became a participant in Belgian democracy (even if subject to the same cordon sanitaire of its earlier incarnation). Supporters of the Vlaams Blok could, if they so chose, transfer their votes to this new party. The wheels of liberal democracy did not stop turning. The first attempt to restrict the participation of the Vlaams Blok came in the late 1980s. The other parties in the Belgian parliament signed an agreement that none of them would work with or form a coalition with the Vlaams Blok. This cordon sanitaire was designed to hamstring the party without formally limiting its ability to compete in the political arena.11 However, the Vlaams Blok instead received the most votes it had ever gained in a general election – winning 6.6 percent of the national vote (Downs, 2012). Given the increase in party support in the elections preceding its dissolution (Downs, 2012), it is clear that the cordon sanitaire did not dull the Vlaams Blok’s popularity even if it may have limited its ability to achieve any of its legislative aims. Indeed, the effect of the cordon sanitaire may have had the effect of galvanizing the Vlaams Blok’s base as a result of the party’s treatment by establishment parties and politicians. Meanwhile, the strategy of party ostracism meant that coalition-building became a harder proposition for those parties in the mainstream. It removed a potential partner for right-leaning parties off the table, forcing them to make uneasy alliances with those on the opposite side of the political spectrum. In this example, the strategy of the cordon sanitaire has limited disadvantages for the targeted party and potentially a higher cost for those imposing the cordon sanitaire. Likewise, the later proscription of the Vlaams Blok may have resulted in the dissolution of the party but it was only to be reborn – albeit in a slightly milder guise. In 2019, the Vlaams Belang won approximately 18.5 percent of the vote in Flanders for Belgium’s ‘triple election’ – the regional, national and European elections. Indeed, the Vlaams Belang was second only to the right-wing New Flemish Alliance, which garnered 24.8 percent of the vote. As a result, the Vlaams Belang won 15 seats in the federal parliament (an increase

The cordon sanitaire has been applied in Israel, in France against the Front National, in Britain against the British National Party and in Slovenia against the Slovenian Democratic Party, among many other examples. In a rare example of militant democracy strategies used against the left, the cordon sanitaire has been used against the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia in the Czech Republic (as well as the far-right Rally for the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia). 11

8  Handbook on democracy and security from its previous three seats) and in the regional parliament it increased its seats from six to 23.12 The results of the election show that the cordon sanitaire has limited impact – while it may have been somewhat in the political wilderness in previous years, the Vlaams Belang found a winning political message and a talented team of politicians to sell it. These latest elections are an example of the dangers of the cordon sanitaire for mainstream parties – while the Vlaams Belang has grown in popularity, and its leader even met with the Belgian king in the lead up to government negotiations,13 it has been excluded from any potential governing coalition. The negotiations to form a government at the federal level had been in deadlock and were finally resolved in the closing months of 2020. Like Belgium, Israel has also experimented with the cordon sanitaire. A policy of ostracism was applied against the Kach party. Kach was an extreme right, religious and nationalist party formed by Rabbi Meir Kahane (Pedahzur, 2001). The party platform called for Arabs within Israel to be offered residency rights but not citizenship (Cohen-Almagor, 1994). Beyond this, all non-Jewish Israelis would not hold national rights. The Kach party platform also sought to enforce an overwhelmingly religious character to the state. It is clear from this platform that Kach advocated a religious state which guaranteed rights and preferences to some citizens over others and, indeed, excluded altogether segments of society from rights guaranteed to others. The Kach party platform upsets the balance between the democratic and Jewish pillars of the state, which the Israeli government has struggled to maintain without diluting the democratic and civic values of the country. Kach’s outright religious platform entails anti-democratic measures and forms of exclusion. Kach won enough seats in the 1984 election to win Kahane a seat in the Knesset, the Israeli parliament. The government met the challenge of being faced with an anti-democratic party in the Knesset by constructing new rules designed to restrict Kahane’s potential influence. Kach was not allowed to propose new laws. Kahane had only restricted immunity as a member of parliament (Pedazhur, 2001). In a battle between legislature and judiciary, the High Court struck down these measures (Cohen-Almagor, 1994) due to there being no precedent for them and no provision for them within the Basic Laws. A more informal policy of ostracism was therefore adopted: members of parliament leaving the chamber whenever Kahane got up to speak. In 1985, the Knesset passed an amendment to the Basic Laws which included the right to exclude from participation any party which negated the democratic character of Israel, negated the existence of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and incited racism. Support for armed struggle of an enemy state or terrorist organization against Israel was later added to the amendment regarding list disqualification. Kach was barred from participating in the 1988 elections and its appeal was rejected by the High Court (Cohen-Almagor, 1994). In 1994, following the massacre at the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron by Dr. Baruch Goldstein, a Kach party member, Kach was banned altogether and deemed a terrorist organization. In 2012, Otzmah Yehudit, an ideological successor to the Kach party, was founded. Its leader, Michael Ben-Ari, was himself a member of Kach. It ran for elections in 2013 and 2015 but failed to meet the electoral threshold. In 2019, Otzmah Yehudit formed a coalition with Jewish Home, a religious right-wing party.14 The left-wing parties of Meretz and Labour filed petitions to the Central Elections Committee to ban Otzmah Yehudit from running in the https://​www​.politico​.eu/​article/​inside​-the​-far​-rights​-flemish​-victory/​. https://​www​.bbc​.com/​news/​world​-europe​-48454034. 14 https://​www​.timesofisrael​.com/​jewish​-home​-reaches​-unity​-pact​-with​-extremist​-otzma​-yehudit/​. 12 13

Democratic Whack-a-Mole  9 2019 elections; however, the Central Election Committee ruled against the petition. Otzmah Yehudit is an example of what I term the ‘Whack-a-Mole’15 problem, seen in Belgium, in which banned parties simply reform under a different name and slightly different platform. However, rather than banning the party, the Israeli Supreme Court banned senior members of the party from contesting the 2019 elections.16 The Court found that these members had breached the state’s anti-racism laws. By banning senior members of the party, the party’s ability to run for election or to be a viable coalition member for other parties on the right was hamstrung. However, the party was not disqualified from contesting elections and its constituents were still able to vote for it. These case studies have shown different tactics in managing parties deemed anti-democratic: the cordon sanitaire, in both formal and informal guises; using legal means to limit a party’s ability to contest elections; and targeting particular individuals. Now to Germany. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) is the largest right-wing party in Germany and as the largest opposition party currently has around 12 percent of the seats in the Bundestag.17 The AfD is often accused as being on the far right. It is seen as embracing a nationalism which seeks to downplay Germany’s Nazi past; it emphasizes that German national identity is under threat from immigration and from the European Union. Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution is tasked with seeking out threats to Germany’s democracy. It is empowered with carrying out surveillance against groups which are seen as domestic terror threats or on the fringes of the democratic system. It is also empowered to carry out surveillance against political parties. After a two-year investigation which recently concluded, it found that the AfD should be placed under surveillance.18 Pending the AfD’s legal challenge, the surveillance of the AfD will continue. It is incredible that such a party – the largest opposition party – would be under surveillance for being suspected of posing a threat to the liberal democratic order. In response, the AfD has embraced two strategies: it has launched a legal challenge, claiming that placing it under surveillance is a political move made to hamper the largest opposition party; and it has released a position paper in which it makes clear that it is a party for all German citizens, even naturalized immigrants.19 In this episode with the AfD, the roses and thorns of militant democracy strategies are evident. On the one hand, the AfD has publicly moderated its language, declaring itself a party which represents all German citizens and is dedicated to democracy. On the other, the appara15 Whack-a-Mole is a popular arcade game in which players must successfully hit ‘moles’ which pop up out of holes in the playing surface – as soon as one mole is hit, another pops up, at random and often faster than a player is able to hit before another mole enters the game. Players score points for every successful hit. 16 https://​www​.timesofisrael​.com/​supreme​-court​-bans​-extreme​-right​-gopstein​-and​-marzel​-from​ -election​-race/​. 17 https://​ w ww​ . npr ​ . org/ ​ 2 021/ ​ 0 1/ ​ 2 2/ ​ 9 59264440/​ g ermany​ - expected​ - to​ - put​ - right​ - wing​ - afd​ -under​ - surveillance​ - for​ - violating​ - constitu​ ? utm​ _ medium​ = ​ s ocial​ & ​ u tm​ _ source​ = ​ f acebook​ . com​ & ​ u tm​ _ campaign​ = ​ n pr​ & ​ u tm​ _ term​ = ​ n prnews​ & ​ f bclid ​ = ​ I wAR3lRO580ZVEfKcM ​ _ akzExPkAX​ _fSpaImvEWSiSr9PIp41vjAfb9OEojNKk. 18 https://​ w ww​ . npr ​ . org/ ​ 2 021/ ​ 0 1/ ​ 2 2/ ​ 9 59264440/​ g ermany​ - expected​ - to​ - put​ - right​ - wing​ - afd​ -under​ - surveillance​ - for​ - violating​ - constitu​ ? utm​ _ medium​ = ​ s ocial​ & ​ u tm​ _ source​ = ​ f acebook​ . com​ & ​ u tm​ _ campaign​ = ​ n pr​ & ​ u tm​ _ term​ = ​ n prnews​ & ​ f bclid ​ = ​ I wAR3lRO580ZVEfKcM ​ _ akzExPkAX​ _fSpaImvEWSiSr9PIp41vjAfb9OEojNKk. 19 https://​www​.irishtimes​.com/​news/​world/​europe/​germany​-s​-afd​-rushes​-to​-embrace​-immigrants​ -ahead​-of​-intelligence​-probe​-1​.4463370.

10  Handbook on democracy and security tus of the state would surveil a political party with sitting members of parliament – using the power of the state to strong-arm, as it were, a party to change its platform. On 5 September 2019, councilors in Altenstadt-Waldsiedlung, a village outside of Frankfurt, elected fellow council member Stefan Jagsch of the National Democratic Party (NPD) as head of its town council and in so doing enraged Germany’s mainstream politicians.20 The NPD is a neo-Nazi party which does little to hide its ideological affinity to National Socialism. The NPD formed a movement, by collaborating with militant neo-Nazi groups, transforming the party from a group of aging Nazis to a movement with more youthful supporters. It has been marginally successful in local government elections. The Bundesrat, the legislative body which represents the 16 federated states of Germany, initiated a ban against the NPD. It argued that a ban was necessary given the NPD’s ultimate goal of overthrowing the democratic regime – indeed, there was historical precedent for banning a party on these grounds.21 In the Federal Republic of Germany, upon framing the post-war constitution, lawmakers handed the power to ban political parties over to the judiciary. The Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) accepted the argument that the NPD’s policy goals were anti-constitutional. It concluded that the NPD aims to eradicate the democratic political order; to violate ‘human dignity’ in its attitudes towards migrants, Jews and other minority groups; and to resemble National Socialism through its anti-Semitic and anti-democratic characteristics and goals.22 Nevertheless, in a unanimous decision, the FCC rejected the ban application on the grounds that, due to its size, the NPD was unlikely ever to be in a position to achieve its policy goals. Given the clear precedents for proscribing political parties, and the even clearer unpleasantness of the NPD’s manifesto, German politicians have repeatedly attempted to ban the party.23 The FCC, however, has rebuffed these efforts. The first attempt to ban the party in 2003 failed because so many of the party’s leaders were found to be agents of Germany’s secret service investigating the party that it was difficult to tell who was legitimately a party member, and therefore to gauge the party’s strength and influence.24 In 2017, as previously mentioned,

https://​www​.dw​.com/​en/​germany​-merkel​-party​-colleagues​-elect​-far​-right​-extremist​-to​-local​ -council/​a​-50340079. 21 In 1951, the Socialist Reich Party (SRP) of Germany was banned by the Federal Constitutional Court. The SRP was formed in 1949. It was overtly neo-Nazi and recognized the Third Reich as the legal authority over Germany. Its founders were former Nazis, including SS officers. Its leaders advocated for National Socialism as the only ideology and regime capable of strengthening Germany (Bourne, 2018). Its primary focus was to contest elections, but it had also formed a paramilitary arm – the Reichsfront – which accompanied party leaders to events. In local elections, the SRP had a strong showing. For example, it won an absolute majority in 35 local governments in Lower Saxony and was the largest party in 375 local governments. Its rallies also attracted thousands of followers. In support of the ban, the FCC ruled that the SRP’s political program and the characteristic of the party was similar to, indeed had an ‘essential affinity’ with, the Nazis. The SRP was banned in 1951, with no attempt to revive it since (Bourne, 2018). 22 https://​www​.bund​esverfassu​ngsgericht​.de/​SharedDocs/​Pressemitteilungen/​EN/​2017/​bvg17​-004​ .html. 23 https://​www​.dw​.com/​en/​angela​-merkels​-cabinet​-greenlights​-motion​-to​-cut​-off​-far​-right​-npd​ -from​-state​-funding/​a​-43443315; https://​www​.dw​.com/​en/​germanys​-constitutional​-court​-rules​-against​ -banning​-far​-right​-npd​-party/​a​-37155332. 24 https://​www​.theguardian​.com/​world/​2003/​mar/​19/​thefarright​.germany. 20

Democratic Whack-a-Mole  11 yet another ban attempt failed because the FCC deemed the NPD too small a party to ever realize its ambitions and become a tangible threat.25 The FCC recognized that the policy aims of the NPD go against the German constitution. The constitution states that a party should be banned if it consistently expresses a will, and works towards policies, to overthrow the democratic order regardless of its capacity to achieve those goals.26 In its 2017 decision, however, the FCC reversed the rationale in its previous party-banning decisions that potential to achieve anti-democratic goals was immaterial to banning decisions.27 Instead, the Court recognized the rationale for banning it as legitimate but unanimously ruled in favor of allowing the party to continue and retain the ability to contest elections. In its decision, the Court wrote that ‘the respondent advocates aims … directed against the free democratic order … However, there are no specific and weighty indications suggesting even at least the possibility that these endeavours might be successful.’28 Therefore, while the party met all the criteria for banning laid out in the constitution, the FCC decided that this was less important a consideration than the size and influence of the party. The decision also made clear the importance that political parties be free from state interference, and the primacy of fairness, equal participation in the political system and equality before the law in a democratic system. Inherent in this is the idea that banning the NPD would do greater harm to Germany’s democracy than allowing it to participate in the political system. But given that the NPD has succeeded in winning seats in regional assemblies in the past, and indeed won a seat in the European Parliament, why is it that this most recent electoral victory should so outrage German politicians? Perhaps it has to do with the rise in popularity of the AfD.29 The ban attempts against the NPD reveal that Germany’s ‘mainstream’ politicians view the NPD as, if not an electoral threat, a party which undermines and challenges the liberal and democratic values to which mainstream German parties adhere and promote. With the rise of the AfD, and the proven success of parties on the far right in both national and regional elections, German politicians may fear that the AfD’s smaller cousin, the NPD, may begin to pose an electoral threat too. The German and Israeli cases demonstrate that though there may be clear provisions for banning parties in constitutions, the decisions to ban particular parties are dependent on a number of factors – not least that it requires an alignment between the judiciary and legislature. This alignment is not easy to achieve given their different calculations regarding the threat to democracy. These differing calculations stem from the institutions’ different functions. For the legislature, its focus is on re-election (Shamir and Weinshall-Margel, 2015). Therefore, its decisions are more likely to be based on short-term considerations of whether or not a party harms or hurts its electoral prospects. The judiciary is more likely to be focused on the long-term damage to democracy: the judiciary is more focused on protecting democratic rights, particularly of a minority party or group. This calculation is clear in the case of the https://​www​.bund​esverfassu​ngsgericht​.de/​SharedDocs/​Entscheidungen/​EN/​2017/​01/​bs20170117​ _2bvb000113en​.html;jsessionid​=​13​BB8C29D531​BB8BC62EBA​3C5975F3C2​.1​_cid361. 26 https://​constituteproject​.org/​constitution/​German​_Federal​_Republic​_2014​.pdf​?lang​=​en. 27 https://​www​.bund​esverfassu​ngsgericht​.de/​SharedDocs/​Entscheidungen/​EN/​2017/​01/​bs20170117​ _2bvb000113en​.html;jsessionid​=​13​BB8C29D531​BB8BC62EBA​3C5975F3C2​.1​_cid361. 28 https://​www​.bund​esverfassu​ngsgericht​.de/​SharedDocs/​Entscheidungen/​EN/​2017/​01/​bs20170117​ _2bvb000113en​.html;jsessionid​=​13​BB8C29D531​BB8BC62EBA​3C5975F3C2​.1​_cid361. 29 https://​www​.dw​.com/​en/​what​-drives​-the​-far​-right​-afds​-success​-in​-eastern​-germany/​a​-50264353; https://​www​.bbc​.com/​news/​world​-europe​-41376577. 25

12  Handbook on democracy and security NPD where the FCC rejected the petition to ban it on the grounds that the party was too small to do damage. The conclusion being that banning the party outright would do greater damage to democracy than allowing it to contest elections. This calculation is also present when it comes to the unsuccessful efforts to ban certain parties in Israel. For example, Balad opposes the notion of Israel as a solely Jewish state, advocating instead for a binational state. In 2001, its leader, Azmi Bishara, gave a speech in which he expressed solidarity with Hezbollah.30 Rejection of the Jewish character of the state and support for terrorism is included in Israel’s Basic Laws as conditions which would warrant party banning. In 2003, the Central Elections Committee banned Balad from running in elections on these grounds. The High Court overturned both bans (Pedahzur, 2003). Balad went on to win three seats in the Knesset.31 In 2006, after the second Lebanon War, Balad held three seats in the Knesset, and the three Balad members of the Knesset visited Lebanon to express support for Hezbollah in its fight against Israel.32 In 2009, the Central Elections Committee again attempted to ban Balad from the elections on the grounds that it did not recognize Israel and supported, and called for, armed conflict against it.33 Again, the ban was overturned.34 In 2015, Balad joined the Joint List, an alliance of Communist, Socialist, nationalist and Islamist parties. They constituted the third largest party in the Knesset, with 10.55 percent of the vote.35 Just as in the German case, these parties met the criteria outlined for banning in the Basic Laws, but the Supreme Court decided to rule in favor of protecting the democratic rights of a minority party. Therefore, these institutions have different perceptions of what constitutes a threat to the democratic regime.

FURTHER RESEARCH In my first example, Belgium, the strategies of the cordon sanitaire and penalties were applied with varying success. The legal penalties for the Vlaams Blok led to the formation of the Vlaams Belang, a party with the same membership and a similar platform. Indeed, the Vlaams Belang has surpassed the Vlaams Blok in terms of its electoral success. Likewise, the cordon sanitaire ultimately had little impact on the Vlaams Blok’s and Vlaams Belang’s electoral successes. The Israeli case, too, demonstrates the limitations of the cordon sanitaire. An attempt at a formal policy of ostracism against the Kach party was struck down by the courts and informal ostracism did not seem to dent the party’s popularity. Indeed, its share of the vote rose from 0.3 to 1.2 between 1981 and 1984.36 Banning political parties is a complicated business, as both the Israeli and German cases reveal. It entails a delicate balancing act between the legislature and the judiciary – when the perception of a threat to democracy is not aligned between these two institutions, it is unlikely that the party will be banned. This makes party banning a challenging avenue to go down, even if it remains the ‘weapon of choice’ of many liberal democracies. Another problem with https://​apnews​.com/​article/​15​e723e0b59e​f826614d55​c2a9e350e7. https://​en​.idi​.org​.il/​israeli​-elections​-and​-parties/​parties/​balad/​. 32 https://​ w ww​ . jpost ​ . com/ ​ I srael/ ​ B alad ​ - MKs ​ - meet​ - with​ - Lebanese​ - PM​ - express​ - support​ - for​ -Hizbullah. 33 https://​www​.ynetnews​.com/​articles/​0​,7340​,L​-3654866​,00​.html. 34 https://​www​.haaretz​.com/​1​.5067719. 35 https://​en​.idi​.org​.il/​israeli​-elections​-and​-parties/​parties/​the​-joint​-list/​. 36 https://​en​.idi​.org​.il/​israeli​-elections​-and​-parties/​parties/​kach/​. 30 31

Democratic Whack-a-Mole  13 party banning is the ‘Whack-a-Mole’ problem. Similar to Belgium, banning Kach gave rise to parties with similar platforms and ex-Kach members contesting elections. The utility of banning parties is therefore unclear. The return of banning a party may not be worth the cost to the strength of the institutions involved nor to the democratic values that they are attempting to uphold. Targeting specific individuals while still allowing the parties to contest elections may be a happier middle ground, although its long-term effect is unknown. The roots of militant democracy were planted in political theory. This seems natural as it deals with the fundamental question of democratic values. Popper’s Paradox of Tolerance (1945) remains unsolved. That is that a tolerant society, encapsulated by liberal democracy, will eventually be undone by the intolerant elements that it allows to flourish. This being the case, Popper argues, democracies have the right to suppress intolerant groups. However, it does not follow that this right should always be acted upon. The question of how this right should be acted upon has entered the domain of comparative politics and has been debated in the preceding paragraphs. The question of when it should be acted upon remains largely unsettled. My cases have pointed to two differing perspectives – one being based on predetermined criteria, the other based upon the potential of the party to attain its goals. Another unsettled question is the impact of these militant democracy strategies. Do these strategies shore up the security and stability of liberal democracy? Or do they themselves pose a threat to the norms and institutions of democracy? The cases tell a mixed story. I have shown how the strategies of ostracism and cordon sanitaire may end up impeding the ability of mainstream parties to form viable coalitions, making governance difficult. I have also shown that this strategy may fall foul of the judiciary in some cases. I have also demonstrated that though there may be a short-term effect on the popularity of the ostracized parties, a strategy of cordon sanitaire does not necessarily lessen their popularity or electoral viability in the long run. Indeed, a strategy of cordon sanitaire may end up representing a greater challenge to democratic institutions than to the targeted parties.

CONCLUSIONS These cases reveal that parties which are typically targeted for proscription and banned tend to be identified as right-wing.37 In each of these cases, the Vlaams Belang and Vlaams Blok, Kach and Otzmah Yehudit, and the NPD and AfD are all identified as right-wing. Though there are crucial differences between these parties, they hold some similarities – most crucially their emphasis on who counts as legitimate members of the state. We can therefore expect that parties with a nationalistic platform which is also exclusionary are more likely to be targeted for bans even if there is no overt call to undo the democratic regime. While some of these parties may not overtly advocate reversing the democratic regime, they are still seen as challenging the liberal democratic status quo by virtue of their brand of nationalism, which seeks to exclude some members of the state from being counted as legitimate citizens. However, it

As noted in an earlier footnote, the Czech Republic has used militant democracy strategies against its Communist party. Though Downs, for example, would argue that given the country’s history, this is unsurprising. I have also noted some unsuccessful attempts of militant democracy against parties in Israel which are not traditionally on the right. However, militant democracy strategies are overwhelmingly employed against parties identified as being on the right. 37

14  Handbook on democracy and security is a puzzle as to why this tends to hold true more so for parties identified as being further right rather than parties far to the left which also challenge the liberal democratic status quo. The methods which deal with such parties – cordon sanitaire and ostracism, legal penalties, banning individuals from contesting elections, banning the parties themselves from contesting elections or banning them outright – have varying degrees of success. Success may be understood as limiting the party’s ability to participate in the democratic system without seriously challenging the functioning of that system. The cases have shown that there is a cost to party banning, for both sides. For the banned party, there is most obviously the cost of not being able to contest elections or being banned outright. However, the cases have also shown that often these parties simply adopt a new name and a slightly reformed political platform. In other cases, party members may form entirely new parties (as in the case of Otzmah Yehudit) or join other existing parties. It is unclear whether the cost of banning parties is worth the return. In the short term, these parties are not able to contest elections; however, in the long term the value of political participation is undermined and support for them among their constituents is not eroded. At the same time, the challenge to democratic institutions is not evaded – neither for political participation nor for the balance between the judiciary and legislature. The case of the NPD in Germany demonstrates clearly the gulf that often appears between the judiciary and legislature when it comes to the question of party banning. The judiciary has decided that banning the NPD would pose a greater threat to German democracy than allowing it to participate in the electoral arena. As a result, the NPD has had some success in regional elections in Germany. Proponents of militant democracy would argue that allowing such a party to contest elections is a challenge to the security of Germany’s democracy, while those in opposition to militant democracy would argue that removing the choice from the electorate – that is, allowing the political elite to decide which parties and ideas are politically palatable – presents a greater threat. Strategies of isolation and cordon sanitaire remove meaningful political participation not only from the political party but from its constituents. Likewise, the strategy of party banning effectively removes electoral choice from the citizenry, instead handing the reigns over to a subset of elites who get to define the boundaries of acceptable discourse. The central paradox at the heart of militant democracy remains unresolved. The adventures, and misadventures, in party banning may be the canaries in the coalmine when it comes to how liberal democracies choose to deal with civil society, religious groups and individual citizens. Policymakers should heed their successes and failures.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Bale, Tim. 2007. “Are Bans on Political Parties Bound to Turn Out Badly? A Comparative Investigation of Three ‘Intolerant’ Democracies: Turkey, Spain, and Belgium.” Comparative European Politics 5 (2): 141–57. Bourne, Angela K. 2012. “Democratization and the Illegalization of Political Parties in Europe.” Democratization 19 (6): 1065–85. Bourne, Angela K. 2018. Democratic Dilemmas: Why Democracies Ban Political Parties. Abingdon: Routledge. Bourne, Angela K., and Fernando C. Bértoa. 2017. “Mapping ‘Militant Democracy’: Variation in Party Ban Practices in European Democracies (1945–2015).” European Constitutional Law Review 13 (2): 221–47.

Democratic Whack-a-Mole  15 Capoccia, Giovanni. 2001. “Defending Democracy: Reactions to Political Extremism in Inter-War Europe.” European Journal of Political Research 39 (4): 431–60. Cohen-Almagor, Raphael. 1994. The Boundaries of Liberty and Tolerance: The Struggle against Kahanism in Israel. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. Downs, William M. 2001. “Pariahs in Their Midst: Belgian and Norwegian Parties React to Extremist Threats.” West European Politics 24 (3): 23–42. Downs, William M. 2012. Political Extremism in Democracies: Combating Intolerance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Kirshner, Alexander S. 2014. A Theory of Militant Democracy: The Ethics of Combatting Political Extremism. New Haven: Yale University Press. Lipset, Seymour M., and Stein Rokkan, eds. 1967. Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (Vol. 7). New York: Free Press. Loewenstein, Karl. 1937a. “Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I.” American Political Science Review 31 (03): 417–32. Loewenstein, Karl. 1937b. “Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, II.” American Political Science Review 31 (04): 638–58. Macklin, Graham. 2018. “‘Only Bullets will Stop Us!’ The Banning of National Action in Britain.” Perspectives on Terrorism 12 (6): 104–22. Pedahzur, Ami. 2001. “Struggling with the Challenges of Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism within Democratic Boundaries: A Comparative Analysis.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24 (5): 339–59. Pedahzur, Ami. 2002. The Israeli Response to Jewish Extremism and Violence. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Pedahzur, Ami. 2003. “Who’s Defending Democracy? The Battle among the Elites over the Elections to the 16th Knesset.” In The Elections In Israel: 2003, edited by Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, 85–101. New York: Routledge. Popper, Karl R. 1945. The Open Society and Its Enemies. London: Routledge. Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. Parties and Party Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shamir, Michal, and Keren Weinshall-Margel. 2015. “‘Your Honor, Restrain Us’: The Political Dynamics of the Right to be Elected in the Israeli Democracy.” In The Elections in Israel 2013, edited by Michal Shamir, 59–84. New York: Routledge.

2. Does globalization hurt liberal democracy? An application of saliency theory to the globalization–democracy nexus Nataliia Kasianenko

INTRODUCTION The annual meeting of the World Trade Organization in Seattle in 1999 marked the beginning of an international anti-globalization movement. While the protests against international economic institutions were not new in the late 1990s, the idea that liberal democracies might be dissatisfied with globalization was indeed a new development (Stiglitz 2002). As the economies and markets around the world became more integrated, states became further divided on the domestic level. While the interests of business elites around the world converged as they profited from globalization, domestic audiences in both developed and developing countries felt left behind (Rodrik 2019). Anti-globalization rhetoric mounted from the 1990s and became particularly prominent after the 2008 financial crisis. The Occupy Movement protests, growing anti-European Union (EU) sentiments, and the electoral support for nationalist and far-right parties are manifestations of these grievances over globalization and neoliberalism (Schmidt 2018). The post-2008 period has also been marked by the backsliding of democracy around the world (Diamond 2015, Freedom House 2019). Not only did democratic progress stall in hybrid regimes, but some established liberal democracies started to backslide. This trend has been particularly problematic for many Western scholars and policymakers, who considered a consolidated liberal democracy to be the end point in political development where democracy becomes so engrained into political culture it becomes “the only game in town” (Linz and Stepan 1996, Fukuyama 1989). Yet, Freedom House (2019) notes that 68 states saw a decline in their freedom scores in 2018. Democratic backsliding occurred not only in states that were transitioning to a democratic regime type but also in established liberal democracies. These developments were highlighted by the surprising results of the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom and the electoral victory of Donald Trump in the United States. In addition, many far-right parties and candidates have received electoral support in Europe and beyond. Specifically, far-right nationalists were elected in countries like Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Sweden, Greece, Denmark, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and Israel (Schmidt 2018). In analyzing recent political developments in the West, scholars and policymakers noted mass frustration with globalization as one of the major factors pushing people to support populist leaders who promoted nationalism and anti-immigrant attitudes, as well as the anti-establishment agenda (Rodrik 2019). The new populist parties and candidates in liberal democracies around the world emphasized the saliency of socio-economic concerns brought on by globalization to fuel mass frustration. They increasingly pushed for the end of the 16

Does globalization hurt liberal democracy?  17 status quo, which in many ways signified a retreat of the liberal democracy. Often, these new elites did not have any clear political programs and instead relied on the anti-establishment rhetoric. Many voters were led to believe that they were left behind as a result of political, socio-economic, and cultural changes associated with globalization. Thus, in recent years voters in liberal democracies increasingly supported the idea of bringing their countries back (Oatley 2015). Is globalization really to blame for this reversal of democracy in the West? This chapter critically explores the effects that political, economic, and social dimensions of globalization might have on liberal democracy. I start by synthesizing the state of the current scholarship on the topic. Then, I focus specifically on saliency theory as a way of explaining how globalization may indirectly impact liberal democracies around the world.

THE GLOBALIZATION–DEMOCRACY NEXUS The topic of globalization has received a lot of attention in the academic literature to the point of “globalization” becoming a catch-all type of term. Generally, globalization is defined as the process of closer political, economic, and social integration among countries (Weinstein 2005). The fast pace of progress in transportation and technological development has sped up these processes of interconnectedness. In the last 30 years, the rapid pace of globalization has also coincided with the expansion of democracy around the world. Thus, to many observers, globalization translated into a promise for democracy. Yet, the academic literature is divided when it comes to the connection between globalization and democratization. There are three dominant perspectives on the globalization–democracy nexus. While some studies emphasize the spread of democratic values that accompanied globalization, others find evidence of the negative relationship between the two phenomena. Finally, the third perspective points to the fact that globalization may not have any significant or consistent effect on democracy (Li and Reuveny 2003). Positive Effects of Globalization The idea that globalization has a positive effect on democracy dates back to the writings of Immanuel Kant. In his theoretical work on liberalism, Kant highlighted the links between economic interdependence, international institutions, and democracy. He argued that international trade and prosperity were associated with the propensity of states to maintain peace and the republican form of government (Kant 1983). Since then, the academic literature has described multiple mechanisms that connected economic globalization with democratic progress around the world. Economic globalization expands business opportunities for domestic producers, consumers, and investors who can take advantage of new markets and resources around the world. The intensification of trade among countries has contributed to economic growth and poverty reduction in many countries, particularly the ones with export-oriented economies like China (Rodrik 2018). Scholars emphasize the role of economic development on the rise of the middle class, and the diffusion of democratic ideas that comes with economic openness and interconnectedness, as well as the pressure for democratization and transparency that international organizations and businesses can mount on states. The role of the middle class is particularly prominent in explaining the positive link between globalization and democracy. Free trade and the international monetary exchange generally

18  Handbook on democracy and security contribute to economic development, which eventually leads to the rise of the middle class and the growing demands for democratic reforms (Schumpeter 1950, Lipset 1959, Lopez-Cordova and Meissner 2005, Eichengreen and Leblang 2008). Specifically, the rise of the middle class is accompanied by the changes in political culture, growing levels of education, and public trust, which are essential for democratization (Huntington 1991). The academic literature also focused on democratization that came with political interconnectedness, an increased exposure to other democratic states, and the diffusion of democratic ideas (Huntington 1991, Starr 1991, Whitehead 1996). Democratic states, international organizations, and businesses may actively push for democratization around the world as it increases the stability and transparency of political institutions (Oneal and Russett 1999, Schmitter 2001). Thus, globalization may help democratically oriented companies and non-governmental organizations be more effective in advancing democracy (Diamond 1992, Boli and Thomas 1999, Risse and Sikkink 1999, Schmitter 2001, Keck and Sikkink 2014). Specifically, economic globalization and openness to democratic ideas became the explanations for transitions in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Huntington 1991, Starr 1991). Advancements in communication and technology that spearhead globalization helped spark social movements and democratic revolutions around the world. In particular, democratic movements in Eastern Europe in the 1980s and in the Middle East in the 2010s were facilitated by the broadcast communication and social media technology (Verdery 1999, Mourtada and Salem 2011). Some scholars suggest that globalization weakens authoritarian regimes because authoritarian rulers can lose their ability to hold on to power (Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985, Drake 1998) and may be open to decentralization of political control (Self 1993, Sheth 1995, Roberts 1996). With global integration, governments gradually weaken in their ability to control domestic economic outcomes. Economic development in a country becomes dependent on international forces, foreign states, and non-state actors, which may undermine the power of authoritarian leaders, particularly during the periods of international financial crises (Huntington 1991). Overall, in highlighting this positive impact of globalization, most studies focus on the democratic transformations in the developing countries (Adsera and Boix 2002, Boix 2003, Rudra 2005, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Eichengreen and Leblang 2008). Yet, the positive effects of globalization on the quality of established democracies have been largely underexplored (Lopez-Cordova and Meissner 2005, Eichengreen and Leblang 2008). Negative Effects of Globalization Multiple studies contradict the idea that globalization has a positive effect on democracy (Li and Reuveny 2003, Rigobon and Rodrik 2005, Decker and Lim 2009). When examining the influence of trade openness on democratization, scholars find that trade liberalization, particularly in the short term, benefits some groups more than others, which exacerbates economic inequality and may impede democratization (Boix 2003, Li and Reuveny 2003, Rigobon and Rodrik 2005, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Newly democratic regimes are particularly vulnerable to the negative impacts of trade liberalization (Drucker 1994, Muller 1995, Bryan and Farrell 1996, Cox 1996, Moran 1996, Marquand 1996, Rodrik 1997, Longworth 1998). These states often lack the financial capacity to provide extensive safety nets for their population. As a result, “the losers” of globalization may also lose confidence in the prospect of democracy (Li and Reuveny 2003). In addition, when democratic institutions are weak, the groups that

Does globalization hurt liberal democracy?  19 benefit from trade openness the most may be tempted to capture control over the government (Adsera and Boix 2002). In highlighting the negative effects of globalization in established democracies, scholars have paid particular attention to the issue of populism. The likelihood of political backlash increases as society becomes further divided economically during the advanced stages of globalization (Rodrik 2018). While globalization generally contributes to the global decline in inequality, it also contributes to the hardening of socio-economic cleavages domestically. Specifically, these cleavages are due to some industries, regions, and workers benefiting from technological progress and automation more than others. The uneven gains tend to exacerbate during economic recessions, leading to major tensions “between capital and labor, skilled and unskilled workers, employers and employees, globally mobile professionals and local producers, industries/regions with comparative advantage and those without, cities and the countryside, cosmopolitans versus communitarians, elites and ordinary people” (Rodrik 2018, 23). Scholars have also advanced the idea that globalization erodes sovereignty and contributes to the “race to the bottom” effect (Lindblom 1977, Held 1991, Diamond 1995, Gill 1995, Gray 1996, Cox 1997, Schmitter 2001, Jones 2013). The growing relevance of supranational institutions like the EU may contribute to a perceived democratic deficit since international institutions increasingly engage in political decision-making on behalf of states. Public opinion polls in the EU states show growing Euroscepticism as more Europeans perceive the EU institutions in Brussels as unaccountable and detached from the true concerns and interests of the ordinary people, the residents of the EU. These Eurosceptic attitudes are linked to the desire of the people to restore sovereignty, limit economic interdependence, and regain political control over their states. The 2016 Brexit vote, in particular, was a manifestation of both anti-EU and anti-globalization types of voter concerns (Hobolt 2016). Ultimately, advanced globalization weakens the sovereignty of democratic states because it increases the dependency of these states on foreign markets and elevates the political power of international institutions and multinational companies. The interests of these foreign actors might not correlate with the needs of the majority population inside a democratic state (Rodrik 2018). Studies suggest that governments may manipulate public opinion and restrict media freedom in a country to attract foreign direct investment, which ultimately negatively affects democratization (Gill 1995, Im 1996, Martin and Schumann 1997). Political leaders may be more interested in satisfying the interests and demands of foreign investors and multinational corporations, while downplaying the needs of the people. Along with this logic, authoritarian states might be more politically efficient in the age of globalization since these regimes are not restrained by public demands and electoral pressures. Another view in the academic literature points to the idea that globalization in essence translates into the internationalization of politics and culture, which contributes to the erosion of citizenship and national identity. As a result, the attachment to a nation and the responsibility that comes with citizenship also become diminished, leading to political apathy and the decline of liberal democracy (Cox 1997, Boron 1998, O’Donnell 1993, Im 1996, Sassen 1996). At the same time, globalization and specifically Westernization may cause a cultural backlash in the form of radicalization. Therefore, another negative effect of globalization on democracy may be associated with the hardening of ethnic and religious identities, rising fundamentalism, and xenophobia (Robertson 1992, Im 1996).

20  Handbook on democracy and security Globalization Has No Effect on Democracy A third perspective within the academic literature suggests that the effects of globalization have been overexaggerated and globalization does not have a significant effect on democracy (Scharpf 1991, Hirst and Thompson 1996, Wade 1996, Hirst 1997, Jones 2013). A number of quantitative studies measured the levels of democracy and the degrees of trade liberalization to find that trade openness does not have an impact on democratization, particularly in the context of developing states (Giavazzi and Tabellini 2005, Rigobon and Rodrik 2005, Decker and Lim 2009, Milner and Mukherjee 2009). Finally, some scholars concluded that the effects of economic globalization on democracy are not universal. They may manifest themselves positively or negatively in some countries, while not affecting democratization in others (Haggard and Kaufman 1995, Frieden and Rogowski 1996, Milner and Keohane 1996, Longworth 1998). Overall, the relationship between democracy and the various manifestations of globalization involves a great deal of complexity and nuance. The positive effects of globalization are not guaranteed as they may be contingent on the distribution of resources in a country or the levels of social welfare that the government provides. Specifically, in a country with a large number of skilled and mobile workers, globalization may lead to a growing socio-economic divide between the skilled and the unskilled groups (Boix 2003). Socio-economic divisions will in turn have a negative impact on democratization. At the same time, research finds that if a government invests in social welfare programs, these negative effects of globalization can be moderated or eliminated (Rudra 2005).

GLOBALIZATION AND ISSUE SALIENCY Globalization is associated with rapid changes in society that create “winners” and “losers” in every country, regardless of its economic development or regime type. These changes require political elites to devise new solutions in creating opportunities and safety nets for those individuals who may be “losing” due to globalization. Some elites may be unwilling or unable to advance specific policies to alleviate issues that pertain to income inequality, migration, and job market volatility, to name just a few. In these conditions, the elites may choose to place the blame for the country’s domestic issues on “others,” be it intergovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, foreign countries, or minorities. As a result, voters in liberal democracies like the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, Poland, and Hungary are increasingly supporting political programs and slogans that seek to reverse the transformations brought on by globalization. These programs are diverse and may involve attacks on economic elites (the 1 percent), on immigrants and minorities, or on international/ supranational organizations. While populists are often criticized for manipulating public attitudes and undermining democratic institutions, they are rather effective in capturing the grievances that many people have with regard to globalization (Bremmer 2018). Overall, populists appeal to the masses through the claims that the ordinary people are both ignored by the elites and left behind by globalization (Bonikowski and Gidron 2016, Müller 2016, Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, Rooduijn and Akkerman 2017, Rydgren 2017). They propose major transformations to the political establishment. At the same time, populists tend to be inconsistent in their political positions

Does globalization hurt liberal democracy?  21 and ideologies. Their main priority is gaining support in elections, which requires them to be flexible and adjust their political objectives based on the needs of the majority. While populist politicians may not have any specific solutions to address the problems brought on by globalization, they nevertheless want to retain political power or advance to power. Therefore, these political entrepreneurs continue putting the blame on the liberal establishment, emphasize the saliency and urgency of political and socio-economic issues, and search for scapegoats domestically and internationally. These populist trends in established democracies tend to be destabilizing and subversive for the democratic process. In this chapter, I advance the idea that saliency theory can be applied to understand how globalization may threaten liberal democracies. Specifically, political elites emphasize and highlight the negative effects of globalization to consolidate power and “reclaim” sovereignty. Scholars have relied on saliency theory to explain party support among voters in advanced multi-party democracies. Saliency theory posits that due to limited resources, political parties and candidates cannot solve all the issues that voters have. Therefore, parties tend to prioritize certain issues over others. By assigning varying degrees of importance to different voter concerns, parties and candidates help voters differentiate multiple political candidates during elections (Budge 1994, Klingemann et al. 1994, Pelizzo 2003, Franzmann and Kaiser 2006). Parties and candidates have the ability to manipulate the saliency of some issues over all others. Based on the expectations of voter preferences, political elites may also switch from focusing on one set of relevant issues to another (Budge 1994, Klingemann et al. 1994). According to the “cue-taking” theory of representation, political parties might offer cues that shape voter preferences and beliefs. As political parties take positions on particular issues, they are able to convince voters that their personal preferences reflect what party positions and priorities are (Popkin 1991, Zaller 1992, Lupia and McCubbins 1998). At the same time, the voters also send cues to political parties as to what their most pressing concerns may be at the moment. With this theoretical foundation, I argue that saliency theory can be used to understand how globalization may indirectly lead to democratic backsliding in liberal democracies through the active role of political elites. In the past, radical parties in established democracies represented exclusively the far-right and the far-left positions on the ideological spectrum and appealed to narrow groups in society. In recent years, radical parties are gaining momentum and receiving widespread public support by emphasizing broad socio-economic and political concerns (Gidron and Hall 2017). The key to the recent success of these parties and candidates is their ability to resonate with the public by appealing to the most salient concerns of the masses. Populists pick up on the relevant issues of voters and make these issues even more salient. The type of issues that populists exploit depends on the country context and the pre-existing cleavages in society. For example, if a country is experiencing a surge in immigration, it might be easier to manipulate public opinion and capture public support by blaming immigrants and refugees for major socio-economic issues in the country. Populists often link immigration to unemployment and crime and label immigrants as a burden on public welfare systems. Alternatively, if a country is hit hard by the economic recession, populists may blame international organizations, foreign investors, and global corporations, as well as advocating for isolationism and economic nationalism to bring back the control over the country’s economy to its people. This emphasis on increasing the saliency of public fears is key to understanding how populists in established democracies may undermine the democratic process by pretending to speak in the name of the majority. Once advanced to power, populists continue to fuel the saliency of

22  Handbook on democracy and security public concerns as they attack democratic institutions and processes, and advance policies that undermine minority rights. I will highlight the application of saliency theory by focusing on different types of globalization-related issues. Specifically, I will examine political, economic, and social dimensions of globalization using examples of how political elites may emphasize and manipulate the saliency of globalization concerns in different countries. Political Dimension of Globalization While globalization is primarily associated with deepening economic connections among states, the related political integration is an important dimension of globalization. In discussing these processes, scholars focus on the potential decline of state sovereignty and the democratic deficit issues that arise with the growing influence of supranational institutions, intergovernmental organizations, and international non-state actors (Steger 2017). Populist groups may focus on these issues by presenting political elites, international institutions, and organizations as the enemies of the people. As a result, anti-establishment politicians in liberal democracies often criticize the corrupt elites, who enrich themselves by embracing globalization, liberalism, and cosmopolitanism while disregarding the needs of the ordinary people in their countries (Rydgren 2005, Bonikowski 2017). In times of political or economic crises, populists find it easier to obtain public support by pointing to those responsible for the crisis, rather than offering long-term solutions to solve this crisis. Public opinion studies suggest that “the more distant people feel from decision-makers, the more inclined they are to believe that the growing disconnection of – international and national – elites translates into decisions and policies not responding to their needs” (Hajdu et al. 2018). This is particularly relevant in the context of the EU, with some Europeans perceiving the government in Brussels as too distant and out of touch with the needs of the people. These public sentiments lead to the anti-EU agenda that populist parties eagerly embrace (Hajdu et al. 2018). In response to the Eurozone financial crisis, European populists blamed the European Commission, the European Council, and the European Central Bank for ineffective policies and regulations. They criticized these international institutions for being too intrusive in the domestic affairs of the EU member states (Rodrik 2018). The Brexit vote in the United Kingdom was largely the result of the popular demand to free Britain from the control of unelected EU policymakers. Specifically, the Leave campaign spearheaded by Boris Johnson urged Britons before the 2016 referendum, “I hope you will vote Leave and take back control of this great country’s destiny” (Hall 2016). Johnson described the EU as “an increasingly anti-democratic system” that should no longer be making political decisions for the United Kingdom. Surveys out of Western European countries suggest that people who support populist parties tend to have low levels of trust towards traditional political institutions and the media (Simmons et al. 2018). In 2016, the supporters of Donald Trump in the United States similarly embraced the populist call to “take back the control” over the country from the establishment politicians and foreign countries working against the interests of the American people. As the U.S. president, Trump continued reinforcing the idea that the United States was threatened by the international institutions it helped create. Speaking at the 2018 United Nations General Assembly session, Trump’s rhetoric was explicitly directed against the political dimension of globalization: “We will never surrender America’s sovereignty to an unelected, unaccountable, global bureaucracy. America is governed by Americans. We reject the ideology of globalism, and

Does globalization hurt liberal democracy?  23 we embrace the doctrine of patriotism” (The White House 2018). Populists tend to exaggerate the saliency of international threats to stability and security brought on by other countries, supranational institutions, and international organizations, putting into question the validity of international institutions. Along with criticizing the establishment politicians that support political integration, populists also help erode the public trust in domestic government institutions, which puts Western democracies in danger. Economic Dimension of Globalization Economic globalization refers to “close economic integration by way of increased trade, foreign investment, and immigration” (Weinstein 2005, 2). This dimension of globalization highlights the power of global corporations, wealthy elites, and international financial institutions. Economic globalization has been the driver of major socio-economic changes around the world contributing domestically not only to economic growth but also economic inequality (Rodrik 2018). Technological progress, specifically the rise of automation, contributes to the loss of jobs among the unskilled workers and the loss of competitiveness in certain industries. Populists avoid blaming the faceless technology and automation for their country’s economic problems. They also prefer not to pursue costly and long-term solutions to these problems, such as the expansion of welfare programs or investment in education and retraining of workers. Instead, they look for scapegoats responsible for the salient economic issues. More often than not, these scapegoats are foreign countries, multinational corporations, international financial institutions, and immigrants (Rodrik 2018). In the context of Europe, left-wing populists emphasize key economic grievances like unemployment and income inequality by putting the blame on international trade, multinational companies, and international organizations (Gomez et al. 2016, Gidron and Hall 2017). In Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has elevated the saliency of socio-economic concerns among the Hungarian people by blaming international financial institutions and immigrant groups for the country’s recession. In particular, Orbán has organized anti-immigration campaigns in Hungary with slogans such as “If you come to Hungary, you cannot take away Hungarians’ jobs” (Dunai 2015). Studies of the EU indicate that immigration fears, unemployment, and perceived losses from international trade are the core economic fears that drive the vote for populist parties (Algan et al. 2017, Guiso et al. 2017, Simmons et al. 2018). Similarly, a study by Colantone and Stanig (2018) examined individual-level data from 15 European countries between 1988 and 2007 to find that fears over the expansion of Chinese imports contributed to support for the far-right nationalist parties. The economic dimension of globalization was also a major point of criticism for the Brexit Party in the United Kingdom. The leader of the party, Nigel Farage, congratulated the British people after the 2016 referendum by saying, “We have fought against the multinationals, we fought against the big merchant banks, we fought against big politics, we fought against lies, corruption and deceit” (Gatehouse et al. 2016). In Latin America, populists gained momentum by emphasizing the vulnerability of domestic economies to foreign imports and multinational corporations, particularly in sensitive domestic industries like mining. Left-wing populists also enhanced the saliency of the economic threats brought on by the international financial institutions, like the International Monetary Fund. Populist parties were able to mobilize the public frustration over economic losses to globalization without offering specific solutions to solving the economic problems

24  Handbook on democracy and security (Rodrik 2018). Quite similarly, in the United States, populists highlighted the issue of economic vulnerability to foreign trade, specifically to imports from China and the need to review the terms of international trade agreements between the United States and its closest trading partners. Left-wing populists gained momentum after the housing crisis in the United States by repeatedly pointing out that the government did not compensate the average Americans for the losses they suffered, instead deciding to bail out major financial corporations (Rodrik 2018). Overall, populists were able to channel the economic fears of the masses in liberal democracies around the world into anti-globalization rhetoric. Unfortunately, more often than not, this type of rhetoric does not lead to effective policy change domestically, and instead challenges the neoliberal world order that Western democracies created and helped support for decades. Social Dimension of Globalization The social dimension of globalization refers to the integration of societies and cultures around the world (Steger 2017). Right-wing populists often attempt to gain public support by appealing to ethnonationalism while maintaining the focus on defending the interests of the people at large (Rodrik 2018). Right-wing politicians often blame minority groups, immigrants, or refugees for the country’s socio-economic problems (Rodrik 2018). Specifically, they emphasize the differences in national, ethnic, and religious identities and present them as dangers to the country’s stability, security, and dominant culture. Populists in Europe often point to the threat of Muslim immigrants, and the vulnerabilities created by various minority groups (e.g., the Roma people, the Jews). In the United States, populists also demonize various groups of immigrants as a threat to security (e.g., the Muslims, the Mexicans) and economic welfare (the Mexicans, the Chinese) (Rodrik 2018). In Slovenia, the rhetoric of the far-right politicians further deteriorated the position of economic migrants from the former Yugoslav nations. Specifically, the members of the Slovenian National Party (SNS) targeted migrants as the lead cause of Slovenia’s economic problems, such as unemployment and economic recession (Bajt and Pajnik 2010). The SNS, a populist party with no clear economic platform, placed the non-Slovene immigrants at the center of its political rhetoric. Populist politicians portrayed immigrants as groups inferior to ethnic Slovenians and blamed them for Slovenia’s socio-economic problems. The leader of SNS, Zmago Jelinčič, used openly xenophobic rhetoric in addressing the migrants, who had no legal residency status. He advanced the idea of denying any social or economic rights to the migrants, arguing, “democratic Europe would throw those people on trucks, train wagons or planes and send them back to their home countries” (Chládková and Mareš 2015, 124). The far-right politicians portrayed the immigrants as an economic burden and a personal threat to every Slovene’s job security (Bajt and Pajnik 2010). The mass media also portrayed ethnic Slovenians as being a more advanced and superior ethnic group compared to others. Movies and television series portrayed migrants as low-income, uneducated, unattractive, and poorly assimilated into Slovenian society (Gorup 2013). In Hungary, populists continue marginalizing the immigrants, as well as local Jewish and Roma minorities. Thousands of Roma who live in Hungary are the common targets of political “ethnicization” of poverty and crime (Halasz 2009). In particular, the elites have advanced social programs to fight “Gypsy crime” and linked Roma with the abuse of Hungary’s welfare programs. One of these social programs involved the creation of the “Hungarian Guard,” an anti-Roma and anti-Semitic paramilitary group engaged in propaganda and patrols of Roma

Does globalization hurt liberal democracy?  25 neighborhoods in rural Hungary (Halasz 2009). Hungary’s political elites also promoted an image of what it means to be Hungarian, based on a narrow criterion of ethnic background. In his speeches, Prime Minister Orbán has emphasized the greatness and superiority of the Hungarian nation, as well as the threat that other nations and cultures (including European states) pose for Hungary. In an attempt to make immigrant threats more personal, Orbán notes, “They (Hungarians) do not want to see their country thronging with people from different cultures, with different customs, who are unable to integrate; people who would pose a threat to public order, their jobs and livelihoods” (Durocher 2015). The rhetoric of political elites has been effective, prompting the rise in xenophobic violence in Hungary. According to the survey research in 2015, a record number of Hungarians (46 percent) are xenophobic, with only 9 percent of the population viewing immigration in a positive way (Bernat et al. 2015). Thus, aggression and violence against minorities can become a reaction of the majority groups to the socio-economic issues that populist leaders emphasize.

CONCLUSION In the last 30 years, globalization has manifested itself in major political, economic, and social transformations. The interconnectedness among states, markets, and societies has brought some countries out of poverty, elevated the status of minorities, and given individuals more economic and political freedom. Yet, globalization has also contributed to economic inequality, socio-economic insecurity, and the sense of disillusionment with liberalism and democracy around the world. These rapid and ambiguous changes are increasingly affecting democratic societies. The loss of public trust in domestic and international institutions, and resentments towards big banks and international corporations, have been amplified after the 2008 financial crisis. Liberal democracies around the world are witnessing a rising tide of populism (Acemoglu and Robinson 2019). While globalization is neither the direct cause nor the only cause of democratic erosion, the different dimensions of globalization point to more direct factors behind the public discontent with the status quo. The growing power of international institutions, fast technological developments that increase the economic gap between skilled and unskilled labor, increased economic competition among states and companies, and the ease of international migration get reinforced in the advanced stage of globalization. The academic literature is rather divided on the question of whether globalization hinders democratization and hurts the established democracies. Saliency theory can help identify the specific drivers behind democratic backsliding associated with globalization. Populist leaders are emphasizing the saliency of key public concerns and further fuel the mass frustration with political, economic, or social dimensions of globalization. Populists tend to pick up on the types of grievances that matter the most to the public and commit to addressing these grievances in their rhetoric and political programs. As political elites amplify the saliency of socio-economic and political concerns, they identify the scapegoats responsible for these issues. As a result, liberal democracies may face a public backlash against the establishment politicians who support the existing domestic institutions, international integration, economic liberalism, and multiculturalism. Populists often highlight the globalization-related issues that are indeed pressing, yet they tend to not offer any meaningful solutions to these issues. More importantly, the attack on globalization and the political establishment often translates into the attack on democracy. Many liberal democracies today are facing growing political polariza-

26  Handbook on democracy and security tion, identity issues, and the weakening of democratic institutions. Scholars and policymakers should refocus the attention of the public on the specific solutions that limit the negative effects of globalization. These solutions should emphasize job creation, reducing income inequality, promoting education, and investing in social safety nets.

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Does globalization hurt liberal democracy?  29 Oneal, John R., and Bruce Russett. 1999. “Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 36 (4): 423–42. Pelizzo, Riccardo. 2003. “Party Positions or Party Direction? An Analysis of Party Manifesto Data.” West European Politics 26 (2): 67–89. Popkin, Samuel L. 1991. The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Rigobon, Roberto, and Dani Rodrik. 2005. “Rule of Law, Democracy, Openness, and Income: Estimating the Interrelationships.” Economics of Transition 13 (3): 533–64. Risse, Thomas, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1999. “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction.” In The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, edited by Thomas Risse, Steve C. Roop, and Kathryn Sikkink, 1–38. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Roberts, Bryan. 1996. “The Social Context of Citizenship in Latin America.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 20 (1): 38–65. Robertson, Roland. 1992. Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. London: SAGE. Rodrik, Dani. 1997. Has Globalization Gone Too Far? Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. Rodrik, Dani. 2018. “Populism and the Economics of Globalization.” Journal of International Business Policy 1 (1–2): 12–33. Rodrik, Dani. 2019. “Globalization’s Wrong Turn.” Foreign Affairs 98: 26. Rooduijn, Matthijs, and Tjitske Akkerman. 2017. “Flank Attacks: Populism and Left-Right Radicalism in Western Europe.” Party Politics 23 (3): 193–204. Rudra, Nita. 2005. “Globalization and the Strengthening of Democracy in the Developing World.” American Journal of Political Science 49 (4): 704–30. Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, and Peter Evans, 1985. “The State and Economic Transformation: Towards an Analysis of the Conditions Underlying Effective Intervention.” In Bringing the State Back In, edited by Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, 69–92. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rydgren, Jens. 2005. “Is Extreme Right-Wing Populism Contagious: Explaining the Emergence of a New Party Family.” European Journal of Political Research 44 (3): 413–37. Rydgren, Jens. 2017. “Radical Right-Wing Parties in Europe.” Journal of Language and Politics 16 (4): 485–96. Sassen, Saskia. 1996. Losing Control: Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization. New York: Columbia University Press. Scharpf, Fritz Wilhelm. 1991. Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy. New York: Cornell University Press. Schmidt, Vivien Ann. 2018. “The Past Decade and the Future of Governance and Democracy: Populist Challenges to Liberal Democracy.” In Towards a New Enlightenment? A Transcendent Decade, 326–46. Madrid: BBVA. https://​www​.bbvaopenmind​.com/​wp​-content/​uploads/​2019/​02/​BBVA​ -OpenMind​-book​-2019​-Towards​-a​-New​-Enlightenment​-A​-Trascendent​-Decade​.pdf. Schmitter, Philippe C. 2001. “The Influence of the International Context upon the Choice of National Institutions and Policies in Neo-Democracies.” In The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas, edited by Laurence Whitehead, 26–54. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1950. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper & Row. Self, Peter. 1993. Government by the Market? The Politics of Public Choice. London: Macmillan. Sheth, D.L. 1995. “Democracy and Globalization in India: Post-Cold War Discourse.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 540 (1): 24–39. Simmons, Katie, Laura Silver, Courtney Johnson, and Richard Wike. 2018. “In Western Europe, Populist Parties Tap Anti-Establishment Frustration but Have Little Appeal Across Ideological Divide.” Pew Research Center, July 12. https://​www​.pewresearch​.org/​global/​2018/​07/​12/​in​-western​-europe​ -populist​-parties​-tap​-anti​-establishment​-frustration​-but​-have​-little​-appeal​-across​-ideological​-divide/​. Starr, Harvey. 1991. “Democratic Dominoes: Diffusion Approaches to the Spread of Democracy in the International System.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 35 (2): 356–81. Steger, Manfred B. 2017. Globalization: A Very Short Introduction (4th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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3. The regional adoption of elite rejection and populism Keely Eshenbaugh

ELITES: A GROUP DEFINED BY POWER Political elites have been defined broadly as people “at or near the top of the pyramid of national power” (Putnam, 1976, p. 14). While scholars have argued more specific definitions of the characteristics and goals of elites, all definitions include the criteria that political elites are individuals that have the means and ability to influence national politics by being close to the top. Embodying Meisel’s “three Cs”—cohesion, consciousness, and conspiracy—many believe that elites and elite theories must be centered around a small group of individuals that run everything seamlessly (Meisel, 1964). However, there are no defining characteristics of elites embedded in Meisel’s Cs that stipulate cohesion can only come from a group of ten or less or that perfect cohesion is a goal of elites. Similarly, a definition that elites are “the leadership [of a body politic] and the social formations from which leaders typically come, and to which accountability is maintained, during a given generation” loses validity by adding social approval to the requirements of elites (Lasswell, Lerner, and Rothwell, 1952, p. 13). As Putnam suggests, the importance of size, composition, and autonomy should be left for empirical studies of elite theory. As power is central to the influence and importance of elites, there are two categories of power that can be distinguished: first is the power to influence individuals over other individuals and second is the ability to influence decision making (Dahl, 1968). While these two forms of power can reinforce and strengthen one another, political power dominantly comes from the second form of power, influencing decisions (Putnam, 1976). Steven Lukes’ first face of power, the open face, emphasizes transparency and obvious deliberation in the decision-making process, contributing to Dahl’s assertion (Lukes, 1974). As the first face is commonly thought of as having a democratic nature, the second face of agenda setting (to allow or ban policies from the agenda) and third face, insidious manipulation, are commonly used by elites in more discrete settings. For example, the political power of the senior population less commonly refers to the ability of the older generation to influence the younger generation and more commonly refers to the older generation’s ability to secure favorable retirement policies like Social Security. Studying how the elite wield their power using direct and/or indirect influence is an area of the study of elite theory that should take the number of actors, environment, public opinion, anticipated reactions, and more into consideration (Friedrich, 1937). Classic elitists Mosca, Pareto, and Michels share five principal assumptions about elites. First, political power is distributed unequally. Those with the “highest indices in their branch of activity” are referred to as the elite, who can be governing or non-governing (Pareto, 1935, p. 1423). The governing elite are active in and have the ability to influence political life, while the non-governing elite do not have a significant role. Pareto does not expand on the relation31

32  Handbook on democracy and security ship between these two classes of elites, but simply identifies there is a difference. Second, all individuals can be classified dichotomously as those with significant political power and those without (Pareto, 1966). Third, elites are not only isolated individuals, but they know one another and operate in a makeshift exclusionary club (Meisel, 1964). Elites generally share backgrounds with similar interests, education, wealth, and maybe even familial pedigrees. Fourth, successful elites are chosen from pools of other elites. Fifth, because elites are self-perpetuating, they are essentially autonomous and do not have to answer to anyone outside of the group (Mosca, 1939). Dominating the masses, classic elite theorists believe that elites are isolated from the rest of society, are chosen from within their own ranks, and only serve the interests of other elites as an “iron law” (Michels, 1959). But why do we see that the political elites vary from one country to another? Mosca answers, “the varying structure of ruling classes [elites] has a preponderant importance in determining the political type, and also the level of civilization of the different peoples,” such as in feudal societies where elites have military valor while modern bureaucratic elites have wealth (Mosca, 1939, p. 51). Starting in the twentieth century, scholars have been trying to identify a typology that elites in particular regime types, regions, and developments of political-economic structures can be categorized into. The “Western” elites and “Soviet” elites were proposed, but missed the nuances between Western states as well as non-Western and non-Communistic elites (Aron, 1950). Authoritarian, totalitarian, cartel, and liberal elites were also outlined as a possible typology, shining light on the absence of a liberal elite that could have rescued Germany during World War II (Dahrendorf, 1967). Robert Putnam later added consensual, competitive, and coalescent “types” that respectively related policy choices and political procedures to communist, stable democratic, and multi-ethnic democratic regimes (Putnam, 1976; Burton and Higley, 2001). Other categories of elites have been posed more recently, but none of them have found popular acceptance in the field. The role of the elites has changed dramatically as societies become more politically complex, making it more challenging to separate the general social structure from elite activities. This complication has challenged many of the elite theories that have been observed in the twentieth century (Blondel and Müller-Rommel, 2009).

INTERNAL SPLINTERING Bordering the literature on coalition characteristics and social networks, elite groups vary in their internal differentiation and integration. Differentiation is a process where groups of elites become more specialized in their offerings, diverse in their organizational structure, and numerous (Keller, 1979). Integration includes the internal unity or structure of the elite group itself; similar to Meisel’s “three Cs” (Meisel, 1964; Putnam, 1976). In this sense, four subtypes of elites can be assumed: strong integration with wide differentiation, strong integration with narrow differentiation, weak integration and wide differentiation, and weak integration with narrow differentiation (Burton and Higley, 2001). Strong integration with wide differentiation, or the consensual elite, has a lot of elites that are locked into a network that operates in many sectors. The group recognizes one another as legitimate elites and provides connections and access to central decision makers. The ideocratic elite, strong integration with narrow differentiation, is very centralized with an elite group that pledges allegiance to the mission of its monopolistic movement. With weak integration and

The regional adoption of elite rejection and populism  33 Table 3.1

Political elites and regime type

 

Elite integration Strong Wide Elite differentiation Narrow

Weak

“Consensual elite”

“Fragmented elite”

Stable

Unstable

Representative regime

Representative regime

“Ideocratic elite”

“Divided elite”

Stable

Stable

Unrepresentative regime

Unrepresentative regime

Source:  Taken from Burton and Higley, 2001.

wide differentiation, the fragmented elite often disagrees with one another’s goals but finds security in pluralism. Lastly, the divided elites have weak integration and narrow differentiation. The divided elites seek to destroy the other camp by any means possible to ensure their power continues to dominate the arena. Recognizing different structures of power, wide differentiation supports a more representative regime type where elite groups take turns dominating. Similarly, strong elite integration creates a stable environment for politics to operate in. Burton and Higley (2001) map these regime traits onto the four types of political elites, creating Table 3.1. This typology was designed to help with the lack of empirical studies about elites and elite control. Being able to identify an elite is not possible by only looking at the top position-holders in large organizations or corporations. Some CEOs may have a lot of wealth and influence in their sphere, but do not translate it into political power. Others may not be the president of a large organization, but have connections to make critical phone calls to influence policy. Organizational-positional identification of elites is complex, but can become easier with the use of interviews, informants, network analyses, and snowball sampling (Burton and Higley, 2001). Discerning boundaries is another conflict of uncovering the motives of elites because their business is often kept secret for reasons of personal gain or deliberate sabotage. Exactly as Mosca pointed out, elites usually do not have to answer to anyone outside of their group (Mosca, 1939). The “elite club” or “power elite” has historically been composed of political, economic, and military men, and is responsible for or aware of a large political move; an investigator of any kind would have a hard time penetrating the group to know any details (Mills, 1956). The second, third, and so on in command would be just as hesitant in giving up “insider” information as the key elite actor.

POPULISM AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT If elites are challenging to categorize and find, let alone talk to, how can they be removed from power? How can elites be rejected or overthrown when most of society does not know who we are talking about when we say “elites”? The most popular social movement attempting to remove elites from power and give it back to the rest of society is known as populism, but it has been challenging for scholars to outline the boundaries of populism scholarship. ‘New Populism’ in the twenty-first century commonly uses appeals to the people to challenge who holds legitimate political power, the elites or general polity, primarily in liberal democracies (Canovan, 1984, 2004; Taggart, 2000). If simply wanting to appeal to “the

34  Handbook on democracy and security people” is considered populism, most people, including elites, would be considered populists. For example, those running for seats in the government often make promises or claims to support the people’s goals for the economy. It is contradictory to include the members of government who are typically elites in the definition of populists. For this reason, more conditions need to be introduced to be considered a populist (Müller, 2016). First, a populist must be critical of elites. Second, a populist must also be anti-pluralist and believe that the people alone are capable and responsible enough to run the government. Unified with all of society, populists combat the corrupt elites. Third, populism is a form of identity politics where the conditions of democracy are challenged. Democracy requires pluralism as society is diverse along with its aims. Like most terms in political science, there is not one agreed-upon definition of populism. The term “populism” did not emerge until the latter half of the nineteenth century in Russia and then in the United States (Urbinati, 2018). Russian populists were intellectuals who voiced concern over peasants and dreamt about an ideal society; meanwhile, populists in the United States were using the Constitution to undermine the place of ruling elites (Walicki, 1969; Taguieff, 1997). After World War II, populism caught on throughout Latin America, where populist regimes dominated during periods of socioeconomic modernization (Urbinati, 2018). Fitting between collapses of fascism and democracy, populism became a legitimate form of government in Latin America and for periods in Western Europe. As a “form of collective action aiming to take power,” populism has been problematic theoretically and empirically because of its seemingly endless bounds as an ideology, logic, discourse, and/or strategy (Moffitt and Tormey, 2013; Urbinati, 2018). The contestability of populism has become so dramatic that we can disregard the concept of populism completely because of how saturated its value has become, or we can embrace the plurality and hope to generate more insightful mechanisms (Gellner and Ionescu, 1969; Laclau, 1977; Taggart, 2000). Most common in comparative literature is the use of populism as an ideology (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). As a “thin-centered” ideology, Mudde argues that populism can be present in a wide variety of interactions and is not limited to operating within one particular paradigm’s assumptions. Populism’s minimal ideological definition allows research to overcome regional and normative biases, but not all scholars agree that populism can be activated as an ideology. Loose assumptions, validity, and utility coupled with the lack of wide-spread, global populist movements challenges populism as an ideology (Moffitt and Tormey, 2013). Populism as a political logic stems from the people being in a “communitarian space” where society hinges on the logic of the political (Laclau, 2005). Populism as a discourse focuses on the “anti-status quo discourse … by symbolically dividing society between ‘the people’ (as the ‘underdogs’) and its ‘other’” (Panizza, 2005, p. 3). This body of literature is criticized for not empirically analyzing the area of study well, but focusing primarily on “proving” the applicability of Laclau (Moffitt and Tormey, 2013). Lastly, populism as a strategy formally attributed populism to only thriving in conditions of low organization or institutionalism. While that condition may be historically true for the majority of Latin America, it fails to explain why populism is gaining speed in a highly disciplined Western Europe (Hawkins, 2010). While populism as an ideology, logic, discourse, and strategy each come with unique critique and speculation, empirical research on populism should still be carried out in the hope of strengthening beneficial cords. One of the most glaring critiques of populism is that the will of the people is often varied without unanimity for one single solution, policy, regulation, procedure, or ideal. Without perfect harmony, how can populists claim to be representing 100 percent of the population? In

The regional adoption of elite rejection and populism  35 government voting, the populist will side with the majority consensus, thus defying their own identity (Urbinati, 2018). With a narrowed focus, populism is not trying to arrange a genuine consensus where there is total agreement on common goods. Populists strive to advocate for policies that benefit “real people,” not corrupt elites that try to assert their influence over policy (Müller, 2016). Referendums are common tools for populists to use because they ask for the real opinion of the public. A referendum does not facilitate an “open-ended process of democratic will-formation” because it is “not [primarily] a path to more participation in politics” (Müller, 2016, pp. 101, 57). Rather, its primary goal is to ensure that the will of elites does not overthrow the will of the people. Highlighting the will of the people, populism tries to bring underrepresented populations back into the discussion. With populism’s goal of being unipolar, there is a strong likelihood that democracy will not exist and perhaps the preferences of the minority will be pushed even further into submission by being out-ruled by the majority (Müller, 2016; Taggart, 2000). That is, as populism emphasizes being unified in one voice, the voice of the public, there will still be opinions that are not represented in the polity, but rather, these minority opinions will be dissolved into the populist claim that all of the polity is represented.

LATIN AMERICAN BIRTH Latin America is one of the most common regions for populist studies in comparative politics. Less concerned with agrarian movements, populism in Latin America is often concerned with urban political parties that are headed by charismatic leaders that end up ruling as “Populist dictators” (Canovan, 1981). Huge followings of the working class with sections of the higher class, a demagogic leadership style, and national policies aimed at modernization and integration are the main ingredients found in Latin American populism (Canovan, 1981). Perón in Argentina, Vargas in Brazil, and Chávez in Venezuela manipulated the public by giving welfare, redistribution, and handouts while leaving them generally out of politics (Di Tella, 1990). Latin American literature on populism primarily takes a historical institutionalist approach focusing on the lack of regulatory state bodies and on influential state leaders, and by-passing political parties (Robertson, 1993; Cammack, 2000). Additionally, the populist elites in Latin America are often classified as “Ideocratic elites” as they are successful in monopolizing political power within their party or organization or as “Fragmented elites” due to fraud and unforeseen seizures of power (Burton and Higley, 2001). One of the most manipulative and colorful cases of populism was led by Juan Perón, who “perceived the masses of barely literate but recently uprooted poor on the doorstep of the political system and invited them in” (Kirkpatrick, 1971, p. 30). Perón used populism as a persuasive political style—rolling up his sleeves during speeches to show solidarity with the descamisados,1 verbally attacking the oligarchy, claiming to serve the wishes of the people, and expanding social programs to the people (Canovan, 1981). His wife and First Lady of Argentina, Evita, was hailed to be a patron saint of the poor as she was from immigrant parents 1 The descamisados, translated as “the shirtless ones,” were the impoverished workers of Argentina, and Juan Perón’s primary supporters. Juan Perón’s wife, Eva Duarte de Perón (more commonly known as Evita), became the cherished icon of the descamisados due to her poor upbringing and dedication to the working class.

36  Handbook on democracy and security and grew up in extreme poverty. Evita’s rise to power was symbolic of the strength of the people, helping to gain supporters for Juan Perón’s anti-elitist narrative. Hugo Chávez was less symbolic in his appeals to the people and more literal. His campaign slogans claimed “¡Chávez es Pueblo!” (Chávez is the people!) and “¡Chávez somos millones, tú también eres Chávez!” (Chávez we are millions, you are also Chávez!). The narrative of Chávez went beyond subtleties and was quite simple—Venezuelans were to believe that they were one with Chávez, and Chávez was to serve the people. Populists “always want to cut out the middleman” and claim that they are the solution themselves—not institutions, political parties, nor community organizations (Müller, 2016, p. 23). Cutting out the middleman, for populism, means there are fewer people involved that can gain power, influence, and wealth from political decisions. In theory, there is a more direct line between the people and politicians because populist politicians should be seeking out the preferences of the people. However, in practice, as seen in Venezuela, there are still plenty of opportunities for corrupt politicians to serve the preferences of the elite and hide the corruption behind a narrative that they are doing what they believe is best for the uninformed population.

EUROPEAN ADOPTION AND REVISION Eleven men throughout Europe shared the ideas of peace and Europe became a more advanced and prosperous region after World War II. Now known as the “Founding Fathers” these men sought to create an organization that ended war between neighbors and united the European countries through their economies and politically in hopes to secure long-lasting peace (European Union, n.d.). The Treaty of Rome in 1957 created the European Economic Community (EEC) as a common market for trade that lowered custom duties and created joint agriculture production between the six member states, but the overarching goal of this organization was for Europe to grow into an economically and politically fortified unit. Thirty-five years later, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, known as the “Treaty on European Union,” established the European Union as we understand it today as well as the European Monetary Union to combat currency fluctuations, completing the robust ideas the Founding Fathers set out to do (Oatley, 1997; McNamara, 1998). After World War II, Western Europe set out to achieve a system of representative politics that allowed for regional integration (Gellner and Ionescu, 1969; Taggart, 2004; Urbinati, 2018). At the state level, institutions constructed ways of representing domestic and local interests; meanwhile, at the national level, states bound together based on elite agreements that were still favorable to the masses. Elites in Europe have been very stable and followed processes of political representation through elections, classifying European elites as “Consensual elites” (Burton and Higley, 2001). European states have not historically accepted populism as a legitimate form of governance as Latin America has, but there are characteristics of populism embedded throughout the European Union. The public has recently taken to the streets throughout the region, voicing concerns over fuel prices, such as the “Yellow Vest” protests that began in France and have continued for over a year. Political parties have emerged such as the Alternative for Germany, the Five Star Movement in Italy, and the People’s Party in Spain. Euroscepticism, demanding more representation and less European Union integration, has captured the attention of many citizens (Chamorel, 2019). Trust in the European Union has declined strongly since 2007 with the United Kingdom’s 2016 Brexit referendum being

The regional adoption of elite rejection and populism  37 a glaring indicator of European Union skepticism (Caporaso, 2018; European Parliament, n.d.). Populism in Europe focuses on far-right movements, anti-immigration, anti-taxation, and ethnic regionalism which has seemingly garnered more support in the twenty-first century, but scholars are still shy to admit populism is in full effect in an advanced, industrial society (Taggart, 2004). Not only have political parties and coalitions been capturing the skepticism of citizens within the European Union, but Union member states themselves have also been critiqued for not being fully democratic. As most of the European Union policy decisions serve the elites and do not satisfy domestic demands, there is a strong case to be made that the European Union, and therefore the associated members, are counter-majoritarian and suffer from democratic deficiency (Moravcsik, 2002). A democratic deficit is the gap between citizens’ aspirations for democracy and their satisfaction with the democratic performance of their own state (Norris, 2011). Commonly referred to alongside of the “winter of democracy” (Hermet, 1991), “the era of post-democracy” (Crouch, 2004), and the “death of democracy” (Keane, 2009), a democratic deficit occurs when legitimacy, accountability, and/or transparency become obscured to the public. The concept of a democratic deficit was introduced in the discussions of European Union legitimacy because of the lack of transparency of national affairs in the Union institution (Norris, 2011). To explain how the stability of democracy is challenged, there are “demand-side” and “supply-side” theories (Norris, 2011). Demand-side theories focus on cultural explanations of societal modernization such as a development in literacy, education, cognitive skills, trust, and community networks. Supply-side theories place blame on institutional arrangements, the policy process, dissatisfaction in public goods, and power-sharing arrangements. While the demand- and supply-side theories of democratic deficiencies can both contribute to the shakiness of democracy, accountability, and transparency, we wonder if one approach seems to dominate the narratives of organizations. That is, do organizations, such as labor unions and businesses, construct and disseminate stories of cultural (demand) or institutional (supply) celebrations and hardships more frequently to their membership? In states where there is an existing populist ideology or a populist ideology is beginning to break through into mainstream politics, are organizations influencing their membership to have an opinion of democracy that is foundationally built upon institutional arrangements or cultural significance? Learning patterns of narrative construction among influential institutions can provide insight into whether other countries are being primed for the rejection of elites, what agenda issues the public is adopting as important, and the possibility of democratic backsliding (Merry, 2016). The narratives that have been constructed and lingering in Europe, so far, have focused on a mixture of supply- and demand-side qualities. The cultural changes from immigration, institutional lack of European Union transparency, policy restrictions from the European Commission, and underwhelming “European” identity have dominated the discussion of Europe’s future for the past decade (Ammaturo, 2019; Caporaso, 2018). A driving, Europe-wide reason for the increase of populism, rejection of elites, and move away from democracy stems from the dissatisfaction of elites in Brussels (the location of the European Union headquarters) making decisions that affect states that the elites are not in tune with. This critique by citizens extends further as the institution of the European Union becomes so increasingly complex that the Union consistently falls short of accountability and transparency that would be expected in advanced democracies (Norris, 2011). The following discussions of

38  Handbook on democracy and security France and the United Kingdom provide support for European Union members “backsliding” from democracy and a democratic deficiency taking place (Kelemen, 2017). The French National Rally (NR), more commonly known as the National Front (FN), was founded in 1972 and has been guided by the Le Pen family for decades. The FN formed as a response to a felt erosion of French life by immigration, Islam, corruption, terrorism, and disruption of heritage stemming from the French Revolution (Reynié, 2016; Morgan, 2017). While there have been times of minimal support for the NR, the movement never ceased and has been gaining support in the last two decades. Marine Le Pen, the current President of the NR, served as a Member of the European Parliament for 13 years and lost two campaigns for France’s President (2012 and 2017) but did have notable support in her campaign (particularly 2017). Critical of the International Monetary Fund, European Union, European Central Bank, globalization, and transnational authorities, Le Pen appealed to working- and middle-class voters who felt that French decisions were being made by European elites that disregard the material and ideological concerns of the general public. While the FN remains a minor party in France, these same sentiments have taken over with majority support in the United Kingdom.

BREXIT AS EUROPE’S GLARING POPULIST MOVEMENT As of today, there are 27 members of the European Union and 19 of those members are also members of the European Monetary Union. Most significantly, the United Kingdom is no longer a member as of January 2020. In June 2016, the United Kingdom voted 51.9 percent in favor in a referendum, known as “Brexit,” to remove itself as a member of the European Union. Scholars are still trying to decipher the motivations for the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, but most of the discussion has centered around three core reasons— sovereignty, economics, and immigration (Friedman, 2016; Caporaso, 2018). The people of the United Kingdom wanted control over domestic policy along with freedom from the bonds of the European Commission, the elite bureaucrats in Brussels were portrayed as out of touch with domestic preferences, and a strong anti-immigration narrative was adopted by those that feared their way of life was at risk (employment, housing, welfare, etc.). On the surface, Brexit appears to be the most intense result of a populist movement that Europe has ever faced, and follows Taggart’s (2004) assessments of populism in Europe. However, it also appears that the public, mass media, and scholars are hesitant to state that populism has infiltrated Europe, and continue a narrative that small traits and characteristics of populism in Europe are present (Freeden, 2017). Why have scholars not accepted that populism has gone beyond “developing” in Europe and is presently powerful? The following section extends the definitional and behavioral criteria of populism, as previously used in Latin America, to the United Kingdom, making the argument that scholars in this vein need to go further than tip-toeing around the possibility of populism in Europe. From Müller (2016), the first requirement of populism is that there is an appeal to the people to make the change to reject elites. The Brexit referendum was first seriously discussed by Prime Minister David Cameron in 2012 after the Treaty of Lisbon institutionalized more power from the states into the European Union. The final decision of the fate of the United Kingdom in the European Union was a public referendum, voted upon by citizens. While big business, international organizations, labor unions, and more certainly used propaganda to sway citizens into the “Remain” or “Leave” camps, Brexit was ultimately left to the public. The second

The regional adoption of elite rejection and populism  39 condition is that populism must be critical of elites and have an anti-elitist position. On June 22, 2016, the Daily Mail (a popular right-wing newspaper) headlined an article “Lies. Greedy elites. Or a great future outside a broken, dying Europe … If you believe in Britain, vote Leave” (“Vote Leave,” 2016). A popular discussion formed, that elites in the European Union have been cherry-picking where certain businesses, policies, and regulations should be put to benefit their own interests. Not only are the elites those that represent the United Kingdom and do their business within the boundaries of the state, but all European elites had the opportunity to “get in” on the benefits that the United Kingdom had to offer. Related to elite criticism is the idea that the public is competent and capable alone to run the government. The citizens of the United Kingdom did not go so far as to say they do not need a prime minister or parliament to run the affairs of the government, but citizens were outraged that many domestic decisions were being made by bureaucrats in Brussels that are not well informed about the concerns or desires of the citizens of the United Kingdom. Lastly, populism is a form of identity politics and challenges the fundamentals of democracy. While the citizens of the United Kingdom are not challenging the democratic principles of their own Parliament and Prime Minister, citizens voted to pull back on their role of participating in a democratic, regional institution. The United Kingdom no longer has Members in the European Union’s Parliament and will not be formally represented in Europe’s aim of regional and economic integration. And while the Leave campaign was supported by the Conservative Party, the elitist party in the United Kingdom, additional confusions lie in the elite’s desire to step away from the European Union. It would be expected that the elites would gain more power and prestige by remaining in the regional decision-making body; moreover, there must be hidden domestic benefits for elites that outweigh the regional benefits.

RECOGNIZING DEMOCRATIC DEFICIENCY VIA TWITTER While Brexit was a popular vote by citizens, there was an intense campaign period leading up to the vote in June 2016. Labor unions, businesses, politicians, and more publicly posted their stance on whether to “Leave” or “Remain” in the European Union. To better understand the strength of democratic deficiency in the United Kingdom, the remainder of this chapter will analyze whether supply- or demand-side narratives were used more frequently by “Leave” organizations during the Brexit referendum. Organizations in favor of the “Leave” campaign were chosen for this study because their agenda was positioned to be anti-elitist with the aim of distancing the United Kingdom from the European Union. As a reminder, the elites in most European Union member states (as the United Kingdom once was) act as “Consensual elites” that are in stable regimes with regular, representative elections (Burton and Higley, 2001). If supply-side narratives are more common, then we have reason to believe that the institutional arrangements and elite advantages from membership with the European Union were more concerning and threatening to United Kingdom citizens. This would provide grounds for more research to analyze if organizations that wanted to leave the European Union were mostly concerned about the role of elites and would sacrifice democratic development for the sake of rejecting elites and the hope of returning a voice to the people. If demand-side characteristics are more commonly used in the narratives, we can infer that the disapproval of elites had very little influence on the United Kingdom’s democratic backsliding.

40  Handbook on democracy and security Table 3.2

Descriptive statistics

Organization

Supply-side

Demand-side

Both

Irrelevant

ASLEF

563

241

59

284

RMT

936

193

36

542

BFAWU

2

0

0

9

BAT

74

36

0

93

Total

1,575

470

95

928

(51.336%)

(15.319%)

(3.096%)

(30.248%)

Tweets were used as the data source for this study because they are narratives that organizations develop themselves and publish in public software, and Twitter permits the purchase of genuine data. The following Twitter accounts of British organizations that supported the “Leave” campaign were reviewed: the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF) union; the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT); the Bakers, Food and Allied Workers’ Union (BFAWU); and British American Tobacco (BAT). These four organizations were in support of the “Leave” campaign and were specifically chosen for this study because they were in favor of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union, they all had active Twitter accounts during the time of the Brexit referendum, and they are all organizations based in the United Kingdom. Official tweets were reviewed from each organization from January 1, 2015 to July 23, 2016. Brexit was first mentioned by former Prime Minister David Cameron in 2013, and then Cameron ran on a platform of ending the United Kingdom’s European Union membership in 2015 during his re-election campaign. As it was an important platform in Cameron’s campaign and all four organizations had Twitter accounts, January 2015 was a sensible date to begin analyzing tweets. The Brexit referendum was voted on and passed on June 23, 2016, and we wanted to capture some of the post-referendum narratives as Brexit was a shock to the world; hence, we stopped analyzing the tweets that took place one month after the referendum. In total, 3,068 tweets were individually coded by a single coder. To decipher whether the demand- or supply-side theory of democratic deficit best explains the Brexit decision, this study coded tweets from United Kingdom businesses and labor unions as the following: (1) Supply-side (S), (2) Demand-side (D), (3) Irrelevant (Z), and (4) Both (B). Supply-side tweets discussed protests, Members of Parliament, prime ministers, laws, privatization, and other institutional discussions. Demand-side tweets told personal stories, and discussed the achievements of communities, solidarity with others, and disadvantaged communities. Tweets coded as “Irrelevant” were direct messages to others, the announcements of monthly newsletters, unreadable tweets (meaning they were likely images), etc. Lastly, “Both” were tweets that had a mixture of supply- and demand-side attributes that did not have a dominant leaning. Table 3.2 provides a summary of the 3,068 tweets broken down by organization and code classification. It is evident that supply-side characteristics were the most frequently used by each organization. As was predicted, “Leave” organizations constructed and publicized more supply-side narratives that focused on institutional arrangements. Criticizing the elites of the European Union and advocating for the termination of the United Kingdom’s participation in a regional democratic institution are two elements of both populism and democratic backsliding that cannot be neglected as we continue to discuss the evolution of international order and development. Table

The regional adoption of elite rejection and populism  41 Table 3.3

Narrative examples Supply-side

Demand-side

In 6 days our country will be taking to the ballot box. Vote

ASLEF Gen Sec says “the EU referendum is a debate being

Labour for fair economy, housing and the NHS (ASLEF)

driven by fear” (ASLEF)

UK commuters paying six times as much as comparable

I’m so proud that Londoners have today chosen hope over fear

European passengers as privatisation subsidises other parts

and unity over division (ASLEF)

(RMT) Tosh McDonald @ASLEFunion the #EU 4th Rail Package

“I’m disgusted”: People respond to MPs vote against accepting

makes public ownership of railways impossible #Lexit on 23

2,000 child refugees (ASLEF)

June (ASLEF) Another betrayal of Britain’s steel as new trains to be built in

Producing less risky alternatives to cigarettes has clear benefits

SPAIN in a £490m deal (RMT)

for society in helping to reduce smoking-related disease! (BAT)

Watch @johnmcdonnellMP proclaim a @UKLabour

Driver Only Trains will increase the dangers and disadvantages

Government by 2020

faced by disabled and vulnerable passengers

(BFAWU)

(RMT)

3.3 provides narrative examples of the two main categories, supply-side and demand-side, that were coded for in this study.

RESULTS The findings show overwhelming support for the dominant use of supply-side narratives throughout the United Kingdom’s “Leave” organizations that were tested in this study. To reiterate, the demand side of democratic deficit looks to focus on the cultural aspirations of human development, focusing on education endorsing democratic values, while the supply side of democratic deficit attempts to understand public dissatisfaction through institutional arrangements, policy performance, and democratic processes (Norris, 2011). It was previously hypothesized that Brexit was able to gain so much support because of European Union skepticism, a rejection of elites in Brussels, a desire for more political sovereignty, and a crisis over the euro (Friedman, 2016; Caporaso, 2018). However, there was also a large debate surrounding the importance of immigration, refugees, and social welfare that would appeal to the demand-side theory (Bulman, 2018; Koch, 2017; Virdee and McGeever, 2018). In the brief selection of tweets above, we can see that the supply-side theory more accurately depicts the democratic deficit seen in the United Kingdom as most of the tweets are concerned with government action, European Union policies of infrastructure, and disparity of resources between Union member states. There is still an important discussion on the cost of Brexit falling to the workers and how fear is being used by organizations and individuals to further their ideas of European Union membership; however, it does not overcome the discussion of the large national and regional changes that were taking place in 2016. Once again, the limitation must be noted that this depiction displays the rejection of grand European Union institutions and policies from the perspectives of national businesses and labor unions, not the individual citizens that casted a vote. Even through this limitation, there is value in understanding that the organizations that are generating narratives of institutional failures and rejecting elite integration are also the organizations that have advocated for the backsliding of democracy (Crow and Lawlor, 2016; Crow and Jones, 2018).

42  Handbook on democracy and security Furthermore, as the Brexit narratives of labor and business organizations are focused on the supply side of the democratic deficit, we will expect there to be a push for institutional change in the coming years; both within the national government of the United Kingdom, regarding new trade policies or new customs procedures, as well as in the regional government of the European Union, updating transportation systems or negotiating visa statuses with non-member states. The rejection of European Union institutions and elites by the United Kingdom, resting on the grounds of a lack of infrastructure assistance, lack of transparency, and desire for sovereignty over national policy, is a hit to democracy that has never occurred so starkly in a Western democratic state before.

CONCLUSION Checking off all of the definitional criteria of populism, Brexit is the obvious and stark result of new populism in Europe. Populism is not only present but dominating the direction and narrative of many European states through means of a supply-side democratic deficit. Citizens are dubious of elites, want power to return to the state, are not impressed with governmental transparency, and regional democracy has diminished by losing the United Kingdom as a member state of the European Union. It is not only Latin American states with lower gross domestic product per capita, weaker institutions, and unstable political parties that have been consumed by populism. But also the United Kingdom, as a hard case, where political parties have been strong for decades, the currency is stable, and there has been a long legacy of industrialization, yet populism is still breaking down the expansion of democracy and rejecting the leading role of elites in the government. Scholarship must not shy away from classifying regional or state movements as populist when all definitional and behavioral criteria are met in order to preserve the notion of democracy and democratic superiority, as seen with Brexit in the United Kingdom. This proper classification will prompt insightful comparative analyses between traditionally unpaired states, such as Venezuela and the United Kingdom, to understand the nuances between populist movements and elite narratives, and understand paths of the decomposition of democracy.

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4. The impacts of water scarcity on the security of democracies Elizabeth A. Koebele and Karen Simpson

1. INTRODUCTION Water is essential for all human and environmental systems, making its management one of the most formidable challenges of our time. In addition to being necessary for life, water is fundamental to economic prosperity and social development. Water scarcity, which occurs when the collective demand for freshwater exceeds available supplies, can therefore have severe impacts on human societies and the ecosystems on which they depend. In democratic and democratizing countries, water scarcity presents a dual challenge. On the macro scale, water scarcity stresses the environmental and socioeconomic systems that undergird democratic regimes. On the micro scale, efforts to address water scarcity often test the limits of democratic procedures and principles. In this chapter, we discuss the impacts of water scarcity on both of these scales to examine the diverse ways in which it can impact the security of democracies. Currently, “about 4 billion people experience severe water scarcity during at least one month of the year” (UNESCO 2019, 1). Over the next century, continued population growth and economic development are expected to increase demands for freshwater and exacerbate scarcity issues, potentially leading to a 40 percent gap between available global water supply and total demand by 2030 (Addams et al. 2009). Moreover, climate change is expected to increase the spatial and temporal variability of water supplies, as well as human and ecosystem demands for water in some already-arid areas (Kundzewicz et al. 2008; Wang et al. 2016). Together, these challenges will lead to an estimated 25 percent of the population living in a country affected by chronic or recurring shortages of freshwater by 2050 (United Nations 2020). The impacts of water scarcity on human and environmental systems are multifarious. Perhaps most obviously, a lack of freshwater for human use can lead to food insecurity and sanitation crises, as well as reduced economic productivity and income, particularly in heavily water-dependent sectors such as agriculture (Ding, Hayes, and Widhalm 2011; Moe and Rheingans 2006). Second-order effects of water scarcity on human systems include the loss of capital resources or capital stock in water-dependent sectors, negative impacts on industries that rely on those sectors or in the economy as a whole, and the potential for increased social and political conflict (Ide 2015; Jiang 2009; Smith 2014). Some studies also report associations between extreme water scarcity and broad-scale migration, lowered prospects for economic development, and civil conflict (Brown and Lall 2006; Caldwell 1975; Findley 1994; Selby and Hoffmann 2014). Water scarcity can also have severe impacts on natural systems. For example, reduced river flows can lead to declining water quality, disruptions for impacted flora and fauna, soil and land degradation, aquifer subsidence, increased risk of wildfire, greater incidence of pests and invasive species, and loss of biodiversity (Crausbay et al. 2017; Ding et al. 2011; Lake 2003; Wilhite, Svoboda, and Hayes 2007). In some cases, 45

46  Handbook on democracy and security water scarcity can play a role in ecosystem transition, such as desertification (Batllori et al. 2019; Le Houérou 1996). Without significant changes to current practices, water scarcity is likely to increase in the future and create widespread impacts on social, economic, and ecological systems across the globe. Consequently, many scholars view it as one of the most important geopolitical issues of our time (Falkenmark 2013; Globalization TrendLab 2016). That said, the impact of water scarcity on politics and political outcomes across countries is often indirect. Political regime type is one component in the complex set of social, institutional, and political conditions that moderates a society’s vulnerability and response to resource stress and scarcity (Adger 2006). While the debate about the merits of different regime types for managing natural resources is robust, research on the impact of resource prevalence on different types of governments is less common. Scholarship in this area has tended to focus on the impact of resource wealth related to extractable and easily exportable resources, such as oil or minerals, on political outcomes (Ross 2001, 2004). The political dynamics of resource scarcity, particularly related to other natural resources like land or water, are less clear. The importance of water resources to both human activity and ecological sustainability, as well as the rising risk of water scarcity in countries across the world, call for a deeper assessment of how water scarcity might impact democratic governance, including when and how it may threaten democratic security. The remainder of this chapter addresses this issue by first introducing the various definitions and causes of water scarcity through an interdisciplinary lens, and then examining the impacts of water scarcity on democratic regimes at both macro and micro scales. We conclude with a discussion of innovations related to water use and management that may help to address scarcity challenges and promote democratic security.

2.

DEFINITION AND CAUSES OF WATER SCARCITY

Different definitions of “water scarcity” abound, though most point to the idea that scarcity occurs when a society’s average demand for freshwater regularly exceeds its average supply. Some scholars have attempted to quantify different levels of water stress and scarcity based on variables such as a country’s renewable water resources, population, and consumptive use withdrawals (Damkjaer and Taylor 2017; Falkenmark, Lundqvist, and Widstrand 1989). Others, however, caution against the development of a generalizable threshold for defining scarcity, due to variation in water use and reuse patterns (Pereira, Cordery, and Iacovides 2002). Moreover, issues of water quality, cost, timing, intra- and inter-annual variability, and localized accessibility, among other factors, also influence whether a society has adequate water supplies to meet its demands (Mekonnen and Hoekstra 2016; Sullivan, Meigh, and Giacomello 2003). While these variables are difficult to integrate into parsimonious metrics for detecting water scarcity, they point to the fact that water scarcity is something that can be influenced to some degree through water resource management practices (Van Loon and Van Lanen 2013). Given the lack of consensus on how to define and measure water scarcity, we use a very broad definition in this chapter: water scarcity arises any time the collective demand for freshwater exceeds the available supply at a given scale and time. The following sections discuss factors that contribute to a geographic or temporal mismatch in water supply and demand.

The impacts of water scarcity on the security of democracies  47 Drought and Aridity Water scarcity is perhaps most commonly associated with aridity and drought. Arid regions are those that permanently lack moisture, whether due to low or highly variable precipitation, or high rates of evapotranspiration. Drought is also associated with a lack of precipitation, though it is considered more temporary in nature. Moreover, drought typically accumulates slowly, has long-term and widespread effects, ranges in severity due to the context in which it occurs, and rarely creates the kind of structural damage associated with other socio-environmental hazards (Wilhite 2000). Both drought and aridity can contribute to “natural” (as opposed to “man-made”) water scarcity (Pereira et al. 2002, 2) by limiting the amount of available water supplies in certain regions. This phenomenon has also been called “physical” or “absolute” water scarcity, signifying that enough water is simply not available to meet demands (FAO 2012). Importantly, however, the severity of drought and aridity can be also affected by humans in a number of ways, including through anthropogenic climate change and its consequent effects on global temperatures and the hydrologic cycle. Due to the continued release of climate-altering greenhouse gases, the extent of global arid zones is expected to increase over the course of this century, as is human population growth in these zones (Lickley and Solomon 2018). This not only increases the risk of water shortages but can also lead to declines in water quality that further reduce usable supplies (Zimmerman, Mihelcic, and Smith 2008). These are not only problems for the future, however: researchers have found that climate change is already affecting drought severity across the world. For instance, in the Colorado River Basin in the western United States, studies have found that a recent two-decade drought was caused both by shifting precipitation patterns and by increased temperatures that reduce total runoff – both factors associated with climate change (McCabe et al. 2017; Udall and Overpeck 2017). Infrastructure and Institutions Water infrastructure, such as dams and reservoirs, can mitigate the impact of drought on water scarcity to some extent by storing water when it is plentiful and distributing it during dry periods. Consequently, even when drought induces water stress in a given location at a given time, it does not necessarily lead to water scarcity. Conversely, a lack of water infrastructure may also contribute to water scarcity – a phenomenon known as “economic” water scarcity (FAO 2012). Under these circumstances, even when a country’s renewable water resources are adequate, “a lack of significant investments in water infrastructure in order to make these resources available” can cause water demand to outstrip supply (Damkjaer and Taylor 2017, 517). Further complicating the relationship between infrastructure and water scarcity are recent studies that have found that expanding water storage infrastructure can have unintended consequences on a region’s water use and risk of scarcity. For instance, having more water storage may actually promote greater water consumption while also increasing a region’s vulnerability in times of shortage by creating a false sense of water security (Di Baldassarre et al. 2018). Additionally, water infrastructure development is often a politically popular decision, which can lead to overdevelopment of basins, which may increase long-term water scarcity while also negatively impacting the environment (Molle 2009). Similarly, insufficient institutions can contribute to water scarcity. In this context, institutions are the “laws, policies, and organizational arrangements” (Blomquist, Schlager, and

48  Handbook on democracy and security Heikkila 2004, 4) that govern how water is managed in a given place, including aspects such as allocation, distribution, and use. Although institutions are often created in response to the conditions in a region – for example, the humid eastern United States uses a different approach than the arid western United States for allocating water – they may also lag behind the realities of water scarcity (Rijsberman 2006). For example, in regions such as the Murray–Darling Basin in Australia and the Colorado River Basin in the western United States, water management institutions have historically allowed for over-allocation of water supplies (Garrick 2015), meaning that the total amount of water granted for use via rights or permits regularly exceeds the available supply. Not only does over-allocation create stress on environmental systems, but it introduces uncertainty for societies dependent on limited water in arid areas. Similarly, in many areas across the world, groundwater development has historically been largely unregulated and uncoordinated with surface water allocation regimes, leading to significant over-pumping and depletion of aquifers (Konikow and Kendy 2005). Water management institutions may also lead to water that is prohibitively expensive or unevenly distributed across a population, leading water-insecure communities to turn to alternatives such as bottled water (Herrera 2017; Pacheco-Vega 2019; Spronk and Webber 2007). A lack of water caused by the mismanagement or over-allocation is sometimes referred to as “artificial water scarcity” (Slavíková, Vojáček, and Smejkal 2017). Changing Water Demands Finally, water scarcity is not only caused by supply issues, but also by increases in human and ecosystem demands, which have many complex and intertwined drivers (Gonzales and Ajami 2017). Demand management technology and practices have led to a decoupling of water use and population growth in many urban areas of developed countries like the United States (Garcia and Islam 2018); however, rising demand in developing countries, due to factors such as population growth, economic development, and shifts in wealth patterns, are expected to outweigh declines or stabilization elsewhere and lead to a net increase in future water demand (Alcamo et al. 2003; Postel 2000). Climate change is expected to further increase water demand by humans and ecosystems as temperatures rise and heat-related weather events become more frequent (Zimmerman et al. 2008). Considering these projected changes in water demand alongside likely changes in supply provides a more complete picture of the causes of water scarcity.

3.

MACRO- AND MICRO-SCALE IMPACTS OF WATER SCARCITY ON DEMOCRATIC SECURITY

As stated above, the primary goal of this chapter is to better articulate the ways in which water scarcity may impact the security of democratic regimes. Democratic political regimes are typically characterized by features such as regular, fair, and competitive elections; high levels of participation in politics by the public; and the provision of various civil and political freedoms (Gasiorowski 1996; O’Donnell 2010). Academic discussions about the security of democratic regimes are often concentrated on the risk of government breakdown, or the transition from a democratic to a non-democratic regime (Cheibub et al. 1996; Foa and Mounk 2016; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013; Svolik 2008). Some scholars also consider

The impacts of water scarcity on the security of democracies  49 processes and risk factors associated with the degradation of democratic regimes, wherein the state retains a democratic regime type but the overall quality of democracy declines (Diamond 2015; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2019). The factors that are most commonly cited as critical for democratic stability and quality tend to be related to institutional design (Lijphart 1991; Linz 1990; Mainwaring 1993), political dynamics (Foa and Mounk 2016; Linz and Stepan 1996; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013), or economic development and performance (Cheibub et al. 1996; Epstein et al. 2006; Svolik 2008). These political and economic features have a complex relationship with structural conditions such as natural resource availability, especially when mediated by other contextual factors such as individual choice, institutions, and socioeconomic conditions. With these intricacies in mind, scholars recognize that water scarcity may threaten democratic stability by directly stressing the government itself through what we call macro-scale impacts, as well as by degrading the quality of democratic processes and outcomes, which we call micro-scale impacts (Gurr 1985). For example, scholars of democratic durability concerned with the macro scale suggest that serious government failures that impact large segments of the population, such as a major economic recession, can destabilize a democracy, reducing its quality or even resulting in a reversion to autocratic politics (Svolik 2008). If water scarcity is sufficiently severe that its impacts are broadly felt, or if it sparks a national crisis – either directly or indirectly via economic, ecological, or sociopolitical effects – it may threaten the stability of the democratic regime. Similarly, experiencing water scarcity may force a democratic government to make difficult or rapid decisions about how water is allocated and used, especially when water resources or demands are unevenly distributed across a country or region. Micro-scale concerns about reduced public engagement and accountability in such decision-making processes (Bäckstrand et al. 2010), as well as whether formally democratic processes create or perpetuate inequitable outcomes for some groups (Kohl 2004; Shiva 2002), rise to the fore under these circumstances. At both scales, issues related to water scarcity feed into broader dynamics that may threaten democratic security. In the following two sections, we flesh out these potential macro- and micro-scale impacts of water scarcity on democracies in greater detail. Before proceeding, it is important to note that democracies may be more effective at managing pressures arising from water scarcity than authoritarian regimes. While decision-making and resource mobilization can be more difficult in democratic regimes (Gilley 2012), democracies tend to have enhanced capacity for preventing severe marginalization, the ability to articulate social problems and popular preferences, and peaceful conflict-resolution mechanisms (Barrett and Graddy 2000; Dreze and Sen 1989; Taenzler, Carius, and Maas 2008), though this may not hold true for partial or unstable democracies. To the extent that a democracy is better equipped to respond to major socio-environmental problems, the potential macro- and micro-scale impacts of water scarcity described in the following sections may be attenuated. Macro-Scale Impacts of Water Scarcity on Democracies As introduced above, the effects of water scarcity can ripple through a country’s political, economic, and social systems, causing significant macro-scale impacts to the security of a democratic regime. The impacts of water scarcity that have received the most attention in terms of the macro scale include economic decline or recession, migration, and violent conflict. Given the complex relationship between water use and social outcomes, many of these impacts

50  Handbook on democracy and security and their drivers are interactive (Gleditsch 1998; Homer-Dixon 1994, 1999). For the sake of clarity, however, the following sections provide an overview of the relationship between water scarcity and each impact individually, with the recognition that they are inherently interrelated. Economic performance Water scarcity can produce a variety of economic effects that are not distributed evenly across countries or even within a country. Many attempts to estimate the macro-economic impact of water scarcity center around drought, which is typically understood as a natural hazard. Overall, estimates of average total gross domestic product loss from serious drought range between 1 and 2 percent in the drought year (Ding et al. 2011; Raddatz 2009). Developing countries, as well as countries whose economies are heavily reliant on agriculture, are likely to be more vulnerable to these economic consequences than more advanced economies. Fomby et al. (2013) find that drought has a negative cumulative impact on growth in developing countries in both the agricultural sector and the economy at large, whereas advanced economies only see negative impacts in the year of the drought and only in the agricultural sector. Due to the identified link between macro-economic recession and de-democratization in unconsolidated democracies (Svolik 2008), we can expect that declines in macro-economic performance, such as those induced by prolonged drought, may put pressure on the security of new democracies. Moreover, economic stress resulting from water scarcity may increase a country’s vulnerability to other stressors, particularly in rural areas where much of the population is dependent on agriculture for its livelihood or for subsistence. For example, droughts create immediate economic pressure that may lead to declining farm performance and, under severe conditions, conflict arising from increased competition over resources. In some scenarios, water scarcity can lead to food insecurity and migration (Raleigh, Jordan, and Salehyan 2008), as will be discussed further in the next sub-section. In urban areas that depend on domestic agriculture for food supply, droughts may lead to increased food prices and urban unrest (Smith 2014). While these circumstances are likely to place pressure on democratic governments, it is unclear under what conditions they actually challenge the nature of democratic governance itself. Migration A second way in which water scarcity impacts the security of democracies at the macro scale is through its influence on migration patterns. Large-scale migration due to either short- or long-term water scarcity may strain state resources, increase levels of social or political conflict, contribute to local ecological or economic stress, and exacerbate other facts that impact the stability or quality of a democratic regime (Homer-Dixon 1991). Migration in response to water scarcity is more likely to be found in lower-income countries, which tend to have less adaptive capacity, and among rural populations that rely on water-intensive activities like agricultural production for their livelihoods. Based on a global evaluation of natural disaster risk, Raleigh et al. (2008) find that, on average, 10–13 percent of a country’s population is exposed to chronic drought risk, but due to regional variability, this figure can be as high as 90 percent for an individual country. Unlike other types of hazards, droughts can contribute to creating water scarcity over large areas all at once, increasing the potential for large-scale and politically impactful population movements. The extent to which water scarcity alone contributes to migration, however, is contingent on multiple factors (Østby 2016; Raleigh et al. 2008). The actual impact of water scarcity on

The impacts of water scarcity on the security of democracies  51 population movement is driven by its contribution to overall vulnerability at the individual or household level. While water stress can be a key factor in determining overall levels of vulnerability, it impacts the decision to migrate only in intersection with other factors that strain individual- or household-level resources (Adger 2006; Raleigh et al. 2008), including pre-existing vulnerabilities (Gilbert and McLeman 2010). This is in part because migration is costly, particularly permanent migration or resettlement (Findley 1994; Lipton 1980). Individuals and households, especially in drought-prone areas, tend to seek alternative solutions first (Jülich 2011). Such strategies include modifications to household- or farm-level operations, resource- and risk-sharing across social networks, and use of government resources to support production in times of unusually high water stress, such as during prolonged drought (Raleigh et al. 2008). If migration occurs, it tends to be short-term migration, and may follow pre-existing patterns of population movement (Findley 1994). Even in extreme cases, when individuals engage in distress migration – migration to escape unlivable conditions – migrants tend to return to their initial location after the crisis has passed (Greenfield 1986; Rain et al. 2011; Raleigh et al. 2008). More permanent rapid large-scale migration can occur, especially under conditions of severe water scarcity, but the political and resource impacts of these migrations on both the country of exit and the receiving country are often highly localized (Greenfield 1986; Rain et al. 2011). To the extent that democracies may promote social equity and higher levels of public goods provision, strong democratic regimes may help to reduce the negative impacts of water scarcity-driven migration. In the long term, droughts can have cumulative effects such as capital depletion or land degradation, which interact with other factors to increase long-term vulnerability to environmental stress, potentially increasing the attractiveness of permanent out-migration (Gilbert and McLeman 2010; McLeman and Ploeger 2012; Raleigh et al. 2008). Studying the impact of successive droughts on population dynamics in Australia, Hunter and Biddle (2011) do not find net population loss during drought periods, but they do indicate that drought impacts may impact the local or regional economy and quality of life in ways that increase out-migration in the long term. Similar to the effects on economic performance discussed above, this may be more likely in developing countries, but it is unclear how often water scarcity has a substantive impact on this process that is distinct from broader processes of development (Selby et al. 2017). Armed conflict The final macro-scale impact of water scarcity on democracies discussed here is the increased potential for armed conflict, both between states and domestically. Conflicts over water can be either direct, when competition over access to the resource itself is a driver (Gleick 1993), or indirect, when the impacts of water scarcity cause other effects – such as migration, economic decline, or weakened state capacity – that facilitate the outbreak of violence (Homer-Dixon 1994; Kahl 2006). Economic development can also create scarcity by changing the distribution of demand for water, which in turn may potentially lead to conflict (Homer-Dixon 1994; Raleigh and Urdal 2007; Selby and Hoffmann 2014). However, water is not the primary factor involved in spurring armed conflict in most instances (Raleigh and Urdal 2007), and if it makes a significant contribution, it does so only as part of a specific conjunction of factors (Ide 2015).

52  Handbook on democracy and security Regarding interstate conflict, the bulk of the research indicates that although competition over shared water resources may stress relations between countries, they usually adopt other, less costly strategies to address the issue (Homer-Dixon 1994; Selby and Hoffmann 2014). In a global survey of international river basins in the 20th century, Wolf (1998) finds that the incidence of acute international conflict over water is low, and when conflict occurs, violence is either non-existent or very limited. This effect exists independently of regime type. Potential conflicts may be attenuated via changes to a state’s domestic economy, such as importing water-intensive agricultural commodities (Allan 2002), international negotiation or co-management agreements and treaties (Alam 2002; Wolf 1998), or the rebalance of power within a riparian system (Zeitoun and Warner 2006). There is somewhat stronger evidence for a relationship between water scarcity and domestic conflict. Raleigh and Urdal (2007) find a correlation between overall water scarcity and local conflict, but its substantive effect as a single variable is small. The relationship between short-term changes in water scarcity, or negative supply shocks, and conflict is stronger. Fjelde and von Uexkull (2012) find relatively robust evidence that declines in precipitation increase communal conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. Using data from 47 African countries, Hendrix and Salehyan (2012) find a relationship between both unusually wet and unusually dry years and social conflict, with dry years having a stronger relationship with non-violent conflict than violent conflict. Corroborating evidence comes from Smith (2014), who finds that drought-induced increases in food prices may result in urban protest, depending on the availability of substitutes and the political economy of food supply with a given state. In all of these studies, levels of scarcity-induced conflict fall short of civil war. From this evidence, it is clear that the relationship between water scarcity and conflict is mediated by political factors, but the impact of democratic regime type is ambiguous. In this vein, a comparison of two conflicts related to economic development of water is illustrative. Selby and Hoffmann’s (2014) study of civil conflict in Sudan and South Sudan identifies attempts by the state or other actors to exert control over water-rich areas for the purpose of development as a key causal factor for the outbreak of violence. This provides a contrast to the 2005 “Water War” in Bolivia, where a series of large-scale protests related to water scarcity induced by water privatization, which included violent interactions between police and protestors, were ultimately resolved via policy change (Spronk and Webber 2007). The contrasting cases suggest the utility of stable democratic institutions with mechanisms for conflict resolution and preference aggregation for reducing water-related political conflict. Bolivia was able to process social demands that had not been fully considered during the initial decision-making process through formal political channels, whereas Sudan saw the escalation and extension of conflict beyond the political arena into sustained open conflict with state participation. Micro-Scale Impacts of Water Scarcity on Democracies In addition to the macro-scale impacts discussed above, water scarcity can also have a variety of impacts on the security of democracies at the micro scale, specifically related to democratic decision-making processes. Particularly under conditions of scarcity, questions about who governs limited water supplies and how become increasingly central to the promotion and security of democracy. The exclusion of key stakeholders, privileging of elite knowledge, and path dependency on past political choices with undemocratic effects can undermine the effec-

The impacts of water scarcity on the security of democracies  53 tiveness and legitimacy of democratic decision-making processes. Moreover, certain policy outputs can exacerbate issues such as poverty, uneven development, and social marginalization – all of which feed back to the macro scale and potentially further undermine democratic security. This section provides an overview of these potential impacts of water scarcity on democratic governance, specifically related to the dominance of technocratic approaches to water management and the politics of water allocation processes. The technocratic nature of water governance Water management in many countries has historically been dominated by engineers and other experts who seek technical solutions to balance supply and demand, optimize water use efficiency, and improve distribution infrastructure, among other related goals (Di Baldassarre et al. 2018, Molle 2009). For example, Waller describes historical water resource management in California, United States, as a system dominated by “an elite group of professional administrators, hydrologists, engineers, lawyers, and economists, who in combination exercise a great deal of influence over the everyday management of and policy choices regarding the state’s water” (1994, 16–17). In water-scarce regions, this approach is often justified to some extent by the fact that limited water resources must be highly controlled and manipulated in order to meet competing societal demands. However, it also presents a conundrum for managing water democratically, when the broader community of stakeholders is excluded from decision-making processes and water managers’ public accountability is reduced (Lemos et al. 2010). While many members of the public may indeed lack the expertise to understand aspects of complex water management scenarios, forced acquiescence to experts can further legitimize the dominance of technical authority in water management and undermine democratic practices. For example, in an empirical study of the use of a hydrogeological model in a groundwater planning process in Chile, Budds notes that the final report from the modeling exercise was so specialized “that few people could scrutinise it, let alone [key stakeholders such as] peasant farmers, most of whom have little or no formal education” (2009, 427). Earle and Bazilli (2013) describe this kind of approach to water management as a masculinized discourse through which important stakeholders, such as women and rural or impoverished people, are inherently excluded. Hence, the groups that are often the most vulnerable may become further marginalized through the use of technocratic approaches to managing water under scarcity conditions. Furthermore, while a technocratic approach is often perceived as objective, science-based, and even apolitical, emerging literatures in the fields of sociohydrology and political ecology point to the necessity of understanding and integrating the deeply embedded social and political aspects of water management into decision-making (Mollinga 2008; Sivapalan, Savenije, and Blöschl 2012; Swyngedouw 2009). For instance, in the same study of Chilean water planning discussed above, Budds (2009) highlights that the model used by the government did not account for important social aspects of water use, such as power asymmetries among water users and local knowledge about how the system actually works, leading to subjective decision-making by managers about water allocation based primarily on model results. Di Baldassarre et al. (2019) warn that ignoring these kinds of social, political, and cultural dimensions in water decision-making processes may produce significant unintended consequences in the long term, such as the exacerbation of scarcity. An important lesson that can be taken

54  Handbook on democracy and security from this literature is that a “re-politicization” of water management practices (Molle 2009) is likely necessary for effectively addressing water scarcity issues while supporting democracy. Water allocation under scarcity Water scarcity can also impact the democratic nature of water allocation processes, which dictate how water is accessed, what water should be used for, and by whom. Allocating water, in comparison to other natural resources, is particularly challenging for a variety of reasons, including the “variable availability and fluid characteristics of water,” as well as “the difficulties of rigorously monitoring and controlling water flows” (Boelens and Zwarteveen 2005, 741). Moreover, different aspects of a hydrologic system are often interconnected in obscure ways. For example, in some river basins, over-pumping of groundwater may indirectly impact surface flows in ways that are difficult to detect and account for in allocation practices (Konikow and Kendy 2005). Finally, water resources often transcend administrative boundaries and jurisdictions, including national boundaries, which may lead to a scale-mismatch between water allocation and management institutions and the realities of hydrologic systems (Cumming, Cumming, and Redman 2006). As a result, democratically governing water resources often necessitates that actors with independent authority work together for their mutual benefit. When there is less water to go around, allocation decisions often become more significant and controversial, and may lead to management choices that perpetuate inequities in water access. At the same time, water allocation processes can create artificial scarcity for certain subsets of the population in relatively water-rich countries. Allocation decisions that result in inequitable access to water can then feed back to increase the likelihood of macro-scale issues related to migration or domestic conflict, for example, that contribute to the destabilization of democracies. Given the disparities in water allocation processes across democratic regimes, attending to the principles by which individual countries make their water allocation decisions, in both law and practice, is crucial for understanding these dynamics. For example, in a study of water allocation politics in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, Roa-García (2014) finds that each country’s allocation laws result in a different balance of the normative principles of efficiency, equity, and sustainability, with equity often being ill-defined and shallow, and sustainability being difficult to achieve. Consequently, water allocation in these countries is dominated by efficiency goals that can further marginalize (by creating or exacerbating scarcity) already-disadvantaged communities. In transboundary river basins, which house approximately 40 percent of the global population and face increasing scarcity issues, both the potential for conflict and the need for democratic allocation processes increase, especially in the absence of an internationally agreed-upon water allocation framework (Degefu et al. 2016). Allocation issues may be further amplified when democratic norms, such as public participation and government accountability, are absent. This may occur in countries that are formally democratic but utilize strong top-down or technocratic approaches to water management, as described above, or in countries with high levels of government corruption in the water sector. For instance, in a study of water allocation politics in West Bengal, India, Chakrabarti (2013) finds that even though authority over water allocation practices had been devolved to the local level to enhance stakeholder engagement in decision-making, the populations most affected by water scarcity (small rural cultivators and agricultural laborers) infrequently participated in governance and increasingly exited the agricultural sector. While a number of factors led

The impacts of water scarcity on the security of democracies  55 to these trends, the villagers in the study cited “water misallocation,” due to the capture of local decision-makers by both internal and external political interests, “as one of the most important” (p. 10). This finding highlights both procedural and distributive injustices related to allocation under conditions of water scarcity that can serve to undermine democracy. Many countries are also dealing with the challenge of managing already over-allocated river systems. In these countries, current water allocation procedures are often path-dependent and institutionalize inequities among different user groups. For instance, in a study of water allocation in the Andean region, Boelens and Zwarteveen argue that the water rights held by irrigators’ collectives “embody [their] historical struggles over resources, rules, authorities and identities” (2005, 735). To enhance democracy and promote equity in this region, especially for historically marginalized groups, the authors suggest that a completely new water rights ontology is necessary, as attempting to address existing issues with popular neo-liberal water management reforms, such as the privatization of individual water rights, will only serve to further ingrain inequities. Somewhat similarly, arid states in the western United States have attempted to protect riparian habitats and aquatic species and enhance overall river basin sustainability by introducing new types of water rights, often called “instream flow” rights, that allocate water for environmental purposes (Boyd 2003). However, since water law in this region relies on a system of seniority, has historically privileged out-of-stream uses of water for agriculture and industry, and has led to over-allocation in many cases, “junior” instream flow rights are often not fulfilled in times of shortage. Other new or historically disadvantaged water users seeking access to water in over-allocated basins face similar challenges in navigating the politics of water allocation.

4.

CONCLUSIONS: ADDRESSING WATER SCARCITY AND PROMOTING DEMOCRACY

Democracies and democratizing countries will continue to face difficult decisions about how to maintain the security of their regimes. Within the context of climate change, water scarcity will be an important factor for these countries to consider. In this concluding section, we briefly summarize two broad categories of strategies for coping with water scarcity into the future. The first category involves the implementation of rapidly expanding technological innovations for water management, which have the potential to help countries address scarcity by augmenting the quantity of water available, decreasing the costs of distributing that water, and maximizing available water supplies. The second category of strategies involves a different realm of innovations that are often overlooked in conversations about securing appropriate water supplies: innovations in water governance (Bakker and Morinville 2013). Specifically, we discuss the proliferation of participatory and collaborative approaches to water governance, which can help to ensure that new technology, as well as other changes in water management practices, are implemented in ways that promote democracy in the long term. Innovations in Water Technology The implementation of technological innovations can help to reduce scarcity on both the supply side and demand side, potentially helping to reduce macro-scale pressures on democracies. On the supply side, desalination can augment water supplies in a region, although this

56  Handbook on democracy and security option is typically very costly. Greater use of renewable energy sources to fuel desalination plants may help to decrease the economic and environmental cost of the option in the future (Shattat, Worall, and Riffat 2013). Similarly, stormwater capture and reuse of gray water and wastewater can augment water supplies by utilizing previously discarded water sources, though these innovations introduce challenges associated with both storage and water quality. Managed aquifer recharge and the use of wetlands and other green infrastructure to improve water quality all present sustainable opportunities for supply enhancement via these mechanisms (Barnett et al. 2000; Dillon 2005). Increasing water use efficiency can also augment available water supplies – meaning that the same amount of water can be used to meet more demands (Ajami, Thompson Jr., and Victor 2014). The introduction of technology such as low-flow toilets, showerheads, and faucets can help to reduce domestic water demands, though the impacts of water conservation technology in the agricultural sector are less certain (Ward and Pulido-Velazquez 2008). Improved water delivery and monitoring technologies can also increase water use efficiency (Ajami et al. 2014). While these water-saving technologies will certainly play a role in mitigating water scarcity, it is important to reiterate some of the lessons described above regarding democratic decision-making under scarcity. Without appropriate democratic governance structures to select, implement, and monitor the use of such technologies while also considering the social aspects of water systems, unintended consequences are likely to arise (Di Baldassarre et al. 2019). Thus, any conversation about technological innovations at the intersection of water scarcity and democracies requires a parallel conversation about how the use of these technologies will be governed, and how any new water supplies will be allocated. While addressing this issue in depth is precluded by the scope of this chapter, the next section discusses approaches to governing water, frequently in areas with scarce water resources, that may be promising for addressing scarcity while simultaneously promoting democracy. Innovations in Water Governance Scholars and governments alike increasingly promote the use of “democratic innovations” to governance practices (Newig, Challies, and Jager 2019) in order to solve environmental problems while enhancing democracy. Such innovations often include increased participation, deliberation, and collaboration in decision-making processes among diverse public and private stakeholders in a given resource context (Gerlak, Heikkila, and Lubell 2012). This general approach to environmental governance has grown increasingly popular in water resources management across the world over the past three decades, in some cases prompted by directives from higher governing bodies like the European Union (Cisneros 2019; Koontz 2016; Neef 2008; Sabatier et al. 2005). In developed countries, trends toward the decentralization of governmental decision-making have also fostered more participatory political processes around water, especially at the local level (Hughes and Mullin 2016). Participatory and collaborative water governance processes may play an important role in addressing scarcity by helping diverse policy actors better understand how and why water is managed and used, uncover interdependencies among their water-related needs, and devise mutually beneficial policy actions that enhance resource sustainability (Koebele 2019). Such processes can also support democratic governance of water resources by enhancing legitimacy around water management (van Buuren, Klijn, and Edelenbos 2012), particularly by increasing and diversifying participation, devolving decision-making power, and increasing trans-

The impacts of water scarcity on the security of democracies  57 parency. However, both perceptions of legitimacy and collaborative success can be tempered by factors such as the representativeness of the collaborative body and its decision-making authority in relation to pre-existing governance structures (Brown 2011; Cisneros 2019; Koontz and Newig 2014; Leach 2006; Siegmund-Schultze et al. 2015). Thus, carefully attending to the design of these governance innovations is critical as they continue to flourish in the water resources sector. One particularly important aspect of the design of participatory or collaborative water governance processes is the scale at which they operate (Daniell and Barreteau 2014; Newig, Schulz, and Jager 2016). While such processes may be local (Bonnell and Koontz 2007), regional (Heikkila and Gerlak 2005; Montero et al. 2006), or international (Gerlak 2017; Koebele 2020) in scope, often with multi-level interactions, they frequently work at the scale of a watershed. This is due in part to the recognition that aligning the scales at which human and ecological dynamics function can improve governance (Cohen and Davidson 2011). As such, watershed-scale governance processes can help to coordinate the management of complex environmental systems wherein multiple jurisdictional actors share formal management authority, thus providing one approach for addressing the issue of scale-mismatch in water resources management. While these changes in governance scale can free up resources, empower new participants, and bring new information into management decisions, they also often involve conflict and contestation among stakeholders, and may create unevenly distributed benefits (Daniell and Barreteau 2014). Moreover, realigning the scale of water management does not necessarily resolve issues of exclusion or power asymmetries among actors (Lebel, Garden, and Imamura 2005). Given the various potential benefits and pitfalls of these innovative approaches to water governance, continued experimentation with and monitoring of such strategies is necessary in order to better understand how they can be used to cope with water scarcity while also promoting democratic security.

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The impacts of water scarcity on the security of democracies  63 Sivapalan, Murugesu, Hubert H.G. Savenije, and Günter Blöschl. 2012. “Socio-Hydrology: A New Science of People and Water.” Hydrological Processes 26 (8): 1270–76. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1002/​hyp​ .8426. Slavíková, Lenka, Ondřej Vojáček, and Tomáš Smejkal. 2017. “Artificial Shortage of Surface Water: How Can Water Demand Management Mitigate the Scarcity Problem?” Water and Environment Journal 31 (1): 12–19. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1111/​wej​.12217. Smith, Todd Graham. 2014. “Feeding Unrest: Disentangling the Causal Relationship between Food Price Shocks and Sociopolitical Conflict in Urban Africa.” Journal of Peace Research 51 (6): 679–95. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1177/​0022343314543722. Spronk, Susan, and Jeffery R. Webber. 2007. “Struggles against Accumulation by Dispossession in Bolivia: The Political Economy of Natural Resource Contention.” Latin American Perspectives 34 (2): 31–47. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1177/​0094582X06298748. Sullivan, C.A., J.R. Meigh, and A.M. Giacomello. 2003. “The Water Poverty Index: Development and Application at the Community Scale.” Natural Resources Forum 27 (3): 189–99. https://​doi​.org/​10​ .1111/​1477​-8947​.00054. Svolik, Milan. 2008. “Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation.” American Political Science Review 102 (2): 153–68. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1017/​S0003055408080143. Swyngedouw, Erik. 2009. “The Political Economy and Political Ecology of the Hydro-Social Cycle.” Journal of Contemporary Water Research & Education 142 (1): 56–60. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1111/​j​.1936​ -704X​.2009​.00054​.x. Taenzler, Dennis, Alexander Carius, and Achim Maas. 2008. “Assessing the Susceptibility of Societies to Droughts: A Political Science Perspective.” Regional Environmental Change 8 (4): 161–72. https://​ doi​.org/​10​.1007/​s10113​-008​-0067​-3. Udall, Bradley, and Jonathan Overpeck. 2017. “The Twenty-First Century Colorado River Hot Drought and Implications for the Future.” Water Resources Research 53 (3): 2404–18. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1002/​ 2016WR019638. UNESCO. 2019. Leaving No One Behind: The United Nations World Water Development Report 2019. Paris: UNESCO. United Nations. 2020. “Goal 6: Ensure Access to Water and Sanitation for All.” Sustainable Development Goals. 2020. https://​www​.un​.org/​sus​tainablede​velopment/​water​-and​-sanitation/​. Van Loon, A.F., and H.A.J. Van Lanen. 2013. “Making the Distinction between Water Scarcity and Drought Using an Observation-Modeling Framework.” Water Resources Research 49 (3): 1483–1502. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1002/​wrcr​.20147. Waller, Tom. 1994. “Expertise, Elites, and Resource Management Reform: Resisting Agricultural Water Conservation in California’s Imperial Valley.” Journal of Political Ecology 1 (1): 13–42. https://​doi​ .org/​10​.2458/​v1i1​.21155. Wang, Xiao-jun, Jian-yun Zhang, Shamsuddin Shahid, En-hong Guan, Yong-xiang Wu, Juan Gao, and Rui-min He. 2016. “Adaptation to Climate Change Impacts on Water Demand.” Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 21 (1): 81–99. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1007/​s11027​-014​-9571​-6. Ward, Frank A., and Manuel Pulido-Velazquez. 2008. “Water Conservation in Irrigation Can Increase Water Use.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105 (47): 18215–20. https://​doi​.org/​10​ .1073/​pnas​.0805554105. Wilhite, Donald A. 2000. “Drought as a Natural Hazard: Concepts and Definitions.” Drought Mitigation Center Faculty Publications. https://​digitalcommons​.unl​.edu/​droughtfacpub/​69. Wilhite, Donald A., Mark D. Svoboda, and Michael J. Hayes. 2007. “Understanding the Complex Impacts of Drought: A Key to Enhancing Drought Mitigation and Preparedness.” Water Resources Management 21 (5): 763–74. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1007/​s11269​-006​-9076​-5. Wolf, Aaron T. 1998. “Conflict and Cooperation along International Waterways.” Water Policy 1 (2): 251–65. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1016/​S1366​-7017(98)00019​-1. Zeitoun, Mark, and Jeroen Warner. 2006. “Hydro-Hegemony: A Framework for Analysis of Trans-Boundary Water Conflicts.” Water Policy 8 (5): 435–60. https://​doi​.org/​10​.2166/​wp​.2006​.054. Zimmerman, Julie Beth, James R. Mihelcic, and James Smith. 2008. “Global Stressors on Water Quality and Quantity.” Environmental Science & Technology 42 (12): 4247–54. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1021/​ es0871457.

PART II COMPARATIVE POLITICS

5. International threat and democratic breakdown in new democracies Michael Masterson

Over the second half of the twentieth century, the number of democracies in the world steadily increased.1 However, since 2006 this growth has halted and possibly reversed. Diamond writes that democracy is “in a global recession” and worries that “many more democracies could fail” (Diamond 2015, p. 153). Since Diamond wrote, the recession has arguably deepened. Summarizing its report for the year 2016, Freedom House writes that “The number of countries showing a decline in freedom for the year—72—was the largest since the 10-year slide began. Just 43 countries made gains” (Freedom House 2016). Understanding the sources of democratic breakdown and under what conditions democracies are vulnerable is vital to any policy effort to halt the decline. Political thinkers have long worried that military threats, most credibly manifested in conflicts, endanger democracy. De Tocqueville writes, “No protracted war can fail to endanger the freedom of a democratic country […] If it lead not to despotism by sudden violence, it prepares men for it more gently by their habits” (1847, p. 285). Recently, the continuous and secretive nature of the War on Terror has led observers to fret about its influence on democracy (Greenwald 2013). There are three broad categories of research dealing with the impact of international threats on democracy. The first examines the influence of international threats on democratization (Thompson 1996; Rasler and Thompson 2004; Gibler and Tir 2010). The latter two both address the effect of international threat on democratic survival. The first of these examines the influence of international threats on public attitudes (Altemeyer 1996; Davenport 2007; Hetherington and Suhay 2011; Gibler 2012). This body of scholarship generally finds that international threats increase public support for repression and centralization of state power. The second examines the impact of international threats on coups. This scholarship indicates that international threats could decrease the likelihood of successful coups (Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni 2010; Chiozza and Goemans 2011; McMahon and Slantchev 2015). The first portion of this chapter reviews the research in each of these three categories. The rest of the chapter focuses on contributing to the latter two categories, having to do with threat’s impact on democratic survival. The research on international threat and public attitudes suggests that threats should decrease the likelihood of democratic survival, while the research on threats and coups suggests the opposite. While research has shown that military threat, usually measured as a type of conflict, can weaken components of democracy, such as judicial independence or checks on executives (Gibler 2010; Gibler and Randazzo 2011), work directly examining the impact of military conflict on democratic breakdown has turned up null results (Reiter 2001; Pevehouse 2002). Conflicting theoretical expectations between the 1 Online appendix available at: https://​www​.michaelrmasterson​.com/​static/​docs/​appendix​_only​ _democratic​_breakdown​.pdf.

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66  Handbook on democracy and security conflict and public opinion literature and the coup literature as well as inconclusive empirical findings merit revisiting theories about international threat’s effect on democratic breakdown. Drawing on work that emphasizes the importance of citizen coordination for the preservation of democracy (Weingast 1997; Fearon 2011), this chapter theorizes that older democracies can survive coordination problems stemming from international threats, but new democracies often cannot. While political scientists have long recognized that new democracies are particularly at risk of democratic breakdown (Gasiorowski 1996; Svolik 2008), research suggests that, although new democracies are more vulnerable to poor economic performance, they experience an “absolute honeymoon” in the first two years that makes them less vulnerable to breakdown from non-economic factors (Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2003, p. 425). Further, previous work on conflict and democracy has found no effect of democratic age (Gibler and Randazzo 2011, p. 706). International threats cause citizens in new democracies to suffer more severe coordination problems than they do in old democracies. Citizens who wish to prevent authoritarian takeovers face a coordination problem because those that participate in failed resistance risk punishment (Fearon 2011, p. 1697). Citizens only want to resist if they know enough others will join them for resistance to succeed. In new democracies, the lack of clear precedents and red lines deprives citizens of focal points for use in coordinating resistance. This chapter contributes empirically by producing the first evidence that military threats have a direct effect on democratic breakdown. This effect is recovered by taking into account the variation in the effect of threats over the length of time a state has been a democracy. I find that international threats increase the probability of democratic breakdown in new but not old democracies. This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section reviews three broad categories of research on international threats and democracy. The second develops a theory that international threats increase the probability that new democracies will collapse. The third explains the data and methods used. The fourth details the results of this analysis. The fifth presents case studies that illustrate the mechanism of threat’s impact on public coordination in new democracies. The final section offers concluding comments.

1.

INTERNATIONAL THREATS AND DEMOCRACY

Research on international threats and democracy can be divided into three groups. The first group of research focuses on the impact of international threats on democratization. Thompson (1996) argues that threat should promote authoritarian tendencies such as support for the centralization of power. This makes democratization less likely. He finds support for this argument in four cases of potential democratization: Japan, France, Scandinavia, and North America. Consistent with this perspective, Rasler and Thompson (2004) argue that external threats create incentives to centralize state power, which decreases the likelihood of democratization because power centralization creates winners with an interest in preserving the current regime. Examining a sample of nine major powers, they find that external threats are negatively associated with democratization. Gibler and Tir (2010) likewise argue that peace facilitates democracy. They focus on the resolution of a particular kind of threat, territorial disputes. They argue territorial threats require a strong army, which lowers the cost of repression, making it easier for small groups

International threat and democratic breakdown in new democracies  67 to control a state (p. 956). They find that peaceful territorial transfers are associated with decreased territorial conflicts, decreased militarization, and increased likelihood of transition to democracy. They further argue that these findings cast doubt on democratic peace theory because it may be that peace produces democracy rather than the other way around. Taking up the question of the direction of the relationship between peace and democracy, some scholars have attempted to use models that explicitly account for the possibility that the relationship could go in both directions. Kim, Rousseau, and others (2013) use a simultaneous equation model to examine this relationship. They find that both aggressive uses of force and systemic wars are associated with decreased levels of democracy. They also find that regional wars are surprisingly associated with increased levels of democracy, but they point out that the substantive magnitude of this effect is small. Enia and James (2015) also examine the relationship between peace and democracy using a simultaneous equation model. They find that Militarized Interstate Dispute onset is associated with decreased levels of democracy both in dyads as a whole and in the state with the lowest level of democracy in a dyad. While both of these papers find support for the idea that peace fosters democracy, they also find evidence that democracy promotes peace, even when accounting for the initial relationship between peace and democracy. After a state democratizes, international threats can influence survival. The remaining two groups of research on threats and democracy examine different aspects of this relationship. Threats may affect democratic survival both through their impact on support for centralization of state power and through their influence on the likelihood of coups. A variety of studies have found international threats increase support for the centralization of state power (Gibler 2012; Thompson 1996). Citizens can gradually lose faith in democracy, grow to support authoritarian measures in response to a crisis, or tacitly consent as an elected leader aggregates power and the country falls into authoritarianism. Hetherington and Suhay (2011) find that terrorist threats increase citizens’ authoritarian attitudes. Davenport finds that interstate threats increase repression (Davenport 2007, pp. 138, 148). Similarly, Lebovic and Thompson (2006) find that intensification of the Arab–Israel conflict is associated with greater repression in the Middle East. This literature is closely related work on the “rally ’round the flag” effect and diversionary war in that it posits international crises may move public opinion in ways favorable to chief executives (Oneal and Bryan 1995; Baker and Oneal 2001; Smith 1996). Contrary to the threats and public opinion literature, theories about international threats and coups often imply that threats should decrease the likelihood of coups, increasing the likelihood of democratic survival. Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni (2010) argue that in the case of new democracies, military threats increase democratic survival. This is because threats allow governments to credibly promise not to reduce the military’s budget, preventing coups. McMahon and Slantchev (2015) contend coups should be more likely the longer a country is at peace, less likely during a crisis, and least likely during an ongoing conflict. Chiozza and Goemans (2011) theorize that citizens’ acceptance of more extreme measures during conflict facilitates coup-proofing.

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2.

INTERNATIONAL THREATS AND DEMOCRATIC SURVIVAL IN NEW DEMOCRACIES

If threats might decrease public support for democracy but may also decrease the chance of coups, what is the net effect of international threats on democratic survival? Posner and Vermeule (2007) argue that the effect of threat on democracy follows a cyclical pattern where emergencies decrease liberties and liberties are restored when emergencies pass (pp. 149–50). Krebs (2009) points out that if this were the case, then the overall effect of conflict on democracy should be null (p. 189). This is precisely what much previous work has found (Reiter 2001; Pevehouse 2002; Gibler 2010; Gibler and Randazzo 2011). However, what if a subset of democracies cannot survive this short-term decline in liberties long enough to recover? I argue that this is the case for new democracies. While threats elevate public support for authoritarianism in both old and new democracies, old democracies are better able to withstand this shock. Uncertainty about when to coordinate resistance against authoritarianism is the key difference between new and old democracies. The fact that after threats pass, public support for increased executive power tends to shrink again accounts for why older democracies that can constrain authoritarianism in the short term tend to ultimately survive international threats (Berinsky 2009, pp. 164–5). Citizens face a coordination problem in resisting authoritarian takeovers, and solving this problem is critical for democratic survival (Weingast 1997; Fearon 2011). This theory draws from Fearon (2011) the assumption that failed resistance is costly to citizens because they may be punished by the new authoritarian regime (p. 1697). This implies that citizens only want to resist if they expect enough other citizens will join them for resistance to succeed. For this reason, even if democrats want to defend their rights, they need to be able to agree on when to coordinate resistance. It is more difficult for citizens to agree on when to resist authoritarian takeovers during conflict in new democracies than in older democracies. First, new democracies have more trouble determining what constitutes unacceptable elite behavior during a crisis. Institutions that constrain executive power are less tested than in older democracies. For example, Marbury v. Madison, which established the principle of judicial review in the United States, did not occur until 1803, over a decade after the constitution first went into effect (Clinton 1994). Often the written constitution alone does not make the relationship between the chief executive and the legislative branch clear. For example, “In formal terms, Russia, Kazakhstan, Poland, and Mongolia all have semipresidential systems. Yet in Russia and Kazakhstan presidents rule and the legislatures sit on the sidelines” (Fish 2006, p. 6). Whether and how the legislature constrains the executive may only become clear with experience. In the absence of clear red lines, potentially constraining institutions may give the leader leeway during a crisis. This deprives citizens of a focal point for resistance. This experience is distinct from the quality of institutions. An institution may be of high quality during normal times and yet be unable to handle a situation it has never faced before. In contrast, aspiring dictators do not face similar coordination problems because they are able to directly reward supporters and punish resisters, whereas the benefits of democracy to the public are non-excludable (Mesquita et al. 1999). Further, citizens lack experience facing an international threat under their new regime. They may be able to draw on information from previous regimes, but the applicability of this information to their current situation is imperfect to the extent that the new regime differs from

International threat and democratic breakdown in new democracies  69 previous regimes. For this reason, citizens living in mature democracies will, on average, have better information about where the threshold for resistance should be. Since both of these mechanisms rely on citizens and institutions acquiring democratic experience, it is reasonable to ask how long a democracy needs to last in order to instill this experience. For institutions, a precedent of restraining executive power must be established, so citizens can form an expectation that other citizens will resist if leaders try to cast off these restraints. For citizens, democracy must have lasted long enough to create the expectation that leaders will still be restrained even during times of threat. The amount of time this takes may differ across countries. Bermeo (1992) conceptualizes these changes in beliefs and expectations from experience of different regimes as a kind of political learning that varies at the individual level. Exactly how quickly this process takes place is unclear, but Bermeo (1992) argues against the proposition that beliefs only change “slowly, over generations” and mentions the role of “crises” in changing beliefs, which indicates that they may change quickly at critical moments (p. 274). Given the variation in learning rates across individuals and circumstances, my theory is unable to offer a more precise answer to the question “how long does a democracy need to last” than that on average the older a democracy is, the more likely these expectations will have taken root. How long it takes in the average country is ultimately an empirical question. There are several potential objections to the claim that publics in new democracies face greater challenges to coordinating against authoritarianism than publics in older democracies. First, institutions and citizens might be able to draw on the experiences of other countries, nascent constraining institutions under authoritarianism, or even previous failed democratic regimes in their own country to decide what actions must be resisted. However, their ability to do so is limited because each democracy has a unique constitution that determines the limits on executive power. For this reason, learning from other countries or their experience in previous democratic regimes does not necessarily inform citizens what is acceptable under their current regime. Second, it could be that citizens in older democracies also lack experience resisting authoritarian power grabs. However, witnessing institutions constraining elites on a regular basis provides them with a much deeper sense of the activities that are acceptable. Some evidence suggests that the increase in support for centralized power in response to international threats is stronger in new democracies than in old democracies (Weeks 2014). Citizens’ inability to distinguish whether and which centralizing practices pose a danger to democracy is a possible explanation for this. Third, some democratic regimes are created from popular protest, so why would this same public face a challenge coordinating in the new democracy? However, previous research suggests citizens will not mobilize again after democratization if the new regime proves authoritarian. This is because “two bad governments in a row are likely to do more to demoralize a population about its prospects for good governance than one government that stays in office” (Meirowitz and Tucker 2013, p. 489). The population may doubt that it is possible to create good government in their country and hence be less willing to undertake the costs of coordination. International threats do not aid democratic survival through coup prevention because elites are hesitant to seize power unless they believe that citizens will at least tacitly acquiesce. This means democracies are not constantly at risk of coups but face moments of vulnerability during crises. Brender and Drazen (2009) argue that “powerful antidemocratic elites pose

70  Handbook on democracy and security serious threats to newly established democracies […] Though antidemocratic elites may have the interest in overthrowing democracy, their ability to do so depends on the attitudes of the citizenry towards democracy, even if only their lack of active opposition to reversion” (pp. 308–9; original emphasis). Because coups are unlikely without at least tacit public support, the shift in public opinion due to international threats is a more important factor of democratic stability than the credible commitment to fund the military or the opportunity to send troublesome actors to the front that military conflicts provide. This resolves the contradiction between the coup-proofing literature that argues that threats prevent coups, with the implication that democracies experiencing threats are more likely to survive, and the public opinion literature that argues that threats decrease support for democracy and increase the likelihood of breakdown. How severe must threats be before they can contribute to democratic breakdown? Can a leader desiring more power simply invent a threat? Possibly; however, citizens and opposing elites are aware of the incentive to inflate threats, so they will likely be skeptical of strictly verbal claims. This raises the question of what kind of threats are most likely to endanger democracy. First, because citizens may suspect that leaders have incentives to inflate threats, the more credible the threat is, the more likely it is to impact citizens’ ability to coordinate. Threats that involve objective external indicators like the movement of troops or attacks from other states are more credible than threats that rely solely on the claims of domestic leaders or intelligence agencies for credibility. Second, threats that endanger the lives of citizens are more likely to create a sense of emergency that may seem to justify the extension of executive powers than threats to peripheral territories. However, what kinds of threats are seen as credible or dangerous are likely to be politically contested, so how citizens perceive threats will partly depend on domestic political debates. Finally, threats that allow leaders to claim that there is an “enemy within” – for example, spies or saboteurs working for the enemy – are more challenging to democracy. The idea that enemies are hidden among ordinary citizens helps leaders justify broad repressive measures to root out the enemy and prevent subversion. These measures can also be used to quash resistance as the leader continues to aggregate power, and leaders may cast resistance to their authority as a fifth column backed by hostile outside forces. Hypothesis 1 (H1): Credible international threats increase the likelihood of democratic breakdown in newer democracies but not in older democracies. A critic might argue that this theory implies all democratic leaders secretly wish to subvert democracy. However, even without necessarily trying to subvert democracy, democratic leaders regularly engage in executive overreaches that must be checked. Further, this is a probabilistic argument, not a deterministic one. The ability of elites in new democracies to take advantage of a military crisis to become dictators does not mean that they will do so in every case. Military threats create an opportunity in new but not old democracies, which makes authoritarian takeovers more likely. International threats are distinct from other crises that new democracies might face because the leader can claim to be acting to defend democracy.

International threat and democratic breakdown in new democracies  71

3. METHOD 3.1

Data and Coding

The data include all sovereign democracies from 1950 to 2008. The dependent variable, Democratic Breakdown, comes from the Political Regimes dataset (Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2013).2 If a leader is democratically elected and then later makes politics in the country uncompetitive, Political Regimes codes the breakdown as occurring when politics became uncompetitive rather than when the leader was initially elected as Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) do (Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2013, p. 1535). This makes the Political Regimes data better suited to compare the timing of breakdown and threats in cases where the breakdown occurs in the middle of a term, since coding the entire term as authoritarian would wrongly indicate that democratic breakdown preceded the threats. Regime change in the Political Regimes dataset does not necessarily imply leader change.3 This guards against concerns that inexperienced leaders are both leading new democracies to be targeted in conflict and to collapse. Time Democratic measures how many years a country has been democratic. This variable is logged because after a country has been a democracy for a sufficient period, each additional year of democracy has a diminishing effect on its ability to survive. Force is a count of the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) involving the use of force that occur in each country-year (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996).4 While this is not a perfect measure of threats, systematic measures of threats lack indicators of how credible citizens believe the threats to be. In place of this, Force is used as an objective indicator that threats are credible and should be salient to the public. Previous work on conflict and democracies has used MIDs to measure of threats (Gibler 2010), and theories about the impact of threats on public support for democracy often assume that “public support follows the use of force” (Gibler and Randazzo 2011, p. 700). Since the theory predicts threats only lead to democratic breakdown in new democracies, meaning the effect of threats is conditional on the time a country has been democratic, Force is interacted with Time Democratic. 3.2

Modeling Strategy

3.2.1 Control variables I seek to identify the effect of threats on democratic survival using the “selection on observables” approach (Keele, Stevenson, and Elwert 2020, p. 3). In this approach the goal is to include control variables “such that conditioning on those covariates makes treatment assignment independent of potential values of the outcome” (p. 4). This means including confounds that are common causes of both the treatment (threats) and the outcome (democratic collapse)

2 See Appendix, Section C for an explanation of why a binary measure of democracy is most appropriate. 3 For example, Taiwan is coded as a democracy for the first time in 1996, but Lee Teng-hui was president of Taiwan from 1988 to 2000. This is just an example to show how democracy and leader change are coded. Taiwan is not coded as sovereign and so is not included in the subset of the data that is analyzed. 4 This is defined as MIDs with a Hostility Level of 4 or 5 – 4 denotes a use of force, and 5 signifies a war.

72  Handbook on democracy and security while excluding post-treatment and collider variables. The goal of this method is not to include every variable that may affect the outcome or the treatment because omitting variables will not bias the results unless they also affect both the outcome and the treatment. Further, the goal is not to test the theory against alternative explanations because other explanations would have different confounds and require a different research design to test (Keele, Stevenson, and Elwert 2020). The first control variable is GDP [gross domestic product] Per Capita, which has been linked with democratic survival (Przeworski 2000). Further, it may also affect the threats a country faces. First, a country’s greater wealth may tempt aggressors who seek to control this wealth (Betts 1993, p. 46). Second, wealth is an important determinate of military power, which may affect whether a state is attacked (Mearsheimer 2001, p. 61). Unlike military spending, GDP per capita is less easy for leaders to change in the lead up to a war to increase a country’s chance of success, which makes it less likely than measures of military spending to introduce post-treatment bias through the anticipatory effect of conflict. Economic Growth is added as a control because growth tends to increase democracy and decrease the likelihood of regime change, such as democratic collapse (Feng 1997). Moreover, Growth could also affect conflict by motivating diversionary wars to distract from bad economic performance (Svolik 2008). Further, great power transition theory views economic growth rates as an important factor in security competition that leads to conflict (Organski and Kugler 1980). Whether a democracy is a presidential, parliamentary, or mixed democracy may be related to breakdown (Svolik 2008). Scholars have argued that presidentialism’s winner-takes-all result increases the stakes of control and excludes the defeated from power in a way that can decrease democratic stability (Linz 1994). Further, executives in presidential democracies have greater control over the armed forces, which could influence conflict because they may use this ability to start or avoid conflicts according to their domestic political incentives. For example, a president may be more able to start a strategically timed conflict to take advantage of the boost in support for leaders from conflict than a leader in a system where control of the armed forces is more divided (Oneal and Bryan 1995; Smith 1996; Baker and Oneal 2001). For these reasons, binary controls are included for Presidential systems and Parliamentary systems, leaving mixed regimes as the comparison category. Lastly, Proportion Democratic Neighbors controls for the proportion of bordering countries that are democratic. The more democratic neighbors a country has, the more it is exposed to democratic diffusion effects (O’Loughlin et al. 1998; Gibler and Tir 2013). This diffusion of democratic values and practices from abroad increases the chance of democratic survival. Further, because of the democratic peace, a democratic country with more democratic neighbors may be less at risk for conflict (Russett 1993). Because states tend to fight states they border more often than states further away, a democracy surrounded by democracies may exist in a zone of peace and be less likely to face conflict (Bremer 1992). This set of variables also has the advantage of overlapping with variables used in previous papers that assessed the effects of threat on democratic stability, which have used variables including: measures of democratic neighbors or regional democracy, growth, and GDP per capita (Reiter 2001; Pevehouse 2002). This allows these results to be more comparable with previous assessments of threat’s effect on democracy that did not allow for threat to have a heterogeneous effect across democracy’s age. Each independent variable (save Time Democratic) is lagged one year.

International threat and democratic breakdown in new democracies  73 A critic might contend that it is necessary to account for the way democratization occurred. For example, some countries democratize through citizen protests, and this could correlate with coordination potential in the new democracy. However, the extent to which citizen collective action is involved in democratization is unlikely to be causally related to whether the democracy later experiences international conflict, so its omission should not bias the estimation of conflict’s effect on democratic breakdown. 3.2.2 Statistical model Event history models are best for modeling democratic breakdown because of time dependence. Time dependence exists because if a given democracy breaks down at time t it cannot break down at time t + 1 or t – 1. The Cox proportional hazard model is chosen because the baseline hazard of breakdown as well as its distribution are unknown.5 Countries exit the dataset upon breakdown. However, if a country breaks down and then re-democratizes, it reenters the dataset. Following Box-Steffensmeier and De Boef (2006), repeated events are accounted for by stratifying across the number of previous breakdowns and using gap time.6 This means democracies are only compared with other democracies that have had the same number of breakdowns in the past. Box-Steffensmeier and De Boef (2006) also recommend including shared frailty for individuals (countries). However, the frailty term is not significant in the model that includes controls, so it is omitted (see Appendix, Section D).

4. RESULTS In the results shown in Table 5.1 positive coefficients mean that a variable is associated with democracies failing more quickly, and negative coefficients mean a variable is associated with democracies surviving longer. As hypothesized, conflicts involving Force have a positive and significant coefficient in both models. Because it is interacted with Time Democratic, the coefficient on Force represents the effect of a single use of force when Time Democratic is 1. This supports the theory that when democracies are young, conflicts increase the hazard of democratic breakdown. The model does not estimate an effect for Time Democratic alone because this is incorporated in the baseline hazard rate. The interaction between Force and Time Democratic is significant and negative. This means that each year of democracy decreases the hazard of breakdown during conflict. Because of this, it is important to examine how the interaction’s significance varies across different values of Time Democratic. Figure 5.1 shows how the simulated natural log of the relative hazard of Force changes as Time Democratic changes.7 Figure 5.1 shows the effect for the first 10 years after democratization. Changing the amount of years shown in the figure does not alter the calculation of the results.

One advantage of these models is that they avoid making the results dependent on arbitrary time windows. On censoring, see Appendix, Section G.2. 6 The number of previous breakdowns is the conditional risk set. Gap time means the time counter starts over after each event (breakdown). The results also hold up without stratification (see Appendix, Section F). 7 All simulations conducted with simPH (Gandrud 2015), which allows post-estimation simulation of Cox proportional hazard models based on Licht’s (2011) method. 5

74  Handbook on democracy and security Figure 5.1 reveals that Force does increase the probability of breakdown substantially for new democracies in the first two years. One-year-old democracies experiencing Force have about seven times the probability of breakdown of one-year-old democracies that do not. An implication of these models is that the hazard of conflict is not proportional across time. Indeed, a test of whether the proportional hazard assumption holds up for the model with controls when Force is not interacted with a function of time rejects the null hypothesis of proportional hazards for the Force variable (p = 0.0297). This means researchers who model democratic breakdown using models that assume proportional hazards risk biasing their results if they do not interact conflict with a function of time (Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter, and Zorn 2003).

Figure 5.1

4.1

Effect of conflict on the probability of democratic breakdown over the age of democracy

Robustness of Findings

To show that the results are not sensitive to the time period or a few influential observations, alternative measures of economic size and growth (iron and steel production) are used to extend the data back to 1800 (see Appendix, Section G.4). To show that the findings are insensitive to the measure of democracy, results are replicated with Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) (see Appendix, Section G.5). The Appendix (Section G.1) shows the results using logistic regression. To guard against the possibility that unobservable differences among countries are driving the findings, the results are replicated with country-shared frailty (see Appendix, Section D).

International threat and democratic breakdown in new democracies  75 Table 5.1

Uses of force and democratic breakdown

 

Democratic breakdown

 

No controls

Controls

Force

1.282**

1.932**

(0.550)

(0.764)

−0.844**

−1.328**

(0.428)

(0.583)

(Log) GDP Per Capita

 

−0.887***

Growth

 

Proportion of Democratic Neighbors

 

President

 

Parliament

 

Stratified on Past Breakdowns?

Yes

Yes

Observations

3,805

2,952

Force*(Log) Time Democratic

(0.228) −7.279*** (2.695) −1.163** (0.456) 1.171*** (0.443) 0.824* (0.482)

Notes:  *p