Handbook of Us-China Relations 1784715727, 9781784715724

Table of contents :
Front Matter
Copyright
Contents
Contributors
Introduction to the book
PART I CO-EVOLUTION
1. Challenges in US–China relations
PART II HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY CONTEXTS
2. The United States in Asia
3. US relations with the PRC during the Cold War
4. US relations with the PRC after the Cold War
5. US perspectives on China: trends and attitudes in US public opinion, media, scholarship and leadership statements
6. Human rights in US–China relations
7. Chinese public perception of the United States
8. US–China economic relations
PART III THE US–CHINA STRATEGIC RIVALRY
9. US–China strategic rivalry
10. China’s global challenge to the United States
11. The US rebalance to Asia: implications for US–China relations
12. Assessing the ‘new model of major power relations’ between China and the United States
PART IV FLASHPOINTS
13. Japan in US–China relations
14. Korea in US–China relations
15. Taiwan in US–China relations
16. The United States and China’s maritime territorial disputes
PART V SECURITY AND DEFENCE
17. Assessing the Sino–US power balance
18. China’s defense build-up: evaluating China’s military capabilities
19. Facing the dragon: debating the US military response to China
20. Against a superior foe: China’s evolving A2/AD strategy
21. The PLA Navy and the US Navy in the Asia-Pacific: Anti-Access/Area Denial vs AirSea Battle
22. Cyberwar: China and the United States
23. Future war: China and the United States
PART VI CONCLUSIONS
24. US–China outlook: pragmatism or confrontation
25. The United States and China: why does their relationship matter to the rest of the world?
Index

Citation preview

HANDBOOK OF US–CHINA RELATIONS

Handbook of US–China Relations

Edited by

Andrew T.H. Tan Associate Professor, University of New South Wales, Australia

Cheltenham, UK + Northampton, MA, USA

© Andrew T.H. Tan 2016 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited The Lypiatts 15 Lansdown Road Cheltenham Glos GL50 2JA UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. William Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016932482

This book is available electronically in the Social and Political Science subject collection DOI 10.4337/9781784715731

ISBN 978 1 78471 572 4 (cased) ISBN 978 1 78471 573 1 (eBook) Typeset by Columns Design XML Ltd, Reading

Contents List of contributors Introduction to the book Andrew T.H. Tan PART I

vii xv

CO-EVOLUTION

1 Challenges in US–China relations Andrew T.H. Tan PART II

HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY CONTEXTS

2 The United States in Asia Mark Beeson 3 US relations with the PRC during the Cold War Andrea Benvenuti 4 US relations with the PRC after the Cold War Andrea Benvenuti 5 US perspectives on China: trends and attitudes in US public opinion, media, scholarship and leadership statements Jeffrey Reeves 6 Human rights in US–China relations Ming Wan 7 Chinese public perception of the United States Shiming Fan 8 US–China economic relations Dong Wang PART III

3

25 44 62 80 100 118 133

THE US–CHINA STRATEGIC RIVALRY

9 US–China strategic rivalry Angela MingYan Poh and Mingjiang Li 10 China’s global challenge to the United States Andrew T.H. Tan 11 The US rebalance to Asia: implications for US–China relations Paul J. Smith 12 Assessing the ‘new model of major power relations’ between China and the United States Richard Weixing Hu v

159 180 199 222

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PART IV

FLASHPOINTS

13 Japan in US–China relations Andrew L. Oros 14 Korea in US–China relations Terence Roehrig 15 Taiwan in US–China relations Andrew T.H. Tan 16 The United States and China’s maritime territorial disputes Chien-peng Chung PART V

283 303

323 340 359 379 398 412 430

CONCLUSIONS

24 US–China outlook: pragmatism or confrontation Robert Sutter 25 The United States and China: why does their relationship matter to the rest of the world? Kerry Brown Index

264

SECURITY AND DEFENCE

17 Assessing the Sino–US power balance Yee-Kuang Heng 18 China’s defense build-up: evaluating China’s military capabilities Yves-Heng Lim 19 Facing the dragon: debating the US military response to China Benjamin Schreer 20 Against a superior foe: China’s evolving A2/AD strategy JingdongYuan 21 The PLA Navy and the US Navy in the Asia-Pacific: Anti-Access/Area Denial vs AirSea Battle Richard A. Bitzinger 22 Cyberwar: China and the United States Nir Kshetri 23 Future war: China and the United States Malcolm Davis PART VI

245

455 475 493

Contributors

Mark Beeson is Professor of International Politics at the University of Western Australia. Before joining UWA, he taught at Murdoch, Griffith and Queensland (Australia) and York and Birmingham (UK), where he was also Head of Department. He is the co-editor of Contemporary Politics, and the founding editor of Critical Studies of the Asia Pacific. Andrea Benvenuti is a senior lecturer in International Relations and European Studies at the School of Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, Australia. Educated at Florence University, Monash University and Oxford University, Dr Benvenuti currently teaches twentieth-century international history and European politics at both undergraduate and postgraduate level. His research interests lies in the field of post-1945 international history with a strong focus on the Cold War. He recently published a co-edited book with Pascaline Winand and Max Guderzo, The External Relations of the European Union (Peter Lang, 2015). His next book, Cold War and Decolonisation: Australia’s Policy towards Britain’s End of Empire in Southeast Asia (NUS Press), is forthcoming in 2016. Richard A. Bitzinger is a Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Military Transformations Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (Singapore), where his work focuses on security and defence issues relating to the AsiaPacific region, including military modernization and force transformation, regional defence industries and local armaments production, and weapons proliferation. Mr Bitzinger has written several monographs and book chapters, and his articles have appeared in journals such as International Security, Orbis, China Quarterly, and Survival. He is the author of Towards a Brave New Arms Industry? (Oxford University Press, 2003), ‘Come the revolution: transforming the Asia-Pacific’s militaries’, Naval War College Review (Autumn 2005), and ‘Military modernization in the Asia-Pacific: assessing new capabilities’, in Asia’s Rising Power (NBR, 2010). He is also the editor of The Modern Defense Industry: Political, Economic and Technological Issues (Praeger, 2009). Kerry Brown is Director of the Lau China Institute and Professor of Chinese Studies at King’s College, London. Prior to this he was vii

viii Handbook of US–China relations Professor of Chinese Politics and Director of the China Studies Centre, University of Sydney. He is an Associate Fellow of Chatham House, London. He was previously Head of the Asia Programme at Chatham House and a member of the British Diplomatic Service from 1998 to 2005, serving as First Secretary, British Embassy Beijing from 2000 to 2003. Educated at the universities of Cambridge (MA) and Leeds (PhD), he is the author of ten books on China, the latest of which are The New Emperors: Power and the Princelings in China (I.B. Tauris, 2014), and What’s Wrong with Diplomacy? (Penguin, 2015). His study, CEO, China: The Rise of Xi Jinping (I.B. Tauris) will appear in early 2016. Chien-peng Chung is Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science at Lingnan University, Hong Kong. Dr Chung received his doctorate at the University of Southern California. His research interests include the politics and history of China, Chinese and Asian foreign and security relations, ethnicity and nationalism, political change in Asia, and two-level games theory. Dr Chung has written three books: Domestic Politics, International Bargaining, and Territorial Disputes of China (Routledge, 2004), China’s Multilateral Cooperation in Asia and the Pacific: Institutionalizing Beijing’s ‘Good Neighbour Policy’ (Routledge, 2010) and Contentious Integration: Post-Cold War Japan–China Relations in the Asia-Pacific (Ashgate, 2014). He has also contributed chapters to edited books, and published articles in journals such as the Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Problems of Post-Communism, Asian Studies, China Report, China Quarterly, Pacific Affairs, Asian Affairs: An American Review, Issues & Studies, American Asian Review, Harvard International Review and Foreign Affairs. Malcolm Davis is Senior Analyst in Defence Strategy and Capability, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Australia. His area of research focus is on Chinese military modernization and defence policy, Asia-Pacific security issues, as well as military-technological transformation and the future of warfare. He was an Assistant Director of Strategic Policy Guidance at the Department of Defence in Canberra, and also worked as a strategic analyst on future strategy and capability issues with the Royal Australian Navy between 2007 and 2012. He was a Lecturer in Defence Studies at King’s College London, based at the UK’s Joint Services Command and Staff College in Shrivenham from 2000 to 2007 and completed his PhD in Strategic Studies with the University of Hull in 2002. He is currently preparing his first book – China’s Military Modernisation and Asia’s Strategic Future – for publication by Routledge UK.

Contributors ix Shiming Fan is Associate Dean of the School of International Studies at Beijing (Peking) University, where he teaches international history, Sino–US relations and the politics of international communication. His research interest covers image, perception, public opinion and communication in international relations. His recent publications include ‘Chinese public perceptions of Japan and the United States in the post–Cold War era’ (in Getting the Triangle Straight, edited by Gerald Curtis, Ryosei Kokubun and Wang Jisi, Japan Center for International Exchange, 2010), ‘The Internet and political expression in China’ (in National-States and Media, edited by Kenji Suzuki, Akashi Shoten, 2007), ‘Popular, but not positive – changing Chinese media and its effect on international coverage’ (in The Review of Asian and Pacific Studies, No. 29, 2005, Japan). He obtained his degrees (BA, 1990; MA, 1993; PhD, 1999) in International Politics from Beijing University. Dr Fan was a Visiting Fellow at the Fairbank Center for East Asian Studies at Harvard University (1998), and a Visiting Professor at Niigata University of Japan (2002–03). His administrative responsibility for the school lies in international cooperation and exchange. Yee-Kuang Heng is Associate Professor of International Relations at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore (NUS). Dr Heng graduated with a BSc (First Class Honours) and PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), where he studied on a British government research scholarship. He previously held faculty positions as Assistant Professor at Trinity College Dublin, Ireland and at the University of St Andrews, UK. His research interests include the globalization of risk and strategic cultures, security studies and soft power in the Asia-Pacific. He has previously published on the concept of net assessment and its relevance to post–Cold War security challenges. From April 2016, he will assume a new position at the University of Tokyo, Japan. Richard Weixing Hu is Professor of Political Science at the University of Hong Kong. He was educated at Peking University, the Johns Hopkins University, and University of Maryland, where he received a PhD in Political Science. Professor Hu has a distinguished teaching and research career in the United States and Hong Kong. He was a John M. Olin Fellow at Harvard University, an IGCC Fellow at the University of California, San Diego, and a CNAPS Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. His teaching and research areas include global political economy, East Asian international relations, and China’s foreign relations. He has published widely in leading academic journals.

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Nir Kshetri is Professor at Bryan School of Business and Economics, University of North Carolina-Greensboro and a research fellow at the Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration – Kobe University, Japan. Professor Kshetri is the author of four books including Cybercrime and Cybersecurity in the Global South (Palgrave, 2013), and The Global Cybercrime Industry: Economic, Institutional and Strategic Perspectives (Springer-Verlag, 2010). His 2014 book Global Entrepreneurship: Environment and Strategy (Routledge) was selected as an Outstanding Academic Title by Choice Magazine (January 2015). He has also published 85 articles in journals. He participated as lead discussant at the Peer Review meeting of the UNCTAD’s Information Economy Report 2013 and Information Economy Report 2015. He is twice winner of the Pacific Telecommunication Council’s Meheroo Jussawalla Research Paper Prize (2010 and 2008). He has been interviewed and/or quoted in over 60 magazines and newspapers. Mingjiang Li is an Associate Professor at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He is also the Coordinator of the China Programme at RSIS. He received his PhD in Political Science from Boston University. His main research interests include China–ASEAN relations, Sino–US relations, Asia-Pacific security, and domestic sources of Chinese foreign policy. He is the author (including editor and co-editor) of 12 books. His recent books are New Dynamics in US–China Relations: Contending for the Asia Pacific (co-editor with Kalyan M. Kemburi, Routledge, 2014) and Mao’s China and the Sino-Soviet Split (Routledge, 2012). He has published papers in various peer-reviewed journals including the Journal of Strategic Studies, Global Governance, Cold War History, Journal of Contemporary China, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Chinese Journal of Political Science, China: An International Journal, China Security, Harvard Asia Quarterly, Security Challenges, and the International Spectator. Dr Li frequently participates in various track II events on East Asian regional security. Yves-Heng Lim is Assistant Professor at Fu Jen Catholic University, Department of French Language and Culture. He is the author of China’s Naval Power: An Offensive Realist Approach (Ashgate, 2014), and the results of his research have been published in the Journal of Contemporary China, China: An International Journal, Pacific Focus as well as in several edited volumes. Andrew L. Oros is Director of International Studies and Associate Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Washington College. He is a specialist on the international and comparative politics

Contributors xi of East Asia and the advanced industrial democracies, with an emphasis on contending approaches to managing security. He is author of Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice (Stanford University Press, 2008), co-author with Yuki Tatsumi of Global Security Watch: Japan (Praeger, 2010), and over a dozen scholarly articles and book chapters. He speaks frequently about his research on issues in Japanese politics and East Asian security to members of the media, fellow researchers and policy-makers in Washington. Angela Ming Yan Poh is a PhD Candidate at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. She received her Master of Science with Distinction from the University of Oxford, where she studied as a Clarendon Scholar. Her main research interests include Chinese foreign policy, US–China relations and Asia-Pacific security. Her dissertation examines the ideational sources of Chinese foreign policy behaviour, with a focus on economic statecraft. Prior to joining RSIS, Angela served in the Singapore Ministry of Defence Policy Office, and received the Singapore Ministry of Defence Postgraduate Award in 2014 to pursue her PhD. She regularly tutors the Undergraduate Professional Military Education and Training Military Studies module at NTU, as well as the Goh Keng Swee Command and Staff College in Singapore. Angela is also a Senior Visiting Student at the Peking University School of International Studies in Beijing, China from 2015 to 2016. Jeffrey Reeves is Associate Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii, USA. His main areas of research, teaching and outreach are Northeast Asian security issues, Chinese politics, political economics, transnational crime and terrorism in Asia, and Mongolia. Before joining the APCSS, Dr Reeves was a research fellow at Griffith University’s Asia Institute in Brisbane, Australia, and also previously worked with the Center for Advanced Defense Studies in Washington, DC, where he was the Director of both the Center’s Chinese Studies and Culture and Conflict programs. He has published widely on security issues in Asia in peer-review journals such as Asian Survey, Pacific Review, Contemporary South Asia and The Asian Journal of Political Science. Dr Reeves has extensive fieldwork experience in China having taught, lectured and studied at Peking University and worked with the United Nations Development Programme in Beijing. Dr Reeves also lived in Mongolia for more than two years while acting as a teacher training for the US Peace Corps. He is proficient in Mandarin Chinese and Mongolian.

xii Handbook of US–China relations Terence Roehrig is Professor of National Security Affairs and the Director of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group at the US Naval War College. He has been a Research Fellow at the Kennedy School at Harvard University in the International Security Program and the Project on Managing the Atom and a past President of the Association of Korean Political Studies. He has published several books including most recently South Koreas Rise: Economic Development, Power, and Foreign Policy with Cambridge University Press, 2014, a work co-authored with Uk Heo. He has published numerous articles and book chapters on Korean and East Asian security issues, North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, the Northern Limit Line dispute, deterrence, the US–South Korea alliance, the South Korea Navy, human rights, and transitional justice. Dr Roehrig received his PhD from the University of WisconsinMadison in political science. Benjamin Schreer is Professor in Security Studies and Head of the Department of Security Studies and Criminology (SSC) at Macquarie University in Sydney. Previously, he was Senior Analyst for Defence Strategy at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI); Senior Lecturer and Deputy Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) at the Australian National University (ANU); Deputy Director of the Aspen Institute Germany; Research Group Leader at Konstanz University; and a research fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP) in Berlin. He specializes in strategic and defence studies, and has published widely on strategic trends in the Asia-Pacific region. Paul J. Smith is Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. He has published over 35 journal articles and chapters on subjects related to transnational security and the international politics of East Asia (with particular emphasis on the People’s Republic of China). His edited books include Human Smuggling: Chinese Migrant Trafficking and the Challenge to America’s Immigration Tradition (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997) and Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability (M.E. Sharpe, 2004). He is author of the book The Terrorism Ahead: Confronting Transnational Violence in the Twenty-first Century (M.E. Sharpe, 2007). Dr Smith frequently provides commentary for national and international news organizations. He earned his Bachelor of Arts from Washington and Lee University, his Master of Arts from the University of London (School of Oriental and African Studies – SOAS) and his JD and PhD (political science) from the University of Hawaii.

Contributors xiii Robert Sutter is Professor of Practice of International Affairs at George Washington University. A PhD graduate in History and East Asian Languages from Harvard University, Sutter taught full-time at Georgetown University (2001–11) before moving to his current position. He earlier taught part-time for 30 years at George Washington, Georgetown, Johns Hopkins Universities, or the University of Virginia. Sutter’s government career (1968–2001) included positions as Senior Specialist and Director of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division of the Congressional Research Service; the US government’s National Intelligence Officer for East Asia and the Pacific; and the China Division Director at the State Department’s intelligence bureau. His publications include over 200 articles and many more government reports dealing with US policy toward the Asia-Pacific, Chinese foreign relations and US–Chinese relations. His 21st and latest book is The United States in Asia (Rowman & Littlefield, 2015). Andrew T.H. Tan is Associate Professor and Convenor for International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Australia. Educated at Sydney University, Cambridge University, UK and the National University of Singapore, Andrew was formerly Senior Lecturer, Defence Studies, at King’s College London, based at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, Watchfield. To date, he has written many articles on various security issues, and is also the author, editor or co-editor of 16 books, including Security and Conflict in East Asia (Routledge, 2015), The Arms Race in Asia (Routledge, 2014), East and South-East Asia: International Relations and Security Perspectives (Routledge, 2013), Security Strategies in the Asia-Pacific: The USA’s ‘Second Front’ in Southeast Asia (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 – nominated for the Asia Society Bernard Schwartz Book Award), US Strategy Against Global Terrorism (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), The Global Arms Trade (Routledge, 2010), A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia (Edward Elgar, 2007), and others. Ming Wan is Professor of Government and International Affairs and Associate Dean at George Mason University’s School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs, USA. He has authored seven books, including The China Model and Global Political Economy: Comparison, Impact, and Interaction (Routledge, 2014) and Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Relations: Defining and Defending National Interests (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001). He has also published in journals such as Asian Survey, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Human Rights Quarterly, Orbis, Pacific Affairs, Pacific Review, and International Studies Quarterly and in edited volumes. His current research interests

xiv Handbook of US–China relations include international relations theory, Sino–Japanese relations, and the political economy of East Asia security. Dong Wang is Distinguished Professor of History at Shanghai University and research associate at the Fairbank Center of Harvard University. Her academic career as full professor spans the United States, China (Hong Kong’s Lingnan University and Peking University) and Europe (Finland and Germany). A recipient of a 2014–15 US National Endowment for the Humanities grant, Dr Wang is President of the Historical Society for Twentieth-Century China (USA), while serving on the editorial board of American Foreign Relations Since 1600 (USA), the Journal of AmericanEast Asian Relations (Netherlands), China Information (UK), TwentiethCentury China (USA and UK) and the Journal of Current Chinese Affairs (Germany). She is the author of the award-winning The United States and China: A History from the Eighteenth Century to the Present (Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), Managing God’s Higher Learning: U.S.– China Cultural Encounter and Canton Christian College (Lingnan University), 1888–1952 (Lexington Books, 2007), and China’s Unequal Treaties: Narrating National History (Lexington Books, 2005). Jingdong Yuan is Associate Professor at the Centre for International Security Studies and the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney. Professor Yuan specializes in Asia-Pacific security, Chinese defence and foreign policy, Sino–Indian relations, and global and regional arms control and non-proliferation issues. He has held visiting appointments at the National University of Singapore, the University of Macau, East-West Center, and the National Chengchi University. Between 1999 and 2010, he was Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. He is co-author with Dennis Gormley and Andrew Erickson of A LowVisibility Force Multiplier: Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions (NDU Press, 2014), co-editor with James Reilly of Australia and China at 40 (University of New South Wales Press, 2012), co-author with Waheguru Sidhu, China and India: Cooperation or Conflict? (Lynne Rienner, 2003). His publications have appeared in a number of refereed journals and in many edited volumes, including, most recently, The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia (2014). He is currently working on a book on China’s relations with South Asia since the end of the Cold War.

Introduction to the book Andrew T.H. Tan*

The evident, and growing, strategic rivalry between China and the United States is arguably the most important issue in international relations today due to its implications not just for the dominant position of the United States but also the stability of the evolving post–Cold War international system. The dramatic economic rise of China has been without precedent historically, and in 2014 it passed a historic milestone in becoming the world’s largest economy measured in purchasing power terms, surpassing the United States for the first time. The problem, however, is best summed up by Hillary Clinton when she stated in 2012 that ‘we are now trying to find … a new answer to the ancient question of what happens when an established power and a rising power meet’.1 This is a reference to Organski’s well-known observation that historically, where a rising power is confronted by a dominant power, war almost inevitably results, since the dominant power is not likely to easily yield its position to the challenger.2 China’s rise and the challenge this poses to US dominance is the international relations problem that has led to this volume on US–China relations. The relationship between the world’s two largest economies (as well as major conventional military and nuclear powers) is pivotal for global peace and stability. At stake here is the very stability and equilibrium of the evolving post–Cold War international system. As Kerry Brown in the concluding chapter of this book observes, the relationship between the two impacts on almost every other country, sometimes forcing them to take sides. This is because both countries see themselves as global powers, through the United States’ promotion of its perceived universally valid political and social values, and China’s enormous global economic reach. The US–China relationship has thus been very aptly described as ‘the most consequential bilateral relationship of our time’.3 The problem is that the relationship has become more contentious and complex, and this has made its management ever more challenging. As Kerry Brown observes, the simple framework of strategic partners working for mutual benefit that had characterized US–China relations since Nixon’s seminal xv

xvi Handbook of US–China relations visit to China in 1972 now needs serious updating. Today, many in the United States see China as a growing threat, while in China many perceive US actions as designed to contain China and prevent it from taking its rightful place as a regional and global power. Thus, with China’s rise, the US–China relationship has become more competitive although they continue to cooperate in a number of areas. However, the fact remains that there is today deep economic interdependence between the two. This has resulted in an increasingly complicated relationship with elements of both competition and cooperation. This volume is designed to address key questions in the US–China relationship. What are the historical and contemporary contexts that underpin this complex relationship? How has the strategic rivalry between the two evolved? What are the key flashpoints in their relationship? What are the key security issues between the two powers? The result is a volume that contains a broad set of contributions that focus on the US–China relationship in a number of spheres, including historical, political, economic, military, international and regional. In addition to the involvement of an international team of scholars, some with strong policy credentials, this volume will have a wide appeal for students and informed readers in both higher education and the policy-making world. This volume will enable them to gain an excellent point of entry into many, if not most, of the key debates regarding the rise of China and the US–China relationship. The mix of US, Chinese and other scholars is also designed to provide a balanced analysis of US–China relations.

CO-EVOLUTION The volume contains 25 chapters and is divided into six parts. The first part contains an introductory chapter that is broad based and focuses on how to theorize US–China relations as well as outlining the key challenges to the relationship. Andrew T.H. Tan’s Chapter 1 argues, citing Henry Kissinger, that the relationship is ‘less partnership than co-evolution’.4 It is this ‘coevolution’ that provides the balanced frame of reference for this volume. Tan also asserts that should the two succeed in coming to an understanding, war will be avoided and a new regional and global equilibrium will be the result. However, it remains to be seen if an entente cordiale could be achieved before growing mutual mistrust and misperception lead to open conflict.

Introduction to the book xvii

HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY CONTEXTS The second part provides the historical and contemporary contexts of the US–China relationship. In Chapter 2, Mark Beeson provides an overview of the United States in Asia. He argues that it is simply not possible to understand the development of this region and the remarkable economic and strategic changes and events that have occurred there without taking account of the role played by the United States. Beeson concludes by considering how a new US strategy based on the ‘Indo-Pacific’ region is likely to influence the future role of the United States in the region, however it may be defined. Chapters 3 and 4, written by Andrea Benvenuti, examine the bilateral relationship during and after the Cold War. Chapter 3 is divided into two key sections. The first explains why, during the early Cold War, relations between Washington and Beijing remained largely antagonistic notwithstanding some behind-the-scenes efforts to reduce conflict. The second section covers Nixon’s ‘opening to China’ and Washington’s subsequent rapprochement with Beijing. In so doing, it shows how Beijing and Washington managed to overcome their mutual suspicions and establish a mutually satisfactory political and economic relationship. Chapter 4 analyses the consequences of the end of the Cold War for US–China relations and shows how both Washington and Beijing found it difficult to adjust their bilateral relationship to the changed dynamics of the post–Cold War world. Although they broadly shared the view that effective cooperation was still very much in their mutual interest, such cooperation appeared at times elusive, often giving way to competition and conflict. Chapters 5 to 8 deal with US perspectives on China, human rights in US–China relations, Chinese perceptions of the United States and US–China economic relations. Chapter 5, written by Jeffrey Reeves, focuses on US perspectives on China. It reviews relevant public opinion polls and surveys, conducts a review of media reporting on China within the United States’ most influential media sources, examines academic writing from the United States’ most prominent Sinologists, and researches key speeches on China by top US leadership to determine dominant US perspectives on China. Reeves concludes that US perspective on China, in a very general sense, is largely negative. This has profound implications for US–China relations given that, historically, antagonism between states and peoples have led to conflict. Reeves therefore argues that both the United States and China should take steps to positively influence US perceptions toward China.

xviii Handbook of US–China relations Chapter 6, written by Ming Wan, focuses on human rights in US–China relations. Applying the theoretical framework of ‘eventstransformed structures’, namely examining how some events transform the structures that affect state behaviour, Ming Wan observes that the singular event of Tiananmen in June 1989 transformed the structure of US–China relations, creating a new normal. While other key events in US–China relations helped mould the shape of US–China relationship, the human rights subset has remained stable, which also constrains the overall bilateral relationship. Chapter 7, written by Shiming Fan, focuses on Chinese public perceptions of the United States. Fan discusses psychological, socio-political and international factors in explaining the phenomenon of conspiracy theories in China regarding the actions of the United States. Fan points out that the exaggeration of the influence and effects of conspiracy theories could seriously affect US–China relations, as they reinforce the enemy image, alienate the American and Chinese people, and contribute to a detrimental atmosphere for governmental relations. Chapter 8, written by Dong Wang, focuses on US–China economic relations, specifically, the governance of US–China economic relations in historical and contemporary terms. As the largest global trader, exportoriented manufacturer, and foreign exchange reserves holder, China should be encouraged to do more for its Asian neighbours, the international economy, and in the provision of public goods. The United States would do no worse than share power and responsibility with not only China but also other countries around the world. Dong Wang also argues that the United States and China should see each other in a more relaxed way.

THE US–CHINA STRATEGIC RIVALRY The third part of the volume contains four chapters that examine the US–China strategic rivalry. Chapter 9, on the US–China strategic rivalry, is co-authored by Angela Ming Yan Poh and Mingjiang Li. The co-authors argue that the US–China strategic rivalry at the global level will be more manageable, given that China appears to be more interested in reforming some elements of the existing international system, rather than in establishing a fundamentally different global order. The more problematic aspect will be the security contentions between China and the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, where the United States has been a dominant power over the past few decades, and where a rising China has increasing political and economic interests. In particular, countries in the region will need to play constructive roles by seeking to

Introduction to the book xix incorporate both the United States and China into new and existing economic and security institutions, instead of forming ‘alliances’ that could lead to further conflict and divisions in the region. Chapter 10, on China’s global challenge to the United States, is written by Andrew T.H. Tan. China’s dramatic economic rise, its emerging global economic power, and its expanding military capabilities have led to predictions that it will soon supplant the United States as the dominant global power. However, Tan argues that it is not in fact on a trajectory to do so. China does not have the desire or capacity for global leadership, its armed forces are not organized for deployment and intervention in the far corners of the globe, and it suffers from a significant deficit in soft power that would make it appeal to others and confer it with global influence. Thus, while China’s global influence will increase as it becomes a global economic actor, it will in fact not replace the United States as the dominant global power any time soon. Chapter 11, on the US rebalance to Asia and its implications for US–China relations, is written by Paul J. Smith. According to Smith, the US ‘rebalance to Asia’ policy announced in 2012 reflects a steady deterioration in US–China relations and the growing reality of a ‘security dilemma’ dynamic between Washington and Beijing. Smith characterizes the current phase in the relationship (since 1990) as featuring warm and robust social and economic relations juxtaposed with cold and hostile security relations. However, this contains evident danger as the two countries’ cooperative social and economic relations obscure the deterioration of the two countries’ security relationship, which could become the source of major conflict. Smith argues that in order to avoid any major bilateral rupture, the United States and China must find ways to build strategic trust and to focus on long-term security challenges in which both countries share common interests. Chapter 12, on China’s ‘new model of major power relations’, is written by Richard Weixing Hu. Hu observes that President Xi Jinping’s response to the US rebalancing strategy has been non-confrontational but also non-compromising in defending China’s national interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Thus, Xi Jinping has proposed the building of a ‘new model of major power relations’ with the United States in order to reset the strained bilateral relationship. However, profound strategic distrust has led to a lukewarm response from Washington. Hu warns that unless Beijing and Washington can find ways to reduce mutual distrust and manage competition, it is unlikely that they could build an enduring, stable and cooperative relationship.

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FLASHPOINTS The fourth part of the volume contains four chapters that examine the various flashpoints in US–China relations. Chapter 13, written by Andrew L. Oros, focuses on Japan in the US–China relationship. Oros observes that Japan plays an integral role in the US–China relationship as a major trading partner of both and as the third-largest economy in the world. Both the United States and China have deep ties with Japan, and both states have used their relationship with Japan to seek to advance their interests with regard to the other. The US–China and Japan–China relationships are therefore in many ways a triangular US–Japan–China relationship, with the added challenges that a three-way relationship entails. Thus, according to Oros, when considering the challenges of the US–China relationship moving forward, careful attention should be paid to the impact of Japan on the evolving US–China dynamic. Chapter 14, written by Terence Roehrig, examines Korea in US–China relations. Roehrig concludes that North Korea will remain a serious flashpoint for conflict in the region and a major point of contact for US–China relations. In the years ahead, South Korea could also be facing a strategic dilemma as China’s rise has been a huge economic opportunity for South Korea. Should US–China relations worsen, South Korea would face a difficult challenge in balancing these two relationships. Roehrig concludes that North and South Korean roles in US–China relations are multifaceted, part challenge and part opportunity, and closely tied to the uncertainty that characterizes the Asia-Pacific. Chapter 15, written by Andrew T.H. Tan, focuses on Taiwan in US–China relations. Tan argues that Taiwan has been a key issue in US–China relations since the end of World War II and, as the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995–96 demonstrated, it could yet lead to open conflict between the two great powers. For China, resolving the Taiwan issue through reunification with the Mainland is a primary political objective on account of the strong and emotive nationalist sentiments surrounding the issue in China. However, Taiwan has been the benefactor of fortuitous strategic developments in Asia, which has led the United States to continue to protect it from China. While Taiwan is ultimately expendable should strategic circumstances change, for the time being it remains a key issue in US–China relations and the challenge is maintaining the status quo and thus peace. Chapter 16, written by Chien-peng Chung, focuses on the United States and China’s maritime territorial disputes. In particular, it examines the roles played by the United States in the claims over the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea and the various outcrops in the

Introduction to the book xxi South China Sea such as the Spratly and the Paracel Islands. While the United States has no territorial claims over these islands, it has been involved in issues related to them since the end of World War II, and continues to do so due to its security presence in the region. US involvement has also been actively sought by countries contesting China’s claims to these territories, such as Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam, and those that are not parties to the disputes, but are nonetheless concerned about China asserting its influence in East and Southeast Asia through the construction of military facilities on these outcrops. The chapter concludes with possible steps that both China and the United States can take to reduce tension caused by these disputes.

SECURITY AND DEFENCE The fifth part contains seven chapters examining the security and defence issues in the US–China relationship. Chapter 17, entitled ‘Assessing the US–China power balance’, is written by Yee-Kuang Heng. In this chapter, Heng asks how China and the United States assess each other’s power capabilities. Heng concludes that Cold War concepts of net assessment and AirLand Battle continue to exert an influence on the way the United States considers China’s military power capabilities. Interestingly, Heng also finds that China stresses the notion of ‘comprehensive power’, which also highlights the importance of ‘soft power’ far more than the US side does. Chapter 18, by Yves-Heng Lim, evaluates China’s military capabilities. In this chapter, Lim examines the progress made by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the context of a potential clash between Beijing and Washington, which, in all likelihood, would mainly be fought over the ‘commons’ – the sea, the air, space and cyberspace. Lim argues that China has substantially enhanced its capacity to deny control of the commons, while it has, at the same time, been striving to build a limited capacity to control the commons for its own purposes. Chapter 19, entitled ‘Facing the dragon: debating the US military response to China’, is written by Benjamin Schreer. Schreer focuses on the scholarly debate about the ‘best’ US military strategy with regard to China. Schreer finds that while the academic debate about US military options against the China challenge is far from conclusive, the Pentagon is proceeding with a strategy that seeks to retain full-spectrum dominance against the PLA, including through deep strikes against conventional targets on the Mainland. As a consequence, Schreer concludes that the United States is likely to retain its forward presence in the Asia-Pacific in

xxii Handbook of US–China relations order to push back against the possibility of a more assertive Chinese strategic posture in the Western Pacific. Chapter 20, which focuses on China’s A2/AD (Anti-Access, Area Denial) strategy, is written by Jingdong Yuan. In this chapter, Yuan reviews and discusses developments in China’s A2/AD strategy, the US AirSea Battle Concept (ASBC) and alternative responses to the A2/AD challenges, and explains the potential risks of miscalculation and escalation. Yuan argues for greater US–China military dialogue and the introduction of crisis management mechanisms in order to prevent major escalation and open confrontation between the region’s two great powers. Chapter 21, on the PLA Navy and the US Navy in the Asia-Pacific, is written by Richard A. Bitzinger. Bitzinger observes in this chapter that US and Chinese competition in the Western Pacific is increasingly taking on a military dimension. Bitzinger points to the concern that China and the United States are increasingly prone to resorting to force in the East and South China Seas in order to achieve their geopolitical goals, which in turn raises fears that such a competition could lead to an armed clash, one that could inadvertently escalate geographically and in intensity. Chapter 22, on the cyberwar between China and the United States, is written by Nir Kshetri. Allegations and counter-allegations have been persistent themes in dialogues and discourses in the US–China relationships involving cybercrime and cybersecurity. There are some signs that the United States has entered into direct confrontation regarding Chinaoriginated cyberattacks. China is also responding to the Western allegations by striking back with strong denials and counter-allegations that US government agencies lack interest in fighting cybercrimes and do not cooperate with their Chinese counterparts. This chapter sheds light into this cyber cold war by examining Western and Chinese allegations and counter-allegations related to cyberattacks and cyberwarfare. Chapter 23, the last chapter in this part, is entitled ‘Future war: China and the United States’, and is written by Malcolm Davis. In this chapter, Davis examines where conflicts might occur, the basic aspects of China’s military strategy, and how it is influencing PLA modernization, with particular focus on naval, air and missile forces, as well as Chinese information warfare capabilities for waging warfare in space, and across the electromagnetic spectrum, including in cyberspace. Davis argues that Chinese strategic interests will ultimately demand that China pursue a greater capability for power projection operations into the Indian Ocean, and that the current focus of the PLA on East Asia will be overtaken by a growing operational focus on Chinese interests and activities in the Indian Ocean. This will lead to new developments for Chinese military strategy and modernization.

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OUTLOOK AND IMPLICATIONS The final, concluding part of the volume consists of two chapters by eminent scholars on US–China relations. Chapter 24 is written by Robert Sutter, and examines the outlook for the relationship. Sutter examines the context of US–China relations since the Cold War to offer an assessment on whether or not the impact of President Xi Jinping is leading to a widely anticipated power shift where a rising China is superseding a declining United States in the intensifying rivalry for influence in the Asia-Pacific region. According to Sutter, substantial constraints dissuade the Xi government from confronting the United States. These include serious domestic Chinese problems, strong and growing US–Chinese interdependence, and power realities in Asia that illustrate China’s surprisingly mediocre record in expanding influence in this critically important region where the United States registers stronger not declining influence. Sutter concludes that while assertiveness and the periodic bluster of Xi’s foreign policy will probably continue, they are married with pragmatic management of serious disputes, thereby reducing the likelihood of confrontation that is not in the interests of either power. Chapter 25 is written by Kerry Brown, and explains why the relationship matters to the rest of the world. As Brown explains, the relationship between the United States and China has been called the most crucial of the twenty-first century, as the bilateral relationship impacts on almost every other country, sometimes forcing them to take sides, or creates problems in their allegiances. Brown’s chapter examines the ways they relate to each other inevitably impacts on the rest of the world, in which ways this manifests itself, and attempts to provide a holistic framework to understand this. Brown concludes that the relationship has become more complicated. For the rest of the world, factoring this complexity into their diplomatic thinking and scenario planning will become increasingly necessary.

NOTES * 1.

2.

The author is grateful to all the contributors of this volume for having supplied the abstracts that have made possible this introduction. Transcript of Hillary Clinton’s speech to the US Institute of Peace China Conference commemorating the 40th anniversary of President Nixon’s visit to China, 7 March 2012, accessed 17 July 2014 at http://australianpolitics.com/2012/03/07/hillaryclinton-on-china.html. Organski, A.F.K. (1968), World Politics, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 376.

xxiv Handbook of US–China relations 3. 4.

Steinberg, J. and M.E. O’Hanlon (2014), Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: U.S.– China Relations in the Twenty-First Century, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, p. 1. Kissinger, H. (2011), On China, London: Allen Lane, p. 527.

PART I CO-EVOLUTION

1. Challenges in US–China relations Andrew T.H. Tan

THE US–CHINA RELATIONSHIP AND WHY IT MATTERS The rise of China and the challenge it poses to US global dominance is regarded by many to be one of the most important issues in international relations today. The relationship between the two is perceived to be pivotal for global peace and stability, particularly as they are, based on their GDP, the second-largest and largest economies in the world respectively in 2016. Indeed, according to US scholars James Steinberg and Michael O’Hanlon, ‘few dispute the notion’ that ‘the US–China relationship is today the most consequential bilateral relationship of our time’.1 Similarly, with some hyperbole, Liu Jieyi, a senior Chinese diplomat, asserted that the two governments ‘have responsibility for the whole world and the development of humanity in the twenty-first century’.2 As Bergsten et al. observed, China’s rise as a globally significant great power presents difficult strategic questions for the United States and its global leadership. Can China be integrated into the US-dominated post-1945 international system? What are the challenges and opportunities presented by China’s rise? These are the questions that increasingly define the challenges facing their bilateral relationship.3 Then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described China’s challenge most succinctly when she stated in 2012: The United States is attempting to work with a rising power to foster its rise as an active contributor to global security, stability and prosperity while also sustaining and securing American leadership in a changing world. And we are trying to do this without entering into unhealthy competition, rivalry, or conflict; without scoring points at each other’s expense and thereby souring the relationship; and without falling short on our responsibilities to the international community. We are, together, building a model in which we strike a stable and mutually acceptable balance between cooperation and competition. This is uncharted territory. And we have to get it right, because so much depends on it.4

3

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Much of the contemporary discussion about China’s rise has been underpinned by power transition theory, which was first developed by Organski in the late 1950s and which he later refined. Organski conceptualized a hierarchical international system in which a dominant power heads an international order that also includes other major powers that are generally satisfied with the status quo. The problem, however, is when the old leader is challenged by newly industrializing nations. As Organski explained, ‘a recently industrialized nation may be dissatisfied with the existing international order because it rose too late to receive a proportionate share of the benefits’. Such a nation may pose a real challenge to the dominant power as it ‘may succeed in drawing to its side lesser nations who are also dissatisfied because they are exploited by the nations that dominate the existing order’.5 Under power transition theory, war is most likely when a dissatisfied challenger increases in strength and begins to overtake the dominant power. It is this combination of parity, overtaking and dissatisfaction that leads to war.6 Thus, in a situation where a rising power is confronted by a dominant power, war almost inevitably results, since the dominant power is not likely to easily yield its position to the challenger. As Organski asserted, ‘the major wars of recent history have all been wars involving the dominant nation and its allies against a challenger who has recently risen in power thanks to industrialization’.7 It was with this in mind that Hillary Clinton thus observed in 2012 that ‘we are now trying to find … a new answer to the ancient question of what happens when an established power and a rising power meet’.8 Recognizing however, that both countries now live in an interdependent world and whose economies are deeply intertwined, she also observed that ‘interdependence means that one of us cannot succeed unless the other does as well’.9 Clinton’s comments succinctly capture the complexity of the bilateral relationship – containing both cooperation and competition. The implications of the US–China bilateral relationship for the international system can be better understood through the lens of hegemonic stability theory, which posits that stability in the global system requires a hegemon to develop and enforce the rules of the system.10 According to Gilpin, global or ‘hegemonic war’ creates a new hegemon, which will create a new international system according to its own preferences. Thus, the United States became dominant following the end of World War II, and it attempted to keep the newly founded world order through the provision of public goods.11 However, hegemons are also prone to imperial overstretch and eventually decline.12 In recent times, China’s rise poses a challenge to the dominance of the international system by the United States, itself facing long-term fiscal and economic problems, in

Challenges in US–China relations 5 turn posing a challenge to the current system of hegemonic stability. This development has potentially serious implications for the international system as well as global stability. In view of their mutual suspicions and intensifying rivalry, Bilahari Kausikan, a senior Asian diplomat, thus observed recently that states in Asia hope that both the United States and China will eventually develop ‘a stable and predictable pattern of relations’, although he recognized that ‘the critical factors will be bilateral between these two key major powers’.13 The US–China relationship is therefore crucial for regional stability in Asia, and also has implications for the future shape and stability of the evolving post–Cold War international system. This relationship has been shaped by historical and contemporary developments that form the context of their present-day interaction and rivalry. The rest of this chapter examines the dramatic rise of China and its challenge to the US-led international system, and the historical relationship that continues to affect perceptions that they have towards the other. It concludes with an analysis of the challenges facing the US–China relationship.

CHINA’S RISE AND ITS CHALLENGE China’s dramatic economic rise in recent decades has underpinned its growing challenge to the current US- and Western-dominated international order. Since the promulgation of its Open Door Policy under Deng Xiaoping in 1978, China has embraced market capitalism and the global economy with alacrity, in the process achieving dramatic economic growth. From 2000 to 2011, China’s economic growth averaged 10.8 per cent, although this fell to an estimated 7.9 per cent and 8.4 per cent in 2012 and 2013 respectively, still very high compared to global averages. By comparison, the United States grew an average of 1.6 per cent from 2000 to 2011, while the world averaged 2.7 per cent over the same period.14 As a result of its economic malaise, Japan, hitherto the world’s second-largest economy, was overtaken by China in 2010.15 China’s rise has been much faster than expected. In fact, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China’s economy, measured in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), surpassed the United States in 2014 to become the world’s largest economy.16 Despite maintaining a supposedly communist system of government dominated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), China today runs a very efficient and competitive capitalist free-market economy that has propelled China into a significant regional and global player.

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As David Shambaugh noted, China is today a ‘trading superstate’, having surpassed Germany in 2009 as the world’s largest exporter. He also observed that China possesses the largest foreign exchange reserves in the world, estimated at US$3.2 trillion in 2011, is the largest foreign holder of US government debt, and has the world’s largest number of millionaires and billionaires.17 In 2009, it also became the world’s largest total energy consumer, with the bulk of its oil imports coming from the Middle East.18 China is also rapidly becoming an important economic player in every major continent in the world, as it searches for raw material and energy resources, and develops new markets as well as destinations for its overseas direct investments (ODIs). Indeed, China is today a significant economic player in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. For instance, China’s overseas aid programme in Africa alone is claimed to have completed 900 projects, involving railroads, highways, stadiums and hospitals.19 In contrast to China’s dramatic rise and economic dynamism, the United States has in recent times stumbled economically and politically. The global financial crisis (GFC) in 2008, sparked by the sub-prime housing loan crisis, revealed the extent of the fundamental fiscal and economic problems affecting the United States. The burgeoning debt crisis, estimated at US$18 trillion by March 2015, has led to sequester (i.e., automatic budget cuts), a process that has uncertain consequences for US investment in infrastructure necessary to sustain its economic future, as well as for meeting its global military and security responsibilities.20 More seriously, its global image and soft power have been undermined by its controversial wars in Afghanistan and Iraq after 2001, which have alienated the Muslim world and divided its allies. In addition, recent exposés by Edward Snowden of the extent of US global electronic surveillance have shocked and enraged allies and their publics. This is not to say that the United States is in terminal decline, as it remains an unrivalled global military power and has managed its dominance in such a way that it has not sparked a containment alliance against it by other great powers.21 Nonetheless, its tepid economic performance and the severity of its fiscal woes, coupled with its recent political missteps on the international stage, have led to renewed questions over US capacity and resolve in managing its global responsibilities. It is this context that China is perceived to be a serious and rising challenge to US regional dominance in Asia, and to its position globally. In recent years, China’s startling economic success has led to the emergence of the so-called Beijing Consensus, which is based on innovation and flexibility, sustainable and equitable development, and independence from outside powers.22 This has presented to the non–

Challenges in US–China relations 7 Western world a serious alternative to the Washington Consensus or Western model of development based on free markets, privatization and deregulation that has formed the foundation of US-led multilateral institutions since the end of World War II.23 The inevitability of China’s rise and its potential to eventually supplant the United States have become recurring themes in the Western academic and policy literature on China. As Paul Starobin asserted, ‘if the American Century ends, then the leading contender to succeed the United States is China’.24 Such a prospect has alarmed many in the West. In 2010, for instance, Martin Jacques asserted in his popular book, When China Rules the World, that not only is China’s rise inevitable, it would also lead to the end of Western dominance in every sphere. More controversially, Jacques argued that China as a great global power would ‘in time require and expect a major reordering of global relationships’.25 This implied that China would challenge the current status quo and would seek to replace the United States as the world’s dominant power. Leading realist scholar John Mearsheimer has also argued that China would behave in a similar way as other great powers in history, and would attempt to establish its own regional hegemony.26 Thus, China’s rise is not likely to be peaceful, as it would pose a challenge to the prevailing international system. Chinese writers however, have sought to counter such alarmist views by promoting the ‘Peaceful Rise’ thesis. Zheng Bijian, for instance, pointed out the many challenges that China faces in its long-term objective of securing a more comfortable life for its people and achieving the status of a ‘modernized, medium-level developed country’ by 2050.27 He argued instead that ‘China’s peaceful rise will further open its economy so that its population can serve as a growing market for the rest of the world, thus providing increased opportunities for – rather than posing a threat to – the international community’. Zheng also asserted that ‘China does not seek hegemony or predominance in world affairs’, since its development depends on world peace, one that ‘its development will in turn reinforce’.28

THE EVOLUTION OF US–CHINA RELATIONS US–China relations today are the product of a long and continuous association that began long before World War II, and that continue to affect perceptions they have towards each other. Many accounts of the historical US relationship with China emphasize the positive elements, such as: the role of US missionaries in improving conditions in the

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country, for instance, in education; the support of the United States for the territorial integrity of China during the age of colonial imperialism; and the cooperation against Japan during World War II. However, as Robert Sutter observed, such accounts are partial and misleading, as there are underlying historical reasons for the distrust and wariness that continue to affect the present-day relationship.29 In fact, according to Sutter, historical experiences of their differences, ‘have the potential to seriously disrupt and upset Sino-American relations’.30 World War II and the Cold War According to Nancy Tucker, the US–China relationship has historically been ‘how the Americans, preoccupied with the affairs of Europe, thought they could use China, subordinating its needs and interests to the realization of weightier objectives elsewhere’.31 During the course of World War II and its aftermath, the United States repeatedly sought to use China for its own strategic purposes. Thus, during World War II, the United States sought China’s support in the fight against the fascist powers, namely, Japan and Germany. In doing so, the United States inadvertently encouraged the nationalists in China to adopt an unrealistic assessment of its importance to the United States. In reaching out to the communists during that time, the United States also inadvertently disappointed them. At the Yalta Conference in 1945, President Roosevelt had little compunction in sacrificing China’s control over Outer Mongolia, Port Arthur and Dairen to the Soviets in the interest of a swifter end to the war.32 As Tucker concluded, ‘not surprisingly, disappointment (has) plagued this distorted relationship … neither country seemed willing or able to fulfil the expectations of the other’.33 In 1949, the United States washed its hands of Chiang Kai-Shek and the nationalists as its defeat to the communists in China’s civil war seemed imminent, and appeared to be prepared to allow the communists to take Taiwan and complete their victory.34 This, however, was swiftly reversed when the Korean War broke out in 1950, which eventually led to China’s military intervention and direct conflict with the United States on the Korean Peninsula. This also meant a reversal over Taiwan, as the United States now used its naval forces to prevent the reunification of Taiwan by China, an action that China interpreted as the re-entry of the United States into the Chinese Civil War.35 In the ensuing Cold War, the United States supported the Republic of China (ROC) regime in Taiwan and protected it from China through the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954.36 In the charged Cold War atmosphere, debates broke out in the United States over ‘who lost China’.37 Thereafter, the United States

Challenges in US–China relations 9 constructed a post-war security architecture in East Asia that ensured US military, political and economic dominance in the region, and that continues to shape the strategic landscape today. During the Cold War, the United States established alliances throughout the Asia-Pacific, and stationed troops in the Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan as part of its containment strategy against the supposedly monolithic threat from communism. This isolated China in Asia to a large degree, ensuring it had little choice but to rely on the Soviet Union for assistance. However, US policy over China changed on account of the Sino– Soviet split in the late 1960s. The United States saw an opportunity to drive a wedge between China and the Soviet Union, and thus preserve the US position in Asia, which appeared to be under threat following its failure to win the Vietnam War. This time, the United States was prepared to sacrifice Taiwan for the sake of wider strategic interests. In the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972, the United States removed the one major obstacle to the normalization of relations and the establishment of a quasi Sino–US strategic alliance against the Soviet Union, by acknowledging that Taiwan was part of China under the ‘One-China’ principle.38 Following this, the United States tore up the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1979 and removed its troops from Taiwan. However, the domestic political backlash in the United States led to the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act, which ensured that Taiwan would still be treated as a country and under which the United States reserved the right to ‘make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability’.39 This perfidy did not fool China for very long. While China was prepared to pragmatically set aside the Taiwan issue for the time being in view of broader strategic objectives, namely, countering the hostility of the Soviet Union and pursuing economic development through its Open Door Policy promulgated in 1978, it has remained a serious thorn in bilateral relations between the United States and China. The End of the Cold War and the Tiananmen Massacre The end of the Cold War and, in particular, the shock of the Tiananmen massacre in 1989, deeply affected Sino–US relations. The end of the Cold War ended the strategic relationship directed at the Soviet Union. More seriously, the massacre of pro-democracy activists at Tiananmen Square in Beijing in June 1989 led to popular revulsion in the United States at China’s communist regime, which now appeared to be an unjust and oppressive government at odds with US values of democracy and

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liberalism.40 On the part of China, however, a similar ambivalence also developed regarding the United States, which appeared in subsequent years to be engaged in attempts to penalize China for its human rights abuses as well as obstruct China’s rise. During the 1990s, US–China relations were dominated by human rights issues, Taiwan, non-proliferation and allegedly unfair trade practices by China.41 Increasingly, China’s economic rise led to attention in the United States on the allegedly unfair and disadvantageous aspects of the bilateral economic relationship. These include the large US trade deficits with China, unhappiness over intellectual property rights and protection in China, alleged Chinese government subsidies for various products amounting to export subsidies, which in turn undermined US industry, and Chinese product safety.42 Given this context, the post-Tiananmen bilateral relationship markedly deteriorated. In 1992, the United States sold 150 F-16 combat aircraft to Taiwan, in violation of the 1982 Joint Communiqué on arms sales in which it had pledged to reduce the quantity of arms sold to Taiwan.43 In 1995, the unofficial visit of the pro-independence President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan to Cornell University, his alma mater in the United States, led to strong protests from China, which viewed this as a violation of the One-China principle.44 These events resulted in China resorting to assertive measures, namely, the conduct of missile tests near Taiwan in 1995–96 as a warning that it should not push its independence agenda too far. The United States responded by moving two aircraft carrier battle groups to waters near Taiwan to deter China.45 This was the most serious crisis in Sino–US relations since the normalization of relations. It was this context of revulsion at China after Tiananmen, its startling economic rise and the perception of an aggressive China that the perception of a ‘China threat’ began to take hold in the United States. In March 1992, a US defence document supervised by Paul Wolfowitz delineated the central challenge the United States now faced after the end of the Cold War, namely that it ‘must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any future potential global competitor’.46 It did not take very long for China to be identified as the new potential global competitor. In 1994, Larry Wortzel, a US intelligence officer with a PhD from the University of Hawaii, published his seminal paper first presented in August 1993 at the American Enterprise Institute, in which he observed that China ‘is not playing wholeheartedly in the new world order, nor is it posturing itself for an order of multilevel interdependence … instead, it seems locked in pre-cold war, almost turn-of-the-century modes of quasi-imperial competition for regional hegemony’. Wortzel also asserted that ‘China seems to be patiently embarked on a new “Long

Challenges in US–China relations 11 March” to become the first among roughly equal great powers that can enjoy freedom of action through a strong military presence and posture in a neo-imperial manner’.47 Further, he warned apocalyptically that ‘the future in Asia will be very painful if the Chinese decide to move through the stages and processes of the twentieth century by building major blue water forces and engaging in hegemonic politics in the region’.48 In 1997, the Quadrennial Defense Review named China (and Russia) as possible global peer competitors beyond 2015.49 By 2000, the United States became sufficiently concerned to begin an annual report on the military power of China.50 The language and tone regarding the ‘China threat’ gradually began to assume gravity and alarm. In 2006, John Mearsheimer asserted that China’s rise would not be peaceful, if the history of the rise of great powers in the past was any guide. He thus expected that China would attempt to establish own regional hegemony.51 This implied a coming conflict and challenge to the US position in Asia at the very least. In 2011, Aaron Friedberg, in his self-explanatory book entitled A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, warned of the danger that a rising China posed to the United States. Citing its ‘vast human and natural resources’ as well as its market-oriented development that had produced very rapid economic growth and technological progress, Friedberg asserted that China had now become a much more serious strategic competitor than Germany and Japan during World War II, and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.52 Indeed, if current trends continued, ‘we are on track to lose our geopolitical contest with China’.53 China’s military build-up, coupled with US fiscal constraints and other impediments, could lead to the United States being ‘pushed to the margins of Asia if not out of the region altogether’.54 With the United States gone from Asia, China could then use its dominant position in Asia as the springboard to challenge the US position globally, such as in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. Friedberg thus warned that ‘if we permit an illiberal China to displace us as the preponderant player in this most vital region, we will face grave dangers to our interests and our values throughout the world’.55 The Rise of Chinese Nationalism The deterioration of bilateral relations during the 1990s culminated in the unfortunate bombing by NATO warplanes of China’s embassy in Belgrade in 1999 during the Kosovo conflict. While this was officially explained by NATO and the United States as an accident due to the purported use of an outdated map, Britain’s The Guardian newspaper

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asserted that the attack was in fact deliberate; the Chinese embassy was attacked because it had allegedly provided assistance to the Milosevic regime in Serbia in communicating with its forces as it was at the time subjected to NATO electronic and communications jamming.56 China also became caught up in domestic US politics during the run up to the 2000 presidential campaign, which was eventually won by George W. Bush. During the run up, Bush played to the growing anti-China sentiments in the United States when he stated that China was not a strategic partner but a competitor. Thus, ‘we must make it clear to the Chinese that we don’t appreciate any attempt to spread weapons of mass destruction around the world, that we don’t appreciate any threats to our friends and allies in the Far East’.57 Soon after, an unfortunate incident highlighted the growing tensions between the two countries. In April 2001, a fighter aircraft from China’s Air Force intercepted a US EP-3 surveillance aircraft operating near China with a crew of 24. A collision occurred in which the Chinese pilot of the fighter aircraft was killed, and the damaged US aircraft was forced to land on the island of Hainan in China.58 China’s dramatic economic and military rise, and the conscious efforts by the ruling Communist Party to cultivate nationalism as a source of legitimacy, have prompted a strong nationalistic response from the Chinese public to what has appeared to be unfriendly US actions. This has been epitomized by the popularity of books with a nationalistic theme. One example is the popular China Can Say No, which was published in 1996 at the height of tensions with the United States over Taiwan and other issues. In this book, the Chinese co-writers describe the United States as a ‘spoiled child’, and US foreign policy as ‘insincere and irresponsible’.59 The authors also challenged the United States to go to war with China over Taiwan, taunting ‘do you dare?’60 More recently, Liu Mingfu’s nationalistic anti-US book, China Dream, published in 2010 (ironically by the China Friendship Publishing Company), has been very popular in China on account of its suggestion that China could, and in fact should, displace the United States in the wake of the GFC in 2008. Liu, an army colonel, asserted that China’s ‘grand goal’ should be to ‘become number one in the world’. This, he stated, would require displacing the United States. Further, he asserted that China’s rise would lead to regional and global peace and prosperity, as China was not an imperialist or hegemonic power. More ominously, he advocated the cultivation of a ‘martial spirit’ and the need for a military rise to accompany China’s economic rise.61

Challenges in US–China relations 13 Present-day Tensions and the US Pivot The terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001 and the subsequent Global War on Terrorism as well as the US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan led to the China issue being consigned to the backburner for the time being. However, it was bound to resurface once the United States began winding down its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly after the coming to power of the Obama administration in 2008. Moreover, in the wake of the GFC in 2008, a much more confident and nationalistic China began to assert China’s territorial claims over maritime territory in the potentially oil and gas-rich South China Sea and the East China Sea, moves that challenged the position of the United States in East and Southeast Asia. This led to the Obama administration paying greater attention to strategic developments in Asia. China’s assertive moves in the South China Sea, the entirety of which it claims, has brought it into conflict with other Southeast Asian claimants, since China’s expansive claims overlaps with the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of, in particular, Vietnam and the Philippines.62 As the United States too does not recognize China’s claims, it did not take long for both to directly confront each other. In March 2009, Chinese ships surrounded and harassed a US Navy surveillance vessel, the Impeccable, which was sailing through the South China Sea. China accused the US vessel of trespassing Chinese waters, but the United States protested that the South China Sea constituted international waters.63 The United States then reinforced its point by despatching a Navy destroyer, the USS Chung Hoon, to accompany the Impeccable.64 Two months later, in May 2009, then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asserted that the United States would remain engaged in the region and that it ‘is not ceding the Pacific to anyone’.65 Despite these evident tensions, the Obama administration that came to power in 2008 in the United States initially took a more measured approach towards China in the hopes that China would support the United States on issues such as climate change and Iran’s nuclear programme. This was epitomized by President Obama’s decision to decline meeting the Dalai Lama in 2009 in order to avoid offending China. However, China proved to be less willing to accommodate the United States on a range of issues, and its assertive behaviour in Asia also appeared to be a direct challenge to the US position.66 Thus, Obama announced a new approach to Asia in a major policy speech delivered in Australia on the occasion of his state visit in November 2011. In his ‘Asia pivot’ speech, Obama declared that the future of the United States lies with the Asia-Pacific, as it has the world’s fastest-growing region and

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is home to more than half of the global economy. He also asserted that ‘with most of the world’s nuclear powers and some half of humanity, Asia will largely define whether the century ahead will be marked by conflict or cooperation, needless suffering or human progress’. Thus, ‘the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with allies and friends’. To achieve this objective, Obama promised that ‘reductions in US defence spending will not … come at the expense of the Asia-Pacific’. Further, the United States would ‘allocate the resources necessary to maintain our strong military presence in this region … we will preserve our unique ability to project power and deter threats to peace’.67 Following the speech, the United States and Australia signed an agreement allowing the United States to station up to 2500 troops in Australia’s Northern Territory for six months every year. The agreement also allowed more US ships and military aircraft, including B-52 bombers, to operate from Australian bases.68 In June 2012, the United States and Singapore reached an agreement allowing four of the US Navy’s latest Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) vessels to be stationed in Singapore on a rotational basis.69 Indeed, throughout 2012, a presidential election year in the United States, China emerged as a major domestic political issue, leading Obama to take a noticeably harder line on China over trade issues and North Korea.70 Significantly, just two days following his re-election as president in 2012, Obama announced that his first visits overseas would be to Cambodia, Thailand and Myanmar, in a clear statement that his administration would have a strong Asia focus.71 This was also an attempt to loosen their linkages to China, as all three countries are friendly to the latter. In April 2014, Obama also visited Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines as part of the US pivot to Asia, now rebranded ‘rebalancing’.72 Thus, the Obama administration has, since the announcement of the Asia pivot, taken visible steps to enhance the US military presence as well as strengthen its alliances and make new ones. While this new focus on Asia has been rebranded as ‘rebalancing’, to China they have been perceived, probably correctly, as moves designed to contain it.73 On its part, China has been in no mood to compromise, upping the ante in 2012 when it became embroiled in a tense naval stand-off with the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal, which lies within the EEZ of the Philippines.74 China continued its creeping annexation of the South China Sea through various measures such as authorizing its coastguard to board and search foreign vessels found in the disputed area.75 In 2012, China also issued passports showing disputed territory in the South China Sea, East China

Challenges in US–China relations 15 Sea and along the India–China border as belonging to it.76 In late 2015, the United States openly challenged China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea by provocatively sailing a guided missile destroyer within 12 nautical miles of one of the land formations that China claims. As a top US military officer declared, ‘our military will continue to fly, sail, and operate whenever and wherever international law allows … the South China Sea is not – and will not – be an exception’. China angrily described this action as ‘an attempt to deprive China of its self-defence right as a sovereign state’, while the official Xinhua news agency warned that it was ‘a serious situation between frontline forces’, and ‘a minor incident that could spark conflict’.77 China has also laid down the gauntlet in the East China Sea by asserting its claim over the disputed Senkaku Islands, currently administered by Japan. Following the government of Japan’s nationalization of the territory through its purchase from private Japanese owners in September 2012, violent anti-Japanese protests broke out in China, accompanied by attacks on Japanese businesses and the temporary suspension of production at Japanese-owned factories.78 In January 2013, in a dangerous escalation of tensions, Chinese warships allegedly locked their fire-control radars onto a Japanese destroyer.79 In late 2013, China declared an ‘air-defence identification zone’ around the Senkaku Islands, prompting the United States to challenge this by flying two B-52 bombers over the islands.80 By 2013, tensions had reached their highest levels since the end of World War II in 1945, with the increased risk of miscalculation and accidental war.81 Given its defence treaty obligations towards Japan, any open conflict would invariably involve the United States and potentially escalate into a broader war. Indeed, the expansion of China’s military capabilities has increasingly preoccupied the United States. In 2013, China’s armed forces boasted very large and increasingly capable conventional capabilities, with 6840 main battle tanks and 7952 armoured personnel carriers in its army, 2525 combat aircraft in its Air Force, and 70 principal surface warships and 70 submarines in its Navy, including nuclear ballistic missile submarines.82 In 2013, it deployed its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, albeit a refurbished Russian vessel, with another three locally built aircraft carriers planned.83 It is also developing a fifth-generation combat aircraft, the J-20, allegedly from the stolen blueprints of the US next-generation F-35 Joint Strike Fighter that is just coming into service.84 More significantly however, China has developed effective anti-access and area denial capabilities, known in US military language as ‘A2/AD [Anti-Access/Area Denial] capabilities’, which are designed to deny US naval forces the capability to operate near Chinese waters and thus give

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China relative freedom of action in the West Pacific and East Asia during times of tension or actual conflict. These A2/AD capabilities include anti-satellite capabilities, sea-mines, ballistic missiles, long-range antiship cruise missiles, conventional submarines and small missile-armed vessels. To deal with A2/AD and to preserve the ability of the United States to project its power in Asia, the US Quadrennial Defense Review in 2010 thus directed the US Air Force and Navy to develop a new war-fighting doctrine, known as ‘AirSea Battle’.85 Given that its Cold War doctrine in dealing with the Soviet Union was known as ‘AirLand Battle’, this appeared to herald the potential of a new cold war but with a different communist adversary. As explained by a former US Navy captain, AirSea Battle would require the ability to withstand an initial attack and to limit damage to US and allied forces and bases, followed by a suppression campaign against PLA (People’s Liberation Army) longrange strike systems. This would require attacking Chinese satellites, ground stations, counter-space capabilities and over-the-horizon radars as the top priority.86 In other words, AirSea Battle envisioned direct attacks on China’s communications and command centres on the Chinese Mainland in the event of major hostilities, which in turn could prompt a dangerous escalation into the use of nuclear weapons by a cornered China.

CHALLENGES IN US–CHINA RELATIONS The rise of China and the challenge it poses to US dominance is regarded as one of the most important issues in international relations today. The problem, according to power transition theory, is that in a situation where a rising power is confronted by a dominant power, war almost inevitably results, since the dominant power is not likely to easily yield its position to the challenger. The challenge of China’s rise is complicated by the long-term financial and economic difficulties that the United States has been facing since the GFC in 2008. This has potentially serious impacts on the will and capacity of the United States in continuing in its role as the global hegemon. According to hegemonic stability theory, stability in the global system requires just such a hegemon to develop and enforce the rules of the system. The challenge from China therefore has serious implications not just on the dominant position of the United States but also on the stability of the evolving post–Cold War international system. The relationship between the world’s two largest economies is thus crucial. Should they succeed in coming to an understanding, war will be avoided and a new regional and global equilibrium will be the result.

Challenges in US–China relations 17 Should the relationship deteriorate further or even fail, the consequences are likely to be continuing tensions, instability and possibly, though not inevitably, open conflict. As this chapter has demonstrated, the US–China relationship has been shaped by historical and contemporary developments that form the context of their present-day interaction and rivalry. Their strategic rivalry today is centred around East and Southeast Asia, as well as a broader rivalry for global influence. In East and Southeast Asia, the strategic rivalry is epitomized by opposing perspectives on regional flashpoints, such as in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Korean peninsula and over Taiwan. Globally, the Beijing Consensus is posing an increasingly strong challenge to the US-led Washington Consensus that has underpinned the post-1945 international system, given the economic inroads that China has made in Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East. Apart from these challenges, there are also a range of serious bilateral issues between the two countries. The issue of human rights in China came to the fore after the Tiananmen massacre of pro-democracy activists in Beijing in 1989, after which the relationship has been on a downward spiral, with evident tensions in the 1990s over Taiwan. China’s economic rise has also focused attention in the United States over the allegedly unfair and disadvantageous aspects of the bilateral economic relationship, such as the inadequacies of intellectual property rights and protection in China, and alleged Chinese government subsidies for various products amounting to export subsidies, which in turn undermine US industry.87 Accompanying China’s economic rise has been its military rise, which has prompted apprehensions in the United States over China’s increasing ability to restrict US military access to East and Southeast Asia. This challenge is epitomized by China’s anti-access A2/AD capabilities, as well as its fast-improving conventional capabilities, epitomized by its development of stealth naval warships, quiet conventional and nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers and fifth-generation stealth combat aircraft. In addition, there has been an ongoing low-level cyberwar competition between the two, with accusations by the United States that China is responsible for cybercrime and cyberespionage.88 What are the future prospects for US–China relations? Veteran statesman Henry Kissinger, who has observed the relationship since his secret diplomacy led to the normalization of relations between the two countries in 1972, has this to say: The question ultimately comes down to what the United States and China can realistically ask of each other. An explicit American project to organize Asia on the basis of containing China … is unlikely to succeed, in part because

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Handbook of US–China relations China is an indispensable trading partner for most of its neighbors. By the same token, a Chinese attempt to exclude America from Asian economic and security affairs will similarly meet serious resistance from almost all other Asian states, which fear the consequences of a region dominated by a single power.89

Thus, Kissinger concluded, ‘the appropriate label for the Sino-American relationship is less partnership than co-evolution’.90 However, as this chapter has attempted to demonstrate, the process of working out the entente cordiale that would underpin such a co-evolution is complicated by a number of serious challenges. It remains to be seen if this could be achieved before growing mutual mistrust and misperception lead to open conflict.

NOTES 1.

2.

3.

4.

5. 6.

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

Steinberg, J. and M.E. O’Hanlon (2014), Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: U.S.–China Relations in the Twenty-First Century, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, p. 1. As cited in Bandow, D. (2013), ‘There’s a great deal for the US to celebrate in China’s rise’, Forbes, 4 June, accessed 17 July 2014 at http://www.forbes.com/sites/ dougbandow/2013/06/04/theres-a-great-deal-for-the-u-s-to-celebrate-in-chinas-rise/3/. Bergsten, C.F., C. Freeman and N.R. Lardy et al. (2009), China’s Rise: Challenges and Opportunities, Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics and Center for Strategic and International Studies, p. 2. Transcript of Hillary Clinton’s speech to the US Institute of Peace China Conference commemorating the 40th anniversary of President Nixon’s visit to China, AustralianPolitics.com, 7 May 2012, accessed 17 July 2014 at http://australianpolitics.com/ 2012/03/07/hillary-clinton-on-china.html. Organski, A.F.K. (1968), World Politics, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 376. Levy, J.S. (2008), ‘Power transition theory and the rise of China’, in R.S. Ross and Z. Feng (eds), China’s Ascent: Power, Security and the Future of International Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 13–14. Organski, World Politics. Clinton, speech to the US Institute of Peace China Conference. Ibid. See Kindleberger, C.P. (1973), The World in Depression: 1929–1939, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press. See Gilpin, R. (1988), ‘The theory of hegemonic war’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 28 (4), 591–613. See Kennedy, P. (1988), The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, New York: Vintage. Kausikan, B. (2014), ‘Washington, Beijing groping to find a new equilibrium’, Straits Times (Singapore), 11 June. World Bank (2013), ‘GDP growth average annual growth 2000–2011’, World Development Indicators 2013, pp. 68, 72, accessed 17 July 2014 at http:// data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/wdi-2013-ch4.pdf.

Challenges in US–China relations 19 15.

16.

17. 18. 19. 20.

21.

22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

37.

38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43.

McCurry, J. and J. Kollewe (2011), ‘China overtakes Japan as world’s second largest economy’, The Guardian, 15 February, accessed 17 July 2014 at http:// www.theguardian.com/business/2011/feb/14/china-second-largest-economy. International Monetary Fund (2014), World Economic Outlook Database, October 2014, accessed 1 April 2015 at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/ weodata/index.aspx. Shambaugh, D. (2013), China Goes Global: The Partial Power, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 157–8. Ibid., p. 163. Ibid., p. 204. US Debt Clock, accessed 1 April 2015 at http://www.usdebtclock.org/. See also The White House, ‘What you need to know about the sequester’, accessed 17 July 2014 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/sequester. Evans-Pritchard, A. (2013), ‘China may not overtake America this century after all’, The Telegraph, 8 May, accessed 17 July 2015 at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/ comment/10044456/China-may-not-overtake-America-this-century-after-all.html. Ramo, J.C. (2004), The Beijing Consensus, London: The Foreign Policy Centre, accessed 19 July 2014 at http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/244.pdf. Bergsten et al., China’s Rise: Challenges and Opportunities, p. 3. Starobin, P. (2006), ‘Beyond hegemony’, National Journal, 1 December. Jacques, M. (2009), When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World, London: Allen Lane, pp. 412–13, 431. Mearsheimer, J.J. (2006), ‘China’s unpeaceful rise’, Current History, April, 162. Zheng, B. (2005), ‘China’s “peaceful rise” to great power status’, Foreign Affairs, 84 (5), 21. Ibid., p. 24. Sutter, R.S. (2010), US–China Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, p. 9. Ibid., p. 8. Tucker, N.B. (1991–92), ‘China and America: 1941–1991’, Foreign Affairs, 70 (5), 75. Ibid., pp. 76–8. Ibid., p. 75. Sutter, US–China Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present, pp. 50–51. Kissinger, H. (2011), On China, London: Allen Lane, pp. 129–32. Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of China, 2 December 1954, accessed 21 July 2014 at http://www.taiwandocuments. org/mutual01.htm. In February 1950, Senator Joe McCarthy launched a strong attack on the Truman administration for having ‘sold China into atheistic slavery’, tapping into popular US angst over the victory of the communists in China. See Clegg, J. (2009), China’s Global Strategy: Towards a Multipolar World, London: Pluto Press, p. 29. Kissinger, On China, pp. 267–73. Taiwan Relations Act, 1 January 1979, accessed 16 March 2016 at http://www. ait.org.tw/en/taiwan-relations-act.html. Suettinger, R.L. (2003), Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of US–China Relations, 1989–2000, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, p. 413. Ibid., p. 415. Sutter, US–China Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present, pp. 191–217. Ross, R.S. (2000), ‘The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait confrontation: coercion, credibility, and the use of force’, International Security, 25 (2), 87.

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44.

Kang, C. (1995), ‘Supporters greet leader of Taiwan’, Los Angeles Times, 8 June, accessed 21 July 2014 at http://articles.latimes.com/1995-06-08/local/me-10756_1_ president-lee-teng-hui. Ross, ‘The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait confrontation’. Tyler, P.E. (1992), ‘US strategy plan calls for insuring no rivals develop a one-superpower world’, The New York Times, 8 March, accessed 21 July 2014 at http://work.colum.edu/~amiller/wolfowitz1992.htm. Wortzel, L.M. (1994), ‘China pursues traditional great power status’, Orbis, 38 (2), 157–8. Ibid., p. 175. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, May 1997, accessed 23 July 2014 at http:// www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1 e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=32542. US Department of Defense (2000), Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, accessed 21 March 2016 at http://csis.org/files/media/ csis/pubs/asia_neac_dod_china[1].pdf. Mearsheimer, ‘China’s unpeaceful rise’. Friedberg, A.L. (2011), A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, New York: W.W. Norton, p. 3. Ibid., p. 4. Ibid., p. 6. Ibid., pp. 7–8. Sweeney, J. and E. Vulliamy (1999), ‘NATO bombed China deliberately’, The Guardian, 17 October, accessed 24 July 2014 at http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 1999/oct/17/balkans. The Washington Post (2000), ‘Text: GOP debate in South Carolina’, 15 February, accesssed 24 July 2014 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/ campaigns/wh2000/stories/text021500.htm. BBC News (2001), ‘China holds US spy plane crew’, 2 April, accessed 24 July 2014 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1255343.stm. Song, Q., Z. Zhang and B. Qiao et al. (1996), China Can Say No: Political and Emotional Choices in the Post-Cold War Age, Beijing: China Industry and Commerce Joint Publishing House, pp. 76, 323. Ibid., pp. 35, 37. Liu, M. (2010), China Dream: The Great Power Thinking and Strategic Positioning of China in the Post-American Age, Beijing: China Friendship Publishing Company, as cited in Kissinger, On China, pp. 506–7. See International Crisis Group (2012), ‘Stirring up the South China Sea (I)’, Asia Report No. 223, 23 April, accessed 28 July 2014 at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/ regions/asia/north-east-asia/china/223-stirring-up-the-south-china-sea-i.aspx. McDonald, M. (2009), ‘US Navy provoked South China Sea incident, China says’, The New York Times, 10 March, accessed 26 July 2014 at http://www.nytimes.com/ 2009/03/10/world/asia/10iht-navy.4.20740316.html?_r=0. Tyson, A.S. (2009), ‘Navy sends destroyer to protect surveillance after incident in South China Sea’, The Washington Post, 13 March, accessed 16 March 2016 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/12/AR2009031203264. html. Davis, A. (2009), ‘US not ceding the Pacific: Clinton’, Sydney Morning Herald, 20 May, accessed 26 July 2014 at http://www.smh.com.au/world/us-not-ceding-thepacific-clinton-20090519-bei8.html. Landler, M. (2012), ‘Obama’s journey to tougher tack on a rising China’, The New York Times, 21 September, A1.

45. 46.

47. 48. 49.

50.

51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64.

65. 66.

Challenges in US–China relations 21 67. 68.

69.

70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76.

77.

78. 79.

80. 81. 82. 83.

Sydney Morning Herald (2011), ‘Text of Obama’s speech to Parliament’, 17 November, accessed 29 July 2014 at http://www.smh.com.au/national/text-ofobamas-speech-to-parliament-20111117-1nkcw.html. Packham, B. (2011), ‘2500 US marines on Australian soil to increase defence ties’, The Australian, 17 November, accessed 29 July 2014 at http://www.the australian.com.au/archive/national-affairs/us-president-touches-down-at-fairbairn-air force-base/story-fnb0o39u-1226197111255?nk=fd00ccc21fa1f53d5a755641223628 88. Weisgerber, M. (2012), ‘Agreement calls for 4 U.S. Littoral Combat Ships to rotate through Singapore’, RPDefense, 2 June, accessed 16 March 2016 at http://rpdefense. over-blog.com/article-agreement-calls-for-4-u-s-littoral-combat-ships-to-rotate-throughsingapore-106279617.html. Landler, ‘Obama’s journey to tougher tack on a rising China’. Bower, E.Z. (2012), ‘Obama trip shows purposeful Asia focus in second term’, 9 November, CSIS.org, accessed 29 July 2014 at http://csis.org/publication/obama-tripshows-purposeful-asia-focus-second-term. Nelson, C.M. (2014), ‘Obama tries again on Asia pivot’, The Wall Street Journal, 22 April, accessed 29 July 2014 at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424 052702304279904579516041148327548. Tiezzi, S. (2014), ‘Why Obama’s Asia tour is bad news for China’, The Diplomat, 23 April, accessed 28 July 2014 at http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/why-obamas-asiatour-is-bad-news-for-china/. Thayer, C.A. (2012), ‘Standoff in the South China Sea’, YaleGlobal, 12 June, accessed 26 July 2014 at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/standoff-south-china-sea. China Daily Mail (2014), ‘China apprehending boats weekly in disputed South China Sea’, 7 March, accessed 29 July 2014 at http://chinadailymail.com/2014/03/ 07/china-apprehending-boats-weekly-in-disputed-south-china-sea. Fisher, M. (2012), ‘Here’s the Chinese passport map that’s infuriating much of Asia’, The Washington Post, 26 November, accessed 28 July 2014 at http://www. washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/11/26/heres-the-chinese-passport-mapthats-infuriating-much-of-asia/. ABC News (2015), ‘South China Sea: US Navy to operate “whenever, wherever” international law allows, Admiral says’, 4 November, accessed 12 November 2015 at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-11-04/us-to-operate-wherever-law-allows-in-southchina-sea/6910058. Ogura, J. and J. Mullen (2012), ‘Fresh anti-Japanese protests in China on symbolic anniversary’, CNN, 19 September, accessed 30 July 2014 at http://edition.cnn.com/ 2012/09/18/world/asia/china-japan-islands-dispute/. South China Morning Post (2013), ‘China military officials admit radar lock on Japanese ship, says report’, 9 August, accessed 30 July 2014 at http://www.scmp. com/news/china/article/1193600/china-military-officials-admit-radar-lock-japaneseship-says-report. BBC News (2013), ‘US B-52 bombers challenge disputed China air zone’, 26 November, accessed 30 July 2014 at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-2511 0011. Hughes, C. (2013), ‘Viewpoints: how serious are China–Japan tensions?’, BBC News, 8 February, accessed 30 July 2014 at www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia21290349. The Military Balance 2014 (2014), London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, pp. 230–40. The Times of India (2014), ‘China plans to build three more carriers: report’, 5 February, accessed 16 March 2016 at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/ China-plans-to-build-three-more-aircraft-carriers-Report/articleshow/46134629.cms.

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84.

Gertz, B. (2014), ‘Top gun takeover: stolen F-35 secrets showing up in China’s stealth fighter’, The Washington Times, 13 March, accessed 30 July 2014 at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/13/f-35-secrets-now-showing-chinasstealth-fighter/?page=all. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 32, accessed 16 March 2016 at http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/QDR/QDR_as_of_29 JAN10_1600.pdf. Von Tol, J., M. Gunzinger and A.F. Krepinevich et al. (2010), AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, pp. 53, 58. Sutter, US–China Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present, pp. 191–217. Kshetri, N. (2013), ‘Cybercrime and cyber-security issues associated with China: some economic and institutional considerations’, Electronic Commerce Research, 13 (1), 41–69. Kissinger, On China, p. 527. Ibid.

85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90.

PART II HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY CONTEXTS

2. The United States in Asia Mark Beeson

INTRODUCTION For a country that is actually thousands of miles from ‘Asia’ the United States has exercised a remarkable influence over that continent’s development. Even if we narrow the focus to a more manageable ‘East Asia’ in the twentieth century, the impact of the United States is remarkable and striking. It is simply not possible to understand the evolution of contemporary East Asia without recognizing the profound impact of US foreign and strategic policies. Indeed, the relationship between the United States and East Asia mirrors the broader impact – and possible decline – of US power in the world more generally. What gives particular importance to this relationship at this moment in history is that the ‘rise of Asia’ in general and of China in particular has caused some observers to question whether the United States’ relationship with Asia is undergoing a profound, possibly permanent change that will see its historical influence and importance in Asia dramatically reduced.1 To understand whether such claims are justified and what it might mean if they are, it is important to put the US experience in Asia in historical context. While we might be accustomed to taking US preeminence, even hegemony, for granted it was not always thus. On the contrary, the United States’ early relationship with East Asia was often hesitant and its reluctance to assume the mantle of international leadership before World War II undoubtedly contributed to the region’s sometimes traumatic and bloody history before the war. In the aftermath of the war, when the United States’ economic and strategic dominance was unambiguously apparent, many observers – especially in the United States itself – saw the United States as an indispensable force for peace and stability.2 As we shall see, such claims are contentious, but what is not in doubt is that the United States played a pivotal role in shaping the transformation of a region that is now arguably the most important economic and strategic area on the planet.3 Given the importance of this historical relationship, this chapter begins by providing a sketch of the United States’ evolving engagement with East Asia in particular. Most attention is given to the period following 25

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World War II, as this is the period in which US influence became most consequential. Particular attention is paid to the two East Asian giants, Japan and China, as these two countries have been the predominant focus of attention for US policy-makers, both strategically and economically. Indeed, one of the most striking features of the relationships with both Japan and China is that economic and strategic issues have generally been inseparable. Dealing with both simultaneously has been and remains one of the defining foreign policy challenges confronting administrations of both political persuasions in the United States.4 The final part of this chapter considers how this dynamic interaction is currently playing itself out and analyses new initiatives like the nascent ‘IndoPacific’ region fit into a still evolving relationship with the region and its key states.

THE MAKING OF A PACIFIC POWER The initial engagement between a newly independent United States of America and what we now think of as a distinct East Asian region was driven by the unabashed entrepreneurialism that has become such a distinctive feature of the United States to this day. Importantly, as Akira Iriye makes clear in his path-breaking analysis of US–East Asian relations, an emphasis on commerce was entirely compatible with an image of Asia as a potential source of wealth and economic opportunity. It was also in accord with the United States’ own evolving self-image as a nation intent on what Jefferson called ‘peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations’.5 This, after all, was not just a relatively new nation – especially when compared to China’s 3000-year history – but one that had been defined by the act of throwing off the yoke of colonialism.6 Not only would this experience give a particular sense of historical mission to the United States subsequently,7 but it would also encourage an aversion to what George Washington called ‘foreign entanglements’. And yet even by the nineteenth century, when the Europeans were still the dominant powers in world affairs as well as the serious business of imperialism, it was becoming apparent that the United States was becoming a force in the Pacific. It could hardly be otherwise given the United States’ benign geography and the rapidly increasing importance of its own west coast.8 In the early 1800s US traders were pushing their government to offer them protection and encourage China and Japan to open up to foreign commerce. Yet it would be one of the other great drivers of intercultural interaction – religion – that would initially prompt

The United States in Asia 27 the US government to insist on greater freedom for US missionaries to proselytize in China.9 What is most striking in retrospect, perhaps, is that while the US was content to follow the British lead in China, in Japan it decisively struck out on its own and unambiguously announced itself as a Pacific power. The Shock of the New It has become rather commonplace to talk about ‘turning points’ in history, but if the phrase has merit it surely applies to the moment when Commodore Perry’s ‘Black Ships’ sailed into Tokyo Bay in 1853. Not only did this indicate both the United States’ capacity and willingness to play a high-profile and proactive role in the affairs of Asian states, but it would also abruptly end Japan’s self-imposed isolation with far-reaching consequences that continue to reverberate to this day. One of the most important consequences as far as the United States’ relationship with Japan and the region more generally is concerned was to establish the basis for what would often be misunderstandings and disappointments, especially on the US side.10 The repeated failure to definitely impose the United States’ vision, values and political or economic practices in Asia has been one of the defining features of the evolving regional order. This is not to say that there have not been changes in either Japan or East Asia. On the contrary, change has been profound; but it has not simply reproduced a Western template – even supposing such a thing existed. While Japan was perhaps the most enthusiastic and diligent student of modernization and Western learning, the Meiji Restoration and its aftermath was distinguished by what prominent Japanese intellectual Fukuzawa Yukichi described as ‘Japanese spirit, Western things’.11 Significantly, even when a rapidly industrializing and modernizing Japan adopted the so-called ‘Western standard of civilization’,12 its leaders did so with decidedly Japanese characteristics. To be sure, Japan may have become convinced that acquiring an empire was the hallmark of a civilized great power, but Japan’s version would be overlaid by a distinctive ideology of Pan-Asianism and the proposed expulsion of the white races from East Asia.13 Paradoxically, one of the reasons that Japan had the opportunity to put such ideas into practice was because of the very success of a process the United States was instrumental in initiating. The first step of this process for a newly empowered and assertive Japan was the invasion of Manchuria in 1931.14 Significantly, the United States remained preoccupied with domestic politics and ‘isolated’ from the rest of the world at that time. Some argue that the United States’ isolationist stance and a

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concomitant absence of international leadership were central components of the economic and ultimately political catastrophes that distinguished the period between the wars.15 Whatever the merits of that argument, it is clear that Japan’s growing militarism and aggression culminated in efforts to ‘contain’ its rise. The idea that Japan should withdraw from China, as demanded by the United States, was completely unacceptable and seen as an existential threat to Japan’s sense of itself as an Asian power. The catastrophically misguided decision to attack the United States needs to be seen in this context.16 The aftermath of this decision would define the bilateral relationship for more than half a century. The Post-war Order While Japan may have been the most deeply affected by the United States’ unparalleled post-war dominance, it was far from unique. On the contrary, the entire development of the region that we now describe as the East was profoundly influenced by the foreign policy of the United States during the intensifying Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union and its allies.17 The principal manifestation of this possibility was the division of the region along ideological lines. The ‘loss’ of China to the communist camp in the aftermath of World War II was seen as a catastrophic failure of US foreign policy, and one that intensified efforts to create successful capitalist economies in North and Southeast Asia with which to counter what was seen as the otherwise inevitable spread of communism.18 At this distance it is perhaps difficult to appreciate the intensity of the Cold War contest or the thinking of some of its most prominent protagonists. One unfortunate consequence of this ideological rivalry as far as the United States was concerned was to encourage a rather Manichean, and undiscriminating view of the nature of the threat posed by communism and its potential attraction to countries keen to throw off their own colonial oppressors. Of the more consequential manifestations of this possibility a few will suffice to illustrate its importance. Not only did US policy-makers generally fail to recognize how formidable and distinctive an adversary Chinese communists under the leadership of Mao Zedong were, for example, but they also failed to appreciate that there were important and potentially exploitable differences between the Chinese and their Soviet patrons.19 In Southeast Asia the picture was more complex and the effects somewhat contradictory. On the one hand the so-called ‘domino theory’ that predicted the collapse of one Southeast Asian regime after another as they succumbed to communism failed to appreciate the very different

The United States in Asia 29 histories and capacities of a number of Southeast Asian states that were anything but the powerless dupes of the Soviets or China for that matter.20 Nevertheless, the United States would be inexorably drawn into a disastrous and bloody conflict in Vietnam, which had almost as big an impact on the United States as it did on Vietnam itself. At the very least it profoundly affected the United States’ domestic politics and eventually led to a major recalibration of strategic policy too, primarily enunciated in the so-called ‘Nixon Doctrine’, that it would supply arms but not military forces to its allies in Asia and elsewhere.21 The most enduring expression of US strategic policy across the region as a whole, however, has been what is frequently described as the ‘hub and spokes’ alliance network,22 a series of bilateral relationships radiating out from Washington and including the likes of the Philippines, Thailand, South Korea, Australia and most importantly of all, Japan. Japan was seen as the pivotally important bulwark against communist expansion in Northeast Asia, and the United States spared no effort in trying to ensure that its economic reconstruction was actively supported. There is no question that the United States’ – and Japan’s – efforts were astoundingly successful: Japan rose from the ashes of military defeat to become the second-largest economy in the world in only a couple of decades.23 There is still some debate about how this occurred, but a couple of points are uncontroversial and merit emphasis.24 First, the United States provided the supportive geopolitical environment and direct aid in which first Japan and then other ‘tiger’ economies like South Korea and Taiwan could take off.25 The ‘East Asian miracle’ would simply not have happened in quite the way that it did without this context and the paradoxically stimulating impact of wars in Korea and Vietnam. Second, there were real limits to the transformative effect the United States had on some of these client states: as long as they were on the ‘right’ side of the Cold War’s ideological divide, US grand strategists were prepared to turn a blind eye to authoritarian, undemocratic practices and business relationships of which they might not otherwise have approved. A post-war generation of ‘strong man’ leaders in places such as South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines was one of the consequences of this period.26 Significantly, the trade-off between economic development and political liberalization that seemed such a feature of this period is also manifest in China to this day as we shall see.

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JAPAN: THE CONSTRAINED COMPETITOR It may seem difficult to believe in retrospect, but Japan’s remarkable post-war economic renaissance led many observers to predict a time when Japan would become ‘No. 1’.27 While this expected dominance might have been confined to the economic sphere, it fuelled a major debate about both the ‘secret’ of Japan’s success and about the implications for the United States’ own position.28 The parallels with the contemporary situation in which the economic rise of China is triggering similar doubts about the health of the United States economic and political system are striking and illuminating. But before considering why China’s rise has generated such consternation in the United States, it is important to revisit its relationship with Japan, which arguably remains the single most important and enduring expression of the impact of US influence and power in Asia – and possibly the world given the European Union’s current problems. The Limits of US Influence Few countries can have exercised a more direct influence over another than the United States has over Japan. Japan was not simply defeated militarily by the United States, but its entire social system underwent the most profound of shocks – including being the only country against which nuclear weapons have been used, of course. One of the most important consequences of this experience has been to entrench a widely based repudiation of militarism.29 Japan’s own wartime experience and the disastrous policies of its military government no doubt helps to account for much of this, but the fact that the United States designed a new ‘peace constitution’ for the defeated Japanese that only permitted Japan to have a defensive capability did much to reinforce this idea. The fact that Japan’s rapid economic expansion actually meant that the notional limits on defence spending soon made Japan a potentially formidable military power should not disguise the fact that the United States’ influence over Japan’s strategic status has been enormous and long-lasting. Indeed, one of the perennial debates in Japan is whether it should be a ‘normal’ nation and adopt the same sort of international posture as other nations.30 Such issues have assumed greater salience of late as a consequence of heightened tensions over unresolved territorial disputes and the rise of a more assertive Japanese prime minister in the form of Shinzo Abe.31 Before we consider how such tensions may influence the

The United States in Asia 31 United States’ policies in the region, however, it is important to emphasize just what a profound constraint US policy has placed on Japan’s strategic posture. It is also important to recognize that this is precisely what it was intended to do, of course. As Kenneth Pyle points out, ‘The purpose of the alliance was not only to defend but also to restrain Japan’.32 From the perspective of the United States, as what has been described as an ‘off-shore balancer’,33 this was one of the key objectives of the post-war strategic architecture it created. The reduction of Japan to ‘semi-sovereign’34 status effectively eliminated a potential great power competitor with a demonstrated capacity to threaten US interests in the Pacific. But while Japan’s strategic threat may have been effectively eliminated, its economic status remained more ambiguous. True, Japan rapidly became a pivotally important part of the region’s post-war economic renaissance, but the form of capitalist development that occurred in Japan was markedly at odds with the free-market, liberal model favoured by the United States. Despite the best efforts of the United States’ occupying forces to eliminate the sorts of close business–government relations and distinctive corporate structures of which they disapproved, they proved unable to eliminate them.35 On the contrary, the ‘developmental state’ that Japan pioneered not only became the centrepiece of its own reconstruction efforts, but it also became a model that has been emulated with various degrees of success across the East Asian region.36 Even China has copied aspects of the Japanese experience, even if its leaders are generally not keen to admit it.37 What the United States’ relationship with Japan illustrates is the contradictory nature of US power and its effects. There were plainly limits to how much the United States could transform Japan’s distinctive political economy, although this was undoubtedly at least partly a consequence of the wider geopolitical setting in which the bilateral relationship was embedded: as long as Japan was succeeding as a capitalist society of some sort, some of the finer details of its actual operation could be overlooked. However, as the Cold War began to thaw and the spectre of Japan’s economic challenge began to intensify, US attitudes began to change, too. Throughout the 1980s, bilateral relations became increasingly acrimonious and distinguished by interminable trade disputes and accusations about Japan’s ‘unfair’ economic practices.38 These tensions eventually culminated in the so-called ‘Plaza Accord’ and US demands that Japan allow its currency to appreciate in the – largely misguided – expectation that this would restore US competitiveness.39 There is still much debate about the wisdom of these policies as many commentators see this agreement as one of the principal causes of

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Japan’s bubble economy and the subsequent decades of decline and suboptimal economic performance from which it has never really emerged.40 Whatever the merits of these debates, there is no doubt that this episode was a telling indicator of where power lay in the bilateral relationship: the Japanese were ultimately unable to resist growing political pressure from an ally with whom they remained in a highly subordinate and dependent relationship. The great irony of US policy has been first to undermine Japan’s economic model, and second to cajole its leaders into greater ‘burden sharing’ as far as its strategic posture is concerned – in ways that may ultimately further destabilize the region.41 But before we consider what the implications of these changes might be, it is important to say something about the other Asian giant, as China presents an altogether different challenge for the United States.

CHINA: A REAL REGIONAL RIVAL As a number of other chapters in this volume provide detailed analyses of various aspects of Sino–US ties, I shall concentrate primarily on highlighting important comparative points that illustrate the challenges facing policy-makers and the nature of US engagement with the region. As we shall see, a number of these issues are strikingly similar to those that emerged with Japan. There is, of course, one profoundly important difference between China and Japan: unlike Japan, China is not a dependent, subordinate ally. On the contrary, many observers – especially in the United States itself – see China as becoming a genuine ‘peer competitor’ and one that is intensely focused on restoring its historical position as the most important state in the region – even if this means pushing the United States out of East Asia in the process.42 China, in short, is arguably the first genuine rival the United States has confronted – the importance of the Soviet Union notwithstanding. As we now know, the Soviet economic model was incapable of competing with the United States’. China, by contrast, has already eclipsed the Soviet’s economic achievements and threatens to overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy in the near future. Even more importantly, perhaps, the United States is increasingly reliant on China to underwrite its fiscal position – a reality that is keenly appreciated by some of the United States’ political leaders and commentators.43 It is worth spelling out how this situation came about and what it means for US policy in the region more broadly. Two events have been central to China’s re-emergence as a major power; both of them came about primarily as a consequence of the

The United States in Asia 33 United States’ unique role in the international system. No doubt China’s ‘rise’ would have come about eventually anyway, but it is hard to imagine that it would have happened at the speed that it did without the direct and indirect support of the United States. Explaining how this occurred tells us much about both East Asia and the nature of the United States’ engagement with the region and the world. It also highlights the paradoxes of hegemonic influence and points to the possible sources of US decline. The most important development in the United States’ relationship with the People’s Republic of China was the rapprochement that occurred in 1972. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was responsible for conducting the secret negotiations that paved the way for Richard Nixon’s historic and entirely unexpected visit. With trademark modesty and understatement Kissinger described the subsequent meetings with Mao and the rest of the Chinese leadership as ‘one of the few occasions where a state visit brought about a seminal change in international affairs’.44 In this case the hyperbole seems justified, even if his claim that this established a ‘quasi-alliance’ with China looks less persuasive. But however the new relationship was described there is no doubt that it did mark something of a turning point in the history of the region, one that simultaneously saw the Soviet Union’s importance significantly diminished, and that prepared the ground for China’s eventual reintegration into the wider international order. In the bigger historical context, it is this latter development that is the most consequential. The reason that China has assumed such prominence and become the focus of such analysis and concern on the part of policy-makers in the United States and elsewhere is primarily because of its economic importance. The simple fact is that for most of China’s neighbours and for the United States too, China is their principal trade partner and consequently a relationship that they have little option but to take seriously.45 This is doubly true for the United States as it feels obliged to respond to China’s potential strategic challenge in a way that no other country could even if it wanted to. But before we consider the difficulties this presents for US policy across a number of interconnected issue areas, it is worth reminding ourselves of the pivotal role the United States played in actually bringing China’s economic ascendancy about. The Paradoxes of Hegemony Perhaps the single most important single development in this regard was China’s accession to the World Trade Organization. This event highlights all of the paradoxes and contradictions of the United States’ relationship

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with China in particular. On the one hand, China’s determination to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), despite conditions that ‘far surpassed’ those demanded of any other applicant in the past,46 looked like an unambiguous triumph of US diplomacy, soft power and/or hegemony. However the United States’ influence over the principal institutions of economic governance is described, China’s entry into the WTO looked like an unambiguous expression of US dominance as the last major holdout against free-market capitalism capitulated and joined an international order dominated by the United States. And yet not only did WTO accession mean that China’s pro-liberalization forces could marginalize opposition to reform,47 but enhanced trade integration also had precisely the impact its supporters hoped: China’s economic ascent was further accelerated as trade increased and foreign investment poured in.48 In the longer term, joining the WTO marked China’s arrival as a potentially major player in the international financial institutions (IFIs) that had been created under the auspices and largely in the image of the United States and its post-war dominance. Critics of the ‘Bretton Woods institutions’ had long claimed that they were an instrument of US hegemony that had often had negative impacts on other countries as a consequence of the conditions under which aid was offered or trade conducted.49 And yet this had not stopped East Asia in general and China in particular from growing ‘miraculously’ economically. The question China’s ascent posed was whether it would come to exert the sort of influence over the IFIs that its growing economic importance seemed to merit if not require. The key debate in this context is ‘who is socializing whom?’50 One of the most widely held expectations among US policy-makers and a number of influential academics was that China would be socialized into the diplomatic ways of the Western world. In other words, simply by taking part in an institutional architecture largely established by the United States according to its norms and expectations, the behaviour of Chinese elites would be changed as a consequence. There is no doubt that this has happened to a significant extent: China is simply not the source of destabilizing revolutionary ideology it was during the heyday of the Cold War.51 What is less clear is whether those same elites have internalized liberal norms or whether they are keen to promote alternative ideas about how the international order should be organized.52 Two aspects of China’s engagement with multilateral organizations are worth emphasizing. First, there is no doubt that China is unhappy with the speed at which the extant institutional architecture is being reformed to address long-standing, increasingly anachronistic distributions in voting rights and influence in pivotal organizations like the International

The United States in Asia 35 Monetary Fund (IMF).53 There is equally little doubt that the United States is unwilling to accede to Chinese demands, much less give up its veto over IMF decision-making.54 Despite the fact that a Chinese national was appointed as the chief economist of the World Bank,55 China is equally unhappy about the pace of change in other organizations too. The second big development, therefore, has been a push by China to develop its own institutional alternatives, over which it expects to have much greater influence. The most interesting and potentially consequential recent expression of this determination on China’s part has been the inauguration of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Despite vigorous opposition by the United States and direct lobbying of normally pliant allies, the United States has been unable to stop the likes of Australia and Britain from joining China’s new Bank.56 Many commentators took this as a telling indicator of both the United States’ declining influence in the region and its occasionally ham-fisted diplomacy.57 Whether opposition to the AIIB was merited at all, never mind with the amount of political capital the United States invested in it, remains moot. What is clear is that the AIIB saga is emblematic of a larger set of processes that revolve around competing regional institutions and even the extent and definition of the region itself. In short, who should be in any putative region and what form should its institutional architecture actually take?

CONTESTED REGIONS The so-called ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalance’ toward the Asia-Pacific region was potentially one of the most important strategic reorientations in recent US history, which is why it receives extensive coverage elsewhere in this volume. The intention here is not to repeat that sort of analysis, but to consider one aspect of the pivot that generally doesn’t feature as prominently: its impact on, and role in, what might be called the politics of regionalism. Indeed, one of the most important but comparatively neglected aspects of the United States’ engagement with the Asia-Pacific and/or East Asia is just which region is actually in play and being engaged with.58 This is not simply an academic point. On the contrary, the way regions are defined necessarily determines which countries are included, the identity and purpose of any putative regional grouping, and – most important of all, perhaps – which countries have power and influence within regional boundaries.59

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The rather belated recognition on the part of US policy-makers of the potential importance of regional groupings, their own relative underrepresentation in such entities, and the possibility that China might dominate an exclusively Asian entity that excluded the United States and key allies like Australia, has led to a flurry of interest in the East Asia Summit (EAS). That this hitherto redundant-looking organization could suddenly became the centre of such attention on the part of the United States tells us much about US policy toward the region – however it is described. It is part of a pattern of fluctuating interest on the part of the United States that has necessarily had global concerns that have occasionally led it to neglect Asia, or so many Asians believe, at least.60 A review of US regional policy suggests such views are not without foundation and stand in marked contrast to China’s approach to the region.61 The Reluctant Regionalist US participation in regional groupings has generally been late, lukewarm and lacking in consistency. Perhaps the most egregious example of this possibility has been US participation in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum initiated by two of the United States’ most stalwart and important allies in the region, Japan and Australia. Both countries have had their own difficulties establishing themselves as authentic members of putative regional communities; the creation of a regional grouping in which they were unambiguous ‘insiders’ offered one way of addressing this diplomatic deficit.62 Significantly, the original Australian proposal did not actually include the United States, but both Japan and other prospective Asian members were keen to include the United States because of their desire to assure continuing access to the United States’ domestic market that had played such a crucial role in export-oriented industrialization. From the outset, however, US policy-makers displayed little enthusiasm for an organization that replicated the so-called ‘ASEAN way’ of diplomacy and eschewed the sort of legally binding agreements preferred by the United States in favour of consensus and voluntarism.63 The all-too-predictable consequence has been that APEC has been relatively ineffective, and unable to promote a free trade agenda about which many of its Asian members had little enthusiasm. APEC’s already disparate membership was further diluted by the inclusion of Russia at the instigation of the United States, which former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating described as ‘an act of economic vandalism’.64 The perception among APEC enthusiasts was that the United States was

The United States in Asia 37 prepared to utilize the organization as a bargaining chip in a wider geopolitical game that showed little commitment to a putative AsiaPacific region. Now, however, things look rather different. The rise of China as both an economic and political force in the region – which China is keen to define as an Asian-only entity based on a more traditional conception of East Asia65 – has galvanized US policy-makers into action. China’s preferred vehicle of regional cooperation – the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) grouping – has had its own share of problems, a number of which have been of China’s own creation. China’s increasingly assertive territorial claims have unsettled its neighbours and led some of the Southeast Asian nations in particular to encourage greater strategic engagement on the part of the United States as a way of hedging against growing Chinese power.66 Nevertheless, China’s growing regional importance and the widely held perception that East Asia ought to have its own institutionalized capacity to respond to financial crises in particular means that there is a residual interest in developing a more narrowly based regional grouping.67 If such an organization does emerge China well be well placed to become its dominant actor. Indeed, prominent commentators in China suggest that its enthusiasm for groupings like the APT and new institutions such as the AIIB needs to be seen as part of a coordinated long-term effort to increase China’s importance as both a political actor and an economic hub in a region centred on Beijing.68 It is as a consequence of these failed and prospective regional institutional initiatives that the EAS has suddenly and unexpectedly come to prominence.69 When the EAS was initially proposed by the Malaysian government and inaugurated in 2005 it looked surplus to regional requirements. After all, there were already a surprisingly large number of proposals for regional initiatives in circulation, and it was not obvious what the EAS would add to this, other than giving India an entrée to East Asia perhaps. Unsurprisingly, the United States showed little initial interest. Recently, however, there has been a noteworthy transformation in US attitudes, triggered in large part by China’s growing economic and diplomatic importance to the region. In this case the EAS was in the right place at the right time: not only did it provide a ready-made institutional mechanism with which to re-engage – if not actually redefine – the East Asian region, but it also offered a way of ensuring that both India and key allies such as Australia were part of a dual institutional and strategic realignment.70

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Redefining the Region While US policy-makers were at pains to suggest that initiatives such as the pivot and the EAS were not designed to contain China’s development, this was not how the Chinese themselves saw it.71 It is not hard to see why. At the very least the EAS would dilute the influence and importance of alternative regional initiatives like the APT that China favoured. More importantly in the longer term, the EAS and other initiatives like the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership, which noticeably excluded China,72 could be seen as part of a broader pattern of policies designed to counter the possibility of Chinese regional hegemony. Given China’s longstanding obsession with US hegemony there is no small irony in all of this. Although concerns about China’s pre-eminence look somewhat overblown at this stage, some commentators argue,73 it is apparent that the United States’ grand strategy is designed in part, at least, to counter the supposed threat China presents.74 Redefining the region itself has become an important part of this approach. In addition to the United States’ belated participation in the EAS, which by definition will help to redefine the identity of the region if it is successful, US strategic policy in particular has become increasingly focused on the ‘Indo-Pacific’. Encompassing key allies like Australia and including the Indian Ocean, the Indo-Pacific represents a concerted effort to expand the focus of US strategic engagement in a dramatically expanded region.75 Significantly, it is also one that includes India, which is seen as a potentially important force in balancing China’s rise.76 It is no coincidence that strategic ties with both India and Australia have been increased significantly recently as both countries are central parts of this new regional vision. It is also clear that for many commentators in the United States and Australia its principal rationale is strategic. As Michael Auslin from the influential, conservative think tank, the American Enterprise Institute puts it: The comprehensive buildup of Chinese military power should be recognized as a tool for the broader geopolitical expansion of Chinese influence, providing the means necessary to achieve regional acceptance of Chinese aims, however those may be defined in the future … Our regional strategy must be based on U.S. forces maintaining their forward presence with superior power projection capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region, responding to disruptions, and mitigating uncertainty.77

It remains to be seen whether the United States and its allies will be able to translate these sorts of strategic ambitions into some sort of effective organization. Without such institutional developments the chances of

The United States in Asia 39 creating an enduring and meaningful regional identity are significantly reduced. Even when an organization is established with a mandate to deal with regional security issues there is absolutely no guarantee that it will be able to do so, as the ASEAN Regional Forum’s underwhelming record of achievement reminds us.78 Indeed, competing visions about how such institutions should operate and the purposes to which they should be put continue to undermine the effectiveness of the Asia-Pacific/East Asian region(s). In such circumstances it is entirely possible that the reputation of the Asia-Pacific region as the home of ineffective institutions will be reinforced as a plethora of competing initiatives cancel each other out. From a US point of view, however, this may not be such a bad outcome: if the region were dominated by China things could be even worse.

CONCLUDING REMARKS The United States’ relationship with the broadly conceived Asia-Pacific region has been one of the most important features of the development of the international system since World War II – even if it was sometimes unclear just who belonged to the region in question at times. The Asia-Pacific was not unique in this regard: the United States’ pre-eminent status as a truly – often uncontested – global power meant that it had an impact across the world. What distinguished US actions in the region was the importance of geopolitics and the consequent impact of foreign policy on East Asia in particular. The prospect of communist expansion led the United States to adopt policies that entrenched the divisions of the Cold War. As the continuing division of the Korean Peninsula reminds us, these divisions have not entirely disappeared. Nor, it has to be said, has the preoccupation of US policy-makers with managing the strategic relations of a continent far removed from their own shores. Even if one accepts that the United States has played an indispensable role in maintaining order in Asia – and as we have seen, this is a far from uncontested claim – it is no longer clear whether the United States has either the capability or the will to continue in its role as an ‘off-shore balancer’. The fact that the United States is a global power means that it is inevitably distracted between competing priorities, and Asia’s problems frequently do not take precedence. Although it is plainly too soon to write off the United States as the world’s greatest power, it is also clear that its capacity to underwrite the costs of hegemony is not what it was. In such circumstances many observers think that China’s growing power and assertiveness will inevitably lead to greater competition if not outright conflict.79 Other more constructive and optimist commentators

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think that new ways of managing regional affairs should and can be found that will allow China’s rise to be accommodated.80 Much, as ever, will depend on the United States. The rise of East Asia has presented the United States with major challenges for over 100 years. First Japan and now China have tested both the resolve and the ability of policy-makers to deal with a region that is still seen as absolutely pivotal, to coin a phrase, to the United States’ place in the international scheme of things. Deciding how to relate to China in particular will be the defining issue for the United States for the foreseeable future – as it is for China’s neighbours. Like China’s regional neighbours, US policy-makers will have to decide whether they think China represents more of a threat or an opportunity. Whatever conclusions they may come to about that, the reality, as David Shambaugh puts it, is that containment is ‘a complete non-starter. Those who advocate it are detached from reality’.81 In other words, whether they like it or not – and plenty of them won’t – there would seem to be little other realistic alternative other than for US policy-makers and commentators to come to terms with the prospect of no longer enjoying an unchallenged ascendancy in Asia.

NOTES 1.

2.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

Mazarr, M.J. (2012), ‘The risks of ignoring strategic insolvency’, The Washington Quarterly, 35 (4), 7–22; Mahbubani, K. (2008), The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East, New York: Public Affairs. Clinton, H. (2011), ‘America’s Pacific century’, Foreign Policy, 11 October; Christensen, T.J. (1999), ‘China, the US–Japan alliance, and the security dilemma in East Asia’, International Security, 23 (4), 49–80; Joffe, J. (1995), ‘“Bismarck” or “Britain”? Toward an American grand strategy after bipolarity’, International Security, 14 (4), 94–117. Beeson, M. (2014), Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia: Politics, Security and Economic Development, 2nd edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Mastanduno, M. (1998), ‘Economics and security in statecraft and scholarship’, International Organization, 52 (4), 825–54. Iriye, A. (1967), Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American–East Asian Relations, New York: Harbinger, p. 14. McDougall, W.A. (1997), Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776, Boston, MA: Mariner Books. Smith, T. (1994), America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Cumings, B. (2009), Dominion from Sea to Sea: Pacific Ascendancy and American Power, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Cohen, W. (2000), East Asia at the Center, New York: Columbia University Press. LaFeber, W. (1997), The Clash: US–Japanese Relations Throughout History, New York: W.W. Norton. Ibid., p. 37.

The United States in Asia 41 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

35. 36.

37.

Gong, G.W. (1984), The Standard of ‘Civilisation’ in International Society, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Zhao, S. (1998), Power Competition in East Asia, London: Macmillan, p. 69. Young, L.M. (1998), Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Kindleberger, C.P. (1973), The World in Depression 1929–1939, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Pyle, K. (2007), Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose, New York: Public Affairs. Cronin, J. (1996), The World the Cold War Made: Order, Chaos, and the Return of History, London: Routledge. Gaddis, J.L. (1972), The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947, New York: Columbia University Press. Yahuda, M. (1996), The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945–1995, London: Routledge. McMahon, R.J. (1999), The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia Since World War II, New York: Columbia University Press. Litwak, R. (1986), Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969–1976, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Cha, V. (2010), ‘Powerplay: origins of the U.S. alliance system in Asia’, International Security, 34 (3), 158–96. Schaller, M. (1982), ‘Securing the great crescent: occupied Japan and the origins of containment in Southeast Asia’, Journal of American History, 69 (2), 392–414. For more detail, see Beeson, Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia. Stubbs, R. (2005), Rethinking Asia’s Economic Miracle, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Gilley, B. (2014), The Nature of Asian Politics, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Vogel, E. (1979), Japan as No. 1: Lessons for America, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Tabb, W. (1995), The Postwar Japanese System: Cultural Economy and Economic Transformation, New York: Oxford University Press. Katzenstein, P. (1996), Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Ozawa, I. (1994), Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation, Tokyo: Kodansha International. Martin, A. and T. Sekiguchi (2014), ‘Japan policy shift to ease restrictions on military’, The Wall Street Journal, 1 July. Pyle, K. (2007), Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose, New York: Public Affairs, p. 349. Layne, C. (1997), ‘From preponderance to offshore balancing: America’s future grand strategy’, International Security, 22 (1), 86–124. See Donnelly, J. (2006), ‘Sovereign inequalities and hierarchy in anarchy: American power and international society’, European Journal of International Relations, 12 (2), 139–70; Arrighi, G. (1996), ‘The rise of East Asia and the withering away of the interstate system’, Journal of World Systems Research, 2 (15), 1–32. Johnson, C. (1982), MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industry Policy 1925–1975, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Taniguchi, R. and S. Babb (2009), ‘The global construction of development models: the US, Japan and the East Asian miracle’, Socio-Economic Review, 7 (2), 277–303; Amsden, A.H. (1991), ‘Diffusion of development: the late-industrializing model and Greater East Asia’, The American Economic Review, 81 (2), 282–6. Heilmann, S. and L. Shih (2013), ‘The rise of industrial policy in China, 1978– 2012’, Harvard-Yenching Institute Working Paper Series, Trier: University of Trier.

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38.

Schoppa, L.J. (1997), Bargaining with Japan: What American Pressure Can and Cannot Do, New York: Columbia University Press. Murphy, R.T. (2006), ‘East Asia’s dollars’, New Left Review, No. 40, 39–64. Grimes, W. (2009), Currency and Contest in East Asia: The Great Power Politics of Financial Regionalism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; Amyx, J. (2004), Japan’s Financial Crisis: Institutional Rigidity and Reluctant Change, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Brenner, R. (2002), The Boom and the Bubble, London: Verso. Beeson, M. (2014), ‘Asia’s alliances: still keeping the peace?’, Global Asia, 9 (3), 102–6. More generally, see Walt, S. (2009), ‘Alliances in a unipolar world’, World Politics, 61 (1), 86–120. Kaplan, R.D. (2012), The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us about the Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate, New York: Random House; Friedberg, A. (2011), A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, New York: W.W. Norton; Mearsheimer, J. (2010), ‘The gathering storm: China’s challenge to US power in Asia’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 3 (4), 381–96. MacAskill, E. (2010), ‘WikiLeaks: Hillary Clinton’s question: how can we stand up to Beijing?’, The Guardian, 4 December; Cohen, S. and J.B. DeLong (2010), The End of Influence: What Happens When Other Countries Have the Money, New York: Basic Books. Kissinger, H. (2011), On China, New York: Penguin, p. 273. Das, D.K. (2013), ‘The role of China in Asia’s evolution to global economic prominence’, Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, 1 (1), 216–29; Reilly, J. (2013), China’s Economic Statecraft: Turning Wealth into Power, Sydney: Lowy Institute; Overholt, W.H. (2009), ‘China in the global financial crisis: rising influence, rising challenges’, The Washington Quarterly, 33 (1), 21–34. Lardy, N. (2002), Integrating China into the Global Economy, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, p. 104. Breslin, S. (2007), China and the Global Economy, Basingstoke: Palgrave, p. 83. Feng, H. (2006), The Politics of China’s Accession to the World Trade Organization: The Dragon Goes Global, London: Routledge. Cammack, P. (2003), ‘The governance of global capitalism: a new materialist perspective’, Historical Materialism, 11 (2), 37–59; Gowan, P. (1999), The Global Gamble: Washington’s Faustian Bid for World Dominance, London: Verso. Ba, A. (2006), ‘Who’s socializing whom? Complex engagement in Sino–ASEAN relations’, Pacific Review, 19 (2), 157–79. Johnston, A.I. (2008), Social States: China in International Relations, 1980–2000, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chin, G. and R. Thakur (2010), ‘Will China change the rules of global order?’, The Washington Quarterly, 33 (4), 119–38; Chan, L.-H., P.K. Lee and G. Chan (2008), ‘Rethinking global governance: a China model in the making?’, Contemporary Politics, 14 (1), 3–19. Clegg, J. (2011), ‘China at the global summit table: rule-taker, deal-wrecker or bridge-builder?’, Contemporary Politics, 17 (4), 447–65. Mayeda, A. (2015), ‘U.S. veto power at IMF said to face threat in rift on governance’, Bloomberg, 30 January. Significantly, Justin Yifu Lin is also an advocate of East Asia–style state-led development and a greater role for China in the IFIs. See Lin, J.Y. (2011), ‘China and the global economy’, China Economic Journal, 4 (1), 1–14. Branigan, T. (2015), ‘Support for China-led development bank grows despite US opposition’, The Guardian, 14 March.

39. 40.

41.

42.

43.

44. 45.

46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52.

53. 54. 55. 56.

The United States in Asia 43 57. 58. 59.

60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81.

Rachman, G. (2015), ‘Transatlantic spat exposes deeper cracks’, Financial Times, 13 March. Beeson, M. (2006), ‘American hegemony and regionalism: the rise of East Asia and the end of the Asia-Pacific’, Geopolitics, 11 (4), 541–60. Hurrell, A. (2010), ‘Regional powers and the global system from a historical perspective’, in D. Flemes, Regional Leadership in the Global System: Ideas, Interests, and Strategies of Regional Powers, Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 15–27; Terada, T. (2003), ‘Constructing an “East Asia” concept and growing regional identity: from EAEC to ASEAN+3’, Pacific Review, 16 (2), 251–77. Ba, A. (2009), ‘Systemic neglect? A reconsideration of US–Southeast Asia policy’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 31 (3), 369–98. Beeson, M. and F. Li (2014), China’s Regional Relations: Evolving Foreign Policy Dynamics, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Beeson, M. and H. Yoshimatsu (2007), ‘Asia’s odd men out: Australia, Japan, and the politics of regionalism’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 7 (2), 227–50. Kahler, M. (2000), ‘Legalization as a strategy: the Asia-Pacific case’, International Organization, 54 (3), 549–71. Beeson, M. (2009), Institutions of the Asia-Pacific: ASEAN, APEC and Beyond, London: Routledge, p. 49. Tiezzi, S. (2014), ‘Is there room for the US in China’s “Asia-Pacific dream”?’, The Diplomat, 11 November. Medeiros, E.S. (2005–06), ‘Strategic hedging and the future of Asia-Pacific stability’, The Washington Quarterly, 29 (1), 145–67. Grimes, W. (2009), Currency and Contest in East Asia: The Great Power Politics of Financial Regionalism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Wang, Z. (2015), ‘China’s alternative diplomacy’, The Diplomat, 30 January. Camroux, D. (2012), ‘The East Asia Summit: Pan-Asian multilateralism rather than intra-Asian regionalism’, in M. Beeson and R. Stubbs (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism, London: Routledge, pp. 375–83. Park, J.J. (2011), ‘The US-led alliances in the Asia-Pacific: hedge against potential threats or an undesirable multilateral security order?’, Pacific Review, 24 (2), 137–58. Swaine, M.D. (2012), ‘Chinese leadership and elite responses to the US Pacific pivot’, China Leadership Monitor, No. 38, 1–26. Terada, T. (2012), ‘Trade winds: big power politics and Asia-Pacific economic integration’, Global Asia, 7 (1), 90–95. Shambaugh, D. (2013), China Goes Global: The Partial Power, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Nathan, A. and A. Scobell (2012), ‘How China sees America: the sum of Beijing’s fears’, Foreign Affairs, 91 (5), 32–47. Le Mière, C. (2013), ‘Rebalancing the burden in East Asia’, Survival, 55 (2), 31–41. Bisley, N. and A. Phillips (2014), ‘Rebalance to where?: US strategic geography in Asia’, Survival, 55 (5), 95–114. Medcalf, R. (2014), ‘In defence of the Indo-Pacific: Australia’s new strategic map’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 68 (4), 470–83. Auslin, M. (2010), Security in the Indo-Pacific Commons: Toward a Regional Strategy, Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, pp. 1–2. Emmers, R. and S.S. Tan (2011), ‘The ASEAN Regional Forum and preventive diplomacy: built to fail?’, Asian Security, 7 (1), 44–60. Most famously, Mearsheimer, J. (2001), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: W.W. Norton. White, H. (2012), The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power, Melbourne: Black Inc. Shambaugh, China Goes Global, p. 315.

3. US relations with the PRC during the Cold War Andrea Benvenuti

INTRODUCTION Relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) during the Cold War can be neatly divided into two phases. The first phase begins with the establishment in 1949 of a Chinese communist state under the leadership of Mao Zedong and stretches to the late 1960s when the United States became massively involved in Vietnam in order to contain the spread of communist influence in Southeast Asia. This period was characterized by the emergence of significant tensions between the two countries in spite of some behind-the-scene efforts to reduce conflict. These tensions were fed by a climate of mutual suspicions occasioned, on the one hand, by the PRC’s strident revolutionary rhetoric and support for subversive communist movements across East Asia and, on the other, by the US policy of containment aimed at arresting perceived communist expansion in the region. Relations between Washington and Beijing remained, therefore, largely antagonistic. From Beijing’s standpoint, US policy in Asia had a strong anti-Chinese flavour. In Chinese eyes, such a policy was not just meant to undermine the PRC’s security through a system of encircling US alliances. It was also designed to constrain China’s international role through a strict trade embargo as well as through a persistent opposition to its membership of the United Nations (UN) and to its engagement with several US allies.1 Last, but no less importantly, the question of Taiwan remained a significant source of tensions between Washington and Beijing, and an enduring stumbling block to better relations. For Mao and the Chinese communist leadership, there was little doubt that the United States was a dangerous hegemon that needed to be challenged. The way in which Chinese policy-makers went about restraining the United States was, at least until the late 1950s, to forge a close partnership with the Soviet Union (USSR). Through its close ties with Moscow, Beijing hoped to boost its military and economic potential. To break up what it saw as a veritable US encirclement and to increase its regional influence, the PRC 44

US relations with the PRC during the Cold War 45 also sought to exploit the incipient process of decolonization in Asia. Chinese participation in the Bandung’s 1955 Afro-Asian Conference was a first step in that direction. When relations with the USSR soured irreparably in the 1960s, Beijing relied increasingly on its Afro-Asian credentials to challenge US (and Soviet) regional influence.2 For their part, policy-makers in Washington were deeply disturbed by Beijing’s rhetoric and actions. They viewed the PRC’s ideological commitment to communist internationalism as a serious threat to Asian stability. They also saw its willingness to use conventional military force in Korea, its ability to hold in check the US-led UN forces there, and its Soviet-sponsored military modernization as clear proof that the PRC was a military force to be reckoned with. In American minds, Beijing’s rising military power, coupled with its militant Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, contributed to conjuring up an image of China as a revisionist power intent on (and capable of) subverting the established regional order. In the 1960s, with the PRC weakened by Mao’s domestic revolutionary experiments and no longer able to rely on Soviet support, Washington somewhat downgraded Beijing’s capacity to harm US regional interests. Yet, Beijing’s decision to step up its military support for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was to have a negative impact on Sino–US relations. With Beijing also embroiled in a fierce contest with Moscow for the leadership of the communist movement, a rapprochement between the United States and the PRC still appeared a long way off. As it turned out, a Sino–US rapprochement was not as far off as policy-makers on both sides assumed it would be. In the early 1970s Washington and Beijing were drawn closely together by their concerns over the role of the USSR in global and regional affairs. Their mutual ‘anti-Sovietism’ provided the political impetus for the normalization of their bilateral relations. Concerns over Moscow’s hegemony and its strong-armed tactics, and the painful realization of the PRC’s weaknesses as a result of the chaos brought about by the Cultural Revolution, pushed the Chinese leadership to tone down its hostility towards Washington. As for the United States, its desire to extricate itself from Vietnam, coupled with the need to keep Soviet ambitions in check, made it appealing to seek a hitherto unconceivable understanding with Beijing. It is with these attempts to reach an understanding between two hostile powers that a new era in Sino–US relations began. This second phase coincides, therefore, with the Nixon administration’s ‘opening to China’ in the early 1970s and ends with the collapse of the Cold War bipolar order at the end of the 1980s. During this period, both Beijing and Washington strove to overcome their mutual suspicions and establish a mutually satisfactory political and economic relationship. By the time Soviet leader Mikhail

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Gorbachev put Soviet policy on a new course, thus allaying Sino–US fears of Soviet expansionism, Washington’s rapprochement with Beijing had gone far enough to seem almost irreversible. In charting four decades of Sino–US relations, this chapter aims to provide an overview of the main issues and problems that characterized the political and economic interactions between the United States and the PRC during a turbulent phase in twentieth-century international affairs.

SINO–US RELATIONS IN THE EARLY 1950s The rapid unravelling of the wartime alliance between the United States and USSR following the end of World War II and their deepening rift over the shape of the post-war settlement in Europe initially forced Harry Truman’s Democratic administration (1945–53) to accord secondary importance to East Asia. However, North Korea’s unexpected invasion of South Korea in June 1950 was to transform this hitherto peripheral area of great power rivalry into a major theatre of world tensions, thus raising US awareness of its importance in the emerging Cold War.3 In this context, the emergence of a communist regime in China in late 1949 acquired a special significance for US policy-makers, for it not only reinforced the impression that communism was on the rise in Asia, but also appeared to signal that both the USSR and the PRC were expansionist powers committed to creating compatible regimes in East Asia.4 Until the outbreak of the Korean War, the Truman administration had regarded Mao as a potential Asian Tito and had thought it possible to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing by exploiting disagreements between them.5 The Department of State, not unreasonably, had conjectured that, since the Chinese communists had come to power without much Soviet support, they could hardly be treated by Stalin in the same way as Moscow’s Eastern European neighbours.6 With this in mind, the Truman administration had carefully avoided alienating Mao’s communists and tried to distance itself from Jiang Jieshi’s Guomintang (GMT) party.7 In the months leading to the Korean conflict, it had done little to dispel Jiang’s fears that Washington would do nothing to prevent Taiwan from falling to Mao’s forces.8 While still unwilling to recognize the PRC as China’s legitimate government, the administration had concluded that Taiwan was not vital to US regional interests and that, as such, it would not be worth defending, especially if its defence came at the cost of long-term hostility with the Mainland government.9 The PRC’s entry into the war in October 1950 was to make any further shift in Washington’s China policy impracticable and put paid to any

US relations with the PRC during the Cold War 47 hopes of breaking up the communist camp in the foreseeable future. As President Truman told visiting British Prime Minister Clement Attlee in December 1950, the Chinese communists were ‘satellites of Russia and will be satellites as long as the present Peiping [Beijing] regime is in power … The Chinese do, of course, have national feelings. The Russians cannot dominate them forever, but that is a long-range view and does not help us just now’.10 Although Secretary of State Dean Acheson never gave up on the hope of weaning Beijing away from Moscow one day, a ‘Titoist detachment’ never took place in the 1950s.11 More importantly, Beijing’s intervention in Korea strongly coloured Washington’s perceptions of China not only as revolutionary power bent on exporting communism, but also as a significant military force to be reckoned with.12 The fact that between October 1950 and June 1951 the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (CPVA) was able to drive back the US-led United Nations forces south of the 38th parallel deeply impressed both the US government and public.13 Before the PRC’s entry into the war, policy-makers in Washington had not regarded the PRC as having sufficient military capabilities to mount full-scale military operations in the Korean Peninsula.14 Following the CPVA’s performance in Korea, however, both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations (1953–61) came to view the PRC as a power ‘with considerable military potential’ – a military potential, in fact, that far outstripped that of other East Asian nations.15 Its growing military capabilities, coupled with an aggressive revolutionary ideology, made China a potentially destabilizing force in an already unstable region. Whether the Truman administration’s ‘wedge strategy’ was ever a realistic proposition was a moot point after 1950.16 By the time Truman stepped down in January 1953, Beijing appeared not only to move in lockstep with Moscow, but also to be at the forefront of the communist revolutionary movement in East Asia.17 By then, however, Washington had also imposed a tough economic embargo against China,18 sped up the political and economic rehabilitation of Japan,19 decided to back the French in Indochina,20 and, more generally, strengthened US ties with key non-communist regional actors.21 Far from ditching the controversial Jiang, Washington stood by him. Although Washington was careful not to let him drive its China policy, renewed US support for the GMT was to introduce a strong element of discord between Washington and Beijing and to prove a particularly contentious issue in Sino–US relations in the early Cold War. In brief, the Korean War generated such a degree of hostility between Washington and Beijing that deep mutual distrust became an entrenched fact of life in the years to come.

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That said, however, the general impression that one draws from Mao’s initial steps in foreign policy prior to the Korean War is that Truman had no hope of weaning the PRC away from the Soviet embrace. Mao’s visit to Moscow in December 1949–January 1950 clearly underscored his desire to align the PRC closely with the USSR in an attempt to obtain Soviet aid to build up the Chinese economy and secure Soviet support in the event of a war with the United States.22 Moreover, with his decision to support diplomatically and militarily Kim Il Sung’s attempts to reunite the Korean Peninsula under communist rule, Mao not only sought to strengthen the PRC’s geopolitical position in East Asia, but also to place China at the epicentre of the Asian revolutionary movement and, in so doing, to raise its prestige within the communist camp. Mao, who was to become the CCP’s undisputed leader and thus dominate the Chinese foreign policy decision-making process for the next three decades,23 saw the promotion of anti-imperialist revolutions in Asia and the support of communist movements across the region as an ideological and political imperative.24 For him, only the radical transformation of the current international system and the establishment of like-minded communist regimes across Asia could consolidate communist gains domestically and provide security externally.25 In his view, security and prosperity at home were very much linked with the success of communist insurgencies and revolutions abroad.26 In the early 1950s, however, there was an ulterior motive behind Mao’s strident support for revolutionary change in Asia – his desire to assuage Stalin’s misgivings about his loyalty to the Soviet leadership.27 With these premises, the room for a fruitful relationship between Washington and Beijing was non-existent. Mao’s revolutionary ideals, coupled with his desire to establish his revolutionary credentials in Moscow and strengthen the PRC’s security position on its southern border, led him in 1950 to offer military and economic aid to a communist insurgency in Vietnam.28 Given his desire to carve a leadership role for the PRC within the Soviet-led communist bloc, the Vietminh’s revolution also ‘provided a fine platform for proof of Mao’s own brand of rural, Third World revolution combined with postcolonial nationalism’.29 Yet, Beijing’s direct and indirect support for communist insurgencies across East Asia heightened Western concerns about Red China’s regional role, thus pushing the United States and its allies to bolster regional defences against Chinese communism.30 In addition, the fact that, thanks to Soviet help, the PRC was rapidly building up its military capabilities and that these capabilities easily dwarfed those of its non-communist East Asian neighbours injected further impetus into the US containment of Red China.31 In the mid1950s, Dwight Eisenhower’s Republican administration concluded, as

US relations with the PRC during the Cold War 49 Rosemary Foot put it, that ‘Asian communism had entered a more vigorous phase’ and that the best strategy to counter it was ‘to maintain a high level of pressure on that most dynamic and confident example, the People’s Republic of China’.32 In 1954, therefore, the new administration championed the establishment of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) to provide a politico-military reassurance to anticommunist regional actors.33 While perhaps the most notable and certainly the best known aspect of Eisenhower’s containment strategy in East Asia, SEATO was only one of the several tools with which the administration planned to contain the PRC. During its first term in office, the US also agreed to strengthen its military commitment to South Korea and Taiwan, and envisaged building the military capabilities of its allies through US military and economic assistance. Its efforts to rebuild the Japanese economy and prop up the Ngo Dinh Diem government in South Vietnam were two clear examples of this strategy. Furthermore, Washington sought to undermine the PRC’s influence by retaining the trade embargo and by maintaining its non-recognition policy (as well as its opposition to China’s admission to the UN).34 In this respect, there was little appreciable difference between Eisenhower’s tough stance and that of his predecessor. Containment through isolation remained the mainstay of Washington’s China policy during the 1950s. Where the two administrations differed somewhat was on their estimation of the feasibility of Washington’s wedge strategy. Whereas the Truman administration doubted it was a feasible proposition in the polarized world of the early 1950s, its Republican counterpart thought otherwise, arguing instead that only through significant political and economic pressure, could the United States hope to whip up disagreement between the PRC and the USSR by forcing the former to make unrealistic demands for assistance on the latter.35 Although Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles did not see eye to eye on this (Eisenhower, unlike Dulles, tended to see inducements such as trade, rather than economic sanctions, as most likely to weaken the PRC–USSR alliance), the administration’s position was that the embargo would, overall, be an effective pressure tool.36 In this, the administration was probably right. As recent research has suggested, the trade embargo did place significant economic pressure on the PRC. In doing so, it not only pushed the CCP leadership to embark on radical social and economic reforms (such as the Great Leap Forward) to offset the damaging effects of US (and Western) economic sanctions, it also encouraged the PRC to demand increasing aid from the USSR. Chinese demands, however, were

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well beyond Moscow’s capacity (and willingness) to deliver. As Washington had hoped, this fact inevitably generated tensions between the two communist powers.37 US suspicions hardly abated as a result of China’s apparently more moderate regional policy in the mid-1950s. Clearly aware that its radicalism had not only pushed its enemies to close ranks, but had also heightened concerns amongst those Asian neutrals, such as India and Indonesia, who had hitherto refused to join the Western camp, Beijing moved in 1954 to tone down its revolutionary élan. Zhou Enlai’s deft diplomacy and cautious pronouncements at the Geneva Conference in 1954 and, subsequently, at Bandung in 1955 were clearly intended to project a more reassuring image of China across the region and, by doing so, to break what Beijing saw as a growing US encirclement.38 Moreover, while still remaining sympathetic to communist and anti-imperialist causes across East Asia, Mao had no stomach for an all-out confrontation with the United States.39 In this respect, Washington’s pledge to stand by Jiang Jieshi during the first Taiwan Strait crisis (1954–55) and its readiness to resort to military force and nuclear threats in order to dissuade the PRC from launching an attack on Jinmen or Mazu (Quemoy and Matsu) no doubt taught Mao and his comrades to proceed with great caution when dealing with Washington (although, it must be said, it also prompted them to give the go ahead to China’s nuclear programme).40 That said, however, foreign policy was only one, albeit important, consideration in pushing the CCP leadership to tone down its revolutionary rhetoric. The combined need to consolidate the communist revolution domestically and to attend to the economic strains imposed by the Korean War (which had ended in a stalemate in 1953) and the Western embargo was an important factor in pushing the CCP to avoid a head on confrontation with the United States. As Qiang Zhai has aptly pointed out, Mao ‘was a realist fully capable of making policy adjustments when he faced either domestic economic difficulties or international pressures’. He was, in other words, well ‘capable of beating tactical retreats from time to time, but always sticking to his colors’.41 For the rest of the decade, for instance, he would recommend caution to the North Vietnamese communists and would seek to dissuade them from going ahead with their planned takeover of the South for fear that this might prompt a Korean-style US intervention in Indochina – an intervention that incidentally would no doubt have had a negative impact on the PRC’s ability to pursue its revolutionary economic and social agenda at home.42 That is also why the PRC was willing to enter diplomatic talks at ambassadorial level with the United States.43

US relations with the PRC during the Cold War 51 The Eisenhower administration did not buy into this apparent new course in Chinese foreign policy. Although, by the time Eisenhower came to office, McCarthyism was in decline in the United States, strong anti-communism still permeated the perceptions of US elites and public opinion. Domestic hostility to communism ensured that the Republican administration remained profoundly suspicious of Beijing’s intentions. That said, its China policy responded primarily to its own assessment of Chinese actions and pronouncements rather than domestic calculations.44 Although a number of scholars have variously identified US party politics, domestic political concerns and ideological anti-communism as the sources of the Republican administration’s hostility towards the PRC, Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s approach appeared to be significantly driven by strategic and foreign policy calculations.45 In other words, the administration’s tough stance towards the PRC was premised on the assumption that unless checked, the PRC would move to fill the power vacuum engendered by the end of the European colonial presence in Asia.46 In this context, the administration viewed accommodation with China as an unappealing course of action. Any indication that Washington was ready to consider such an option would not only – to use Dulles’s own words – ‘sow discouragement’ amongst Asia’s noncommunist nations and force them to bow to Chinese power, but would also significantly weaken the United States’ defence position in the region.47

SINO–US RELATIONS IN THE EARLY 1960s The legacies of the 1950s carried forward into the 1960s. Throughout the decade, relations between Washington and Beijing remained strained. Despite its growing rift with Moscow, Beijing continued to regard the United States as its major adversary. US growing political and military involvement in Indochina led the CCP leadership to view Washington as an aggressive power bent on undermining China’s international role. On the US side, both the Kennedy (1961–63) and Johnson (1963–69) administrations identified Red China as the main revolutionary force in Asia and the major obstacle to peaceful coexistence between the two blocs. As Matthew Jones has noted, policy innovation in Washington was ‘crippled by the identification of Communist China as the ultimate source of all American problems in South East Asia, and the Cultural Revolution in the PRC eventually making any steps towards reconciliation impossible’.48 Upon coming to office in January 1961, John F. Kennedy’s Democratic administration (1961–63) inherited from its predecessors the

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assumption that China was a revisionist power and that a hardline approach was needed to contain it. It also inherited their policy of containment through isolation as well as the system of Western alliances along China’s periphery.49 At no stage, therefore, did the new president give any indication that his administration was planning to carry out a major reappraisal of the United States’ China policy. Not only was Kennedy aware that neither the US public, nor the Republican Party nor the China lobby were likely to countenance any such a move, he also knew that having only won the presidential contest by the tiniest of margins, he lacked the political mandate to effect such a controversial move.50 More importantly, there was no sign that the CCP leadership would welcome such a move.51 Between the late 1950s and early 1960s the signals coming out of Beijing were discouraging. Domestically, Mao embarked on a new revolutionary wave – the Great Leap Forward – aimed at completing the communist revolution in China. Externally, Mao had been critical of both Nikita Khrushchev’s ‘de-Stalinization’ programme and his attempts to seek peaceful coexistence with the West.52 Slowly but surely, Mao set out to challenge Moscow’s leadership of the communist movement by portraying the PRC as the only and true revolutionary power and by arguing that communism in the Soviet Union had been undermined by the emergence of a ‘bureaucratic capitalist class’.53 By 1962 Mao was theorizing that two ‘intermediate zones’ existed between the two superpowers – the first consisting of the underdeveloped nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the second comprising Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Canada and the capitalist nations of Western Europe. For Mao, China’s role was to challenge US and Soviet influence in the first intermediate zone by supporting revolutionary and national liberation movements there.54 In the early and mid-1960s, the CCP leadership viewed Southeast Asia as the most promising area in which to challenge both the US capitalists and the Soviet revisionists. Believing this region to be susceptible to revolutionary change, Beijing sought to coordinate policy with regional communist parties and encouraged them to promote anti-imperialist revolutions across the region by promising material support.55 Of particular concerns to Beijing was the Kennedy administration’s growing involvement in South Vietnam. While Kennedy’s Vietnam policy no doubt played an important part in pushing the CCP leadership to step up Chinese support for the DRV, it also provided Mao with the pretext to accelerate revolutionary change domestically and regain control over the party following the failure of the Great Leap Forward.56

US relations with the PRC during the Cold War 53 Faced with Mao’s renewed radicalism, the Kennedy administration stuck with the policy of status quo, but remained uncertain about the exact nature of the Chinese threat. Within the administration, some officials speculated that the spectacular failure of Mao’s Great Leap Forward and the increasingly vicious Sino–Soviet rift had reduced China’s ability to harm US regional interests. Others, instead, took a rather different view, claiming that these two factors, far from hampering Red China’s regional involvement, would instead ‘encourage Chinese meddling in Vietnam’.57 These two views were not mutually exclusive. By the early 1960s, the Kennedy administration, despite concerns over unrelenting Chinese efforts to develop a nuclear capability, was somewhat more relaxed about China’s conventional military power, viewing Mao-induced domestic upheavals as having had a negative impact on the PRC’s military power.58 At the same time, however, China’s reduced military capabilities did not prevent Mao from taking an active involvement in the Vietnamese crisis and creating significant problems for Kennedy’s containment policy in Southeast Asia (while simultaneously trying to carefully avoid a direct military confrontation with the United States).59 That said, the administration also remained unsure what to do with the growing rift between the USSR and the PRC. If Mao’s hardline revolutionary rhetoric made a radical reappraisal of Kennedy’s China policy unthinkable, at least for the time being, the Washington foreign policy bureaucracy nonetheless began to consider ways to exploit the emerging Sino–Soviet rift.60 Nothing came of it, but, during the Kennedy years, the United States and the PRC were, nonetheless, able to avoid escalation in Laos and in the third Taiwan Straits crisis in 1962.61 The Warsaw ambassadorial channel provided the context for managing tensions between the two rivals.62 Some historians have argued that towards the end of his presidency Kennedy was considering a major departure in his China policy.63 Whether this was indeed the case remains very much an open question, but what is certain is that his sudden death in Dallas in October 1963 brought the prospect of such reappraisal to an end. Under Kennedy’s successor Lyndon B. Johnson (1963–69), the prospect of an improvement in Sino–US relations remained as chimerical as ever. Johnson, who had inherited both Kennedy’s team of advisers and the preceding administration’s broad assumptions on Chinese communism, avoided any policy departure and, instead, continued to regard the PRC as its most problematic adversary.64 This was understandable. With administration increasingly drawn into the Indochinese quagmire and with the PRC staunchly standing by the DRV, the room for manoeuvre was non-existent.65 To make things worse, the Johnson years witnessed what can arguably be regarded as the most radical turn in Chinese foreign

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policy. During the Cultural Revolution, pronouncements emanating from Beijing became increasingly shrill and inflammatory. Although the growing chaos, in which the country plunged as a result of Mao’s latest revolutionary drive, ensured that Beijing’s revolutionary foreign policy statements remained, in the main, purely rhetorical, the PRC faced increasing isolation (and hostility) internationally.66 In due course, however, the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, which laid bare the country’s weakness, and the ever worsening ideological quarrels between Moscow and Beijing, sowed the seeds for a dramatic turn in Sino–US relations. Unfortunately for Johnson, it was his Republican successor, Richard Nixon, who would take advantage of Beijing’s reassessment of its foreign policy options. In 1968, with his political prestige undermined by the worsening situation in Vietnam, Johnson announced that he would not run for a second term.

NIXON’S OPENING TO CHINA AND THE NORMALIZATION OF SINO–US RELATIONS It was not without irony that the chance of normalizing Sino–US relations fell to Richard Nixon, the quintessential anti–Cold War warrior. As a Congressman and Eisenhower’s vice-president, Nixon had distinguished himself for his strongly anti-communist views. Yet, it was precisely Nixon’s indisputable anti-communist pedigree that made it possible for him to bring about a significant U-turn in the United States’ China policy. He did not run the risk, as a Democratic president might have, of standing accused of being soft on communism.67 Before seeking his party’s nomination for the 1968 presidential election, he had, for some time, toyed with the idea of a rapprochement with China.68 In an article published in Foreign Affairs in 1967, he had already emphasized the need for US policy to ‘come urgently to grips with the reality of China’. This, Nixon explained, did not mean ‘rushing to grant recognition to Peking, to admit it to the United Nations and to ply it with offers of trade’. It did, however, mean considering the costs involved in ‘leave[ing] China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors’. In Nixon’s view, the world could not ‘be safe until China changes. Thus our aim, to the extent that we can influence events, should be to induce change’.69 His arrival at the White House in January 1969 provided him with the opportunity to help bring about such a change. Progress on this front, however, was slow. Overcoming two decades of Sino–US hostility was not easy. Although Nixon conveyed to the Chinese leadership as early as

US relations with the PRC during the Cold War 55 1969 that he was serious about improving bilateral relations, it was not until his visit to Beijing in February 1972 that a Sino–US rapprochement was achieved.70 From a Chinese viewpoint, coming to terms with the United States made eminent sense for two principal reasons. The first and most important one was the containment of the USSR, which, by the end of the 1960s was regarded by Mao and his entourage as the most threatening of the two superpowers. By then, relations between the two former communist allies had become so tense that in March 1969 they faced each other in two major military clashes on the Ussuri River. The CCP leadership even feared the possibility of a Soviet attack.71 The second reason was to facilitate the unification of Taiwan with the Mainland.72 As for Nixon, the rationale for his opening to China was provided by both the transformed nature of the communist bloc and his reading of the United States’ declining power in international affairs at the end of the 1960s. Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger were convinced that the United States needed to not only extricate itself from Indochina, but also to transfer some of its defence burden onto its allies. In their view, the over-extension of the United States’ global commitments, coupled with the rapid raise of Soviet power during the 1960s, made it imperative for the United States to reappraise its world role. The ‘power of the United States’, Nixon told his trusted adviser Bob Haldeman, ‘must be used more effectively at home and abroad or we go down the drain as a great power’.73 In Nixon’s and Kissinger’s minds, the opening to China was to serve a number of purposes, from holding the USSR in check and pushing it to negotiate détente (so to contain, among other things, the rising costs of the US–USSR nuclear build-up) to splitting the communist camp further and to reducing US commitments in Asia. Last but not least, it also served to neutralize Soviet and Chinese support for the DRV and in so doing, to put pressure on Hanoi to come to the negotiating table.74 Nixon’s visit to China in late February 1972 was to provide the hitherto elusive circuit-breaker in Sino–US relations. As indicated in the Shanghai Communiqué signed by Nixon and Zhou Enlai at the end of the summit, the United States and the PRC both committed to putting aside their differences for the sake of achieving a mutually beneficial relationship. Much hinged on a broad agreement regarding the vexed question of Taiwan. With the Shanghai Communiqué, Washington settled, in practice, for the principle of ‘one China but not now’ while Beijing acquiesced, for the time being, to continuing US support for the Taiwanese government.75 Both governments also committed themselves to containing Soviet influence in Asia.76 Nixon’s 1972 visit was the

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beginning of a long diplomatic journey for both Washington and Beijing. In 1973 the PRC and the United States established liaison offices in each other’s capitals,77 but full normalization was held off until the end of the decade. Quite predictably, mutual suspicions did not help. If Mao complained that, in order to achieve détente with the Soviets, the United States was riding on China’s back, the Nixon and the Ford administrations wondered how committed China really was to its new foreign policy course given Mao’s complex political succession. With radicals and moderates jousting for the control of the CCP, there seemed to be little certainty that normalization would be irreversible.78 China’s unsettled internal situation, however, was only part of the story. US domestic politics also played its part in delaying normalization. Nixon had told Mao and Zhou that he would deal with the recognition issue in his second term, but the Watergate scandal prevented him doing so.79 When Nixon stepped down in 1974, Gerald Ford’s crammed political agenda (1974–77), his reluctance to give up US ties with Taiwan, and more generally, his political weakness, also contributed to slowing down the recognition process.80 In the end, Beijing’s ever tense relations with Moscow and the emergence of Deng Xiaoping’s moderate leadership in the aftermath of Mao’s death in 1976 ensured that normalization was finally accomplished in January 1979. The growing impasse in US–Soviet détente in the late 1970s also helped inject new momentum into the US–PRC relationship.81 To contain an increasingly assertive USSR, the Carter administration (1977–81) paid increasing attention to China.82 In spite of some continuing disagreements over Taiwan, Carter and Deng agreed in December 1978 to establish diplomatic relations between their two countries. The agreement also paved the way for Deng’s visit to the United States in January–February 1979 – the first undertaken by a PRC leader. Deng regarded relations with the United States as a ‘top priority’.83 Deng’s economic reforms and opening to the outside world entrenched Beijing’s interest in deepening relations with the United States. Under Deng, China needed not only US economic assistance, but also access to Western markets and technology to modernize an economically backward nation.84 Over time, Deng’s reformist agenda would not only succeed in bringing about what Jian Chen has called a ‘profound derevolutionization process’, but also in transforming China from an ‘outsider’ in a still Western-dominated international system to an ‘insider’.85 Under the Reagan administration (1981–89), the United States and China formed an effective de facto alliance.86 Both countries worked together to undermine pro-Soviet regimes in Cambodia and Afghanistan.87 The United

US relations with the PRC during the Cold War 57 States also provided the PRC with arms and military-related technology.88 When the Cold War came to an end in the late 1980s, relations between the United States and PRC appeared to have changed fundamentally in spite of the temporary freeze generated by the Tiananmen crisis.89 Both countries had managed to overcome some of the deep-seated differences that had marred their mutual relationship in the 1950s and 1960s. Yet, as the 1990s set in, new and critical challenges appeared to lie ahead in the relationship between the United States and the PRC.

CONCLUSIONS This chapter has aimed to provide a concise analysis of Sino–US relations during the Cold War. In doing so, it has focused on the key issues that set the United States and the PRC apart for two decades. During the early Cold War, deep ideological and political differences made the prospect of a thaw in Sino–US relations almost unthinkable. Although neither the Truman nor the Eisenhower administration believed that international communism was a monolith under tight Soviet control, they nonetheless found it impossible to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing. Mao’s attachment to revolutionary change both domestically and externally left Washington with no room to manoeuvre. That said, Eisenhower’s ‘maximum pressure’ on Beijing could hardly have been conducive to an immediate improvement in Sino–US relations. However, when the Sino–Soviet split finally materialized in the 1960s, the United States was in no position to take advantage of it. If anything, the growing rift between Moscow and Beijing had the dubious merit of pushing the latter towards greater radicalism. Both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations chose to stick to the well-tried policies of their predecessors, but it is most unlikely that efforts to seek an accommodation with China would have produced a different and better outcome. For most of the 1960s, a Sino–US détente was simply not there for the taking. It took a China enfeebled by the spectacular failures of Mao’s Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution and threatened by Soviet hostility to push the CCP leadership to seek a new course in foreign relations. In Nixon and Kissinger the Chinese leadership found two shrewd political operators willing to play the China card to get the United States out of the Vietnam morass, to reappraise US posture in Asia and to negotiate détente with the USSR. If, nowadays, this is sometimes regarded as an inescapable conclusion, there was nothing preordained about Nixon’s opening to China. Throughout the 1970s, mutual distrust of the USSR continued to provide the political glue for the PRC and the United States to stick

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together. In the 1980s, the process of political and economic reforms embraced by Deng and the US desire not to undermine one of Washington’s major successes in its Cold War diplomacy ensured that the bilateral relationship remained amicable and mutually advantageous. In less than two decades, Washington and Beijing had transformed their relations from ‘total confrontation’ to a ‘tacit strategic partnership’.90

NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

17. 18. 19.

Foot, R. (2004), The Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 11. Foot, The Practice of Power, p. 12. On the PRC’s Third World activism see Westad, O.A. (2005), The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 162–5. Benvenuti, A. (2015), ‘The international relations of East Asia in a historical perspective’, in A.T.H. Tan (ed.), Security and Conflict in East Asia, New York: Palgrave. Ibid. Zhai, Q. (2000), ‘Crisis and confrontation: Chinese–American relations during the Eisenhower administration’, Journal of American–East Asian Relations, 9 (3/4), 221. Gaddis, J.L. (1982), Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 68–70 and 116–17. Christensen, T.J. (2011), Worse than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 32–3 and 53. Ibid., pp. 32–3. Ibid. Truman cited in Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 117. Gaddis, J.L. (1990), ‘The unexpected John Foster Dulles: nuclear weapons, communism, and the Russians’, in R.H. Immerman (ed.), John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 60. Foot, The Practice of Power, p. 143; see also Benvenuti, ‘The international relations of East Asia in a historical perspective’. Ibid. Foot, The Practice of Power, p. 144. Ibid., pp. 143–5 and 149. For the debate on whether there was ever a chance for better US–PRC relations before the Korean War see Cohen, W.I. (1997), ‘Symposium: rethinking the lost chance in China. Introduction: was there a “lost chance” in China?’, Diplomatic History, 21 (1), 71–5. Yahuda, M. (2011), The International Politics of the Asia Pacific, 3rd edition, Hoboken, NJ: Taylor and Francis, p. 143. Kochavi, N. (2002), A Conflict Perpetuated: China Policy during the Kennedy Years, London: Praeger, p. 4. On the rehabilitation of Japan see Leffler, M.P. (2010), ‘The emergence of an American grand strategy, 1945–1952’, in M.P. Leffler and O.A. Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 1, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 87–8.

US relations with the PRC during the Cold War 59 20. 21. 22.

23.

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

39. 40.

Logevall, F. (2010), ‘The Indochina wars and the Cold War, 1945–1975’, in M.P. Leffler and O.A. Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 2, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 286. Leffler, ‘The emergence of an American grand strategy’, p. 87. Zhang, ‘The Sino–Soviet alliance and the Cold War in Asia, 1954–1962’, p. 354; Westad, O.A. (1998), ‘The Sino–Soviet alliance and the United States’, in O.A. Westad (ed.), Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino–Soviet Alliance 1943–1963, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, p. 169. Sutter, R.G. (2013), Foreign Relations of the PRC: The Legacies and Constraints of China’s International Politics since 1945, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 29; Chen, J. (1998), ‘Not yet a revolution: reviewing China’s “new Cold War documentation”’, Cold War History Project, accessed 17 March 2016 at http:// www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy/cold-war/conference/chen-jian.html. Chen, J. (2001), Mao’s China and the Cold War, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, p. 7. Zhai, Q. (2000), China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950– 1975, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, p. 4. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 4. Ibid. Zhang, ‘The Sino–Soviet alliance and the Cold War in Asia’, p. 354. Logevall, ‘The Indochina wars and the Cold War’, p. 120. Christensen, Worse than a Monolith, p. 104. The PRC’s support for the Malayan Communist Party did not go much beyond verbal and ideological support. Its backing of Burmese and Filipino insurgents remained very limited. See McMahon, R.J. (1999), The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia Since World War II, New York: Columbia University Press, p. 47. Fenton, D. (2006), ‘SEATO and the defence of Southeast Asia, 1955–65’, PhD dissertation, University of New South Wales, pp. 3–4. Foot, R. (1996), ‘The Eisenhower administration’s fear of empowering the Chinese’, Political Science Quarterly, 111 (3), 505. On the United States and the establishment of SEATO see Dingman, R. (1989), ‘John Foster Dulles and the creation of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization in 1954’, International History Review, 11 (3), 457–77. Choi, W. (2012), ‘Structural realism and Dulles’s China policy’, Review of International Affairs, 38 (1), 133; Zhai, ‘Crisis and confrontation’, p. 227. Kochavi, A Conflict Perpetuated, p. 2. On Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s different approaches to economic sanctions see Choi, ‘Structural realism and Dulles’s China policy’, p. 132; Zhai, ‘Crisis and confrontation’, p. 228. Zhang, S.G. (2001), Economic Cold War: America’s Economic Embargo against China and the Sino–Soviet Alliance, 1949–1963, Washington, DC and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, pp. 268–9. On China projecting a more reassuring image of itself see Zhang, S.G. (2000), ‘China’s strategic culture and the Cold War confrontations’, in O.A. Westad (ed.), Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory, London: Frank Cass, p. 267. For Zhou’s role at Bandung see Chen, J. (2014), ‘Zhou Enlai and China’s “prolonged rise”’, in R. Guha (ed.), The Makers of Asia, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, pp. 9–10. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 4–5. Chang, G.H. (1998), ‘To the nuclear brink: Eisenhower, Dulles and the QuemoyMatsu Crisis’, International Security, 12 (4), 98 and 122. On China’s nuclear ambitions see Zhang, ‘China’s strategic culture and the Cold War confrontations’, p. 272.

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41. 42. 43.

Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 4–5. Ibid. Held initially in Geneva in 1955 (and then in Warsaw after 1958), the Sino–US ambassadorial talks continued through the 1960s. While producing no breakthrough, they provided a useful line of communication between Washington and Beijing at a time when the two countries had not yet established diplomatic ties. Choi, ‘Structural realism and Dulles’s China policy’, pp. 119–40. Ibid., p. 137. Foot, ‘The Eisenhower administration’s fear of empowering the Chinese’, p. 520. Ibid., pp. 514 and 515–16. Jones, M. (2001), ‘“Groping toward coexistence”: US China policy during the Johnson years’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 12 (3), 176. Fredman, Z. (2014), ‘“The specter of an expansionist China”: Kennedy administration assessments of Chinese intentions in Vietnam’, Diplomatic History, 38 (1), 115 and 122. Quigley, K. (2002), ‘A lost opportunity: a reappraisal of the Kennedy administration’s China policy in 1963’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 13 (3), 176; Kochavi, A Conflict Perpetuated, p. 244. Quigley, ‘A lost opportunity’, p. 176. Zhang, ‘The Sino–Soviet alliance and the Cold War in Asia’, pp. 353–75. See Chen, ‘Zhou Enlai and China’s “prolonged rise”’, p. 162. Ibid. Also see Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 146. Chen, ‘Zhou Enlai and China’s “prolonged rise”’, pp. 162–3; for Chinese support to the Indonesian Communist Party see Moyar, M. (2006), Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–65, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 380. Fredman, Z. (2014), ‘The specter of an expansionist China’, pp. 113–14; Kochavi, N. (1998), ‘Kennedy, China, and the tragedy of no chance’, Journal of American-East Asian Relations, 7 (1/2), 115–16. Fredman, ‘The specter of an expansionist China’, pp. 111–12. On China’s military capabilities in the 1960s see Foot, The Practice of Power, pp. 154–9. On Kennedy’s concerns about a nuclear China see Kochavi, ‘Kennedy, China, and the tragedy of no chance’, p. 112. On China’s involvement in Vietnam in the early 1960s see Nguyen, L.-H.T. (2012), Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam, Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, p. 80; see also Westad, O.A. (2009), Restless Empire: China and the World since 1750, New York: Random House, p. 347. Kochavi, ‘Kennedy, China, and the tragedy of no chance’, p. 110. Ibid. Ibid. See, for instance, Quigley, ‘A lost opportunity’, p. 192. Jones, ‘Groping toward coexistence’, p. 175. Logevall, ‘The Indochina wars and the Cold War’, pp. 294–8. Chen, J. (2010), ‘China and the Cold War after Mao’, in M. Leffler and O.A. Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 3, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 182. Macmillan, M. (2008), ‘Nixon, Kissinger, and the opening to China’, in F. Logevall and A. Preston (eds), Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969–1977, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 107. Ibid. Nixon, R. (1967), ‘Asia after Viet-Nam’, Foreign Affairs, 46 (1), 111–25. For the diplomatic steps that led to Nixon’s visit to Beijing in February 1972 see, for instance, Macmillan, M. (2007), Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed the World,

44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59.

60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70.

US relations with the PRC during the Cold War 61

71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90.

New York: Random House; see also Tudda, C. (2012), A Cold War Turning Point: Nixon and China, 1969–1972, Baton Rouge, LA: LSU Press. Radchenko, S. (2010), ‘The Sino–Soviet Split’, in M. Leffler and O.A. Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 2, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 367. See Chen, ‘Zhou Enlai and China’s “prolonged rise”, p. 166. Nixon cited in Macmillan, ‘Nixon, Kissinger, and the opening to China’, p. 110. For Nixon’s rationale see, for instance, Hanhimäki, J.M. (2004), The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 57–61. Yahuda, M. (2004), The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 2nd edition, London: Routledge Curzon, p. 174. Kissinger, H. (2011), On China, New York: Penguin Press, p. 270. Wang, D. (2013), The United States and China: A History from the Eighteenth Century to the Present, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 193. On China’s internal politics see Wang, The United States and China, pp. 233–5. Chen, ‘China and the Cold War after Mao’, p. 189. Ibid. See also Sutter, R.G. (2013), U.S.–Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 75. Wang, The United States and China, p. 235. Chen, ‘China and the Cold War after Mao’, pp. 190–92. Ibid., p. 190. Wang, The United States and China, pp. 54 and 236. For Deng’s domestic reforms see Chen, ‘China and the Cold War after Mao’, p. 181. Westad, Restless Empire, p. 375. Herring, G.C. (2008), From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 901. Ibid. See next chapter. Chen, ‘China and the Cold War after Mao’, pp. 183–4.

4. US relations with the PRC after the Cold War Andrea Benvenuti

INTRODUCTION The end of the Cold War came both as a relief and a challenge to the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). On the one hand, the rapid demise of the Soviet Union (USSR) and its alliance system handed both nations an unexpected strategic advantage by depriving them of a redoubtable strategic competitor. If Chinese policy-makers saw it as a long-awaited chance to reduce pressure on China’s northern border and ‘stake a claim to greater regional influence’, for their US counterparts it represented both the attainment of a long sought-after foreign policy goal and the opportunity to lay the groundwork for a de-escalation of international tensions and a reduction in US commitments worldwide.1 On the other hand, the end of the Cold War also posed significant challenges to both countries. The unravelling of Soviet power raised concerns among US policy-makers that the end of bipolarity, far from being the unmitigated strategic boon they had hoped for, might instead have serious destabilizing effects on international stability and order. For their part, Chinese leaders feared that the implosion of communist regimes in Eastern Europe might impact negatively on domestic political developments and lead to the demise of Chinese communism. Yet, important as they were, these were not the only major challenges facing both Washington and Beijing. At the Cold War’s end, the future of their bilateral relationship also appeared deeply uncertain and in flux. To put it somewhat differently, it was unclear how the collapse of Soviet power might impact on Sino–US relations. ‘The strategic rationale’, as one observer put it, ‘that had brought China and the United States together in opposition to the USSR was no more’.2 A new strategic rationale was needed, but this was slow to emerge from the ashes of the Cold War bipolar system. Indeed, it could be easily argued that, a quarter of century later, this has yet to emerge. While broadly recognizing that continued bilateral cooperation was very much in their mutual interest, 62

US relations with the PRC after the Cold War 63 Washington and Beijing found it difficult to translate this shared goal into concrete actions and remained somewhat uncertain on how best to adjust their bilateral relationship to the changed dynamics of the post–Cold War world. The post-Nixon consensus that viewed Sino–US economic and strategic interests as broadly convergent came increasingly under attack in both countries. As a result, accommodation and cooperation often gave way to competition and conflict. And, as the relationship weakened, it ‘became contentious and increasingly driven by domestic politics in both countries’.3 In taking the Sino–US story up from to end of the Cold War to the present, this chapter therefore aims to provide a brief examination of a complex, often touchy and at times even quarrelsome relationship.

SINO–US RELATIONS UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (1989–93) Welcomed by Chinese leaders, the election of George H.W. Bush to the presidency of the United States in November 1988 appeared to augur well for the future of Sino–US relations.4 In the mid-1970s, the new president had spent two years in China, serving as the director of the US liaison office.5 He had, therefore, direct knowledge of China and, more to the point, ‘believed he had some specialist knowledge’ of it.6 Sceptical about Mikhail Gorbachev’s ability to reform the USSR and still convinced that Beijing’s support was needed to balance Moscow, Bush was keen to maintain close relations with the PRC and, in order to do so, he set out to establish regular contacts with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership.7 Soon after arriving at the White House, Bush travelled to China with the view to signalling the importance that his administration placed on close Sino–US ties.8 However, upon arriving in Beijing in February 1989, little did he know that he would soon be faced with one of the toughest foreign policy challenges of his presidency. Only a few weeks after his visit, the Chinese leadership brutally cracked down on protesters in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. The Tiananmen crackdown had been ‘long in the brewing’.9 During the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping’s reforms had brought rapid economic growth and produced far-reaching changes in Chinese society, but had also generated significant inequalities and failed to promote political liberalization. Hence, concerns over the pace and nature of the economic reforms and frustration at the lack of political reforms coalesced to generate growing popular discontent towards the CCP and its leadership. In April–May 1989 such a latent discontent erupted in widespread student protests in Beijing and elsewhere in the country. When Beijing students and residents refused to

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comply with the martial law imposed by the government, Deng and CCP leadership decided to send People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops to disperse students gathered in Tiananmen Square. In the process, hundreds of students and residents were killed.10 Only too aware of the popular eruptions that had brought down communism in Eastern Europe, the CCP was determined to keep China from falling to the same fate.11 The Tiananmen crackdown deeply shocked US public opinion and marked the beginning of the end of the ‘general Congressional support for administration initiatives on China that had characterized US policy since 1980’.12 Against its own instincts, the Bush administration was forced into imposing tough sanctions on China. In a statement on 5 June, the president explained that while this was ‘not the time for an emotional response’, he could ‘not ignore the consequences for our relationship with China, which has been built on a foundation of broad support by the American public’.13 As a result, the administration decided to cut off military ties and suspend all sales of weapons; it also announced a temporary stop to high-level political contacts and a freeze on international loans to China.14 As the administration imposed sanctions, Bush sent National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft on two missions to Beijing to reassure Deng and the CCP leadership of continuing US friendship towards China.15 As Scowcroft told his Chinese counterpart, Bush ‘recognise[d] the value of the PRC–US relationship to the vital interests of both countries’ and ‘ha[d] a deep personal desire to see the friendship between the Chinese and the American people maintained and strengthened’.16 In Bush’s eyes, the PRC was too an important partner to antagonize – a partner who, as Henry Kissinger recently put it, ‘had cooperated with the United States for nearly two decades on some of the most fundamental security issues of the Cold War’.17 Its isolation would not only be counterproductive, but would also run counter to US interests in China.18 Too harsh a stance, Bush believed, would play into the hands of those CCP conservatives who were critical of Deng’s policies.19 The president’s view was that only by maintaining a working relationship with Beijing could the administration prod China towards greater political liberalization and cooperation on security issues.20 In any case, the United States was in no position to impose democratic change on a profoundly reluctant CCP leadership. Albeit sensible on paper, Bush’s approach was, in practice, not without significant pitfalls. Scowcroft’s second trip to Beijing was a case in point. In the White House’s plans, the visit was not merely to convey the administration’s interest in keeping Sino–US dialogue alive, but also to signal its view that ‘only with a change in China’s behaviour could relations with America be fully restored’.21 Alas, its significance was soon submerged in a cacophony of

US relations with the PRC after the Cold War 65 domestic recriminations that the administration was intent on appeasing a repressive Chinese government.22 In the end, the visit only served to highlight the growing chasm between a cautious administration and a distinctly less patient American public. Bush, however, was unrepentant. Amid growing calls from Congress for a much more punitive approach, he did his best to insulate the relationship from the excesses of domestic partisan politics and to ensure that bilateral cooperation would be sustained. Difficult as it was, his balancing act managed, at least, to prevent the bilateral relationship from descending into acrimony. In November 1989, for instance, the president vetoed the Pelosi bill, which, if passed by Congress, would have provoked the Chinese government into an angry response.23 As to be expected, the PRC’s initial response was resentful. The CCP leadership viewed US protests over Tiananmen and the imposition of sanctions as hostile acts aimed at undermining its legitimacy.24 Regarding political liberalization as likely to weaken the party’s role in Chinese society and determined to secure the regime’s survival,25 the Chinese authorities were naturally reluctant to make concessions in this area. Within the CCP Politburo voices were raised to criticize Deng’s reforms and his opening up to the West. Deng’s critics blamed Tiananmen on his reforms and demanded that the pace of their progress be slowed on grounds that closer links with the West had resulted in Western interference in Chinese affairs.26 In the aftermath of Tiananmen, Deng’s reputation was somewhat dented and doubts existed outside China as to whether he was still in control of the party. However, he soon counterattacked by again stressing the need for China to stick to its economic reforms and policy of opening up.27 In early 1992 Deng took the opportunity of a tour of China’s southern provinces to support the reformist leadership of his designated successor, Jiang Zemin, and to lay the groundwork for the process of rapid economic growth that China would experience throughout the 1990s and into the new century.28 Underpinning Deng’s rationale was the conviction that economic development was ‘key to solving China’s internal and external problems’ as well as ‘essential to the CCP’s claim of legitimacy and to maintaining social stability’.29 In this context, a good working relationship with the United States was still important to China. The United States not only remained the PRC’s most profitable market (in 1990 the US trade deficit with the PRC totalled US$10.4 billion) and its main source of advanced technology, but also underwrote regional stability in Asia – stability upon which China relied for its continued growth.30 As Deng himself had told Scowcroft in December 1989, ‘despite problems and disagreements of all kinds, relations between the US and China will have to improve

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ultimately. This is necessary for peace and stability’.31 That said, the CCP leadership showed very little flexibility on the issue of human rights, giving no ground to US demands for greater consultation in this area.32 That relations were on the mend, at least at government-to-government level, became evident in November 1990 when Bush met Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen in Washington following Beijing’s decision not to veto a US-backed UN Security Council’s (UNSC) resolution authorizing the use of force against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.33 The meeting between Bush and Qian ended in practice the US-imposed freeze on high-level diplomatic exchanges between the United States and the PRC.34 Yet, ties remained ‘fragile’ and ‘in a state of flux’.35 Two key reasons contributed to making relations between Washington and Beijing prone to periodic turbulence. The first and perhaps the most important one was China’s declining geopolitical significance in Washington’s strategic calculations.36 Although the Gulf War’s successful outcome reminded US policy-makers of the importance of keeping China on side and securing its support in the UNSC if Bush’s multilateralist drive, based on his ‘New World Order’ concept, was to have any chance of success,37 the collapse of the USSR in December 1991 undoubtedly reduced the PRC’s ‘strategic capital’ in Washington. The second reason was the Congress’s growing assertiveness in seeking to shape the United States’ China policy. Apart from pushing for stringent sanctions in the aftermath of the Tiananmen events, in 1990–91, Congress sought to link the renewal of China’s Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to progress on human rights and political reforms in China.38 Only repeated presidential interventions in congressional politics and the imposition of a presidential veto to legislation suspending China’s MFN status ensured that Bush’s efforts to sustain the bilateral relationship would not be derailed.39 Bush’s attempts to keep the relationship on an even keel, however, came at significant cost for the president. While these actions produced no perceptible change in Beijing’s attitude to political and civil freedoms, they made sure that Washington’s China policy came under increasing criticism domestically.40 With the CCP leadership in no mood to make concessions in this area – in the early 1990s Beijing strongly criticized US attempts to impose Western values on non-Western nations and sought to exploit Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) solidarity to impose its own conception of human rights – political and civil rights remained a bone of contention between the two countries for the entire duration of the Bush administration.41 Alongside these issues, other problems had the potential to create significant friction between Washington and Beijing – from the export of Chinese missile technology to countries like Syria and Pakistan to intellectual property rights and market access. Here the

US relations with the PRC after the Cold War 67 administration was more successful in securing concessions from the Chinese.42 All in all, when Bush stepped down in January 1993, he could take satisfaction from the fact that bilateral disagreements had been kept within acceptable bounds and no serious and lasting damage to the relationship had been done. That said, however, there was no denying that Sino–US relations were entering a new era – one characterized by increasing competition and even conflict. Gone were certainly ‘the days when the two sides could sweep their differences aside in the interest of forging a strategic partnership or “united front” against a common Soviet threat’.43 In 1993, the task of trying to take stock of the changing realities in Sino–US relations fell on a new president, William Jefferson (‘Bill’) Clinton, who, unlike his predecessor, lacked a clear grasp of US interests in Sino–US relations.

THE CLINTON YEARS (1993–2000) Unsurprisingly, Clinton’s arrival at the White House in January 1993 did not put the bilateral relationship on a firmer footing. Far from it. During his two terms in office, relations between Washington and Beijing experienced significant turbulence. Frequently exposed to congressional and public criticism, susceptible to conflicting pressure from human rights and business lobby groups, and subject to interagency divisions, the new administration found it hard to formulate a coherent and effective policy towards the PRC. In this complex task the new administration was certainly not helped by its Chinese counterparts who viewed the United States with increasing suspicion and were therefore ever less inclined to accommodate US foreign policy priorities. With the United States’ powerful display of force in the Gulf War making quite plain the difference in capabilities between the only remaining superpower and the rest of the world, Chinese leaders became increasingly ambivalent about US pre-eminence in post–Cold War international affairs.44 Such an ambivalence was further reinforced by Chinese concerns at Washington’s constant focus on human rights for Beijing feared that US advocacy might hide a more sinister goal – that of overthrowing communism in China.45 Formulating a coherent policy towards China was not made easier by the new president’s lack of experience in, and passion for, foreign affairs. With little interest in foreign policy and even less in China policy, Clinton was never likely to make relations with Beijing a primary focus. In practice, the conduct of the United States’ China policy passed, as Nancy Bernkopf Tucker aptly noted, ‘from a man who personally cared

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about American relations with China to one who saw China through the eyes of advisers with competing agendas’.46 In this respect, the problem for Clinton was not only that most of his top advisers had neither a keen interest in nor close expertise on China (Defence Secretary William Perry was an exception), but also that they hardly saw eye to eye on the question of dealing with China.47 While there was broad consensus within the administration for a policy of constructive engagement (no one, in fact, thought it possible or desirable to contain or isolate the PRC), there was little agreement on what constructive engagement really meant and how it should be pursued. At least initially, the new administration sought to give substance to Clinton’s electoral pledges. During the 1992 presidential campaign, Clinton had attacked Bush for being too soft on China.48 In June 1992, for instance, he criticized Bush’s decision to renew China’s MFN status with no conditions attached as an ‘unconscionable’ act and ‘another sad chapter in this administration’s history of putting America on the wrong side of human rights and democracy’.49 In his acceptance speech to the Democratic Convention in July 1992, Clinton then declared that if elected, he would not ‘coddle dictators from Baghdad to Beijing’.50 Throughout the campaign, he also ‘called for the imposition of a series of conditions China would have to meet for any annual renewals of MFN trade benefits’ and courted the overseas Chinese students of the Tiananmen Square movement who had urged the Bush administration to adopt tougher measures against China.51 Relying on a Democratic majority in Congress, Clinton decided to link progress in economic cooperation with progress in the human rights field. Unless Beijing committed itself to improving its poor human rights record, the administration announced that the United States would not renew China’s MFN status. This was easier said than done. In 1994, with Beijing unwilling to cave in to what it saw as US attempts to meddle in Chinese internal affairs, Clinton was soon forced to back down as a result of intense pressure from the administration’s economic departments as well as from US business.52 Both the former and the latter had become increasingly concerned that by sticking to its policy, the government would damage US commercial interests in a rapidly expanding Chinese economy.53 Keen on re-establishing ties with the Chinese defence establishment, the Pentagon too was reluctant to see the government’s China policy held hostage to human rights considerations.54 Once the administration understood that its emphasis on human rights was at odds with its much cherished economic agenda of expanding US foreign trade across the globe (as well as in China), it quickly abandoned this policy of linkage between economic concessions and human rights. Concern for human rights

US relations with the PRC after the Cold War 69 continued to be a significant aspect of Clinton’s rhetoric, but it increasingly held less sway over government policy.55 Yet, despite such a significant U-turn in the United States’ China policy, relations between Washington and Beijing remained edgy and unsettled. In 1996 the two governments quarrelled over Taiwan. At the core of their dispute lay their unreconciled differences over the status of Taiwan. The PRC regarded the island as part of its territory and opposed any attempt by the Taipei government to gain greater international visibility. For its part, the United States accepted the ‘one China’ principle but also recognized that significant disagreements continued to exist between Beijing and Taipei over who was to be considered the legitimate Chinese government. During the 1980s and early 1990s Washington had continued to provide military aid to Taiwan while pressing both Beijing and Taipei to negotiate peacefully a final settlement between them. While the Cold War was still on, both Washington and Beijing had successfully managed to minimize their mutual differences over Taiwan. However, with the Cold War now over, unresolved disagreements re-emerged. Following the visit of Taiwan’s president Lee Tenghui to the United States in 1995, the PRC began to carry out provocative military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. Its aim was to send a warning to both Washington and Taipei that its patience was not limitless and that it would not tolerate Lee Teng-hui’s efforts to stress Taiwan’s autonomy from Beijing.56 With Congress and the wider American public harbouring a deep dislike for Beijing’s bullying tactics, the administration responded energetically by dispatching two aircraft carrier battle groups near the Taiwan Strait. Tensions soon abated, but the bilateral relationship appeared, more than ever, to have gone adrift. In an attempt to reset the relationship, both governments agreed in the second half of the 1990s to resume contact at the highest level. While both Clinton and President Jiang Zemin had already met on the margins of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and other international fora, there had yet not been a ‘US presidential visit to China since 1989, or Chinese presidential visit to the US since 1987’.57 Accordingly, the two countries agreed to re-establish ‘regular channels of communications’ at both ministerial and officials levels between the State Department and its Chinese counterpart.58 Other US agencies and departments also sent their representatives to China ‘to re-establish functional cooperation’ with their Chinese counterparts.59 Defence exchanges also restarted in 1996.60 More importantly, Jiang Zemin paid an official visit to the United States in late 1997 and Clinton went to China in July 1998.61 During the two visits, both leaders spoke of their intention to ‘build towards a constructive, strategic partnership for the 21st century’.62

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But, for all Clinton and Jiang’s good intentions, their goal of creating a strategic partnership between their two countries remained as elusive as ever. True, in the autumn of 1989 Washington and Beijing signed a WTO accession treaty that paved the way for China’s entry into the World Trade Organization 2001 – an important step towards China’s greater integration into the world economy. Both Jiang and Clinton had pushed hard for this outcome.63 Around the same time, the US Senate also agreed to permanent normal trade relations between the United States and the PRC, thus putting bilateral commercial relations on a sounder footing.64 Yet, for all these steps towards closer Sino–US relations, the general impression remained that both Washington and Beijing were nowhere nearer to reviving that sense of closeness that had characterized their bilateral relationship during the last stretch of the Cold War. As the Cold War receded into the past and the powerful political incentive – provided by their common anti-Sovietism – to paper over their differences disappeared, both Washington and Beijing no longer seemed to ‘know what they stood for in common’ and, hence, found it difficult to come up with a ‘new rationale for their relationship’.65 Mutual suspicions, never too far below the surface, re-emerged. If the Clinton administration continued to maintain a strong politico-military presence in the Asia-Pacific with the view to ensuring, amongst other things, that a rising China would not jeopardize US interest in a region perceived at vital to US national security, the PRC saw Clinton’s rhetoric about enlarging democracy and its military intervention in Kosovo without UN approval, as a sign of an increasingly (and dangerously) hegemonic United States.66 The accidental US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 certainly did not improve Washington’s stocks in Beijing.67 In general, Clinton’s China policy remained confused as the priorities in Washington were confused. The administration never found the ‘right mix’ between its willingness to engage China and its desire to play hardball to ensure that China adopted policies more friendly to the United States. For its part, Beijing was never willing to compromise on vital issues such as human rights and domestic democratization. With the Clinton administration unwilling to put at risk its growing economic ties with the PRC, the CCP leadership in Beijing could afford to resist US pressure when it felt that this was necessary.

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THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND SINO–US RELATIONS (2001–09) The arrival of a new Republican president to the White House in January 2001 hardly promised a major improvement in Sino–US relations. On the presidential campaign trail, new president George W. Bush had criticized his predecessor’s China policy and had attacked Clinton’s vice-president and the Democratic candidate, Al Gore, for his association with an administration known for its soft approach to China.68 He had also spoken of ‘strategic competition’ as the guiding principle that would inform his administration’s China policy should he become president.69 Upon being elected to the White House, Bush toned down some of his earlier rhetoric, yet the substance of his message remained much the same. In March 2001, for instance, a defence review commissioned by him viewed the PRC as the main challenge to US regional and global pre-eminence.70 The PRC’s rapid economic growth throughout the 1990s had not passed unnoticed in Washington and its continuing defence modernization had raised concerns among US policy-makers.71 Furthermore, in April 2011 a collision between a US reconnaissance plane and Chinese jet off China’s south-east coast triggered a diplomatic stand-off between Washington and Beijing.72 Bush’s decision to sell US$4 million worth of arms to Taiwan did not improve the atmospherics of the relationship.73 Nor, for that matter, did the Bush administration’s plans for a national missile defence.74 Not surprisingly, the administration’s repeated references to China as a strategic competitor were not well received in Beijing and caused concerns to Jiang and his successordesignate, Hu Jintao.75 Likewise, Bush’s adoption of a more sympathetic attitude towards Taiwan than Clinton’s did not please Beijing, yet it did not lead to a worsening of Sino–US relations.76 Bush’s initial approach to China, however, was not destined to last long and changed significantly following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. With its decision to intervene militarily in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003, the Bush administration refocused its foreign policy priorities on the need to reduce the threat posed by both Islamic terrorist groups and those states suspected of supporting (or harbouring) those groups. In so doing, Washington brushed aside its earlier concerns about China’s international role and actively sought Chinese collaboration against the threat posed by international terrorism.77 To the Chinese, it was a welcome change of attitude for it allowed the PRC ‘to pursue its goals for domestic development without excessive threat from the United States’.78 Unsurprisingly, the PRC’s response was by and

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large constructive. Hot on the heels of the 9/11 attacks, Jiang informed Bush that Beijing stood ready to cooperate closely with the United States in confronting international terrorism.79 Accordingly, the PRC voted in favour of various UN resolutions authorizing the use of force against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.80 Furthermore, it indicated its willingness to commit peacekeepers to Afghanistan should the need arise, encouraged Pakistan to offer support to the United States, provided some training and equipment to the Afghan police and contributed a small amount of funds to the rebuilding effort in that country.81 Last but not least, it provided valuable intelligence to the United States.82 With its own concerns over the rise of Islamic militancy amongst its Muslim minorities in Xinjiang, Beijing had a vested interest in collaborating with the United States over international terrorism. True, Beijing did not support the United States’ invasion of Iraq in March 2003, but it was careful not to oppose US actions too openly and in the UNSC the Chinese hid behind the more vocal opposition of France, Germany (as a non-permanent member) and Russia.83 Given the PRC’s overall helpful attitude, it was hardly surprising that in September 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell was able to describe Washington’s relations with Beijing as ‘the best they have been’ since Nixon set foot in China nearly 30 years earlier.84 Unlike Clinton, who had shunned any high-level meeting with Jiang during his first term in office, Bush not only met the Chinese president four times in the 13 months that followed 9/11, but he also held talks with Jiang’s successor-designate, Vice President Hu Jintao, on three occasions between 2002 and 2003.85 More importantly, the administration toned down its earlier pro-Taiwan rhetoric and reassured Beijing that it was opposed to any unilateral move on the part of Taiwan towards independence.86 To this end, it let Taiwan’s new president Chen Shui-bian know that Washington did not favour Taiwanese independence, preferring instead to stick with the ‘One China’ principle.87 Last but not least, greater collaboration also took place between Beijing and Washington on the North Korean question in an attempt to restrain Pyongyang’s quest for nuclear weapons.88 Despite some US complaints on issues such as China’s approach to intellectual property rights, its exchange rate policy aimed at keeping the yuan undervalued against the US dollar and its lack of military transparency, relations between Washington and Beijing also remained cordial during Bush’s second term in office (2005–09).89 Washington’s attempts to improve its chequered relations with India, China’s traditional rival, by, among other things, giving New Delhi access to nuclear material for its civil nuclear programme, were not met with favour in Beijing, but did not affect the Sino–US relationship negatively.90 Washington and Beijing

US relations with the PRC after the Cold War 73 continued to collaborate closely on the North Korean issue – one in which the PRC played a significant role in both bringing the United States and North Korea to the negotiating table and in advancing international negotiations (six-party talks) on Pyongyang’s nuclear programme.91 The two powers also maintained a collaborative approach on Taiwan. Despite ongoing US arms sales to Taiwan, Washington reiterated its disagreement with President Chen’s pro-independence stance.92 However, with the replacement of Chen by Ma Ying-jeou in 2008, the administration found itself in a much easier position. Unlike his predecessor, Ma had no desire to antagonize Beijing and was happy to endorse the status quo.93 This ensured that the issue of Taiwan, while always capable of creating friction between Washington and Beijing, would, for the time being, be neutralized. In general, the two countries showed no interest in creating problems for each other and tried, instead, to downplay disagreements and broaden the areas of understanding.94 Government-to-government institutional links were strengthened.95

SINO–US RELATIONS UNDER BARACK OBAMA With the arrival of Barack Obama at the White House in January 2009, relations between the United States and China appeared set for a period of relative tranquillity. Unlike Clinton and George W. Bush, Obama had no intention of confronting China on the question of human rights and political freedoms, nor did he wish to cast it as potential adversary.96 On the contrary, the new president approached, at least initially, relations with Beijing with more optimism than his two predecessors, viewing a close Sino–US partnership as crucial to ensuring international stability.97 In his attitude, there was certainly none of the brashness displayed by the early Clinton and Bush Jr administrations. Upon taking office, therefore, the new administration conveyed its desire to engage China further and, in doing so, to improve bilateral cooperation.98 In February 2009, during a brief visit to China, Obama’s new Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made it emphatically clear that the ‘opportunities for us to work together are unmatched anywhere in the world’.99 Accordingly, Obama not only embraced the Sino–US economic dialogue initiated by his predecessor, but also beefed up existing institutional dialogues on strategic issues.100 Last but not least, he expressed Washington’s support for China’s transformation into ‘a prosperous and successful power’.101 US efforts to build upon the progress made during the Bush years were again in evidence during Obama’s visit to Beijing in November 2009: in the administration’s intentions, the visit was to signal the beginning of a new

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phase in Sino–US relations – a phase in which both Washington and Beijing would work more closely together to solve a number of complex international issues, from economic/financial instability to climate change.102 In this, the administration seemed to heed the advice of former but still influential policy-makers, such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, who had been calling for the bilateral relationship to be ‘taken to a new level’ (Kissinger) or advocating the establishment of an exclusive Sino–US G-2 club (Brzezinski).103 Alas, Obama’s visit was to prove ‘the highpoint of the Sino–US partnership’.104 Alongside its desire for enhanced bilateral cooperation, the new administration soon stressed the need for the PRC to ensure that its rise to great power status posed no threat to international peace and stability.105 Accordingly, its strategy consisted of a mix of inducements and pressures. While it centred on genuine efforts to engage China further, it also featured frequent calls on Beijing to abide by international norms and become a responsible stakeholder in international stability. Similarly, while accepting a greater Chinese role in international and regional affairs, it was also committed to ensuring that countervailing mechanisms to Beijing’s enhanced influence be in place through the strengthening of relations with the United States’ regional allies.106 Given these premises, it was not altogether surprising that Obama’s strategy was bound to create some friction with Beijing. Soon the relationship descended into a series of disagreements over climate change, trade policy, currency manipulation, Taiwan and human rights.107 Obama’s decision in 2011 to step up the US commitment to Asia-Pacific security created further tensions with Beijing.108 At the same time, Beijing’s regional assertiveness and its claims over the South China Sea and the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands raised significant doubts in US minds about Beijing’s much-trumpeted claims that China’s rise to great power status would be peaceful. Despite the significant rapproachment that had occurred during the Bush Jr administration, the two powers were evidently not yet ready for a quantum leap in their bilateral relationship.

CONCLUSIONS As this chapter has outlined, relations between the United States and the PRC in the years following the end of the Cold War have been far from plain sailing and have in fact experienced some significant turbulence, especially in the aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown. If, during the last 20 years of the Cold War, Washington and Beijing had effectively managed to set aside their differences for the sake of containing Soviet

US relations with the PRC after the Cold War 75 communism, they were no longer able to do so once the Cold War was over. By seemingly reducing their incentive to collaborate, the end of bipolarity put an end to the de facto alliance that they had so painstakingly built over the previous two decades. With the Soviet threat gone, successive US administrations struggled to formulate a clear rationale for a continuing Sino–US partnership and remained unsure on how to best engage China. As a result, Washington’s China policy appeared to fluctuate between efforts to engage the PRC more deeply and attempts to isolate it if the latter failed to conform to the rules and norms of a Western-led international system.109 Not surprisingly, the Chinese leadership too remained deeply uncertain on how to deal with the United States. Chinese perceptions of the United States oscillated between engagement and mistrust. If Beijing appreciated the importance of close Sino–US relations for regional stability and prosperity, it also remained uncomfortable with Washington’s overwhelming power and its prohuman rights advocacy. The shift and turns in US political discourse made the CCP leadership wonder whether the United States was truly interested in deepening Sino–US relations or whether, instead, it was seeking to force regime change on a recalcitrant PRC. Despite their different values and interests, the two governments managed to keep their differences within acceptable bounds and were able to weather a number of major crises. Ultimately, they both recognized that they shared a common interest in maintaining the relationship in working order and were willing to work to overcome mutual misunderstandings.110 Relations might not have been nearly as amicable as they were during the 1980s, but they were still far better than they had been during the early Cold War. That said, in the ever shifting political context in which contemporary Sino–US relations take place, room for disagreement remains substantial. In recent years, the United States’ costly interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan (and its resultant inability to bring stability to both areas), coupled with US economic weakness following the 2007–08 global financial crisis, have raised questions about US long-term pre-eminence in international affairs. At the same time, China’s spectacular economic growth and enhanced military capabilities have signalled the emergence of a new power ready to rival the United States. Much has been made of the United States’ declining political and economic ascendancy and China’s concomitant rise to great power status. While the United States is often perceived in China as a declining power determined to obstruct China’s rightful rise, the PRC tends to be seen in the United States as an assertive power intent on displacing it from Asia. Whether and to what extent these perceptions will influence policy-making in both countries is

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hard to predict. Much will depend upon whether the above trends become further entrenched and what policy-makers choose to make of them. Conflict is not inevitable, yet it cannot be completely ruled out. In fact, cooperative behaviour is likely to continue to coexist with discord and mutual mistrust. It will be up to the future leaders of both countries to make sure that reciprocal disagreements and inevitable misunderstandings will not pull them irremediably apart.

NOTES 1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

8.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

Yahuda, M. (2011), The International Politics of the Asia Pacific, 3rd edition, Hoboken, NJ: Taylor and Francis, pp. 245 and 258–9; Buckley, R. (2002), The United States in the Asia-Pacific since 1945, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 184–5. Between 1992 and 1994 Russia and the PRC resolved all the remaining territorial disputes and further reduced military deployments along the common border. Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia Pacific, 3rd edition, p. 240. Shambaugh, D. (2000), ‘Sino–American strategic relations: from partners to competitors’, Survival, 41 (2), 98. Chen, J. (2010), ‘China and the Cold War after Mao’, in M. Leffler and O.A. Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 3, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 198. Ibid. Foot, R. (2004), The Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 243. Cohen, W.I. (2013), The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Vol. 4: Challenges to American Primacy, 1945 to the Present, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 254; Kissinger, H. (2011), On China, New York: Penguin, p. 414; Herring, G.C. (2008), From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 902; Foot, The Practice of Power, p. 243. On Bush’s visit to China see Schmitz, D.F. (2011), Brent Scowcroft: Internationalism and Post-Vietnam War American Foreign Policy, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 199–200. See also Mann, J. (1999), About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China from Nixon to Clinton, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 176. Wang, D. (2013), The United States and China: A History from the Eighteenth Century to the Present, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 273. Henderson put the number of those killed at 2500. See Henderson, R.D’A. (2012), ‘China: great power rising’, in B.J.C. McKercher (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Diplomacy and Statecraft, Hoboken, NJ: Taylor and Francis, p. 67. Chen, ‘China and the Cold War after Mao’, pp. 195–8 and 199–200. R.G. Sutter and K. Dumbaugh cited in Jiang, Y. (2012), ‘The relations between China and the US’, in E. Kavalski (ed.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Chinese Foreign Policy, Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, p. 203. Digital National Security Archive (DNSA), ‘Statement by the President, June 5, 1989 in James Baker III to James Lilley, cable 177497’, 6 June 1989. Ibid. Also see Mann, About Face, p. 205. At the Paris G-7 summit of the world’s leading economies in mid-July, the United States and its closest Western allies

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15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

agreed to a temporary freeze on World Bank loans to China. See Tolchin, M. (1989), ‘House, breaking with Bush, votes China sanctions’, New York Times, 30 June, accessed 21 March 2016 at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/30/world/housebreaking-with-bush-votes-china-sanctions.html. Cohen, The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, p. 254; Herring, From Colony to Superpower, p. 902. Brent Scowcroft cited in Westad, O.A. (2013), Restless Empire: China and the World since 1750, London: Vintage, p. 382. Kissinger, H. (2011), On China, p. 415; Foot, The Practice of Power, p. 245. Foot, The Practice of Power, p. 245. Ross, R.S. (2001), ‘The Bush administration: the origins of engagement’, in R.H. Myers, M.C. Oksemberg and D. Shambaugh (eds), Making China Policy: Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administrations, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 26. Jiang, ‘The relations between China and the US’, p. 204. Foot, The Practice of Power, p. 247. Herring, From Colony to Superpower, p. 103. Ross, ‘The Bush administration’, p. 26. Yahuda, M. (2004), The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 2nd edition, London: Routledge Curzon, p. 290. Sutter, R.G. (2013), Foreign Relations of the PRC: The Legacies and Constraints of China’s International Politics since 1945, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 110. Westad, Restless Empire, p. 383; Kissinger, On China, pp. 440–41. Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 2nd edition, pp. 285–6. Kissinger, On China, pp. 440–46. Jiang, ‘The relations between China and the US’, p. 203. Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 2nd edition, p. 290; Ross, ‘The Bush administration’, p. 28. Deng Xiaoping cited in Wang, The United States and China, pp. 277–8. Ross, ‘The Bush administration’, p. 27. Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 2nd edition, p. 249. Foot, The Practice of Power, p. 246. Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 2nd edition, pp. 249 and 288. Herring, From Colony to Superpower, p. 903. Foot, The Practice of Power, p. 248. For Bush’s New World Order see Nye, J.S. Jr (1992), ‘What New World Order?’, Foreign Affairs, 71 (2), 83–4. Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 2nd edition, p. 249. Ross, ‘The Bush administration’, pp. 25–9. Ibid. On Chinese criticism see Foot, The Practice of Power, pp. 249–50. Ross, ‘The Bush administration’, pp. 34–9. Shambaugh, ‘Sino–American strategic relations’, pp. 112–13. Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia Pacific, 3rd edition, p. 244. Kissinger, On China, p. 462; Roy, D. (1998), ‘Current Sino–U.S. relations in strategic perspective’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 20 (3), 229 and 234. Bernkopf Tucker, N. (2001), ‘The Clinton years: the problem of coherence’, in Myers et al., Making China Policy: Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administrations, p. 45. Bernkopf Tucker, passim. Wang, The United States and China, p. 281. Mann, About Face, p. 263. Ibid., pp. 261–2.

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51. 52.

Ibid., pp. 262 and 275. Bernkopf Tucker, ‘The Clinton years’, p. 49; Mann, About Face, pp. 294–5; Jiang, ‘The relations between China and the US’, p. 204. Bernkopf Tucker, ‘The Clinton years’, pp. 53–4. Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 2nd edition, p. 256. Bernkopf Tucker, ‘The Clinton years’, p. 54. For Clinton’s economic agenda see Herring, From Colony to Superpower, p. 926. Westad, Restless Empire, pp. 390–92. Shambaugh, ‘Sino–American strategic relations’, p. 98. Shambaugh, D. (1998), ‘The United States and China: cooperation or confrontation?’, Current History, 96 (611), 242. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 242–3. Shambaugh, ‘Sino–American strategic relations’, p. 98. Ibid., pp. 97, 98. Buckley, The United States in the Asia-Pacific since 1945, p. 201. Ibid. Shambaugh, D. (2000), ‘Sino–American strategic relations’, p. 98 [original emphasis]. Roy, D. (1998), ‘Current Sino–U.S. relations in strategic perspective’, pp. 226 and 238. On US military presence in the Asia-Pacific see Buckley, The United States in the Asia-Pacific since 1945, p. 221. Sutter, R.G. (2013), US–Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 98–9. Westad, Restless Empire, p. 400. Shambaugh, ‘Sino–American strategic relations’, p. 98. The Economist (2001), ‘America’s China syndrome’, 11 April, accessed 21 March 2016 at http://www.economist.com/node/53310. On China’s economic development and defence modernization see, for instance, Jacques, M. (2009), When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World, London: Allen Lane, pp. 151–62 and 354–5. Lampton, D.M. (2003), ‘The stealth normalization of U.S.–China relations’, The National Interest, No. 73, 39. Wang, C. (2013), The United States and China Since World War II: A Brief History, London: M.E. Sharpe, p. 171. Ibid., p. 172. Westad, Restless Empire, p. 400. Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia Pacific, 3rd edition, pp. 244–5. Ibid., p. 241. Lampton, ‘The stealth normalization of U.S.–China relations’, p. 39. Westad, Restless Empire, p. 401. Bates, G. (2007), Rising Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, p. 119; Westad, Restless Empire, p. 401. Lampton, ‘The stealth normalization of U.S.–China relations’, p. 39; Bates, Rising Star, pp. 119–20. Lampton, ‘The stealth normalization of U.S.–China relations’, p. 39. Westad, Restless Empire, p. 401. Colin Powell cited in Westad, Restless Empire, p. 401. Lampton, ‘The stealth normalization of U.S.–China relations’, p. 40. Hu Jintao would take over from Jiang in March 2003. Ibid. Wang, The United States and China, pp. 293–4.

53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87.

US relations with the PRC after the Cold War 79 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99.

100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110.

Lampton, ‘The stealth normalization of U.S.–China relations’, p. 40; Wang, The United States and China Since World War II, pp. 178–80. Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia Pacific, 3rd edition, p. 254. Ibid., p. 259. Ibid., p. 258. Wang, The United States and China, p. 292. Wang, The United States and China Since World War II, pp. 193–4. Sutter, US–Chinese relations, pp. 156–7. Wang, The United States and China, p. 294. Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia Pacific, 3rd edition, p. 260. Jiang, ‘The relations between China and the US’, pp. 184 and 186; Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia Pacific, 3rd edition, p. 259. Wang (2013), The United States and China Since World War II, pp. 198–9. Hillary Clinton cited in E. Economy and A. Segal (2009), ‘The G-2 mirage: why the United States and China are not ready to upgrade ties’, Foreign Affairs, May/June, accessed 18 March 2016 at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ 64996/elizabeth-c-economy-and-adam-segal/the-g-2-mirage?nocache=1. Wang (2013), The United States and China Since World War II, pp. 198–9. Jiang, ‘The relations between China and the US’, p. 184. Economy and Segal, ‘The G-2 mirage’. Ibid. Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia Pacific, 3rd edition, p. 260. Jiang, ‘The relations between China and the US’, pp. 183–4. Wang, The United States and China Since World War II, pp. 198–9; Bader, J. (2012), Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy, Washington, DC: Brooking Institution Press, p. 3. Jiang, ‘The relations between China and the US’, p. 207. Wang, The United States and China, p. 273. Foot, The Practice of Power, pp. 225–7. Wang, The United States and China, p. 200.

5. US perspectives on China: trends and attitudes in US public opinion, media, scholarship and leadership statements Jeffrey Reeves

INTRODUCTION There is no more basic starting point in thinking about bilateral relations between two states than the issue of perception. How one state’s people think of another state, or another state’s people, can shape every aspect of state-to-state relations from political and economic engagement to military exchange and/or lack thereof. There are, however, few concepts in social science more elusive than that of perception, particularly within a large, heterogeneous population. Even the most robust methodology can do little more than collect vague generalities about how a small percentage of people within a larger society think at a certain fixed moment in time. Measuring perception, in this respect, is much like trying to trace the topography of a sand dune. It is an attempt to try to apply structure where only fluidity exists. Yet my aim in this chapter is to do just this: to write an account of the United States’ perspective toward China. For if one is to make an effort to understand US–China relations in their comprehensive form, one must attempt an account of how the people in the United States – across a range of different groups – think about China, across a range of different sectors. In so doing, one can provide a foundation of thought for all other bilateral interactions. People, after all, are the agents driving bilateral relations through diplomacy and trade. Behind every exchange there is intent; perception is the key to understanding such intent.

METHODOLOGY AND FOCUS GROUP To determine dominant US perspectives toward China, I examine relevant public opinion polls and surveys, conduct a review of media reporting on China within the United States’ most influential media sources, examine academic writing from the United States’ most prominent Sinologists, 80

US perspectives on China 81 and research key speeches on China by top US leadership. Through these sources, which collectively constitute the dominant narrative within the United States on China, I determine major trends in US perspectives toward China on politics, economics and military issues. I limit my query to 2014–15 to ensure a manageable time frame for analysis. This sample of time is relevant as contemporary perceptions have the greatest potential to influence current US–China relations. I draw on established research methodology for measuring US perspectives toward China. I examine public opinion polls and surveys, for example, as social scientists largely agree they provide qualitative insight based on quantitative data to the study of perception. Opinion polls and surveys are especially valuable in determining perception in democratic states where individuals are theoretically freer to express their opinion without fear of state retribution or censure.1 Polls and surveys are also valuable data sets for determining linkage between social perception and national policy as they can provide law-makers with rationale and justification for legislation.2 Similarly, I use media content analysis as it is an effective means of determining and measuring social perception.3 Media content analysis is a well-established research method that aims at extracting key messages from news sources through the targeted use of key words and search terms.4 I employ media content analysis as a qualitative means of examining US perspectives toward China, focusing on narratology (storytelling) in particular.5 In line with Miles et al., I use content analysis to identify representative, disconfirming and discrepant examples of US media treatments of China.6 To limit my sample size, I examine only the five most influential US national media outlets as identified in a 2012 media survey study published by Forbes Magazine. This includes The New York Times, Washington Free Beacon (Fox News), USA Today, The Wall Street Journal, and The Washington Post.7 I pay particular attention to blogs dedicated to China within these sources, such as The New York Times’ ‘Sinosphere’ and The Wall Street Journal’s ‘China Real Time’. I review only print media, as it is outside this chapter’s scope to review television media on China, even where doing so would provide greater insight into trends and developments within US perceptions on China. I also look at US public intellectuals’ writing on China as ‘thought leaders’ have the ability to shape public perceptions on certain topics.8 To access academic perceptions on China’s political system, I look at scholars including, but not limited to, David Lampton, David Shambaugh and Susan Shirk.9 With regard to academic work on China’s economic system, I review work by well-established US scholars such as Michael Pettis, Anne Steveson-Yang and Nicholas Lardy, among others. On

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China’s military, I look at work by top security scholars including Peter Dutton, M. Taylor Fravel, James Holmes and Michael Swaine. Where applicable, I identify major debates and conflicting viewpoints within US scholarship on China. Last, I review US top leaders’ speeches for reference to China under the assumption that the country’s political elite both influence wider social perceptions and represent existing opinion toward China.10 On the civilian side, I examine speeches by individuals in the executive and legislation braches. I limit my review to senior civilian leaders and to those individuals whose work focuses on China as their positions provide them with unmatched access to national platforms, which increases their influence on public opinion. On the military side, I look at speeches by senior commanders in US Pacific Command (PACOM) such as Admiral Samuel Locklear and Admiral Harry Harris, speeches by General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for 2014–15, and statements by Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter. These four key military leaders’ speeches provide insight into strategic-level military perspectives within the Asian region and from the Pentagon. For more operational-level perspectives, I look at writings and speeches by senior officers with direct responsibility for work on China, such as the former Director of Intelligence and Information Operations at US Pacific Fleet, Captain James Fanell. There are, of course, inherent deficiencies in my methodological approach that are necessary to acknowledge upfront. First, my approach is largely qualitative, with the exception of public opinion data from external sources, which means that my analysis rests on observational rather than quantitative data. Understanding this deficit in approach, I believe there is still value in a qualitative assessment of US perceptions on China, particularly as many of my sources are too disparate to code properly. Second, many of the choices I made regarding sourcing are largely arbitrary despite my best efforts to provide criteria for all the sites and individuals I examine. My decision to choose the top five most influential media sources as opposed to, say, the top ten, is ultimately a decision I made for convenience rather than comprehension’s sake. I have, however, taken care to include a meaningful and diverse sample size where possible, which I hope mitigates the arbitrariness of selection and provides some analytical value. Third, my approach seeks to provide a degree of finality to a constantly developing and adapting phenomenon. US national perception toward China is not a fixed constant. It is, rather, constantly in motion with the state of US–China affairs and with domestic conditions that shape national dialogue on China.

US perspectives on China 83 Fourth, and most important to address, I make the claim that one can view a common perception (or perceptions) within the United States toward China. The issue with this claim is, of course, that the United States is an inherently complex and diverse country with disparate opinion across ethnic, education and geographic lines. There is no single US perceptive on China, any more than one could find a single US perspective on any subject matter with complex and often contradictory components. Neither is China a hugely discussed topic within US households as opposed to domestic issues or more familiar foreign issues, such as terrorism and instability in the Middle East. The average American knows little about China, to the extent that he or she would have difficulty identifying a single member of China’s current leadership. Proceeding with the clear understanding of my approach’s shortcomings, I offer a survey of US perceptions from across a range of different actors that provides a panoply of views as notable for what they exclude as what they include. I do not claim to offer a definitive account of US perceptions toward China in this limited chapter but rather to highlight trends, even when trends conflict or contradict one another. I organize the remaining chapter along thematic lines, paying particular attention to perceptions on China’s political, economic and military developments. This approach’s value is not a definitive answer to what Americans think about China but rather what kind of thinking about China is ongoing within contemporary United States.

POLITICS US opinion polls on China show a general distaste among the American public toward the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and China’s political system. A 2014 Gallop poll on US perception of Chinese leadership, for example, noted that 70 percent of US public respondents expressed disapproval of the CCP and Chinese leadership.11 A separate 2014 Gallop poll on US perceptions of China also recorded that a majority (53 percent) of Americans have negative feelings about China in general, with respondents noting political repression as the key driver of their negative opinion.12 These findings are in line with a 2014 Pew Research Center report on China’s image, which reported 78 percent of respondents believed the Chinese government curtails personal freedom, suppresses political dissent and marginalizes the state’s ethnic minorities.13 One can view a similar negative perception toward China’s political system in US media writing on the CCP and Chinese governance.

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Reporting on China’s political system in The New York Times, Washington Free Beacon (Fox News), USA Today, The Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal during 2014–15 largely focused on the CCP’s shortcomings or issues related to poor governance such as the CCP’s control over Chinese media, its regulation of the Internet, its crackdown on political dissent, its allowance of environmentally damaging activities, and its steady opposition to religion. The New York Times, for instance, wrote extensively on corruption within the CCP and the Xi administration’s anti-corruption campaign, focusing on both the campaign’s outcomes and the political motivations behind the campaign.14 The Wall Street Journal ran a number of stories on the stability and/or fragility of the CCP under Xi Jinping, many of which questioned Chinese leadership’s ability to stay in power in the face of growing economic inequality, an economic slowdown in the country and the country’s corruption campaign.15 The Washington Post wrote extensively on the CCP’s oppression of China’s ethnic minorities and its move to control Chinese and Western media reporting on China.16 Such negative reporting was widespread across all five media source reviewed. Much writing from US academics on China’s political system during 2014–15 was also negative, even from those academics who refrained from criticizing the CCP in the past. George Washington University’s David Shambaugh, David Lampton of Johns Hopkins University and Susan Shirk of UC San Diego – three top US scholars writing on China’s political system – all expressed unprecedented concern about the CCP’s stability and legitimacy in 2014–15. In 2015, for instance, Shambaugh created a great deal of controversy (and concern) in the US China studies field when he wrote an opinion piece in The Wall Street Journal where he expressed deep reservations over the CCP’s effectiveness and China’s political stability. Shambaugh – known in the United States for his earlier writing on the CCP’s resiliency – claimed that the CCP faces unprecedented pressure stemming from elite flight, political repression, corruption and an economic slowdown, and questioned the Xi administration’s ability to address these problems.17 Lampton expressed similar concern over the CCP’s ability to cope with changes taking place within China to the country’s social, economic and political fields in his 2014 book Following the Leaders: Ruling China, From Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping.18 More sanguine about the CCP’s future prospects than Shambaugh, Lampton’s interpretation of party stability was nevertheless uncharacteristically pessimistic. Shirk expressed similar reservations over the CCP’s stability in a 2015 radio interview with a Boston station.19 She noted in particular the CCP’s ongoing corruption campaign as a source of internal instability for the party.

US perspectives on China 85 One can observe a similar critical perception toward China’s political system in statements from US leadership, with the exception of President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry who are diplomatic and circumscribed in their comments on governance in China. Review of President Obama’s and Secretary Kerry’s rhetoric on China over 2014–15, for instance, reveals tendencies by both men to avoid direct comment on China’s politics with the exception of recognizing the CCP’s (and Chinese people’s) contribution to China’s development over the past several decades.20 Rhetoric toward China outside the executive office, however, is markedly more direct and critical. House Speaker John Boehner and Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, for example, publically called the CCP ‘one of the most egregious offenders of human rights in the world’ at a 2014 event marking the 25th anniversary of the Tiananmen incident.21 In 2014, Senator Sherrod Brown, former Chairman of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC), noted that China’s political system under President Xi has become more repressive and less tolerant.22 Congressman Chris Smith, active Chairman of the CECC, also criticized the CCP’s treatment of Chinese ethnic minorities in the PRC in the 2014 CECC annual report – arguably the most critical document on China’s government published by any branch of the US government. Republic presidential candidate Marco Rubio, co-chairman of the CECC and ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, called the CCP ‘oppressive’ in light of what he called ‘interference’ in Hong Kong’s internal political affairs.23 Opposition to China’s political ‘repression’ toward Hong Kong became a bipartisan issue in US congress in 2014, with 21 US senators signing an open letter to President Obama calling for a robust US response to the CCP’s ‘interference’ in Hong Kong’s democratic process.24 US military sources are more reticent about China’s political system, choosing instead to focus on the military dimension of China’s development and US–China relations (on which more is written below). Active duty military leaders do not, for instance, engage in detailed critique of China’s system of government in open source speeches and/or statements. US civilian military leaders such as Senators John McCain and Jack Reed, chairman and ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee respectively, however, are vocal in criticizing China’s leadership, particularly in relation to China’s foreign policy. In 2015, for instance, McCain and Reed called on Defense Secretary Carter to suspend China’s involvement in the 2016 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercises in Honolulu, Hawaii, in light of the CCP’s ‘aggressive’ activities in the South China Sea and its use of coercion toward US allies

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and partners in the Asia-Pacific.25 Senator Bob Corker, chairman of the US Senate on Foreign Relations, and Senator Bob Menendez, ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, joined McCain and Reed in 2015 to call on Secretaries Kerry and Carter to develop a more comprehensive maritime strategy for dealing with the CCP’s growing ‘assertiveness’ on the international stage.26 This short review of meta-narratives shows a clear distaste for China’s political system and the CCP across the US public, media and political/ military leadership and a sense of concern over the CCP’s stability and ability to govern among US scholars. One observes repeated critique over the CCP’s ‘oppression’ of political dissent, ethnic groups’ rights and religious freedom within US rhetoric surrounding China’s political system and growing pessimism within media and academic circles over the party’s ability to adapt to a fluid, changing domestic environment. Moreover, writing on the CCP’s shortcomings within US media often carries an undertone of schadenfreude that gives the impression the United States is engaged in a zero-sum competition for political influence with the People’s Republic of China. Absent from the writings of more experienced ‘China hands’, one can view this subtext as both a product of and contributor to overall negative US perspectives toward the CCP and China’s political system.

ECONOMICS Since 2011, opinion polls have shown a steady increase in US public concern over China’s economy. A 2011 Gallup–China Daily USA poll, for instance, showed that 48 percent of US adult responders identified China’s economic growth as a ‘bad thing’.27 More specifically, US respondents registered concern over trade imbalances between the United States and China, the perceived poor quality of Chinese goods, and the effect China’s economic growth has on US employment. A 2012 Pew opinion poll also showed that 78 percent of Americans were concerned about the amount of US debt China held and 72 percent were concerned about the United States losing jobs to China.28 In 2014, 42 percent of Americans identified China’s economic development as a negative occurrence for the United States in a Pew poll.29 Perhaps most telling of US perceptions toward China’s economic development was the outcome of a 2014 Gallup poll on world affairs where 52 percent of respondents identified China’s economy as a ‘critical threat’ to the United States’ national security, 6 percent more than those who identified China’s military as a threat to US interests.30 Fifty-two percent of respondents

US perspectives on China 87 also identified China as the world’s pre-eminent economic power in the same poll (31 percent identified the United States).31 There is a clear indication that the majority of US participants polled believe China is the largest economy in the world and that its economic size is a threat to the United States. Review of US media reporting on China’s economy during 2014–15, however, shows a different picture as sources focused on the system’s weakness, not its strengths. The New York Times, for example, paid a great deal of attention to the slowdown of China’s quarterly gross domestic product (GDP) growth and the large growth in Chinese domestic debt at the local government level.32 The Wall Street Journal carried multiple stories on the limitations of China’s economic growth model and the need for China’s leadership to institute and carry out fundamental economic reform.33 The Washington Post similarly reported on vulnerabilities in China’s housing and stock markets.34 Overall economic reporting on China for 2014–15 was largely bearish, with most reporters seeing further difficulty in readjustment in the years to come. Outside the daily reporting on China’s economy across 2014–15, US media sources carried a number of stories on China’s economic initiatives, such as its development of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and its establishment of a ‘One Belt, One Road’ economic grand strategy. Reporting on these topics differed widely, with some prominent US analysts and scholars presenting China’s initiatives as a threat to the United States’ regional standing and others arguing that the United States should embrace China’s initiatives as a means of expanding its own influence.35 Writing focused primarily on the economic side of the AIIB and ‘One Belt, One Road’ however, was far more measured in its treatment of China’s intentions than writing that equated China’s economic intentions with its security goals. Most economic reporting on China’s institutional development was largely positive, with authors understanding the need in Asia for additional development aid and foreign direct investment.36 Writing on China’s economy predictably becomes more nuanced in academics’ and economists’ work. Viewpoints among better-informed writers do, however, remain widely divergent. For the sake of simplicity, one can divide academic and professional writing on China’s economy into the traditional ‘bear/bull’ categories meant to convey weakness or strength within an economic system. Among analysts with a bearish take on China’s economy, US economists Anne Stevenson-Yang, Michael Pettis and Patrick Chovanec stand out for their data-driven analysis and in-country experience. Over 2014–15, these three analysts pointed to dangers within China’s economy coming from the country’s housing

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bubble, localized debt, internal distortions and excess credit within China’s domestic market.37 Cynical about China’s ability (or intent) to institute meaningful economic reform, all three writers predict scenarios ranging from slowdowns to potential government default.38 On the bullish side, three of the most prominent US writers on China’s economy are Arthur R. Kroeber, Barry Naughton and Nicholas Lardy. For all three men, their bullishness comes from confidence in the CCP under Xi Jinping to identify and implement reforms to the country’s economy. Kroeber has argued, for instance, that the Xi administration has been far more proactive in implementing economic reform than most economic analysts realize.39 Naughton has also identified a ‘Xi model’ of economic reform aimed at addressing the country’s most serious economic challenges, such as consolidation of local government finances.40 Lardy’s 2014 book Markets Over Mao, perhaps more than any other sustained analysis on China’s economy, challenged bearish interpretations of China’s economy by claiming the country is far more of a market economy (with a market economy’s self-correcting mechanisms) than commonly viewed.41 The bifurcation in treatment of China’s economy is also evident in US government statements and speeches during 2014–15. President Obama regularly identified US–Chinese economic alignment as the source of the two states’ bilateral relations and the primary means through which China engages the Asian region – and wider world – as a ‘responsible stakeholder’. In a 2014 statement following a meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, President Obama, for example, highlighted the two states’ economic interdependency as the cornerstone of their broader exchanges on matters related to climate change and security, among other areas.42 At the 2014 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Beijing, President Obama rejected the idea of economic zero-sum gain, arguing that the United States’ and China’s economies could both grow to each state’s benefit.43 Secretary of State Kerry was equally sanguine on China’s economy, noting in a 2014 speech that economic cooperation between the United States and China has ‘vast potential’ to enrich both states.44 Kerry also stated in 2014 that China’s economic success is profoundly in the United States’ best interest.45 Secretary of the Treasury Jack Lew is also largely positive about China’s economic development. In 2015, for instance, Lew expressed his confidence that China would adopt international economic norms and institutions as it continued to develop.46 Beyond these high-level, diplomatic statements about China’s economy, US political elite are largely critical of China’s economic management. Senators Sherrod Brown and Jeff Sessions, for instance,

US perspectives on China 89 noted in 2014 that China’s currency manipulation has weakened the United States’ economic recovery, undermined the competitiveness of US exports, and contributed to unemployment in the United States.47 Congressman Sander Levin, the ranking member of the US House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee, also called China’s manipulation of its currency (the renminbi) the single most important contributor to the United States’ financial crisis.48 Calls from US Congress for President Obama to become ‘tougher’ on China’s currency manipulation are widespread, and bipartisan, and have even led to legislation proposals such as the Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act. US political elite are also highly critical of China’s perceived failure to adhere to World Trade Organization (WTO) regulations. In 2015, for example, US Trade Representative Michael Froman openly criticized China’s export subsidy program, its failure (or unwillingness) to protect intellectual property rights, and its engagement in commercial espionage, all with respect to its obligations under the WTO.49 Congressional statements from both the US House and Senate mirror Froman’s concerns and charge China with unfair practices in global trade.50 Discussion on China’s economy within US military circles during 2014–15 focused on China’s military spending and China’s use of economic tools as a form of coercion in the South China Sea. General Martin Dempsey, for example, raised concerns over China’s increased military spending in a 2014 speech in Honolulu, Hawaii.51 In 2015, Secretary of Defense Carter identified China’s military spending as a key challenge to US strategy in the Asia-Pacific, but one, he noted, that the United States could manage through dialogue with China.52 During Congressional testimony in 2015, Admiral Samuel Locklear, former Commander, US Pacific Command, raised the issue of China’s use of trade with the Philippines as a tool for coercion as a worrying sign of China’s intentions in the South China Sea.53 Former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel also raised concern over China’s use of economic statecraft in the South China Sea in his 2014 speech at the Singapore-based IISS Shangri-La Dialogue.54

MILITARY The 12-plus months between early 2014 and the middle of 2015 have been a pivotal time for US–China security relations. One can observe a marked increase in negative perceptions toward China’s military posturing across US public opinion polls, US media reports, within US

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scholarship on China, and in US political and military leaders’ statements and speeches. The percentage of Americans who view China’s military as a security threat to the United States, for instance, has increased from 39 percent in 2004 to 46 percent in 2014.55 Over the same period, the number of Americans who viewed China as an adversary (however defined) rose from 14 to 22 percent.56 Still a relatively low percentage, to be certain, one can view increased anxiety over China’s military modernization and use of its military in responses to more targeted questions. A 2014 Pew poll registered 67 percent of US respondents as being very concerned that China’s territorial expansion would lead to war.57 A 2014 Gallup poll showed that 20 percent of Americans view China as their country’s greatest enemy, more than any other state.58 The same poll showed that 46 percent of Americans viewed China’s military power as a critical threat to US national security. One can equally observe in US media coverage of China a growing concern over China’s military development and its use of its military to support its controversial territorial claims. All five media sources examined for this review carried stories on a daily basis about China’s military developments and the challenges they pose for the Obama administration. The main topics of exposé were China’s increased military spending, maritime security (with regard to China’s activities in the East and South China Seas), China’s military modernization – particularly with regard to its missile technology – and US military strategy toward China. Fox News, in particular, tended toward alarmism, with Bill Gertz (well-known China ‘hawk’ and author of a book titled The China Threat) serving as the channel’s newspaper Washington Free Beacon’s principal correspondent covering China’s military development.59 US scholarship on China’s military development closely mirrors media reporting on the topic. Over 2014–15, for example, there was a flood of academic writing on China’s military strategy and its military modernization. These themes were prominent in work by M. Taylor Fravel, Chris Twomey and James Holmes, who wrote that China’s military is prioritizing ‘offshore active defense’, that China is introducing more sophisticated military platforms into the Asian region, and that China’s military strategy complicates the US military’s ability to operate in the Asian theater.60 Scholarship on China and maritime security also expanded rapidly during 2014–15, as evidenced in work by Ryan Martinson and Peter Dutton from the US Naval War College.61 Such work addressed China’s shift in strategic priorities from land to sea defense, its rapid development of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), its focus on area-denial in its near seas, and its use of naval power to affect the status quo around maritime disputes with states like Japan and the Philippines.

US perspectives on China 91 Within academic writing on China’s military development there has been a robust, contentious debate about whether and how the United States should respond to China’s military development. Participants in this debate are divided between those who argue the US policy of engagement with China remains the best path forward and those who believe the engagement policy has contributed to China’s development and, consequently, to the United States’ diminishing ability to control China’s activities. The nature of the debate is clear in a pair of articles published in 2015 in Foreign Affairs by Andrew Krepinevich and Michael Swaine. Krepinevich argued the United States must take a more proactive approach to dealing with China, through a military doctrine called ‘Archipelagic Defense’.62 For Krepinevich, this approach entails concerted efforts from the US military and US allies to deter China through assertive posturing and a forward deployment of US military assets. Conversely, Swaine argued that any move by the United States to deter, or contain China would exacerbate existing tensions between the two states while simultaneously providing China with additional incentive to further develop its military capacity.63 There is general accord between US political and military leaders that China’s military development, particularly the lack of transparency around its intentions, is a challenge for the United States’ position in Asia. During a joint statement with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2015, for instance, President Obama expressed concern over China’s military activity in the East and South China Sea, particularly with regard to contested territorial issues.64 In 2014, Secretary Kerry noted that the Obama administration is against China’s use of its military to challenge Asia’s maritime status quo and to engage in cyberespionage.65 Concern over China’s military development is even clearer among Congressional statements, particularly from those with foreign policy and military experience like Senator John McCain, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. In 2015, Senator McCain identified China’s military activity as a threat to international order and stability, called on the US Department of Defense (DoD) to suspend its invitation to the PLAN to participate in the 2016 Rim of the Pacific military exercise in Hawaii, and announced his intention to introduce legislation that would allow the United States to sell weapons to Asian states that face challenges from China’s military such as Vietnam and the Philippines.66 Senator McCain is among the most vocal critics of China’s military development and US strategy toward China. His perspective on foreign affairs – including China – is, however, extremely influential among Republicans and Democrats as well as the US public.

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As one might expect, the most vocal community to talk about China’s military development is the US DoD. In a 2015 statement to the Defense Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, General Dempsey identified China’s military development – both operationally and strategically – as one of two ‘heavyweight’ challenges the United States faces (Russia being the second) in terms of its international security posture.67 Dempsey noted that the US DoD actively considers all secondary effects to China’s military development, such as its challenge to the international order and regional security in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Admiral Locklear, former Commander of US PACOM, noted that while the US DoD maintains extensive communication channels with the PLA and PLAN, China’s claims and its actions with regard to military development are at odds. In 2015 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral Locklear stated that China’s use of its military to support its territorial claims in the East and South China Seas undermines Beijing’s claims to peaceful development.68 Less circumspect, Admiral Harris, active Commander of US PACOM, during a 2015 speech to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in Canberra, accused China and the Chinese military of contributing to instability in the Asian region through its construction of a ‘great wall of sand’ in the South China Sea.69 At the 2015 Shangri-La Dialogue, Secretary of Defense Carter called for China to cease its land reclamation activities in the South China Sea, noting that China’s activities were leading to a general uptick in tensions between claimant states.70 These high-level statements provide important insight into perspectives within the US military toward China but are, in many ways, tempered with diplomatic niceties. One can view greater concern over China’s military development in lower-ranking military officers’ statements. In this respect, statements by Captain James Fanell, the Director of Intelligence and Information Operations at US Pacific Fleet, are important sources to examine. Captain Fanell openly stated the PLAN was preparing for a ‘short, sharp war’ with Japan and that it’s activities in the South China Sea were an attempt to gain control over territory within its ‘so-called nine-dash line’. Captain Fanell claimed that the PLA and PLAN were involved in expansions in support of the Xi administration’s ‘China Dream’ concept and were focused on ‘war at sea, and sinking an opposing fleet’.71 While senior military leadership was quick to distance themselves from Fanell’s remarks, his comments drew massive support within armed forces and defense media sites.72

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CONCLUSION This chapter’s review of US polling data, media reporting, academic writing and leadership statements reveals three important trends that contribute to the discussion of US perspectives toward China. First, there is concern within the US public, media, academic and leadership over the nature of China’s political system and its overall development. There is, for example, a clear indication that many in the US public, media and leadership view China’s political system as repressive and the CCP as oppressive on matters of human rights, ethnic representation and religious freedom. Such critique is perhaps understandable in line with what many pundits label the US ‘values’ of democracy and individual freedom. One can also view concern for China’s economic development within US public opinion and media reporting, to the degree that they identify China’s economic development as a threat to US national security in both the domestic and foreign arenas. Domestically, concerns are tied to issues such as stagnation of wages, the economic decline of the US middle class, and unemployment. With regard to foreign policy, concern is linked to a decrease in US influence within international financial institutions corresponding to China’s rise. There is also widespread agreement among the US public, media, scholars, government and military officials on the challenges China’s military development poses for the United States. One can view these concerns as encompassing three key issues: military modernization, China’s strategic intent, and US responses to China’s military development. Second, there is a clear interplay between the survey groups examined that contributes to an interdependent strategic narrative on China that is largely negative. US media, for instance, report on the negative aspects of China’s political and economic system that US respondents have identified as meaningful in public opinion polls. Selective reporting, in turn, reinforces and exacerbates existing public opinion.73 Political leaders, similarly, focus their vitriol on China where its systems or actions conflict with US domestic values and interests. US military leadership set the state’s security agenda in line with perceived interests, many of which are the result of US beliefs and national identity. The result of such leadership is the construction of a narrative of threat, of an ‘us’ against ‘them’ dichotomy defined by antagonism.74 Third, there are clear signs that rhetoric in the United States surrounding China is becoming more hostile, even over the relatively short period between 2014 and 2015. This deterioration in perspective is best captured in David Lampton’s 2015 article, ‘A tipping point in U.S.–China relations

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is upon us’, where he argued that the narrowing gap between US and Chinese national power (defined in terms of political, economic and military development) has led to an increase in ‘security anxiety’ in the United States.75 Such anxiety, in particular, is evident in writing and statements on China’s military development, or what the US public, media, academia and leadership increasingly refer to as Chinese ‘aggression’. Taken together, these three indicators suggest that US perception of China – in a very general sense – is largely negative. The implications for US–China relations could not be more profound. History is full of examples where antagonism between states and peoples led to conflict where conflict could otherwise be avoided. As such, both the United States and China should take steps to positively influence US perceptions toward China. US leadership, for example, should make every effort to speak to the American people about the positive aspects of China’s political, economic and even military development, as there are many. Chinese leadership should work to increase transparency around its actions and intentions – steps it must take to develop strategic trust with the United States (as Washington must do toward Beijing). Short of these efforts, it is likely that US perspectives toward China will continue to worsen.

NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Walden, G. (2014), Public Opinion Polls and Survey Research: A Selective Annotated Bibliography of U.S. Guides & Studies from the 1980s, London: Routledge, p. 9. Manza, J., F.L. Cook and B. Page (2002), Navigating Public Opinion: Polls, Policy, and the Future of American Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 33. Gunter, B. (2000), Media Research Methods: Measuring Audiences, Reactions and Impact, Los Angeles, CA: SAGE, p. 1. Berger, A.A. (2013), Media and Communication Research Methods: An Introduction to Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, Los Angeles, CA: SAGE, p. 232. Newbold, C., O. Boyd-Barrett and H. van den Bulck (2002), The Media Book, London: Arnold, p. 84. Miles, M.B., A. Huberman and J. Saldana (2013), Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods Sourcebook, Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications, p. 34. Bruner, J. (2012), ‘The media map: who’s reading what and where’, Forbes, 8 June, accessed 3 June 2015 at http://www.forbes.com/special-report/2012/media-map.html. Posner, R. (2009), Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline, With a New Preface and Epilogue, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 157. These three scholars were identified as three of the top US Sinologists by China’s Foreign Affairs University. The report can be found at: China Foreign Affairs University (2014), Report Evaluating US Scholars Working on China [meiguo he Hua pai pinggu baogao], Beijing: China Foreign Affairs University, p. 11.

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McCain, J. (2015), ‘Remarks by SASC Chairman John McCain on top defense priorities for 114th Congress at Center for Strategic and International Studies’, John McCain, 26 March, accessed 5 June 2015 at http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/ index.cfm/2015/3/remarks-by-sasc-Chairman-john-mccain-on-top-defense-prioritiesfor-114th-congress-at-center-for-strategic-international-studies; Baldor, L. (2015), ‘McCain: US should allow sale of defensive weapons to Vietnam’, Stars and Stripes, 30 March, accessed 4 June 2015 at http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/mccain-usshould-allow-sale-of-defensive-weapons-to-vietnam-1.349744?utm_source=twitterfeed &utm_medium=twitter. Dempsey, M. (2014), ‘Posture statement of General Martin Dempsey, USA 18th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the 114th Congress Senate Appropriations Committee Defense Subcommittee FY16 Department of Defense Budget’, Senate Appropriations Committee, 6 May, accessed 20 March 2016 at http://www. armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dempsey_03-03-15.pdf. McCain, J. (2015), ‘Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on the U.S. Pacific Command & US Forces Korea’, US Pacific Command, 17 April, accessed 17 April at http://www.pacom.mil/Media/SpeechesTestimony/tabid/6706/Article/585392/ transcript-senate-armed-services-committee-hearing-on-the-us-pacific-commandus.aspx. Harris, H. (2014), ‘Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, Australia, Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr.’, US Pacific Fleet, 31 March, accessed 4 June 2015 at http://www.cpf.navy.mil/leaders/harry-harris/ speeches/2015/03/ASPI-Australia.pdf. Marshall, T.C. (2015), ‘Carter: Asia-Pacific will continue to “rise” with strong security architecture’, US Department of Defense, 30 May, accessed 6 June 2015 at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=128941. Dyer, G. (2014), ‘China training for “short, sharp war”, says senior US naval officer’, Financial Times, 20 February, accessed 4 June 2015 at http://www.ft.com/ cms/s/0/687e31a2-99e4-11e3-91cd-00144feab7de.html#axzz3bwzWuyZb. McGrath, B. (2014), ‘Navy intel officer was right about China’s prep for “short, sharp war” with Japan’, Real Clear Defense, 11 November, accessed 4 June 2015 at http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2014/11/11/intel_officer_was_right_about_ chinas_prep_for_short_sharp_war_with_japan_107540.html. Geer, J.G. (2004), Public Opinion and Polling Around the World: A Historical Encyclopedia, Vol. 1, Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, p. 43. De Graaf, B., G. Dimitriu and J. Ringsmose (2015), Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion and War: Winning Domestic Support for the Afghan War, London: Routledge. Lampton, D. (2015), ‘A tipping point in U.S.–China relations is upon us’, US–China Perception Monitor, 11 May, accessed 12 June 2015 at: http://www.uscnpm. org/blog/2015/05/11/a-tipping-point-in-u-s-china-relations-is-upon-us-part-i/.

6. Human rights in US–China relations Ming Wan

I have written on human rights in US–China relations since the mid1990s. I have agreed to contribute a chapter on the same topic for this Handbook not because I want to update what has happened in this area over the past few years, important though it might be. Rather, I seek to examine this topic from a different theoretical perspective. In the past two decades, I have closely followed the Sino–Japanese and the US–China human rights relationships. The similarities and differences between these two relationships have helped sharpen my understanding of them and of international relations in general. For the past few years, I have been experimenting with a different analytical framework to provide what I view as a deeper understanding of the Sino–Japanese relationship.1 The invitation to contribute to this Handbook provides an opportunity to test the framework on a different case. The theoretical framework adopted for the chapter is that of ‘eventstransformed structures’, namely examining how some events transform the structures that affect state behavior. Defined as regularized patterns of social interaction, structure exists on different levels, dimensions or networks of power. Fundamentally, a structure-transforming event affects either or both physical and social environments, which necessitates visible adaptation in thinking and behavior. This chapter focuses on two pathways through which events transform structure. An event may directly affect the structure that it is most relevant to. It may also have varied impacts on structures on different levels, dimensions or networks of power, thus the broader political ecology. I argue that the singular event of Tiananmen in June 1989 transformed the structure of US–China relations, creating a new normal in those relations. Other key events in US–China relations helped mold the shape of the relationship, but the human rights subset has remained stable, which also constrains the overall bilateral relationship. This conclusion should be familiar for those who follow the human rights angle of US–China relations. But this chapter offers a stronger theoretical basis for that conclusion, which also enables us to connect this case potentially to other cases studied with a similar framework and to anticipate future events better. 100

Human rights in US–China relations 101 This chapter includes four sections. The first section lays out the theoretical framework. The second section examines the event of Tiananmen in 1989. The third section examines what has happened in the US–China human rights relationship since then. The Hong Kong demonstrations in late 2014 will be analyzed in the last section.

STRUCTURE-TRANSFORMING EVENTS My thinking about how events transform structure has been heavily influenced by William Sewell’s work.2 Sewell differentiates ‘events’ from other happenings and defines them as ‘that relatively rare subclass of happenings that significantly transforms structures’.3 Events are thus constitutive, with structures defined as rules, schemas and resources.4 How do events exactly transform structures? Sewell’s thinking has changed over time, alternatively viewing labor, language or human agency as drivers of social transformation.5 He has also at times experimented with the idea of variability in structures as a causal pathway. Consistent with a constitutive logic, Sewell points out that ‘it is characteristic that many structural accounts of social transformation tend to introduce change from outside the system and then trace out the ensuing structurally shaped changes, rather than showing how change is generated by the operation of structures internal to a society’.6 Sewell focuses on five key axioms for understanding structural changes, namely the multiplicity of structures, the transposability of schemas, the unpredictability of resource accumulation, the polysemy or multiplicity of meanings of resources and the intersection of structures.7 To understand how social structures are exactly constructed, I have found John Searle’s theory of construction of social reality illuminating.8 Searle argues that social structures are constructed with both physical and social materials. The collective assignment of a function creates a new institutional fact. To imagine how this process works, we can use the examples of cities, which have been constructed and reconstructed by human agents and which in turn affect them. One implication of looking at social construction is to say that there is a constitutive causal logic. And to say that events change structures and structures impact events is not tautological. At least from a dynamic perspective, the impact may see variability in temporality. A constructivist approach has become prominent in the field of international relations (IR) in recent decades. Similar to other more established approaches such as realism and liberal institutionalism, constructivism is also a big tent for a diverse range of studies.9 Like

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Searle, Alexander Wendt emphasizes the irreducibility of structures to individuals, but he focuses more on knowledge, identity and ideas rather than assigned functions to explain social change.10 While Wendt is convinced that IR scholars should and can engage in scientific research, many constructivists in the IR field do not. I also believe in the possibility of studying international relations scientifically although not modeled after a mechanical version of physics. Rather, I now follow a biogeographical approach that studies both the ecology and history of society based on an evolutionary theory.11 Evolution is not the same as teleology. Charles Darwin viewed evolution as open-ended, thus divorcing it from teleology. This chapter is not designed to tackle the fundamental questions of biogeography and eventful transformation of temporality. Rather, it operates on the assumption that societies evolve constantly and often relentlessly.12 I see my research agenda as open-ended, guided by evolutionary scientific principles rather than by physics-like causal laws. Thus, I treat ‘What events have transformed US–China relationship structure?’ as an empirical question. Rather than seeking to test an evolutionary approach in this chapter, I will simply provide a narrative consistent with the approach.

THE 1989 TIANANMEN INCIDENT The 1989 Tiananmen Incident was a pivotal event that reshaped the structure of US–China relationship. To understand the Tiananmen effect on a bilateral relationship, we need to recognize that the event was momentous on a number of dimensions. While differing on focus, virtually all commentators or analysts agreed on the importance of the event. As Perry Link observed, the number of those killed on the night of 3–4 June 1989 ‘was almost certainly lower than that of yesterday’s deaths due to malaria [in Africa]’. He reasoned rightly that the longevity of the Tiananmen memory results from the fact that ‘these particular killings had to do with the fate of a nation. They were an important turning point for a society of more than a billion people’.13 Focusing only on the United States, political leaders and strategic thinkers virtually all recognized the profound impact of the event on China and on US–China relations. The Chinese government wants to bury the memory of Tiananmen but its own actions speak volumes about the long shadow of the event.14 More broadly, Tiananmen was one of a few events in that fateful year of 1989 when communism subsequently collapsed in Eastern

Human rights in US–China relations 103 Europe, leading to the end of the Cold War and the break up of the former Soviet Union.15 There has been much written about Tiananmen.16 There are still unanswered questions despite a broad consensus on what happened.17 More importantly, like all important events, Tiananmen is relived culturally although with decreasing intensity. People continue to write and debate about Tiananmen outside China.18 That discourse itself is a crucial reason for the continuous relevance of the event. Tiananmen is such a well-known event that I do not need to labor the point. But I should reinforce the widely shared view that the event transformed US–China relations. The United States was focused on the strategic goal of containing the Soviet Union in its newly found friendship with China in the 1970s and was encouraged through observing the Chinese reform and opening championed by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s.19 In fact, the US–China relationship appeared to be moving in a positive direction right before the student-led demonstrations in China. As Henry Kissinger recalled, China’s ‘relations with the rest of the world were the best since the Communist victory in 1949 … Relations with the United States especially had made major progress’.20 The dream of a democratic China that would presumably arise from economic reform and progress was shattered.21 The saturated live television coverage in the United States and elsewhere left a lasting impression on the American people. The subsequent end of the Cold War and a growing triumphalism only increased distain for the Chinese government and disappointment yet again in China’s lack of progress. Much of that negativity was drawn from earlier images of China.22 A drastically restructured US–China relationship came to constrain the options for the Bush administration led by a president arguably the most knowledgeable about and invested in China. President G.H.W. Bush sought and succeeded to a large extent to engage post-Tiananmen China.23 That structural constraint has not fundamentally changed ever since. Despite ups and downs in the bilateral relationship, the US presidents have also largely maintained an engagement policy toward China. How important was human rights per se for shaping an important bilateral relationship? We should differentiate the event from the dimension it is most closely associated with. Tiananmen was more than just human rights. The Cold War was ending, some may point out. However, Tiananmen took place before the collapse of the Soviet Union. In fact, Tiananmen did its part in explaining weak resistance to public protests in former Eastern Europe.

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THE US–CHINA HUMAN RIGHTS RELATIONSHIP SINCE 1989 I argue that there have mainly been happenings in US–China human rights relations since 1989, which reproduce the basic structure of the bilateral relationship. Through a longer historical lens, we should be able to observe a ‘steady stream’ of US–China human rights relationships. Due to limitations of space, I will provide a cursive discussion of the major happenings in US–China relations since 1989. In the aftermath of Tiananmen, there were ‘institutionalized tensions’ over human rights between China and the United States until around 1996, with intense media attention on the State Department Annual Report on Human Rights, Congressional approval of the Most Favored Nation clause for China, and the United Nations Human Rights Committee resolution on China. The US government also froze high-level government exchange and imposed military sanctions on China. President Clinton delinked human rights and trade in 1994, indicating a significant adjustment in US policy toward China. But the United States pushed even harder at the United Nations Human Rights Committee to pass a resolution on China, almost scoring a victory in 1995. The two countries had a tense moment when President Clinton sent two carrier groups to the Taiwan area in response to the People’s Liberation Army’s large military exercise to intimidate Taiwan in 1996.24 The 1996 near crisis led to greater efforts by the United States and China to improve relations. The Chinese government had learned to handle Western pressure on human rights and democracy, mixing release of noted dissidents at opportune moments, increased propaganda, some reform and lobbying of developing countries for political support. In that context, human rights studies became more legitimate,25 and legal reform offered some hope of improvement in the country.26 Human rights had become more ritualistic and marginalized since the late 1990s to the mid-2000s, but it remained a salient diplomatic issue between Washington and Beijing. For example, the US government decided to sponsor again a resolution on China at the UN Human Rights Commission in early 2004. The Chinese government again succeeded in using a procedural maneuver to prevent the draft resolution from coming to a vote. Beijing subsequently suspended its human rights dialogue with Washington until just before the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Moreover, the value clash placed a severe limit on how far the US–China relationship could improve. The Obama administration tried harder than the previous administrations to set a positive tone for the relationship from the start

Human rights in US–China relations 105 and was criticized for downplaying the human rights issue,27 but the human rights issue re-emerged in 2009.28 The US–China relationship became more strained since around 2008 with the start of the global recession. The 2008 global recession gave the Chinese government greater confidence in their model of development. Thus, they tried to bring closure to some long-standing issues with the United States such as Taiwan and human rights, to no avail. Reacting to a perceived assertive China, the US policy community views on China also hardened. Human rights issues continued to flare. In a high-profile case, Chen Guangcheng, a blind Chinese human rights lawyer, dramatically escaped from house arrest and sought protection in the US embassy in Beijing in April 2012. After intense diplomatic negotiations, Chen was allowed to leave the embassy for medical treatment and then depart to the United States with his wife and children.29 The event was so significant for the US government that then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton devoted a chapter to the incident in her book Hard Choices.30 In a familiar pattern, the White House released a statement just before President Obama’s scheduled visit to Beijing for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in November 2014, saying that National Security Advisor Susan Rice had met with US and Chinese human rights activists and expressed a ‘deep concern’ about ‘the deterioration of China’s human rights situation’.31 This was simply the latest happening that kept the issue to the fore, but should not and did not affect the overall relationship. On the Chinese side, the Chinese government under Xi Jinping has sought to build a ‘new type of great power relationship’ with the United States, thus, diplomatic efforts have been made. While there is little substance to that strategic slogan, it serves to prevent the relationship from deteriorating at a faster pace. The seventh round of the US–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue held on 23–24 June 2015 covered a wide arrange of issues for cooperation.32 There were major areas of contention between the two governments at the meeting but mainly over the Chinese land reclamation projects in the South China Sea and cyberattacks. Human rights were hardly mentioned in the government’s remarks or media coverage of the event. My discussion above deals mainly with diplomatic exchange. However, human rights in US–China relations should also be examined on societal and global dimensions. Whether or not the US government takes up the human rights issue with the Chinese government, the two countries have a clear clash of political systems and political values, which underlies the growing tensions in bilateral relations. Moreover, as for all other aspects of US–China relations, we need to take a global

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perspective as the relations are increasingly entangled with other countries and global issues. As a democratic country, human rights and democracy have always been important for the American public, media and policy community even though their saliency varies depending on the circumstances.33 As a result, the human rights issue will not go away as long as China is politically different. Put simply, human rights continue to exert a structural constraint on US–China relations, namely that the two countries cannot be friends due to the gap in political values and political systems. In fact, one may argue that even when the US government necessarily becomes more concerned about balancing its larger strategic and economic interest in dealing with a rising China, the national psychology would become even more suspicious of a non-democratic great power and attribute all kinds of problems to that fundamental difference. Human rights remain salient in US–China relations also because Chinese human rights activists continue to push for change and the Chinese government continues to repress dissent, which draws the US government in even though the Chinese government views official US remarks or actions as interference in Chinese domestic politics. As a case in point, the Chinese government has apparently tightened control on academics and the media and has prosecuted a number of lawyers, journalists, activists and scholars in recent years. Such incidents receive strong media attention in the United States, which adds to public pressure on the president to act. Congress continues to express strong concern over a wide range of issues with China, including human rights. As the Chen Guangcheng case shows, when media stories report on prominent Chinese activists seeking US help, the White House and State Department simply cannot look the other way, thus causing tension with the Chinese government. As I was finishing this chapter, the Chinese government had begun a coordinated crackdown on human rights lawyers, their families and activists on 9 July. Within a week, the authorities arrested or questioned nearly 200 individuals throughout the country.34 This development has attracted much media attention in the United States. While we do not know how much an impact this crackdown will have on US–China relations, it has doubtlessly made relationship management more challenging for the US government. Beyond the human rights dimension, the overall US–China relationship has continued to evolve. China’s economy began to take off after Deng’s famous Southern Tour in 1992, building on the previous reform efforts and progress. The two countries became increasingly intertwined economically and financially, particularly since China joined the World

Human rights in US–China relations 107 Trade Organization in December 2001. By the early 2000s, China began to go global economically and politically, expanding its global reach and influence. Many viewed the 2008 Great Recession that started in Wall Street as an indication of the United States’ decline and China’s rise.35 That perception matters because it affected how the Chinese officials and analysts think about China and its political system, boosting their confidence and reinforcing their view that the United States is not qualified to criticize China over human rights.36 There emerged a greater interest among the Chinese officials in touting the merits of the Chinese system over the US system. Many in China saw the 2008 recession as a game changer, leading to a push to resolve some of the issues with the United States once for all, human rights included. The global recession did do some damage to the US power and prestige but was not an event that structured the international order as critics of the United States had hoped. Instead of removing the human rights issue in its relationship with the United States, a more assertive Chinese government invited a backlash from the West and some Asian countries while expanding its influence worldwide. US views on China visibly hardened.37 China’s current leader Xi Jinping assumed his general secretary position with the campaign slogan of the ‘China Dream’ in November 2012. That theme received immediate worldwide attention because it came from the new leader of a rising great power.38 The ‘China Dream’ was an important development related to Chinese leadership, Chinese politics and Chinese foreign policy. It was apparent for nearly all who follow the developments in China that Xi made a bold move, unlike his two cautious predecessors. The jury is still out on whether Xi will ultimately succeed in his goals but there is no question that he has already accumulated more power at a faster pace than Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao at a similar stage. It is now apparent that Xi has the ambition to be in the same league as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Xi has been rewriting the rules about group leadership and special status for politburo members, which seem to have been institutionalized in the past two decades. This is a reminder that China has an authoritarian system that allows its top leader to make such moves if he is determined enough. A more fruitful way to study the ‘China Dream’ is to place it within the larger context of the Chinese discourse. Some China experts have done precisely that.39 The Xi government has advanced other slogans such as ‘Strong Maritime Power’, ‘China–US New-Type Great Power Relationship’, and ‘One Belt, One Road’. Like the ‘China Dream’ these slogans can be confusing, contradictory and unrealistic, but they are not

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empty, as one can readily observe in government actions consistent with these principles. It has always been important for analysts to pay close attention to the Chinese discourse and with a strong leader rising, it is even more important to pay attention to the Chinese discourse to understand the transformation of Chinese foreign policy.40 The CCP Central Committee held a plenum on 20–23 October 2014. The plenum communiqué listed the ‘China Dream’ as a goal while focusing on the theme of ‘governing according to law’. While there were a few concrete policy measures related to rule by law, the communiqué emphasized party leadership, confirming yet again that the ‘China Dream’ is meant to be the CCP-defined dream. The ‘China Dream’ resonates to some extent with Chinese elites and population because it is consistent with the rising nationalist tide in the country. With the country’s rapid rise and greater openness, many Chinese can also dream of a better life. At the same time, dreaming raises expectations and people may be frustrated in their pursuit of the dream. As well understood by students of transitional politics, rapid change may lead to polarization in wealth, power and status, and what matters for many people is not whether their absolute economic well-being has improved but a sense of relative deprivation watching others move ahead. Better communications mean that people can indeed watch the rich and successful living a different life and feel particularly resentful when they believe that those rich people have acquired their status due to political connections and corruption. The ‘China Dream’ simply sounds hollow for those disadvantaged in contemporary Chinese society. The ethnic minorities in the country often view the ‘China Dream’ as the ‘Han Chinese Dream’, which does not address their own aspirations. And the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong starting in late September 2014 have revealed the depth of dissatisfaction with a single party rule among Hong Kong Chinese residents. China’s influence is growing in the world mainly due to its greater economic and financial resources. But it is hardly the case that the Chinese government is winning the hearts of the people. In fact, the image of the ‘China Dream’ seems to be worsening outside China. Despite the Chinese official explanations, the term ‘China Dream’ sounds Sinocentric. More importantly, the ‘China Dream’ discourse is happening in a larger context of a more assertive Chinese foreign policy.41 Factually, China is becoming stronger, a fact that is affecting the global environment for the United States as well, even though the latter remains the only superpower in the world. Put simply, the growing Chinese presence affects how important human rights should be in US diplomacy. As a case in point, President Obama held a rare summit with African

Human rights in US–China relations 109 leaders in Washington DC in early August 2014. Part of the rationale was to strengthen US relations with Africa and benefit from African economic growth, with China’s growing influence in the continent as one motivating factor. As such, human rights activists criticized the summit as having limited participation by civil society although the US government did not invite a few serious human rights–violating governments, unlike the Chinese government that professes a non-interference principle.42 One may ask, what might the Obama administration have chosen to do without a rapidly growing Chinese presence in the world? Thus, while human rights activists would argue that a sustainable relationship requires better governance and discussion of political values, others may well consider human rights controversies as impediments to business. Beijing is forcing Washington to reduce its emphasis on human rights to some extent, and a Washington Post editorial called the Obama administration’s de-emphasis a ‘flawed agenda’.43 Such criticism could be a reason for the White House statement of ‘deep concern’ mentioned above. The rapid advance of the Islamic State (ISIS or ISIL) in Syria and Iraq in early 2014 raised alarm, seemingly putting at least a temporary stop to growing isolationist sentiment in the United States. That event has conflictual impact on US–China relations. On the one hand, the United States is again distracted away from East Asia and needs Chinese cooperation. On the other hand, the rise of the ISIS has highlighted security challenges for the United States in the mind of the American public and policy community. It has become common to see China listed along with ISIS and Putin’s Russia as key security challenges. In a new National Intelligence Strategy released by the Director of National Intelligence on 17 September 2014, China was described as having ‘interest in a stable East Asia, but remains opaque about its strategic intentions and is of concern due to its military modernization’.44 President Obama himself has been careful not to include China in that list. In a speech given at the United Nations General Assembly, he named several crises that have created ‘a pervasive sense of unease’ around the world, namely the Ebola outbreak in Africa, Russian aggression in Ukraine and the Islamic State in the Middle East.45 Susan Rice, the national security advisor, reportedly sought China’s help to respond to the ISIS during her visit to Beijing in early September 2014 to prepare for Obama’s scheduled visit in November. A senior US official said that China showed interest.46 However, with China’s rapid and large-scale land reclamation in the South China Sea, which came to the public eye in early 2015, the United States has become far more critical of Beijing. In that context, some human rights events reinforce but do not fundamentally change the existing structure. As a case in point, The

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Washington Post issued an editorial on 15 September 2014, urging President Obama to take a harder line on China over human rights and ‘find his voice and make clear that Mr. Gao’s fate is important to the United States’ – Gao Zhisheng is a human rights lawyer who was allegedly mistreated in prison and is now under house arrest.47 But it is doubtful that events like this will have a major impact on the structure of US–China relations. From the Chinese perspective, human rights constitute a discord in their design for a new type of great power relationship. As a case in point, before a round of Strategic and Economic Dialogue was held in Beijing on 9–10 July 2014, the US House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations voted on 24 June in favor of changing the name of the street in front of the Chinese embassy in Washington, DC from ‘International Place’ to ‘Liu Xiaobo Plaza’, after a jailed dissident. Fundamentally, the Chinese system is now a greater challenge to Western democracy. It is not a Cold War–style confrontation. China now has a capitalist system, state capitalism though it might be. Nevertheless, China presents an illiberal capitalist alternative. To make things worse, China belongs to a group of similar countries. It is questionable how many countries are actually emulating such a model. But the perception, partly supported by evidence, is that the Chinese system has advanced at the expense of liberal democracy. On the one hand, China as an alternative source of resources and influences means that the United States cannot exercise as much control as before. For example, Myanmar is believed to be inching back to China with strong US criticism on its human rights situation.48 One may also argue that the greater US emphasis on economics and US access to the African market in its historical summit with the African leaders in early August 2014 is another case in point. On the other hand, the countries that have tension have incentive to ‘out-democratize’ China in order to secure US support. Vietnam is a good example. Chinese influence means that the United States wants to put greater pressure on Beijing, pushing for political change in places like Hong Kong and Macau.49 Conversely, the United States may tone down human rights criticism of those countries that it is courting against Beijing. Indeed, human rights activists have criticized the Obama administration on that score through its effort to forge a strategic partnership with Hanoi.50 That perceived strategic priority in US human rights diplomacy will doubtlessly reinforce Beijing’s suspicion that the United States has an ulterior motive in its promotion of human rights. As a reflection of China’s greater presence, the narrative about the China challenge has evolved to include the notion of an irresponsible

Human rights in US–China relations 111 rising great power. Human rights are part of that narrative. Western media make that argument from time to time. For example, The Washington Post published an editorial on 31 October 2014 that the United Nations should take action to hold the North Korean government accountable for its human rights violations. Noting that China is assumed to be willing to veto any UN Security Council referral of the North Korean case to the International Criminal Court, the editorial urged the UN Security Council to do precisely that, reasoning that ‘if China decides to veto it, then the entire world will see who supports the thugs who have built a superstructure of brutality in North Korea’.51 Indeed, a UN General Assembly committee approved a resolution condemning North Korea’s human rights abuses and paved the way to refer Kim Jong Un and other North Korean leaders to the International Criminal Court on 18 November 2014, by a vote of 111 against 11, with 55 countries abstaining. China and Russia voted against the resolution without saying whether they would veto the referral. Editorials like this reproduce the basic structure of US–China relations. North Korea is yet to be referred to the International Criminal Court. In short, from 1994 to present we have not seen any dramatic transformation of the structure of US–China relations over human rights. As before, the Chinese government continues to complain about US interference in Chinese domestic affairs and about US using human rights and democracy as instruments of hegemony. The United States still talks about human rights in China from time to time but critics take a negative view of how little the US government has done in this area.52

THE 2014 HONG KONG DEMONSTRATIONS Of all the happenings since 1989, the Hong Kong student-led demonstrations in late 2014 have the greatest potential to become a structuretransforming event. Similar to Tiananmen, it was led by young students who demanded greater democracy, supported by a massive presence of residents. Similar also to Tiananmen, the foreign press was present. Similar to Tiananmen, the demonstrators faced stern opposition from the government. But different from Tiananmen, the demonstrations took place in Hong Kong, which is viewed as somewhat different from the Mainland. Of course, the Hong Kong demonstrations took place in the shadow of Tiananmen, and when the movement began to lose steam and public support, a few demonstrators sought to re-energize the protest by staging a hunger strike in early December.

112 Handbook of US–China relations The student demonstrators wanted to turn their demonstrations into a landmark event, which was part of the reason that some did not want them to end for fear that they might not see another incident like this any time soon.53 In the end though, this is not a structure-transforming event for US–China relations. The demonstrations will worsen the relationship in the same direction as Tiananmen, not transforming it into a different form and moving in a different direction. If the Chinese central government listens to the Hong Kong demonstrators and allows greater democracy in Hong Kong, that would improve the relationship with Washington, but not dramatically because that move might always be interpreted as a technical concession to better protect the core party interests on the Mainland. As the demonstration expanded, the Western media began to pay greater attention. In The Washington Post, for example, the story appeared on the front page on 30 September 2014 and with a full page inside. At the same time, one sensed that the United States was largely an observer. On the same day’s Washington Post, an editorial viewed the demonstration as a dilemma for Beijing, not an explosive issue between the United States and China, but another editorial appeared the next day urging the US government to warn China of the costs of a crackdown on the Hong Kong demonstrators.54 There has not been any new language used in the US context that would suggest a different linguistic understanding that would affect the structure. Diplomatically, as two Washington Post journalists rightly observed before the Obama–Xi meeting in Beijing for the occasion of the APEC summit in November 2014, ‘the Obama administration has also been restrained in its comments about the massive pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong, saying only that it hopes issues can be resolved peacefully, without endorsing the goals of the demonstrators’.55 Any major initiative on human rights has to have the president’s support. But by the time Obama left for the APEC summit, it was clear where the priorities were. Since public relations have been crucial in shaping US–China human rights relations, we can sample The Washington Post’s 12 November 2014 coverage to indicate where human rights are in the scheme of things. The long headline story was a breakthrough deal on climate change between President Obama and President Xi. This ‘historic’ agreement resulted from months of quiet diplomatic negotiations between the two countries. The two governments also agreed to remove tariffs on information and communication technology trade.56 Both deals would put momentum into global negotiations, which made the two countries behave as if they were the ‘big two’ at least in these areas. On the same day and in the same newspaper, there was another related article

Human rights in US–China relations 113 about US–China competition for regional leadership.57 Juxtaposed to the two articles was a long story on the Hong Kong demonstrations, making the point that the dragging demonstration risks losing public support.58 Furthermore, an article about the Myanmar government’s treatment of the minority Muslim community Robingya indicated that human rights would be a far more important issue on the agenda for President Obama who flew from China to Myanmar for the East Asian summit.59 Not surprisingly, Obama did raise the human rights issue in his joint press conference with Xi on 12 November 2014, explaining the US position and mentioning Hong Kong in that context. Put simply, the worst scenario would be another Tiananmen, which would worsen US–China relations. But mainly for domestic reasons rather than concerns about the United States, the Chinese government had apparently learned from 1989 and was adopting a strategy of waiting it out, precisely to prevent another Tiananmen. Two months into the protest movement, most observers saw the beginning of the end even though much uncertainty remained. Even the Hong Kong public opinion began to turn against the protracted occupation. The Hong Kong police cleared the main site of demonstrations on 11 December 2014, effectively ending the 75-day occupying movement starting on 28 September.60 However, that tactical Chinese adaptation has not helped improve US–China relations. Activists, the media and the public want to keep the human rights issue alive when dealing with China. As a case in point, The Washington Post published an editorial lauding the ‘landmark’ climate deal,61 but it had another editorial right below it, arguing that precisely because the two governments can proceed with cooperation in areas such as climate, the US government should speak up on human rights in China.62 The 1989 structure remains intact.

NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

See, for example, Wan, M. (2014), ‘Coevolution and Sino–Japanese tensions’, Asia-Pacific Review, 22 (1), 30–40. Sewell, W.H., Jr (2005), The Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Ibid., p. 100. Ibid., pp. 128–37. For a critique of Sewell’s work, see Riley, D. (2008), ‘The historical logic of Logics of History: language and labor in William H. Sewell Jr.’, Social Science History, 32 (4), 555–65. Sewell, Logic of History, p. 139. Ibid., pp. 139–43. Searle, J.R. (1995), The Construction of Social Reality, New York: Free Press.

114 9. 10. 11.

12. 13. 14.

15. 16.

17.

18.

19.

20. 21.

Handbook of US–China relations See, for example, Finnemore, M. and K. Sikkink (2001), ‘Taking stock: the constructivist research program in international relations and comparative politics’, Annual Review of Political Science, 4 (1), 391–416. Wendt, A. (1999), Social Theory of International Politics, New York: Cambridge University Press. For an introduction to biogeography, see Cox, C.B. and Moore, P.D. (2010), Biogeography: An Ecological and Evolutionary Approach, 8th edition, Hoboken, NJ: Wiley; Lomolino, M.V., B.R. Riddle, R.J. Whittaker and J.H. Brown (2010), Biogeography, 4th edition, Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates; McCarthy, D. (2009), Here be Dragons: How the Study of Animal and Plant Distributions Revolutionized our Views of Life and Earth, New York: Oxford University Press; Morrone, J.J. (2009), Evolutionary Biogeography: An Integrative Approach with Case Studies, New York: Columbia University Press; Lomolino, M.V., D.F. Sax and J.H. Brown (eds) (2004), Foundations of Biogeography: Classic Papers with Commentaries, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. For theory of relentless evolution, see Thompson, J.N. (2013), Relentless Evolution, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Link, P. (2014), ‘Foreword’, in R.X. He, Tiananmen Exiles: Voices of the Struggle for Democracy in China, New York: Palgrave, pp. xi–xii. The Chinese government launched an effective re-education program for students. See Zhao, S. (1998), ‘A state-led nationalism: the patriotic education campaign in post-Tiananmen China’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 31 (3), 287–302; Rosen, S. (1993), ‘The effect of post-4 June re-education campaigns on Chinese students’, The China Quarterly, No. 134, 310–34. Carter, J. and C. Paces (2010), 1989: End of the Twentieth Century, New York: W.W. Norton. Yang, G. (2005), ‘Emotional events and the transformation of collective action: the Chinese student movement’, in H. Flam and D. King (eds), Emotions and Social Movements, London: Routledge, pp. 79–98; Zhao, D. (2001), The Power of Tiananmen: State–Society Relations and the 1989 Beijing Student Movement, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago; Tong, S. (1998), with M. Yen, Almost a Revolution, 2nd edition, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press; Calhoun, C. (1995), Neither Gods nor Emperors: Students and the Struggle for Democracy in China, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press; Schell, O. (1994), Mandate of Heaven: A New Generation of Entrepreneurs, Dissidents, Bohemians, and Technocrats Lays Claim to China’s Future, New York: Simon & Schuster. As time goes by, more insider information is coming out. See for examples Pu, B., R. Chiang and A. Ignatius (eds) (2009), Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang, New York: Simon & Schuster; Liang, Z., A. Nathan and P. Link (eds) (2001), The Tiananmen Papers, New York: Public Affairs. See for examples Lim, L. (2014), The People’s Republic of Amnesia: Tiananmen Revisited, New York: Oxford University Press; He, R.X. (2014), Tiananmen Exiles: Voices of the Struggle for Democracy in China, New York: Palgrave; Spence, J.D. (1999), The Search for Modern China, 2nd edition, New York: W.W. Norton, pp. 696–704. Richard Madsen has argued convincingly that a ‘liberal myth’ about a troubled modernizer that needed US assistance came to dominate two other main schools of thought about China, namely the ‘communist paradise’ and the ‘red menace’. See Madsen, R. (1995), China and the American Dream: A Moral Inquiry, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Kissinger, H. (2011), On China, New York: Penguin Press, p. 408. Madsen maintains that the liberal myth was shattered by the event. See Madsen, China and the American Dream. By contrast, Christopher Ford suggests that the

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22.

23.

24.

25.

26. 27. 28. 29.

30.

31. 32.

33. 34.

liberal myth about China continued for many years after 1989. See Ford, C. (2014), ‘The death of the “liberal myth” in U.S. China policy’, 20 November, accessed 4 December 2014 at http://www.newparadigmsforum.com/NPFtestsite/?p=1896. This was similar in some other Western countries. See for examples Kinzelbach, K. (2015), The EU’s Human Rights Dialogue with China: Quiet Diplomacy and its Limits, London: Routledge; Evans, P. (2014), Engaging China: Myth, Aspiration, and Strategy in Canadian Policy from Trudeau to Harper, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 36–42; Strahan, L. (1996), Australia’s China: Changing Perceptions from the 1930s to the 1990s, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 301–6. Kissinger, On China, pp. 411–46; Ross, R.S. (2001), ‘The Bush administration: the origins of engagement’, in R.H. Myers, M.C. Oksenberg and D. Shambaugh (eds), Making China Policy: Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administrations, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 21–44; Bush, G.H.W. and B. Scowcroft (1998), A World Transformed, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, pp. 86–111. Sutter, R.G. (2013), U.S.–Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 249–71; Wan, M. (2001), Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Relations: Defining and Defending National Interests, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 42–65; Lampton, D.M. (2001), Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing US–China Relations, 1989–2000, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, pp. 134–55. Wan, M. (2005), ‘Democracy and human rights in Chinese foreign policy: motivation and behavior’, in Y. Deng and F.-L. Wang (eds), China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 279–303. Wan, M. (2007), ‘Human rights lawmaking in China: domestic politics, international law and international politics’, Human Rights Quarterly, 29 (3), 727–53. Bader, J.A. (2012), Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 15–16. Wan, M. (2010), ‘Values and human rights in Sino-American relations’, in Y. Hao (ed.), Sino-American Relations: Challenges Ahead, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 213–25. In a more recent case of Chinese government ‘concessions’, the Chinese government released on bail five women’s rights activists who had been detained for over a month on 13 April 2015 thanks to the pressure from the United States and the international community. Clinton, H.R. (2014), Hard Choices, New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 83–100. For Chen’s own account, see Chen, G. (2015), The Barefoot Lawyer: A Blind Man’s Fight for Justice and Freedom in China, New York: Henry Holt, pp. 252–318. Cited in Morello, C. (2014), ‘White House expresses concern on China rights’, The Washington Post, 8 November, A8. US State Department mentioned 127 items in the strategic track in its media note. See Office of the Spokesperson of the State Department (2015), ‘US–China Strategic & Economic Dialogue outcomes of the Strategic Track’, 24 June 2015, accessed 20 July 2015 at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/06/244205.htm. The Chinese government mentioned 300 areas of results – see China News Agency, 25 June 2015, accessed 20 July 2015 at http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2015/06-25/7365827.shtml [in Chinese]. For the place of human rights in US policy toward China, see Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams, pp. 130–34. Amnesty International (2015), ‘China: lawyers face 15 years in jail on “chilling” state security charges’, 16 July, accessed 20 July 2015 at https://www.amnesty.org/ latest/news/2015/07/china-lawyers-16-july/.

116 35.

36.

37. 38.

39. 40.

41.

42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

49.

50. 51. 52.

Handbook of US–China relations For my own skeptical view of that argument, see Wan, M. (2012), ‘The China model and the Great Recession: a historical comparison’, in D.L. Yang (ed.), The Great Recession and China’s Political Economy, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 223–42. As an example, on 29 October 2014 a senior Chinese diplomat criticized the US as attacking other countries while suffering from mounting human rights problems at home. See China News Agency, 30 October 2014, accessed 20 July 2015 at http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2014/10-30/6733585.shtml [in Chinese]. For comments on US views, see Ford, ‘The death of the “liberal myth’ in U.S. China Policy’. See Wan, M. (2013), ‘Xi Jinping’s “China Dream”: same bed, different dreams?’ The Asan Forum, 1 (1), accessed 20 July 2015 at http://www.theasanforum.org/xijinpings-china-dream-same-bed-different-dreams/, and parts of six monthly essays in ‘Topics of the month: the China Dream’, also in The Asan Forum, accessed 20 July 2015 at http://www.theasanforum.org/the-china-dream/. See, for example, Mahoney, J.G. (2014), ‘Interpreting the Chinese dream: an exercise of political hermeneutics’, Journal of Chinese Political Science, 19 (1), 15–34. For a Chinese view, see Wang, Y. (2014), ‘China’s new foreign policy: transformations and challenges reflected in changing discourse’, The Asan Forum, 21 March, accessed 20 July 2015 at http://www.theasanforum.org/chinas-new-foreign-policytransformations-and-challenges-reflected-in-changing-discourse/#. As a recent example, some senior Vietnamese ideological officials explicitly linked the ‘China Dream’ to the ‘Nine-Dash Line’, which is the Chinese claim to the South China Sea. This is when the Vietnamese Communist Party had a strong interest in working with the Chinese Communist Party to ensure regime security. Personal communication in Hanoi, 23 July 2014. Eilperin, J. (2014), ‘Obama to convene African leaders for historic summit’, The Washington Post, 3 August A1. The Washington Post (2014), ‘A flawed agenda: the Obama administration chooses not to emphasize human rights in its historic Africa Summit’, 3 August 2014, A18. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2014), The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America 2014, p. 4, accessed 21 March 2016 at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2014_NIS_Publication.pdf. Summarized in Nakamura, D. (2014), ‘Obama pursues broader coalition’, The Washington Post, 25 September, A1. Wan, W. (2014), ‘U.S. seeks China’s help in fighting Islamic State’, The Washington Post, 10 September, A8. The Washington Post (2014), ‘Mr. Gao’s nightmare’, 15 September, A16. Sankei Shimbun, 9 August 2014, accessed 20 July 2015 at http://sankei.jp.msn.com/ world/news/140809/chn14080920210007-n1.htm [in Chinese]. Indeed, prior to President Obama’s planned visit to Asia, a Washington Post editorial urged him to confront the Burmese military government to prevent the country from sliding backwards on human rights and democracy. See The Washington Post (2014), ‘Confronting Burma’, 3 November, A14. Sutter, R. (2014), ‘PacNet #58: Dealing with America’s China problem in Asia: targeting China’s vulnerabilities’, CSIS, 21 July, accessed 20 July 2015 at http:// csis.org/publication/pacnet-58-dealing-americas-china-problem-asia-targeting-chinasvulnerabilities. Nakamura, D. (2015), ‘Obama working to make Vietnam an ally against China’, The Washington Post, 7 July, A8. The Washington Post (2014), ‘Overdue justice’, 31 October, A20. For example, an Economist article criticized what it viewed as weak US leadership in human rights in Asia under President Obama. It reasoned that the United States’

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53.

54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

attention was elsewhere and that the United States had greater security and economic agenda in its relationship with China. The Economist (2014), ‘The city on the hill’, 1 November, 41. This comment could have been voiced at any given moment after 1994. Indeed, a protester was quoted as making the following comment: ‘After this occupation ends, I don’t think there will be another one like it. The government won’t allow it, and we won’t have the momentum for it’. See Wan, W. (2014), ‘Hong Kong protesters debate the endgame’, The Washington Post, 19 November, A9. The Washington Post (2014), ‘Standing against repression’, 1 October, A16. Nakamura, D. and S. Mufson (2014), ‘US–China strains permeate summit’, The Washington Post, 9 November, A14. Nakamura, D. and S. Mufson (2014), ‘U.S. and China announce climate deal’, The Washington Post, 12 November, A1. Denyer, S. (2014), ‘China counters “pivot” with “Asia-Pacific dream”’, The Washington Post, 12 November, A11. Denyer, S. (2014), ‘Protesters in Hong Kong risk losing public support as occupation drags on’, The Washington Post, 12 November, A9. Gowen, A. (2014), ‘In Burma, a government-driven “betrayal”’, The Washington Post, 12 November, A8. One may extend the period to 15 December when the police cleared the last demonstration site. The Washington Post (2014), ‘A landmark climate deal: the United States and China announce serious, achievable commitments’, 13 November, A18. The Washington Post (2014), ‘The debate on human rights: accords don’t prevent Obama from speaking up in Beijing’, 13 November, A18.

7. Chinese public perception of the United States Shiming Fan

When US Secretary of State John Kerry was interviewed by China Central Television (CCTV) in June 2014, he urged that ‘China really needs to move away from this theory, this conspiracy theory that somehow the United States is focused exclusively on China … The theory is 100 percent false’.1 His comment, however, was quickly refuted by a widely circulated Chinese newspaper as ‘deceiving himself’.2 For many in China today, malicious US design seems everywhere and has led to many domestic and international problems for Beijing. From Ukraine to the South China Sea, Washington seems to be playing on a big chessboard against the rising dragon. This chapter thus focuses on the Chinese perceptions of the United States in recent years, especially the widely existing conspiracy theories among the Chinese people when they think of US policies and behavior in the world. It describes the perceived US conspiracies related to China and explores the psychological, socio-political as well as international reasons behind this phenomenon.

THE CONSPIRATORIAL UNITED STATES The Chinese fascination with US conspiracy theories in the post–Cold War era began in the mid-1990s, when Chinese nationalists unhappily perceived the demonization of China in US media.3 This was later reinforced by the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in which the Chinese public strongly believed in a CIA or Pentagon plot behind the so-called ‘mistake’ by the US government. The spread of US conspiracy theories became more prevalent after the 2008 global financial crisis and the Western criticism of human rights and Tibet that accompanied the Beijing Olympic Games, both of which aroused great suspicion of the West amongst the Chinese public. There are many versions of US conspiracy theories in China today. To name a few: genetically modified products and the related technologies are sinister plots of some US companies to control the world food market 118

Chinese public perception of the United States 119 and weaken the health of people in other countries; the crash of the Chinese stock market being the result of secret collaboration between major US investment banks and their Chinese agents not only to trap retail investors but is also a form of a currency/financial warfare to destroy and control the Chinese economy; the Energy Information Administration’s assessment of China’s shale gas reserve exaggerated the volume with ill intentions so as to export excessive US technology and equipment, or to shift Chinese focus from other clean energy resources; the credit ratings by Standard & Poors, Moody’s, and so on, are not normal market alerts, but evil Western leverage to discredit China’s development. Even the Hollywood movie Kung Fu Panda is believed to contain hidden cultural infiltration as a form of ideological aggression. More sensationally, the SARS and bird flu could be US biological/ psychological weapons aimed at arousing panic and destabilizing Chinese society. And some Chinese believe that the United States was behind the mysterious disappearance of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH370 because the US military desperately wanted to stop the shipping of some secret material to China.4 For the believers of US conspiracy theories, Zheng Wang wrote, ‘there is a larger, overarching U.S. scheme or hidden agenda behind current events … United States has a master plan to “divide China territorially, subvert it politically, contain it strategically, and frustrate it economically”’.5 One of the most vicious US schemes in this grand plan is its ‘pivot to Asia’ policy, which resembles Washington’s covert encirclement of China in the eyes of Chinese conspiracy theory followers. Behind troublemaking Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam is the hostile United States, manipulating the containment of China so that the US hegemony is maintained as US power declines. The US rebalancing or re-engagement moves in the West Pacific are seen as well-coordinated steps to ‘hold down or actually disrupt China’s rise’,6 as Kenneth Lieberthal observed from studying Chinese books, articles, conferences and interviews, and many that many Chinese writers and commentators have reaffirmed. The United States is: […]creating problems for China by fanning fears about Beijing’s intentions among its neighbors and encouraging those, such as Vietnam, that have traditionally harbored deep suspicions of Chinese ambitions; forging cooperation among countries – especially the major democracies – in Asia to create obstacles to China’s achieving its rightful role as the major power in the region; challenging China’s model of development as an alternative to the

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tarnished Western democratic model; and using measures such as the formation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) to reduce the scope for internationalization of the renminbi, which China thinks is an important step in reining in the United States’ abuse of the dollar’s role as the global reserve currency.7

The epidemic spread of US conspiracy theories in China has worried some of the more liberal, cosmopolitan Chinese. They have started to express their concerns over the negative consequences both on Chinese society and Sino–US relations. A Peking University professor warned that the widely propagated conspiratorial thinking over a long time in China could lead to a psychology or culture in which people are suspicious of everything around them, which would have very unfortunate and negative consequences.8 A Tsinghua University psychologist criticized conspiracy theories for encouraging people to believe without evidence and ignore the real truth, while discouraging independent, critical thinking. For him, a vicious cycle emerges from conspiratorial thinking where no logic and rationale can be found.9 As He Fan of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences commented on Michael Shermer’s book The Believing Brain, conspiratorial thinking is first to believe then to prove.10 Others have paid attention to the influence of conspiracy theories over decision-makers or the policy-making process. One Yale University professor mentioned after his interviews with Chinese officials that they were ‘very much poisoned’ by the book Currency Wars, which portrayed international financial activities as a Wall Street conspiracy under the Rothschild family.11 Cheng Siwei, a well-known economist and former vice-president of the Chinese National People’s Congress, warned that financial security, which was at the very core of economic security in contemporary times, could not be based on the understanding that all international financial activities were life-and-death struggles with conspiracies. He stated ‘that was not the reality’.12 However, despite these warnings and criticisms, US conspiracy theories still enjoy wide popularity in China, even amongst the elite. It is thus necessary to understand more about conspiracy theories and interpret them within the Chinese domestic and international context.

DEFINING CONSPIRACY THEORY The first use of the term ‘conspiracy theory’ in English literature occurred in 1880,13 but the belief in conspiracy theories has been a global and historical phenomenon. For instance, Barry Coward and Julian Swann edited a book, Conspiracies and Conspiracy Theories in Early

Chinese public perception of the United States 121 Modern Europe, in 2004.14 One former Lebanese official said to the BBC that ‘in the Middle East, conspiracy theories are in our blood’, when he referred to the rumor in Beirut that the United States was behind the creation of the Islamic State.15 Two American scholars, Jewett and Lawrence, regard the United States as ‘the home of conspiracy theories’, given the widespread conspiratorial thinking in their country especially after the 1960s.16 The Chinese are no exception and also share an attraction to conspiracy theories. The word for conspiracy (yin mou) in the Chinese language first appeared in a book 2000 years ago when it mentioned the secret planning between the Zhou Emperor and his advisor in about 1000 BC,17 at a time when the word did not have a negative connotation. Later, however, Chinese history has been filled with ugly political conspiracies, according to a Fudan University professor.18 The Oxford Dictionary defines conspiracy as ‘a combination of persons for an evil or unlawful purpose; an agreement between two or more persons to do something criminal, illegal, or reprehensible (especially in relation to treason, sedition, or murder); a plot’, while a conspiracy theory is the explanatory proposition that ‘an event or phenomenon occurs as a result of a conspiracy between interested parties; a belief that some covert but influential agency (typically political in motivation and oppressive in intent) is responsible for an unexplained event’.19 Similarly, political scientist Michael Barkun holds that a conspiracy theory is a belief that explains an event as the result of a secret plot by exceptionally powerful and cunning conspirators to achieve a malevolent end.20 Katherine Young and Paul Nathanson observe that ‘every real conspiracy has had at least four characteristic features: groups, not isolated individuals; illegal or sinister aims, not ones that would benefit society as a whole; orchestrated acts, not a series of spontaneous and haphazard ones; and secret planning, not public discussion’.21 Within these parameters, to the Chinese, in US policies or behavior conspiracies are apparent: the US government and private sectors including US companies and NGOs, together with their international allies and partners, must be behind those dubious moves and events that are interrelated and negatively affect China. It might be necessary to differentiate a conspiracy theory here from a real conspiracy. A conspiracy theory contends for the dominant role of the scheme in the event and its final outcome, while a conspiracy simply means the plot itself and implies no automatic or conceived causation between the malign intention/planning and the result. In other words, conspiracies might be everywhere, but whether or not they should be responsible for the development of the events and the consequences is

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another question. More often than not, conspiracy theories are more speculative than manifest. For instance, how much of a role Wall Street traders’ secret discussions played in the 2008 world financial crisis is not easily identifiable. The claim that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a plot aimed at containing China, and is not designed for the welfare or economic needs of the member-states, may never be verified as well. Conspiracy theorists do not appreciate the argument that the world is full of random accidents and events may be caused by isolated acts. They tend to exaggerate the effects of a conspiracy, assuming that one exists, in a systematic way among many other factors. As Karl Popper observed, ‘conspiracies occur, it must be admitted. But the striking fact that, in spite of their occurrence, disproved the conspiracy theory is that few of these conspiracies are ultimately successful. Conspirators rarely consummate their conspiracy’.22 According to historian Bruce Cumings: [I]f conspiracies exist, they rarely move history; they make a difference at the margins from time to time, but with the unforeseen consequences of a logic outside the control of their authors: and this is what is wrong with ‘conspiracy theory.’ History is moved by the broad forces and large structures of human collectivities.23

Unfortunately many are still fascinated with conspiracy theories, especially when they face a situation that is hard to explain with employable cognitive frameworks.

INTERPRETING CHINESE SUSPICIONS Conspiracy theory is appealing to many people, traversing ethnicity, gender, education and occupation, for many reasons, even though it acquires negative criticisms associated with being paranoid, ridiculous, unfounded and irrational. Besides the universal psychological element of human nature, specific socio-political contexts also contribute to the emergence of conspiracies in China. Conspiratorial thinking involves psychological factors. When people experience uncertainty or lack of control, such as facing mysterious or traumatic events like the missing MH370, they tend to look for some simple explanations to reduce those feelings and blame a suspicious powerful actor, such as the United States, in order to regain the state of order mentally and avoid cognitive dissonance. This is particularly true if there is an information shortage or information excess that prevents people from comprehending the happenings. For example, after the 1999 embassy bombing in Belgrade, useful or convincing information was

Chinese public perception of the United States 123 very limited to help the Chinese public to understand the situation. Existing knowledge could not explain how the US military went so wrong as to target the Chinese embassy, and therefore rumors and speculations started to spread regarding a US conspiracy. In other cases, when the events are caused by very complicated institutional mechanisms, such as the global financial crisis or the controversy over the value of renminbi, ordinary people tend to ignore the very sophisticated professional or institutional analysis and concentrate more on the simple but more attractive answer. As Scott Radnitz observed, ‘conspiracies represent a rational response to uncertainty – a device to economize in the midst of overwhelming information and an insurance mechanism to err on the safe side in a dangerous world’.24 Moreover, according to Wan Weigang, a professor at Colorado University, people have the tendency to establish correlations among many random happenings/events that in fact have no causal linkages among each other. The result is to use a simple theory for interpreting the complicated world.25 Conspiracy theories may also have a connection with the socioeconomic status of the believers. Several researchers point out that conspiracy theories ‘occur more frequently within communities that are experiencing social isolation or political dis-empowerment’. It is ‘the ultimate refuge of the powerless. If you cannot change your own life, it must be that some greater force controls the world’.26 The mindset of the weak is responsible for interpreting both domestic events and international circumstances. In the United States, conspiracy theories are largely within domestic politics and are aimed at alleged plotters on Wall Street or in Washington, while in international society the powerful United States has become a frequent and convenient target of conspiracy theories. China has been emerging rapidly as a potential superpower during the past decade. Confidence has accumulated among the Chinese people who are proud of China’s achievements and expect that their beloved country is fully respected in the international community after its 100-year humiliation at the hands of imperialist powers. At the same time, however, China is experiencing huge transitional problems economically, socially and politically. Its political system and ideology are not well received in the West and are often criticized. Many Chinese people become easily disappointed by the fact that Western countries, especially the United States, continue to dominate international society and China has not obtained the status that it deserves. Thus the mentality of being a victim of Western humiliation and international isolation still lingers deep in the Chinese minds and contributes to China’s domestic and international frustrations that some perceive to be as a result of conspiracies

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from outside. As Sun Xingjie, a Chinese writer, warned however, ‘conspiracy theories, while keeping the Chinese people alert of dangers, actually reinforce the mindset of the weak state’.27 Looking inside China, the spread of conspiracy theories is not just limited to the mass public. That the poor, disaffected and marginalized people are more prone to conspiracy theories does not mean that the elite groups are free of them. The belief in US conspiracy theories among some Chinese elites might be genuine, because one can be an expert in a specific area but not knowledgeable outside one’s field. Further, the elite become in some cases not only followers but makers or advocates of conspiracy theories for other reasons. As Professor Peng Kaiping noted: [M]any smart people, or some enjoying high social status, are also promoters of conspiracy theories, such as the author of Currency Wars. He is super smart, sensitive to what might be popular among the mass people and what could be tolerated by the government, and marketing himself through disseminating them.

He continues, ‘some so-called elite people even understand little English language, but comment everyday on foreign conspiracies. Isn’t it a funny thing?’28 Unfortunately, conspiracy theorists appear as experts frequently on the Chinese TV screen or on the popular websites, penetrating the US plotters’ deceptions with their ‘special, secret knowledge unknown or unappreciated by others’.29 The popularity of conspiracy theories in China may also reflect in some way the general social settings in which trust or credibility becomes a scarce thing. Food safety problems, fake drugs, counterfeit products, financial frauds, unfair trials and corrupt officials have filled the Chinese media for quite some years. Rumors are rampant, and the lack of trust as well as a sense of insecurity opens the door for the general public to embrace conspiracy theories. This is because people keep a generally high level of vigilance towards what is happening around them, including the international events that are usually far away and hard to understand. The problem, however, is best exemplified by an ancient Chinese folklore that after one loses one’s ax, one sees every neighbor as a possible thief. Today, in the eyes of many Chinese people, Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Australia, India, and in particular the United States, are all dubious participants in an anti-China conspiracy. Another significant factor in understanding the Chinese fascination with conspiracy theories is the rising nationalism in Chinese society. Numerous articles and books have been published on the obvious

Chinese public perception of the United States 125 resurgence of Chinese nationalism in the post–Cold War era. As He Yinan notes, ‘Chinese popular nationalism still has deep roots in the state’s history propaganda which has implanted pernicious myths in the national collective memory. Fueling mistrust and exacerbating a mutual threat perception, popular nationalism could be a catalyst’ in its foreign relations.30 Zhao Suisheng, a professor of political science at University of Denver, has also observed that even some liberal Chinese intellectuals who had embraced Western democracy have become nationalists, and have criticized the United States for conspiratorially preventing China from rising to the status of a great power, regardless of whether it is democratic or not.31 Nationalism functions more as a collective emotional appeal that promotes internal identity and cohesion, usually at the expense of the external adversaries. It also goes against independent, individual rational thinking and thus makes fertile soil for the spread of conspiracy theories. Thus, Wang Dingding quotes an Indian sage when he commented on conspiracy theories in China that wisdom disappears in the face of nationalism and patriotism.32 US conspiracy theories become popular in China also at a time when Chinese reform and transition navigates into the so-called ‘deep water’ – a period where difficulties are being experienced, such as declining industries, social unrest, ethnic conflict and international disputes. When things sometimes go wrong, interested parties may point their cause to external hostile forces that are believed to destroy Chinese culture or sabotage Chinese success. An example to illustrate this point is the case of the Chinese Medicine Association’s accusation during the bear gall controversy, in which Chinese use of bear gall as a medicine was severely criticized by animal rights activists. Top officials of the Association charged that those who were against them were part of a Western conspiracy to weaken the Chinese medicine industry.33 A domestic ethical dispute became a struggle between China and insidious foreign forces. If Western conspiracy theories are not used instrumentally for some specific purposes, they at least cater to the scapegoat psychology among the general public. This phenomenon is observed by Chinese intellectuals34 and even criticized by some Chinese netizens: ‘Oh, dear, we are too reluctant to admit our own shortcomings, so all our misfortunes are made by others, and the US is precisely that other. It’s so useful!’35 The overall atmosphere of Chinese politics in the recent past also seems to favor the acceptance of Western conspiracy arguments in China. When the Chinese economy is becoming increasingly integrated into the global economy, its development model as well as political system challenges Western preferences and has therefore become controversial.

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The Chinese government has responded by promoting the unique characteristics of the Chinese model and the ‘three self-confidence concepts’, as well as intensified control over liberal expression to safeguard legitimacy.36 The balance between the left/conservatives and the right/liberals has shifted in favor of the former. Those who promote universal values and criticize conspiracy theories in China are thus sometimes labeled as Western agents or national traitors in cyberspace or even in the official media. At the same time, open criticism of the United States or Japan, correct or not, is politically safe. Overtime, the image of a United States that harbors evil designs emerges and is consolidated.

US–CHINA RELATIONS There is surely an interactive process between the development of Sino–US relations and the spread of US conspiracy theories in China. Although US conspiracy theories worsen the atmosphere between Beijing and Washington and can actually affect part of the bilateral relationship, public sentiments are more the function of the evolution of governmental relations than vice versa. In other words, the widespread belief of US conspiracy theories in China is more the projection of the strained but still ambivalent relations between two countries that seriously lack mutual trust. Wang Jisi and Kenneth Lieberthal address in detail the mutual distrust problem between China and the US in their co-authored monograph in 2012. They worry that: […] in the context of growing strategic distrust, an accident could trigger a devastating political or military crisis between China and the United States. The ‘enemy image’ about each other could be easily invoked in the populations … Even more important, strategic distrust can produce, over time, a self-fulfilling prophecy of antagonistic relations that are basically zero sum on both sides.37

Their concerns are somewhat reflected in recent US–China relations. While the Chinese leaders advocate a new type of great power relations between China and the United States, and the Obama administration has reluctantly accepted the concept,38 the rhetoric has demonstrated that there has been increased tension and competition between Beijing and Washington in recent years. China’s economic power has continued to rise in the past few years, rapidly narrowing the gap between the overall Chinese GDP and that of the United States. The Chinese government has invested remarkable resources into its military, which has led to the impressive progress of China’s Navy and Air Force. China has also

Chinese public perception of the United States 127 noticeably expanded its presence in Africa and Latin America through trade, investment, aid and setting up of Confucius Institutes. Chinese diplomacy has become more assertive, particularly in relations with some neighboring countries including US allies. The Chinese government at Zhongnanhai has also taken different positions from the United States on key international issues like Syria and Ukraine. More recently, China is aggressively setting up and leading new organizations such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank amongst the BRICS countries to boost its role in multilateral international institutions. The United States has responded to China’s rise with its ‘Asia pivot policy’. It has strengthened alliances with Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Singapore and Australia, pushed forward the TPP to lead regional economic integration, increased its military presence in the West Pacific, and improved relations with Vietnam, India and Myanmar. Washington has also not disguised its sympathy with or support to the countries that are involved in territorial disputes with China in the East and South China Sea, and has openly challenged Beijing’s claims. Moreover, the US Congress has continued to severely criticize China on human rights, cybersurveillance, Hong Kong’s elections, and other issues. Some of the commercial deals launched by Chinese companies in the United States have also been blocked for national security reasons by the US Congress. All these developments in Sino–US relations contribute to a background in which many Chinese people see a rising structural confrontation between the emerging superpower, that is, China, against the dominant one, that is, the United States. They also perceive that US behavior in re-engaging Asia and its criticism over China’s domestic affairs only mask its ‘geopolitical objective to constrain an increasingly powerful competitor’39 by aligning with some other adversaries of China. As Wang Jisi, a well-known Chinese expert on US–China relations observed, ‘it is strongly believed in China that the ultimate goal of the United States in world affairs is to maintain its hegemony and dominance and, as a result, Washington will attempt to prevent the emerging powers, in particular China, from achieving their goals and enhancing their stature’.40 Against this backdrop, the United States is perceived to be blamed for the failure of a Chinese initiative to construct a hydropower station in Myanmar,41 for President Aquino’s policy over the South China Sea islets/reefs, and the Diaoyu Island dispute with Japan,42 and for the fluctuation of the renminbi’s value.43 This structural conflict, real or perceived, nurtures mutual distrust and suspicions. Lack of communication between the two countries at different levels, from top leaders to military officers and young students, is also regarded

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as a factor contributing to the distrust and suspicions that lead to conspiracy thinking. Researchers encourage more interactions and dialogues to promote mutual understanding and confidence.44 In fact, the two governments have realized the problem and have been investing heavily in facilitating communications across the Pacific. The most notable ones include the summit between the presidents; the annual US–China Economic and Strategic Dialogue led by high-level officials from the economic sectors and diplomatic agencies from both sides; institutionalized visits by top military leaders; and US–China people-topeople exchange. To promote US students studying in China, President Obama announced in 2009 his ‘100 000 Strong Educational Exchange Initiative’, which was successfully carried out under governmental and private cooperation by 2014. The two-way flow of travelers between the two countries also reached 6.13 million in 2014.45 According to a Chinese statistic, more than 60 formal dialogue mechanisms exist at ministerial level or above between China and the United States.46 The real problem thus is not the lack of communication channels or opportunities but the substance and effectiveness. The depth rather than the width of the exchange decides the quality of US–China communication. Effective communication requires understanding across different cultures, systems and histories among the participants so as to avoid misperceptions. Thus, Peking University Professor Yuan Ming appealed for the ‘communication between the souls’ when she discussed US–China exchange in an interview in 2011.47 The problem, however, is the presence of a deeply held, historical perception amongst the Chinese that there exists an imperial United States that harbors a wild ambition to destroy China. This pre-existing belief has been influential in China since the founding of the People’s Republic of China and has fluctuated with the bilateral relationship. Even when China opened itself to Western markets and technologies in the 1980s, vigilance against Western ideological infiltration and political sabotage has continued, fueling conspiracy theories. They are embedded in the love–hate complex among the Chinese public towards the United States and emerges whenever there are problems in the bilateral relationship.48 The memory of a shrewd, hypercritical, interfering and bullying United States represents a direct threat to the territorial integration, national unity and political stability in the minds of the Chinese people. According to Scott Radnitz, ‘scholars of political behavior have noted the tendency of people to hew toward information consistent with their preexisting beliefs and to reject discrepant information’.49 Conspiracy theories conform with that memory.

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CONCLUSION Conspiracy theory is a belief that some covert, organized and influential forces are responsible for an unexplained event. In international relations, it is shown in the conviction that hostile foreign organizations or governments’ plots are behind the negative happenings related to the country of the believers. Some conspiracies are simply open secrets, such as the cooperation between the United States and its allies to balance rising Chinese power, or the dominance of major international institutions by the West. Some conspiracies may be real, like the Wall Street manipulation for profit during the Asian financial crisis in 1997–98. Conspiracy theories exist in many countries, and are also prevalent in present-day China regarding the United States. Many people are highly vigilant when it comes to US intentions and behaviors, and perceive that the United States is shrewdly and intentionally making every effort to discredit, weaken and contain China, so that its own primacy and dominance are maintained. Psychological, socio-political and international reasons are discussed in this chapter to interpret the spread of US conspiracy theories in China. First, people tend to employ simple explanations rather than sophisticated, institutional analysis when they encounter sudden, mysterious, complicated events, while the financial, security and political issues between China and the United States are usually beyond mass, sometimes even elite, comprehension. Second, the domestic socio-political context is introduced to understand the phenomenon. Decreasing level of social trust, elite/interest group manipulations, rising nationalism, and the changing political atmosphere may have contributed to the widespread Chinese suspicion of the United States. Third, the state of bilateral US–China relations is identified as a factor accounting for the popularity of conspiracy theories. Emerging structural conflict colors the perception of the United States by the Chinese public and intensifies distrust. Compared to the United States, the Chinese are still lacking in selfconfidence, leading to the mentality of victimization, in which the delusion of persecution persists. Confidence building measures between the two countries, though occurring on a fairly large-scale, have not been effective promoting mutual trust and understanding. Finally, the negative historical memory of a hostile United States has colored Chinese perceptions. The exaggeration of the influence and effects of conspiracy theories is unfortunate. US conspiracy theories may lead to serious negative consequences in China and its relations with the United States. Rational,

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independent thinking is diminished in favor of collective emotional appeals. Decision-making might thus be based on groundless speculation rather than the facts. Real domestic problems are probably ignored because of scapegoating the malicious external forces. According to Zheng Wang, US conspiracy theories ‘have spawned their own discourse and captured the public imagination, exacerbating a heavy, pernicious political atmosphere’50 between China and the United States. It reinforces the enemy image, alienates the American and Chinese people, and shapes a detrimental atmosphere for governmental relations. US conspiracy theories should not be part of the new type of great power relations.

NOTES 1. 2. 3.

4.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Transcript of John Kerry’s ‘Interview with Wang Guan of CCTV’, accessed 12 July 2015 at http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/06/228904.htm. Wang, D. (2014), ‘Kerry denies American conspiracy – please show actions’, Global Times, 10 July. Two popular books exemplify the Chinese resentment at the perceived ill-intentioned coverage of China in the US media in the mid-1990s: Zhang, Z., X. Zhang and Q. Song et al. (eds) (1996), China Can Say No: Political and Emotional Choices in the Post Cold-War era, Beijing: China Industrial and Commercial Publishing House, and Li, X. (1996), Behind Demonizing China, Beijing: China Social Sciences Press. These US conspiracy theories in China were either promoted, discussed or criticized in but not limited to the following articles or books in the Chinese language: He, Q. (2015), ‘China “casino capitalism” rules of the game’, accessed 12 July 2015 at http://www.voachinese.com/content/heqinglian-blog-china-economy-20150705/2849767. html; You, Y. (2014), ‘Hard to escape conspiracy theory of MH370’, South Wind, July, 71; Yuan, Y (2013), ‘The United States “shale gas revolution” is it a bubble?’, accessed 12 July 2015 at http://cn.nytimes.com/business/20130911/cc11shalegas/; Huang, X. (2013), Rating Conspiracy, Beijing: China Friendship Publishing Company; The Wall Street Journal – China Real Time (2013), ‘New bird flu is a U.S. conspiracy, Chinese military official says’, The Wall Street Journal, 9 April [also accessed in English 25 March 2016 at http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/04/ 08/new-bird-flu-is-a-u-s-conspiracy-chinese-military-official-says/]; Liu, Y. (2012), ‘Through transgenic conspiracy fog’, Science News, August, accessed 7 July 2015 at http://news.qq.com/a/20120814/001705.htm; Jing et al. (2012), ‘To China in the next decade – Wall Street conspiracy’, Chinese Businessman, November; Xiu, Y.S. and Y.W. Zhang et al. (2012), ‘Cultural conspiracy theory’, Excellence, July. Wang, Z. (2011), ‘American conspiracy: strategic suspicion and U.S. re-engagement in Asia’, Asia Policy, No. 12, 27. Lieberthal, K. (2011), ‘The American pivot to Asia’, Brookings, 21 December, accessed 7 July 2015 at http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2011/12/21obama-asia-lieberthal. Ibid. Wang, D. (2011), ‘Conspiracy theories prevail in China: from “Russian conspiracies” to “American conspiracies”’, New Century, No. 48. Peng, K. (2014), ‘Why is conspiracy theory popular?’, New Weekly, No. 419, June.

Chinese public perception of the United States 131 10.

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

Fan, H. (2014), ‘Interpreting the conspiracy theories’ [in Chinese], accessed 5 July 2015 at http://book.sina.com.cn/zl/shuping/2014-03-14/1638270.shtml. See also Shermer, M. (2012), The Believing Brain: From Spiritual Faith to Political Convictions, London: Robinson. Chen, Z. (2009), ‘Nonsense! Does isolation make us avoid crisis?’, New Economy Weekly, No. 11, 16. Chen, S. (2015), ‘Strategic thinking needed in the research of financial issues’, The People’s Daily, 21 May. Oxford English Dictionary [online edition], ‘Conspiracy theory’, accessed 24 July 2015 at http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39766?redirectedFrom=conspiracy#eid. Swann, J. and B. Coward (eds) (2004), Conspiracies and Conspiracy Theories in Early Modern Europe: From the Waldensians to the French Revolution, Aldershot: Ashgate. BBC News (2014), ‘The US IS and the conspiracy theory sweeping Lebanon’, accessed 12 July 2015 at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28745990. Jewett, R. and J.S. Lawrence (2004), Captain America and the Crusade Against Evil: The Dilemma of Zealous Nationalism, Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, p. 206. Shi Ji (Records of the Grand Historian), Vol. 32, Hereditary House for Qi. Luo, Y. (2009), Power Players: The Grand Conspiracies in Chinese History, Shanghai: Fudan University Press. ‘Conspiracy’ and ‘Conspiracy theory’ defined in the Oxford English Dictionary, accessed 10 July 2015 at http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39766?redirectedFrom= conspiracy+theory+#eid8383475. Barkun, M. (2003). A Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, p. 3. Young, K.K. and P. Nathanson (2010), Sanctifying Misandry: Goddess Ideology and the Fall of Man, Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press, p. 275. Popper, K. (1945 [2013]), The Open Society and its Enemy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 307. Cumings, B. (1999). The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. II, The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947–1950, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Radnitz, S. (2012): ‘The determinants of belief in conspiracy theories’, paper prepared for presentation at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, 30 August 2012, New Orleans, p. 4. Wan, W. (2014), ‘Why does everybody love conspiracy theory?’, China Business Review, No. 5, 101. Wikipedia (2016), ‘Conspiracy theory’, accessed 21 March 2016 at https:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conspiracy_theory. Sun, X. (2011), ‘A rising China should keep alert to the weak state mentality’, accessed 5 July 2015 at http://www.21ccom.net/articles/qqsw/zlwj/article_20111 20950092.html [in Chinese]. Peng, K. (2014), ‘Why is conspiracy theory popular?’, accessed 6 July 2015 at http://www.21ccom.net/articles/world/qqgc/20150315122220.html [in Chinese]. Berlet, C. (2004), ‘Zog ate my brains’, New Internationalist, October, p. 20, accessed 21 March 2016 at http://newint.org/features/2004/10/01/conspiracism/. He, Y. (2007), ‘History, Chinese nationalism and the emerging Sino–Japanese conflict’, Journal of Contemporary China, 16 (50), 1. Zhao, S. (2008), ‘The Olympics and Chinese nationalism’, China Security, 4 (3), 52. Wang, ‘Conspiracy theories prevail in China’. Deng, Y. (2012), ‘Why do conspiracy theories prevail in China?’, accessed 5 July 2015 at http://www.21ccom.net/articles/dlpl/shpl/2012/0224/54361.html [in Chinese].

132 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

Handbook of US–China relations Ren, J. (2015), ‘Conspiracy theory and state crisis’, Journal of Jiangsu Administration Institute, No. 1, 80, 83. ‘Why are there all kinds of conspiracy theories, particularly related to the US, in the Tianya online forum?’, accessed 5 July 2015 at http://www.zhihu.com/question/ 24140115 [in Chinese]. The three self-confidence concepts refer to: confidence in Chinese theory, confidence in the Chinese (socialist) road and confidence in the Chinese system. They are now greatly promoted in China. Wang, J. and K. Lieberthal (2012), Addressing China–US Strategic Distrust, John L. Thornton China Center Monograph Series, Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, p. 39. Zhang, X. (2015), ‘New model of great power relations: an interpretation’, in Q. Jia and J. Yan (eds), New Type of Great Power Relations: Opportunities and Challenges, Beijing: Peking University Press, pp. 159–60. Zhao, ‘The Olympics and Chinese nationalism’, p. 52. Wang and Lieberthal, Addressing China–US Strategic Distrust, p. 10. See Yun, S. (2015), ‘The conflict in Northern Myanmar: another American antiChina conspiracy?’ Asia-Pacific Bulletin, No. 302, 20. Liu, M. (2014), ‘Making Japan crazy: American think-tanks’ plot to incite China– Japan confrontations’, Decision & Information, No. 6, pp. 45–9. Ye, T. (2012), ‘Short renminbi is unlikely’, Wisemoney, No. 1, 11. Wang and Lieberthal, Addressing China–US Strategic Distrust; Wang, ‘American conspiracy: strategic suspicion and U.S. re-engagement in Asia’. ‘Flight passengers exceeded 6 million in 2014’, accessed 15 July 2015 at http:// news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2015-05/06/c_1115201214.htm [in Chinese]. Jin, C. and W. Dai (2013), ‘Instill positive energy in developing new type of great power relations between China and the US’, International Security Studies, No. 2, 17. Ke, Y. (2011), ‘Communication between the souls makes the best public diplomacy: an interview with Professor Yuan Ming’, Public Diplomacy Quarterly, Vol. 5. Fan, S. (2005), ‘Anti-Americanism in the love and hate complex: Chinese perceptions of the US in the post Cold War time’, Studies of International Politics, No. 2. Radnitz, ‘Determinants of belief in conspiracy theories’, p. 4. Wang, ‘American conspiracy: strategic suspicion and U.S. re-engagement in Asia’.

8. US–China economic relations Dong Wang

Understanding the United States and China as evolving paradoxes is a useful way to make sense of the bilateral relationship in a global context. During the last four decades since President Richard Nixon’s historic China trip in 1972, US–China relations fluctuate between being friends and foes, and strategic partners and rivals, as well as between deterrence and engagement, hedging and confrontation, accommodation and friction, and interdependence and independence. Economic ties remain important at the core of the US–China interaction. Often China’s global economic impact is approached with apprehension, as partial, as a question between ‘us’ (Europe and the United States, or China) and ‘them’ (China, or the United States and its allies), or as the ‘end of the beginning of the Chinese century’. In Arvind Subramanian’s striking imagination of 2021, US dominance will be eclipsed by a risen China: ‘The odds are strong that China will act to maintain the current open rules-based trading system … If it were to do so, and given its size, the resulting conflict could undermine the post-World War II system’.1 David Shambaugh argues that China ‘will never “rule the world”’ because the ‘elements of China’s global power are actually surprisingly weak and very uneven. China is not as important, and it is certainly not as influential, as conventional wisdom holds’.2 Using the ‘we’ vs ‘they’ identity, Peter Nolan assesses the position of Chinese firms around the globe as follows: ‘Their presence in the high-income countries is negligible …“we” are inside “them”, but “they” are not inside “us”’.3 Chinese economist Hu Angang countered these viewpoints that China is embracing a new stage of development, a ‘new normal’ for the rest of the world to gain.4 In this chapter, I shift to an aspect that has been less debated, namely the governance of US–China economic relations in historical and contemporary terms. How do the Americans and Chinese approach their economic relations? Their actual performance in dynamic trading over the last 40 years suggests that interactions caused tensions to arise between China and the United States that ultimately pushed both sides toward an improved form of governance that continued to bolster growth. The second part of this chapter is devoted to intellectual property rights 133

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(IPR), a long-standing US concern over China. This is followed by a discussion of several flashpoints and new dynamics by raising the question whether geopolitics can be overcome. As the largest global trader, export-oriented manufacturer, and foreign exchange reserves holder, China should be encouraged to do more for its Asian neighbors, the international economy and public goods, and these are not going to thrust the United States’ nose out of joint in the world order. The United States would do no worse than share power and responsibility with not only China but also other countries in Asia, Europe, Africa, the Oceania and the Americas. During the last five years, the United States has reinvigorated its presence in the Asia-Pacific while China continues to grow and aspires to a global role greater than ever before. Expanded US–China economic cooperation is a question of making choices. It matters to the future of humanity, for peace and prosperity in one region depend on the stability and growth of another. I argue that new institutional arrangements including the Strategic and Economic Dialogue are poised to bring order to conditions of increased complexity. Both countries, therefore, should and can see each other in a more relaxed way.

ECONOMIC INTERACTION: US AND CHINESE APPROACHES, 1971–2014 The current urgency for global cooperation on trans-border issues including trade5 and migration calls for an examination not of how (if at all) sovereign states perish, national cultures converge or global and cosmopolitan orders impose themselves, but of how international norms evolve. In other words, we need to look at how the major international regimes have developed through the lenses of their protagonists, be they sovereign states, transnational corporations, civil society organizations, international bodies or individual citizens. We also need to question how the agency of these protagonists operates in practice, involving issues ranging from material claims and moral rights to cultural beliefs and self-projection.6 The normative and operative aspects of international trade allows us to examine not only the diversity of interests and behaviors among the participants in global regimes, but also how they have changed as an integral part of the process by reference to the paradigms of selective adaptation and institutional capacity.7 Global encounters have shaped the evolution of international order as well as institutional regimes in various manners. They have also given rise to anxiety and exercised the minds of theoreticians in times of the

US–China economic relations 135 shift and rediffusion of power. The possibility and impossibility of global cooperation run through all current perceptions of the state of the world, be they realist, neorealist, liberalist, neoliberalist, structuralist, postmodernist, or cosmopolitanist. The deeply rooted beliefs that underpin statehood seem to make global cooperation impossible. Moving beyond the world of sovereign states, Arjun Appadurai claims that the current academic postmodern discourse of globalization is more a project of subjugation of the poor (and ordinary people) than of liberation.8 Similarly, Craig Calhoun deplores the Eurocentric cultural and philosophical rootedness and historiographical bias of the cosmopolitanization debate.9 These ‘isms’ are all inclined to emphasize international interactions or assert the rise of new global orders, but presume that evolution of cooperation by its nature is a conflictual encounter involving the moreor-less incompatible and inequitable cultural and political predispositions of sovereign states. ‘The traditional focus across many fields has been on competition, self-interest, and violence’.10 In trade, the United States and China are becoming more tolerant of compromise, reconciliation, restraint and sharing than has long been assumed within the conventional paradigms of research. Changing trade patterns and institutions in the US–China economic sphere during the last four decades suggest that market and organizational mechanisms are used to harmonize national law.11 The decade 1971–80 witnessed rapid institution building and the lifting of some of the barriers to the flow of goods, technology, and people between China and the United States. These legislative changes transformed both countries and enhanced operative capacity in the world economy. China was marginal to world trade in 1971 when President Richard Nixon announced his upcoming visit to China. Data from a book by Li Lianqing, former Chinese vice-premier, reveal that in 1955 China accounted for 4.7 percent of global GDP and by 1978 it was only 1 percent. ‘While others had moved on, China had gone back’. Li wrote. ‘As China’s leaders came to terms with the poverty of their people and the yawning gap between them and the West the enormousness of the task and the “race against time” to develop, as Deng Xiaoping called it, became clear’.12 The establishment of full diplomatic relations in 1979 helped the US and Chinese government move to eliminate the remaining legislative and administrative hurdles to commercial relations. Of critical importance, on 24 January 1980, Congress passed a trade agreement conferring contingent Most Favored Nation (MFN) status on China. This exempted Chinese exports to the United States from the high tariff rates

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stipulated by the Smoot-Hawley Act of June 1930, a measure that was long used to distinguish friends from foes among US trading partners.13 But despite China’s MFN trade status, new legal and political impediments to Sino–US trade relations arose. Under US law, trade with the People’s Republic fell within the purview of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment contained in Title IV of the 1974 Trade Act. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment linked trade benefits with the human rights policies of communist (or former communist) countries. Not only did it deny preferential trade relations to offending nations, but also those nations could not receive credits or credit or investment guarantees from the US government. The US president retained the authority to waive application of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to a particular country, but Congress was required to review semi-annual reports on that country’s continued compliance in upholding freedom of emigration. In short, the amendment provided the legal grounds for the annual congressional renewal of China’s Most Favored Nation status until 2001, when China joined the WTO, whose core rules prohibit members from imposing additional trade restrictions on other members, the principle of MFN status. Throughout the 1980s, the normalization of political relations between the two countries and China’s economic reforms paved the way for acceleration in the US–Chinese transfer of goods, values, ideas, personnel and technology. These interactions were mutually beneficial, although from the US point of view the China trade was still small. However, as early as 1984 the United States had become China’s third-largest trading partner, trailing only Japan and Hong Kong, then still a British colony. On the other hand, as the United States’ 14th-largest trade partner, China accounted for a paltry 1.7 percent of total US foreign trade in 1988 and 2.2 percent in 1990. The 1980s witnessed the restructuring of the Chinese domestic economy, coinciding with China’s opening to the outside world. Here the position of Hong Kong as an entrepôt linking East with West was crucial. A key step involved harnessing Hong Kong’s trading power in world markets by encouraging Hong Kong firms to sign export processing contracts with businesses in China’s newly established Special Economic Zones in Guangdong and Fujian Provinces. By the mid-1980s the number of companies engaged in the direct export and import trade had increased dramatically, and the central government relaxed controls over local agencies and prioritized revenue creation. Government tax incentives to both domestic and foreign investors virtually turned China’s entire littoral into a lucrative export-processing zone. These dual trade reforms resulted in an annual growth of around 10 percent in China’s gross national product (GDP) from 1983 to 1987, and

US–China economic relations 137 a 15.8 percent annual expansion in international trade. China’s foreign trade virtually tripled from US$20.6 billion in 1978 to US$60.2 billion in 1985, while trade with the United States increased sevenfold, from about US$1 billion to over US$7 billion. The US–China opening was a signal for China’s emergence in the world economy. US–China economic relations were facilitated by the steady liberalizing of US controls over US exports of advanced technology. In 1980, such exports to China were reassigned from category Y (the Warsaw Treaty countries) to category P (new trading partners with the United States). Then in May 1983 under the Reagan administration (1981–89) they were assigned to category V (US allies), thereby allowing additional exports. A three-tiered system of export licenses further streamlined the licensing process, placing 75 percent of export license applications in a ‘green zone’ under the sole control of the Department of Commerce. In the second half of the decade, finished manufactures and technologically advanced products began to enter the China market. At the same time, textiles and clothing accounted for more than 40 percent of the total value of Chinese exports to the United States. After Hong Kong and Macau, the primary conduits for overseas Chinese capital, the United States was the largest investor in China, with about US$3 billion in assets by 1985. Following Chinese economic reforms of the 1980s, US consumer goods companies were increasingly drawn to China. US companies entered the country by forming joint ventures with a Chinese company or government agency. Early participants included such giants as H.J. Heinz, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, Coca-Cola, American Express, American Motors, AMF, Inc., General Foods, Beatrice, Gillette, Pepsi-Cola, Eastman Kodak, AT&T, Nabisco and Bell South. China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) on 11 December 2001 established a new order in its export-driven economy and in US–Chinese relations. It took 15 years of negotiations (1986–2001) for China to become the 143rd member of the WTO. Joining forces with China, the United States was the prime mover in China’s accession to the WTO. China’s membership in the WTO has contributed to major growth in international trade and investment; commercial operations both in China and overseas have widened and grown increasingly sophisticated. In the course of 30 years, China emerged from relative economic insignificance to become, in 2005, the world’s third-largest trading nation after the United States and Germany, and in 2012 the largest. In 1978, the total value of China’s trade was US$20 billion, 30th in the world. In 2005

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China’s trade had rocketed to $1.4 trillion in value, and in 2012 it was $3.87 trillion. US exports to China increased by 81 percent in the three years after China joined the WTO, compared with 34 percent in the three previous years. Similarly, US imports from China rose by 92 percent in the three years following China’s WTO entry; they had risen by just 46 percent in the three previous years. As the business environment in China improved, US entrepreneurs spared no time exploring new opportunities. The draw of the China market was felt across the board by the US business sector, although the issue of protecting intellectual property rights was the single biggest hurdle for most companies to overcome. In 2004, Wal-Mart was the United States’ largest corporation, with revenues that made up 2 percent of the nation’s GDP. Of Wal-Mart’s 6000 suppliers, 80 percent were in China. The World Trade Organization is a widely recognized and respected international organization in China. Within short ten years, China used the WTO and international legal obligations as external levers to transform its unprofitable state-owned enterprises and institutionalize its structural, liberalization reform, greatly helped by some leeway and ‘unfair practices’ accepted by the WTO. China’s WTO protocol ‘permits WTO members to treat China as a non-market economy until December 2016 for antidumping purposes, and indefinitely for anti-subsidy purposes’.14 China’s massive efforts to build the institutions and make the laws that extend the rule of the market and deepen reforms right across the country have been underappreciated. On its own terms, China learns and adapts to international trading norms and rules that are not applied to all countries equally and universally, whether by design or by historical coincidence. ‘In a number of ways, the disciplines that apply to China under the WTO are stronger than those that apply to other countries, including bigger and stronger players such as the United States’.15 Article 11 of China’s protocol of accession to the WTO, for example, bound China to remove all taxes and surcharges levied on its export products including foodstuffs and raw materials. This is the basis for United States and European action against China under WTO rules for restricting exports of rare earths.16 For over four decades, national, bilateral and transnational institutions and governance produced one of the world’s most robust and complex commercial relationships between the United States and China. Major US–China bilateral mechanisms include the US–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED, starting in 2009; the seventh round of the meeting was concluded in July 2015 in Washington), the US–China

US–China economic relations 139 Defense Talks (last meeting in February 2015), and the US–China Human Rights Dialogue (July 2013, the 18th meeting). US–China trade volume in goods continued to grow in 2014 at US$590.5 billion, 14.9 percent of the US trade with the world in goods, the highest ever, in 2013 at US$562 and $536.2 billion (2012) on the US books and US$555 billion (2014), US$520.9 (2013), and US$484.7 billion (2012) in Chinese figures.17 Back in 1991 it stood at US$25.6 billion and in 1972 at a mere US$4.7 million. By the end of 2014, with a population of 1.36 billion, over four times larger than the United States’ (321 million),18 China overtook the United States as the world’s number one economy worth US$17.6 trillion while the US economy was US$17.4 trillion in the International Monetary Fund estimate.19 However, measured by GDP per capita, China (US$6807) is still well behind the United States (US$53 042).20 The United States has become China’s largest export market, and China is the United States’ third-biggest export destination. China’s foreign exchange reserves reached close to US$4 trillion in 2015, the largest in the world and more than the next six-largest holdings combined. China is the largest foreign banker of the United States, holding about US$1.26 trillion US Treasury bonds as of May 2015, more than 7 percent of the United States total debt, compared to 1.22 trillion for Japan as the second largest US creditor. It must be noted that US–China trade in services has developed its own dynamics different from their trade in goods. The US advantage in commercial services has remained. As the world’s largest importer and exporter of commercial services since the 1970s, the United States ran a total surplus of US$64 billion in 2003, in 2011 the surplus was US$186 billion with US$976 billion of trade in services, and in 2014 the surplus was over US$233 billion with a total trade volume of US$1188 billion in service.21 In comparison, China has been a net importer of commercial services, especially since joining the WTO in 2001. China’s trade deficit in commercial services reached US$9 billion in 2003, snowballed to US$55 billion in 2011 with a total import of US$237 billion, and a three-fold increase to US$159.9 billion in 2014 within only three years.22 China’s trade in services has expanded to an unprecedented level of more than US$600 billion in volume in 2014 with 59.5 percent of increase in finance, communications, computer and data-processing services – a reflection of China’s industrial restructuring and modernization of commercial services.23 China still has a huge deficit with the United States in the knowledge economy. For instance, the number of Chinese students in the United States during the last five years has increased to a quarter of a million, whereas there were only about 20 000 US students studying in China as of 2013.24

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Meanwhile, the United States and China have rebalanced their bilateral economic relations to changing strategic situations on a global scale. Since it entered the WTO in 2001, China’s export and import trade with other partners has increased more rapidly than its trade with the United States. In 2014, China’s fastest trade growth was with the European Union (9.9 percent increase from 2013), followed by the United States with a growth of 6.6 percent from year 2013. China’s newly established markets in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), India, Russia, Africa and mid-Eastern Europe, continued to enlarge at a speed faster than average. Both the United States and China have significantly strengthened their participation in mega-multilateral and bilateral economic and security forums and frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region and other places.25 Since 2011, the US ‘pivot’ and new economic initiative in the IndoPacific also promise increased business opportunities in the region, which is paralleled by expanded cooperation between China and Russia, Europe, Central and Southeast Asia, Africa, Latin America, and other places. The Doha Development Agenda (Doha Round) of negotiations, now in its 14th year, has failed to produce tangible results to facilitate free trade particularly for developing countries. A multi-centered global trading system is emerging beyond WTO. Both the United States and China compete over their own separate trading blocks, known as the ‘Spaghetti Bowl’. The United States has been conducting Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations with the European Union, and concluded its Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations with Pacific nations (including Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States and Vietnam), to the exclusion of China. These 12 TPP members seek to set new rules, preferential trade agreements, for economic exchange that reflect commerce in the twenty-first century, including for goods, trade in services, investment, technical cooperation, competition, intellectual property, data flows and high standards in areas such as labor and environment. Another mega-regional talk is also underway, that is, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). RCEP consists of ten ASEAN members (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) plus six of their FTA partners: China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India. In early October 2013, China announced its interest in participating in the 23-country (including EU) negotiation of a Trade in Service Agreement (TSA) outside the WTO framework as well as of the revised Information Technology Agreement.

US–China economic relations 141 China has been signing bilateral FTAs with two dozen countries and regions including Chile, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Iceland, New Zealand, Peru, Taiwan, Australia and ten ASEAN member states. In June 2010, China and Taiwan signed a historic free trade agreement, the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). This is in line with increased cooperation spurred by the 2008 global financial meltdown. As expected, the China–Taiwan ECFA has strengthened ties and reduced the potential for cross-strait tensions, although the 2016 elections cast new uncertainty. The financial crisis of 2008 had structural and institutional effects on China and the United States’ trade and financial relations. In reaction to the post-2008 economic downturn and the sovereign debt and euro crises, advocates of a new world economic order have called for a rebalancing of global demand. Many observers are convinced that the Chinese renminbi (RMB) must step up to the plate in international markets as an alternative to the US dollar, since the United States is spending its way out of the crisis and since internationalization is a necessary step toward the furthering of China’s economic reform. Through swap agreements with foreign central banks, the People’s Bank of China has been promoting trade invoicing, settlement and bond issues in RMB, and the trend is gaining momentum in Asia and Britain. In September 2013 the Shanghai Free Trade Zone (FTZ) was established to carry out reform and innovation in investment, trade, finance, post-filing supervision and RMB convertibility. Critics have been disappointed at its lack of progress on financial reforms. On the other hand, in a year, the Shanghai FTZ expanded from about 29 km2 to over 120 km2 to provide more space for pilot reforms in the FTZ Bonded Area, Lujiazui Financial Area, Jinqiao Export Processing Zone and Zhangjiang High Tech Park, while other FTZs were introduced in Guangdong, Tainjin and Fujian. Some scholars argue that China is slowly chipping away at the US dollar dominance as a reserve currency, thus creating the structures and providing the experience for a gradual expansion of its role in global finance.26 In US–China economic relations, trade imbalances, intellectual property rights, industrial policy and open investment environment are the United States’ main concerns. China, in contrast, has demanded fair business and investment opportunities in the United States and world markets as well as the reform of the US system.

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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS There exists a thriving global market for legal standards, in which national bodies of commercial law compete for adoption in international business contracts. Organizations are active in this field. The World Trade Organization harmonizes national laws on intellectual property as well as trade; the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) attempted to accommodate investment laws through the nowabandoned Multilateral Agreement on Investment; and the EU has harmonized member state law in many areas. These organizations also compete: the WTO captured ‘market share’ from the World Intellectual Property Organization by adopting mandatory intellectual property rules.27 Global Evolution The story of intellectual property rights (IPR) is one of the international political economy of modernity. Intellectual property rights are not just positive rights to intellectual discoveries created once and for all by the state, but constitute a continuing, contested process to legalize conceptions of rights and duties. Among other factors, the real major driver for national IPR policies and their implementation is the different choices made by various nation-states and civil societies in order to balance benefits against costs. As a field for global cooperation, the study of IPR offers rich material for understanding how Britain, Germany, the United States, Japan and China have utilized the international IPR regime to their best advantage in pursuit of economic development. These countries have also proactively shaped IPR regimes in correspondence with new technologies, trade and investment patterns, and even military conflicts. Transnational corporations and supply chains have emerged under the ambit of the global IPR regime, helping create the core institutions of the global economy that challenge the sovereignty of nation-states. The emergence and evolution of international norms thus provide the instruments for very diverse players to participate in the construction of global institutional regimes. England was the first industrialized country to protect copyrights, patents and trademarks from the seventeenth through the mid-nineteenth centuries. During the latter half of the nineteenth century, the international efforts and cooperation on intellectual property took shape in the form of international treaties. Examples include the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883 and the Berne Convention

US–China economic relations 143 for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886. These instruments were often ignored or evaded. Americans were culprits, as much as the French or Germans, for example, in reproducing works by British authors without permission and without paying royalties. In the international trade arena, protectionism and the free trade principle worked side by side, depending on the situation. Maintaining this balance was closely associated with the complex issues involved in nation building and industrialization in the nineteenth century. Britain, for instance, took the lead in extending reciprocal copyright protection to foreign countries by passing the 1838 and 1844 Copyright Acts. The US Copyright Act of 1790 granted copyright protection only to US citizens. As a latecomer on the international scene, the United States had the will to dismantle the obstacles to entering a geopolitical and economic arena dominated by Britain. The global harmonization of IPR gained momentum when the United States linked world trade with intellectual property rights in the 1980s. The United States reshaped its trade laws to give it a series of bilateral enforcement strategies against countries it considered had inadequate or weak levels of intellectual property enforcement. In 1984, the United States amended its Trade Act of 1974 by adding IP provisions. Together with the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, these new provisions required the Office of the United States Trade Representative to identify problem countries and to enter into negotiations. If negotiations failed to work, the offending countries would face trade sanctions by the United States. The worldwide intellectual property movement culminated in the 1994 multilateral Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), binding on all members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The TRIPS Agreement and the Agreement Establishing the WTO are attached to the Marrakesh Final Act that embodies the results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations held that year. Nationstate members of the WTO thus signed up to a set of minimum intellectual property requirements, standards that have gradually become common to more states by virtue of their participation in regional and multilateral trade regimes. The above sketch of the evolution of intellectual property rights suggests how the norms of contract and property were globalized. Through the contract system, the objects of property become tradable capital and markets. Intellectual property norms also become part of the emerging trade norms of cyberspace. However, for sovereign nations, there is an inherent need to manage the balance between international

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intellectual property obligations and the right to choose their national paths of development and welfare. Normative Obligations vs Operative Performance in China In this section, I shall first summarize the Chinese regulatory records on patents, copyrights and trademarks, followed by a discussion of the intellectual property operations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China since the establishment of their diplomatic relations in 1979. On the one hand, this has been a process of China’s continued interaction with international standards and global governance. On the other hand, this is a process of both conflict and conciliation in which the two countries have competed and selectively practiced instrumentalism and formalism although at different times of history. Transparency and the rule of law are two important WTO and global governance standards to which China has selectively adapted its regulations and legislation. The first PRC Patent Law was passed on 12 March 1984, and the implementation details took effect in April 1985. Three amendments were made thereafter in September 1992, August 2000 and December 2008. The substantial patent law revisions in 2000 aimed to align it with the requirements of TRIPS. In October 2001 – just one week before China signed its WTO accession documents – the Chinese government promulgated the amendment to its first Copyright Law of 1990 to take immediate effect in compliance with TRIPS and other international conventions. The Chinese Copyright Law was again revised in 2008. The first contemporary trademark legislation came through in August 1982 and was amended twice in 1993 and 2001. The United States has been the driving force in harmonizing intellectual property rights since World War II. China regards the normalization of US–China relations as an impetus for their modernization launched by Deng Xiaoping over three decades ago. China’s success in using foreign trade to rapidly develop its economy is widely acknowledged. In 1979, China and the United States reached a bilateral agreement on trade relations, which touched on, among other things, the issue of mutual protection of copyright. Since then, China started to develop a conforming intellectual property system, including signing a series of international intellectual property treaties and conventions and joining the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 1980. Although China’s regulatory compliance with US norms and value orientation proved unsatisfactory to the United States, their intellectual property issues became politicized in US domestic politics. IPR was associated

US–China economic relations 145 with China’s human rights record and Most Favored Nation status following the 1989 Tiananmen crisis and the end of the Cold War. In 1989 and 1990, in response to US industry complaints about China’s copyright infringement, the senior Bush administration twice placed China on the Special 301 Priority Foreign Countries report. The Special 301 provision of the US Trade Act of 1974 identifies intellectual property infringement as an unfair trade practice. US industry complaints about foreign intellectual property protection are investigated by the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In reaction, China announced its first Copyright Law in 1990. The following year, the USTR invoked Special 301 status responding to US business requests. The US threatened China with trade sanctions unless China agreed to improve the protection, whereas China threatened to retaliate by drastically raising tariffs on US products. In 1992, intense negotiations between both countries yielded a comprehensive agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property (1992 MOU). In 1996 the United States put China on the Special 301 list for the third time, but a trade war was averted when the United States and China signed a last-minute agreement.28 After its WTO entry, China witnessed a soaring number of domestic IP lawsuits. In 2011, 66 000 IPR cases went to court, up 37.7 percent compared to 2010.29 Similarly, there has been a patent explosion: China in 2011 became the world’s top patent filer, exceeding the United States, Japan and South Korea by a wide margin, and has maintained this position as of 2014. In 2013 there were 825 136 IPR requests (including over 120 000 from foreign entities) made in China, while in the United States the number of patent filings was 571 612, Japan 328 436 and South Korea at 204 589. Since China made the second amendment to its patent law in 2001, patent applications from both domestic and foreign inventors have grown at an annual rate of 23 percent. Four factors contributed to this IPR filing upsurge. First, the pro-patent amendments to the Patent Law in 1992, 2002 and 2008 may have increased the overall return to seeking patent protection. Second, the Chinese state’s push for an innovation-based economy has spurred interest in innovations. Third, accessibility to resources and foreign competition make Chinese firms more innovation oriented. Fourth, growing public awareness of IP rights and incentives also led to the surge of patenting.30 Experts read the huge filing upswing differently: some believe that as more and more Chinese companies become patent holders, they will then have a vested interest in protecting their technology, just like their international competitors. Some argue that Chinese IPR filings in foreign countries are still limited, thus lacking competitive edge in international markets.31

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Besides bilateral negotiations and dialogues, the US government has used world trade institutions to compel countries such as Japan, China and some European countries to make statutory adjustments. In August 2007, the United States requested the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to form a panel to resolve its disagreement with China over certain measures relating to the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in China. One of the three complaints against China was the denial of copyright and relevant rights protection to works that have not been authorized for publication or distribution within China as indicated by Article 4 of the 2001 Chinese Copyright Law. The United States claimed that China was acting inconsistently with its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. The WTO Panel concluded that China should bring the Copyright Law into conformity with its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. Accordingly in its 2010 Copyright Law, China removed the controversial Article 4. But it is unclear how significant public input is to government agencies in lawmaking and trade, given the fact that the Chinese government is treating intellectual property rights as a strategic resource. Over the last two decades, the Chinese developmental state has, on an unprecedented scale, engaged in the construction of intellectual property capability. This is a deliberate, national strategy somewhat like what Japan, Inc. did in its day. This means the enhanced state ability to invest in high and green technology – such as high-speed railways and sulfur dioxide (SO2) scrubbers, or flue gas desulfurization facilities – where state-guided acquisition of intellectual property rights, expanding markets and technology are integrated. Since 2008, China has built the world’s largest high-speed rail network. The 16 000-km rail system connects 160 cities on the Mainland in 2014, and the Chinese government will spend US$300 billion to expand it to 25 000 km by 2020. This means planning and creating frameworks and funding structures and providing coordination and transfer of knowledge through some superagencies such as the State Intellectual Property Office and the National Development and Reform Commission in China – arguably a parallel to Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). For both China and the United States, continuous technological innovation is the key to controlling the future. In the area of climate change and technology transfer, the Chinese state agencies utilized the market to help acquire foreign technologies.32 SO2 scrubbers, for instance, became the most vital technology in achieving China’s goal of 10 percent reduction in SO2 emissions in the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–10). By the end of 2010, over 90 percent were installed by Chinese companies using licensed foreign technologies.33

US–China economic relations 147 Another example is the Beijing–Shanghai High-Speed Railway (HSR), the largest and longest HSR that was built all at once. In 2008 the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology and the Ministry of Railways signed the Chinese HSR Joint Operation Plan for Indigenous Innovation. This Joint Operation Plan aimed to meet the key technical needs of the Beijing–Shanghai HSR, speedily develop China’s intellectual property rights to the 350-km/hour HSR system. The entire investment of the plan was CNY3 billion, of which 1 billion was from the central government, with matching funds provided by the Ministry of Railways. Intellectual property rights represent a controversial limit on contractual obligations and implementation choices, common to all international treaties. But focusing the attention on such juridical wrangling on specific issues in international fora and courts of law would miss the point that the big game of global technological change has already moved the field into a new terrain where new international norms are emerging and being used by major players in new constellations. The strategic use of intellectual property rights as an important part of China’s national development involves IPR acquisition through contracts, systematic domestic research and development policies, and joined-up planning and investment procedures. The current global power constellation within the IPR regime displays a challenge by China – in particular its National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) – to the powerful projection of US legislation on international IPR and to the direct and indirect US statutory control of technological exports. The global challenge posed by Japan’s MITI in the 1950s–80s was visibly formidable, but is being eclipsed by China’s NDRC. Although the European Union (EU) and its member states assume a significant role in the world economy, they have been much stronger in ‘protecting’ themselves from the impact of IPR regimes (e.g., in terms of genetically modified crops and food) than in controlling or challenging them. The global interlinking of IPR, financial, environmental and resource extraction regimes raises fundamental questions that impinge on how polities, corporations and organizations interact.

CAN GEOPOLITICS BE OVERCOME? A CONTINUED SEARCH FOR ORDER US–China economic relations are ambidextrous: they are able to help the United States and China to both articulate their differences and to interact together carrying both differences and sharedness. It is these very

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dynamic paradoxes themselves that provide the kind of purpose and meaning to the United States’ and China’s continued search for order in their uneasy mutual relationship. There is much potential for Sino–US economic relations, but that is contingent on whether both countries can avoid stalling or backtracking over divergent views for trade, security, strategic positioning and ideologies. Such a situation confronted the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Since the beginning of 2013, voices on both sides have strongly advocated a new model of great power relations for long-term cooperation.34 At a press conference during the first plenary session of the 12th National People’s Congress in March 2013, Chinese Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi, stated that China and the United States should work together in an effort to build ‘a new type of relationship between major countries’, that is ‘unprecedented and inspiring for future generations’. President Xi Jinping expressed the same goodwill during his visit with President Obama in California in June 2013. A few months later, the report by the China–US Joint Working Group – the Atlantic Council of the United States and the China Institute of International Studies – entitled ‘US–China Cooperation: Key to the Global Future’ calls on both countries to reconcile their strategic aims and strategies with cooperative pursuits of global common interests. The United States and China should ‘move from emphasizing “balancing of power” against each other to “pooling” the power of the US, China, and other nations and non-state actors to solve global problems and meet long-term challenges’.35 However, the differences between the two countries are obvious. To Americans, two main areas of contention with China in 2014–15 include China’s alleged cybertheft harming US businesses and national security, and China’s reclamation in the disputed South China Sea. More broadly, from the US perspective, China seems perpetually dissatisfied with the global system without making any constructive proposals to change the system.36 China counters that the United States itself is the very destabilizer in Asia and throughout the world. ‘The United States is hypocritically bending the rules and playing double standards all the time’.37 From the Chinese point of view, China is integrating into the world system rather than breaking it while making constructive contributions to peace keeping and climate change. China believes that China faces multifaceted challenges and problems, which have, however, been dealt with through continued growth and collective resolution to pursue a better life during the last four decades. Many US observers recognize that in the mature economy of the United States such a consensus and dynamic to reform seem to be lacking in their country at the moment.

US–China economic relations 149 The United States remains vague on what exactly China’s legitimate influence around the globe should be. Should China be a strong trader and economic performer without a commensurate military presence in the world? How then should the United States deal with its Eurasian dilemma in relation to the ‘pivot’ to Asia that many critics deem hard to complete? China consumes half of the steel and coal in the world, yet China’s voting share in International Monetary Fund (IMF) is equal to that of Belgium and the Netherlands together. The US decision not to join the Chinese-initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the widespread criticism of US dealings with AIIB in the United States have heightened the United States’ dilemma about China’s role in global affairs. In June 2015, 50 countries signed the article of the agreement of the AIIB including Britain and Australia. The real rationale beyond the public pronouncement is that Washington sees the AIIB headquartered in Beijing and the New Development Bank, its Chinese sister for the BRICS (the BRICS Development Bank), as a geopolitical threat. Involving over 40 percent of the world population and over 25 percent of the global GDP, the New Development Bank was created in 2014 by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa to counter the US-dominated World Bank, the IMF and the Japan–US-led Asian Development Bank (ADB) based in Manila.38 In 2013–14, the Chinese government put forth the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative, which focuses on infrastructure investment in Eurasian and Southeast Asian and African countries. In the course of the Western debate about how to channel China’s rise during the last 20 years, China has learned its way and is now perceived to have a substantial global strategy particularly since the inception of the Xi Jingping and Li Keqiang administration in 2013, in comparison with the United States and other advanced countries.39 Many critics agree that China’s international influence comes largely from its economic strength – it is a major importer and exporter, a major host to foreign direct investment, a foreign investor in a wide range of developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and a major global creditor. China’s export trade and use of labor are becoming more sophisticated and it is outsourcing unskilled work to somewhere else in Africa. Despite their success and contribution to developing countries, Chinese ‘going out’ policies in Africa and Latin and South Americas have been the subject of complaints for their disregard for human rights, local labor, and environmental standards.40 As China changes from an agrarian, sweatshop, manufacturing economy to a mature consumer society, its state-sponsored industrialization, urbanization and overseas investment are widely seen as similar

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to developmental capitalism in Japan and Europe. Since the 18th Chinese Communist Party Congress in November 2012, China has been implementing its economic blueprint that promises sweeping structural changes over the next decade with a much stronger role for market forces to allocate capital and resources in the economy. Anti-corruption, governance with the rule of law, ecological economy, real estate market, shadow banking, Internet financing, aging population and countrywide medical insurance are some of the reform agendas. What does the Chinese leadership’s agenda mean for US–China economic relations in the midst of uneven global economy and geopolitical reorientation? Russia’s takeover of Crimea in 2014 and the changing situation in Ukraine, the Middle East and Europe have cast further geopolitical complexity on US–China relations. Russia and China have moved toward a comprehensive strategic partnership, although the upgraded Russian– Chinese relationship has been questioned as unsustainable, unsubstantial with mutual conflicts in Central Asia. Joint military exercises, the US$400 billion gas deal, and the high-speed railways are some common projects launched by the two countries in a short few years.41 However, the United States and China actually can work together if they want to. Each year the list of specific outcomes and areas for further cooperation are getting longer from the Strategic and Economic Dialogue of the strategic track: 127 items in 2015 vs 91 in 2013. One area is climate change. At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC, with 21 member countries and two observing members) summit 5–11 November 2014, the Sino–US agreement on carbon dioxide reduction cap was signed. The United States agreed to reduce the emissions by 26 percent by 2020, whereas China agreed not to increase the emissions by 2030. Besides climate change, education, legal reform, energy, ecology, mineral resources, disaster relief, security in the Asia Pacific, and even the military are some areas for both countries to work together.

CONCLUSION The present analysis views US–China economic relations as a field that is constantly changing and reinventing itself in response to the needs of all participants, and as an outcome of their active use of international law, practices and procedures. I have taken a close look at how notions of exceptionalism, essentialism and culturalism, claims of universalism as well as political and/or ideological superiority, are utilized by all players for their own ends, (re)interpreting them as part of their national histories, and cultural, ethnic and religious make-up. I posit that in the

US–China economic relations 151 long term, the governance of US–China economic relations has grown stronger and more intricate, leading to greater sharing of international norms and greater convergence in the behavior of the participants. However, given the diversity of interests and the asynchrony of economic, technological and political development, US–China and global cooperation will continue to be ambiguously possible as well as impossible. China is not exceptional in selectively adopting marketization and internationalization. Bilateral, multilateral and global governance can discipline national governance, without replacing it, through rules and procedures that hamper capture by parochial interests.42 China will take part in global governance in a wider and deeper fashion. China’s ongoing reform has not been confined to active participation in economic globalization but also in political democratization, that have promoted its economic, social and cultural progress, turning itself an important force on the global stage. China has a reflexive way to embrace democracy trying to reach an internal consensus on new ideas and a democratic procedure. It notices constraints imposed by democratic institutions of OECD and EU and their relative inability to deal with financial and refugee crises. The ‘China scares’ and ‘the US scares’ do not help the entrenchment of democracy and freedom in China and US–China relations. Two speculative observations may serve as a conclusion here. First, China, while asserting itself and strengthening its strategic position, seeks to avoid real conflict, even in areas where it has some leverage. Its approach is to experience how security, finance and trade relationships through its own active participation undergo qualitative shifts to its own advantage. ‘China wants global cooperation to work. It does not want to overturn the current global system, but to reform it, and it wants America and Europe to engage in that process of reform without trying to dominate it’.43 As the world’s two largest economies with the two largest military budgets and forces, the United States and China need to learn to collaborate more with each other and with other countries. Their continuous trading has unleashed opportunities for all parties involved, but false dilemmas and black-and-white thinking have proved more than a challenge. Second, what still today constitutes as Chinese or US strengths or weaknesses may gradually emerge as their burden or advantages. For example, the United States’ global financial role, its sovereign debt advantage, and global regulatory dominance, while today still formidable, in the view of some already display weaknesses: tiny cracks and fissures that can still be pasted over but begin to cause structural instability. China is transforming its export-oriented (40 percent of the GDP) economy to

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consumer-driven development. Real estate bubbles and overhanded statism particularly in state-owned enterprises may impede its continued growth. But the value of Chinese brands have improved within a short time as more Chinese firms begin to eye the United States and global markets: 14 Chinese brands including Alibaba made it to Top 100 world most valuable brands list in 2015, while back in 2006 there was only one.44 But China still needs some time to catch up. In the case of the China FAW Group Corporation and German Volkswagen negotiations, to China, the results of attempting to use the Chinese market in exchange for German and other foreign technologies have been disappointing. China’s auto market is the world’s largest, but is still a developing market. The Chinese auto manufacturers now account for more than a quarter of China’s passenger car market while narrowing their gap with international brands in producing dependable vehicles. Both China and the United States are changing, and will confront very tough choices in the coming years.45 Only the future will tell.

NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

11.

Subramanian, A. (2011), Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China’s Economic Dominance, Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, p. 186. Shambaugh, D. (2013), China Goes Global: The Partial Power, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. x and 6. Nolan, P. (2012), Is China Buying the World? Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, pp. 140–41. Hu, A. (2015), ‘Embracing China’s “new normal”: why the economy is still on track’, Foreign Affairs, May/June, 8–12. See ‘U.S.–China Joint Fact Sheet: Sixth meeting of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue’, U.S. Department of the Treasury, 11 July 2014, accessed 23 June 2015 at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2561.aspx. One example is De Soysa, I. and P. Midford (2012), ‘Enter the dragon! An empirical analysis of Chinese versus US arms transfers to autocrats and violators of human rights, 1989–2006’, International Studies Quarterly, 56 (4), 843–56. Potter, P.B. (2014), Assessing Treaty Performance in China: Trade and Human Rights, Vancouver: UBC Press. Appadurai, A. (2000), ‘Grassroots globalization and the research imagination’, Public Culture, 12 (1), 1–19. Calhoun, C. (2010), ‘Beck, Asia and second modernity’, The British Journal of Sociology, 61 (3), 597–619. Bowles, S. and H. Gintis (2011), A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Nowark, M.A. and R. Highfield (2011), SuperCooperators: Altruism, Evolution, and Why We Need Each Other to Succeed, New York: Free Press; Sahlins, M. (2008), The Western Illusion of Human Nature, Chicago, IL: Prickly Paradigm Press. Abbott, K.W. and D. Snidal (2001), ‘International “standards” and international governance’, Journal of European Public Policy, 8 (3), 345–70.

US–China economic relations 153 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

23.

24.

25.

Li, L. (2010), Breaking Through: The Birth of China’s Opening-Up Policy, New York: Oxford University Press. A few paragraphs below are drawn from Wang, D. (2013), The United States and China: A History from the Eighteenth Century to the Present, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, Chapter 10. Qin, J.Y. (2007), ‘Trade, investment and beyond: the impact of WTO accession on China’s legal system’, The China Quarterly, Special Issue, No. 191, September, 720–44. Drysdale, P. (2013), ‘China and the norms of trade’, East Asia Forum, 19 August. Ibid. Also see King, A. and S. Armstrong (2013), ‘Did China really ban rare earth metals exports to Japan?’ East Asian Forum, August. For US figures, see https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#2015 and https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c0004.html, accessed 21 June 2015. Chinese statistics can be found at http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201402/ t20140224_514970.html and http://us.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztdy/201503/201503009 11236.shtml, accessed on 21 June 2015 [in Chinese]. Since the 1980s, the two nations have drastically differed on the extent of trade and the trade deficit. The controversy over statistics originated in a number of areas: the two sides’ different accounting approaches to re-exports to and from China via Hong Kong; US policy constraints on exports to China; the role of foreign firms in China; the multinational trade in commercial services; and global outsourcing and capital flows in the increasingly interdependent East Asian and world economy. See Wang, The United States and China, for more comprehensive discussion. The 2015 figure makes the United States the third most populous country in the world following India. Carter, B. (2014), ‘Is China’s economy really the largest in the world?’ BBC News Magazine, 16 December, accessed 21 June 2015 at http://www.bbc.com/news/ magazine-30483762. The World Bank, ‘GDP per capita (current US$)’, accessed 21 June 2015 at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD. U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (2015), U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, accessed 4 July 2105 at http://www.census.gov/ foreign-trade/Press-Release/2014pr/final_revisions/final.pdf. World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics 2012, p. 29, accessed 21 March 2016 at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2012_e/its2012_e.pdf. The 2014 figure comes from Zhonghua renmin gongheguo tongjiju (National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China), announced in February 2015, accessed 21 June 2015 at http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201502/t20150226_685 799.html [in Chinese]. Commercial services include a large variety of trade-related activities such as maintenance and repair services, transport, travel, information services, computer, banking, accounting, insurance and education, legal counsel, management consulting, royalties and license fees, telecommunications, transportation and travel, and government goods and services. Xi, J. (2014), ‘Goujian Zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi’ [Constructing a new type of U.S.–China relations between major powers], remarks made in June 2013 during Xi’s meeting with President Barack Obama. See Zhonggong Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, Shibada yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian [Selected Documents of the Central Committee since the 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party], Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, pp. 305–6. According to President Xi, the number of Chinese students in the United States in 2013 was 190 000. Asia-Pacific multilateral institutions include the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (1994), ASEAN Political-Security Community

154

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27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

32. 33. 34.

35.

36.

37.

Handbook of US–China relations (APSC, 2003), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting (1993, APEC), East Asia Summit (2005, a leader’s forum comprising 18 members, including the ten ASEAN members, China, Japan, South Korea, United States, Russia, India, Australia and New Zealand), ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM, 2010), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO, 2001, an outgrowth of the Shanghai Five, i.e., China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, with the addition of Uzbekistan), Shangri-La Dialogue (2001), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC, 1980, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka), Six Party Talks (2003), and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). Further, see Lynch, D.A. (2010), Trade and Globalization: An Introduction to Regional Trade Agreements, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Ito, T. (2013), ‘Convergent currencies: challenges to the Asian financial markets’, East Asian Forum, 17 June, accessed 16 September 2013 at http://www.east asiaforum.org/2013/06/17/convergent-currencies-challenges-to-the-asian-financialmarkets/; Chin, G.T. (2013), ‘Understanding currency policy and central banking in China’, The Journal of Asian Studies, 72 (3), 519–38. Abbott, K.W. and D. Snidal (2001), ‘International “standards” and international governance’, Journal of European Public Policy, 8 (3), 345–70. Chen, C.-S. and T.A. Maxwell (2010), ‘Three decades of bilateral copyright negotiations: Mainland China and the United States’, Government Information Quarterly, No. 27, 196–207. China Daily European Weekly (2012), News Briefs: ‘Number of lawsuits soars’, 16–22 March, 2. Hu, A.G. and G.H. Jefferson (2009), ‘A great wall of patents: what is behind China’s recent patent explosion?’ Journal of Development Economics, 90 (1), 57–68. Sneddon, M. (2015), ‘A look at the huge upswing in China patent filings’, Intellectual Property Watch, 22 April, accessed 7 July 2015 at http://www.ipwatch.org/2015/04/22/a-look-at-the-huge-upswing-in-china-patent-filings/; Perkowski, J. (2012), ‘Protecting intellectual property rights in China’, Forbes, 18 April, accessed 7 July 2015 at http://www.forbes.com/sites/jackperkowski/2012/04/18/protectingintellectual-property-rights-in-china/print/. Xu, Y. (2011), ‘China’s functioning market for sulfur dioxide scrubbing technologies’, Environmental Science & Technologies, 45 (21), 9161–7. Ockwell, D.G., R. Haum, A. Mallett and J. Watson (2010), ‘Intellectual property rights and low carbon technology transfer: conflicting discourses of diffusion and development’, Global Environmental Change, 20 (4), 729–38. Hadley, S.J., Board Director of the Atlantic Council (2013), ‘US–China: a new model of great power relations’, lecture given at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy on 11 October 2013 accessed 9 November 2013 at http:// www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/us-china-a-new-model-of-great-powerrelations. The Atlantic Council of the United States (Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security) and the China Institute of International Studies, China–US Joint Working Group, report, China–US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future, September 2013, p. 19, accessed 21 March 2016 at http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/ china-us-cooperation-key-to-the-global-future. Naughton, B. (2014), in N. Hachigian (ed.), Debating China: The U.S.–China Relationship in Ten Conversations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. xiv, 28; Sutter, R.G. (2013), Foreign Relations of the PRC: The Legacies and Constraints of China’s International Politics since 1949, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Formulations such as ‘The United States is the culprit causing disorder in the South China Sea’ are commonly seen in the Chinese official and unofficial media. See, for

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38.

39. 40. 41.

42. 43. 44. 45.

instance, Renmin ribao haiwaiban (2015), ‘Dui Nanhai wenti Meiguo xu mingbai jige jiben daoli’ [On the issue of the South China Sea, the United States needs to understand a few basics], 27 May, accessed 11 July 2015 at http://news.cntv.cn/2015/ 05/27/ARTI1432676682707748.shtml; Zeng, J. (2015), ‘Zhongguo gai ruhe yingjie Ao junji xunhang nanhai?’ [How should China deal with the prospect of Australian military planes patrolling the South China Sea], posted on Gongshiwang message board on 4 June, accessed 11 July 2015 at http://www.21ccom.net/plus/ wapview.php?aid=125435. The two largest shareholders of the ADB are Japan (15.7 percent of capital share) and the United States (15.6 percent), which have strong influence over ADB leadership, personnel and policy. As the largest holder of foreign reserves in the world, China’s share in the ADB is 6.5 percent. The wave of change is extrapolated in Freeman, C.W., Jr (2012), Interesting Times: China, America, and the Shifting Balance of Prestige, Charlottesville, VA: Just World Books. Harris, S. (2014), China’s Foreign Policy, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, p. 175 and Chapter 6. In 2011, the Chongqing (Southwest China)–Duisburg (Western Germany) rail line via Xinjiang and Eurasian countries was open for cargo transport as the initial part of the growing rail network, the so-called New Silk Road between Europe and China. In November 2014, another European–Chinese freight rail route of more than 8000 miles was in operation between Yiwu (Zhejiang) and Madrid (Spain), the longest in the world. Xiao, Y., A. Tylecote, and J. Liu (2013), ‘Why not greater catch-up by Chinese firms? The impact of IPR, corporate governance and technology intensity on late-comer strategies’, Research Policy, 42 (3), 749–64. Brown, G. (2012), ‘Let’s stick together’, International Herald Tribunal Magazine, 30 November, 32, 34. On 11 November 2015, ‘Singles Day’ in China, Alibaba set a new sales record. Within 24 hours, CNY91.2 billion (US$14.3 billion) worth of merchandise was sold online. Green, B.R. (2012), ‘Two concepts of liberty: U.S. Cold War grand strategies and the liberal tradition’, International Security, 37 (2), 9–43. Sound relations with regional countries have been the new focus in China’s security strategy, although the outcomes are unclear. During a meeting on neighboring diplomacy in October 2013, President Xi Jinping put forth four notions of closeness, honesty, benefit and tolerance as the basic principle in handling neighboring nation-states. Xi stated that good relations with neighbors form the basis for efforts to create a sound regional environment for prosperity and mutual development: Xi, Jinping (2014), The Governance of China, Beijing: The Foreign Language Press, pp. 296–9. On the troubled Sino–Japanese relationship, the China Daily’s editorial of 26 October 2013 calls for both China and Japan to ‘rebuild strategic mutual trust’: ‘To build strategic trust the two countries should focus on three things: The first is to faithfully adhere to the political commitments reached by previous leaders of the two countries … Zhou Enlai and Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka … The second is to adhere to the four China–Japan political documents that have been signed, namely the China–Japan Joint Statement, the China–Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship, the China–Japan Joint Declaration, and the China–Japan Joint Statement on All-round Promotion of Strategic Relationship of Mutual Benefit … The third is to strengthen people-topeople exchanges and ideas’.

PART III THE US–CHINA STRATEGIC RIVALRY

9. US–China strategic rivalry Angela Ming Yan Poh and Mingjiang Li

China’s rapid rise over the past few decades has provoked widely divergent views with regard to US–China relations and its impact on the global and regional security order. Scholars of both comparative politics and international relations have sketched out various contrasting prospects as China continues its meteoric rise and reshapes the global distribution of power. In this chapter, we identify three main schools of thought in the existing literature concerning the trajectory of US–China relations and its impact on global and regional security. First, a realism model of power transition emphasizes the structural conditions that will define the trajectory of the US–China relationship.1 China can be expected to increasingly confront the United States and its allies to reshape the international system and realign spheres of influence as it grows stronger economically and militarily, and as the United States faces the prospects of a relative decline. Second, a ‘tributary system’ model adopts a historical and cultural perspective, suggesting that China may be striving toward a hierarchical tributary system in contemporary East Asia, as was the case in Imperial China. According to such a view, China may seek to establish a ‘benign dominance’ that is unlike the Europe’s ‘Westphalian’ system, and this system may in fact bring about stability to the region.2 Third, a liberal model of ‘peaceful coexistence’ suggests that there is a real chance for the United States and China to coexist peacefully, as their economies are heavily interdependent. This interdependence therefore increases the costs of war and induces restraint on both countries.3 Many scholars also believe that the two countries are likely to find new ways to properly manage bilateral ties and the changing dynamics of the relationship.4 There is no doubt that the United States and China have had many points of friction in their bilateral interactions over the past few decades, particularly in the areas of politics, ideology and security. However, while tensions in these areas continue to exist, both countries have largely managed to maintain the overall stability in their relationship thus far. Washington has always been far more active than Beijing in shaping the discourse and making grand proposals to guide bilateral interactions. In recent years, however, Beijing has also made significant attempts to 159

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propose grand strategies in order to shape the bilateral relationship to its favour. An example is the slogan ‘new type of great power relations’ (xinxing daguo guanxi), which was first raised by then Chinese VicePresident Xi Jinping during his visit to the United States in February 2012, and subsequently reiterated on multiple occasions by Chinese leaders.5 Beijing has constantly argued that this proposal is intended to avoid the so-called ‘Thucydides Trap’, and to mitigate the strategic rivalry between the two countries. The United States has viewed this widely publicized slogan with some ambivalence. Some US officials and scholars have raised concerns that Xi’s slogan seeks to elevate China to an equal status with the United States, and in turn compel Washington to accommodate China on the latter’s terms.6 Washington has, however, not rejected this slogan outright, and has also repeatedly expressed its willingness to work with China to maintain peace and stability in the world, as well as to tackle various global challenges. Notwithstanding these positive signs and rhetoric, many analysts remain highly sceptical of the trajectory and ultimate destiny of the relations between these two major powers. This chapter weighs into these existing debates by reviewing the competition between the United States and China at the global level and in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as existing impetus and efforts by both countries to strengthen engagement and cooperation. The analysis will proceed in three sections. The first section examines the extent to which China is posing a challenge to the United States in terms of economic and military resources, as well as soft power and influence on the world stage. It also evaluates the potential for conflict between both countries in these aspects. The second section focuses on the Asia-Pacific region, in particular how the United States’ policy of strategic rebalance to Asia and a more assertive Chinese foreign policy over the past few years have affected the power dynamics between both countries. This section also assesses the implications of these shifts in power dynamics on the region. The final section concludes by discussing the possible trajectory of the US–China relationship. We argue that the US–China strategic rivalry at the global level will be more manageable, given that China appears to be more interested in reforming some elements of the existing international system, rather than in establishing a fundamentally different global order. The more problematic aspect will be the security contentions between China and the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. Leaders from both countries will need to demonstrate extraordinary wisdom in order to delicately manage the security rivalry in the region.

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US–CHINA RIVALRY: A COMPARISON OF HARD AND SOFT POWER China’s increasing ascendance to great power status on the world stage has emerged as a topic that preoccupies many policy-makers, scholars and journalists in recent years. This is in part due to the scale and speed of China’s ascendance, which have resulted in the inability of many countries, possibly including China itself, to comprehend and accept China’s new international status. The consequence of this is the substantial rhetoric of a ‘China threat’, as well as strong nationalistic sentiments within China against a West that it perceives as containing China’s rise. Some Chinese scholars and analysts have also suggested that there are differences within China itself with regard to the assessment of China’s status in the international system. There are conflicting imperatives and obligations that Chinese leaders have to take into account – such as whether China should undertake more international responsibilities or focus on its domestic development – resulting in a seemingly inconsistent Chinese foreign policy.7 In considering the dynamics of the US–China relationship, one must therefore examine the gap between both countries in terms of economic power, military capabilities, soft power and role in global governance. The assessment of which will shed light on the extent of competition as well as the potential for conflict in these aspects. Economic Power China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, accepting terms and obligations put in place by a capitalist order largely dominated by the United States, and making significant domestic adjustments, which had led to increased pressure on China’s largely uncompetitive state-owned enterprises. The United States supported China’s entry into the WTO, believing that free trade was ‘a forward strategy for freedom’ and that economic freedom would eventually result in democracy.8 As Alastair Iain Johnston suggested, China’s entry and participation in the WTO marked a successful ‘socialization’ process that many had hoped for.9 China’s entry into the WTO was crucial in propelling China’s economy forward, leading to unprecedented rates of economic growth. By 2013, China overtook the United States to become the world’s largest merchandise trader, with its share of the world trade increasing from 3.6 per cent in 2000 to 11 per cent in 2013.10 As of 2014, China is the largest trading

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partner of more than 120 countries and regions, and its growing number of free trade agreements and bilateral treaties will continue to shape the world’s trading profile. China also has the largest accumulation of foreign currency reserves, and is the largest foreign holder of the United States Treasury securities.11 More impressively, China overtook the United States as the world’s largest economy in 2014, after the IMF adjusted for purchasing power parity. The Chinese economy is projected to continue growing, albeit at a slightly slower pace.12 Even by the most conservative standards of estimation, China’s economy will likely overtake that of the United States’ by 2027.13 China’s continued economic growth will necessarily intensify the competition between China and the United States, especially with China increasingly engaging in favourable trade activities with countries around the globe, including the United States’ closest allies. For example, Chinese President Xi Jinping reportedly sealed more than £30 billion worth of trade and investment deals during his high-profile state visit to the United Kingdom in October 2015.14 China and Australia also signed an ambitious free trade agreement in June 2015 – following the completion of negotiations in November 2014 – which on full implementation will allow 95 per cent of Australian goods exports to China to be tariff free.15 It is unclear the extent to which these extensive trade deals will realign countries’ strategic calculations towards the United States and China. The United States has also had mixed feelings regarding China’s economic growth over the past few decades. While the United States has benefited from its trade relationship with China, at the same time it has accused China of its state-directed policies that distort trade and investment flows, its poor intellectual property rights enforcement, cyber economic espionage, currency valuation and pressure on foreign firms in China to share information on technology in exchange for access to the Chinese market.16 These factors contributed to the now famous saying by John Mearsheimer that ‘the United States has a profound interest in seeing Chinese economic growth slow considerably in the years ahead’.17 And indeed, one cannot take for granted that China’s economic growth would be a linear process. Scratch beneath the headline figures and it will become apparent that China remains behind the United States as an economic power, and is facing enormous challenges in sustaining the growth of its economy. China has thus far benefited from its favourable exchange rate and trade policies, low wages and large domestic market. However, as its economy reaches a higher level of development, it is increasingly losing its competitive edge as a low-cost manufacturing base to neighbouring countries like Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia. China also lags far behind the United States in its financial services sector and

US–China strategic rivalry 163 knowledge-intensive industries. Many of China’s massive state-owned enterprises are heavily reliant on the domestic market, with a substantial number logging losses and struggling with overcapacity.18 In the medium to long term, China’s economy could be further disrupted by a myriad of problems on its domestic front, including a rapidly ageing population, widening regional economic disparity and rampant corruption. China’s economic growth is already slowing, and this trend is expected to continue despite policy adjustments to avoid an abrupt slowdown. Chinese leaders recognize the significant challenges and potential obstacles to its growing economy, and will be keen to maintain stable ties with the United States as well as its other trading partners to ensure that there will not be further disruptions and instabilities, especially given its heavy reliance on trade that requires a stable international environment. The United States is similarly distracted with increasing challenges such as budgetary constraints and other domestic problems. The sustainability of Washington’s commitment to the Asia-Pacific region is challenged by an increasingly constrained defence budget. According to the 2011 Budget Control Act, there could be approximately US$600 billion in potential defence cuts between 2013 and 2023, in addition to the US$450 billion in cuts that have already been put in place.19 The United States’ increasing entanglement in the Middle East will further challenge its will and ability to directly confront China. The already substantive and growing economic interdependence between the United States and China is also a significant mitigating factor for conflict. China is one of the United States’ largest trading partners, second only to Canada.20 Over the past few years, Chinese investors have been investing heavily in the United States, especially at the sub-federal levels. According to the US–China Business Council, US exports to China reached US$120 billion in 2013, making China the third-largest export market for US goods, just behind Canada and Mexico.21 The United States’ exports to China also increased 255 per cent from 2004 to 2013, with 401 out of a total of 435 congressional districts in the United States experiencing triple-digit growth of exports to China during the same period.22 These investments and joint ventures between the United States and China will increasingly constrain the ability of Washington and Beijing to adopt any measures that could potentially upset the bilateral trade relationship. Regular bilateral talks between both countries, such as the US–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue and the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, will provide further platforms for the United States and China to enhance communication and prevent competition from deteriorating into conflict.

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Military Capabilities The military-to-military relationship between both countries is a weaker link, and is likely to be the most challenging aspect of US–China relations. The United States has viewed China’s rapid expansion of its defence budget and military capabilities over the past two decades with immense suspicion. The United States Department of Defense, in its 2014 annual report to Congress, highlighted that despite increasing dialogue between the United States and Chinese militaries, ‘outstanding questions remain about the rate of growth in China’s military expenditure due to the lack of transparency regarding China’s intention’.23 Responding to the report, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense accused the United States of ‘using double standards … [having spent] several times more on its military than China has on its armed forces in recent years, strived to develop state-of-the-art weaponry, organized aggressive forces to engage in cyberattacks and sought to deploy a global network of its anti-missile system’.24 China lags behind the United States in a range of areas, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is clearly aware of the superiority of the United States’ military, especially given the PLA’s lack of powerprojection capabilities, defence technology due to export restrictions, and limited joint capabilities with a primarily land-based army. The United States’ defence expenditure is also far larger than that of China’s. In 2013, the United States spent US$640 billion on defence, several times more than China’s military budget – even by the United States’ prediction of China’s total military-related spending of approximately US$145 billion in the same year, close to US$30 billion more than China’s officially disclosed military budget.25 However, notwithstanding the significant gap in defence expenditure and capabilities, the United States remains concerned about China’s potential development and deployment of Anti-Access and Area-Denial (A2/AD) capabilities, which threatens the United States’ security interests, particularly its ability to project power in the Asia-Pacific region. China’s shift toward a missile-centric strategy, which includes mediumrange and short-range ballistic missiles, could also pose a substantial challenge to the US Navy’s presence in the West Pacific region.26 The US military is also increasingly nervous about the PLA’s use of asymmetrical methods, including space, cyber and electronic warfare, which could potentially compromise the United States’ computer systems and critical information in times of peace, and hit military facilities and civilian networks in combat situations.27 From China’s perspective, the United States’ increasing involvement in the South and East China Seas,

US–China strategic rivalry 165 repeated arms sales to Taiwan and its reconnaissance and surveillance activities along China’s coast are severe hindrances to the military-tomilitary relationship. The US and Chinese military forces frequently operate in close proximity with each other, resulting in significant risks and opportunities for miscalculation. In April 2001, for example, there was a collision between a US Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plane and PLA naval F-8 fighter in the South China Sea, which killed the Chinese pilot and led to a diplomatic row between both countries with China’s detention of the 24 US crew members.28 More recently, there was a near-collision between a Chinese vessel accompanying the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning, and a US guided missile cruiser, the USS Cowpens in the South China Sea in December 2013. Such incidents could easily escalate and result in a military conflict between both countries. In this regard, China has repeatedly requested the United States to stop such reconnaissance activities, which China regards as a severe threat to its national security. Chinese media has also asked the United States to imagine what it would think if Chinese military vessels similarly started reconnaissance activities off the coast of Florida, California or New York.29 However, there have been increasing efforts between both militaries in recent years to sustain dialogue and enhance cooperation, most notably through the PLA Navy’s inaugural participation at the Rim of the Pacific Exercise at the invitation of the US Navy in 2014, and the conduct of the first joint drill on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in China’s Hainan Province in January 2015.30 The United States and China have also established various working groups, even in contentious areas like cybersecurity. While there remains strategic distrust between both countries, and progress in various areas has been hindered by mutual accusations of military hack attacks and reconnaissance activities,31 these existing efforts of cooperation represent the willingness of both countries to continuously work on improving the military to military relationship despite existing differences. Soft Power The Chinese leadership picked up the discourse of ‘soft power’ since Joseph Nye coined the term in 1990.32 At the Central Foreign Affairs Leadership Group meeting in January 2006, then Chinese President Hu Jintao noted that the increase of China’s status and influence depended on both hard and soft power.33 In Hu’s subsequent keynote speech to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2007, he declared that ‘culture has become a more and more important source of

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national cohesion and creativity and a factor of growing significance in the competition in overall national strength … [China] must enhance culture as part of the soft power’.34 More recently, in a speech to members of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee in January 2014, Xi vowed to ‘promote China’s cultural soft power by disseminating modern Chinese values and showing the charm of Chinese culture to the world’.35 China has indeed attempted to enhance its soft power through the promotion of Chinese values and culture in recent years, including through China’s hosting of various major international events such as the Olympic Games in 2008 and the Shanghai Expo in 2010. China has also invested significant resources in boosting its cultural diplomacy through the establishment of government-funded Confucius Institutes worldwide. As of 2013, there were more than 400 Confucius Institutes in over 100 countries and regions.36 There has been some success in China’s efforts to promote its language and culture. According to the Modern Language Association of America, while traditionally popular foreign languages among college students in the United States – such as Spanish, French, German, Italian and Japanese – have all witnessed a reduction in enrolment numbers from 2009 to 2013, the number of students opting to learn Mandarin has been steadily on the rise during the same period.37 There have also been an increasing number of colleges in the United States offering courses related to Chinese history and culture. In addition to enhancing its soft power by promoting culture, China has also sought to expand its influence through a ‘soft use of power’,38 particularly its attempts to increase attraction and appeal through economic diplomacy. These efforts have similarly not been in vain. According to a 2013 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center, China’s strongest supporters are in Asia, Africa and Latin America, particularly among nations that have become large commodity exporters to, or are huge aid recipients of, China.39 Despite these efforts, there remains a wide divergence of views concerning whether China’s soft power lags far behind its economic and military power.40 Over the past decade, Beijing’s efforts to enhance its soft power have been hindered by significant publicity worldwide on China’s domestic crackdown on human rights activities, as well as by China’s aggressive actions over maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas. Many scholars and policy-makers in the United States have also viewed the growth of China’s soft power as a threat. For example, the University of Chicago and Pennsylvania State University in the United States, as well as McMaster University in Canada, terminated their respective relationships with the Confucius Institute. The American

US–China strategic rivalry 167 Association of University Professors and the Canadian Association for University Teachers also called for partnerships with Confucius Institutes in their respective countries be reformed to reflect Western views or otherwise eliminated altogether.41 According to the Pew Research Center survey, while outright anti-China sentiment is limited, the United States’ global image remained far better than China’s. China’s favourability is also largely unchanged from 2007, even as it steps up its efforts by investing significant resources into enhancing its image and influence.42 Global Influence As China grows in economic and military terms, it has also played a more active role on the world stage, especially in the global economic arena. The 2008–09 financial crisis, from which China emerged relatively unscathed, has arguably served as a catalyst for China’s increased participation in global governance.43 Some notable examples are China’s expanding role in multilateral institutions such as BRICS and G20. Chinese leaders have made clear their intent to advocate for a larger share of representation and voting powers for China, as well as for other emerging markets, which China sees as key to balancing a US–dominated global order. The United States’ reluctance to agree on International Monetary Fund (IMF) voting shares reforms, as well as its opposition to the inclusion of the yuan as an IMF reserve currency, have severely frustrated Beijing.44 This has arguably led to China’s recent efforts to create new multilateral institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which has received substantial international participation notwithstanding the United States’ strong reservations and lobbying efforts.45 China has also stepped up its participation in the United Nations (UN). Out of the nine vetoes that Beijing issued since it assumed a position in the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 1971, four were cast in the last five years. In September 2015, Xi Jinping made a speech in the UN calling for a ‘new type of international relations’ that ‘seeks partnership rather than alliance’.46 These efforts reveal China’s increasing confidence in injecting its vision of international order into the global stage. However, despite China’s growing involvement in global governance, Beijing appears to be more interested in gradually increasing China’s decision-making powers in the existing international system, rather than in overhauling the entire structure. China has indicated that the AIIB is meant to be ‘complementary to existing development banks’,47 and has also expressed eagerness to cooperate with the World Bank and the IMF. China has also welcomed established powers, including the United States

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and Japan, to join the AIIB. While the United States may be increasingly suspicious of China’s new initiatives and increasing clout on the world stage, China’s expressed willingness to cooperate with established international institutions would help to mitigate rivalry and the potential for conflict. In addition, Chinese leaders and elite also appear to be undecided as to whether China should assume a leadership role in global governance, especially in areas outside of global economic affairs.48 China’s current involvement in global security is largely limited to its participation in multilateral institutions such as the UN Security Council, six-party talks, and multilateral talks on Iran. China also does not appear to be interested in competing with the United States on global governance relating to political issues. China’s longstanding rhetoric on ‘non-interference’ will also continue to constrain China’s involvement in global governance. While there is increasing competition between China and the United States for global influence, particularly on economic affairs, China’s involvement in global governance and in multilateral institutions should facilitate more interactions and avenues for cooperation between China and the United States. Overall, this should play a positive effect in restraining strategic rivalry between the two countries at the global level. Diplomatic and normative pressures brought about by global and regional institutions could also increase the impetus for both countries to practise a more moderate and responsible foreign policy. There are already signs of the United States and China cooperating on challenging global issues that were previously seen by leaders of both countries as ‘zero-sum’ and as detrimental to their own national interests. In November 2014, for example, the United States and China agreed to reduce their greenhouse gas output, with China agreeing to cap emissions and the United States committing to deep reductions over the next decade.49 This is a significant change compared to what had transpired at the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference in 2009, where both countries accused each other of sinking negotiations to reduce emissions despite significant global pressure for action.50

A ‘GAME OF CHICKEN’ IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC? We have argued that China lags behind the United States to varying degrees in terms of economic, military and soft power, and that the strategic rivalry between China and the United States at the global level will be largely manageable. This is given that there is significant impetus for both countries to keep the relationship on an even keel, and that

US–China strategic rivalry 169 China does not appear to be interested in establishing a fundamentally different global order, at least in the near to mid-term. The next section examines the strategic rivalry between China and the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, which is arguably a much more worrisome aspect of the relationship. This is especially given the United States’ strategic rebalance to Asia, which China perceives as an attempt to contain China. The rivalry between both countries is also likely to be exacerbated by a more assertive Chinese foreign policy over the past few years, which appears to be a marked departure from Deng Xiaoping’s low-profile (taoguang yanghui) strategy. Heightening tensions between China and the United States’ allies in the region over maritime disputes could also further complicate the relationship, as the United States feels obliged to come to its allies’ defence, and as China perceives the United States as emboldening its allies to challenge China. In addition, China sees the Asia-Pacific region as its ‘backyard’ and is unlikely to back down in the face of pressure from the United States. This could potentially lead to a ‘game of chicken’ in the region, with neither the United States nor China willing to turn aside in the face of conflict. The United States’ Rebalancing Strategy The United States announced its intent to play a leadership role in the Asia-Pacific region in the early years of Barack Obama’s administration, beginning from Hillary Clinton’s high-profile visit to the region in February 2009, when Clinton chose Asia as her first trip abroad as Secretary of State instead of the traditional choice of Europe. By end 2011 and early 2012, the Obama administration further announced that it would intensify its role in the region, and introduced a series of economic, diplomatic and military initiatives, including rotational deployments of 2500 US Marines to Darwin, Australia, the forward deployment of four Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore, and expanding areas of military cooperation with the Philippines. In late 2012, the United States’ overall strategy and rhetoric on its rebalancing strategy began to evolve – presumably in response to China’s concerns – as it attempted to play down the significance of its ‘military rebalance’ and emphasized instead diplomatic and economic elements, including a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that would involve the United States and 11 other countries. In a speech to the Asia Society in March 2013, then US National Security Advisor Tom Donilon clarified that the United States’ rebalance strategy was a result of changes in ‘Asia’s economic, diplomatic and political rules of the road’ and demands ‘from leaders and publics across the region for U.S. leadership, economic engagement, sustained attention to

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regional institutions and defence of international rules and norms’. Donilon further elaborated on the United States’ rebalance strategy, which would involve strengthening the United States’ alliances in the region; ensuring peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula; forging deeper partnerships with emerging partners; building a constructive relationship with China; strengthening regional institutions; and building an economic architecture that would benefit the United States and countries in the region.51 Notwithstanding the United States’ constant reiteration that its policy of strategic rebalancing is not targeted at any specific country, and is primarily undertaken to maintain stability in the region as well as to enhance economic benefit between the United States and countries in the Asia-Pacific, China has viewed the United States’ initiatives with extreme suspicion. The majority of Chinese elite are convinced that the United States’ rebalancing strategy is aimed at encircling China and containing China’s rise. China is also convinced that the United States is emboldening its allies against China, particularly over the ongoing maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas. For example, China reacted strongly to the US military’s large-scale joint exercise with the Philippines in October 2011, amid former US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s visit to Asia as well as heightening tensions between China and the Philippines during the same period. The nationalistic Global Times even went as far as warning claimant states to prepare for ‘the sounds of cannons’ if they did not change their provocative actions against China.52 More recently, the PLA Deputy Chief of General Staff General Wang Guanzhong, speaking at the 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore, also accused the then US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel of coordinating with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to ‘condemn China’, claiming the following: ‘Hagel was more outspoken than expected … his speech [was] a speech with tastes of hegemony, a speech with expressions of coercion and intimidation, a speech with flaring rhetoric that usher destabilizing factors into the Asia-Pacific to stir up trouble, and a speech with unconstructive attitude’.53 China’s view that the United States’ initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region will come at the expense of China could exacerbate the strategic rivalry between both countries, and there is a danger that countries in the Asia-Pacific would increasingly witness efforts by the United States and China to compete for and carve out their respective spheres of influence in the region.

US–China strategic rivalry 171 A More Assertive Chinese Foreign Policy A seemingly more assertive Chinese foreign policy in recent years has further complicated the US–China relationship. Addressing a Business Roundtable in Washington, DC in December 2014, Obama commented that Xi ‘has consolidated power faster and more comprehensively than probably anybody since Deng Xiaoping … [tapping] into nationalism that worries his [Xi’s] neighbours’.54 This comment is also illustrative of the debate in recent years among Chinese observers that Beijing is becoming more aggressive in its conduct of foreign policy since Xi came into power in late 2012. Some Chinese scholars have also used the term ‘new diplomacy’ (waijiao xinzheng) to describe Chinese foreign policy under Xi.55 There have indeed been discernible changes to China’s foreign policy since Xi came into power. We have identified three of these changes that could severely exacerbate the strategic rivalry between China and the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, potentially leading to conflict. First, China has been much more aggressive in defining and defending its ‘core interests’ (hexin liyi) in recent years, reacting strongly to any actions that it perceives as challenging its national pride and sovereignty, especially on issues concerning Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet. This has included punishing European countries when their leaders met the Dalai Lama in official capacities, and when Norway presented the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo in 2010, which the Chinese leadership saw as a direct confrontation to its legitimacy. Notably, the United States’ arms sales to Taiwan have always been a substantial point of conflict between the United States and China, leading to official protests from China as well as sustained periods of suspension of military ties. China sees Taiwan as a ‘core interest’, and also perceives the United States’ arms sales to Taiwan as a fundamental challenge to China’s sovereignty over Taiwan. In 2011, then Chief of the PLA General Staff General Chen Bingde declared that the extent of the damage to US–China relations from US arms sales to Taiwan ‘would depend on the nature of the weapons sold to Taiwan’.56 The United States had in recent years been cautious not to cross the Chinese ‘red lines’. This was evident from the Obama administration’s decision to decline Taiwan’s request to buy 66 F-16s to replace the jets it bought in 1992 during George H.W. Bush’s administration, and to help refurbish its existing fleet instead.57 Notwithstanding this, China could be increasingly intolerant of the United States’ arms sales to Taiwan, which could lead to a substantial deterioration of bilateral and military ties between the two countries.

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Second, China has been increasingly assertive over its territorial claims in the East and South China Seas. In a speech to the National People’s Congress in early 2014, Xi called for the Chinese military to accelerate its military modernization efforts, stating that ‘[China] longs for peace dearly, but at any time and under any circumstances [China] will not give up defending [its] legitimate national interests and rights, and will not sacrifice [its] core national interests’.58 In a visit to the South Sea Fleet in 2013, Xi also reportedly urged soldiers to be ‘better prepared for military struggle’.59 China has backed up its rhetoric with actual actions in recent years, including creating a new status quo over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and taking the Scarborough Shoal under Chinese control. To this end, there have also been a number of organizational changes to China’s foreign and security policy decision-making machinery and processes, most notably China’s announcement during the Third Plenum of the 18th National Party Congress in November 2013 to establish a National Security Commission (NSC) (guojia anquan weiyuanhui), which would be headed by Xi himself. The NSC, together with China’s consolidation of its maritime law enforcement agencies under the State Oceanic Administration, reflects the Chinese top leadership’s determination to streamline processes and ensure coordination in its foreign and security policy-making and implementation. China’s reclamation activities in the South China Sea have resulted in significant anxiety among countries in the region and the United States. In May 2015, media reports surfaced that the United States military was examining options to send aircraft and naval vessels near disputed islands in the South China Sea to contest China’s claims.60 Beijing reacted strongly to these reports, with the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying asserting that ‘[China is] severely concerned about relevant remarks made by the American side. [China believes] the American side needs to make clarification on that’.61 Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi went further by claiming that while changing position on China’s claims over disputed islands in the South China Sea could shame its ancestors, China would shame its children if it did not face up to infringements of Chinese sovereignty.62 China’s aggressive actions in the disputed islands, as well as increasingly strong remarks, have contributed to the United States indicating in its National Military Strategy updated in July 2015 that ‘China’s actions are adding tension to the Asia-Pacific region’.63 Alluding to China and Russia, the National Military Strategy also stated that ‘the probability of US involvement in interstate war with a major power is assessed to be low but growing’.64 On 27 October 2015, the United States made good on its promise and sent a guided missile destroyer, the USS Lassen, to patrol within 12

US–China strategic rivalry 173 nautical miles of the Mischief and Subi Reefs, which have been central to China’s reclamation activities in the South China Sea. While China’s official responses to the incident were fairly muted and largely limited to diplomatic protests, the possibility of a collision between the United States’ and China’s military aircraft or naval vessels is likely to increase as both countries step up their presence in disputed areas in the East and South China Seas. Third, a closer look at remarks from Beijing and Washington in recent years will suggest fundamental ideological differences between the two countries, especially with regard to how they perceive their roles in the Asia-Pacific region. For example, in Xi’s keynote address at the Fourth Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia Summit held in Shanghai in May 2014, he said that ‘[it] is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia’.65 These remarks, together with Xi’s ‘New Asian Security Concept’ that called for the establishment of a new regional security cooperation architecture, made clear China’s intention to play a much larger, if not dominant role, in the Asia-Pacific region.66 Washington does not share these sentiments, and has repeatedly emphasized its intent to stay in the region. Speaking in Australia several months after Xi’s call for a ‘New Asian Security Concept’, Obama affirmed the United States’ commitment to the region and its allies by asserting the following: ‘Generations of Americans have served and died in the Asia Pacific so that the people of the region might live free. So no one should ever question our resolve or our commitment to our allies … We do not benefit from a relationship with China or any other country in which we put our values and our ideals aside’.67 These misaligned expectations may increasingly result in the United States and China forcing countries in the region to choose sides in order to carve out their respective spheres of influence in the Asia-Pacific region. There are already signs of this happening, with many analysts claiming that ASEAN’s agenda and discussions are increasingly being held hostage by the rivalry between the United States and China.68 This could lead to significant instability in the region in the long run.

CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF US–CHINA RELATIONS It is only to be expected that structural conditions, that is, the power shift between China and the United States, will intensify competition between both countries. There is no lack of historical examples reflecting these

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great power dynamics, and warning us that conflict between great powers could bring about severe implications to global and regional security. The trajectory of the US–China relationship will very much depend on the extent to which China will seek to change the status quo, and whether the United States will accommodate China’s increasing ambitions. We have argued that despite China’s meteoric rise, China still lags behind the United States, particularly in the areas of military capabilities, soft power and global influence. Washington and Beijing have significant impetus to mitigate strategic rivalry and expand cooperation on issues of mutual interests, especially given their significant and growing economic interdependence. China and the United States are already increasing cooperation on these matters of common interests, and the US–China strategic rivalry at the global level is likely to be manageable. However, the risks of miscommunication and miscalculation are high in the Asia-Pacific region, where the United States has been a dominant power over the past few decades, and where a rising China has increasing political and economic interests. The involvement of external actors – such as Taiwan over a potential conflict with China in the Taiwan Strait, as well as the Philippines’ and Japan’s disputes with China over islands in the East and South China Seas – will only complicate the relationship, potentially exacerbating tensions and increasing the possibilities of a US–China confrontation. Given the high stakes and the substantial risks, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, leaders from both countries will need to demonstrate extraordinary wisdom in order to truly establish a ‘new type of major power relations’. In this regard, it is crucial for both countries to keep communications at all levels open, and this should involve establishing more comprehensive conflict resolution and communication mechanisms like political and military hotlines. There must also be sufficient political will on both sides to manage nationalistic sentiments, as well as to build a sustained bilateral and military relationship that is not disrupted by the suspensions of ties in any aspect of the relationship. With specific regard to the Asia-Pacific region, China will have to avoid an overtly hostile foreign and security posture especially against countries that it has disputes with, and will also need to control the temptation to curb Washington’s presence in Asia. As for the United States, the challenge is to manage its allies in order to avoid being inadvertently drawn into a conflict with China. Countries in the region will also need to play constructive roles by seeking to incorporate both the United States and China into new and existing economic and security institutions, instead of forming ‘alliances’ that could lead to further conflict and divisions in the region.

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NOTES 1.

2. 3.

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5.

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7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

12. 13.

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Handbook of US–China relations See, for example, Jia, Q. (2014), Quanqiu zhili: baohu de zeren [Global Governance: Responsibility to Protect], Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House; Liu, F. (2010), ‘G2 yu dangqian zhongmei guanxi de bozhe’ [G2 and the fluctuations in Sino–US relations], shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, 449 (3); Lu, C. (2008), ‘Zhongguo dui duobian waijiao de canyu ji duice sikao’ [China’s participation in multilateral diplomacy and policy suggestions], xuexi yu tansuo, 2 (175); Yan, X. (2006), ‘The rise of China and its power status’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 1 (1), 5–33 [all in Chinese]. Transcript of the US and China’s joint announcement on climate change, 12 November 2014, accessed 21 February 2015 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/11/11/us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change. Harding, L. (2009), ‘China leads accusation that rich nations are trying to sabotage climate treaty’, The Guardian, 5 October, accessed 22 February 2015 at http:// www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/oct/05/climate-change-kyoto. Transcript of Thomas Donilon’s speech at Asia Society New York, 11 March 2013, accessed 21 February 2015 at http://asiasociety.org/new-york/complete-transcriptthomas-donilon-asia-society-new-york. Global Times (2011), ‘Don’t take peaceful approach for granted’, 25 October 2011, accessed 20 February 2015 at http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/680694.shtml. Transcript of Wang Guanzhong’s speech at the 2014 Shangri La Dialogue, 1 June 2014, accessed 21 February 2015 at http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri% 20la%20dialogue/archive/2014-c20c/plenary-4-a239/wang-guanzhong-2e5e. Quoted in Barber, E. (2014), ‘Obama issues a warning over Xi Jinping’s growing power’, Time, 4 December, accessed 20 February 2015 at http://time.com/3617581/ obama-xi-jinping-china-hong-kong/. Qu, X. (2014), ‘2013 Zhongguo Waijiao Xinzheng’ [2013 China’s new diplomacy], Shijie Zhishi, 1 (32–33); Wang, Y. (2013) ‘Zhongguo de Waijiao Xinzheng’ [China’s new diplomacy], Jiefang Ribao, 11 November, accessed 20 February 2015 at http://news.sina.com.cn/w/2013-11-11/101028677031.shtml [in Chinese]. For alternative views, see also Johnston, A.I. (2013), ‘How new and assertive is China’s new assertiveness?’, International Security 37 (4), 7–48. China Daily USA (2011), ‘Arms sales to Taiwan hurt military ties’, 20 May, accessed 22 February 2015 at http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/us/2011-05/20/content_12545584. htm. Landler, M. (2011), ‘No new F-16’s for Taiwan, but U.S. to upgrade fleet’, New York Times, 18 September, accessed 22 February 2015 at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 09/19/world/asia/us-decides-against-selling-f-16s-to-taiwan.html?_r=0. Quoted in Zhang, J. (2015), ‘China’s new foreign policy under Xi Jinping: towards Peaceful Rise 2.0?’, Global Change, Peace and Security, 27 (1), 5. Ng, T. (2013), ‘Xi Jinping calls on navy to be prepared for struggle’, South China Morning Post, 12 April, accessed 22 February 2015 at http://www.scmp.com/news/ china/article/1212630/xi-jinping-calls-navy-be-prepared-struggle. Entous, A., G. Lubold and J.E. Barnes (2015), ‘U.S. military proposes challenge to China Sea claims’, The Wall Street Journal, 12 May, accessed 5 July 2015 at http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-military-proposes-challenge-to-china-sea-claims1431463920. Dou, E. and J. Hookway (2015), ‘China lashes out over U.S. plan on South China Sea’, The Wall Street Journal, 13 May, accessed 5 July 2015 at http://www.wsj.com/ articles/china-lashes-out-over-u-s-plan-on-south-china-sea-1431508182. Blanchard, B. (2015), ‘China says changing position on sea disputes would shame ancestors’, Reuters, 27 June, accessed 5 July 2015 at http://www.reuters.com/article/ 2015/06/27/us-southchinasea-china-idUSKBN0P708U20150627.

US–China strategic rivalry 179 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68.

Joint Chiefs of Staff (2015), The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015, June 2015, accessed 23 March 2016 at http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/ Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf, p. 2. Ibid., p. 4. Pang, X. (2014), ‘Summit to reshape Asian security with new concept’, Xinhua, 22 May, accessed 4 February 2015 at http://en.people.cn/n/2014/0522/c90883-8730794. html. Transcript of Xi Jinping’s remarks at the Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, 21 May 2014, accessed 20 February 2015 at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1159951.shtml. Transcript of Barack Obama’s speech at the University of Queensland, 15 November 2014, accessed 2 February 2015 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/ 11/15/remarks-president-obama-university-queensland. Teoh, S. (2015), ‘Asean meeting’s powerful signal’, The Straits Times, 6 November, accessed 8 November 2015 at http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/aseanmeetings-powerful-signal.

10. China’s global challenge to the United States Andrew T.H. Tan

INTRODUCTION China’s dramatic economic rise, its emerging global economic power, and its expanding military capabilities have led to predictions that it will soon supplant the United States as the dominant global power. China’s rise poses questions as to how the current post-1945 US-dominated international system could accommodate it. These concerns are magnified by the general perception that the international system requires some kind of hegemon to set the rules and maintain stability, best exemplified by hegemonic stability theory.1 However, since hegemonic powers eventually decline due to imperial overstretch, the question then is whether China’s rise would lead to the displacement of the United States by China as the dominant global power.2 Indeed, China’s rise and its potential to become the new global hegemon has become a common theme, reflected in Paul Starobin’s assertion that ‘if the American Century ends, then the leading contender to succeed the United States is China’.3 Several key indicators seem to suggest that China is on course to become the world’s largest economy. From 2000 to 2011, for instance, China’s economic growth averaged 10.8 per cent, compared to 1.6 per cent for the United States over the same period.4 According to Goldman Sachs, based on its current trajectory, China is on course to surpass the United States as the world’s largest economy by 2026 measured in absolute GDP.5 In late 2014, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that, measured in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), China’s economy had indeed surpassed the United States in that year to become the world’s largest economy.6 In 2013, China became the world’s largest trading nation, importing and exporting around US$4.2 trillion, exceeding the United States for the first time.7 By the end of 2014, China also held by far the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves, estimated at US$3.8 trillion.8 180

China’s global challenge to the United States 181 In tandem with its economic rise, China has also become a global economic player. As a result of its rapid economic growth, it became the world’s largest importer of petroleum and other liquid fuels in 2013, with the bulk of its imports coming from Saudi Arabia, Oman, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Angola, Venezuela and Russia.9 China is also a major trading partner for many countries around the world, as it imports raw materials, resources and finished products, and exports its manufactured and other produce to the rest of the world. Indeed, by 2014, China had become a major trading partner of a number of countries in Africa and Asia (including Central Asia). In Africa, this included South Africa, Zambia, Angola, Congo and Gambia, among others. In Asia, this included Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, Burma, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Kazakhstan, among others. More significantly, China is the largest trading partner of large, resource-rich countries such as Brazil, Iran, Russia and Australia.10 In 2014, the world was also surprised when China’s Alibaba.com became the largest Internet company in the world following its IPO (Initial Public Offering) in the United States, with a turnover of US$248 billion.11 China’s dramatic rise as a global economic power has led to predictions that it will challenge the United States and displace it as the world’s leading global power. Reflecting a common theme in Western literature on China, Martin Jacques thus asserted in his popular work, When China Rules the World, that China’s rise would eventually lead to the end of the West’s dominance in every sphere.12 Further, Jacques argued that China, ‘as a country that regards itself, for both cultural and racial reasons, as the greatest civilisation on earth’, and it will, as a great power, ‘require and expect a major reordering of global relationships’.13 This implied that China would seek to replace the post-1945 Western-dominated international system. Such predictions appeared plausible given the serious economic and financial difficulties that the West has been facing since the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC). The GFC was sparked by the US sub-prime housing loan crisis, but attention also soon turned to the massive deficits and burgeoning debt of the United States, which surpassed US$18 trillion by the end of 2014.14 The GFC was also accompanied by the Eurozone crisis, sparked by runaway sovereign debt incurred by several European countries, and which has continued to hobble European economies. The economic malaise in the West contrasted sharply with China’s vibrant economic growth, which continued throughout the GFC and helped sustain the global economy. Accompanying its emergence as a global economic power, external analysts have also raised the alarm over China’s growing military budget

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and the rapid modernization of its armed forces. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China spent US$171.3 billion on defence in 2013, the second largest in the world. While this was dwarfed by US defence spending that totalled US$618.6 billion in the same year, the gap has been narrowing rapidly in recent years due to large increases in China’s defence spending.15 China’s rise has roused nationalist pride within China amidst rising expectations that the time may have come for China to reclaim its historical position, before it fell victim to imperialist predations in the nineteenth century, as the world’s leading power. Thus, in his popular work in 2010, China Dream, Chinese Colonel Liu Mingfu asserted that after the GFC in 2008, China was now in a position to replace the United States, an argument that resonated with a section of the increasingly nationalistic Chinese public.16 On the part of the United States, fears over China’s inevitable rise and the consequences this would have has been epitomized by the warning issued by leading conservative scholar Aaron Friedberg, who warned in his book, A Contest for Supremacy, in 2011 that ‘if current trends continue, we [the United States] are on track to lose our geopolitical contest with China’.17 This chapter argues, however, that such scenarios are not realistic. Despite evidence of China’s global economic rise and its expanding military capabilities, China in fact is not on a trajectory to supplant the United States, as it does not possess the required attributes to become the next global hegemon, even though its global influence will increase as it becomes a global actor, and even though it might be able to dominate its own strategic backyard, namely, East Asia. This chapter examines China’s economic rise and its expanding military capabilities, and then explains why China is not a global power on the verge of displacing the United States. This is due to its lack of desire and capacity for global leadership, the limitations of its military capabilities, and its soft power deficit.

EVALUATING CHINA’S GLOBAL LEADERSHIP Despite evidence of China’s economic rise and expanding military capabilities, China, however, is in fact not on a trajectory to supplant the United States as the new dominant global power. The reason is that China lacks the attributes to become a true global power. Indeed, unlike the United States, China lacks the desire and capacity for global leadership. On its part, the United States’ global leadership and dominance were a result of World War II, which devastated all the other

China’s global challenge to the United States 183 major powers but left the United States as the strongest nation in the world. In contrast, China was devastated by war with Japan since 1937. Japan’s defeat in 1945 did not end conflict in China, as it then became embroiled in a deadly civil war between the communists and the nationalists, ending only in 1949 when Mao Zedong proclaimed the People’s Republic of China following the victory of the communists. After that, China was caught up in the ensuring Cold War and was isolated and contained by the United States and its allies in Asia. On the other hand, as a result of its involvement and victory in World War II, the United States dominated the international political, economic and financial institutions that were set up after 1945. The outbreak of the Cold War also led the United States to establish and maintain worldwide alliances, bolstered by bases and military deployments around the world. Since then, it has been able to intervene anywhere in the world if it so chooses, since it possesses the world’s most powerful armed forces, with bases and allies in every continent. Much of the non-communist world welcomed the global role that the United States played, recognizing that ultimately this role has been a stabilizing one. While it has resorted to unilateral actions when its interests are at stake, the United States has also generally supported the international institutions, regimes, laws and norms that have enabled post-war economic development to take place. The United States has thus willingly provided the valuable public goods required to ensure that the post-1945 international system remained stable and functioned reasonably well. While local wars did break out, they never became region-wide or global conflicts and there has been no repetition of the previous two world wars. The United States has been willing to provide this global leadership due to its sense of exceptionalism stemming from its strong belief in the superiority of its values, which it sees as universal in nature. The historian Joyce Appleby described its sense of exceptionalism as ‘America’s peculiar form of Eurocentrism’.18 As Madeleine Albright, then US Secretary of State, asserted in 1998, ‘we are America, we are the indispensable nation … we stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future’.19 In 2012, Obama, in an address at the US Air Force Academy, also asserted, at a time when the rise of China had led to predictions of the end of US dominance in the twenty-first century, that he saw ‘an American century because no other nation seeks the role that we play in global affairs, and no other nation can play the role that we play in global affairs … that includes shaping the global institutions of the 20th century to meet the challenges of the 21st’.20 The metaphor of ‘the indispensable nation’ comes to mind, especially as it is the United States that initially responded (until Russia’s intervention in Syria in late

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2015) to the surprising rise and momentum of the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq in 2014, taking the lead in building a coalition of allies that included Australia, Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Qatar to fight against it.21 Thus, it has been the strength of belief in the place of the United States in the world and of the superiority of US values that explains its willingness to play an active global role. US foreign policy can thus be described as proactive and interventionist, the essence of offensive realism.22 In contrast, China does not possess the same vision of a global mission, and thus does not have the same proactive and interventionist policies. As Mel Gurtov observed, ‘one searches in vain for … any history of belief in a global Chinese mission’. He further observed that ‘the Chinese do not believe, as many in the United States do, that what is good for their country is good for the world … nor is there evidence that China today seeks to restore the ancient Sinocentric order’.23 China’s foreign policy has been essentially defensive in nature, with its objectives defined as follows: first, domestic political stability; second, sovereign security, territorial integrity and national unification; and third, China’s sustainable economic and social development.24 In 2000, Liu Huaqiu, a senior Chinese official, asserted that the basic objective of China’s foreign policy is ‘to firmly safeguard the nation’s independence, security and sovereignty’.25 In 2010, Dai Bingguo, China’s senior leader in charge of foreign policy, provided a more definitive exposition of China’s official foreign policy based on ‘peaceful development’. According to him, China’s basic policy is based on ‘never seeking leadership, never competing for supremacy and never seeking hegemony’ and that as a member of the international community, its interests are best served through cooperation with other states. The ultimate objective, according to Dai, is to ‘build a harmonious society at home and help build a harmonious world abroad’.26 China’s focus is thus primarily on internal development and the safeguarding of its own sovereignty, although the latter objective has expanded in recent years to include disputed maritime territory in the South China and East China Seas. China continues to maintain that it is guided by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. These principles were originally conceived in 1954 by Premier Zhou Enlai and India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and underpinned the Non-Aligned Movement. The five principles are: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each

China’s global challenge to the United States 185 other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.27 Thus, while the United States has not shied away from intervening in various parts of the world, according to Gurtov, ‘when it comes to conflicts in Africa, the Middle East and other regions, Beijing’s voice is rarely heard or sought’.28 Indeed, a study of China’s voting patterns in the United Nations suggested that it has, in the main, supported its principle of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs and the non-use of force, although it has selectively supported humanitarian interventions, such as in East Timor in 1999 and the Ivory Coast in 2011.29 In contrast, since the seminal terrorist attacks in the United States on 9/11 in 2001, US leadership in dealing with the threat of global terrorism emanating from pan-Islamist radicalism has been crucial. The United States controversially attacked and occupied Iraq in 2003, and has been engaged in ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. In 2014, despite the depth of the economic and financial crisis that the United States was still facing, the Obama administration put together a coalition of Middle Eastern and Western states to begin military action against the Islamic State, which had achieved surprising success in Iraq and Syria. What is significant has been the absence of China’s voice in the seminal developments in the Middle East in recent years, including the uprisings in Libya, the domestic political upheavals in Egypt, the civil war in Syria and Iraq, and more recently, the rise of the IS. In 2011, in response to the Libyan civil war, China, together with Russia, objected to the use of force by the UN but ultimately abstained because the Arab League and the African Union requested UN intervention in that country. As it turned out, it was Britain and France that led the NATO intervention in Libya. At the same time, both China and Russia vetoed a UN resolution condemning the violence against antiregime demonstrators and activists in Syria. More interesting, it has been Russia, not China, that has taken the lead in opposing Western interventions in both countries.30 China’s only intervention in the Libyan crisis in 2011 was to organize the evacuation of some 36 000 of its citizens involved in various economic projects in the country.31 China’s passive role is all the more surprising given its rising economic power and its significant economic presence in the Middle East. Indeed, driven by its demand for oil, China’s trade with the Middle East increased from US$25.5 billion in 2004 to US$238.9 billion in 2013.32 In 2009, China was, after the European Union, Libya’s second largest trading partner, and has been a major oil importer.33 In 2012, China became Iraq’s second largest trading partner, importing substantial quantities of oil. China has been a beneficiary of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, with the first

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oil licence awarded by Iraq’s government to China’s state-run China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and oil exports to China increasing dramatically after that.34 As Robert Kaplan complained, ‘we [the United States] have liberated Iraq so that Chinese firms can extract its oil’.35 In short, China has in fact had to rely on the United States to protect its interests in the Middle East. Far from actively providing global leadership to help manage economic and security problems around the globe, or, as detractors in the West have charged, that China is a dissatisfied power keen to revise the current international system, China has in fact proven to be a passive as well as status quo power. Although it has been assertive in its claims over disputed maritime territories in the South China and East China Seas, its international behaviour has been generally supportive of the current international system. It has been a relatively passive member of most international organizations, and has in fact significantly reduced its export of major conventional weapons systems, as well as curtailed its assistance to missile and nuclear weapons programmes in compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its de facto adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). It has also enforced UN arms embargoes, such as those on Iran.36 Not only has it not played an active global security role, it has, until recently not attempted to provide leadership in the economic sphere, despite its growing global economic reach and power. While there is admiration in the non-Western world for the Chinese model of development, that is, the so-called Beijing Consensus based on innovation and flexibility, equitable development and independence from outside powers, China itself has not taken serious steps to challenge the dominant US-led Washington Consensus based on free markets, privatization and deregulation.37 US and Western dominance of the post-1945 Bretton Woods financial system, including its institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, remains largely intact. Although the United States faces unprecedented levels of debt, the US dollar also remains the world’s reserve currency. By doing so, the United States is able to issue debt, print money freely, and, through its control of dollar-clearing systems, limit the financial access of other states. This control confers significant political benefits and soft power to the United States.38 While China has promoted the use of the renminbi worldwide, this has been constrained by the reluctance of the United States to accommodate China’s monetary rise, and moreover, China lacks the ability to turn its currency into strategic power, unlike the United States, due to its passivity and lack of soft power.39 More significantly, China itself has invested heavily in US government debt, holding a record US$1.317 trillion by November 2013,

China’s global challenge to the United States 187 the largest of any government. This represents a huge vote of confidence by China in the US economy and the future economic prospects of the United States, and also underscores how reliant both economies are on each other.40 In late 2014, China took the initial, tentative step at challenging US global financial dominance by establishing the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which will be led by China and focused on providing capital for infrastructure development in Asia. The new bank would thus pave the way for China to play a greater role in the economic development of Asia, one that would be commensurate with its growing economic power. The AIIB has been sensationally touted in mass media as a global challenge to the IMF and World Bank, but it is early days and as its name suggests, is primarily focused on Asian development.41 It will certainly help China strengthen its political influence in Asia, but it would be a stretch to describe it as a direct global challenge to the IMF and the World Bank. In order to effectively challenge US global political and economic leadership, China must also be in a position to offer an attractive model for the rest of the world. The Beijing Consensus, however, is not so much a model as a justification for state-directed capitalism. China’s heavy investment in Africa, Latin America and Asia, buying up land and sending large numbers of Chinese to extract their resources and build up the infrastructure, has in fact not endeared China to the locals. Indeed, the Chinese economic juggernaut has been so overwhelming that it has led to perceptions of a neo-colonial relationship between China and a number of countries around the world where it is a major trading partner. As Sanou Mbaye, a senior official of the African Development Bank, observed in an essay in The Guardian, ‘China has seized control of a huge swath of local African industries, in the process grabbing their allocated export quotas’. Reflecting the growing resentment of many Africans, Mbaye also charged that ‘within a mere decade, more Chinese have come to live in Africa than there are Europeans on the continent, even after many centuries of European colonial and neo-colonial rule’. Worse, ‘with apartheid-style practices … Chinese managers impose appalling working conditions on their African employees’.42

THE LIMITATIONS OF CHINA’S MILITARY POWER Another telling indication that China is not yet ready for a global role is the limitation of its military capabilities. Despite alarmist evaluations of China’s growing military power, it remains dwarfed by the impressive global military capabilities of the United States. While China’s military

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footprint is almost entirely confined to within China’s own territory, the United States established alliances and bases around the world after 1945 and remains a true global power able to deploy its military forces anywhere around the globe. Indeed, the organization and deployment of its armed forces suggests that it is configured for a global role. In the Middle East, US Central Command has 23 000 troops in Kuwait, and the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet is headquartered in Bahrain.43 In Africa, the US Africa Command maintains a base in Djibouti. In Europe, the US European Command has about 43 000 troops in Germany, 11 000 in Italy and 10 000 in Britain. In Asia, the US Pacific Command (USPACOM) has substantial deployments that ensure US dominance of the Pacific Ocean. USPACOM has about 50 000 troops in Japan, as well as one aircraft carrier, nine destroyers, four amphibious ships and a US Marine division. In South Korea, the same command has about 29 000 troops. USPACOM is headquartered in Hawaii, where the Third Fleet has 38 nuclear-powered submarines, five aircraft carriers, 36 destroyers, ten frigates and ten amphibious ships. At Guam, the same command has over 5000 military personnel and also operates three nuclear-powered submarines. The United States also maintains naval and air facilities in the British-run island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. In the Atlantic Ocean, it has tracking facilities on Ascension Island and the US Northern Command, which dominates this ocean, has 29 nuclear-powered submarines, three aircraft carriers, 28 destroyers, eight frigates and 13 amphibious ships assigned to it. In Central America, the US Southern Command has bases in El Salvador and Honduras. Elsewhere, the United States maintains military forces and bases in: Canada, Cuba (Guantanamo Bay), Portugal, Belgium, Spain, Turkey, Norway, Netherlands, Greece, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Australia.44 Thus, despite its economic and financial woes, the United States continues to maintain a substantial and impressive global military capability. In comparison, China has no global alliances and bases to call upon in order to play global political and military roles, nor are China’s armed forces configured for a global role. A comparison of China’s land, air and naval capabilities with those of the United States in 2013 also suggests that China’s military capabilities remain far inferior to those of the United States, notwithstanding its recent expansion. A comparison of the two countries’ Air Forces is instructive. In 2013, China deployed 2193 combat aircraft, of which only a comparative small number can be described as truly modern, namely, 75 Su-27, 73 Su-30MKK, 240 J-10 and 110 J-11 fighter ground-attack aircraft.45 Indeed, China’s Air Force continued to be dominated by large numbers of

China’s global challenge to the United States 189 J-7 and Q-5 combat aircraft that originated from Soviet designs in the 1950s, with production only finally coming to an end in 2013.46 While China is developing the next-generation J-20 and J-31 stealth combat aircraft, they are still not yet deployed, while the United States has a massive lead in stealth technology, as it already has 159 F-22 Raptor stealth combat aircraft, and is about to mass-produce three versions of the stealth F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The US Air Force, with 2921 combat aircraft in 2013, is not appreciably larger than China’s Air Force but it is much more sophisticated, dominated by modern F-18, F-16 and F-15 combat aircraft, and supplemented by state-of-the-art aircraft such as the F-22 as well as an impressive long-range bomber fleet consisting of 65 B-1 Lancer conventional bombers and 20 B-2 Spirit stealth bombers. The United States also leads in electronic surveillance and reconnaissance. For instance, it has a large fleet of 101 E-2 Hawkeye and E-3 Sentry Airborne Early-Warning aircraft, which it has deployed on its aircraft carriers and bases around the world. By comparison, China had only 18 such aircraft. Other indications of a clear US superiority in air power as well as its globally deployable capabilities is the fact that the United States had 226 air-refuelling tankers compared to China’s 13, and also had 228 C-5 and C-17 heavy transport aircraft compared to just 16 IL-76 for China.47 However, it is US naval superiority that has ensured US dominance of the seas, a significant factor in an age of globalization in which 90 per cent of global commerce is carried by sea. US naval capabilities enable the United States to control the world’s vital sea-lines of communications, deploy substantial military force anywhere in the world, and confers it great prestige and influence since it is able to bring its presence to bear along the world’s littorals.48 Naval forces are flexible and influential instruments of the state. Obviously, they can be used for warfighting in the course of any conflict. During peacetime, however, they also play important roles, such as in the governance of the maritime sphere, territorial protection, anti-smuggling and counter-terrorism. In addition, due to their mobility, endurance and operational flexibility, they can be used in humanitarian rescue, multilateral exercising, defence diplomacy, coercion and deterrence.49 In particular, the kinetic firepower of combat aircraft and accompanying warfighting vessels of aircraft carrier battle-groups confers enormous prestige, as it is a very visible manifestation of a state’s power. In addition to their actual warfighting capabilities, they enable any state possessing them to ‘show the flag’ around the world in communicating a state’s intent and purpose. In 2013, the United States had ten nuclearpowered Nimitz-class aircraft carriers, each with a typical complement of

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59 F-18 Hornet combat and electronic warfare aircraft (soon to be replaced by the new F-35 stealth combat aircraft), four Airborne Early Warning aircraft, and six helicopters. By comparison, China currently has only one aircraft carrier, a refurbished ex-Russian ship that it has renamed the Liaoning. This carrier has limited capabilities as it is not nuclear-powered (and therefore is limited in range) and can embark a smaller complement of 24 combat aircraft and 17 helicopters. Accompanying US aircraft carriers are also the warfighting vessels with their impressive array of anti-aircraft, anti-missile, anti-ship and long-range cruise missiles as well as anti-submarine warfare torpedoes and missiles. In 2013, the US Navy had 22 Ticonderoga cruisers and 62 Arleigh Burke destroyers, all equipped with the state-of-the-art AEGIS integrated naval weapons system. By comparison, China’s Navy had 15 destroyers, the most sophisticated being four Russian-built Sovremenny-class destroyers, as well as 54 frigates, the most modern consisting of 17 Type 054 Jiangkai-class vessels.50 China’s Navy also lags in terms of amphibious landing capabilities. In 2013, China had 88 amphibious landing ships, the largest and most sophisticated of which are three Yuzhao-class Landing Platform Dock (LPD) vessels, each carrying two helicopters and up to 800 troops. The US Navy, on the other hand, had 30 large amphibious ships, some the size of small aircraft carriers. Indeed, it deployed eight Wasp-class Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) vessels that can each carry 1900 troops as well as 48 helicopters and five Harrier Vertical Take-off and Landing (VTOL) combat aircraft (soon to be replaced by the VTOL version of the new F-35 stealth combat aircraft). This reflected its immense seaborne attack capabilities, and indeed, the US Marine Corp totalled 197 000 personnel in 2013. By comparison, China’s marine forces numbered just 10 000.51 China similarly lags behind in submarine capabilities. In 2013, China had 70 submarines, of which nine were nuclear-powered and four could fire Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). The US Navy, on the other hand, deployed 72 modern nuclear-powered submarines, including 14 that could launch SLBMs.52 In short, the US armed forces, particularly its Air Force, Navy and Marine corps, are configured for a global role and could be deployed in large numbers anywhere in the world. The large numbers of heavy air transports, the existence of long-range strategic bombers, the size and capability of its naval amphibious forces, the immense firepower and range of its aircraft carrier battle-groups and the fact that all its submarines are nuclear-powered and can therefore be deployed globally, all point to a global power with worldwide interests that it is able to defend if required. This confers great prestige and power on the United

China’s global challenge to the United States 191 States, as it is able to buttress its diplomacy around the world with real military firepower. In comparison, despite its recent military advances and expansion, China does not possess comparable worldwide deployable military capabilities, nor does it have worldwide bases and allies that would make that possible.

CHINA’S SOFT POWER DEFICIT In tandem with its growing global economic interests, China has in recent years made an effort to improve its global image, recognizing that the development of soft power accrues significant advantages. As Joseph Nye explained, soft power resources, such as cultural attraction, institutions and ideology, help a state to achieve the outcomes that it prefers in world politics ‘because other states want to follow it or have agreed to a situation that produces such effects’. As he elaborated, soft co-optive power is all about ‘getting others to want what you want’.53 The development of soft power is therefore desirable as it could enable China to get what it wants through attraction rather than through coercion. Thus, China’s staging of the Beijing Olympics in 2008 showcased China’s astonishing rise, given the scale and sophistication of its Olympic facilities. Equally, the massive Shanghai Expo in 2010 showcased China’s modernization and arrival as an economic great power. China Central Television (CCTV) is now broadcast via satellite all over the world, in an effort to present the Chinese perspective on world affairs. China’s government has invested heavily in CCTV’s global footprint, launching a major expansion in 2011 to increase its overseas staff tenfold by 2016. By 2016, the estimated number of its overseas staff would be 500, compared to 49 at the end of 2010, with most working for its English and other foreign language channels. As The Guardian marvelled, ‘in a sign of how far the Chinese media reaches, you can buy the European edition of the English-language China Daily in Sheffield and read Xinhua’s Kenyan “mobile newspaper’ on your phone in Nairobi’.54 China has also established over 480 Confucius Institutes worldwide to promote China as well as its culture and language. Each of the institutes is located at a local university campus and paired with a partner university in China, which provides additional resources and expertise.55 In 2014, the IPO of Alibaba.com in the United States made headlines around the world as Alibaba.com has now become the world’s largest Internet company, with an annual turnover of over US$248 billion.56 China is also deeply involved in many multilateral forums, plays an active role in many global organizations, signed a number of free trade

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agreements, provides ‘no-strings attached’ foreign aid programmes and has actively participated in UN peacekeeping operations.57 However, China’s soft power is dwarfed by that of the West, particularly the United States. China lags far behind when measured in terms of major soft power attributes such as cultural attraction, institutions and ideology. In terms of cultural attraction, China is also outmatched by the West, especially by the United States. While the BBC and CNN have been joined by Al Jazeera in the non-Western world, they remain influential as significant global media shaping world opinions and presenting a Western and US interpretation of events around the world. US and Western popular culture and the arts also continue to dominate global media and have genuine global appeal. Western dominance of global media and pop culture is facilitated not just by media giants but also by the widespread use of English, the de facto global language of business and commerce. On the other hand, Chinese media remains stuck in a propaganda rut with its state-derived official positions on a wide range of subjects. Despite its massive investment to improve its global reach, CCTV and other Chinese media face the major hurdle of persuading people to watch or read it, given its lack of credibility. As The Guardian noted, ‘even at home (in China), commercial rivals often trounce state offerings and there is widespread cynicism about news content’.58 Similarly, while the major English language newspapers that target a foreign readership, namely, China Daily and The Global Times, are supposed to explain the Chinese worldview, the fact is that the rest of the world continues to obtain its information about China mainly from foreign newspapers and media.59 China also does not have global pop or cultural icons comparable to Western and US pop and movie stars, nor does it have a movie industry comparable to the global success and appeal of Hollywood. Indeed, its movie industry has been stymied by state control, resulting in the production of a number of formulaic movies, many with openly propagandistic themes. Its movie industry also often uses outdated antiJapanese themes as it seeks to exploit nationalism as a source of state legitimacy. While this might work domestically in bolstering nationalism, it has created a serious credibility problem externally.60 Not only is China outmatched by the United States in cultural attractiveness, it has lagged in terms of the attraction of its economic and educational institutions. The United States continues to lead the world through the global dominance of its economic and educational institutions. As at the end of March 2014, 47 of the top 100 companies in the world by market capitalization were US companies, worth a combined

China’s global challenge to the United States 193 US$8 trillion, compared to China with eight companies worth a combined US$1.08 trillion. What was more significant was the fact that eight of the top ten companies, and 13 out of the top 20, were US companies.61 The top US companies are recognised global brands, such as: Apple, Exxon Mobil, Google, Microsoft, Johnson & Johnson, General Electric, Pfizer, IBM, Coca-Cola, Intel, PepsiCo, McDonald’s, Amazon, Boeing, MasterCard, Facebook and American Express. In contrast, the top eight Chinese companies are: PetroChina, ICBC, China Mobile, China Construction Bank, Bank of China, Sinopec, Tencent and Agricultural Bank of China. While these are big companies in the Chinese context, they are not global brands that are easily recognizable outside of China except within narrow financial and economic circles.62 While China’s Alibaba. com became the world’s largest Internet company following its IPO in the United States in September 2014, few outside of China had heard of it as much of its business is conducted in China. While China’s economic rise has led to academic discussions regarding whether the Chinese model of development could apply to other developing countries, China itself has not actively endorsed this, as the government has argued that every country’s development path is unique, a not unsurprising position given China’s careful adherence to the principle of non-interference in other countries’ affairs.63 In 2014, 15 of the top 20 universities in the world as ranked by Times Higher Education were US universities, including respected names such as Harvard, Stanford, MIT, Princeton, UC Berkeley, Yale, Columbia and Johns Hopkins. Only two Chinese universities were ranked in the top 100, namely Beijing and Tsinghua, which were ranked 48 and 49 respectively.64 Indeed, it is to the top US universities that the global elite prefer to send their children, thus extending US influence around the world as they become the elite leaders and decision-makers in their own countries. This confers much soft power on the United States, which is able to tap a worldwide network of the US-trained elite in influential positions in their own countries. Such is the prestige of top US universities that the top leaders of China have themselves sent their own children to be educated at such institutions, such as China’s President Xi Jinping, whose daughter attended Harvard University, and China’s VicePresident Li Yuanchao, whose son attended Yale University.65 Thus, in a speech in 2012 at China’s influential Central Party School, which trains the country’s top leaders, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong reminded the Chinese audience that predictions of the US decline were wide of the mark, as the United States ‘is an enormously resilient and creative society, which attracts and absorbs talent from all over the world, including many from China and the rest of Asia’, noting as well that ‘all

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eight Nobel Prize winners in science who are of Chinese descent either were or subsequently became American citizens’.66 Finally, China does not offer a positive ideological appeal, as its political system and values are not attractive to the rest of the world. While authoritarian leaders in Africa and elsewhere have welcomed China’s principle of non-interference in local domestic affairs, China’s authoritarian political institutions, and its lack of democratic free speech and accountability do not make it an attractive model for populations in the non-Western world yearning for greater democracy, accountability and freedoms. Although China claims to be a communist country, it is clear to everyone that it no longer subscribes to communism, instead presiding over a capitalism that is also corrupt, though the current leadership under Xi Jinping is making efforts to root out the deep corruption. While the United States has had serious domestic social and economic problems, and while its foreign policy record has been less than stellar, it does offer idealistic Jeffersonian democracy and liberal values. These values continue to inspire peoples the world over in their aspirations for greater freedoms and equality, such as in the Middle East as epitomized by the Arab Spring, and in Hong Kong, China’s own backyard, where unprecedented pro-democracy protests broke out in 2014.67 Indeed, Chinese scholars themselves acknowledge that China suffers from a serious deficit of soft power, and that it does not possess the national attributes that can appeal to others. Thus, while Men Honghua, a leading expert in China on soft power, has stressed the universality of four core Chinese values, namely, peace and harmony, morality, etiquette and benevolence, he has also acknowledged that these values are absent in China itself today. As a respected Chinese intellectual, Wu Jianmin, opined, Chinese society is suffering from an identity crisis as it has an intellectual and moral vacuum, and thus China has in fact to reinvent its own culture.68 This means that China has little by way of values to offer to the rest of the world.

CONCLUSION Despite evidence of China’s global economic rise and its expanding military capabilities, it is not in fact on a trajectory to supplant the United States as the new dominant global power. While China’s global influence will increase as it becomes a global actor, and while it might come to eventually dominate its own strategic backyard, namely, East Asia, it does not have the desire or capacity for global leadership. Moreover, its

China’s global challenge to the United States 195 armed forces are not organized for deployment and intervention in the far corners of the globe. China also suffers from a significant deficit in soft power that would make it appeal to others and confer it with global influence. The dominant global position of the United States was established after 1945, when all other powers were exhausted through years of total war. While this global dominance has of late been diminished due to unwise and costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the effects of the GFC in 2008, the United States retains the capacity for global leadership, as it continues to maintain global military capabilities, and retains sufficient (albeit diminished) soft power that confers it with influence throughout the world. As President Obama asserted in 2012, ‘no other nation seeks the role that we play in global affairs, and no other nation can play the role that we play in global affairs’.69 In the final analysis, while China’s global influence will increase as it becomes a global economic actor, it will in fact not replace the United States as the dominant global power any time soon. For the foreseeable future, the United States will remain, however tendentiously, the ‘indispensable nation’.

NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

8. 9.

An argument made by Charles P. Kindleberger (1973), in The World in Depression: 1929–1939, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press. The argument regarding the rise and fall of great powers was developed by Paul Kennedy. See Kennedy, P. (1988), The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, New York: Vintage. Starobin, P. (2006), ‘Beyond hegemony’, National Journal, 1 December, accessed 29 September 2014 at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1747976/posts. World Bank (2013), ‘GDP growth average annual growth 2000–2011’, World Development Indicators 2013, pp. 68, 72, accessed 28 September 2014 at http://data. worldbank.org/sites/default/files/wdi-2013-ch4.pdf. Marshall, C. (2011), ‘Goldman Sachs: China to overtake US economy in 2026’, Citywire Money, 7 December, accessed 28 September 2014 at http://citywire.co.uk/ money/goldman-sachs-china-to-overtake-us-economy-in-2026/a550329. IMF (2014), World Economic Outlook Database, October, accessed 1 April 2015 at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/index.aspx. The Economist (2014), ‘Trading up: which country gets the most out of international commerce?’, 18 January, accessed 28 September 2014 at http://www.economist.com/ news/finance-and-economics/21594343-which-country-gets-most-out-internationalcommerce-trading-up. Trading Economics (2016), ‘China foreign exchange reserves, 1980–2016’, accessed 24 March 2016 at http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/foreign-exchange-reserves. US Energy Information Administration (2014), ‘China is now the world’s largest net importer of petroleum and other liquid fuels’, 24 March, accessed 28 September 2014 at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=15531.

196 10.

11.

12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

21. 22.

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

Handbook of US–China relations CIA (n.d.), ‘Country comparison to the world’, CIA World Fact Book, accessed 28 September 2014 at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ fields/print_2061.html and https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-fact book/fields/print_2050.html. Davidson, L. (2014), ‘In five charts: how Alibaba pulled off the largest IPO ever’, The Telegraph, 22 September, accessed 28 September 2014 at http://www. telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/11106146/In-five-charts-howAlibaba-pulled-off-the-largest-IPO-ever.html. Jacques, M. (2009), When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World, London: Allen Lane, pp. 412–13. Ibid., p. 431. US Debt Clock, accessed 1 April 2015 at http://www.usdebtclock.org/. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, accessed 28 September 2014 at http://www. sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database. Liu, M. (2010), China Dream: The Great Power Thinking and Strategic Positioning of China in the Post-American Age, Beijing: Zhongguo youyi chuban gongsi. Friedberg, A.L. (2011), A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, New York: W.W. Norton, p. 7. Appleby, J. (1992), ‘Recovering America’s historical diversity: beyond exceptionalism’, Journal of American History, 97 (2), 420. USIS Washington File (1998), ‘Transcript: Albright interview on NBC-TV’, 19 February, accessed 30 September 2014 at http://fas.org/news/iraq/1998/02/19/ 98021907_tpo.html. Klein, K. (2012), ‘Obama: US “the one indispensable nation in world affairs”’, Voice of America, 23 May, accessed 30 September 2014 at http://www.voanews.com/ content/obama_tells_air_force_academy_us_is_one_indispensable_country_world_ affairs/940158.html. Fantz, A. (2014), ‘Who is doing what in the coalition battle against ISIS?’ CNN.com, 17 September, accessed 30 September 2014 at http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/14/ world/meast/isis-coalition-nations/. Offensive realism posits that the anarchic nature of the international system leads to aggressive state behaviour in international politics. According to John Mearsheimer, states would ceaselessly pursue state power. See Mearsheimer, J.J. (2001), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: W.W. Norton. Gurtov, M. (2013), Will This be China’s Century? A Skeptic’s View, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, p. 21. Jakobson, L. (2013), ‘China’s foreign policy dilemma’, Lowy Institute for International Policy, February 2013, p. 4, accessed 3 October 2014 at http://www. lowyinstitute.org/publications/chinas-foreign-policy-dilemma. Liu, H. (2000), ‘Liu Huaqui on China’s foreign policy’, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States, accessed 3 October 2014 at http://www. china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/zgwjzc/t35078.htm. Dai, B. (2010), ‘Adhere to the path of peaceful development’, US–China Institute, 6 December, accessed 23 March 2016 at http://china.usc.edu/dai-bingguo-%E2%80 %9Cadhere-path-peaceful-development%E2%80%9D-dec-6-2010. People.com (n.d.),‘Five principles of peaceful coexistence’, accessed 3 October 2014 at http://english.people.com.cn/92824/92845/92870/6441502.html. Gurtov, Will This be China’s Century?, p. 29. Ibid., pp. 29–30. Krever, M.B. (2012), ‘Why won’t the U.N. Security Council intervene in Syria?’ CNN.com, 14 January, accessed 6 October 2014 at http://edition.cnn.com/2012/01/ 13/world/meast/un-security-council-syria/index.html.

China’s global challenge to the United States 197 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41.

42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54.

English.news.cn (2011), ‘35,860 Chinese evacuated from unrest-torn Libya’, 3 March, accessed 6 October 2014 at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/ 2011-03/03/c_13759456.htm. Zhao, M. (2014), ‘China’s Arab march’, CNBC.com, 26 June, accessed 6 October 2014 at http://www.cnbc.com/id/101792181#. Afribiz (2012), ‘Libya trade and economic partnerships 2011’, 4 May, accessed 6 October 2014 at http://www.afribiz.info/content/2012/libya-trade-and-economicpartnerships-2011. Al-Tamimi, N. (2013), ‘China in Iraq: winning without a war’, Al-Arabiya News, 16 March, accessed 6 October 2014 at http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/2013/03/16/ China-in-Iraq-Winning-Without-a-War.html. Kaplan, R.D. (2011), ‘The Middle East crisis has just begun’, The Wall Street Journal, 26 March, accessed 6 October 2014 at http://online.wsj.com/articles/ SB10001424052748704050204576218842399053176. Shambaugh, D. (2013), China Goes Global: The Partial Power, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 303–4. For an explanation of the Beijing Consensus, see Ramo, J.C. (2004), The Beijing Consensus, London: Foreign Policy Centre. Zoellick, R.B. (2013), ‘The international monetary system: past, present … and a possible future?’ in A. Wheatley (ed.), The Power of Currencies and the Currencies of Power, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 135. Wheatley, ‘Conclusion’, in The Power of Currencies and the Currencies of Power, p. 150. Egan, M. (2014), ‘China now owns a record $1.317T of US government debt’, FoxBusiness.com, 16 January, accessed 6 October 2014 at http://www.fox business.com/economy-policy/2014/01/16/china-now-owns-record-1317t-us-governmentdebt/. News.com.au (2015), ‘US holds out against new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’, 31 March, accessed 1 April 2015 at http://www.news.com.au/finance/ economy/us-holds-out-against-new-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank/story- e6frfl o9-1227286037463. Mbaye, S. (2011), ‘Africa will not put up with a colonialist China’, The Guardian, 7 February, accessed 6 October 2014 at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 2011/feb/07/china-exploitation-africa-industry. IISS (2014), The Military Balance 2014, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, pp. 54–5. Ibid., pp. 54–6. Ibid., p. 236. Airforce-Technology.com (2014), ‘J-7/F-7 Fighter Aircraft’, accessed 10 October 2014 at http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/j7f7fighteraircraft/. The Military Balance 2014, pp. 47–52, 235–6. Kaluza, P. et al. (2010), ‘The complex network of global cargo ship movements’, Interface: Journal of the Royal Society, 19 January, accessed 10 October 2014 at http://rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/early/2010/01/19/rsif.2009.0495.full. Bateman, S. (2007), ‘Navies and the maintenance of good order in peacetime’, in A.T.H. Tan (ed.), The Politics of Maritime Power, London: Routledge, pp. 95–6. The Military Balance 2014, pp. 45, 233–4. Ibid., pp. 45–6, 234–5. Ibid., pp. 45, 233. Nye, J.S. Jr (1990), ‘Soft power’, Foreign Policy, No. 80, 166–7. The Guardian (2011), ‘Chinese state TV unveils global expansion plan’, accessed 10 October 2014 at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/08/china-statetelevision-global-expansion.

198 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60.

61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69.

Handbook of US–China relations UCLA Confucius Institute (2014), ‘Confucius Institutes worldwide’, accessed 10 October 2014 at http://www.confucius.ucla.edu/about-us/confucius-institutesworldwide. Davidson, ‘In five charts: how Alibaba pulled off the largest IPO ever’. Shirk, S.L. (2007), China: The Fragile Superpower, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 105–39. The Guardian, ‘Chinese state TV unveils global expansion plan’. Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power, p. 235. A good example is the government-backed movie, The Flowers of War, which failed dismally outside of China. See Von Tunzelmann, A. (2012), ‘The Flowers of War fails to bloom for Chinese film industry’, The Guardian, 3 August, accessed 11 October 2014 at http://www.theguardian.com/film/2012/aug/02/flowers-of-warchinese-film. PWC (2014), Global Top 100 Companies by Market Capitalisation, 31 March, Slides 3 and 10, accessed 11 October 2014 at http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/audit-services/ capital-market/publications/assets/document/pwc-global-top-100-march-update.pdf. Ibid., Slides 33, 35, 36, 37. Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power, p. 214. Times Higher Education (2014), ‘World university rankings, 2014–2015’, accessed 11 October 2014 at http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-universityrankings/2014-15/world-ranking. China ‘Watch’ Canada (2014), ‘Overseas offspring of Chinese leaders summoned home’, 30 December [blog], accessed 23 March 2016 at http://chinawatchcanada. blogspot.co.uk/2014/12/overseas-offspring-of-chinese-leaders.html. Perlez, J. (2012), ‘Singaporean tells China US is not in decline’, New York Times, 6 September, accessed 11 October 2014 at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/world/ asia/singapores-prime-minister-warns-china-on-view-of-us.html?_r=0. Barreto, E. and J. Pomfret (2014), ‘Pitching tents, Hong Kong democracy protesters dig in for long haul’, Reuters, 11 October, accessed 11 October 2014 at http:// www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/11/us-hongkong-china-idUSKCN0I005320141011. Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power, pp. 212–13. Klein, ‘Obama: US “the one indispensable nation in world affairs”’.

11. The US rebalance to Asia: implications for US–China relations Paul J. Smith*

In January 2012, the United States Department of Defense issued its strategic guidance document, which called for a US reorientation back to the Asia-Pacific region following more than ten years of military engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq. The 2012 guidance stated that the US military, while continuing to contribute to security globally, would ‘of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region’. It further stated that US ‘relationships with Asian allies and key partners are critical to future stability and growth of the region’.1 Although dramatically unveiled at a news conference, the new strategy document simply formalized a policy shift that had been taking shape over several years. Indeed, hints of such a strategic readjustment could be heard in the remarks of Secretary of State designate Hillary Rodham Clinton in her 2009 confirmation hearings; in those meetings, Clinton spoke of the ‘urgent need … for the United States to focus on reconnecting in East Asia and Southeast Asia’.2 However, soon after the January 2012 announcement, US officials began to recognize that Chinese leaders were viewing the policy shift as unsettling or even provocative. Consequently, top US officials sought to assuage Chinese concerns by emphasizing non-military aspects of the rebalance. One emerging US narrative posited that the rebalance was in essence a re-engagement effort – involving economic, institutional and cultural factors –rather than solely a military shift. In a speech delivered in March 2013, National Security Advisor Tom Donilon sought to present five pillars of the US rebalance to Asia, most of which emphasized its non- (or quasi-) military dimensions. Donilon described the five pillars of the US rebalance to Asia as: ‘strengthening alliances; deepening partnerships with emerging powers; building a stable, productive, and constructive relationship with China; empowering regional institutions; and helping to build a regional economic architecture that can sustain shared prosperity’.3 Second, and expanding on Donilon’s third pillar, US officials also emphasized the importance of engaging with China as part of the rebalance. Dr. Ashton Carter, the Deputy Secretary of Defense at the time, stated in August 2012 that as part of the US rebalance, the United 199

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States was seeking to develop ‘a sustainable military-to-military program with China – to improve mutual understanding and reduce risk’.4 He further added that ‘China is key to developing a peaceful, prosperous, and secure Asia-Pacific region’.5 Donilon went further and addressed the essential issue that many observers were quietly and anxiously contemplating: the US rebalance to Asia, according to Donilon, ‘does not mean containing China or seeking to dictate terms to Asia’.6 Nevertheless, despite US diplomatic assurances, many Chinese officials, scholars or journalists are convinced that the US rebalance strategy is aimed squarely at their country. In fact, in many Chinese quarters, there has been persistent apprehension regarding the true intentions of the US rebalance and why the United States suddenly felt the need to ‘strengthen’ its alliance with Japan, Thailand and South Korea, while ‘deepening’ its partnership with India, among other initiatives.7 In April 2015, Ambassador Qu Xing, the Chinese envoy to Belgium, stated that ‘the US maintains its global dominance by keeping [a] balance of power in every region of the world … Whatever name it is called, the [US rebalance to Asia] presumes that China [has broken] the balance of power in [the] Asia-Pacific which needs to be rebalanced’.8 This narrative is consistent with similar ones found in Chinese scholarly literature; these narratives assert that the US rebalance policy is designed to either contain China or constrict China’s strategic space.9 One Chinese editorial noted that ‘the pivot [rebalance] policy is widely conceived as an attempt to contain rapidly developing China’. The editorial further stated that despite Washington’s repeated claims of ‘innocence’, the ‘facts on the ground have rendered its explanations weak and lame’.10 Such dramatically disparate interpretations in both China and the United States regarding the US rebalance policy and its implications should give pause to leaders in both countries, and indeed to leaders in neighboring countries concerned about the potential for a precipitous decline in US–China relations. More to the point, this chapter contends that the US rebalance to Asia is a reflection of a general deterioration in Beijing–Washington security relations that began roughly after 1989, following two pivotal events: the Tiananmen Square massacre (June 1989) and the fall of the Berlin Wall (November 1989). Although the two countries have enjoyed and continue to enjoy unprecedented economic and trade linkages, their security relationship is much more complicated and is plagued by a persistent sense of mutual distrust.11 Thus, while the US rebalance to Asia has indeed created assurance among certain US allies, it has also exacerbated ‘security dilemma’ dynamics between Beijing and Washington, leading both toward the path of a protracted and exhausting security competition.12 Unless leaders in both countries can

The US rebalance to Asia 201 recognize, manage and address the root cause of this competition, the chances of conflict between the two countries, either sparked intentionally or by accident, will rise dramatically in the years and decades ahead. To examine the validity of this thesis, this chapter will proceed as follows. First, it will explore the Cold War history and rationale of the US alliance structure in Asia. Second, it will examine the 20 years of rapprochement (roughly from 1969 to 1989) between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, which was stimulated and guided by convergent interests with regard to the Soviet Union. Then it will examine what the author believes to be the most complex and troubling period in the US–China relationship – the period that extends from roughly 1989 to the present and which, according to the author, reflects a grand bifurcation: on one side marked by increased economic integration and ‘complex interdependence’, but on the other – military and security side – marked by increased mutual suspicion, security competition and occasional hostility.13

COLD WAR ORIGINS OF THE US ALLIANCE SYSTEM IN ASIA When the United States announced its rebalance to Asia 2012, it raised a very fundamental question: exactly what was the US rebalancing to? In some respects, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, answered that question, at least partially, in a 2014 speech. Specifically, he stated that the United States ‘has more alliances in [the Asia-Pacific] than anywhere else in the world. Our deep partnership with Japan as well as with the Republic of Korea, with Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are the foundation of our Asia-Pacific strategy’. He further stated: ‘They underpin a growing network of increasingly important trilateral and multilateral relationships and forums. When you ally with the United States, you ally with the region’.14 The ‘network’ that Chairman Dempsey referred to was created in the aftermath of World War II and, in particular, was accelerated in the early 1950s as a result of US involvement in the Korean War. In January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson delivered his landmark speech to the National Press Club in which he described the US-supported security architecture in East Asia as a ‘defense perimeter [which] runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus [Okinawa] … to the Philippine Islands’.15 The following year, the United States signed a number of treaties that would formalize the perimeter defense system. In 1951, the United States signed a treaty with the Philippines (30 August),

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Australia (1 September) and Japan (8 September). Two years later, the United States signed a defense treaty with the Republic of Korea (1 October 1953). Eventually, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles would give the perimeter a name: the Pacific Security System (PSS). The PSS reflected Dulles’s concept of collective defense: ‘The cornerstone of security for the free nations must be a collective system of defense. They clearly cannot achieve security separately’.16 In other words, Dulles believed that countries would achieve much more by acting as a group, rather than depending solely on their own capabilities: ‘No single nation can develop for itself defense power of adequate scope and flexibility’.17 Similarly, each nation would be expected to contribute to this collective defense effort ‘in accordance with its capabilities and facilities’.18 With the PSS having been established, the next question was what country (or countries) was the PSS constructed to oppose. In the late 1940s, it was understood that the emerging US defense architecture in Asia would be directed against the Soviet Union; China was not yet a major factor for US security planners. In fact, as late as 1949, US strategy in Asia had hoped to ‘prevent China from becoming an adjunct of Soviet power’.19 However, the Korean War would change this conceptualization for decades to come. After late 1950, following Beijing’s intervention in Korea against the United States and its allies, China would be viewed as part of – or even as a co-equal to – the Soviet threat. In 1953, Secretary of State Dulles argued that the Korean War ‘forms one part of a world-wide effort of communism to conquer freedom’.20 A year later, Dulles referred to the two powers as if they constituted a single entity: ‘The Soviet–Chinese bloc does not lack manpower and spends it as something cheap’.21 In 1954, as a result of aggressive actions by the People’s Republic of China, such as the PLA’s artillery attacks on Taiwanese military installations on the island of Quemoy (or Jinmen), Secretary Dulles would expand his PSS to formally include Taiwan, which hosted Chiang Kai-shek and his exiled nationalist government. Indeed, four years earlier, following the outbreak of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, President Harry Truman ordered the 7th Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Strait (to avoid invasion by either side of the other). In 1951, General Douglas MacArthur, testifying before the US Senate, emphasized the growing importance of Taiwan to US strategy in the Pacific: ‘I believe … from our standpoint we practically lose the Pacific Ocean if we give up or lose Formosa [Taiwan] … Formosa should not be allowed to fall into red hands’.22 On 2 December 1954, the United States and Taiwan signed a mutual defense treaty, which Premier Zhou Enlai would later characterize as an

The US rebalance to Asia 203 ‘aggressive treaty of war’.23 The following year, the US Congress passed House Joint Resolution 159 (84th Congress) – the Formosa Resolution – which authorized the president ‘to employ the armed forces to protect Taiwan, the Pescadores, and related positions and territories in the area’.24 That same year, a US National Security Report (NSC 5503) listed a key objective for the United States with regard to Taiwan: ‘Maintenance of the security of Formosa [Taiwan] and the Pescadores as part of the Pacific off-shore island chain, which is an element essential to US security’.25 In addition, the United States sought to restrain Taiwan from unilaterally taking military action against Mainland China, which could have had an adverse impact on US security interests. In 1958, the US commitment to Taiwan’s security would be tested once again when the PRC sought to increase military pressure on the island, including, once again, artillery attacks on the outer islands, especially Quemoy (or Jinmen). The United States responded with an elaborate and powerful combined naval and air force show of force.26 Finally, the persistent focus on communism – and specifically Chinese communism – would shape US actions in Southeast Asia. This region was seen, similar to China and North Korea, as a place where ‘hostile communist power’ was spreading its influence.27 Thailand was added to the PSS in 1954 when it signed the Manila Pact, leading to the creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). However, it was nearby countries, such as Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, that concerned US policy-makers the most. Secretary Dulles and others within the US government feared that if communists gained control in Southeast Asia, they would threaten the entire US defense perimeter (and hence the larger PSS). ‘Communist control of Southeast Asia would carry a grave threat to the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, with whom we have treaties of mutual assistance’, Dulles argued.28 Following the withdrawal of the French in 1956, the US committed increasing numbers of ‘advisors’ to South Vietnam. In 1964, the US Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, granting its endorsement of ‘all necessary measures’ the president might need to take to repel communist aggression.29 At the peak of the conflict in 1969, the United States had deployed more than 543 000 military personnel to Vietnam and surrounding areas (the war resulted in over 58 000 US casualties).30 In addition, the conflict highlighted the importance of US bases in Okinawa, Taiwan and the Philippines (in particular, Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Base) in the overall US defense architecture. Overall, for nearly two decades, the US Pacific Security System ‘kept the peace’ and kept communism – emanating from both the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China – contained. The logic of the Pacific

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Security System was explained in a national security memorandum issued during the Nixon administration. It states that ‘for years the US has deployed strategic and conventional forces in forward positions throughout East Asia [which] have been directed against the military potential of the USSR and China’, including specific threats linked to those countries in Vietnam and North Korea. Thus, while the PSS had been successful, the memorandum noted that ‘the presence of US troops, particularly in mainland Asia, [had] projected a threatening image of the US in the eyes of the Chinese and other Asian Communists, constituting one of the barriers in the way of improvement in our relations with them’.31 In other words, the PSS had been successful, more or less, for roughly two decades. It had contained communism and Soviet and Chinese expansion. But it had also created a conflictual structure rooted as much in psychology as actual physical reality. This is one reason why President Richard Nixon, who had ironically built his career on anticommunist campaigns and rhetoric, chose to alter the system by introducing new ideas and expectations with a series of concepts that would later be known as the ‘Nixon Doctrine’.

THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND US–CHINA 20-YEAR RAPPROCHEMENT In July 1969, President Richard M. Nixon delivered a speech in Guam that would later form the basis of the Nixon Doctrine and would indirectly underpin a rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China that would last for roughly 20 years. This policy shift was predicated on three key principles: (1) the United States would keep all of its treaty commitments; (2) the United States would provide a shield ‘if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with [the United States] or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security’; and (3) ‘In cases involving other types of aggression, [the United States] shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense’.32 The key motivation for the Nixon administration in introducing this policy shift was to find an honorable exit out of the Vietnam War through a process described as ‘Vietnamizing’ the war effort. ‘In the previous [Johnson] administration, we Americanized the war in Viet Nam’, Nixon stated. ‘In this administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace’.33 Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine were predicated on the

The US rebalance to Asia 205 notion that ‘the defense of freedom is everybody’s business – not just America’s business’.34 And a key component of Nixon’s new doctrine was an emphasis on redefining the relationship with China, a country that was viewed as central to ending the conflict in Vietnam. In addition, Nixon saw a rapprochement with China as a way of balancing against Soviet power. According to Nixon’s logic, the Soviet Union presented an ominous threat to both countries, especially China, which had experienced armed clashes along the Ussuri River in March 1969. A US National Intelligence Estimate published in August 1969 stated: ‘For the first time, it is reasonable to ask whether a major Sino–Soviet war could break out in the near future. The potential for such a war clearly exists’.35 More ominously, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger wrote to President Nixon in September 1969, describing ‘probes’ by Soviet diplomats and officials regarding US attitudes toward (or likely US reactions in response to) ‘a possible Soviet air strike against China’s nuclear/missile facilities or toward other Soviet military actions’.36 Given this atmosphere, President Richard M. Nixon was able to accomplish his historic visit to China in February 1972, resulting in the joint promulgation of the historic Shanghai Communiqué, which would define the parameters of US–PRC relations for years to come. As Nixon wrote in 1982, ‘the key factor that brought [the US and China] together [in 1972] was our common concern with the Soviet threat, and our recognition that we had a better chance of containing that threat if we replaced hostility with cooperation between Peking [Beijing] and Washington’.37 Nixon’s resignation in August 1974 did not stop the impetus of the warming relationship between China and the United States. President Gerald Ford largely continued the efforts, particularly due to his retention of Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s chief China policy architect. In his December 1975 visit to China, Ford described the US–China rapprochement in 1972 as one of ‘historic significance’ and that he sought to ‘reaffirm [his] commitment to the objectives and the principles that emerged from those first steps’.38 However, any question of normalization would have to be postponed due to the ‘collapse of South Vietnam and the opposition of conservative Republicans [which] created an inhospitable environment’ for China-related diplomatic initiatives.39 By sharp contrast, President Jimmy Carter, who took office in January 1977, was able to take US–China relations to entirely new levels, including the formal establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979. This breakthrough was accompanied by the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic

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Relations, the second major communiqué after the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972. Similar to the Shanghai Communiqué, the Joint Communiqué attempted to address the thorny question of Taiwan by asserting that the US government ‘acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China’.40 The timing of US–China diplomatic normalization was ideal; the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan and once again, the ‘geopolitical glue’ that held the United States and China together became even stronger than before. China, moreover, was not shy about admitting the instrumental value of its warming relationship with the United States as a foil against Soviet power. In 1977, for instance, Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng reportedly told US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance that China was committed to a relationship with the United States ‘as a counterweight to the Soviet threat’.41 Meanwhile, according to Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s national security advisor, the long-term objective for the US government should be to ‘include China in the international framework of cooperation which we are attempting to build among the key nations of the world’.42 More importantly, Carter administration officials were proud that they had consummated the efforts begun by President Nixon ten years earlier by applying just the right mix of realism and optimism. In a letter addressed to President Carter, Michel Oksenberg, a China specialist who worked on Carter’s National Security Council staff, contrasted Carter’s China policy with past presidents: ‘[Franklin Delano] Roosevelt’s [China] policy was too romantic; Truman’s too reactive; Eisenhower’s, Kennedy’s, and Johnson’s too hostile; Nixon’s too manipulative; and Ford’s too timid’. President Carter, according to Oksenberg, had been ‘distinctive for its insistence on realism, reciprocity, and long-run considerations’.43 Like President Nixon, President Ronald Reagan had built his career on a conservative, anti-communist and pro-Taiwan platform. But ironically (and similar to Nixon), Reagan would adopt a pragmatic and cooperative stance toward China based on what he perceived to be the two countries’ convergent interests ‘in furthering strategic cooperation … against the common Soviet threat’.44 Eventually, the administration would characterize China as a ‘friendly non-allied country’, notwithstanding differences over such issues as human rights and Taiwan.45 A key US strategic goal was to strengthen Chinese military capabilities so that Beijing could play an effective anti-Soviet balancing role; this would be done ‘by supplying appropriate arms and other military technology’ [to China] as well as by sponsoring ‘associated training’ and ‘military exchanges’.46

The US rebalance to Asia 207 However, the United States’ residual relationship with Taiwan continued to hamper the growth of US–PRC relations during Reagan’s administration – particularly as perceived from the Chinese side – and thus the two countries sought to codify their understanding via their third (and final) major communiqué. Known simply as the Joint Communiqué of the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America (17 August 1982), the communiqué reaffirmed broad principles (such as non-interference in each other’s internal affairs) as articulated in the previous two communiqués (1972 and 1979). In addition, it stated that the United States has no intention of ‘pursuing a policy of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan”’.47 In addition, it stated that relations between the two countries were not only in the interests of the countries themselves, but would also be ‘conducive to peace and stability in the world’.48 When President George H.W. Bush took office in January 1989, he probably never realized that he would be the last US leader to preside over the 20-year rapprochement era in US–China relations. Compared to previous presidents, Bush had remarkable China-related credentials. He had served as chief of mission in China (in the US Liaison Office) from 1974 to 1975. Prior to that, he served as US Ambassador the United Nations and attended the critical 1971 talks between Henry Kissinger and Chinese Ambassador Huang Hua regarding coordination of US–Chinese positions with regard to the Indo-Pakistan war.49 In addition, he directed the CIA from January 1976 to January 1977 and thus was in a key policy position where he could influence the trajectory of US–China relations. However, within months of assuming the presidency, Bush would experience two key events that would have profound and lasting effects on Chinese–American relations, although the significance of each was largely not recognized or completely understood at the time. The first occurred on 4 June 1989 when the Chinese government deployed military troops against thousands of Chinese student protestors in Tiananmen Square, killing hundreds or thousands. Although the United States ultimately chose to continue engaging with China – including allowing access to US markets – it sought to encourage China’s transformation into a ‘responsible’ country willing to abide by international norms and uphold international obligations.50 The second event occurred on 9 November 1989 when the Berlin Wall finally fell. The breach of the wall would signify, ultimately, the collapse of the Soviet Union two years later and the end of the Cold War. For many it was a joyous occasion, but for US–China relations, the fundamental shift in the international system would slowly unravel the rationale for bilateral cooperation. In other

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words, without the Soviet Union providing an ‘enemy referent’, the US–China relationship lost the ballast that had kept the two countries’ relationship steady for nearly two decades.

GRAND BIFURCATION AND THE PROTRACTED DIVORCE Within the post–Cold War structure, US–China relations began to experience what might be termed the ‘grand bifurcation’, meaning that on the economic front, relations thickened and experienced greater economic and social interdependence and integration, while on the military and security front relations became more distant, hostile and competitive, although in many cases the benefits of the first trend obscured or masked the pernicious evolution of the second.51 On the first point, trade figures clearly demonstrate the growing economic linkages between the two countries although tensions did grow over what was viewed – on the US side – as an imbalanced trade relationship. In testimony before a US House of Representatives committee, Kent Wiedemann, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, stated: ‘We have deep concerns over the current imbalance in our trade relationship with China. Last year our bilateral trade deficit was nearly $30 billion, second only to our trade deficit with Japan’.52 This imbalance would only grow in the years ahead. However, the more troubling aspects of the relationship would manifest on the political and security fronts, especially as the United States sought to influence, transform or even change China. In the Clinton administration, this strategy was known as ‘comprehensive engagement’. ‘We want China to be fully integrated into the international community’, Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated in early 1995. ‘For that to happen’, he continued, ‘[Beijing] must accept the obligations that come with membership in international institutions and adherence to international norms’.53 Essentially, as Robert Zoellick would later describe, the United States was seeking to transform China into a responsible power (or responsible stakeholder) that would be a fellow supporter of the post–World War II international system largely constructed by the United States and its allies.54 More troubling, from a US perspective, were changes in China’s military posture. From the early 1990s, the United States began to express public concern about China’s military development. In March 1994, the head of US Pacific Command, Admiral Charles Larson, testified that ‘China continues to increase the pace and scope of its

The US rebalance to Asia 209 military modernization program’. He urged China to exhibit greater transparency regarding its strategic planning so that neighboring countries could be assured that the ‘military modernization program is limited to legitimate defensive needs and is peaceful in intent’.55 This testimony occurred roughly a year before one of the most serious military crises in the history of US–China relations when China conducted missile tests near Taiwan in an attempt to influence democratic elections. The United States responded by sending two carrier strike groups to the region. Like previous Taiwan Strait crises (1954–55 and 1958), the 1995–96 crisis dramatically increased US–China tensions over Taiwan, but ultimately did not lead to war. Three years later, another crisis erupted in US–China relations when the United States accidentally bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade (many Chinese have never accepted that this was an accident). The bombing evoked such ire from Beijing that one foreign ministry spokesman vowed that China would stop all cooperation with the United States on issues such as proliferation and arms control.56 In addition to specific military events, US–China relations were rocked by allegations of espionage and illegal procurement of sensitive technologies. In January 1999, the Congressional Cox Committee released a report accusing China of spying on and stealing an array of US defense technologies, including nuclear warhead and missile designs, among other technologies such as high-performance computers (HPCs). Among its most important conclusions, the Committee stated that the US intelligence community ‘is insufficiently focused on the threat posed by PRC intelligence and the targeted effort to obtain militarily useful technology from the United States’.57 In addition to espionage and illegal procurement allegations, the United States accused China of proliferating missile and other technologies around the world to various actors, including rogue states. Not surprisingly, Dulles’s Pacific Security System, which had largely avoided focusing on China during the 1970s and 1980s, seemed to be reviving some of its Cold War era raison d’être. One US policy document from the mid-1990s stated that the rationale for the PSS could be distilled into three key interests. First, the United States wanted to (1) promote peace and security (and avoid a major war that ultimately would involve the United States); (2) ensure freedom of navigation (which underpinned the region’s prosperity); and (3) prevent the rise of any competitive hegemonic power or coalition. The United States avoided naming any single country, but as the 1990s unfolded, it was becoming clear that China was once again emerging as the implied referent for this security

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architecture, particularly after the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis. Moreover, with the loss of bases in the Philippines after 1992, the center of gravity of the system shifted northward back to Japan and South Korea. US–Japan defense relations were fundamentally restructured with negotiations over guidelines and parameters for defense cooperation. At the same time, US officials sought to publicly reassure China that an enhanced US–Japan security relationship was not aimed at Beijing. ‘China must realize that the US–Japan security dialogue is not an effort to constrain or ostracize China’, stated Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye in October 1995.58

TERRORISM DETENTE AND A DIVORCE DELAYED At the dawn of the twenty-first century, it appeared that US–China relations were headed into an era of greater security competition and accelerated mistrust. The new president, George W. Bush, had previously characterized China as a ‘competitor, not a strategic partner’.59 Shortly after Bush’s inauguration, a US EP-3 surveillance aircraft was intercepted near Hainan in the South China Sea. The plane made an emergency landing and was later confiscated (along with the crew) by Chinese authorities. High-level negotiations ultimately resulted in the crew’s release, but it was clear that the incident had precipitated the first major Sino–US crisis for the new Bush administration. It seemed that Bush’s ‘China as competitor’ assessments, made prior to becoming president, were very prescient. However, this tone would change following the 9/11 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. Despite the horrific and tragic consequences of the attacks in New York City and Washington, DC, they did have a salutary effect on the deteriorating US–China relationship. American and Chinese leaders found common cause in the overall threat of global terrorism. At a joint news conference held in Shanghai, President George Bush and Chinese President Jiang Zemin spoke enthusiastically about the two countries’ common counter-terrorism interests. There was no doubt, Bush said, that the Chinese government ‘would stand with the United States and our people during this terrible time’.60 From a Chinese strategic perspective, the US ‘war on terrorism’ was a godsend. Not only would it divert the United States’ attention away from China’s military modernization and build-up efforts, but it would also commit the United States to multi-billion dollar military adventures in both Afghanistan and

The US rebalance to Asia 211 Iraq that would ultimately result in ambiguous conclusions. Meanwhile, China would be free to focus on building up its economic and military power. In future years, however, the temporary respite brought about by the US–China ‘terrorism détente’ would quickly subside as members of Congress and media commentators began ‘attacking China’s policies, from the exchange rate to military buildup’.61 Meanwhile, in the Executive Branch, the Department of Defense’s annual reports to Congress titled The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China would reflect a steady progression of palpable angst among US defense and security planners regarding Chinese military advances. In the 2002 report, for instance, the authors noted that ‘Beijing’s military training exercises increasingly focus on the United States as an adversary’.62 In the 2003 report, the authors note that Beijing ‘may have acquired high-energy laser equipment that could be used in the development of ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons’.63 In 2004, the authors noted that ‘China is expanding and upgrading its submarine fleet with the purchase of four Russian KILO Class attack submarines (SSNs)’.64 The 2005 report noted that China was increasing, by a rate of roughly 100 per year, its deployment of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) in locations across from Taiwan.65 The election of Barack Obama as the 44th US president proved to be a huge watershed both domestically and internationally. Viewing his election as a mandate to reduce US military engagements abroad, Obama pursued a new course in US diplomacy that would place particular emphasis on China. At a speech in Shanghai in November 2009, President Obama acknowledged the increasing integration of the US and Chinese economies. Indeed, the two countries were inextricably linked on an unprecedented scale: ‘In 1979, trade between the United States and China stood at roughly $5 billion – today it tops over $400 billion each year’, Obama stated.66 Moreover, given these growing economic linkages between the two countries, Obama declared that the United States and China had a ‘positive, constructive and comprehensive relationship’ that opened the door to partnership on key issues, including economic recovery, the development of clean energy, mitigation of nuclear proliferation, addressing climate change and so on.67 These sentiments were echoed by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who saw US–China cooperation as essential for a global economic recovery. She stated: ‘If the United States and China work together as we have in the G-20 process, we can help to stabilize the economic situation in the world and begin a recovery and a return to growth’.68

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However, notwithstanding Obama’s initiatives, it was clear, from a security and military angle, that the US–China relationship continued to move in competitive directions. Notwithstanding Obama’s warm and affectionate gestures toward Beijing, the US Department of Defense’s annual reports to Congress continued to stress China’s military modernization advances and the implications for US security planning. For example, the 2009 report, issued only months prior to President Obama’s speech in Shanghai, described the PLA’s acquisition of ‘highly accurate cruise missiles’, the modernization of China’s ‘longer-range ballistic missile force’ and the development of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile (the JL-2) to be deployed on ‘up to five new JIN-class (Type 094) SSBN’ submarines, among other developments.69 On 23 July 2010, Obama’s Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton, delivered a speech in Hanoi, Vietnam that was more than obliquely directed at China. ‘The United States, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea’, Clinton stated. Later in the speech she added: ‘We oppose the use or threat of force by any claimant’.70 Clinton’s statement was complemented by the 2010 DOD assessments regarding China’s military, including one statement that had direct relevance for China’s projection of power into the South China Sea: ‘China’s probable plans to base the Type 094 SSBN (JIN-class) at Hainan Island raises the potential that the PLA Navy would consider conducting strategic patrols in the waters of the South China Sea requiring Beijing to provide for a more robust conventional military presence to ensure the protection of its sea-based deterrent’.71 Three years later, President Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in Palm Springs, California. During their joint speeches, delivered in the bucolic and tropical setting of rural California, Obama affirmed that the United States ‘welcomes the continuing peaceful rise of China as a world power’.72 In a similar vein, President Xi spoke of a ‘vast convergence of shared interests’ between the United States and China to include economic growth and the need to confront global challenges.73 Simultaneously, however, the defense establishments of both countries were warily describing or assessing the motives of the other. The 2013 DOD report described the PLA’s desire to expand beyond a Taiwan contingency to ‘improve extended-range power projection and operations in emerging domains such as cyber, space, and electronic warfare’.74 The report also described the PLA’s acquisition of a ‘range of technologies to improve China’s space and counter-space capabilities’, among other developments.75 Chinese military publications similarly wrote of the

The US rebalance to Asia 213 threat posed by US forces, particularly after the announcement of the US ‘rebalance’ policy. In November 2013, China announced the establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that covered a substantial portion of the East China Sea (including the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands). Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel characterized the Chinese move as a ‘destabilizing attempt to alter the status quo in the region’.76 The incongruence between cheerful and optimistic speeches in California and elsewhere on the state of US–China relations, juxtaposed with dire military assessments, was striking. To be sure, for many US officials, China’s actions have not matched its words or its promises. According to China’s Military Strategy (released in May 2015), China claims that it pursues a defense policy that is ‘defensive in nature, [opposed to] hegemonism and power politics in all forms’ and that China ‘will never seek hegemony or expansion’.77 At the same time, China engages in provocative and assertive sovereignty claim activities in nearby maritime zones and conducts provocative naval exercises in various parts of the Western Pacific region. The apparent contradiction between aspirational diplomatic language on one hand and assertive military activities on the other reflects the broad bifurcation of the Sino–US relationship between the economic, cultural and social sphere, where bilateral relations are reasonably congenial and productive, juxtaposed with the military and security sphere, where relations are much more fraught with mutual suspicions and fears. A good example of the bifurcation – and indeed the contradictions – of US–China relations could be seen in events that occurred in June 2015. On a positive note, Washington and Beijing held their 7th ‘US–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue’. The dialogue, established in 2009, ‘represents the highest-level bilateral forum [for the United States and China] to discuss a broad range of issues between the two nations’.78 The June 2015 meeting of the dialogue bore a number of successes, including ‘commitments toward the protection and conservation of the world’s oceans’ and agreements to ‘deepen and strengthen law enforcement cooperation’, among other pledges.79 Simultaneously, however, the meeting was held under the cloud of one of the largest cyberattacks on the US government in its history, which focused on the personnel and security files of current and retired US government officials.80 The attack, allegedly and publicly attributed to the Chinese government, occurred in the context of larger efforts by the Chinese government, as purported by former and current US officials, to build ‘vast databases of Americans’ personal information for counterintelligence purposes’.81

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In addition, US–China tensions over the South China Sea came to a head in late 2015 when the United States deployed a guided missile destroyer (USS Lassen) within 12 nautical miles of Zhubi Reef in the Nansha Islands as part of a Freedom of Navigation (FON) exercise. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the US actions ‘threatened China’s sovereignty and security interests, put the personnel and facilities on the islands and reefs at risk and endangered regional peace and stability’.82 The exercise came roughly one month after President Xi Jinping, speaking in the Rose Garden of the White House, stated that ‘China and the United States have a lot of common interests on the issue of [the] South China Sea. We both support peace and stability of the South China Sea’.83 Nevertheless, the United States (as of this writing) has signaled that it will continue engaging in FON operations regardless of China’s protests or assertions of national interest. In a November 2015 speech in Beijing, Admiral Harry Harris, Commander of US Pacific Command, stated that the US military ‘will continue to fly, sail, and operate whenever and wherever international law allows. The South China Sea is not – and will not – be an exception’.84 Thus, viewing the broad phases of US–China relations in a broad continuum, one can conclude the following: US–China relations were marked by ongoing and persistent hostility for roughly two decades (1949 to 1969). This was followed by almost 20 years of rapprochement (1969 to 1989), which was followed by the current bifurcated era – increasingly competitive military relations on one hand, and increasingly cooperative economic relations on the other. It is the third phase that is most dangerous because the comfort that is perceived in cooperative economic relations obscures the insidious underlying cancer of military competition. More to the point, the ‘security dilemma’ is actively in play within the US–China dyad. According to security dilemma logic, one country’s ‘gain in security often inadvertently threatens others’.85 When the United States announced an operational concept known as AirSea Battle – now re-labeled Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons, or JAM-GC – which is designed to overcome AntiAccess/Area Denial (A2/AD) challenges, it generated insecurity within China, which perceived that it was the unnamed country against which the concept had been developed. Similarly, when China developed or improved its conventional and nuclear missile capabilities, it created insecurity among US military planners who then began planning countermeasures. According to security dilemma logic, since neither the United States nor China can feel completely secure or safe from the actions of the other, ‘power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on’.86

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CONCLUSION Overall, this chapter leads to three broad conclusions. First, the rebalance to Asia is an indication of deep trouble in the US–China relationship, and if Chinese perceptions of the US strategic shift could be taken into account, the strategy might be relabeled as the ‘rebalance to China’. While the United States has reassured certain allies as part of this strategic adjustment, it has also strengthened a security architecture, dating back to the end of World War II, that was designed to oppose and contain Soviet and, later, Chinese military and political power. When the Soviet Union disappeared in 1991, the party left standing was the People’s Republic of China. As a result, due to its heavy military emphasis, the US rebalance to Asia threatens to exacerbate pre-existing security dilemma dynamics that have persisted within the US–China dyad since at least the early 1990s. As Admiral Harry Harris, Commander of US Pacific Command, recently stated, the most ‘visible sphere’ of the US rebalance is in the military realm. ‘Our military is playing an important role in the rebalance’, he stated. ‘We are on pace to have 60 percent of our Navy based in the Pacific Fleet by 2020’.87 Not surprisingly, China views the move as a revival of the Cold War era containment policy. Second, the United States and China need to arrive at a common conclusion that there are no viable military solutions to their respective disagreements or disputes. Both countries are nuclear weapons states and it is likely – perhaps even inevitable – that such weapons would be used in a conflict, particularly a protracted one. Needless to say, this would have devastating consequences not only for the two countries, but also for the world as a whole. In addition, the existence of strong economic linkages between the two countries is generating a false sense of security within both countries that the ‘most dreadful scenario’ would never occur. This leads to the obvious conclusion that the weakest link in the US–China relationship is in the military realm. This is where the United States and China should concentrate their diplomatic energy in order to (1) avoid a major ruinous and destructive war that would have tragic and horrifying collateral global effects and (2) foster and build trust to address long term security issues that are in the common interest of both countries. The US strategic default, which apparently aims to sustain US primacy in the Asia-Pacific for the indefinite future, is simply not sustainable in the very long run without significant risks in terms of miscalculation and inadvertent conflict.

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Third, China and the United States need to find a ‘geopolitical glue’ to keep their interests aligned. The 1969–89 rapprochement era was underpinned by the common threat of the Soviet Union. With that threat having dissipated, the two countries have found that their convergent geopolitical moorings are adrift. In 2005, Henry Kissinger wrote that ‘the rise of China – and of Asia – will, over the next decades, bring about a substantial reordering of the international system’.88 While Kissinger’s observation may be true, any rise of China will not occur without severe resistance from the US political and security elite.89 Thus, a security competition between the two countries will likely accelerate in the years and decade ahead unless serious efforts are made – in both Beijing and Washington – to focus on common interests and to assuage the fears and anxieties that are growing in each country. This goal will not be easy to achieve and will require ‘constructive realism’ pragmatism and accommodation from both sides.90

NOTES * 1. 2. 3.

4.

5. 6. 7. 8.

9.

10.

The views or opinions expressed in this chapter are the author’s own. Department of Defense (2012), Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. 2. Transcript of Hillary Clinton’s Confirmation Hearing, 13 January 2009, Council on Foreign Relations, accessed 28 March 2016 at http://www.cfr.org/elections/transcripthillary-clintons-confirmation-hearing/p18225. The White House (2013), ‘Remarks by Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor to the President: “The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013”, 11 March, 2013’, accessed 16 April 2015 at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/11/ remarks-tom-donilon-national-security-advisory-president-united-states-a. U.S. Department of Defense (2012), ‘The U.S. strategic rebalance to Asia: a defense perspective, as delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense, Ashton B Carter, New York City, August 01 2012’, accessed 23 March 2016 at http://archive.defense.gov/ speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1715. Ibid. The White House, ‘Remarks by Tom Donilon’. U.S. Department of Defense, ‘The U.S. strategic rebalance to Asia: a defense perspective’. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2015), ‘China–US: duel of the century or partner of the century? Qu Xing;Belgium, 14 April 2015’, accessed 25 March 2016 at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_ 665342/zwbd_665378/t1254993.shtml. Yuan, Z. (2013), ‘The Sino–US relationship: progress under cooperation and competition’, International Security Studies, No. 1, 70, 75 [in Chinese]. See also Tao, W. (2013), ‘Sino–US relations are at a new point’, Peace and Development, No. 1, 21 [in Chinese]. English News.cn (2014), ‘Commentary: time for US to revisit “pivot to Asia” policy’, 9 January, accessed 23 March 2016 at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/ indepth/2014-01/29/c_133083109.htm.

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Lieberthal, K. and J. Wang (2012), Addressing US–China Strategic Distrust, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, pp. 1–65. Herz, J.H. (1950), ‘Idealist internationalism and the security dilemma’, World Politics, 2 (2), 157–80. Keohane, R.O. and J.S. Nye (2000), ‘Globalization: what’s new? What’s not? (and so what?)’, Foreign Policy, No. 118, 115. Martin, M. (2013), ‘Remarks at the National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, Japan’, Federal News Service, 26 April 2013. Acheson, D. (1950), ‘Speech on the Far East’, accessed 2 July 2015 at http:// www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/44/1950-01-12.pdf. Dulles, J.F. (1954), ‘Policy for security and peace’, Foreign Affairs, 32 (3), 353–64. Ibid. Ibid. Digital National Security Archives, NSC 34/1, A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on United States Policy Toward China, 11 January 1949, p. 1. Avalon Project (2008), ‘Excerpt: Indochina – The consequences of direct Chinese intervention in Indochina: Address by the Secretary of State, September 2, 1953’, Yale Law School, accessed 23 March 2016 at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_ century/inch016.asp. Secretary of State (1954), ‘The Secretary of State to the Embassy of Japan, Washington, August 20, 1954’ [telegram], Foreign Relations of the United States 1952–1954, Volume XIV, Part 1, China and Japan, Document No. 260, accessed 23 March 2016 at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d260. Bosco, J.A. (2015), ‘Taiwan and security strategy’, The Diplomat, 15 May, accessed 23 March 2016 at http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/taiwan-and-strategic-security/. Chai, W. (1999), ‘Relations between the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan: overview and chronology’, Asian Affairs, 26 (2), 65. Ibid. National Security Council (1954), ‘U.S. policy toward Formosa and the Government of the Republic of China, Washington, DC, 15 January 1955’, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume II, China, Document No. 12, accessed 23 March 2016 at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v02/d12. Van Steaveren, J. (1962), Air Operations in the Taiwan Crisis of 1958, declassified, USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, November 1962, pp. 1–73, accessed 23 March 2016 at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb249/doc11.pdf. National Security Council Planning Board (1954), ‘Current US policy in the Far East’, Foreign Relations of the United States 1952–1954, Volume XIV, Part 1, China and Japan, Document No. 436, accessed 23 March 2016 at https://history.state.gov/ historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d436. The Daily Illini (1954), ‘Dulles calls for action. Urges Indochina defense’, 30 March, accessed 23 March 2016 at http://idnc.library.illinois.edu/cgi-bin/illinois?a=d&d= DIL19540330.2.1. Torreon, B.S. (2015), Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–2015, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, p. 11. Ibid. ‘Draft response to National Security Study Memorandum 106, Washington, February 16, 1971’, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document No. 105, accessed 25 March 2016 at https://history.state.gov/ historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d105. Chicago Tribune (1969), ‘Text of president’s Viet Nam speech’, 4 November, 8, accessed 23 March 2016 at http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1969/11/04/page/8/ article/text-of-presidents-viet-nam-speech.

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Handbook of US–China relations Ibid. Ibid. ‘National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 11/13-69), Washington, August 12, 1969’, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, ‘The USSR and China’, Volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document No. 24, accessed 25 March 2016 at https:// history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d24. ‘Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 29 1969’, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document No. 37, accessed 25 March 2016 at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d37. Nixon, R. (1982), ‘America and China: the next 10 years’, The New York Times, 11 October, A19. ‘The President’s toast at the Welcoming Banquet in Peking’, 1 December 1975, p. 2, accessed 8 June 2015 at http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0331/ 1553946.pdf#pagemode=bookmarks&page=9. US Department of State, ‘Milestones: 1977–1980: China policy’, Office of the Historian, accessed 2 July 2015 at https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/ china-policy. Council on Foreign Relations (1979), ‘Joint Communiqué of the USA and the People’s Republic of China on the establishment of diplomatic relations, 1979’, accessed 2 July 2015 at http://www.cfr.org/china/joint-communique-usa-peoplesrepublic-china-establishment-diplomatic-relations-1979/p8452. Sino–American Relations: From the Shanghai Communiqué to the Present, report prepared for the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US House of Representatives, July 1980, p. 4. [CB-17], accessed 23 March 2016 at http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/011338382. ‘Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter’, 25 January 1979, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIII (China), Document No. 196, p. 720, accessed 25 March 2016 at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v13/d196. ‘Memorandum from Michel Oksenberg of the National Security Council Staff to President Carter, Washington, DC, 14 February 1980’, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIII (China), Document No. 300, p. 1091, accessed 25 March 2016 at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus197780v13/d300. National Security Decision Directive No. 120, ‘Visit to the United States of Premier Zhao Ziyang’, 9 January 1984, Digital National Security Archive, Item Number: CH00654. ‘Secretary’s talking points: US–China relations’, 4 June 1981, Digital National Security Archive, Item number: CH00562. ‘US National Security Strategy, April 1982’, Digital National Security Archive, Item Number: PR01452, p. 32. Embassy of the PRC (1982), ‘Joint Communiqué of the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America, August 17, 1982’, accessed 6 May 2015 at http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/doc/ctc/t946664.htm. Ibid. ‘Memorandum of conversation, New York, December 10, 1971’, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, Document No. 176, accessed 25 March 2016 at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus196976v17/d176. ‘Prepared Testimony of Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’ (1995) Federal News Service, 14 February.

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Liu, Y. and J.Z. Ren (2014), ‘An emerging consensus on the US threat: the United States according to PLA officers’, Journal of Contemporary China, 23 (86), 255–74. ‘Prepared Testimony of Kent Wiedemann, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Before the House Ways and Means Committee, Subcommittee on Trade’ (1995), Federal News Service, 23 May. ‘Prepared Testimony of Secretary of State Warren Christopher Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’. ‘Remarks by Robert B. Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State, to the National Committee on U.S.–China relations, New York City, September 21 2005’, U.S. Department of State Archive, accessed 1 July 2015 at http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/ former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm. ‘Admiral Charles R. Larson, US Navy Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Posture Hearing, 2 March 1994 (Lexis-Nexis)’, Federal News Service. Pomfret, J. (1999), ‘China suspends some US ties’, Washington Post, 10 May, A01. Cox Report: ‘Overview’, Select Committee of the United States House of Representatives, 3 January 1999, p. xxxiv, accessed 17 April 2015 at http://www. house.gov/coxreport/pdf/overv.pdf. ‘Prepared Statement of Joseph S. Nye, Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, before the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific’ (1995), Federal News Service, 24 October. ‘Governor George W. Bush, “A distinctly American internationalism”, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California, November 19 1999’, Global Security.org, accessed 6 May 2015 at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/ news/usa/1999/991119-bush-foreignpolicy.htm. Bush, G.W. (2001), ‘The President’s News Conference with President Jiang Zemin of China in Shanghai, China’, 19 October, The American Presidency Project, accessed 23 March 2016 at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64116. Kissinger, H.A. (2005), ‘China: containment won’t work’, The Washington Post, 13 June, A19. Office of the Secretary of Defense (2002), Annual Report to Congress; Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, Washington, DC, p. 2. Office of the Secretary of Defense (2003), Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, Washington, DC, p. 9. Office of the Secretary of Defense (2004), Annual Report to Congress; Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, Washington, DC, p. 40. Office of the Secretary of Defense (2005), Annual Report to Congress; Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, Washington, DC, p. 11. ‘Remarks by President Barack Obama at Town Hall Meeting with future Chinese leaders’, Museum of Science and Technology, Shanghai, The White House, 16 November 2009, accessed 20 April 2015 at https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-town-hall-meeting-with-future-chineseleaders. Ibid. Transcript of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, ‘Interview on the Charlie Rose Show, 9 November 2009’, State Department Documents and Publications, accessed 25 March 2016 at http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/ 2009a/11/131713.htm. Office of the Secretary of Defense (2009), Annual Report to Congress; Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, p. 48. ‘Comments by Secretary Clinton in Hanoi, Vietnam, discusses U.S.–Vietnam relations, ASEAN Forum, North Korea, 23 July 2010’, IIP Digital, accessed 2 July 2015

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Handbook of US–China relations at http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2010/07/20100723164658su0. 4912989.html. Office of the Secretary of Defense (2010), Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, Washington, DC, p. 39. ‘Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping of the PRC before Bilateral Meeting, Sunnylands Retreat, Palm Springs, California, 7 June 2013’, The White House, accessed 2 July 2015 at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/ 06/07/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-jinping-peoples-republic-china-. Ibid. Office of the Secretary of Defense (2013), Annual Report to Congress; Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, p. 29. Ibid., p. 33. US Department of Defense (2013), ‘Statement by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, Release No. NR-036-13, 23 November 2013’, accessed 24 March 2016 at http://www.defense.gov/releases/ release.aspx?releaseid=16392. Xinhua (2015), ‘Full text: China’s military strategy’, 26 May, accessed 27 May 2015 at http://www.ecns.cn/2015/05-26/166858.shtml. US Department of the Treasury (2015), ‘US–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue’, accessed 1 July 2015 at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Pages/china.aspx. Office of the Spokesperson (2015), ‘US–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue outcomes of the Strategic Track’, Media Note, Washington, DC, 24 June, accessed 23 March 2016 at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/06/244205.htm. Sanger, D.E. and J.H. Davis (2015), ‘Data breach tied to China hits millions’, The New York Times, 5 June, A1. Nakashima, E. (2015), ‘Chinese had access to security data for a year’, The Washington Post, 19 June, A18. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC (2015), ‘Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lu Kang’s regular press conference on October 27, 2015’, accessed 25 November 2015 at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/ t1309625.shtml. ‘Remarks by President Obama and President Xi of the People’s Republic of China in Joint Press Conference, Rose Garden, September 25, 2015’, The White House, accessed 25 November 2015 at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/ 09/25/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-peoples-republic-china-joint. ‘Remarks by Admiral Harry B. Harris, Commander, US Pacific Command, at Stanford Center-Peking University, Beijing China’, Targeted News Service (LexisNexis), 3 November 2015. Jervis, R. (1978), ‘Cooperation under the security dilemma’, World Politics, 30 (2), 170. Herz, ‘Idealist internationalism and the security dilemma’, p. 157. Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr., Commander, US Pacific Fleet, at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, Australia, 31 March 2015, accessed 25 March 2016 at http://www.cpf.navy.mil/leaders/harry-harris/speeches/2015/03/ASPIAustralia.pdf. Kissinger, ‘China: containment won’t work’. Blackwill, R.D. and A.J. Tellis (2015), Revising US Grand Strategy Toward China, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, March 2015, pp. 1–70.

The US rebalance to Asia 221 90.

Rudd, K. (2015), U.S.–China 21. The Future of U.S.–China Relations Under Xi Jinping, Toward a New Framework of Constructive Realism for a Common Purpose, summary report, Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, April 2015, pp. 1–52.

12. Assessing the ‘new model of major power relations’ between China and the United States Richard Weixing Hu

US–China relations have largely been stable since the end of the Cold War. Yet tensions have been rising since the Obama administration began its ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy. China’s economic power and military capabilities are growing fast, and that has made US policy-makers and elites increasingly take the view that China is becoming assertive and is challenging US primacy in world affairs and the existing US-led international order in the Asia-Pacific region in particular. Thus, the ‘pivot to Asia’ is seen as a strategic shift that is aimed at maintaining US primacy and its leadership role in the Asia-Pacific region. Yet, in the eyes of the Chinese, Obama’s pivot is no more than a coordinated effort to contain the rise of China in the Asia-Pacific. This perception is strong and powerful in China and in the region. Washington has tried to dispel this perception. The White House has repeatedly argued that the pivot is a necessary rebalance of resources and strategic attention to focus more on US interests in Asia after a decade-long ‘war on terror’,1 but to the Chinese, this is just empty rhetoric. The majority of Chinese elites believe that the purpose of the ‘pivot to Asia’ is to contain China or at least undermine China’s growing regional influence. Washington is tacitly encouraging or emboldening Asian countries that have territorial disputes with China to challenge Beijing and to forge a de facto anti-China coalition. Although a small number of Chinese elites are not so pessimistic, they still believe that the US rebalancing would inevitably lead to the weakening of China’s strategic position and influence in East Asia. Hence, Obama’s strategic rebalance has become a central variable for the future development of US–China relations. It has also become a powerful driving force shaping the future regional strategic landscape as well as major power relations in the region. The Chinese answer to the pivot is President Xi Jinping’s proposal to build a ‘new model of major power relations’ between China and the United States. Xi’s proposal was made when he was paying an official visit to the United States as Chinese Vice President in February 2012.2 In 222

Assessing the ‘new model of major power relations’ 223 the Chinese view, the US rebalance to Asia has created a strong ‘strategic whirl’ in the Asia-Pacific region, and this strategic shift has dramatically led to a deterioration of China’s international environment. Beijing and Washington need to ‘reset’ their relationship by avoiding conflicts, increasing mutual respect, and creating win-win cooperation in global governance. What does this new model of major power relations really mean? How feasible is it to build such a new relationship between the United States and China? As the US rebalance to Asia is changing regional dynamics, how could Beijing and Washington manage their competition while expanding their cooperation with each other? This chapter examines the strategic context and rationale of building the ‘new model of major power relations’ between China and the United States, how Obama’s pivot to Asia has reshaped regional strategic parameters for future US–China relations, and how feasible it would be for Beijing and Washington to build a new relationship in the changing context of Asia-Pacific international relations.

CHANGING LOGICS OF US–CHINA RELATIONS The United States and China are two most consequential powers in today’s world. Unlike relations between the United States and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War, Washington and Beijing see each other as neither friend nor foe. Since the normalization of relations with China in the 1970s, the United States has pursued a policy of engagement with the country. US leaders hope that engagement with China would help integrate the rising power into the existing international order and gradually transform its political system and international behavior. For China, Beijing has followed Deng Xiaoping’s strategy of ‘biding time and hiding capability’ (tao guang yang hui) in the last 20 years.3 Chinese leaders have concentrated on domestic economic development and believed that a non-confrontational relationship with the United States is essential for China’s international environment. It would enable China to focus on economic development without external problems. Based on this mutual understanding, both China and the United States have sought to build a stable, cooperative and constructive relationship in which they can expand cooperation over issues of mutual interest while managing competition in the areas where their interests diverge. Despite frictions from time to time, the overall US–China relationship has been stable since the end of the Cold War.

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China and the United States are two great powers bound together by deep political, economic, security, cultural and social ties. US–China relations are characterized by economic interdependence as well as security interdependence. On one hand, this interdependent relationship requires cooperation, but on the other hand the relationship also demonstrates strong elements of competition.4 Yet, how to build stable and cooperative relations between a rising power and a dominant power is an important issue in history as well as a real challenge in today’s international politics. US policy toward China in the post–Cold War era has been based on a logic of ‘engage but hedge’. The ‘engage but hedge’ policy is a nuanced one and sometime swings between two extremes of engagement and containment. The long-term expectation is the ‘peaceful evolution’ of China, while in the short run the United States keeps its dominant military posture in Asia to hedge against China’s rise and make sure that it will not undermine the dominant position of the United States in the Asia-Pacific. From Clinton to Bush this ‘engagement plus’ policy has played out well without any major problem. In 2005, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick encouraged China to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the international system. In 2009 when Obama first came to office, his administration held high expectations that China could cooperate with the United States in addressing the global financial crisis and other problematic regional issues. There were even discussions about a possible ‘G-2’ between Washington and Beijing in managing global governance issues. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg signaled to China that Washington wanted to build a more stable and cooperative relationship with China on the basis of ‘engagement and reassurance’. In his words, Washington would not oppose China’s rise to great power status but China needs to cooperate with the United States on an array of issues where the two countries have common or overlapping interests.5 Entering the twenty-first century, China’s rapid rise to great power status has led to discussions about the implications of China’s rise in every corner of the world, especially its likely impact on the US-led postwar world order. In Washington, there are also rising concerns about China’s future policy directions. Despite the declaration by President Obama in 2009 that ‘the United States welcomes the rise of a peaceful, prosperous China’, he added that ‘we do not want our relationship to become defined by rivalry and confrontation’.6 US elites are thus increasingly concerned with a likely Chinese challenge to its leading position in the Asia-Pacific. The Obama administration’s China policy was originally based on the logic of ‘engagement and reassurance’ but the ‘pivot to Asia’ quickly

Assessing the ‘new model of major power relations’ 225 reversed the original tone of reassurance and changed it to a direction towards ‘balancing’. Most US commentators blame China for the quick policy reversal. They believe that Obama’s China policy did not work because Beijing did not reciprocate Obama’s goodwill, which led to US–China cooperation collapsing over issues such as climate change, North Korean nuclear crisis, and the Iranian nuclear issue. Some argue that as China’s economic power and military capabilities grow rapidly, Beijing has become more confident and even assertive in its foreign policy. Beijing has enlarged its scope of ‘core national interests’ just as the PLA has expanded its military capabilities and operational scope. China has even stepped up efforts to transform various international institutions and regimes. So when China is perceived as a ‘bully’ in regional politics and everyone in the region asks Washington to step up its role in the region, it would be alarming if Washington did not reassure regional allies and confront Beijing’s assertive international behavior. To the Chinese, however, the fundamental reason for Obama’s policy shift is the changing balance of power between China and the United States over the last two decades. China has become the world’s secondlargest economy in 2012. Twenty years ago, the United States was the largest trading partner of most East Asian countries. Today, however, China is its number one trading partner. Due to growing financial constraints and a weak US economy, the Obama administration has had to significantly cut defense spending and the United States’ global military posture. Under Obama, the United States has withdrawn combat troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, two unpopular wars started by George W. Bush, and reduced its military commitment in other parts of the world. Meanwhile, with shrinking resources, Washington has to readjust its global attention to concentrate on the Asia-Pacific region.

IS OBAMA’S ‘REBALANCE TO ASIA’ A STRATEGIC SHIFT AGAINST CHINA? The reason why the Obama administration decided to make the strategic shift is complicated. We must analyze it in a broader context of the changing global strategic environment for the United States. The strategic shift is not totally against China but largely due to the changing balance of power between China and the United States in East Asia. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton first introduced the idea of the rebalance to Asia. In an article entitled ‘America’s Pacific century’ in Foreign Policy magazine in October 2011, she argued that:

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[…] over the last 10 years, we have allocated immense resources to those two theaters [Iraq and Afghanistan]. In the next 10 years, we need to be smart and systematic about where we invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in the best position to sustain our leadership, secure our interests, and advance our values. One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment – diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise – in the Asia-Pacific region.7

The global ‘war on terror’ during the George W. Bush administration resulted in the United States being much too preoccupied with the Middle East. When Obama came to office, most US elites and policymakers agreed that the United States’ wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had seriously undermined its ability to adapt to major power shifts in the Asia-Pacific region, and there was a need for Washington to reorient its foreign policy focus to Asia. Starting from early 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates began to talk about shifting US military attention and posture toward the maritime and offshore region along the littoral of the Eurasia continent. Secretary Clinton surprised the Chinese delegation at the annual ASEAN Regional Forum (AFR) meeting in July 2010 by openly criticizing China’s stance on the South China Sea and inserting a US role in regional maritime disputes. Speaking before the Australian Parliament in 2011, President Obama announced that the US future strategic focus would reorient toward Asia. Endorsing his Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, Obama declared that ‘as a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future’.8 At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Hawaii on 13 November 2011, President Obama again tried to assure US allies that the United States is a Pacific nation and would continue to play the leadership role in the region. The ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy was not clearly articulated until early 2013. In a policy speech given by Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor to the President, at the Asian Society on 11 March 2013, the Obama administration unveiled the ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy. In the speech, Donilon discussed the strategic context why the United States wanted to rebalance to Asia and what the rebalancing meant. In his words, the strategic rebalance meant devoting the time, effort and resources necessary to focus on Asia. To dispel the perception that the pivot is targeted at containing China and ‘all about China’, Donilon argued that the rebalance ‘does not mean containing China or seeking to dictate terms to Asia. And it isn’t just a matter of our military presence. It is an effort that harnesses all elements of US power – military, political, trade and investment, development and our values’. The strategy has a few pillars. As he stated, ‘[The] United States is implementing a comprehensive,

Assessing the ‘new model of major power relations’ 227 multidimensional strategy: strengthening alliances; deepening partnerships with emerging powers; building a stable, productive, and constructive relationship with China; empowering regional institutions; and helping to build a regional economic architecture that can sustain shared prosperity’.9 To avoid the confusion that the United States wanted to pull out from other strategic regions to focus only on Asia, the Obama administration later changed the term of ‘pivot to Asia’ to ‘rebalancing to Asia’.10 Susan Rice, Donilon’s successor as National Security Adviser after 1 July 2013, reiterated that ‘[rebalancing] toward the Asia-Pacific remains a cornerstone of the Obama administration’s foreign policy’ in her speech entitled ‘America’s future in Asia’ at Georgetown University on 20 November 2013. This speech again reconfirmed the determination and objectives of the rebalancing to Asia for the second term of the Obama administration.11 The underlying logic and rationale for the rebalancing is that the US national security strategy had become ‘out of balance’ since the George W. Bush administration’s ‘war on terror’ and Washington needed to rebalance its resources and efforts to the region where rising powers might challenge the US leadership role in the world. The global financial crisis in 2008 and the US budget crisis also called into question Washington’s financial capability of maintaining a substantial military presence in the Middle East. Moreover, when the United States was bogged down in the Middle East, Chinese power and influence rose rapidly in East Asia at the expense of the US influence in the region. Thus it made sense for the United States to shift its strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific region. Since it was first unveiled, the strategic rebalancing has widely been interpreted or at least perceived by regional nations as well as China as a major step by Washington to balance against or even try to contain the rise of China in East Asia. This perception is strong and powerful. It has generated a great deal of debate about future major power relations in the region. For Washington, the rise of China is a central concern for the US global strategic rebalancing, but it is not the only consideration for the strategic shift.12 Obama’s rebalancing to Asia is a multidimensional strategy and it is not all about China, and, instead, the new strategy tries to reconfigure US military, economic and diplomatic resources and attention in the light of the shift of the strategic balance of power in Asia and in global politics. Recognizing the likely impacts on future US–China relations, Susan Rice argued that ‘when it comes to China, we seek to operationalize a new model of major power relations. That means managing inevitable competition while forging deeper cooperation on issues where our interests converge – in Asia and beyond’.13

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To dispel his critics and reconfirm his ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy, President Obama toured four Asian states around China in April 2014. One of the purposes of the tour was the ‘renewing our leadership in the AsiaPacific’. President Obama also needed to strike a delicate balance between what was perceived as a counterbalancing measure against China and what he meant by building constructive relations with China. This was how he articulated the US position during the Asian tour in April 2014: We welcome China’s peaceful rise. We have a constructive relationship with China. There is enormous trade, enormous business that’s done between the United States and China. There are a whole range of issues on the international stage in which cooperation between the US and China are vital. So our goal is not to counter China. Our goal is not to contain China. Our goal is to make sure that international rules and norms are respected, and that includes in the area of maritime disputes. We do not have claims in this area territorially. We’re an Asia-Pacific nation and our primary interest is the peaceful resolution of conflict, the freedom of navigation that allows for continued progress and prosperity. And we don’t even take a specific position on the disputes between nations. But as a matter of international law and international norms, we don’t think that coercion and intimidation is the way to manage these disputes.14

Nevertheless, no matter how the Obama administration has tried to strike a delicate balance between what has been perceived as balancing against China and what is meant by building constructive relations with China, analysts and policy-makers in Beijing have much different interpretations of the rebalancing strategy.

CHINESE PERCEPTION OF OBAMA’S REBALANCE TO ASIA There is no doubt that the rebalance to Asia is a game changer for US–China relations. The rebalance discourse has changed the US China policy debate and reversed the policy of ‘engagement and reassurance’ in the early months of the Obama administration. The Chinese view of the US role in East Asia after the Cold War was positive. Beijing believed that the United States was a stabilizing force in the region and welcomed Washington playing a positive role in regional stability. In the US–China Joint Statement of 17 November 2009, Beijing stated that ‘China welcomes the United States as an Asia-Pacific nation that contributes to peace, stability and prosperity in the region’.15 But the initiation of the ‘pivot to Asia’ has led to an overall reassessment of the US role in East

Assessing the ‘new model of major power relations’ 229 Asia and the likely consequences of the changes in the regional security and economic environment for China. Beijing’s reaction to the ‘pivot to Asia’ was cautious when the idea first emerged. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman commented on the pivot by saying that China supported ‘the constructive role played by the US in the Asia-Pacific region’.16 When the strategic implications of the rebalance became clear, there was a rising intellectual frenzy within the foreign policy community to analyze and debate about the motivation and likely consequences of the US ‘pivot to Asia’. Most of Chinese foreign policy scholars see the rebalancing as an attempt to contain or at least balance against the rise of China. As a consequence, it would become a source of tension for the US–China relationship as well as regional politics. They believe the purpose of enhancing the US alliance system and developing partnerships with other emerging power in Asia is targeted at China. To some scholars, it would become more threatening for China as it could be a signal that Washington would involve itself more directly in regional territorial disputes and enter into confrontation with China. From this pessimistic perspective, they see the rebalancing in a completely negative way and believe that it would unsettle the future East Asian security and economic environment.17 In contrast to this pessimistic assessment, some Chinese analysts see it in a less alarming and more pragmatic way. They do not necessarily see rebalancing as solely containment against China. Put into a broader context, they consider the pivot as part of the US global strategic readjustment to address the aftermaths of the Bush administration’s ‘war on terror’ and its purpose is to maintain the US primacy in the Asia-Pacific region.18 Yet no matter what assessments, pessimistic or less pessimistic, most Chinese analysts seem to all agree that Obama’s rebalancing to Asia would test China’s regional policy and its future in East Asia in three areas: (1) an enhanced US military presence in the region; (2) the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) initiative and its implications for future regional institution building; and (3) the future role of the United States in regional territorial and maritime disputes. First of all, the Chinese post-9/11 threat perception has undergone a significant revision due to the US rebalancing to Asia. President Obama has tried to cut the budget deficit and defense spending since taking office, but the Pentagon has managed to find ways to prevent these cuts from having a significant impact on the US global military posture and especially the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific. Instead of being reduced, the Pacific theater has actually been further strengthened. Under the rebalancing arrangement, Pentagon has continued to prioritize the Asia-Pacific and has shifted about 60 percent of its Navy and Air Force

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to the region. For the Chinese, this poses a more serious threat to Chinese security due to the enhanced US military presence, in terms of basing, new weapon deployments, and military exercises. What is more significant is the new US military doctrine known as AirSea Battle (ASB), which emphasizes pre-emptive and deep strikes against the Chinese military facilities and deployments.19 Second, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which is the economic pillar of the strategic rebalance, is viewed by the Chinese as politically motivated to hold back China’s growing economic power in the region. TPP is a key tenant of the rebalancing. Using TPP as a vehicle, Washington is trying to play the leading role in pushing forward a free trade agreement in the region that excludes China. TPP even aims to reconstruct regional institutions. Many Chinese observers regard TPP not as an economic undertaking but primarily as an instrument of the US political strategy of containing China and undermining the Asian-oriented regionalism based on the ASEAN+3 process since the Asian financial crisis in 1998.20 Although many Chinese analysts do not believe that the TPP could be successfully negotiated soon, they do believe that it would have tremendous impacts on regional trade pattern and terms of trade if it is successful. Third and more importantly, many Chinese analysts see the rebalancing as political and diplomatic warfare targeted at China. In their view, the rebalancing is aimed at strengthening the US alliance system and developing relations with emerging powers in the region. This would have impacts on the overall power relations in Asia. Besides strengthening relations with Japan, South Korea and Australia, the Obama administration has also been working on partnership or cooperative relations with India, Indonesia and ASEAN states such as the Philippines and Vietnam that have territorial and maritime disputes with China. Thus, the rebalance would not only reshape regional strategic landscapes, but could also lead to the possibility that Washington would get directly involved in territorial and maritime conflicts between China and its Asian neighbors, whether it is in the South China Sea or in East China Sea.21 There is no doubt, from the perspective of Chinese analysts, that US efforts in consolidating its alliance system and reaching out to Asia’s emerging powers would greatly squeeze China’s strategic space in the region and reduce Chinese influence earned from its ‘charm offensive’ over the last ten years.

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XI JINPING’S FOREIGN POLICY: VISION AND STRATEGY Obama’s rebalancing strategy coincided with President Xi Jinping taking over the supreme leadership role in China in 2012. The US rebalancing created a completely new international environment for Xi Jinping. Xi is a strong leader in the mold of Deng Xiaoping, and has tried to make his mark on China’s foreign policy. When Xi took over the leadership role in late 2012, the international environment was much tougher for him than his predecessor Hu Jintao. Although Xi wanted to continue focusing on economic growth and domestic reforms, he has found himself facing much more complicated foreign policy challenges. Economic ties with neighbors have not removed rising tension with them involving contested maritime and territorial boundaries in the East and South China Seas. Obama’s rebalancing has further complicated China’s regional environment, and there has been evidence of ‘hard balancing’ by other East Asian countries against China. Many of China’s neighbors appear to be hedging or balancing, though a few are still bandwagoning with China. Domestically, nationalist sentiments in China – as well as elsewhere – often hamper compromises and accommodation on territorial disputes. China’s response to the US rebalancing and changing international environment is best analyzed through Xi Jinping’s new foreign policy. Xi’s foreign policy goals and vision are remarkably different from his predecessor. When Washington rebalanced its global strategy, Xi has tried to rebalance China’s overall foreign strategy as well. China has thus pivoted westwards and reached out to Russia, Africa and Latin America in its diplomatic activities in response to the US ‘pivot to Asia’. Xi has tried to conduct China’s neighborhood diplomacy based on amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness and take a ‘right approach to principles and interests’ when dealing with developing and poor countries. In response to the criticism that China has no ally in the world, he has argued for partnership over alliance. China is thus working hard in developing a global network of partnerships. According to Foreign Minister Wang Yi, China has established 72 partnerships in different forms, which cover all the major countries and regions in the world.22 Different from Western alliance diplomacy, this practice helps China to expand its influence and diplomatic space in competition with other major powers. To meet the rebalancing challenge from Washington, Beijing is also actively cultivating economic relations of mutual benefit with countries in Eurasia and Southeast Asia. By promoting the development of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk

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Road, China has boosted its relations with a number of countries. The Silk Road projects are designed to boost economic ties and infrastructural interconnections between China and Eurasian and Southeast countries, and serve as part of the overarching architecture for China’s external cooperation in the new era.23 Another aspect of Xi’s new strategy demonstrates the realist face of Chinese foreign policy. Beijing has become more assertive over territorial and maritime disputes by rapidly modernizing its naval and air forces and power projection capabilities. Xi Jinping’s foreign strategy prioritizes ‘safeguarding core national interests’ and developing maritime power. Since the early 1990s the underlying theme of Chinese foreign policy has been reassurance, that is, to reassure others of China’s peaceful rise. The Chinese leadership has since conducted foreign policy under a framework of two guiding principles laid down by Deng Xiaoping after 4 June 1989: one is Tao Guang Yang Hui for economic development, and the other is to prioritize the Sino–US relations in foreign policy. Deng Xiaoping’s maxims, as guiding principles, have influenced Chinese foreign policy over the last two decades. If Beijing could be vague on territorial disputes and emphasize the reassurance of neighbors of China’s peaceful rise in East Asia during the Hu Jintao period, this relatively peaceful approach is no longer attainable for Xi Jinping today. He has become more straightforward on defending China’s ‘core national interests’. From day one in office, Xi has made it clear that while China wanted to maintain good neighborly relations, it cannot be at the expense of China’s national interests. Xi Jinping’s goal of the ‘China Dream’ means that China intends to achieve great power status in world politics. Geopolitically, the great power dream requires strong maritime capabilities that enable the Chinese Navy go beyond the First Island Chain (from Okinawa to Taiwan and the Philippines) and even the Second Island Chain (from the Ogasawara Island chain and Guam to Indonesia). That means China needs to have the capability to secure a vast maritime domain in the Pacific for its growing overseas interests far beyond the traditional land boundaries. This view indicates the strategic importance of the East China Sea and the South China Sea for China’s maritime strategy. Given this intensifying rhetoric and aspiration of transforming China into a maritime power, Beijing has become more proactive and aggressive over maritime disputes.24 Beijing has taken a tough stand on maritime and territorial disputes since 2012 with the Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea and with Japan in the East China Sea. Xi is not shy in drawing the red line for neighbors as he perceives that the old policy is

Assessing the ‘new model of major power relations’ 233 no longer effective. Beijing has also seen success in using law enforcement forces in asserting its claim and control over contested waters in the East and South China Sea. Xi’s foreign policy priorities in maritime power, defending sovereign rights, and a sustained military build-up are answers to Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’. China does not want to call a ‘fight’ with the United States but will not be ‘silent’ over issues concerning its national interests. During the Hu Jintao period, China gave the impression of trying to avoid confrontations at all costs and that China would never oppose Washington over any international conflicts in which China was not a party. To maintain a constructive relationship with the United States, Beijing even tried hard to find a way to defuse tensions over sovereignty disputes with Japan and Southeast Asian nations. Yet, in the last three years Beijing frequently reported breakthroughs in China’s military build-up, advanced weaponry technology, and the increasing capability of the PLA’s combat readiness. By declaring an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea in February 2014, Beijing took a major step to intensify confrontation with Japan over the Diaoyu Islands. This step also signified the calculated expansion of China’s ‘strategic space’ in East Asia, especially over the maritime space beyond China’s offshore water and traditional defense boundary. To implement his policy, President Xi is consolidating his foreign policy power by reorganizing and centralizing the decision-making process within the party and government apparatus. In November 2013, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) decided to establish a US-style National Security Commission (NSC). The Chinese NSC intends to have more seamlessly integrated decision-making on domestic and foreign security issues. With its Chinese characteristics, the Commission conflates domestic security challenges with foreign threats and gives Xi the comprehensive authority in deciding all security-related issues.

HOW FEASIBLE IS THE ‘NEW MODEL OF MAJOR POWER RELATIONS’? Xi Jinping’s proposal of the ‘new model of major power relations’, according to State Councilor Yang Jiechi, includes three pillars: (1) avoidance of conflict or confrontation between the two countries, (2) mutual respect on important matters of concern, and (3) pursuit of cooperation by renouncing a zero-sum game mindset.25 From the Chinese perspective, this new concept should provide a new way to better manage the relationship in the changing world and regional context.26 Speaking at

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the Sixth US–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Beijing, President Xi Jinping pointed out that: China and the US should stick to the general direction of building a new model of major country relationship which features no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation. Both sides should also enhance mutual trust, expand converging interests, and manage and control differences, so as to promote the US–China relations to continuously move forward along the right track.27

Some Chinese analysts even believe that this new model would be a new driving force behind future US–China relations.28 The Chinese proposal received a positive response from President Obama when the two presidents met at the informal summit meeting at Sunnylands in California in June 2013. The US–China relationship contains elements of both cooperation and competition, though managing the competitive side of the relationship is always challenging. Although both sides claim that they want to build a stable, productive and constructive relationship, the strategic complexity and mutual distrust makes it difficult for the United States to draw up a viable comprehensive strategy toward China, and vice versa. Through this new vision for future US–China relations, the Chinese side hopes to reshape the relationship into a model of ‘no conflict or confrontation, mutual respect of each other’s core interest and concerns, and win-win cooperation’.29 For the Chinese, constructing this new relationship could follow a three-step formula. As the first step, the two sides should manage conflict avoidance, and, based on that, the next step is mutual respect of each other’s ‘major matters of concerns’, code name for ‘core national interests’. Then the two sides can reach the stage of win-win cooperation over a wide range of global issues.30 In the Chinese view, since the US–China relationship is characterized by ‘competition cum cooperation’ or ‘competitive cooperation’, the key challenge for the bilateral relationship should focus on how to manage bilateral competition and disputes while expanding cooperation over issues of mutual interests. More practically, the Chinese side believes building a ‘new model of major power relations’ hinges upon whether the two sides can have constructive interactions in the Asia-Pacific region over the long term. As China is increasingly feeling the heat when Washington readjusts its military deployments to the Asia-Pacific and intensifies diplomatic maneuvering at China’s periphery, its approach has focused on managing US–China differences or conflict of interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

Assessing the ‘new model of major power relations’ 235 The US side has quite different interpretations of the new model of US–China relations. Washington emphasizes more on ‘managing inevitable competition while forging deeper cooperation on issues where our interests converge’.31 Washington is more interested in concrete steps and actions, or operationalized cooperation, rather than making up a hollow concept such as the ‘new model of major power relations’.32 Washington is concerned by China’s rapid pace of military modernization, alleged unfair trade practices, and more assertive actions regarding the East and South China Seas, such as the declaration of the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). Another US skepticism about China’s proposal is that Beijing is using the phrase to get unilateral concessions from Washington on the issues concerning Chinese ‘core national interests’. As Michael Chase puts it, the new model ‘appears to require Washington to accommodate China’s interests and to do so largely on Beijing’s terms – apparently without reciprocal adjustments’.33 If Washington accepts this concept, it will be trapped in a process of de facto ‘unilateral concession’ to China. Andrew Nathan agrees with this view, arguing that the new model, as a slogan, is ‘Chinese code for the US preemptively yielding to what China views as its legitimate security interests’.34 The United States and China have huge differences over political systems, culture and values, while they have many common and shared interests over global challenges. They maintain exceedingly interdependent economic ties and inter-societal exchanges between the two nations and societies. Neither side can afford to have the relationship derailed, which means that they must carefully manage this ‘neither friend nor foe’ relationship. As Patrick Cronin has argued: [as] the new type of great power relationship is at best aspirational and at worst a smoke screen designed to hijack any agenda that slows China’s rise, the US and China need to find a way to make progress on tough, hardsecurity challenges. They need to come together over the common goal of stability, building effective cooperation across a range of measures designed to reduce and manage risk and avert unnecessary strategic competition.35

The biggest obstacle to building the new major power relationship is the lack of mutual strategic trust between them. As discussed above, China’s rising power status has created a new dynamic of strategic anxieties in East Asia. Prominent Chinese and American scholars have commented on this strategic distrust in Sino–US relations.36 As China rises, it will continue to invest in building a regional defense buffer and expanding ‘strategic space’ at its periphery. However, this move is viewed by Washington as intended to constrain the United States or even to drive it

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out of East Asia. The strategic suspicions deriving from this anticipated geopolitical rivalry is not just between the United States and China, but also between China and other Asian powers. Elizabeth Economy observes that any trust-based relationship requires that the parties have a certain willingness to give before receiving in the process of building friendly ties over the long run.37 This observation is surely true, but it is also conditional on extensive and repeated interactions. Trust is gained through continuous exchanges of reciprocity, so that one learns over time that the other side will not exploit one’s goodwill and will return cooperation with cooperation. This learning and the trust developing from it requires that the prospective rewards of future interactions are greater than any momentary gain to be made from opportunistic behavior at the present.38 The challenge of developing strategic mutual trust is that it must be forged from a long-term process so that both sides can learn that the other will eschew opportunism at its expense even when such defection or self-serving behavior may be rewarding.39 It is established only after a long series of experiences when each side has deliberately and consistently demonstrated its trustworthiness by forswearing egoistic actions. For instance, when China refrained from devaluing its currency when other Asian countries adopted this policy in the midst of their financial crises in the late 1990s, this action communicated reassurance and helped to build trust. A country can also offer to give ‘hostages’ in order to demonstrate its trustworthiness. Thus, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty provided that the United States and USSR would leave all but one of their urban centers unprotected against a possible nuclear retaliation by the other side, thereby building confidence that neither of them had any intention of launching a preemptive strike. In the same way, the large amount of US debt held by China is a form of reassurance because if their relations were to deteriorate, both would suffer enormous economic and financial losses.40 Over the last decade, China and the United States have developed a series of dialogues at different levels, including the Strategic and Economic Dialogues. But in these dialogues, each side has focused more on what the other side should do, rather than on what China and the United States both must do.41 For the Chinese, President Xi has made clear at the 2013 Sunnylands Summit that he had no intention of backing away from Chinese interests in the South China and East China Seas. For Washington, it does not want to give the impression that the US acceptance of the concept means that Washington will prioritize the US–China relationship above all other commitments in Asia. It is clear for Washington that, if it did so, its Asian allies will be less likely to

Assessing the ‘new model of major power relations’ 237 cooperate with Washington and will instead seek alternative strategies to ensure their security, which would undermine its leadership role in Asia. Therefore, leaders of the two countries must be clear on what extent one would accept the other’s role in world affairs. It is crucial for them to have a basic strategic understanding of each other. As former National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley opined: Is the United States ready to accept an increasingly powerful China playing an enhanced role on the world stage – perhaps ultimately a role on a par with that played by the United States itself? Is the United States ready to accept that as China’s economy grows, it will build a larger, more capable oceangoing naval force to protect the sea lanes from which China receives the energy, resources, and global trade on which it increasingly depends? Is the United States willing to counsel restraint to its friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific region and urge them to make efforts to find a compromise with China on issues where China feels strongly that its interests are threatened?42

Most Chinese elites believe that the United States could accept China’s future leading position in areas such as the size of the economy, the volume of foreign trade, and the diplomatic and economic impact in Asia, as well as, albeit to a lesser degree, the mutual strategic deterrence and the peaceful co-existence of both great powers. However, Washington would never accept a future Chinese military advantage over the United States. China’s relatively marginal military advantage against the United States in the West Pacific could provide it with a sizable ‘strategic space’ in East Asia, which means the offshore waters along the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and up to the Korean Peninsula (beyond what is the first island chain). However, the dominant role of the United States in East Asia has been built on Washington’s overall military superiority in the West Pacific, east of Okinawa and Guam, under the so-called San Francisco System after 1945, which helped it to consolidate its dominant position in Asia. For the Chinese, Hadley asked a similar set of hard-choice questions. These questions are: President Xi argues that ‘security in Asia should be maintained by Asians themselves’ – does that mean that China wants to exclude the United States from any Asian security architecture? Does China really want the United States out of the Asia-Pacific? Does China think it can improve its relations with its neighbors while at the same time increase the economic, diplomatic and military pressure on them to give up their territorial claims and compromise their interests? More fundamentally, does China believe that the existing international framework that emerged after the end of World War II – the United Nations, the global financial institutions, the international legal structures – does

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not serve China’s interests and needs to be overturned?43 These are tough questions for Beijing and Chinese elites to answer. As China rises rapidly, Beijing seems not quite ready to answer these tough questions, especially what kind of world order China wants to see as an alternative to the current US-led world order. China’s future role in East Asia and the power distribution between China and the United States will be contingent on the two countries’ respective strengths in functional areas as well as their respective contributions to regional governance. There is a tendency of bifurcation in East Asian international relations. Regional countries turn to China for economic benefits while seeking security protection from the United States. This situation creates possibilities of power-sharing, close consultation and selective collaboration between Beijing and Washington. In economic and financial affairs, the United States needs China to play a more positive role in East Asia. Although Sino–US relations have been frequently affected by problems in regional affairs, third party conflicts, situational frictions and competition, it is not impossible to have a more positive and cooperative US–China relationship. In such a scenario, the United States accepts a peaceful and constructive China as a world power, and China, in turn, will respect the essential interests and rightful international concerns of the United States as a world dominant power.

CONCLUSIONS Current Sino–US relations are quite different from US–Soviet relations during the Cold War. Whatever may be said about the ‘China threat’ Beijing is not propagating a competing ideology as Moscow did or organizing an anti-Western coalition. As Chinese leaders repeatedly state, China does not want and is not capable of destroying the existing international order. Unlike US–Soviet relations, there are vibrant and extensive economic ties between China and the United States today, and economic interdependence helps to hold the two countries together and provide the basis for strategic dialogues and cooperation on global governance issues. Today the US–China relationship is one between a rising power and an established power, similar to that between the Athens and Sparta 2000 years ago. In order not to fall into the Thucydides Trap,44 the two countries should explore new ways to deal with one another in order to avoid the inevitable trap of war and power rivalry. In any case, most Asian countries do not want to choose between the United States and China.

Assessing the ‘new model of major power relations’ 239 In response to the US rebalancing, the Chinese leadership has so far avoided taking a sharply confrontational stance. The strategic rebalancing could be a source of conflict with China, but it also provides an opportunity to engage and gradually integrate China into the existing regional international system. The interaction process would be prolonged and challenging. It requires both China and the United States to follow a balanced and pragmatic policy in dealing with each other. Central to future regional security and stability in East Asia is whether Beijing and Washington could find out ways to effectively manage their competition while expanding cooperation and developing a genuinely new model of major power relations.

NOTES 1.

2.

3.

4. 5.

6.

7.

White House (2013), ‘Resourcing the rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region’, 12 April, accessed 9 August 2015 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/04/12/ resourcing-rebalance-toward-asia-pacific-region. In a speech at the State Department lunch honoring him on 14 February 2012, Vice President Xi proposed that China and the United States should ‘build a new type of cooperative partnership between two countries’ and that this would be a pioneering endeavor with great and far-reaching significance. Accessed 9 August 2015 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2012/02/14/state-department-lunchhonoring-vice-president-xi-jinping-china#transcript. There are different translations of the term tao guang yang hui. Others translate it as ‘hide brightness and cherish obscurity’. See Economy, E. (2012), ‘The game changer: coping with China’s foreign policy evolution’, Foreign Affairs, November/December, 142. Shambaugh, D. (ed.) (2012), Tangled Titans: The United States and China, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, Chapter 1. Steinberg, J.B. (2009), ‘Administration’s vision of the US–China relationship’, Keynote Address at the Center for a New American Security, Washington, DC, 24 September, accessed 9 August 2015 at http://www.state.gov/s/d/former/steinberg/ remarks/2009/169332.htm. Remarks by President Obama during his visit to East Asia in November 2009, accessed 9 August 2015 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarkspresident-barack-obama-suntory-hall. See also Obama’s remarks when he visited the Philippines in April 2014, accessed 9 August 2015 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2014/04/28/remarks-president-obama-and-president-benigno-aquino-iiiphilippines-joi. Similar statements can be found in ‘Remarks by Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor to the President, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013”’, The Asia Society, New York, 11 March 2013, accessed 9 August 2015 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/11/remarks-tom-donilon-nationalsecurity-advisory-president-united-states-a. Clinton, H. (2011), ‘America’s Pacific century’, Foreign Policy, 11 October, accessed 9 August 2015 at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_ century.

240 8. 9.

10. 11.

12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

25.

Handbook of US–China relations Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament, 17 November 2011, accessed 20 February 2015 at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/ 17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament. Remarks by Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor to the President: ‘The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013’, The Asia Society, New York, 11 March 2013, accessed 9 August 2015 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/11/ remarks-tom-donilon-national-security-advisory-president-united-states-a. State Department (2013), ‘The East Asia-Pacific rebalance: expanding US engagement’, 16 December, accessed 9 August 2015 at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/pl/2013/ 218776.htm. Remarks as prepared for delivery by National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice at Georgetown University, Gaston Hall, Washington, DC, ‘America’s future in Asia’, 20 November 2013, accessed 9 August 2015 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/11/21/remarks-prepared-delivery-national-security-advisor-susan-e-rice. Bader, J. (2012), Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press. Susan E. Rice, ‘America’s future in Asia’. Remarks by President Obama and President Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines in Joint Press Conference, 28 April 2014, accessed 9 August 2015 at http://www. whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/28/remarks-president-obama-and-presidentbenigno-aquino-iii-philippines-joi. The White House (2009), ‘US–China Joint Statement’, 17 November 2009, accessed 9 August 2015 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-china-jointstatement. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regular Press Conference, 4 June 2012, accessed 9 August 2015 at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t939675.htm. See Swaine, M. (2012), ‘Chinese leadership and elite responses to the US Pacific pivot’, China Leadership Monitor, No. 38, January, accessed 9 August 2015 at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Swaine_CLM_38_Final_Draft_pdf.pdf. For example, Jin, C., X. Liu and D. Huang (2013), ‘The US rebalance to Asia strategy and its impacts on Sino–US relations’, Northeast Asia Forum, No. 5, 5–14. Luo, Y. (2012), ‘China should stay calm, alert about US strategy adjustments’, People’s Daily, 12 January, accessed 9 August 2015 at http://english.people daily.com.cn/90883/7702723.html. Wang, T. (2011), ‘US uses “hedging” strategy to deal with China’s rise’, People’s Daily, 26 December, accessed 9 August 2015 at http://english.people.com.cn/90780/ 7688310.html. Zhong, S. (2012), ‘US should not muddy the waters over the South China Seas’, People’s Daily, 20 March, accessed 9 August 2015 at http://english. peopledaily.com.cn/102774/7762724.htm. Wang, Y. (2014), ‘Speech on China’s diplomacy in 2014’, 31 December, accessed 9 August 2016 at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/wjb_602314/wjbz_602318/zyjhs/ t1224950.shtml [in Chinese]. For more discussion, see Wong, J. and F.L. Liang (2014), ‘Reviving the Ancient Silk Road: China’s new diplomatic initiative’, East Asian Policy, 6 (5); Xie, T. (2014), ‘Back on the Silk Road: China’s version of a rebalance to Asia’, Global Asia, 9 (1). Johnson, C. et al. (2014), Decoding China’s Emerging ‘Great Power’ Strategy in Asia, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, accessed 9 August 2015 at http://csis.org/files/publication/140603_Johnson_DecodingChinas Emerging_WEB.pdf. Yang, J. (2013), ‘US, China can forge a more cooperative relationship’, China.org.cn, 10 July, accessed 9 August 2015 at http://www.china.org.cn/business/ 2013-07/10/content_29377105.htm.

Assessing the ‘new model of major power relations’ 241 26.

27.

28.

29.

30. 31. 32.

33. 34.

35.

36.

37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

The Chinese side later began to use the term ‘a new type/model of major countries relations’, while the US side prefers to call it ‘a new model of major powers relations’. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China (2014), ‘Xi Jinping attends and addresses the opening ceremony of the sixth round of US–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue and the fifth round of US–China High-Level Consultation on People-to-People Exchange in Beijing’, 9 July, accessed 9 August 2015 at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1173485.shtml [in Chinese]. Ruan, Z. (2013), ‘A new model of major-country relations: the new driving force behind US–China relations’ 24 December, China and US Focus, accessed 9 August 2015 at http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/a-new-model-of-major-countryrelations-the-new-driving-force-behind-china-us-relations/. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s speech at the Brookings Institution, ‘Toward a new model of major country relations between China and the United States’, 20 September 2013, accessed 9 August 2015 at http://www.brookings.edu/events/2013/ 09/20-us-china-foreign-minister-wang-yi. Da, W. (2013) ‘Pathways to construct the new model of great power relations between China and the United States’, Journal of World Economy and Politics, No. 7. Susan E. Rice, ‘America’s future in Asia’. See, for example, D. Shambaugh (2013), ‘Prospects for a “new type of major power relationship”’, China–US Focus, 7 March, accessed 9 August 2015 at http:// www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/prospects-for-a-new-type-of-major-powerrelationship. Chase, M. (2012), ‘China’s search for a “new type of great power relationship”’, China Brief, 12 (17), 12–16. Nathan, A. et al. (2013), ‘What should Obama and Xi accomplish at their California summit?’, China File, posted 30 May, accessed 9 August 2015 at http://www. chinafile.com/what-should-obama-and-xi-accomplish-their-california-summit. Also see Mattis, P. (2013), ‘Nothing new about China’s new concept’, The National Interest, 7 June, accessed 9 August 2015 at http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/ nothing-new-about-chinas-new-concept-8559; Glosserman, B. (2013), ‘PacNet #40: “A new type of great power relations”? Hardly’, CSIS PacNet, accessed 9 August 2015 at https://csis.org/publication/pacnet-40-new-type-great-power-relations-hardly. Cronin, P. (2013), ‘The path toward a new type of great power relations’, CSIS PacNet, No. 80, 7 November, accessed 9 August 2015 at http://csis.org/files/ publication/131108_Pac1380.pdf. Lieberthal, K. and J. Wang (2012), Addressing US–China Strategic Distrust, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, accessed 9 August 2015 at http://www. brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/3/30%20us%20china%20lieberthal/ 0330_china_lieberthal. Economy, E. (2012), ‘Xi’s visit won’t fix US–China “trust deficit”’, Foreign Affairs, 15 February, accessed 9 August 2015 at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ 137236/elizabeth-economy/xis-tour-wont-fix-the-us-chinese-trust-deficit. Axelrod, R. (1984), The Evolution of Cooperation, New York: Basic Books. Kydd, A.H. (2000), ‘Trust, reassurance, and cooperation’, International Organization, 54 (2), 325–57. Chan, S. (2012), ‘Money talks: international credit/debt as credible commitment’, Journal of East Asian Affairs, 26 (1), 77–103. Lampton, D.M. (2013), ‘A new type of major-power relationship: seeking a durable foundation for US–China ties’, Asia Policy, No. 16, July, accessed 9 August 2015 at http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=650.

242 42. 43. 44.

Handbook of US–China relations Hadley, S. (2014), ‘Asia-Pacific major power relations and regional security’, Carnegieendowment.org, 21 June, accessed 9 August 2015 at http://carnegie endowment.org/2014/06/21/asia-pacific-major-power-relations-and-regional-security. Ibid. Allison, G.T. (2013), ‘Obama and Xi must think broadly to avoid a classic trap’, New York Times, 6 June, accessed 9 August 2015 at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 06/07/opinion/obama-and-xi-must-think-broadly-to-avoid-a-classic-trap.html?_r=0/.

PART IV FLASHPOINTS

13. Japan in US–China relations Andrew L. Oros

Japan plays an integral role in the US–China relationship. Both the United States and China have deep ties with Japan, and both states have used their relationship with Japan to seek to advance their interests regarding the other. Japan’s power is shrinking relative to the United States and China, but it remains an important regional and global actor – capable of substantially enhancing US power with regard to China and of acting as a spoiler for both US and Chinese interests. The three states possess the three largest economies in the world. Their coordination of economic policy is essential to the health of the world economy. Japan’s military power is considerably less than that of the United States or China, but still the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), as Japan’s postwar military is called, possesses substantial capabilities that bolster US power projection via the US–Japan military alliance that was created over a half a century ago, and has only deepened in recent years; around 50 000 US troops are permanently based in Japan under the terms of the US–Japan Security Treaty, and play a vital role not only in Japan’s own security but also US military strategy in the region, including with regard to China. In addition, the JSDF is capable on its own of checking China’s naval and air power in many scenarios. Japan perceives a growing threat from China, despite now trading more with China than with any other state (including the United States). In this manner, Japan’s complicated relationship with China mirrors the dual challenge the United States faces regarding China. This has enabled the United States and Japan to cooperate to a large degree over China policy, but future cooperation may be limited by Japan’s declining relative power and the increasing military threat Japan perceives from China’s continued military rise. Japan’s regional environment has shifted dramatically in the early years of the twenty-first century. China’s economic size has more than tripled. In 2010, China surpassed Japan to become the world’s secondlargest economy, a significant psychological milestone for citizens of both states. North Korean military provocations escalated beyond testing missiles and nuclear weapons (which also continued) to provocative military operations, with the sinking of a South Korea submarine and 245

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shelling of a South Korean border island. South Korea, Australia and the ASEAN as a regional unit all significantly increased their regional security engagement in this period as well, indicating a move away from the China–Japan regional rivalry apparent since the 1990s toward a more complex, multi-actor regional economic and security environment. In 2012, total defense spending in the Asian region as a whole (including beyond East Asia) surpassed the next highest region, Europe, for the first time – US$287.4 billion for Asia versus US$259 billion for Europe – accounting for 20 percent of total defense expenditures in the world.1 Spending on defense has continued to rise in the region since then, with Chinese increases as the principal driver of the total reported increase.2 Japan’s evolving military posture is sparked by Japan’s changing interpretation of its security needs and perceived efficacy of different approaches to security in a shifting world – in particular, Japan’s declining relative power in relation to China and other regional actors, the persistence and escalation of the North Korean and Chinese military threats, and a global shift towards more cooperative security practices via formal institutions, expanded ‘mini-lateralism’ and globalized production networks. These regional and global changes have sparked new thinking at home that roots Japan’s security in an expanded regional and global ‘contribution’ – including through a deepened US–Japan alliance and new security partnerships with other regional actors. In response to the perception of an increasingly insecure region, Japanese security planners have crafted a three-tiered response set out in its 2013 national security strategy: (1) increase Japan’s own military capabilities, including by reforming the legal framework and strategic deployment limiting the use of these capabilities; (2) deepen security cooperation and planning within the existing US–Japan alliance framework, including formal revision of the Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation; and (3) seek new security partners in the region, both friendly states and multilateral institutions.3 China’s new behavior and resources mark the most dramatic change in this period, but is only one of many changes Japanese security policies have sought to address. There is a rising economic prosperity in the region overall, leading to a relative decline of Japan economically and militarily – though in both areas Japan remains a regional giant. The US ‘rebalance’ to Asia is another shift that Japan’s security planners have sought to adapt to, largely by following a similar strategy. Japan’s ‘rebalance’ in this period involves a deepening of the US–Japan alliance and expansion of security partners in the region. As such, Japan’s moves in the region largely complement US strategy with regard to China, and enhance US power with regard to China. This trend is likely

Japan in US–China relations 247 to continue as the United States and Japan implement new guidelines for defense cooperation adopted in April 2015,4 and move toward implementing the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) together with ten other states in the Asia-Pacific (which, notably, does not include China).

RISING REGIONAL PROSPERITY AND THE RELATIVE DECLINE OF JAPAN Japan is no longer the formidable economic giant whose rise caused great concern in the United States; China now plays that role in American public opinion. Rather, Japan is a long-stagnating state with rising security challenges and significant future challenges facing its domestic economy and society. Meanwhile, across the East Asian region – well beyond China – states are experiencing robust economic growth, a growing middle class, and rising military spending as a result. The security environment is therefore getting more complex as more states have grown into middle-income status and completed a first phase of state formation post-independence. While China’s increased militaryrelated activities in the region have been the primary drivers of Japan’s recent expansion of JSDF and Japan Coast Guard (JCG) capabilities and roles, Japan also independently has national interests in helping to shape and create linkages with the growing military infrastructure developing across Southeast Asia, Oceania and South Asia – as does the United States. For example, Japan has an interest in shaping ‘codes of conduct’ to avoid unintentional escalation or accidents at sea, and to promote personal ties with growing officer corps of regional states through educational exchanges and joint exercises. Japan actively promotes following the rule of law in its diplomacy, which includes a stress on the international law of the sea. While China – and others – often describes such behavior as ‘balancing’ China, the reality is much more nuanced. Moreover, apart from the strictly military balance and security concerns in the region, Japan’s economic decline relative to other states in the region also has security implications for Japan – both directly and psychologically. Japan’s relative decline also affects US strategy in the region, which is one motivation for the United States also to seek out new regional partners, both in the security arena and through economic policy such as the proposed TPP. In 1989, Japan’s was the second-largest economy in the world, after the United States.5 Its GDP of just over US$3 trillion was almost twice the combined GDP of China, Russia, India, South Korea and all ten ASEAN countries. In 2014, China’s GDP alone is over twice that of

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Japan’s and the remaining economies combined are about 70 percent larger than Japan’s. The Japanese economy is still well over twice the size of the Russian or Indian economies (in real terms, not using purchasing power parity), and almost twice the size of the combined ASEAN economies, and Japan’s per capita income is vastly higher than any of these states, but all of these economies have been growing faster than Japan’s economy and are likely to continue to do so, further narrowing the economic gap between Japan and its neighbors. The growth burst from 2004 is especially striking – with China leading the way by far, but total ASEAN GDP also doubling in this ten-year period and South Korea GDP increasing by over 50 percent. By contrast, Japan’s economy in this period declined in dollar terms.6 In yen terms, Japan’s economy was more or less stagnant for the past two decades – with modest growth in the past few years offset by a decline in the value of the yen relative to the dollar.7 In part as a result of increased economic size, states across the region also are spending more on their militaries – just as Japan had when it was growing economically. Still, military spending by Japan and China dwarfs other military spending in the region, even though Japan spends only 1 percent of its GDP on defense (Figure 13.1). Russia also spends mightily (above Japan in recent years), but only a small fraction of its spending is devoted to Asia. The United States remains far and away the largest military spender, with its stated ‘rebalance’ policy to Asia likely to lead to even more resources devoted to the region in future years (though, as discussed later in this chapter, US military spending has been declining overall since 2010). (Figure 13.2 later in this chapter shows US military spending in relation to Asian states; the vastly larger scale of US spending makes it difficult to see the spending of smaller Asian states on the same figure.) Japanese defense documents do not express concern over growing military spending in the region apart from China and North Korea, but do call for adequate training of new military forces, and more broadly express concern about a potential arms race in the region that links to China’s greatly increased military spending. Japan also shares security concerns with many states in Southeast Asia, and so now has new potential partners – and is planning for further partnerships moving forward as these states continue to grow. Despite Japan’s relative economic decline, Japan’s economic size still dwarfs that of Southeast Asia – larger than the combined ASEAN GDP by about a third, despite having less than one-quarter of the combined ASEAN population. Moreover, despite relative decline, Japan is expanding its security role in the region – both bilaterally and through multiple

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Figure 13.1 Japanese defense spending in comparison to neighbors, 1989–2014, constant 2011 US$ regional institutions. The website Global Firepower ranks Japan’s overall military capability in 2015 as ninth in the world, after the United States, Russia, China, India, United Kingdom, France, South Korea and Germany.8 These rankings do not factor in nuclear weapons; in addition, comparing military capabilities across all areas is a notoriously difficult endeavor given important subjective measures as level of technology and training. Still, it seems beyond dispute that Japan’s military forces in terms of capabilities overall would fall behind the United States, Russia and China, and above most other states in the world apart from the short list mentioned on the Global Firepower list. In terms of a specific sort of military conflict, however – such as a naval battle between Japan and China or Japan and Russia – it seems likely that Japan’s modern, well-trained Maritime SDF (MSDF) could hold their own. Japan’s Air SDF (ASDF) also possesses the fifth largest number of planes of any air force in the world, and among the very highest level of technology. In addition, of course, Japan is a formal military ally with the United States, which is treaty-obligated to defend Japan if it is attacked. Thus, while

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Japanese power may be declining in relative terms, in absolute terms Japan’s military capabilities are stronger than ever, and likely to grow further (if modestly) in response to new and emerging threats. In this way, the United States and Japan are likely to work closely together in managing China’s military rise well into the twenty-first century.

CHINA’S LEADING ROLE IN JAPAN’S EXPANDING MILITARY POSTURE AND GROWING US EXPOSURE China’s resurgence in the region marks a substantial change to Japan’s security environment, and poses the largest long-term challenge to Japanese security – and, arguably, to global security. China has risen to a level of ‘existential threat’ in the eyes of some Japanese – paralleling language used to describe the Soviet threat to the United States in the context of the Cold War. Chinese military forces have possessed the ability to strike Japan with both conventional and nuclear weapons for half a century. In terms of defense planning, it is Japan’s alliance with the United States that protects Japan from this threat through the doctrine of ‘extended deterrence’. Although China has a formal pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states like Japan, escalating military tensions between Japan and China naturally lead Japanese defense planners to question this pledge, and to value Japan’s alliance with the United States even more. It is ironic that Japanese security concerns over China have played such an outsized role in Japan’s defense build up of the past decade since China repeatedly has criticized Japan’s increased defense capabilities, international security contributions, and deepened military alliance with the United States – which China itself has arguably brought to fruition. In this way, Japan–China security relations exhibit a classic security dilemma, one compounded by the growing US–China security dilemma discussed in other chapters of this volume. Japan’s relationship with China is multifaceted, however, with deep economic and social ties despite growing military tensions9 – paralleling the complex and multifaceted nature of the US–China relationship. Tourism between Japan and China is booming: more than 3.5 million Japanese visited China in 2013, up 70 percent from 2000 to 2010; more than one million Chinese have visited Japan, and many more are expected after visa restrictions were relaxed in 2011.10 The countries are deeply connected economically, with much of Japan’s modest economic growth in the past decade attributed to Japanese trade and investments in China, and Chinese economic growth undergirded by Japan’s substantial

Japan in US–China relations 251 foreign direct investment (FDI) in China (which has declined in percentage terms in recent years, but still is the largest source of FDI apart from Hong Kong and Taiwan).11 The period from the start of the first Sino–Japanese War of 1894–95 (which resulted in the Japanese colonization of the island of Taiwan) to the conclusion of the second Sino–Japanese war in 1945 created a vivid and difficult 50 years of troubled memories that continue to complicate Japan–China ties, and the broader US–Japan–China triangular relationship. Still, after Japan’s reopening to China was possible due to US normalization with China in the 1970s, Japan quickly re-established positive relations with its close neighbor and provided massive economic development assistance to China (in lieu of reparations for the damage it caused in World War II) in the subsequent three decades. As Sheila Smith writes in her study of China’s impact on Japanese domestic politics: ‘The last forty years of Japanese–Chinese diplomatic relations have rested on a simple premise: economic interdependence would be the path to postwar reconciliation between the peoples of both countries’.12 Unfortunately, however, this premise turns out to have been flawed. As economic interdependence deepened, China became more demanding about historical reconciliation issues and its overt military challenges to Japan also increased. China Challenges to Japanese Security and to the US–Japan Alliance More Broadly The nature of the Chinese military threat to Japan has changed dramatically as China’s economic rise has fueled huge increases in China’s military spending, military capabilities and military activities. In the area of military security, China poses both a direct territorial challenge with rising military and quasi-military escalation over the disputed Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands and a broader challenge related to its growing military capabilities and the implications for the security of the Japanese main islands, of joint US–Japan forces in Okinawa, and the security of the South China Sea sea lanes, which both Japan and China (and South Korea) rely on as a lifeline for energy imports and trade. China surpassed Japanese defense spending in 2004.13 Moreover, China’s defense spending is dramatically higher if adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP) – US$400 billion in 2011, over four times the real dollar value.14 Japan’s annual defense white papers and the annual China Security Reports produced by the MOD’s National Institute for Defense Studies convey growing explicit concern about China.

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Growing Japanese concern about a China threat is based on increasingly provocative Chinese military and quasi-military actions, which are widely covered in the Japanese media and documented annually in Japan’s defense white papers. For example, the transit of Chinese naval vessels through the Tsugaru Strait (between the main Japanese islands of Honshu and Hokkaido to the north) and the Miyako Straits (between the Okinawan main island and the Miyaoko island chain to the south) took place over a dozen times from 2006 to 2014. In April 2010 Chinese military helicopters buzzed Japanese destroyers that were tracking ten Chinese naval vessels en route to the Pacific via the Miyako Straits, leading to a formal diplomatic protest by the Japanese government. In January 2013 Chinese naval vessels locked fire-control radar on MSDF vessels in the East China Sea on two separate occasions, again leading to diplomatic protests by the Japanese government. (Chinese officials deny that these latter incidents took place at all.) The most substantial and urgent perceived threat by Japan over China’s re-emergence and military rise remains over China’s claims to the uninhabited Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands that are located in the East China Sea between the two states. China’s increasingly assertive claims to this territory and actions to challenge Japan’s administrative control over the islands constitutes the principal driver of Japan’s increased military capabilities and reform of long-standing practices and institutions that limit Japan’s effective use of its military power. For example, significant shifts in JSDF posture from the north to southwest of Japan, development of ‘jointness’ between the three branches of the JSDF, and development of amphibious assault capabilities set out in the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and deepened in the 2014 NDGP are all directly the result of the increased threat perception of China.15 The islands in question are, technically, islets: five small uninhabited islands and three large protruding rocks, with a total area of about four square miles, located to the southwest of the Japanese main islands and the outlying Okinawan/Ryukyu island chain – roughly equidistant from populated Japanese islands and Taiwan, and also close to Mainland China (and roughly 1000 miles from Tokyo). As a practical matter, the maritime space around these islands is also central to the dispute – a sea rich in fishing resources, and possibly other undersea minerals, oil and gas. This territory has been ‘administered’ by Japan (a term important to the US–Japan Security Treaty) since 1895, apart from the period of US occupation of Japan and administration of the Okinawan islands (1945– 72). One of the islands was used as a firing range for US forces in the early postwar period. In the early twentieth century, a small Japanese fishing village was located on one of the islands, which remained in

Japan in US–China relations 253 private hands until it (and two other of the islands) was purchased by the Japanese government (i.e., ‘nationalized’) in 2012 to keep them out of the hands of Japanese nationalists seeking to escalate the dispute, a second major spark of escalation in the evolving crisis in Japan–China relations. China (and Taiwan) maintain that these islands are administratively part of Taiwan, and thus should have been returned to Chinese control at the end of World War II when Japan agreed to relinquish all territory it acquired in its long campaign of territorial expansion dating back to the first Sino–Japan War, which included the Japanese withdrawal from the island of Taiwan. Japan’s position is that the islands were integrated into Japanese territory unrelated to its first war with China, following international law of the time.16 The United States does not take a position in this sovereignty dispute, but has repeatedly stated that the US–Japan Security Treaty is crystal clear that any territory administered by Japan is included in the US security guarantee provided to Japan under Article Five of the treaty – making the United States central to the controversy, since China is well aware that its military cannot defeat the US Seventh Fleet. Bjorn Grønning describes Japan engaging in ‘counterbalancing’ behavior to China’s re-emergence, rooting this both in ‘Japanese perceptions of aggressive Chinese behavior’ and in the changing balance of military power in the region in China’s favor. He writes: ‘Japan’s balancing has manifested itself both internally through a comprehensive revision of the JSDF’s force posture and military capabilities and externally through efforts to strengthen the Japan–US alliance framework’.17 Jeffrey Hornung also argues that Japan ‘has shifted away from its traditional engagement policy toward first a soft hedge, followed by a harder hedge that continues to this day’.18 Such actions bolster the US-led military presence in the region. China’s own defense-planning documents – which are widely criticized as lacking sufficient transparency – acknowledge China’s quest for a blue-water navy, transitioning away from coastal defense to ‘far sea defense’. Chinese defense planners also frequently refer to a strategy of ‘asymmetrical warfare’ to challenge the United States, including plans to develop ‘carrier killer’ ballistic missiles and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack capability.19 In January 2007, China destroyed one of its own weather satellites – an act that demonstrated to itself and the world its ability to destroy the sort of satellites that US forces rely on for weapons and troop guidance. Such Chinese statements and actions underscore a dilemma Japan faces in its attempts to respond to China’s increase in military capabilities: while Japan is seeking to respond to China’s new

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muscle, China is seeking to develop forces capable of deterring the much more powerful US military. In this sense, Japan is caught in the middle – though, of course, it benefits from its security relationship with the United States. Beyond these hard military challenges, China also poses a broader threat to Japan’s global economic competitiveness, its regional economic leadership, and to Japan’s ‘soft power’ – particularly since Shinzo Abe’s return to power when China began a coordinated global propaganda campaign to paint Abe as a dangerous ultra-nationalist and Japan as the provocative and unpredictable military power in the region, a campaign in part designed to complicate US–Japan relations. The milestone of China surpassing Japan as the second-largest economy in the world in 2010 led to countless media stories within Japan about the rising China challenge, that only in part were about China’s growing military challenge. The United States in the Japan–China Security Dilemma Japan’s complicated relationship with China is not just a bilateral phenomenon though, but deeply linked to other relationships – as seen in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute that cannot be understood apart from the US–Japan alliance element. Both Japan and China view their relationship with each other through a prism that includes the United States. Japan fears the emergence of a ‘G-2’ relationship between the United States and China that excludes Japan, possibly even jeopardizing the US–Japan alliance – despite abundant US official reassurance that the G-2 concept exists only in the imagination of certain thinkers outside government. China sees Japan’s power greatly amplified by the US–Japan alliance and has regularly sought to disrupt the harmony of the alliance to weaken both US and Japanese power in the region. Japan–China relations are also manifested through a competition over influence in Southeast Asia and Oceania – in terms of ‘soft power’ but also direct economic ties and increasingly over military ties, with Japan now in a deep ‘security partnership’ with Australia, and with growing military ties to the Philippines and Singapore, and to Vietnam and Indonesia and elsewhere. Most of the states in the region traded substantially more with Japan than China at the start of the twenty-first century, but now are larger trade partners with China. And yet, China’s high level of defense spending with regard to Japan does not translate directly into military superiority regarding Japan – at least not presently. Even though China’s military spending now is over double that of Japan’s (and perhaps many orders of magnitude more in

Japan in US–China relations 255 real terms), China still needs to make up for decades of minimal investment in defense – both in terms of the accumulated stock of weapons over time, plus technology and practice with the new technology.20 In addition, as a continental power and a nuclear weapons state, China has vastly greater demands on its budget compared to Japan. China has land borders with 14 countries plus neighboring sea borders with several others. Plus, China has no formal military allies – and not even any significant informal allies; even Russia privately considers China a military threat, despite cooperating with China on multiple fronts, and North Korea is arguably more of a drain on China’s security writ large than contributor (apart from the land buffer it provides from US forces in South Korea). Thus, there are reasons to consider the military balance between Japan and China to be closer than some pessimists portray it and also numerous reasons to expect moderation in China’s military posture in the coming years.21 Two factors that remain especially salient are addressed in the following sections of this chapter: (1) that regardless of an objective analysis of China’s threat to Japan, the Japanese themselves perceive a rising threat and are taking numerous actions to address it, and (2) that the United States plays a complex role in moderating and or exacerbating Japan’s already complex relationship with China.

‘REBALANCING’ TO ASIA: THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN IN PARTNERSHIP AND ON THEIR OWN East Asia’s economic rise has created a multi-polar environment well beyond even a US–Japan–China strategic triangle. Japan’s response to this increased complexity together with its relative decline is quite similar to that of its primary alliance partner, the United States: deepen the US–Japan alliance to handle a broader range of issues, and seek out new security partnerships. Like Japan, the United States is also losing power relatively in Asia as its investments flatten and China rises. US defense spending dwarfs others in the region, including China. Yet, as seen in Figure 13.2 and as summarized by SIPRI: ‘Since reaching its highest recorded peak in 2010, US military expenditure has decreased by 19.8 per cent in real terms [by 2014]. The USA’s share of world military expenditure remains high at 34 per cent, but it is declining steadily year on year as the USA reduces its spending and other states increase expenditure’.22 Economically speaking, the relative decline of the United States and Japan together is even more striking than a comparison of military spending alone. As shown in Figure 13.3, in 1989 Japan and the United

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Figure 13.2 US defense spending in comparison to East Asian states, 1989–2014, constant 2011 billion US$ States were the two largest economies in the world, with Japan’s GDP amounting to 55 percent of US GDP. In 2014, Japan is number three in the world with a GDP totaling only 26 percent of the US, less than half the percentage share of the US economy only 25 years later. By contrast, the Japanese economy was roughly eight times the size of the Chinese economy in 1989, but less than half the size in 2014; in 2014, the size of Chinese economy was about 60 percent of the United States’, more than Japan’s share in 1989. The US Rebalance to Asia Simultaneous with Japan’s increased regional security activities, the United States also sought to deepen its engagement with Asia through what would come to be called the ‘rebalance’ strategy of the Obama

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Figure 13.3 Japan, US, China GDP, 1989–2014 administration. It is not the case, of course, that the United States was uninvolved in East Asia before the rebalance strategy. The US–Japan relationship in the Bush–Koizumi years of 2001–06 was a time of great closeness and deepening of the US–Japan alliance. In addition, in a line widely thought to refer obliquely to China’s growing power in the region, the final Quadrennial Defense Review of the Bush administration in 2006 stated: ‘[The United States] will attempt to dissuade any military competitor from developing disruptive or other capabilities that could enable regional hegemony or hostile action against the United States or other friendly countries’.23 Rather, the perception of the United States by the end of the Bush years in 2008 was that the United States had become distracted by a large number of other international challenges: nearly a decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, weathering and devising strategies to address the worst international economic recession in almost a century (referred to as the ‘Lehman shocks’ in Japan, as an indicator of where the root of the problem was seen), and growing discord at home about the best ways to meet the foreign policy challenges of the twenty-first century. Moreover, there was a widespread perception across Asia, including in Japan, that the Bush years reflected a unilateralism to US actions that did not make the United States a true part of the region. In addition, the United States was no longer the largest trading partner

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with most states in the region, and had not been for at least a decade in most cases. President Obama looked to the Pacific from the start of his presidency (2009–16). Obama dispatched his Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, to make her first overseas trip to Japan and other places in Asia in February 2009, less than a month after he assumed office. She returned to Asia again in July of that year for the ASEAN Regional Forum, and again in November for the APEC Ministerial meetings. President Obama also visited Japan in his first year in office, in November 2009, and also attended the APEC Economics Leaders’ Meeting that month. He met newly installed Prime Minister Hatoyama in New York City at the opening of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2009, just weeks after Hatoyama became prime minister. The US rebalance is not just about Japan, of course. The US–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue met for the first time in July 2009 in Washington, DC, and has continued annually ever since. At the June 2013 ‘Sunnylands Summit’ President Obama met the newly installed Chinese President Xi Jinping. At a June 2009 summit between Obama and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, a US–South Korea ‘Joint Vision for the Alliance’ was released – using similar language (a ‘joint vision’) as the US–Japan joint statement released in April 2015. US–ASEAN outreach also boomed in the Obama years, with the US signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN in July 2009, which served as an important symbol appreciated by regional leaders. Later US outreach to Myanmar and deepening relations with Vietnam also indicate the depth of US renewed interest in the region – even before the escalation of the South China Sea territorial disputes drew the United States even closer to Vietnam and to the Philippines. Across these cases, the United States and Japan shared many common interests, and coordinated together in ways that further increased Japan’s security role in the region. Japan alone cannot keep pace with China’s increased military capabilities, but can address them in tandem with the United States and other partners – a core aspect of Japan’s 2013 national security strategy. Similarly, US strategy to manage China’s rise includes working more closely with existing US allies, and also forging new partnerships. Thus, there is much overlap and potential for cooperation in recent US and Japanese security strategies. To realize these important synergies, however, there is a need for changes in the US–Japan alliance due to rising China. In the past, as noted by Sheila Smith, ‘The alliance spent very little time on the possibility that Japan might become engaged in a direct conflict with China’.24 Rather, alliance planning was concerned with Japanese support

Japan in US–China relations 259 of US forces over a Taiwan or a Korea contingency. At the same time as the United States seeks to recraft its alliance with Japan to respond to the new security environment – as seen in the April 2015 new Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation – the United States is also seeking to craft a new relationship with China to jointly address regional and global security challenges. Also as noted by Smith, ‘The biggest challenge for US policy-makers will be developing a cooperative relationship with Beijing while not undermining the United States’ close alliance with Tokyo’.25 This interconnectedness between Japan’s Asia outreach and US efforts to outreach to Asia is discussed by T.J. Pempel in a broader regional context. Pempel concludes that if the United States continues its recent policies of deeper engagement with Asia it helps Japan to have to keep from deciding over which to preference in its overall foreign policy, the Asian region or the US–Japan relationship.26 Japan’s New Regional Security Partnerships One challenge of the Japanese strategy of broader engagement in the region – a similar challenge to what the United States faces – is to expand these partnerships without causing increased tensions with China over China’s fear that it is being ‘contained’ by hostile states. Yet, recent escalation of tensions in the South China Sea further concerns Japan about potential lapses in the sea lines of communication through that area, and thus further encourages partnerships with regional states who seek to push back against Chinese claims, in particular the Philippines and Vietnam. In recent years Japan has added a military dimension to its bilateral relationships with a number of states in the region – not just provision of assistance or participation in joint exercises that have a security dimension (such as support for coastguards or anti-piracy operations), but direct cooperation with the militaries of states other than the United States. Such security cooperation has proceeded furthest with Australia, where Japan issued its first ever ‘joint declaration on security cooperation’ with a state other than the United States in 2008. Japan’s earlier forays into security cooperation beyond the United States included promotion of the ASEAN Regional Forum as a way to handle traditional security issues multilaterally and provision of overseas development assistance for the training by regional coastguards (though not, pointedly, naval forces).27 In 2012, however, Japan’s Ministry of Defense announced that it would, for the first time, provide non-combat military equipment and supplies to the militaries of other countries in Asia, including to the Philippines and

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Vietnam, for the purpose of capacity building. Japan has held bilateral talks with defense officials of numerous states in the region on an expanded and more substantive basis in this period.28 The new JSDF Chief of Joint Staff even chose to visit the Philippines in the midst of the standoff between the Philippines and China over the disputed islands in the South China Sea. Wallace writes: While Chinese boats were still surrounding the Scarborough Shoal in July, the Philippines and Japan signed a ‘Statement of Intent on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges’ which indicated that the two sides would continue to hold high level exchanges at all levels of the defense establishment – ministerial, official, and uniformed – and that the two sides would also conduct ‘training activities and exercises on the occasion of the mutual ship visits between the PN and the MSDF.29

Japan also provided six patrol boats and an advanced maritime surveillance system to Indonesia from 2006 to 2009, and agreed to hold high-level annual defense dialogues beginning in 2012. It has provided additional assistance to Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand and Burma as well. In addition to this new military connection with multiple states in the region, Japan continues to engage in deepening its economic and cultural ties with the region, in no small part in recent years as a further mechanism to balance against rising Chinese influence.30 All of these efforts by Japan complement US strategy in Asia with regard to China; both the United States and Japan seek to engage China economically and via other avenues of cooperation and also to balance against Chinese behavior seen as antithetical to their interests.

CONCLUSION Japan’s security policies and capabilities have evolved substantially in the past decade to respond to many new security concerns and to new twists in old security concerns. Japan’s security environment has changed in ways that require a shift in existing policies and practices, and which have had the effect of pushing Japan to even deeper cooperation with its long-time ally and economic partner, the United States. Looking forward, the likelihood is that current concerns with regard to China and related to Japan’s relative regional decline will deepen. In its comprehensive ‘strategic net assessment’, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argues that a full-scale military conflict between Japan and China is unlikely, but that China’s ‘coercive power’ is likely to grow in ways that will negatively affect Japan.31

Japan in US–China relations 261 Overall, though, despite rising tensions in some areas, the broader story of developments in East Asia in the past decades is one of overwhelming growth in cooperation, including institutional networks of cooperation – which has undergirded, indeed fostered, the substantial economic growth the region has enjoyed in recent decades.32 This dual nature of the Japan–China relationship – of increased military tensions but also deepened economic cooperation – also characterizes the US–China relationship. The parallel makes both relationships in many ways a single triangular US–Japan–China relationship, with the added challenges that a three-way relationship entails.33 When considering the challenges of the US–China relationship moving forward, careful attention should be paid to the impact of Japan on the evolving US–China dynamic.

NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

9.

International Institute for Strategic Studies (2014), The Military Balance 2014, London: Routledge. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (2015), ‘Trends in world military expenditure, 2014’, SIPRI Fact Sheet (April), 3, accessed 13 October 2015 at http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1504.pdf. National Security Strategy (Provisional Translation), 17 December 2013, accessed 13 October 2015 at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf. The full text of these Guidelines is available from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, accessed 25 March 2016 at http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000078188.pdf. Economic statistics in this paragraph are drawn from World Bank, World Development Indicators, multiple years, accessed 25 March 2016 at http://wdi.worldbank. org/table/1.1. Ibid. World Bank ‘Data: GDP growth (annual %)’, accessed 25 March 2016 at http:// data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG. Accessed 25 March 2016 at http://www.globalfirepower.com. The website explains the methodology for its overall calculations as follows: ‘Note that nuclear capability is not taken into account; the GFP ranking is based strictly on each nation’s potential conventional war-making capability across land, sea and air. The final ranking incorporates values related to resources, finances and geography. Over 50 different factors make up the final GFP ranking, delivering the “PowerIndex” value by way of an in-house formula, and bonuses and penalties are applied where appropriate. Updates to the list are attempted annually or when new information/corrections warrant them’. There is a large body of scholarly literature that examines Japan–China relations in a number of different areas. One recent book that stresses the interactions between China and Japan as both sought to modernize is Westad, O.A. (2012), Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750, New York: Basic Books. A short book on the contemporary period is Yahuda, M. (2013), Sino–Japanese Relations after the Cold War: Two Tigers Sharing a Mountain, New York: Routledge; on recent interactions between the two states from a Japanese perspective, see Takahara, A.

262

10. 11. 12. 13.

14.

15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

Handbook of US–China relations (2012), Nicchu Kankeishi 1972–2012 [A History of Japan–China Relations 1972– 2012], Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. For a longer historical narrative, see Wan, M. (2006), Sino–Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Smith, S. (2014), Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China, New York: Columbia University Press, p. 9. Ibid., p. 258. Ibid., p. xi. As computed in constant 2011 US$ by SIPRI: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 1988–2014, accessed 25 March 2016 at http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/ milex/milex_database. Roy, D. (2013), Return of the Dragon: Rising China and Regional Security, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 63-4; Bitzinger, R.A. (2015), ‘China’s doubledigit defense growth: what it means for a peaceful rise’, Foreign Affairs On-Line, 19 March, explains how China’s official defense spending is both widely considered to be underreported plus that China is able to acquire more for what it spends than other major military spenders due to lower costs of acquisition and labor in China. Full text accessed 25 March 2016 at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ china/ 2015-03-19/chinas-double-digit-defense-growth. These documents are available in English at: Ministry of Defense, National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and Beyond, 17 December 2013, accessed 25 March 2016 at http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/ 20131217_e2.pdf and National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond, 17 December 2010, accessed 25 March at http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_ policy/pdf/guidelinesFY2011.pdf. Japan’s official position is explained in a pamphlet distributed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Senkaku Islands, accessed 25 March 2016 at http:// www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/pdfs/ senkaku_pamphlet.pdf. Grønning, B.E.M. (2014), ‘Japan’s shifting military priorities: counterbalancing China’s rise’, Asian Security 10 (1), 15. Hornung, J. (2014), ‘Japan’s growing hard hedge against China’, Asian Security 10 (2), 97. This article includes citations to a large number of recent articles that have tracked Japan’s growing military response to the rise of China. Roy, Return of the Dragon, p. 70. Ibid., pp. 60–62. Roy, Return of the Dragon, Chapter 7, offers five ‘mitigating factors’ for why the security relationship with China may not deteriorate as much as some fear: (1) US–China relations appear stable and efforts on both sides to keep that the case; (2) the system works for China too; (3) China itself does not seem to want to be a global superpower with all the responsibilities that entails; (4) other actors are balancing against China’s military rise; (5) China itself argues that it seeks to achieve a ‘peaceful rise’. And yet, Roy sees a persistent risk of conflict due to factors such as that ‘aggression is in the eye of the beholder’ and that many Chinese are acting in a way that seeks to legitimate a ‘Chinese sphere of influence’ in East Asia. SIPRI, ‘Trends in world military expenditure, 2014’. US Department of Defense (2006), Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, DC, accessed 25 March 2016 at http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/QDR2006 0203.pdf. Smith, Intimate Rivals, p. 259. Ibid., p. 260. Pempel, T.J. (2011), ‘Japan’s search for the “sweet spot”: international cooperation and regional security in Northeast Asia’, Orbis, 55 (2), 273.

Japan in US–China relations 263 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

Singh, B. (2013), Japan’s Security Identity: From a Peace State to an International State, London: Routledge, provides additional details on these cases. Annual Defense of Japan white papers list such bilateral defense-related meetings. Wallace, C.J. (2013), ‘Japan’s strategic pivot south: diversifying the dual hedge’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 13 (3), 490. Sun, J. (2012), Japan and China as Charm Rivals: Soft Power in Regional Diplomacy, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, provides an overview of both aspects. Swaine, M. et al. (2013), China’s Military and the U.S.–Japan Alliance in 2030: A Strategic Net Assessment, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Smith, Intimate Rivals, p. 260 develops this point further. For more discussion of the triangular dynamic among the three states, see Oros, A.L. (2010), ‘Prospects for trilateral security cooperation’, in G. Curtis, R. Kokubun and J. Wang (eds), Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing China–Japan–US Relations, Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange.

14. Korea in US–China relations Terence Roehrig*

INTRODUCTION Korea has a long history of being caught in the middle of conflicts between the regional powers of Northeast Asia. China, Japan and Russia have often played out their rivalries fighting over Korea as a prize or using the peninsula to reach one of their competitors. In the past, Korea was relatively weak compared to these contenders and did what it could to resist this struggle for power. Japan’s rise and subsequent occupation of Korea from 1910 to the end of World War II were dark days for Koreans. When the war came to an end, they hoped at last for liberation and the opportunity to establish their own state. Much to their disappointment, Washington and Moscow agreed to a plan that temporarily divided the peninsula to accept the surrender of Japanese forces, and Cold War hostility, including a very hot war from 1950 to 1953, prevented the reunification of North and South. Since then, the story of Korea and US–China relations became two very different narratives though closely linked in one of the geopolitical legacies of the Cold War. The role of North and South Korea in US–China relations remains a complicated one. Concerning North Korea, Beijing and Washington share the goal of denuclearization. Achieving that objective, however, is increasingly unlikely, and the desire to keep Pyongyang from disturbing regional security through provocative actions such as nuclear weapons tests or the sinking of the Cheonan is an additional challenge. While Washington regularly calls on China to do more to restrain North Korea, and some voices in China are making similar calls, there are limits to how far Beijing will press North Korea; stability is far more important to Beijing than denuclearization. North Korea will remain a serious flashpoint for conflict in the region and a major point of contact for US–China relations. South Korea is a different matter, and its story has been an amazing one. From the destruction of the Korean War with a per capita gross national product less than US$100, South Korea has become one of the world’s economic powerhouses. Since its founding, South Korean security has been tied to its close alliance relationship with the United States. 264

Korea in US–China relations 265 Anchored in the 1953 Mutual Security Treaty and the basing of US troops on the peninsula, the relationship has lasted for over 60 years and has been a cornerstone for Republic of Korea (ROK) security. Yet in the years ahead, Seoul could be facing a strategic dilemma. China’s economic rise has been a huge economic opportunity for South Korea as it has been for everyone in Asia. Trade and investment with China is a significant driver for the ROK economy. Should US–China relations worsen, South Korea could be in a difficult bind and would need to do yeoman’s work balancing these two relationships. However, while placing Seoul in a difficult spot, it may also be a useful position to help assure that US–China ties never reach that point. In the end, North and South Korean roles in US–China relations are multifaceted, part challenge and part opportunity, and closely tied to the uncertainty that characterizes the Asia-Pacific.

CHINA, THE UNITED STATES AND THE KINGDOM OF KOREA For many centuries, China had close ties with the Kingdom of Korea, which existed under Chinese suzerainty. Korea paid tribute to Chinese emperors in return for protection and being left alone to run its domestic affairs. The relationship was akin to the Confucian relationship of a big brother to a little brother and ensured Korea was protected from outside interference. Over these years, Korean–Chinese cultural ties also grew with significant sharing of art, literature and philosophy. Chinese power began a steady decline during the nineteenth century that was accompanied by European colonialism and the rise of Japan. As a result, the regional power structure began to change. The United States joined the fray in 1882 when it established formal diplomatic ties through the signing of the Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation with Kingdom of Korea. Despite establishing formal ties, however, Korea was not very important to US leaders. Washington’s primary goals were to improve the circumstances of shipwrecked sailors who ended up in Korea and to help secure its ‘Open Door’ policy for trade access to all areas in the face of increasing European colonial expansion.1 Korean leaders hoped ties with the United States, a country that was apparently uninterested in colonization, would insulate the kingdom from the growing regional rivalry but that was not to be the case.2 In the Sino–Japan War (1894–95), Tokyo wrested control of Korea away from Beijing, and as Paine notes, ‘shattered Chinese hegemony and demonstrated to an astonished West that Japan had become a modern

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great power’.3 The Treaty of Shimonoseki that ended the war forced China to end its relationship with Korea and cede Taiwan, the Pescadores and the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan. Later, Japan was forced to return Liaotung but the war was a bitter defeat for China, and soon after, Korea fell under the control of the Japanese empire where it stayed until the end of World War II.

CIVIL WAR, DIVISION AND THE KOREAN WAR While Korea was part of the Japanese empire, China struggled through its own internal problems. During most of the 1920s and 1930s, China fought a civil war between communist forces led by Mao Zedong and the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek. US leaders supported Chiang though his regime showed ever increasing signs of corruption and wasting of US aid. The civil war paused for a time during World War II for both sides to fight the Japanese but began again in earnest until communist forces prevailed. On 1 October 1949, Mao declared the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, while a debate raged in the United States among leaders and analysts concerning ‘who lost China’. Korea played relatively little role in US–China relations during this time. Korean communists fought with Mao against the Japanese but there was no link to the United States. The division of Korea at the end of World War II began a slow process that eventually brought China and the United States into direct armed conflict in Korea. At the end of World War II, Washington and Moscow agreed to divide the Korean Peninsula along the 38th parallel for the purposes of accepting the surrender of Japanese forces. Despite US intentions to unify the peninsula, Cold War competition prevented negotiations from reaching this goal. In 1947, the United States turned the problem over to the United Nations, which approved a unification plan that included elections leading to a single Korean government. Russian and North Korean leaders ignored the UN resolution and eventually two separate regimes were established in Korea – the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south on 15 August 1948 followed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north on 9 September 1948. Despite formally establishing two separate states, both North and South longed for reunification and continued plans to reach this goal, one way or another. North Korean leader Kim Il-sung was ready to use force but knew he needed Soviet assistance. As Stueck notes, ‘Kim was in no position to launch an invasion of the South without massive Soviet support, and he knew it’.4 Kim first approached Stalin in March 1949 for help and

Korea in US–China relations 267 permission to invade but Stalin was hesitant since an invasion would likely lead to a direct conflict with the United States, a war he had no interest in starting. Kim continued his lobbying and by early 1950, had begun to change Stalin’s mind. In a complex triangle of discussions and motives between Kim, Stalin, and Mao, all eventually came together to support a North Korean invasion. However, Stalin made it clear that if the war went badly, he would not be able to bail Kim out against the United States and would need to rely on China.5 On 25 June, North Korea invaded the South but China stayed out of the fight, keeping a watchful eye on the US/UN response. China knew an invasion was coming but Pyongyang never notified Beijing of the start date, leaving Chinese leaders surprised and miffed when the war began. Though the early operations were successful, by August, Mao had concluded that intervention might be necessary and began to make preparations. When DPRK troops were routed following the September 1950 landing at Inchon and pushed back across the 38th parallel, Chinese angst increased dramatically. Beijing issued clear warnings through Indian foreign minister K.M. Panikkar that it would intervene in the war if UN troops did not pull back across the 38th. On 1 October, China received an urgent message from Kim Il-sung requesting help, and soon after, Mao issued the formal order to enter the conflict, believing China had no choice but to come to Pyongyang’s defense.6 Though China succeeded in rescuing the North Korean regime, preserving the status quo came at a heavy price. Over 900 000 Chinese died in the war, including Mao’s son, and it cost billions of dollars. Mao was furious at Kim Il-sung for starting the war, not only for the costs but also for the damage it did to China’s strategic interests. The Korean War cemented Sino–US animosity for many years and crystallized US support for Taiwan, with Washington sending the 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Strait during the war to forestall a Chinese invasion, and concluded a mutual security treaty in 1954.

THE COLD WAR AND KOREA DIVIDED The Korean War ended with little territory exchanging hands but a high price in blood and treasure paid by all. Chinese relations with South Korea remained locked in the Cold War for the next four decades with little economic or political contact. There it would remain until the economies of both countries began to grow and create opportunities for a renewed relationship.

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China remained a strong supporter of the North Korean regime, providing large amounts of aid and assistance to rebuild after the devastation of the Korean War. In 1961, the two concluded a security agreement that formally committed China to ‘render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal’ should North Korea come under attack. After signing the agreement, Chinese officials declared that the treaty was a signal of solidarity and unity among the communist world.7 Despite the formal agreement, it was clear that China was ambivalent about the treaty, and it was never an ironclad security guarantee, with China ready to interpret the commitment as it saw fit. In addition, Kim Il-sung was adept at manipulating the growing Sino–Soviet split, playing them off to ensure maximum funding and political support. As Victor Cha notes, North Korea has long been good at ‘pulling China’s chain’ moving back and forth between Beijing and Moscow to play on their need to have the DPRK in their camp.8 While Kim was able to play both sides for support and aid, neither relationship became close and it was clear to all that the majority of the interactions were dictated by assessments of national interest and not communist brotherhood.

THE END OF THE COLD WAR The end of the Cold War brought significant changes to China’s ties with both Koreas. After Mao died in 1976 and the succession struggle settled down, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping embarked on an unprecedented reform of the Chinese economy, laying the groundwork for China’s economic take-off. Deng noted that it doesn’t matter if the cat is black or white so long as it catches mice, a sign he intended to pursue a pragmatic economic policy and abandon the ideological motives of the Mao years. Consequently, Deng led the country to a mixed system of communist political control with a free market, capitalist economy. Over the next 15 years, both the Chinese and South Korean economies grew significantly and their trade ties increased as well. By the end of the Cold War, the ROK economy held out too many opportunities for Beijing and its willingness to deal with Seoul increased greatly. At the same time, Beijing also began to improve its political ties with Seoul. Initially it was hesitant, fearing the impact these efforts would have on relations with North Korea. During the Korean War, thousands of Chinese died defending the DPRK and as communist allies, Mao once remarked their relationship was as close as lips and teeth. When Moscow started to approach Seoul, this provided some space for Chinese leaders to follow suit, though with continued trepidation for North Korea’s

Korea in US–China relations 269 response.9 After years of vetoing South Korea’s attempts to join the United Nations, China announced in May 1991 that it would no longer do so. Then, in August 1992, China and South Korea established formal diplomatic relations and in turn, South Korea discontinued its recognition of Taiwan. Realizing the difficulty increased ties created for Sino–DPRK relations, ROK President Roh Tae-woo told China’s Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen: ‘we fully understand China’s loyal relationship with North Korea that was forged through the Korean war, [but] I believe that China, [South] Korea and North Korea can build a relationship without betraying that loyalty’.10 As Chinese leaders expected, North Korea was outraged by Sino rapprochement with the South. In addition to Beijing’s political treachery, China changed the terms of trade with North Korea reducing the level of subsidized trade and expecting more normal economic interactions. These changes along with Russia’s complete abandonment of aid and subsidized trade with North Korea were a devastating blow to its economy. After years of relatively close ties and the bonds of fellow communist states, North Korea felt betrayed and for most of the next decade, Sino–DPRK relations were cold. From 1992 to 2000, no senior Chinese officials traveled to North Korea and Kim Jong-il did not visit China.11

NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS AMBITIONS Sino–US relations are a deep and complex mix of economic, political and security issues. Some of the most important security issues revolve around North Korea’s nuclear weapons ambitions and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Beijing and Washington share both goals but prioritize them differently – for China, stability is its chief goal in Korea, while Washington values denuclearization more highly. Yet, despite the many years of support for North Korea, Beijing does not benefit from its provocative behavior including nuclear weapon and ballistic missile tests that increase regional tensions, push Japan and South Korea to greater military preparations, and foster discussions in both neighbors about the possibility of acquiring their own nuclear deterrent. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program remains a severe challenge for regional security and is a concern for both China and the United States. Yet, despite hopes in Washington that Beijing will exert more pressure on Pyongyang, there are limits to how far China is willing to go and this position is unlikely to change for some time.

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North Korea’s nuclear ambitions began soon after the Korean War, and it is likely Kim Il-sung long had a desire for nuclear weapons.12 Kim Il-sung was well aware of the destructive power of atomic weapons displayed during World War II and experienced US nuclear threats first hand during the Korean War followed by the deployment of nuclear weapons to South Korea.13 Kim was determined to acquire nuclear weapons and prodded Beijing and Moscow for help but received less than he had hoped for. By the 1980s, concerns increased dramatically for a possible DPRK program and an ‘on and off’ series of crises ensued until 1994 when Washington and Pyongyang concluded the Agreed Framework that appeared to solve the nuclear crisis.14 With the agreement, North Korea consented to shut down its nuclear program and ship out any remaining spent fuel in return for two modern light water reactors that were more proliferation resistant, along with heavy fuel oil to tide them over while the reactors were built. In addition, the Agreed Framework called for improved North–South relations and taking the initial steps to normalize ties with the United States. Implementation of the accord was rocky from the start but survived to the incoming Bush administration in 2001. Though the administration continued to implement the agreement, it was done so with great skepticism. Sometime in the 1990s, North Korea began a second, clandestine route to nuclear weapons through highly enriched uranium (HEU). US intelligence slowly put the pieces together, and in October 2002 at a meeting with North Korean officials, US representatives presented evidence of the HEU program. After initially denying the program, negotiators later acknowledged the allegations and pronounced ‘they have more powerful things as well’, a likely reference to one or two plutonium-based weapons along with chemical munitions.15 In subsequent months, the Agreed Framework unraveled as North Korea disabled the seals and monitoring equipment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN organization tasked with verifying DPRK compliance. Pyongyang also withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and began reprocessing spent fuel that had been sealed into more nuclear weapons. In the wake of these events and the collapse of the Agreed Framework, North and South Korea, the United States, Japan, Russia and China gathered in August 2003 for the first of five rounds of multilateral talks to negotiate an end to the DPRK’s nuclear program. The talks were difficult and slow. In February 2005, DPRK officials raised serious doubts about the chances of success declaring they had ‘manufactured nukes for self-defence to cope with the Bush administration’s evermore undisguised policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK. Its nuclear weapons will remain [a]

Korea in US–China relations 271 nuclear deterrent for self-defence under any circumstances’.16 Yet, in September the six-party talks announced a joint statement whereby North Korea agreed to halt its nuclear program, return to the NPT, and permit the return of IAEA inspectors. In return, North Korea received energy assistance and food aid along with assurances of normalized relations with Japan and the United States.17 The agreement was never implemented, in part due to the US imposition of sanctions one month later on Banco Delta Asia, a Macao-based firm believed to be laundering money for Pyongyang.18 However, it is not clear that North Korea would have complied regardless. Talks continued but with little further progress, and in April 2009, the DPRK walked out for good. Later, North Korea declared the September 2005 agreement null and void. Throughout this process, China has been a vocal advocate for continuation of the six-party talks, working hard to push North Korea and the remainder of the group back to the negotiating table. Critics often maintain that China was unwilling to exert the political and economic pressure necessary to force North Korean compliance and was more interested in maintaining the facade of dialogue through the talks rather than actually solving the problem. China holds the key to solving the North Korean nuclear problem but has been unwilling to exert the leverage needed to change Pyongyang’s position. Cracks in China’s support began to appear in October 2006 when North Korea conducted its first nuclear weapons test. China used strong language, criticizing the test as ‘flagrant and brazen’ and calling on ‘North Korea to honor its vow made last year not to push for a nuclear peninsula and to return to the six-nation talks’.19 China had worked hard to convince North Korea not test and Pyongyang ignored the entreaties, conducting the test without notifying Beijing in advance. Cha notes that North Korea understood China’s objections ‘and thus, in Beijing’s eyes, the nuclear test amounted to the ultimate sign of disrespect and irresponsible behavior that Kim Jong-il could have levied against China, short of starting a second Korean War’.20 Subsequently, Beijing joined a unanimous vote for UN Security Council resolution 1718 to impose sanctions on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile capabilities along with luxury goods and ramped up inspections of DPRK ships. North Korea tested again in May 2009, and once more China voted to approve another resolution, UNSC 1874 that further ratcheted up sanctions. While China was unhappy with these tests, its anger soon abated as it sought to keep channels open with Pyongyang by sending Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in October 2009 to commemorate the 60th anniversary of Sino–DPRK ties. In addition, though China supported sanctions for both tests, it sought to water down initial proposals for punishing

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North Korea, and there is little evidence that Beijing has exerted much effort to enforce existing sanctions. In February 2013, Chinese frustration reached new levels when North Korea conducted its third nuclear test, despite Beijing’s pleading. Responding to the test, the Chinese Foreign Ministry declared it ‘resolutely opposes’ the test, expressing its ‘dissatisfaction’ and called on DPRK leaders to ‘abide by their promise to denuclearize and take no further action that will worsen the situation’.21 Beijing followed by calling in the North Korean ambassador to the foreign ministry for an explanation, while carrying out new trade sanctions and demonstrating its ability to cut energy supplies.22 Sino–DPRK ties were rocked by another event that year – the purge and execution of Jang Song-taek in December. Jang was Kim Jong-un’s uncle, married to Kim Jong-il’s sister and second in the country’s political hierarchy as vice-chair of the National Defense Commission. Jang was a proponent of economic cooperation between the two countries and had visited China on several occasions. According to one assessment, ‘although Kim purged several high-profile officials before Jang, Jang’s execution was a disturbing action for Chinese observers who viewed him as the necessary counterbalance to the young, inexperienced, rash and even brazenly insolent Kim’.23 The two countries were working closely on two economic zones – Rason Economic and Trade Zone and Hwanggumpyong and Wihwa Islands – which Jang had supported. These types of projects are viewed as crucial for China to develop its northeast provinces, and Jang’s interest in cooperation on these and other efforts as well as growing Sino–North Korea economic ties were most welcome. The purge caught Chinese leaders by surprise, and they were particularly stung by one part of the indictment leveled against Jang. His most serious crime was political, accusing him of being ‘an anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional element and despicable political careerist and trickster’.24 In short, he had become a political rival for Kim Jong-un, despite his role as a regent to guide the young leader. Jang was also accused of economic crimes that included reference to the treachery of selling land and national resources at low prices to a ‘foreign country’ that could only be China. Thus, the indictment appeared to be in part a rebuke of Jang’s close relationship with Beijing. Opinions of Chinese analysts varied over the degree to which Jang’s execution damaged China’s ties with North Korea. Official Chinese statements declared this was ‘North Korea’s internal affair’ but expressed no overt support for the Kim regime, elaborating largely on Beijing’s desire for continued cooperation based on mutual interest and healthy development.25 In the

Korea in US–China relations 273 end, while China’s trust in North Korea diminished further, one diplomatic source noted that ‘even though it’s hard to trust Kim Jong-un, it’s even harder to find a replacement’.26 For several years, Chinese leaders have become incredibly frustrated with North Korean actions, not only for what they believe is insolence and a lack of respect but also more importantly for the damage it does to Chinese interests. Though historical and ideological bonds remain, provocative North Korean behavior creates a series of problems for China. A hostile, nuclear-armed DPRK provides a rationale for increased deployments of ballistic missile defense (BMD) assets to the region by the United States along with increased cooperation on BMD between Washington and Tokyo. Chinese leaders are convinced that North Korea is a convenient excuse for actions that are really directed at them. This is not entirely an accurate assessment but no doubt some US strategists see this as a side benefit to addressing the North Korean threat. So far, South Korea has resisted US prodding to join its regional BMD architecture, preferring instead to develop its own Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system, but increasing North Korean capabilities make this a more likely possibility. Indeed, overall trilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan and South Korea becomes more likely the more North Korea becomes troublesome. North Korean behavior also becomes a catalyst for increased US naval presence in the region and should Pyongyang conduct military actions as it did in 2010, South Korea has vowed to retaliate. A ROK or joint ROK–US military response could lead to a larger military conflict in the region. Moreover, North Korea’s nuclear ambitions have generated discussions in South Korea and Japan about the need to acquire their own nuclear weapons, an outcome China strongly opposes. All of these actions upset regional stability and hurt China’s security interests. Yet, despite these serious concerns and a vigorous debate in China over whether or not it is time to ‘cut North Korea loose’, in the end, it is likely China will retain its present course for several reasons. China’s extensive economic support keeps the North Korean regime afloat and if it chose to exercise that leverage, could bring serious pressure on North Korea. However, Chinese leaders fear that too much pressure could cause a collapse of the regime. The ensuing chaos would be a severe disruption to regional stability and economic ties, particularly its northeast provinces of Jilin and Liaoning that are development priorities to catch up with China’s coastal regions. Collapse could also mean a flood of refugees that could further disrupt political and economic stability in China and the region. The likely end result of a DPRK collapse is reunification under a South Korean government that places a

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US ally on its border and the loss of a strategic buffer it fought so hard to retain during the Korean War. Thus, China will continue to support the North Korean regime, as distasteful as it is, because it provides an important net contribution to China’s security. The United States will continue to hope and push for greater Chinese pressure in dealing with North Korea, but this is unlikely to be forthcoming.

CHINA, THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH KOREA’S STRATEGIC DILEMMA The most important factor in the international system over the past decade has been the rise of China. The growth of its economic, political and military power has been nothing short of amazing. As Chinese power has grown, its ambitions, particularly in Asia have clashed with those of the United States, the current dominant power. International relations theory provides two possible paths to the outcome of US–China relations. Realism predicts that conflict is inevitable, as the rising power will attempt to unseat the current hegemon. It is near certain that China will seek to displace the United States as the dominant regional power and Washington will push back to maintain its position. On the other hand, liberal-internationalism maintains that economic links and trade ties will ameliorate future conflict, making it more difficult for states to go to war. Indeed, the integration of the US and Chinese economies is extensive and deep, and while there will be strong disagreements and potential clashes, liberal-internationalism maintains that leaders in Beijing and Washington will realize what is at stake and prevent a major power war. Which of these arguments will prevail remains hotly contested, but as China’s rise and the future of Sino–US relations unfolds, South Korea is caught squarely in the middle of the outcome. For over 60 years, the United States and South Korea have maintained an alliance to ensure the security of South Korea. The US security commitment has included a mutual security treaty, billions of dollars in economic and military aid, the deployment of US combat troops to Korea, and the inclusion of South Korea under the US nuclear umbrella, a posture that included the deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons from 1958 to 1991.27 In 2009, Lee Myung-bak and Barack Obama concluded the Joint Vision Statement that outlined the goal of broadening ties to a ‘comprehensive strategic alliance of bilateral, regional and global scope, based on common values and mutual trust’.28 The alliance has evolved from a Cold War patron–client relationship and South Korean power and influence both within the alliance and internationally has grown, allowing it to

Korea in US–China relations 275 pursue a more independent foreign policy.29 Yet its goals are often similar to those of the United States and the alliance that remains central to ROK security. While depending on the United States for security, China has been the crucial economic partner for South Korea. After Seoul and Beijing established formal relations and broke through their Cold War standoff, economic ties soared. From a mere US$16.6 billion in 1995, bilateral trade climbed to US$235.4 billion in 2014 (Table 14.1), representing close to a quarter of South Korea’s total trade volume. By 2003, China had become South Korea’s largest trade partner, a position that had been held by the United States for years. Table 14.1 Sino–South Korea total trade: 1995 to 2014, selected years Year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014

Trade in Billion US$ US$16.6 US$31.3 US$100.6 US$188.4 US$235.4

Source: Korea Customs Service, www.customs.go.kr.

In 2014, its trade with China was more than the United States (US$115.6) and Japan (US$86.0) combined, its next two trade partners.30 China is also a key destination for ROK foreign investment at US$3.65 billion in 2014.31 For China, trade with South Korea is less important though still significant. In 2014, bilateral trade with South Korea ranked third behind the United States and Japan. Chinese investment in the ROK economy is relatively low at only US$414.2 million for 2014. Seoul and Beijing have also signed a free trade agreement (FTA) that will remove more than 90 percent of tariffs over the next 20 years and is expected to increase bilateral trade to over US$300 billion. In a letter to South Korea, Xi Jinping noted ‘signing an FTA between South Korea and China, major economic players in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region, is a monumental event. This will not only lead to a new leap in trade relations between the two countries but also bring practical benefits to the people of both countries’.32 Finally, in March 2015, South Korea announced that it would join the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), despite US efforts to convince its allies to stay out. Seoul was

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initially reluctant to join but in the end believed there were too many opportunities for its firms to receive infrastructure contracts not to become a member.33 Sino–ROK economic ties will continue to grow and be particularly important for South Korea. Indeed, many South Koreans believe that eventually China will overtake the US economy. A 2015 Asan Institute poll found South Korean respondents believed that the United States will retain its dominant position in international political (84.6 percent) and economic influence (63.6 percent) in the near term. However, in the future, 70.5 percent of respondents thought China would surpass the United States and become ‘the future economic superpower’.34 Yet not all of this news is good, as China’s economic rise will also mean greater competition for South Korea. The Korean Development Institute released a report in May 2015 stating that while China will continue to pose many opportunities for the ROK economy, it will also increasingly be a competitor in certain market sectors that will reduce South Korea’s market share in international markets.35 While economic ties continue to grow, political relations are more complicated. In recent years, Beijing has made significant effort to reach out to Seoul to grow its political as well as economic ties. Since coming to power, Xi and Park have met on several occasions including two summits, the most recent during Xi’s July 2014 visit to Seoul along with several meetings on the sidelines of other events such as the Nuclear Security Summit and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. Park also attended the 70th anniversary celebration of the end of World War II in Beijing in September 2015. Despite these contacts with the South, Xi has yet to meet Kim Jong-un and the 2014 summit was the first time a Chinese leader had ever visited South Korea before visiting the North. Beijing also snubbed Pyongyang by turning down its request to join the AIIB, citing its economic fundamentals as a disqualification. Economic cooperation issues have largely dominated the agenda of these summit meetings, especially the FTA, along with North Korea. South Korea understands that it needs Chinese help to solve the North Korean nuclear problem along with reunification and had hoped these summits might lead to greater pressure on Pyongyang to denuclearize. However, the joint statements for both summits included relatively lukewarm pronouncements that failed to mention North Korea by name. For example, the 2014 statement noted that Xi Jinping ‘stressed that China upholds an objective and impartial position on the Korean Peninsula issue, and is firmly committed to realizing the goal of denuclearization of the Peninsula, maintaining peace and stability on the Peninsula and resolving the issue through dialogues and consultations’.36 Despite

Korea in US–China relations 277 its efforts, South Korea has been unsuccessful in persuading China to exert more pressure on Pyongyang. Indeed, South Koreans were highly dismayed with the tepid Chinese response to North Korea’s sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong-do. Instead of condemning North Korean actions, China merely called on all sides to show restraint and not escalate tensions, a decidedly disappointing response from Seoul’s view. For China, improving ties with South Korea has other strategic advantages that go beyond economics. Xi Jinping has noted his unhappiness with the US alliance system in Asia, calling for it to be dissolved and replaced by a broader regional security structure.37 Closer ties with South Korea raise the possibility of pulling it away from its alliance with the United States. When reports surfaced that the United States was considering deploying a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery to protect US forces in Korea, China attempted to utilize its leverage to pressure Seoul from agreeing. Beijing has been a vigorous opponent of US missile defense with the Chinese Foreign Ministry arguing, ‘the deployment of anti-missile systems in the Asia-Pacific and seeking unilateral security is not beneficial to strategic stability and mutual trust in the region. It is not beneficial to peace and stability in Northeast Asia’.38 Yet China may have overplayed its hand on THAAD, causing a backlash in South Korea and increasing concerns for future Chinese intimidation. China and South Korea also share strong anti-Japan sentiment that Beijing can use for common cause and to counter US efforts to improve trilateral cooperation between Japan, South Korea and the United States. Thus, while there are many arguments for South Korea to improve its trilateral ties with Washington and Tokyo to address North Korea, trilateral cooperation is also directed at China, an element that makes some South Korean leaders uncomfortable. While South Korea has much to gain economically, it is also wary of China as well. Will China’s rise continue to be an important economic opportunity or will it seek to dominate the region? Beijing may seek to dominate relations with Seoul in ways that push Korean interests to the sidelines. Chinese actions in the South China Sea and elsewhere have raised anxiety that these behaviors could be indications of future clashes that directly affect South Korean interests.39 Several potential disputes exist in the maritime domain.40 First, China and South Korea have not resolved their overlapping exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claims in the Yellow/West Sea. According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), countries are allowed to claim a 200 nautical mile (NM) zone from its coastline in which it controls access to resources and fishing.41 The width of the

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Yellow Sea is 378 NM leading to considerable overlap of their respective 200 NM claims. Seoul and Beijing have had numerous meetings to settle the issue but have yet to reach a resolution. Second, South Korea has been very concerned over illegal Chinese fishing in its waters. As the Chinese population continues to grow and becomes more urbanized, greater pressure is placed on its fishing industry to meet the growing demand. Complicating matters, the Chinese fishing fleet has already overfished local waters and coastal pollution has made matters worse. As a result, Chinese boats have had to venture farther out to sea, sometimes trespassing into the EEZs of neighbors. Beijing and Seoul have formal agreements to manage fishing but enforcement has been difficult, a fact complicated by the lack of EEZ delimitation. From 2006 to 2011, a South Korean report indicated that the Coast Guard caught 2600 Chinese boats and 800 fishermen fishing illegally in ROK waters.42 Third, China and South Korea have an ongoing dispute over the administrative control of a set of submerged rocks Beijing calls Suyan Rock and Seoul, Ieo-do. Both sides agree the dispute is not over an island as the rocks are 4–5 m below the surface even at low tide. The reef is 80 NM from the closest ROK territory (island of Mara-do) and 155 NM from the nearest Chinese land (island of Tongdao). South Korea built a research station on the reef in 2003 to gather scientific data on ocean currents, fishing, climate change and weather. South Korea maintains it had the right to build the facility under UNCLOS Articles 60 and 80 that allow for construction of artificial islands, installations and structures in areas within its EEZ or on its continental shelf.43 However, Chinese officials have filed regular protests, reminding South Korea that the area is in a disputed EEZ, and South Korea should refrain from placing structures on the reef until the dispute is settled. In 2011, China sent ships to the area to help assert its claim to jurisdiction and in November 2013, extended its Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea to include the area around Ieo-do/Suyan Rock without prior consultation with Seoul. Soon after, South Korea extended its ADIZ to include the reef. Finally, China and South Korea have their own dispute about history, involving the ancient Korean kingdom of Koguryo or what the Chinese call Gaogouli.44 The Kingdom of Koguryo existed from 37 BC to 668 AD in the northern portion of the Korean Peninsula into a substantial portion of Manchuria. Two other kingdoms – Silla and Baekje – controlled the remainder of Korea to the south. In 668 AD, Silla conquered both Koguryo and Baekje to bring about a unified Korea that is the precursor of the modern Korean state. The unification of these

Korea in US–China relations 279 three kingdoms is a crucial element for Korean history and the identity of the Korean people. Beginning in the 1980s, some Chinese historians began to argue that Koguryo’s history was more closely connected to China’s past, an assertion that greatly angered Koreans. Though initially beginning as a dispute among academics, eventually the Chinese government became involved in the dispute in a variety of ways including providing funding for historians to present China’s case and removing content from the Foreign Ministry’s website dealing with Koguryo. Chinese motives are unclear but some Koreans feared the dispute was an attempt by Beijing to build the historical justification for possibly claiming North Korean territory in the wake of a DPRK collapse. It is also possible that Beijing is concerned that Chinese of Korean descent might call for separation from China to join their brothers and sisters in a unified Korean state should North Korea ever collapse. Maintaining Koguryo as part of Chinese history, some believe, helps to head off any effort of separation by the Korean-Chinese community. The Koguryo dispute has quieted down and returned largely to a discussion among academics. Indeed, the ancient residents of Koguryo had no conception of being a part of either China or Korea, and this dispute is more about politics than history. Yet, the disagreement raised hackles in both North and South Korea, and could become a contentious issue again sometime in the future. Thus, in the years ahead, South Korea could face a difficult strategic situation. Should US–China relations deteriorate, it will be caught in the middle between its ally and top security partner or its number one trade partner. Hopefully, Beijing and Washington will be able to manage their relationship in ways that do not bring major power conflict that is in no one’s interests. Until these relationships become clear, South Korea is likely to continue its current hedging strategy that seeks to strike a deft balance between its economic and security interests.

CONCLUSION In the years ahead, the two Koreas will be a central factor in US–China relations. North Korea is unlikely to collapse, in large part due to Chinese assistance, and its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities will continue to grow into a small, operational force that will be able to reach the United States mainland. The North Korea problem will not go away and will continue to be an irritant for US–China relations and the region. Yet, solutions are few and the likely path is to continue to reinforce

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deterrence and defense to ensure North Korea does not use its nuclear weapons or become emboldened to act at lower levels, believing it has the ultimate deterrent to protect the Kim family from regime change. The North Korean nuclear problem can be both a catalyst for the direction of Sino–US relations and it can also be a reflection of those ties, so that if Washington and Beijing slide further in their relationship there will be even less motivation for cooperation on the issue. South Korea’s position will also be heavily dependent on the evolution of US–China ties. Much about the future political and security structure of Asia is yet to be determined, and South Korea is doing its best to manage that uncertainty. Should Sino–US ties deteriorate, South Korea will be in an increasingly uncomfortable position and its importance in their geostrategic game will become more important as both Washington and Beijing work to pull South Korea in their direction. South Korea’s power and influence has grown along with its ability to chart a more independent path in its foreign policy. Yet the US–ROK alliance will remain a cornerstone for ROK security in the future uncertainties of the East Asian security environment.

NOTES *

1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

The views expressed in this chapter are the author’s alone and do not represent the official position of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the US government. Chay, J. (1982), ‘The first three decades of American–Korean relations, 1882–1910: reassessments and reflections’, in T.-H. Kwak (ed.), U.S.–Korean Relations, 1882– 1982, Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, p. 20. Conroy, H. and W. Patterson (1999), ‘Duality and dominance: a century of Korean–American relations’, in Y.-B. Lee and W. Patterson (eds), Korean–American Relations, 1866–1997, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, pp. 2–4. Paine, S.C.M. (2005), The Sino–Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 3. Stueck, W. (2002), Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 71. Ibid., pp. 67–77. Scobell, A. (2001), ‘Soldiers, statesmen, strategic culture, and China’s 1950 intervention in Korea’, in S. Zhao (ed.), Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 107–27. The New York Times (1961), ‘China says pacts show reds’ unity’, 13 July, A2. Cha, V. (2012), The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future, London: Bodley Head, pp. 317–23. Oberdorfer, D. (1997), The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, New York: Basic Books, p. 231. Ibid., p. 244. Cha, The Impossible State, p. 327.

Korea in US–China relations 281 12. 13.

14.

15. 16.

17.

18.

19.

20. 21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26. 27. 28.

29.

See Pollack, J.D. (2011), No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and International Security, London: Routledge. See Foot, R.J. (1988–89), ‘Nuclear coercion and the ending of the Korean conflict’, International Security, 13 (3), 92–112; Dingman, R. (1988–89), ‘Atomic diplomacy during the Korean War’, International Security, 13 (3), 50–91. See Wit, J.S., D.B. Poneman and R.L. Gallucci (2014), Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution; Chinoy, M. (2010), Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis, New York: St. Martin’s Press. Sanger, D. (2002), ‘North Korea says it has a program on nuclear arms’, New York Times, 17 October. Korean Central News Agency (2005), ‘DPRK FM on its stand to suspend its participation in six-party talks for indefinite period’, 11 February, accessed 26 March 2016 at http://www.acronym.org.uk/news/200502/north-korea-suspends-participationin-six-party-talks-claims-have-manufactured-nukes. U.S. Department of State (2005), ‘Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks’, Beijing, 19 September 2005, accessed 2 June 2015 at http://www. state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm. U.S. Department of the Treasury (2005), ‘Treasury designates Banco Delta Asia as primary money laundering concern under USA PATRIOT Act’, 15 September, accessed 2 June 2015 at http://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm. Kahn, J. (2006), ‘Angry China is likely to toughen its stand on Korea’, The New York Times, 10 October, accessed 28 March 2016 at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/10/ world/asia/10china.html?fta=y&_r=1&. Cha, The Impossible State, p. 330. Mullen, J. (2013), ‘Tough U.N. action vowed after North Korean nuclear test’, CNN, 12 February accessed 13 June 2015 at http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/11/world/asia/ north-korea-seismic-disturbance/. Xu, B. and J. Bajoria (2014), ‘The China–North Korea relationship’, Council on Foreign Relations, 22 August, accessed 13 June 2015 at http://www.cfr.org/china/ china-north-korea-relationship/p11097. Beauchamp-Mustafaga, N. (2014), ‘China–North Korea relations: Jang Song-thaek’s purge vs. the status quo’, Asia Centre, February, accessed 13 June 2015 at http://www.centreasia.eu/sites/default/files/publications_pdf/note_china_north_korea_ relations_after_jang_song_thaek_s_purge_february2014_0.pdf. The Guardian (2013), ‘North Korea executes Kim Jong-un’s uncle as “traitor”’, 13 December, accessed 26 March 2016 at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/ 13/north-korea-executes-kim-jong-un-uncle-jang-song-thaek. See Mu, C. (2013), ‘China’s official response to Jang Song-Thaek’s execution: an analysis’, The Diplomat, 21 December, accessed 20 June 2015 at http:// thediplomat.com/2013/12/chinas-official-response-to-jang-song-thaeks-execution-ananalysis/. Beauchamp-Mustafaga, ‘China–North Korea relations’. See Roehrig, T. (2006), From Deterrence to Engagement: The U.S. Defense Commitment to South Korea, Lanham, MD: Lexington Press. ‘Joint Vision for the Alliance between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea’, 16 June 2009, accessed 5 June 2015 at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the_ press_office/ Joint-vision-for-the-alliance-of-the-United-States-of-America-and-theRepublic-of-Korea/. Heo, U. and T. Roehrig (2014), South Korea’s Rise: Economic Development, Power, and Foreign Relations, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

282 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

37.

38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

Handbook of US–China relations Korea Customs Service, ‘Import/export by country’, accessed 11 May 2015 at http://www.customs.go.kr/kcshome/trade/TradeCountryList.do?layoutMenuNo= 21031. The Export–Import Bank of Korea (2015), ‘Foreign investment statistics’, accessed 28 March 2016 at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/10/world/asia/10china.html?fta= y&_r=1&. Yonhap News Agency (2015), ‘S. Korea, China formally sign free trade deal’, 1 June, accessed 1 July 2015 at http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2015/06/01/ 95/0301000000AEN20150601001552320F.html. Reuters (2015), ‘South Korea sees gains for its infrastructure firms from joining AIIB’, 27 March, accessed 4 June 2015 at http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/ 28/us-asia-aiib-idUSKBN0MN08L20150328. Kim, J., J.J. Lee and C. Kang (2015), ‘Measuring a giant: South Korean perceptions of the United States’, Asan Institute, April, accessed 5 May 2015 at http://en. asaninst.org/contents/measuring-a-giant-south-korean-perceptions-of-the-united-states/. Jung, K.-C. (2015), ‘Changes in the export competitiveness of China, Japan, and Korea’, Korea Development Institute, 5 May, accessed 10 June 2015 at http:// www.kdi.re.kr/upload/cu20150505_eng.pdf. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China (2014), ‘Xi Jinping holds talks with President Park Geun-hye of ROK and two heads of state agree to make China and ROK partners seeking common development, striving for regional peace, jointly promoting Asia’s vitalization and enhancing world prosperity’, 4 July, accessed 24 June 2015 at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/ xjpzxdhgjxgsfw/t1172038.shtml. Xinhuanet (2014), ‘China Focus: China’s Xi proposes security concept for Asia’, 21 May, accessed 21 June 2015 at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-05/21/ c_133351210.htm. See also Tiezzi, S. (2014), ‘At CICA, Xi calls for new regional security architecture’, The Diplomat, 22 May, accessed 21 June 2015 at http:// thediplomat.com/2014/05/at-cica-xi-calls-for-new-regional-security-architecture/. Reuters (2014), ‘China criticizes U.S. missile defense radar in Japan’, 23 October, accessed 9 June 2015 at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/23/us-china-japanusa-idUSKCN0IC16P20141023. See Roehrig, T. (2015), ‘Option 2: strengthening the ROK–U.S. alliance’, Asan Institute Special Forum, 3 (3), 11 June, accessed 21 June 2015 at http:// www.theasanforum.org/option-2-strengthening-the-rok-us-alliance/?dat=. See Roehrig, T. (2012), ‘Republic of Korea navy and China’s rise: balancing competing priorities’, in M.A. McDevitt and C.K. Lee (eds), CNA Maritime Asia Project: Workshop Two, CNA, August pp. 69–76. See UNCLOS, Part V: Exclusive Economic Zone, accessed 24 June 2015 at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm. Yonhap News Agency (2011), ‘Eradicate illegal fishing by Chinese boats in Korean EEZ’, 5 December, accessed 28 June 2015 at http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/yhedit/ 2011/12/05/88/5100000000AEN20111205007600315F.HTML. The Korea Herald (2012), ‘No territorial dispute’, 13 March, accessed 3 June 2015 at http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20120313000457. For a detailed examination of this issue, see Roehrig, T. (2010), ‘History as a strategic weapon: national identify and the Korean dispute over Koguryo’, Journal of African and Asian Studies, 45 (1), 5–28; Hays Gries, P. (2005), ‘The Koguryo controversy, national identity, and Sino–Korean relations today’, East Asia, 22 (4), 3–17.

15. Taiwan in US–China relations Andrew T.H. Tan

THE TAIWAN PROBLEM IN US–CHINA RELATIONS While the US–China relationship is perceived to be ‘the most consequential bilateral relationship of our time’, it has been beset by a number of problems.1 Arguably the most significant issue between the two countries has been the Taiwan issue, that is, the continued existence of a rump Republic of China (ROC) on the island of Taiwan long after the Communist Party of China (CCP) had triumphed over the Kuomintang (KMT) in the Chinese civil war of 1945–49 and established the People’s Republic of China (PRC). For China, resolving the Taiwan issue through reunification with the Mainland is a primary political objective on account of the strong and emotive nationalist sentiments surrounding the issue in China. For many Chinese, Taiwan is the one remaining scar from China’s century of humiliation at the hands of foreign imperialist powers and has to be ‘recovered’ (i.e., reunified with the Mainland) to complete China’s revolution begun under Sun Yat-sen. Thus, according to Article 4 of China’s Anti-Secession Act of 2005, ‘accomplishing the great task of reunifying the motherland is the sacred duty of all Chinese people, the Taiwan compatriots included’.2 Taiwan has therefore been a central issue in US–China relations since the end of World War II, and the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995–96 demonstrated how it could yet lead to open conflict between the two great powers. This chapter therefore examines the Taiwan problem in the evolving US–China relationship. While President Obama has, through the Asia ‘pivot’ (or ‘rebalancing’) that was announced with fanfare in Australia in November 2011, felt the need to draw the line in Asia to contain a rising China, the question is on which side of the line Taiwan is located – is it ultimately expendable, or does it have a major role in the United States’ rebalancing in Asia?3 These questions are important in the current context of heightened tensions and intensifying strategic rivalry between the two main protagonists in Asia, namely, the United States and China. This chapter will therefore examine how the Taiwan problem emerged, how it has affected the relationship between the United States and China since the end of World War II, and how the present Obama administration 283

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is approaching the problem. It concludes by assessing the future prospects for Taiwan.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE TAIWAN PROBLEM The Taiwan problem emerged as a result of the defeat of the KMT government of Chiang Kai-shek to the CCP led by Mao Tse-tung in the Chinese civil war from 1945 to 1949. Long before Japan’s invasion of China in 1937, the two parties had been engaged in a bitter struggle for power. The KMT expended considerable resources to counter the rising appeal of the peasant-backed CCP, waging a number of campaigns to destroy it. The KMT remained hostile to the CCP, until the infamous Xian Incident in 1936, in which KMT Marshal Zhang Xueliang kidnapped Chiang and forced him to enter into an alliance with the communists to oppose the Japanese occupation of Manchuria.4 In 1937, Japan invaded China proper, sparking an eight-year war that sapped the strength of the nationalists, while the communists, fighting a guerrilla war instead of frontal conventional battles with the Japanese, grew in strength.5 Following Japan’s defeat and surrender in 1945, the two main protagonists resumed their domestic struggle for power, fighting a long and bitter civil war that lasted four years. The KMT had enormous resources at its disposal, such as the support of the wealthy industrialist and merchant elite, the power of incumbency and the backing of the United States. How it ultimately fell to the communists is not the subject of this chapter, suffice to note that it was the deep corruption, incompetence and poor leadership of the KMT government that alienated not just large numbers of Chinese but also the United States. As President Truman commented, ‘we picked a bad horse’.6 By the time the KMT fled to Taiwan in 1949, the United States had already decided to wash its hands of the KMT. Indeed, in National Security Council (NSC) 48/2, signed on 30 December 1949, the United States ruled out any military defence of Taiwan at a time when the CCP was preparing to attack the island. The Truman administration, expecting Taiwan to fall, even directed US diplomatic missions around the world to explain that Taiwan possessed no strategic significance and that the United States had no responsibility for it.7 This was despite the Cold War having started, with the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 (albeit in the context of the communist threat in Greece) that the United States would ‘support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures’.8 Evidently, while a line

Taiwan in US–China relations 285 was drawn against Soviet-inspired communism, in Asia this did not initially include Taiwan. What changed everything was the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. According to Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, ‘the fear of a monolithic communist conspiracy based in, and directed from, Moscow, which sought domination in East Asia, overwhelmed all other considerations’.9 Taiwan now assumed strategic significance as part of the frontline against the spread of communism in Asia. Actions by the PRC towards Taiwan undertaken after the outbreak of the Korean War therefore led to deeper US involvement and commitment to Taiwan, in the eyes of China making the United States a third party in the Chinese civil conflict. Not surprisingly, US–China relations revolved around the Taiwan problem during the Cold War. In August 1954, PRC forces launched an artillery attack on Quemoy, which is occupied by the ROC and is located just off the Chinese Mainland. The initial artillery barrage killed two US military officers, forcing President Dwight Eisenhower, Harry Truman’s successor, to order the deployment of three US carrier battle groups to the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait. This was followed by open talk of using tactical nuclear weapons against China should the crisis escalate.10 This was the context under which the long-planned Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the ROC was signed in November 1954. Under the Treaty, ‘each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes’. Further, the ROC granted the United States ‘the right to dispose such United States land, air, and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as may be required for their defense, as determined by mutual agreement’.11 With the line against communism now drawn on the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan was safe, at least for the time being, as it was now an important component of the US-led ‘hub and spokes’ alliance system in Asia designed to contain communism. Moreover, the ROC tied down communist forces in China, and was also useful to the United States as it held the permanent seat representing China in the United Nations Security Council. However, to deter any attack by China on any part of Taiwan, including offshore islands that it controlled, such as Kinmen, Matsu and the Pescadores (or Penghu), the Eisenhower administration practised a policy of strategic ambiguity, as clarifying the territories that the United States would protect would encourage China to seize the rest. At the same time, this same strategic ambiguity served to restrain Chiang

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Kai-shek, in case he dragged the United States into a broader war with China in his illusionary quest to retake the Mainland.12 This was reflected, as Henry Kissinger pointed out, in the text of the Mutual Defense Treaty, which lacked clarity over the US defence commitment to territory other than Taiwan itself and the Pescadores, since there was no mention of the outer islands such as Kinmen and Matsu.13 In 1958, another crisis broke out, again involving the offshore islands, as PRC forces heavily shelled them. This prompted the United States to openly restate its commitment to the defence of Taiwan, this time including Quemoy and Matsu. By the end of the 1950s therefore, developments in the Taiwan Strait had led the United States to assume a full defence commitment to Taiwan. Indeed, much of the Cold War phase in US–China relations revolved around the Taiwan issue. Kissinger described this phase in the bilateral relationship as ‘combative co-existence’, which was a form of hostile mutual tolerance but ultimately did not lead to full-blown war.14 For Taiwan and the United States, as Nancy Bernkopf Tucker observed, ‘between 1949 and 1969, Taipei and Washington found each other useful in their shared opposition to communism in China’.15

THE SINO–SOVIET SPLIT AND US–CHINA RAPPROCHEMENT The differences between China and the Soviet Union that led to the Sino–Soviet split in the 1960s are not the subject of this chapter, suffice to note that the clashes of national interests, ideological differences and mutual mistrust led to clashes along the Sino–Soviet border in the late 1960s, and fears of open conflict between the two communist powers. This development resulted in China and the United States sharing a mutual interest in countering the Soviet Union, thus laying the foundation for a surprising rapprochement between the two erstwhile adversaries. On the part of the United States, it calculated that such a move would divide the Soviet bloc and improve the US position in Asia, now under severe threat as the Vietnam War was not going well for the United States. After careful preparatory work by then US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, President Richard Nixon was able to make his groundbreaking trip to Beijing in 1972 where he met with Premier Zhou Enlai and Chairman Mao Tse-tung.16 However, despite the clear mutual interests involved, the main obstacle to rapprochement was the one issue that remained primary for the PRC, that is, Taiwan. As the Shanghai Communiqué on 27 February 1972 clearly stated, ‘the Taiwan question is

Taiwan in US–China relations 287 the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States’. Over Taiwan, however, the Nixon administration was prepared, for the sake of broader strategic objectives, to sacrifice it. Thus, in the same Shanghai Communiqué, the United States acknowledged that ‘all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China’, and that ‘the United States Government does not challenge that position’. Although the United States affirmed its desire that the Taiwan question be settled peacefully amongst the Chinese themselves, it also pledged to ultimately withdraw all US forces and military installations from Taiwan.17 Indeed, it was the rapprochement with China that ultimately saved the US position in Asia, particularly as the United States lost the Vietnam War when communist forces ended the US-backed Saigon regime in 1975. With the breaking of the Sino–Soviet alliance, and China on its side, the US position in Asia actually improved despite the debacle of the Vietnam War. However, it was Taiwan that proved expendable for these broader strategic gains and interests to be realized. In January 1979, the United States under the Carter administration and China formally normalized relations. This was accompanied by the termination of the US–ROC Mutual Defense Treaty in 1980.18 The US Congress, under the prompting of the Taiwan lobby, however, also enacted the Taiwan Relations Act on 1 January 1979 to accompany the normalization of relations between the United States and China. There were strong sentiments in the US Congress that the United States could not be seen to be abandoning a Cold War ally so callously. Indeed, the Taiwan Relations Act stated that the United States would ‘consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States’. Further, the Act pledged to ‘provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character’, and also promised that the United States would maintain the capacity ‘to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan’.19 This was thus another attempt at strategic ambiguity, as the Taiwan Relations Act contained no automatic provisions for US security assistance in the event of war with China but its wording was sufficiently strong to suggest that it might intervene if China used force. Thus, while the United States now had China on its side in the triangular balance of power with the Soviet Union, it also took steps not be seen to be abandoning Taiwan entirely, and hoped that some form of continuing but ambiguous commitment to it would be enough to

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deter any use of force by China over the Taiwan issue, and thus maintain stability on the Taiwan Strait. As the Taiwan Relations Act stated at the onset, its purpose was to ‘help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific’.20 China tolerated this in view of the greater strategic objective of countering the Soviet Union and pursuing economic development through its Open Door policy announced in 1978. China, however, pressured the United States for some clarity over arms sales to Taiwan, which led to the 17 August Communiqué in 1982. Under the Communiqué, the United States pledged that it: […] does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution.21

Again, the United States, under the Reagan administration, tried to have its cake and eat it by also quietly delivering, a month before the Communiqué was signed, the so-called Six Assurances to Taiwan, under which the United States pledged that it would not set a date for termination of arms sales to Taiwan and would also not consult with China in advance before making decisions about US arms sales to Taiwan.22 It has been this form of perfidy over Taiwan that has disappointed China time and time again, leading to widely held perceptions in China that it is in fact the United States that has been the main obstacle to China’s ultimate national interest and objective, that is, the reunification of Taiwan with the Mainland.

THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND THE TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS The end of the Cold War after 1989 led to the unravelling of the Sino–US alliance against the Soviet Union. With the fall of communism and indeed the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself in 1992, the common strategic interests that held the two powers together, and that had temporarily swept the Taiwan issue under the carpet, were no longer there. Moreover, the Tiananmen massacre of pro-democracy protesters in Beijing in June 1989, which was broadcast around the world on live television, shocked Western and US audiences and led to a strong, popular moral backlash at the seemingly oppressive anti-democratic

Taiwan in US–China relations 289 communist regime governing China. It was in the backdrop of postTiananmen sanctions and questions over human rights in China that the Taiwan Strait crisis broke out in the mid-1990s. The context of the crisis was the growth of pro-independence sentiments on Taiwan in the 1990s, encouraged by none other than its President, Lee Teng-hui, who had come to power in 1988 following the death of President Chiang Ching-kuo, son of Chiang Kai-shek. Lee was the first native Taiwanese to lead the country and had served in the Japanese Imperial Army during World War II as a military officer. Lee represented those Taiwanese who felt little connection with China and who identified themselves as Taiwanese first instead of Chinese. Indeed, Lee helped to foster the pro-independence movement when he enacted democratic reforms that permitted pro-independence views to be openly heard. In 1996, Lee presided over the first direct presidential elections, which he duly won.23 The administration of George H. Bush (father of George W. Bush) compounded tensions in the Taiwan Strait when he appeared to violate the 17 August Communiqué in 1982 regarding arms sales to Taiwan after he approved the sale of 150 F-16A/B combat aircraft to Taiwan in 1992.24 It was in this context that the Taiwan Strait crisis broke out in 1995. The spark was the unofficial, personal visit of President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan to his alma mater in the United States, namely, Cornell University. In granting him a visa to do so, the Clinton administration reversed a 16-year ban on visits to the United States by high-level Taiwan officials enacted after the normalization of relations with China in 1979. At Cornell, Lee lamented Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation and took the opportunity to deliver the message that ‘the people of the Republic of China on Taiwan are determined to play a peaceful and constructive role among the family of nations’.25 China, fearing that Taiwan was on the road to independence, responded by test-firing missiles and holding massive military exercises near Taiwan from July 1995 to March 1996. The missile tests took place close enough to force the temporary closure of two key ports in Taiwan. China undertook the largest exercises in March 1996, just before Taiwan’s first free presidential elections, in a clear warning to Taiwan over moves towards independence. The Clinton administration did not hesitate in coming to Taiwan’s aid, deploying two aircraft carrier battle groups near Taiwan to deter China.26 One of the aircraft carriers, the Nimitz, actually sailed through the Taiwan Strait under the pretext of avoiding bad weather, in a clear message by the United States to China that it would defend Taiwan if it was attacked.27 Thus, Lee Teng-hui, in an interview with Newsweek in May 1996, expressed his gratitude with the words

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‘thank you very much for defending Taiwan at a very crucial time’, declaring as well that ‘we must defend ourselves’ against China.28 China’s aggressive moves angered the Taiwanese electorate so much that Lee won the presidential elections in 1996 comfortably. The United States also demonstrated that it would come to Taiwan’s defence if required. This emboldened pro-independence forces on Taiwan. Thus, in July 1999, Lee called for bilateral ties between Taiwan and China to be on a ‘special state-to-state’ basis. This prompted much vitriol from China’s state-owned press, which described Lee as ‘the Number One scum in the nation’, and a ‘deformed test-tube baby cultivated in the political laboratory of hostile anti-China forces’.29 However, the Taiwan Strait crisis also demonstrated that China was prepared to risk open conflict to assert its position over Taiwan. Recovering Taiwan is such an important and popular nationalist cause in China that the CCP dare not appear weak over it as this would affect its political legitimacy, particularly as the CCP itself has been strongly promoting nationalism as a legitimizing tool. As Susan Shirk observed, ‘it may be impossible to prevent China from using force (over Taiwan) if Party leaders believe that it is necessary to preserve their power’.30 This also means that Taiwan is a ready-made nationalist cause to rally the population behind the party should there be any domestic crisis affecting the CCP’s legitimacy. Thus, the end of the Cold War brought little comfort to the US–China relationship, as the Tiananmen massacre of pro-democracy activists in 1989 deeply affected US–China relations. US–China relations became ridden with tensions, and dominated by Taiwan and issues relating to human rights, non-proliferation and trade.31 In particular, the tensions over Taiwan, epitomized by the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995–96, served to highlight the differences between the two powers and raised the possibility that both could find themselves engaged in armed conflict. It was with this backdrop of deteriorating relations and tensions in 1990s that the China threat discourse began to take hold in the United States. By 2000, the United States had become so concerned with China’s rise that it began an annual report on the military power of China.32 Nonetheless, President Clinton was still able to persuade Congress to support China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) and provide China with permanent Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status, which duly took place in 2001 after he left office. Reflecting a view held by many moderates in the United States, Clinton had argued that it was far from inevitable that China would become a major military threat, and that the United States should therefore seek to engage it in order to support reform in China, instead of attempting to confront or contain it. Supporting China’s entry into the WTO would, Clinton insisted, be ‘profoundly in our national

Taiwan in US–China relations 291 interest … it is not a favor to China … it is the best way to level the playing field’.33

THE CHEN SHUI-BIAN ERA IN TAIWAN The ascendency of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) Chen Shui-bian to the presidency in Taiwan in 2000 sent shock waves through China, as he represented the growing pro-independence aspirations of many Taiwanese. This alarmed China, which made preparations to attack Taiwan should it declare independence, a move that would have broad popular support within China. Not surprisingly, relations between Taiwan and China during the Chen era were marked by tensions.34 As China’s defence white paper in 2000 declared: The Taiwan Straits situation is complicated and grim. Lee Teng-hui flagrantly dished out his ‘two states’ theory in an attempt to split the country. The new leaders of the Taiwan authorities have adopted an evasive and obscure attitude to the one-China principle. Separatist forces in Taiwan are scheming to split the island province from China, in one form or another. This has seriously undermined the preconditions and foundation for peaceful reunification across the Straits. This is the root cause of tension across the Taiwan Straits.35

In 2002, China’s defence white paper declared that: […] the Taiwan separatist force is the biggest threat to peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits … by continuing to sell weapons and military equipment to Taiwan and elevating relations with the Taiwan authorities, a handful of countries have interfered in China’s internal affairs, inflated the arrogance of the separatist forces and undermined China’s peaceful reunification.36

Thus, a key objective of China’s armed forces was ‘to stop separation and realize complete reunification of the motherland’.37 This represented a clear statement on the overriding importance of the Taiwan issue to China, over which China will be prepared to use force. It also indicated, without naming the United States, that in the Chinese perspective, it was the United States that was preventing reunification. Given the gravity of the situation on Taiwan, Hu Jintao, who succeeded Jiang Zemin in 2002 as President of China, took direct personal leadership over Taiwan affairs in 2003. Hu was responsible for the Anti-Secession Law in March 2005, which was designed to dissuade Taiwan from declaring independence, an act that would have forced China to invade Taiwan immediately.38 Failure to oppose Taiwanese independence would have put the CCP’s legitimacy in jeopardy, not to

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mention the possible secession of other parts of China that did not want to remain within the PRC, such as Tibet and Xinjiang. The AntiSecession Law was thus clearly directed at Taiwan. It specified three broad circumstances in Article 8 under which China would use military force: first, ‘in the event that the “Taiwan independence” secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China’; second, ‘major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China’; and third, when ‘possibilities for a peaceful reunification’ are ‘completely exhausted’. Should any of these circumstances occur, China would ‘employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity’.39 In addition, Article 3 declared that as the Taiwan question is one that is left over from China’s civil war of the late 1940s, ‘solving the Taiwan question and achieving national reunification is China’s internal affair, which is subject to no interference by any outside forces’. Thus, the United States is seen as an illegitimate party to what is essentially a domestic, internal dispute that has its origins in the Chinese civil war. Yet, the passing of the Anti-Secession Law could also be seen as positive, as it clearly specified the red lines that the pro-independence movement on Taiwan was not to cross if open conflict was to be avoided. Domestically, it also imposed at least some conditions under which China would use force, thus making it harder for nationalistic elements to resort to military means as a preferred instrument to resolve the Taiwan problem. As Suisheng Zhao noted, the Anti-Secession Law did not change China’s policy position nor did it contain an ultimatum for reunification to take place. According to Zhao: […] one needs to pay equal attention to the emphasis on the peaceful means as the most preferable approach to reach the long-standing objective of national unification, to be achieved through phased consultations, conducted on an equal footing as long as there is a glimmer of hope of success in reunification.40

Indeed, Article 5 pledged that China would do its best to achieve peaceful reunification, so long as the ‘One China’ principle is upheld, and also further pledged that ‘after the country is reunified peacefully, Taiwan may practice systems different from those on the Mainland and enjoy a high degree of autonomy’.41 Seen in this light, the Anti-Secession Law is therefore not in fact very threatening as it attempts to set the boundaries as well as sketches, albeit in brief, the key principles upon which China would approach the Taiwan problem.

Taiwan in US–China relations 293 Thus, when George W. Bush became president of the United States in 2000, he was faced with tensions over the Taiwan Strait, as Chen Shui-bian had also come to power in Taiwan. Moreover, during the presidential election campaign, Bush had played the China card, playing up the China threat in an effort to shift the US–China relationship away from the strategic partnership that Bill Clinton had previously advocated.42 In addition, relations at the onset were tense, as Bush was soon confronted by the EP-3 incident in April 2001, in which a US surveillance aircraft was intercepted by China’s Air Force and forced to land on Hainan in China.43 In late April 2001, Bush approved major arms sales to Taiwan, which included four refurbished Kidd-class destroyers and 12 P3C Orion anti-submarine warfare aircraft, as well as raised the possibility of the sale of diesel submarines.44 Bush also shocked China by stating during a television interview that the United States would defend Taiwan if it was attacked by China, although US officials later stressed that the United States was not in fact changing its policy over Taiwan, which remained governed by the Taiwan Relations Act.45 The terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 led to changes in the US–China relationship. With the United States now preoccupied with the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the Bush administration welcomed China’s help in Afghanistan, and more generally in its global fight against Al-Qaeda, although China did not support the US invasion and occupation of Iraq.46 The United States also became concerned that Chen Shui-bian, in his push for independence for Taiwan, could drag the United States into a regional war with China at a time when it was involved in major military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Bush administration thus made efforts to maintain the status quo on the Taiwan Strait. In a joint press conference in November 2004 with China’s President Hu Jintao, President Bush openly criticized Chen and affirmed the opposition of the United States to any move by Taiwan to become independent. Without US support, Taiwan’s independence movement began to lose momentum. 47 This was seen in the controversial national referendum on Taiwan’s application for UN membership in 2008 that Chen had strongly pushed for. This move, which coincided with the Beijing Olympics, inflamed passions on the Mainland, prompting an outpouring of mass media attacks on Taiwan, and open speculation of possible war scenarios.48 In any event, the referendum proved invalid due to the low turnout.49

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MA YING-JEOU, OBAMA AND TAIWAN Obama’s election as US president in 2008 coincided with the defeat of the DPP in Taiwan and the return to power of the KMT under Ma Ying-jeou. While relations between the United States and Taiwan deteriorated during the second Bush administration due to the DPP’s push for independence, Obama’s election in fact led to an initial improvement in the relationship. Obama’s initial overriding concern was maintaining good relations with China through a policy of engagement. Indeed, during his trip to China in November 2009, Obama accepted that Taiwan is an important issue in US–China relations and acknowledged that it is a ‘core issue’ for China.50 Reflecting a view amongst some in the United States that have advocated a policy of engagement rather than containment against China, retired Admiral Bill Owens, the Vice-Chief of Staff of the US military during the Clinton administration in the 1990s, wrote an op-ed in the Financial Times to coincide with Obama’s China trip, in which he described the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) as an outdated piece of legislation. He called for its ‘thoughtful review’ as it ‘would be viewed by China as a genuine attempt to set a new course for a relationship that can develop into openness, trust and even friendship’. Owens justified this betrayal of Taiwan on grounds of the broader strategic interest of cooperating with a rising China.51 Similarly, in 2011, a roundtable discussion on Asia-Pacific policy by US analysts, chaired by a former commander of the US Pacific Command, acknowledged that the US involvement with Taiwan has been ‘a frequent point of contention with the Chinese … and one that should be re-examined’.52 The roundtable report also asserted that ‘US arms sales to Taiwan are part of a vicious circle’, and further argued that ‘a peaceful resolution of the long-standing Taiwan issue, acceptable on both sides of the strait would indeed be a boon to stability in East Asia, as well as to US/China relations’.53 This perspective on arms sales came after the sale by the United States in 2010 of mine-hunting ships, helicopters, missiles, machine guns and ammunition, night vision gear, radar equipment and information technology to Taiwan in a deal worth around US$6 billion, one that sparked deep anger on the part of China.54 The drift away from Taiwan at the onset of the Obama administration could also be explained by developments in domestic Taiwan politics. Following its electoral victory, the KMT government under Ma Ying-jeou followed a policy of engagement and conciliation with China, in order to clearly differentiate his administration from the confrontational stance

Taiwan in US–China relations 295 pursued by the previous Chen Shui-bian administration that had led to tensions with China. Ma stressed the preservation of the status quo and took steps to improve relations with China, particularly through economic cooperation. In 2010, China and Taiwan agreed on an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), which cut tariffs on 539 Taiwanese exports to China and 267 Chinese products entering Taiwan.55 The free trade agreement, which clearly benefitted Taiwan rather than China, can be seen as part of China’s charm offensive to woo the pragmatic people of Taiwan, which might in time come to accept the benefits of being part of a rising and prosperous China. Indeed by 2010, bilateral trade was worth around US$100 billion a year, and 40 per cent of Taiwan’s exports went to China. Taiwanese businesses had also invested some US$200 billion in China, given its vast market and cheap labour.56 Ma also took other steps to reduce tensions with China, such as pursuing generally low defence budgets and reducing Taiwan’s military manpower levels by taking steps to eventually phase out universal male conscription.57 However, Ma’s policies also reflected a belief by many Taiwanese that growing economic interdependence would reduce the likelihood of conflict and help preserve peace and stability on the Taiwan Strait.58 China’s continued economic rise amidst the global financial crisis in 2008, and its subsequent assertive moves in the South and East China Seas, however, led to a change in US perceptions regarding China. In March 2009, Chinese ships harassed a US Navy surveillance vessel, the Impeccable, in the South China Sea, the entirety of which China claims. While China accused the US vessel of trespassing in Chinese waters, the United States asserted that those were international waters.59 China has since undertaken a number of measures to assert its control over both the South and East China Seas. For instance, in 2012, China was involved in a naval stand-off with the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal, which lies within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Philippines.60 In January 2013, Chinese warships allegedly locked their fire-control radars onto a Japanese destroyer.61 In late 2013, China declared an ‘Air Defense Identification Zone’ (ADIZ) around the Senkaku Islands. This resulted in the United States deliberately challenging this by flying two B-52 bombers over the islands.62 Indeed, by 2013, tensions between China and Japan reached their highest levels since the end of World War II, heightening the risk of miscalculation and accidental war, one that would have invariably involved the United States on account of its Mutual Defense Treaty with Japan.63 By 2011, the Obama administration had begun to take a harder line towards China. In November 2011, President Obama announced in his

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seminal ‘Asia pivot’ speech in Australia that ‘the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with allies and friends’, and that it would ‘allocate the resources necessary to maintain our strong military presence in this region’, in order to ‘preserve our unique ability to project power and deter threats to peace’.64 This has been followed by a number of moves by the United States that suggest that the Asia Pivot (subsequently rebranded as ‘rebalancing’) is in fact a strategy designed to contain China. Indeed, an initial agreement between the United States and Australia to station, on a rotational basis, 2500 US Marines in Australia’s Northern Territory was followed by a Force Posture Agreement in 2014 that would expand the military presence of the United States. The United States also stationed its latest Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) in Singapore, and concluded a military access agreement with the Philippines.65 Indeed, in 2012, China became a major domestic political issue in the United States in the context of a US presidential election year, which merely served to solidify the hardening stance against China’s rise.66 The intensifying US–China tensions have benefitted Taiwan. In 2014, 52 US senators from both the Democrat and Republican Parties jointly wrote to President Obama to reaffirm the importance of the Taiwan Relations Act and called for an expanded dialogue with Taiwan. Calling Taiwan one of the United States’ strongest allies in Asia, the joint statement also asserted that ‘helping Taiwan make further meaningful contributions in the region is in the interest of the United States’.67 Indeed, there have been calls for Taiwan to be included in the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).68 In April 2014, US Congress authorized the sale of four refurbished Oliver Hazard Perry-class guided missile frigates to Taiwan. Significantly, the bill authorizing the sale also stated that the United States ‘reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act’. The Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee also remarked that ‘America’s support for Taiwan has allowed this island nation to realize its full potential’, and that ‘it is now more important than ever that we reaffirm our strong commitment to Taiwan and the Taiwan Relations Act’.69 This reflected growing appreciation in the United States of Taiwan’s achievements, such as its economic development, liberal democracy and civil society. As Bergsten et al. observed, ‘Taiwan’s evolution from a one-party authoritarian state to a multiparty democracy and open society over the past 20 years has also added a critical new component to US interest in the security and viability of Taiwan’, particularly in view of its status as an old friend.70

Taiwan in US–China relations 297 More importantly, the United States ‘continues to assess that remaining true to its long-standing commitment to the people on Taiwan is critical for the continued credibility of US strategic commitments throughout East Asia’.71 Should China challenge the status quo by forcibly reunifying Taiwan with the Mainland, the US position in Asia would be severely jeopardized. Indeed, as prominent US scholar Aaron Friedberg asserted in 2011, ‘if through inadvertence, error or deliberate decision we permit China as presently constituted to dominate Asia, our prosperity, security and hopes of promoting the further spread of freedom will be seriously impaired’. Worse, according to Friedberg, if China did succeed in dominating Asia, it would be freed from having to defend its maritime periphery and would thus be able to extend its interests in the rest of the world, thereby challenging the global position of the United States.72 Given the context of growing US–China strategic rivalry and tensions, the United States’ Asia pivot (or rebalancing) means that Taiwan has now assumed greater strategic significance as part of the frontline surrounding China’s coast, along with Japan and South Korea.73 As a recent National Interest commentary opined, ‘abandoning Taiwan might considerably enhance China’s military and geostrategic position in Asia, and severely weaken that of the United States and its allies’.74 A US analyst also warned that ‘if we allowed China to take direct control of Taiwan … it would signal once and for all the end of this American-dominated era and the start of another’.75 US allies in Asia have also expressed alarm at the prospect of Taiwan under China’s control, which would enable it to project its naval power beyond its shores to the Pacific. As a top Japanese maritime expert argued, ‘losing Taiwan (to China) … would be a game-changer for Japan and the regional naval balance’.76

CONCLUSION Taiwan has been a key issue in US–China relations since the end of World War II and, as the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995–96 demonstrated, it could yet lead to open conflict between the two great powers. Taiwan has been the benefactor of fortuitous strategic developments in Asia that has led the United States to continue to protect it from China, which has remained determined to reunify the island with the Mainland. While the United States initially decided that it would not stand in the way of reunification, the Cold War and, in particular, the outbreak of the Korean War, led to the United States intervening in the Chinese civil war to help preserve the ROC in Taiwan. This was formalized through the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954 with the ROC. While Taiwan was

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sacrificed in the face of broader strategic interests when the United States and China normalized relations in 1979 following the Sino–Soviet split, China was preoccupied with the Soviet threat and with economic modernization. After the end of the Cold War and the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, relations between the United States and China deteriorated, and the United States found itself intervening in the Taiwan Strait in 1995–96 in order to deter China, which threatened to use force to stop the apparent move towards independence of Taiwan. While there were calls to abandon Taiwan at the onset of the Obama administration that came to power in early 2009, China’s aggressiveness in the East and South China Seas, coupled with the intensifying strategic rivalry between a rising China and the United States, has led to Obama’s Asia pivot (or rebalancing) policy in 2011, a thinly disguised containment strategy against China. This has resulted in Taiwan assuming greater strategic importance, and an apparent renewed US commitment to the strategic ambiguity that has helped deter China from using force to challenge the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. What are Taiwan’s prospects? It is clear that independence is not an option for Taiwan, a fact accepted by the United States and the rest of the international community. The fact that reunification is such an emotive nationalist priority for China precludes such an option. The question then is whether Taiwan would voluntarily return to the Mainland. This is not likely to happen in the near future. Indeed, a 2012 television poll revealed that only 9 per cent wanted reunification, with 61 per cent preferring the status quo.77 On its part, China has opted to use economic tools, such as the generous provisions of the free trade agreement with Taiwan in 2010, to win the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people. The question then is how long China would be prepared to be patient, as the danger is that the longer the question of reunification is postponed, the less likely it might take place given the ongoing development of a separate Taiwanese identity. Moreover, the use of military force by China is an increasingly viable option, given the military imbalance on the Taiwan Strait as a result of Taiwan’s international isolation and failure to procure modern weapons systems from abroad. However, given the intensifying strategic rivalry between the United States and China, it is also increasingly unlikely that the United States would fail to intervene should China use force, given the broader strategic consequences of failing to maintain its position in Asia. Already the United States has drawn up AirSea Battle, which involves broad and deep attacks on China’s surveillance, intelligence and command systems as a way to countering China’s anti-access strategy, which in turn is designed to keep US forces away from East Asia in order to give China’s

Taiwan in US–China relations 299 armed forces freedom of action.78 Given the context of China’s rise and challenge to the US position in Asia, the US has thus continued the policy of strategic ambiguity embodied in the Taiwan Relations Act. This has proven in the past to have deterred China and incentivized it to use peaceful means in the pursuit of reunification, thus helping to maintain peace and the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. However, Taiwan can only maintain the status quo if it has the means to prevent any direct attack that would swiftly overwhelm its defences and present the United States with a fait accompli. There is also the danger that once the United States and China achieved an entente cordiale sometime in the future, Taiwan would once again be sacrificed by the United States. The fact remains that Taiwan is ultimately expendable. For the time being, however, it remains the key issue in US–China relations and the challenge is maintaining the status quo and thus peace.

NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

Steinberg, J. and M.E. O’Hanlon (2014), Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: U.S.–China Relations in the Twenty-First Century, Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, p. 1. People’s Daily (2005), ‘Full text of Anti-Secession Law’, 14 March, accessed 12 August 2014 at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200503/14/eng20050314_176746. html. Sydney Morning Herald (2011), ‘Text of Obama’s speech to Parliament’, 17 November 2014, accessed 12 August 2014 at http://www.smh.com.au/national/textof-obamas-speech-to-parliament-20111117-1nkcw.html. Larus, E.F. (2012), Politics and Society in Contemporary China, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, p. 44. Ibid., pp. 44–5. As cited in Pike, F. (2010), Empires At War: A Short History of Modern Asia Since World War II, London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 77–8. Bernkopf Tucker, N. (2009), Strait Talk: United States–Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 13. ‘President Harry S. Truman’s address before a Joint Session of Congress’, 12 March 1947, accessed 12 August 2014 at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp. Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk, p. 13. Kissinger, H. (2011), On China, London: Allen Lane, p. 154. ‘Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China’, 2 December 1954, accessed 12 August 2014 at http://www.taiwan documents.org/mutual01.htm. Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk, p. 15. Kissinger, On China, p. 155. Ibid., pp. 174–5. Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk, p. 26. The account of this historic development is well-documented in Kissinger, On China. ‘Joint statement following discussions with leaders of the People’s Republic of China’, Shanghai, 26 February 1972 (the Shanghai Communiqué), Office of the

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23.

24.

25.

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33.

34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

Handbook of US–China relations Historian, US Department of State, accessed 13 August 2014 at http:// history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d203. People’s Daily (n.d.), ‘Major events in Sino–US ties’, accessed 13 August 2014 at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/features/bush/ties.htm. Taiwan Relations Act, 1 January 1979, accessed 13 August 2014 at http:// www.ait.org.tw/en/taiwan-relations-act.html. Ibid. ‘Joint U.S.–China Communiqué’, 17 August 1982, accessed 13 August 2014 at http://www.choices.edu/resources/documents/ch_3.pdf. Huang, A.C.-C. (2010), ‘The United States and Taiwan’s defense transformation’, Taiwan-U.S. Quarterly Analysis, No. 2, February, accessed 13 August 2014 at http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2010/02/taiwan-defense-huang. ‘A summary of Teng-hui Lee’s life and how he democratized Taiwan’ (n.d.), Reitaku University, Japan, accessed 14 August 2014 at http://www.hs.reitaku.jp/english/ic/ rpaper/2004/lee/body.htm. ‘Bush announces sale of F-16 aircraft to Taiwan, 1992’, portion of President Bush’s speech at the General Dynamics Factory in Fort Worth, Texas, 2 September 1992, accessed 28 March 2016 at http://china.usc.edu/bush-announces-sale-f-16-aircrafttaiwan-1992. Lee T.-H. (1995), ‘Always in my heart’, The Spencer T. and Ann W. Olin Lecture delivered at the Cornell University Alumni Reunion, 9 June, accessed 14 August 2014 at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/programs/taiwan/timeline/sums/timeline_docs/ CSI_19950609.htm. Shirk, S.L. (2007), China: Fragile Superpower, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 189. Kissinger, On China, p. 477. Parker, M. (1996), ‘We must defend ourselves’, Newsweek, 127 (21), 20 May. CNN (1999), ‘Why Beijing fears Taiwan’s Lee Teng-hui’, accessed 14 August 2014 at http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1999/china.50/inside.china/profiles/lee.tenghui/. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, p. 186. Suettinger, R.L. (2003), Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of US–China Relations, 1989–2000, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, pp. 413–15. Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, June 2000, accessed 28 March 2016 at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/asia_neac_dod_ china[1].pdf. The New York Times (1999), ‘Clinton gives strong push to admitting China to WTO’, 6 April, accessed 15 August 2014 at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/08/news/08ihtclint.2.t_1.html. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, pp. 201–4. White Paper on China’s National Defense in 2000, accessed 15 August 2014 at http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/2000/. White Paper on China’s National Defense in 2002, accessed 28 March 2016 at http://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/natdef2002.html. Ibid. Ji, Y. (2006), ‘China’s Anti-Secession Law and the risk of war in the Taiwan Strait’, Contemporary Security Policy, 27 (2), August, 237. People’s Daily (2005), ‘Full text of Anti-Secession Law’. Zhao, S. (2008), ‘Strategic dilemma of Beijing’s Taiwan policy: Chinese nationalism and the making of the Anti-Secession Law’, in P. Chow (ed.), The One China Dilemma, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 209. People’s Daily, ‘Full text of Anti-Secession Law’.

Taiwan in US–China relations 301 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52.

53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61.

The Washington Post (2000), ‘Text: GOP debate in South Carolina’, 15 February, accessed 24 July 2014 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/campaigns/ wh2000/stories/text021500.htm. BBC News (2001), ‘China holds US spy plane crew’, 2 April, accessed 24 July 2014 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1255343.stm. Boese, W. (2001), ‘Bush approves major arms deal to Taiwan, defers Aegis sale’, Arms Control Association, 21 May 2001, accessed 17 August 2014 at https:// www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_05/taiwan. Sanger, D.E. (2001), ‘US would defend Taiwan, Bush says’, New York Times, 26 April, accessed 15 August 2014 at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/26/world/uswould-defend-taiwan-bush-says.html. Rabin, A. (2012), ‘US–China relations in the Bush era – strategic partners or competitors?’ InPEC, 1 February, accessed 15 August 2014 at http://inpec.in/2012/ 02/01/us-china-relations-in-george-w-bush-era-hu-jintao/. Ross, R.S. (2006), ‘Taiwan’s fading independence movement’, Foreign Affairs, 85 (2), 144, accessed 28 March 2016 at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/ 2006-03-01/taiwans-fading-independence-movement. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, p. 204. Lu, M. (2008), ‘Presidential election 2008: referendums fail to meet thresholds’, Taipei Times, 23 March, accessed 15 August 2014 at http://www.taipeitimes.com/ News/taiwan/archives/2008/03/23/2003406756. ‘U.S.–China Joint Statement’, The White House, 17 November 2009, accessed 17 August 2014 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-china-joint-statement. Owens, B. (2009), ‘America must start treating China as a friend’, Financial Times, 17 November, accessed 17 August 2014 at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/69241506d3b2-11de-8caf-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Ad8BFJ3L. Miller Center of Public Affairs (2011), A Way Ahead With China: Steering the Right Course With the Middle Kingdom: Recommendations from the Miller Center of Public Affairs Roundtable, Virginia University, p. 10, accessed 17 August 2014 at http://web1.millercenter.org/conferences/chinaroundtable-report.pdf. Ibid., p. 24. Nasaw, D. and D. Batty (2010), ‘China retaliates over US arms sales to Taiwan’, The Guardian, 30 January, accessed 19 August 2014 at http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2010/jan/30/china-sanctions-taiwan-arms-sales. BBC News (2010), ‘Historic Taiwan–China trade deal takes effect’, 12 September, accessed 17 August 2014 at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11275274. BBC News (2010), ‘China–Taiwan trade pact sparks street protest in Taipei’, 26 June, accessed 17 August 2014 at http://www.bbc.com/news/10423409. Financial Times (2012), ‘Taiwan prepares for end of conscription’, 21 November, accessed 17 August 2014 at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/489ed4c4-1eaa-11e2bebc-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2MvA4XHSE. Lynch, D. (2010), ‘Searching for Taiwan’s plan B’, The Diplomat, 23 February, accessed 17 August 2014 at http://thediplomat.com/2011/02/23/searching-fortaiwan%E2%80%99s-plan-b/. McDonald, M. (2009), ‘US Navy provoked South China Sea incident, China says’, The New York Times, 10 March, accessed 26 July 2014 at http://www.nytimes.com/ 2009/03/10/world/asia/10iht-navy.4.20740316.html?_r=0. Thayer, C.A. (2012), ‘Standoff in the South China Sea’, YaleGlobal, 12 June, accessed 26 July 2014 at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/standoff-south-china-sea. South China Morning Post (2013), ‘China military officials admit radar lock on Japanese ship, says report’, 29 August, accessed 30 July 2014 at http://www.scmp. com/news/china/article/1193600/china-military-officials-admit-radar-lock-japaneseship-says-report.

302 62. 63. 64. 65.

66. 67.

68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76.

77. 78.

Handbook of US–China relations BBC News (2013), ‘US B-52 bombers challenge disputed China air zone’, 26 November, accessed 30 July 2014 at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia25110011. Hughes, C. (2013), ‘Viewpoints: how serious are China–Japan tensions?’ BBC News, 8 February, accessed 30 July 2014 at www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21290349. Sydney Morning Herald (2011), ‘Text of Obama’s speech to Parliament’, 17 November, accessed 17 August 2014 at http://www.smh.com.au/national/text-ofobamas-speech-to-parliament-20111117-1nkcw.html. News.com.au (2014), ‘New agreement for thousands of US troops to train in Australia’, 12 August, accessed 17 August 2014 at http://www.news.com.au/national/ new-agreement-for-thousands-of-us-troops-to-train-in-australia/story-fncynjr2-12270 21016884. Landler, M. (2012), ‘Obama’s journey to tougher tack on a rising China’, The New York Times, 21 September, A1. United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (2014), ‘Fifty-two senators commemorate the 35th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act in letter to President Obama’, 9 April, accessed 19 August 2014 at http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ chair/release/fifty-two-senators-commemorate-the-35th-anniversary-of-the-taiwanrelations-act-in-letter-to-president-obama. Benard, A. and P.J. Leaf (2014), ‘The US, TPP and Taiwan’, The National Interest, 24 April 2014, accessed 19 August 2014 at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-ustpp-taiwan-10300. Tiezzi, S. (2014), ‘House approves frigate sale to Taiwan’, The Diplomat, 20 April, accessed 19 August 2014 at http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/us-house-approvesfrigate-sale-to-taiwan/. Bergsten, C.F., C. Freeman, N.R. Lardy and D.J. Mitchell (2009), China’s Rise: Challenges and Opportunities, Washington, DC: Peterson Institute, pp. 176–7. Ibid., p. 177. Friedberg, A. (2011), A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, New York: W.W. Norton, pp. 7–8. Pizzi, M. (2014), ‘What’s next for China–Taiwan relations?’, Aljazeera.com, 15 February, accessed 19 August 2014 at http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/2/ 15/what-s-next-for-chinataiwanrelations.html. Rehman, I. (2014), ‘Why Taiwan matters: a small island of great strategic importance’, The National Interest, 28 February, accessed 19 August 2014 at http:// nationalinterest.org/commentary/why-taiwan-matters-9971. Linker, D. (2014), ‘What would America do if China invaded Taiwan?’ The Week, 21 March, accessed 19 August 2014 at http://theweek.com/article/index/258467/whatwould-america-do-if-china-invaded-taiwan. Serchuk, V. (2013), ‘Obama’s silence on Taiwan masks its significance in US relations with China’, The Washington Post, 23 May, accessed 19 August 2014 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obamas-silence-on-taiwan-masks-itssignificance-in-us-relations-with-china/2013/05/23/a1b40470-c243-11e2-914f-a7aba 60512a7_story.html. Minnick, W. (2012), ‘China tries to expand control as Taiwan resists: report’, Pacific Sentinel, 29 August, accessed 19 August 2014 at http://pacificsentinel.blogspot.co.uk/ 2012/08/news-story-china-tries-to-expand.html. Von Tol, J. et al. (2010), AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, p. 95.

16. The United States and China’s maritime territorial disputes Chien-peng Chung

INTRODUCTION: THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA IN THE DIAOYU/SENKAKU AND SOUTH CHINA SEA ISLAND DISPUTES Not long ago, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was the darling of its Asian neighbors, with its growing economic linkages with them and a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states that contrasted with bellicose and interventionist US foreign policy after 11 September 2001. However, a series of saber-rattling incidents over territorial disputes involving Beijing have encouraged many Asian nations to reassess their choices, between an increasingly assertive China and a more distant and relatively benign United States. In the words of Captain James Fanell, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and Information Operations at the US Pacific Fleet, while the United States had trouble getting port calls for its ships in East Asia or landing permission for its aircrafts in 2007, by 2013, more nations there wanted US ship visits than could be accommodated by the US naval budget.1 What accounted for this change in attitudes? Although China has resolved many disputed parts of its immense land border, important maritime sections remain unsettled. China and Japan claim sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. China and Vietnam both claim sovereignty over the Paracel Islands, and China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia all claim sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. The Paracel and Spratly Island groups lie in the South China Sea, as does Scarborough Shoal, disputed between China and the Philippines. Huge deposits of oil and natural gas are believed to lie beneath the seabed and the area contains some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, through which the bulk of China’s oil imports and raw materials pass. Whether fair or otherwise, being the largest country making the most extensive claims amongst the disputants to the islands and waters of the East and South China Seas has made China the most obvious target of the other claimants, which are, to a certain extent, 303

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supported by the United States. Two of China’s disputes are with countries to which the United States has defense treaty commitments: Japan and the Philippines. The Standing Committee of the PRC’s National People’s Congress adopted a ‘Law on the Territorial Waters and Their Contiguous Areas’ on 25 February 1992. This law does not specify China’s exact maritime territorial claim, but it does assert the country’s sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku, Paracel and Spratly Islands. China uses the principle of natural prolongation of its land territory, arguing that the East China Sea continental shelf that covers the Diaoyu outcrops is the natural extension of the Chinese continental shelf and thus is under the jurisdiction of China. For the Paracel and Spratly Islands claims, PRC authorities adhere to a map that shows a broken U-shaped line enclosing most of the South China Sea that they inherited from the previous Republic of China regime. China also uses the arguments of discovery and historical rights to bolster its sovereignty claims to the territories that it disputes in the East and South China Seas. As China has rapidly expanded and modernized its Navy in recent years, Beijing has become more assertive and tensions have grown in the region, particularly between China and Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines, the points of contention being more often than not the islands under dispute. The reasons behind China’s push cannot be known for sure due to its closed political system. Some in China may have believed that the global financial crisis that started in 2008 signaled the decline of the United States and that the time was ripe to become more assertive. It could well be the need to find resources to fuel economic growth. There again, Beijing may be flexing its military might amidst the ‘pivot to Asia’ by US President Barak Obama that Beijing sees as a direct threat to its rising power and influence in its own neighborhood. Uncertain of Chinese intentions, the reinvigoration or return of US influence is thus something to which the elites of Japan and Southeast Asian states, keen to balance and hedge against China’s increasing domination of the region, are quite receptive. The United States has never tendered any sovereignty claims over these islands, and indeed does not have any grounds to forward such claims. As such, these island disputes between China and other claimant countries are not for the United States to solve. What the United States can do is to stop the disputants from provoking incidents or going to war over these issues, through mediation or intercession, or both. However, it can only bring its stabilizing influence to bear if it demonstrates strength and resolve, and tries its best to refrain from giving the impression of

The United States and China’s maritime territorial disputes 305 being partial to the cause of any side, which is something that would put its diplomacy in the region to rigorous test.

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE DIAOYU/SENKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE A key question of US involvement in the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute will be whether the United States is considered an honest broker in the squabble. While Japan bases its claim on discovery, China embraces the argument that Japan illegally seized the islands following China’s defeat in the 1895 Sino–Japanese War. China holds the United States partly responsible for the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, because it held the islands in trust for Japan rather than return them to China at the end of World War II. China has never accepted that the US–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security includes the Diaoyu Islands, because Beijing does not recognize Japanese control over them. The US position is exactly the opposite, and in so far as the United States is involved, this is the crux of the dispute between it and China. A number of official documents showed that the US government defined Senkaku as part of the Ryukyu (Okinawa) Archipelago, which was administered by the United States after 1945 and returned to Japan pursuant to the 1971 Okinawa Reversion Treaty. Meanwhile, the United States used Senkaku for bombing practice.2 Upon the signing of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, several US officials endorsed the view that Senkaku is part of the Okinawa chain by stating that ‘Nansei Shoto south of 29 degrees north latitude’ to be administered by the United States was ‘understood by the United States and Japan to include the Senkaku Islands’.3 However, the conference that produced the San Francisco Peace Treaty that determined Japan’s war responsibility and territorial boundaries was without due representation from China. Then US Acting Assistant Legal Advisor for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Robert Starr also testified before the US Congress that the Okinawa Reversion Treaty contained ‘the terms and conditions for the reversion of the Ryukyu islands, including the Senkakus’.4 The Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute was contested verbally, until Japan declared a 200-nautical mile (NM) Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in February 1996, permitted by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which would place the disputed isles and considerable fisheries and hydrocarbon resources in and under the East China Sea within the claimed EEZ of Japan as measured from the Okinawa Islands. To assert physical claim over the Senkaku for Japan, a Japanese

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right-wing group landed on one of the islands to erect a lighthouse, which resulted in the drowning of a Hong Kong activist as he tried to swim ashore from his boat to protest the action of the Japanese. This led to huge demonstrations in Chinatowns all over the world, and the Chinese government felt compelled to denounce Japan’s territorial and EEZ claims in the East China Sea. During the 1996 quarrel between Japan and China over Senkaku/Diaoyu, Washington reiterated that the United States maintained that claimants should resolve the dispute ‘in a peaceful manner’ and ‘through direct negotiations’ and that it had no intention of serving as a mediator.5 Obama’s administration has said it will not take sides in Tokyo’s territorial disputes, but will honor US security commitments to Japan, for according to his first US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, ‘the islands are part of our mutual treaty obligations’.6 Following Japan’s detention of a Chinese vessel and its crew and captain in disputed waters in September 2010, Washington implored both nations to solve the dispute peacefully.7 At the summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Hanoi, Vietnam in October 2010, Clinton said the United States was willing to serve as mediator in the disagreement, reportedly raising the issue of a trilateral US–China–Japan talk with PRC State Councilor Dai Bingguo and Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi on the sidelines of the summit, and earlier with Japanese Foreign Minister Maehara Seiji.8 Nothing came of Clinton’s efforts, but the fact that she tried to host a talk on the issue demonstrated that the United States believed that, unlike 14 years before, the Chinese military has the wherewithal and confidence to initiate a conflict with Japan over the dispute, and in the process, drag the United States into a war from which it can derive no benefit. As the dispute escalated between China and Japan in light of the move by Japan’s Noda government to ‘nationalize’ the Senkakus in August 2012, then US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta called for calm and urged China to participate in multilateral efforts to resolve its territorial disputes.9 PRC leader Xi Jinping’s response to Panetta’s plea was: America should stay out of the dispute.10 Clearly concerned about Xi’s response, Obama in late October 2012 dispatched a top-level bipartisan mission to Beijing and Tokyo made up of four senior members of the US foreign policy establishment: Stephen Hadley, James Steinberg, Joseph Nye and Richard Armitage, respectively National Security Adviser in President George W. Bush’s second term, Deputy Secretary of State in the Bill Clinton administration, Clinton’s Secretary of Defense, and Deputy Secretary of State during Bush’s first term. Although the main purpose of the trip was for the US delegation to make clear to the

The United States and China’s maritime territorial disputes 307 Chinese leadership that a Chinese attack on the disputed islands would trigger the security obligations that the United States has toward Japan under their mutual alliance, it was also an opportunity for the United States to warn Japanese politicians not to take unnecessary risks, as they might be tempted to confront China before the power gap between the two nations grows too large, and while the United States is still the dominant military force in the Pacific.11 Prior to leaving office in January 2013, Clinton repeated her country’s stance that the Senkakus were administered by Japan, and the Obama administration opposed ‘any unilateral actions that would seek to undermine Japanese administration of the islands’.12 This reference to unilateral actions, generally understood to mean that the United States was unhappy with China’s dispatch of civilian ships and surveillance aircrafts to the disputed vicinity, was harshly condemned by the Chinese Foreign Ministry as ‘ignoring facts and confusing right and wrong’.13 In order not to irritate China further, Obama’s new Secretary of State John Kerry merely reconfirmed that the United States’ security treaty with Japan covers the Senkaku Islands.14 Kerry may also have suspected that Abe Shinzo, who became Japanese Prime Minister in late 2012, intends to restore Japan as a powerful player to be reckoned with in its own neighborhood, even if this means demonstrating a strong stance against China, or for that matter, Japan’s vital ally the United States, on this dispute. While Abe has threatened that Japan will use force if China tries to land troops on the islands, China’s Ministry of Defense said that if Japan were to shoot down unmanned Chinese drones operating close to the Diaoyu Islands, it would be considered an act of war.15 There is at least one aspect of this dispute where the Japanese are ahead of the Chinese: the government of Japan reportedly hired a full-time lobbyist whose job was to explain Japan’s case to members of the US Congress.16 This shows that, in spite of US military support for continued Japanese administration of the Senkakus, Japan is taking no chances. In December 2012, the US Senate passed an amendment to the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act that stated, ‘While the United States takes no position on the ultimate sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands, the United States acknowledges the administration of Japan over the Senkaku Islands. The unilateral actions of a third party will not affect United States acknowledgment of the administration of Japan over the Senkaku Islands’.17 In other words, as the US–Japan Security Treaty states, if territories under Japanese administration were to come under armed attack, the United States will assist Japan militarily. At the US–China summit in June 2013 at Sunnylands, California, US President Obama urged Chinese President Xi to ‘de-escalate’ the dispute and deal with

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Japan through diplomatic channels.18 Xi’s reply was the Pacific Ocean is large enough to accommodate two great powers, hinting that China would not accept a status quo that saw the United States remain the Pacific’s pre-eminent power.19 When events took an ominous turn with China’s declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), which overlaps significantly with Japan’s existing air defense zone above the East China Sea and Diaoyu/ Senkaku, the United States sent two B-52 bombers over Senkaku three days later on 26 November 2013 without notifying the Chinese, and a day later, a US aircraft carrier battle group and several Japanese warships conducted a brief exercise on a stretch of sea disputed by China.20 This USS George Washington carrier strike group includes destroyers, cruisers and a fast-attack submarine, as well as up to 90 aircraft. Although they were on their way to undertake exercises in the Andaman Sea, the message to all – including China – was loud and clear: the United States had signaled its intention to continue serving as a regional ‘stabilizer’.21 Then US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said China’s ADIZ announcement represents a ‘destabilizing attempt to alter the status quo’ and ‘will not in any way change how the US conducts military operations in the region’.22 In all possibility, Xi believed he had to take a strident position in order to keep his anti-corruption campaign in China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from being deflected, which was focusing towards recently retired members of the ruling Chinese Communist Party’s Central Military Commission (CMC). China’s ADIZ announcement came just ahead of a planned visit to China, Japan and South Korea in early December 2013 by US VicePresident Joe Biden. His mission, according to one senior US administration official, was to push for ‘crisis management mechanisms and confidence-building measures to lower tensions and reduce risks of escalation or miscalculation’.23 Washington was concerned that China was taking advantage of the United States’ risk aversion by rocking the boat, and letting the United States take responsibility for ensuring the situation does not get out of control. Some Chinese scholars have expressed hope that the United States might exert pressure on Japan to concede that the status of the islands is disputed.24 Biden reiterated that the United States does not recognize the ADIZ, although privately, US officials have pointed out that declaring an air defense zone is not the same as declaring sovereignty over an area, and Washington has quietly advised commercial aircraft to submit flight plans to Chinese authorities.25 The US vice-president also called on China to open a diplomatic hotline to Japan,26 for real-time communication. Indeed, the risk of an accidental collision or clash between Chinese and Japanese boats or

The United States and China’s maritime territorial disputes 309 airplanes around the islands does make armed conflict a real possibility. On his visit to Tokyo in April 2014, Obama declared that the disputed islands are covered by Article Five of the US–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. This stance is not surprising, but it was the first time a sitting US president has made the commitment explicit, thus reassuring the Japanese government that the United States would indeed come to the islands’ defense in the event of a serious Chinese incursion.27 US quandary over the Diaoyu/Senkaku imbroglio is simply this: standing with Japan to face down China would be tantamount to letting the Japanese government dictate the terms of US–China relations; but allowing China to redraw boundaries would destroy or at least seriously undercut the United States’ standing among its allies and hasten the decline of US influence everywhere. US policy of recognizing Japanese administrative control of Senkaku but taking no formal position on its ultimate sovereignty yet asking both China and Japan to resolve their differences peacefully is sensible. It allows the United States to demonstrate support for an ally, without entangling it in the twists and turns of the history of the claims. Whether or not the US–Japan alliance is seen as part of a larger strategy to contain China, the dominant Chinese view that the United States is behind Japan on this issue actually serves as deterrence against any Chinese actions against the disputed islands.28 Obama’s April 2014 declaration in Tokyo can be interpreted as a move to reinforce this perception. A trickier proposition for the United States would be to avoid giving encouragement to Abe to ratchet up tensions in the region, as he is looking to amend Japan’s constitution to provide it with something more than a defensive military capability, and a clash with China, accidental or intended, would provide just such a justification.29

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ISLANDS DISPUTE With regard to the South China Sea, the US State Department has maintained that it ‘takes no position on the legal merits of the competing claims to sovereignty over the various islands, reefs, atolls and cays’.30 In other words, the United States has always been aware that stretches of the South China Sea and the outcrops around it were under dispute for their ownership. However, during the Cold War, it maintained a disinterested stance on the issue, mainly to preclude attracting the Soviet Union’s presence, but also to avoid drawing attention to the activities of China, which was then on the side of the United States in its standoff against the spread of Soviet communism. As such, although South Vietnam was an

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ally of the United States, Washington did nothing when in January 1974 China’s PLA Navy seized all the islands in the Paracel group controlled by Saigon. Likewise, when a confrontation occurred between the Chinese and Vietnamese over Fiery Cross Reef (Yong Shu Jiao) in 1988, during which the PRC sank three Vietnamese vessels, killing 72 people, the United States made no official comments. Since US military forces were told by the Philippines Congress to remove themselves from Clark Air Force Base and Subic Naval Base in 1992, US strategic commitments to the Philippines and the entire Southeast Asian region have been uncertain, despite reaching a Visiting Forces Agreement with Manila in 1999. As such, while Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam declared their respective 200-NM EEZs over the South China Sea, all Southeast Asian countries have to various degrees tried to play down fears of what China’s military activities in the South China Sea implies for their need to accommodate its burgeoning interests. Although the United States viewed with concern the discovery of Chinese facilities on Mischief Reef, off the Philippine island of Palawan and claimed by Manila, the United States’ primary interest was freedom of navigation – keeping the sea lanes open for international maritime traffic, regarding which the US State Department issued a statement on 10 May 1995.31 Erstwhile Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord declared that the United States would not be an innocent bystander to the use of force by China in the South China Sea.32 According to the terms of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States was obliged to assist the Philippines in the event of an ‘armed attack’. However, the United States never voiced any commitment to aid the Philippines if conflict were to break out in the Kalayaans (as the Spratly outcrops claimed by the Philippines are known collectively), and had even indicated that it did not think the Kalayaans were covered by the 1951 Treaty, because the islands were not officially incorporated into the Philippines until 1978.33 One consequence of the Mischief Reef incident was that disputing states have found themselves in a race to bolster their claims to sovereignty by gaining occupation of the outcrops through establishing physical presence or erecting markers on the outcrops where physical occupation is not feasible. Still, the preference of the United States was for the Philippines and its ASEAN partners to raise the issue of China’s behavior in the South China Sea at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),34 the series of annual meetings established by the ASEAN in 1994 for the foreign ministers of ASEAN states to discuss security matters with their counterparts from the ASEAN’s dialogue partners.

The United States and China’s maritime territorial disputes 311 A near collision on 8 March 2009 resulting from an attempted blocking of the USNS Impeccable by several Chinese vessels in an EEZ claimed by China south of its Hainan Province had raised the hopes of Vietnam’s foreign and defense establishments for keener US attention on the South China Sea, thus inhibiting China’s inclination to press its territorial claims.35 As some US Congressmen and women had publicly favored the Spratly Islands claims of ASEAN states and called for more Pentagon attention to the region, US Senator Jim Webb (Democrat of Virginia) held a Senate hearing on 16 July 2009 to examine China’s attempt to ‘expand its territory’ in the South China Sea.36 However, Vietnamese officials have also expressed fears that Vietnam could be caught between the two powers in the event of a US–China clash, or that Washington might cede informal control of some parts of the South China Sea to Beijing.37 Such a secret understanding is not impossible, should the United States wish to retain China’s goodwill as Washington’s influence in the Asian Pacific loses out to Beijing’s. Yet for the time being, despite the vast chasm of political ideology that separates the US from Vietnam, then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates accepted invitations from the Vietnamese government and paid visits to Hanoi in 2010, for the clear purpose of showing support for Vietnam in its territorial disputes with China. Vietnam’s efforts in lobbying the United States were aided by comments made by Chinese officials to their US counterparts in March 2010 that they saw the South China Sea as part of China’s ‘core interests’, on a par with Taiwan and Tibet, in which foreign interference would not be tolerated.38 Apparently, the Chinese officials making these assertions were PRC Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs Cui Tiankai and State Councilor Dai Bingguo,39 and the remarks were reportedly made to US Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg and National Security Council Advisor Jeffrey Bader during their visit to Beijing.40 This was evidently not taken well by the United States. On 23 July 2010, US Secretary of State Clinton told the ARF meeting at Hanoi that the United States had a national interest in freedom of navigation and would like to see peaceful, multilateral negotiations among disputants to the South China Sea outcrops.41 Clinton voiced her country’s willingness to mediate a solution and added that the United States supported ‘a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving the territorial disputes without coercion’.42 The implication was of course that China was attempting coercion to settle the South China Sea islands disputes in its favor. Two days later, her Chinese counterpart, Yang Jiechi, struck back and warned the United States against inflaming tensions by internationalizing what Beijing insists are bilateral matters with individual claimants.43 While

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China wants to negotiate disputes over the Spratly and Paracel Islands with its neighbors through bilateral talks involving only the disputants, the ASEAN prefers to present a united front, and the United States tends to see these matters ASEAN’s way. Starting from August 2010, US warships began docking in Vietnam for joint military exercises. In July 2011, at separate meetings with her ASEAN counterparts and during the ARF, Clinton reiterated US interests in the South China Sea and called on disputants to back their claims with legal evidence, in ensuring conformity with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).44 However, the United States is ever cautious about not being drawn into a possible fray with China over the issue. A month earlier, Vietnam’s Navy had conducted a live-fire exercise to flex its military muscle, in response to what was believed to have been a Chinese fishing boat supported by two Chinese naval patrol crafts cutting a cable of a seismic survey craft operated by state-run energy company PetroVietnam. A US State Department spokesman told the press that his country did not support the Vietnamese military maneuver, which he said, was not conducive to the reduction of tensions in the region.45 Still, to ward off US pressure to negotiate with its smaller neighbors, China agreed with the ASEAN just before the ARF meeting to new guidelines that could eventually lead to a binding Code of Conduct on the South China Sea. Despite Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s admonition at the November 2011 East Asia Summit in Bali, Indonesia that the forum was not the appropriate venue to discuss the South China Sea disputes, the subject was squarely brought up by Obama. After repeating that the United States was not taking sides, he declared, ‘We have a powerful stake in maritime security in general, and in the resolution of the South China Sea disputes specifically, as a resident Pacific power … and guarantor of security in the Asia Pacific region’.46 Whether Obama had made an effort before the meeting to forge an anti-China alliance with Southeast Asian countries on the dispute is unclear, but in the face of obvious Chinese displeasure, the leaders of Singapore, the Philippines and Vietnam present also addressed the need to discuss the issue multilaterally.47 With US support, the ASEAN had insisted that China’s maritime disputes with its neighbors be placed on the agenda of the 2012 East Asia Summit in Manila, Philippines, but this move was successfully opposed by China.48 During the standoff between the warships and fishing boats of China and the Philippines at Scarborough Shoal in mid-2012, the Obama administration again offered to play the role of regional peacemaker, while at the same time contesting the Chinese presence by sending the US Navy through the area to assert its right to freedom of navigation.49

The United States and China’s maritime territorial disputes 313 The Chinese government then announced that it was administratively combining the Paracels, Spratlys and Macclesfield Bank into a prefectural-level ‘Sansha City’ and garrisoning it, to which the official US response was that so doing ‘runs counter to collaborative diplomatic efforts to resolve differences and risks further escalating tensions in the region’.50 Although the US statement was remarkably muted, Beijing responded angrily, warning that US State Department officials who made the statement had ‘confounded right and wrong, and sent a seriously wrong message’. The People’s Daily accused the United States of ‘fanning the flames and provoking division, deliberately creating antagonism with China’, and its overseas edition said it was time for the United States to ‘shut up’.51 At the ARF meeting of July 2012 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, after China’s Sansha announcement, Hillary Clinton said that: […] the United States has no territorial claims in the South China Sea, and we do not take sides in disputes about territorial or maritime boundaries, but we do have a fundamental interest in freedom of navigation, maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law, and unimpeded lawful commerce; and we believe the nations of the region should work collaboratively and diplomatically to resolve disputes without coercion, without intimidation, without threats, and certainly without the use of force.52

Although left unmentioned, it was clear which country Clinton’s remarks on ‘coercion’ and ‘intimidation’ were directed against. Central to political maneuvering at the 2012 ARF meeting was the drafting of a Code of Conduct (COC) that would cover issues such as the terms of engagement to be used when naval vessels meet in disputed waters, to avoid or limit armed confrontations before they get out of hand, a move strongly supported by the United States. Emboldened by US intervention at the last ARF meeting, the Philippines contingent insisted on having the communiqué mention its naval standoff with Chinese vessels at Scarborough Shoal, while both Philippines and Vietnam criticized Cambodia’s COC draft for lacking teeth and being deferential to China.53 This distressed host Cambodia, a major recipient of aid from China, to the extent that it did not issue the ARF chairman’s customary closing statement on behalf of the ASEAN. Manila then forwarded its claims to UNCLOS for adjudication, although Beijing had stated it would not recognize any external rulings on its territorial disputes. Some commentators worry that too much US support may be emboldening countries like the Philippines to be more assertive and thus creating division within the ASEAN on its relationship with China.54 However, this fear may be exaggerated. The Philippines is a US treaty ally, yet in

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contrast to its promises to Japan, the United States has made clear its guarantee does not cover areas under Manila’s dispute with Beijing (and other claimants). The question is: why the difference in treatment? Clearly, US leaders seem to think that while Japan already controls the Senkakus and so can be counted on to keep cool against Chinese actions that are seen as provocative, the Philippines is on the retreat from territories it claims in the Spratlys in the face of Chinese pressure and may wish to ‘entrap’ the United States into helping it make a stand. To counter Chinese muscle in the water, Vietnam is encouraging a US presence. The United States was the first country to start commercial repair facilities in Cam Ranh Bay when Vietnam opened the naval base to visits by foreign navies in 2009. For now, Vietnam is only welcoming logistics ships, although the purpose of a visit in 2012 by US Secretary of Defense Panetta to the former US base was to bring US Navy ships to the bay.55 At the very least, the trip was to highlight the growing relationship and potential military cooperation between the United States and Vietnam, to counter China’s escalating dominance of the South China Sea. To demonstrate sovereign possession, tourist cruises by ship to the Paracel Islands for only Chinese citizens started operating from Haikou, Hainan Province, on 1 May 2013.56 Then nearby in December 2013, a Chinese Navy ship cut directly across the path of the US guided-missile cruiser Cowpens, forcing it to change course abruptly to avoid a collision. Neither of these Chinese actions escaped US attention.57 At the August 2014 ARF meeting, US Secretary of State John Kerry floated a proposal that called on all states to refrain from taking ‘provocative actions’ in the South China Sea, but aside from the Philippines, found little support from China or the other ASEAN member states.58 A halt to China’s reclamation or building efforts on disputed islands in the South China Sea cannot be expected. According to China’s state-run Xinhua News Agency, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who also attended the meeting, rebuffed the freeze proposal as counterproductive, saying that it would only fan the flames by emboldening countries like the Philippines and Vietnam to take a hardline stance against China.59 Seeking to isolate the United States diplomatically, Wang also urged Asian nations to come together to solve their problems without outside interference.60 Much depends on whether the United States continues to be perceived as a reliable actor in the region. With the Pentagon’s budget being drastically cut, just keeping the United States’ military presence credible in Asia is increasingly a challenge. The less Washington is able to influence the course of events in the disputed waters, the more likely it is that Asia’s capitals will decide they must deal

The United States and China’s maritime territorial disputes 315 with Beijing directly, and on a one-to-one basis, which accords China tremendous advantage on account of its size and strength. US Defense Secretary Hagel has said that his country will oppose any effort to restrict overflight or freedom of navigation, which is understandable considering the significance of trade with Southeast Asian countries to the United States. The United States demonstrates and ensures its freedom of navigation in the South China Sea by conducting annual military drills and insisting on free passage of its warships through disputed territorial waters and claimed EEZs. In March 2015, China conducted an amphibious-landing exercise on the Chinese-controlled Johnson Reef featuring elements of its Air Force, Navy, Armor and Infantry. However, China does not as yet seem to be spoiling for a showdown with the United States. Instead, what China seems to be doing is pushing the envelope with the United States’ friends and allies, by gradually establishing ‘facts on the ground’ in what it considers to be its own back pond.61 The Chinese are erecting structures on Nanji Island in the East China Sea 300 km northwest of the Diaoyu Islands and performing reclamation works on several reefs in the South China Sea for possible naval or air force uses. At the defense ministers’ meeting of the ASEAN and its dialogue partners in November 2015, the United States and Japan pressed for a mention of the South China Sea disputes in the final statement, but as this met with China’s objection, no joint declaration was issued.62 Without naming China, Obama later called on the claimants to ‘halt reclamation, construction and militarization of disputed areas’ in the South China Sea.63

CONCLUSION: CONSTRUCTING A US–CHINA AXIS FOR PEACE The United States has been a lot more embroiled and far less neutral in the maritime territorial sovereignty disputes involving China than it recognizes or is willing to admit. It is true that the United States does not claim territory in the South or East China Seas, that it has not recognized one sovereignty assertion over another, and that its sea lanes of communication are not under threat. What, then, account for the oft expressed concerns of top US officials for the area’s activities, usually directed against China? Obama’s pivot is certainly the main reason, but that is because China’s rising capabilities are making the United States increasingly uncomfortable. China has amassed large holdings of US government debts, and the United States has huge investments in China. As

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such, China already has considerable sway over US economic calculations. China’s control, whether de facto or de jure, of the South China Sea, and acquiescence of Southeast Asian countries to that control, would mark the beginnings of a Chinese Monroe Doctrine, which would allow China to rule this salient maritime connection between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Although China is not yet able to challenge the United States’ role as superpower, China has sufficient missile and naval capabilities in the South and East China Seas to make US intervention very costly; it is becoming powerful enough such that the superpower cannot simply do what it wants in Asia.64 It is to forestall any move by the Chinese to veto US action in that part of the world that explains US desires to check the growth of China’s power and influence in the region. Consequently, besides holding annual war games with the Philippines, the United States conducted a military exercise with Japan in the South China Sea in October 2014, as did Japan with the Philippines in June 2015. China has long seen the United States as a troublemaker, perhaps not unjustly from the Chinese perspective, blaming it for encouraging and perhaps even instigating a more aggressive approach from both the Philippines and Vietnam, while turning a blind eye to what China perceives as provocations on their part. However, because China does not want ASEAN countries to present it with a united front, in which case they will likely be backed up by the United States, it will work with ASEAN towards reaching a regional Code of Conduct to lessen the risks of conflict. No Asian country at present, with the possible exception of the Philippines and Japan, wishes to be drawn into an anti-China coalition or be put in a position of choosing between Beijing and Washington, arguably their most important economic and security partner respectively. This should work to China’s advantage, if it is prepared to take the initiative in settling territorial disputes with its neighbors. Although renouncing the use of force in dispute situations is only the first step in a Code of Conduct, the United States might also wish to counsel China’s Southeast Asian neighbors to reach a deal with China on the COC before the window of opportunity closes as China becomes more powerful, and consequently, more demanding. There would be another consideration for the United States in providing such counsel. While confrontation by some of the United States’ regional friends and allies against China may entangle the United States in conflicts that are not in its interest to get involved in, continued US failure to back the Philippines’ or Vietnam’s stance against China over the South China Sea may undermine US–ASEAN relations. Given that the long drawn out COC negotiations are no closer to bearing fruit, the United States could

The United States and China’s maritime territorial disputes 317 perhaps work out a deal (an informal one of course) with China: the United States will involve itself no further in the South China Sea disputes, if the Chinese agree to conclude a COC for the South China Sea speedily. In August 2014, a Chinese fighter intercepted a US Navy P-8 maritime patrol in international airspace about 135 miles (216 km) off Hainan Island. This incident gave impetus to naval chiefs from China, the United States and several other countries to sign a Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea, which provides guidelines for naval ships or aircraft when they unexpectedly come close to each other.65 Although the Code is not legally binding, nor does it apply in a country’s territorial waters, it nonetheless offers a measure of potential damage prevention, particularly in the disputed vicinities of the South China Sea. This is particularly salient since the verbal warnings issued by the Chinese Navy to a US P-8A Poseidon spy plane that flew over China’s Spratly land reclamations in May 2015, which led the Pentagon to expand sea and air patrols to within 12 NM of the disputed islands in a direct challenge to China’s territorial claims.66 The code may also offer a blueprint for one aspect of the COC. One popular suggestion to prevent conflict is the creation of a Joint Development Agency, which would involve claimants agreeing to put aside questions of sovereignty and cooperate on joint resource development in a disputed area. Regardless of where the final boundary is located, the parties concerned should enter into ‘provisional arrangements of a practical nature’ for management of resources in areas of overlapping claims, as provided by UNCLOS Articles 74(3) and 83(3). The United States could be the external party present to guarantee fair play among the disputants. The only problem is whether China would agree to such an arrangement. China’s leaders can be pragmatic, and they seemed to have been so far. Yet pressure from Chinese nationalists or the PLA for more assertive action from their leaders cannot be discounted. More than 20 years ago, Tommy Koh, Singapore’s former ambassador to the United States, remarked that ‘America’s presence in the region keeps Asians from provoking fights with Asians’.67 Given that only the United States has the military leverage and diplomatic clout to help maintain regional stability, this statement still holds true today. The only question is how long today will last.

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NOTES 1. 2. 3.

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

Robson, S. (2013), ‘China’s aggressive tactics turning off Asian neighbors’, McClatchy – Tribune Business News, 25 June. The Economist (2012), ‘Narrative of an empty space’, 22 December, 53–5. United States Congress, ‘Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Okinawa Reversion Treaty Hearings’, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, 27–29 October, 1971, pp. 90, 91, 93, 149, 147, 152. Ibid., p. 91. Jiji Press (1996), ‘US calls for restraint in Senkaku dispute’, 24 September. Labott, E. (2010), ‘Clinton urges Japan and China to return to talks over disputed islands’, CNN.com, 1 November 2010, accessed 21 July 2105 at http://edition. cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/10/30/vietnam.clinton.visit/. Auslin, M. (2012), ‘Playing chicken in the East China Sea: nationalist passions in both China and Japan increase the risk of confrontation’, The Wall Street Journal, 24 September. Labott, ‘Clinton urges Japan and China to return to talks over disputed islands’. Barnes, J.E. and B. Spegele (2012), ‘Panetta calls for calm in China–Japan dispute’, The Wall Street Journal, 17 September. Ferguson, N. (2012), ‘All the Asian rage: it’s not just the Middle East: China’s on the March’, Newsweek, 1 October, 20. Rachman, G. (2013), ‘The shadow of 1914 falls over the Pacific Ocean’, Financial Times, 5 February, 9. Perlez, J. (2013), ‘China criticizes Clinton’s remarks about dispute with Japan over islands’, The New York Times, 20 January, accessed 21 July 2015 at http://www. nytimes.com/2013/01/21/world/asia/china-criticizes-clintons-remarks-about-disputewith-japan-over-islands.html?_r=0. Ibid. The Economist (2013), ‘Spin and substance: Japan and America’, 2 March, 39–40. Valencia, M.J. (2014), ‘The East China Sea disputes: history, status, and ways forward’, Asian Perspective, 38 (2), 183–218. Fish, I.S. (2013), ‘The island lobbyist’, Foreign Policy, No. 202, September/October. Johnston, E. (2012), ‘US Senate passes Senkaku backing’, Japan Times, 1 December. Spetalnick, M. (2013), ‘Obama urges de-escalation, dialogue in China–Japan maritime row’, Reuters, 8 June. Stevens, P. (2013), ‘China has thrown down gauntlet to America’, Financial Times, 29 November. Spitzer, K. (2013), ‘US tests China-claimed waters’, USA Today, 27 November, 5. Valencia, ‘The East China Sea disputes’. Spitzer, ‘US tests China-claimed waters’. Colby, E. and E. Ratner (2014), ‘Roiling the waters’, Foreign Policy, January/ February, 10–13. The Economist (2013), ‘Crossing a line in the sky’, 30 November. LaFranchi, H. (2013), ‘Biden’s Asia challenge: can he reassure US allies without inflaming passions?’, Christian Science Monitor, 2 December, 2. EIU ViewsWire (2013), ‘World politics: quick view – US vice-president takes soft approach over ADI’, 5 December. The Economist (2014), ‘So long, and thanks for all the naval bases: Barack Obama’s Asian tour’, 28 April. Perlez, J. and K. Bradsher (2012), ‘Former Chinese diplomat says US is using Japan to make gains in Asia’, New York Times, 30 October. Stevens, ‘China has thrown down gauntlet to America’.

The United States and China’s maritime territorial disputes 319 30. 31.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55.

Yu, P.K.-H. (2003), ‘The Chinese (broken) U-shaped line in the South China Sea: points, lines, and zones’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 25 (3), 405–30. The US State Department statement read: ‘The United States is concerned that a pattern of unilateral actions and reactions in the South China Sea has increased tensions in the region. The US strongly opposes the use or threat of force to resolve competing claims and urges all claimants to exercise restraint and to avoid destabilizing actions. The US would view with serious concern any maritime claim, or restriction on maritime activity in the South China Sea that was not consistent with international law. Unhindered navigation by all ships and aircraft in the South China Sea is essential for the peace and prosperity of the entire Asia Pacific region, including the US’. See Straits Times (1995), ‘US warns against restriction in South China Sea’, 12 May. Eurasia Review (2010), ‘China throws strategic challenge at US in South China Sea’, 4 October, accessed 21 July 2015 at https://volvbilis.wordpress.com/2010/10/08/ china-throws-strategic-challenge-at-us-in-south-china-sea/. Reuters News Service (1992), ‘Philippine senators question US defence pact’, 9 November. Straits Times (1995), ‘ASEAN Forum should address Spratlys issue’, 19 April. Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service (2009), ‘US/VIETNAM: China concern promotes security ties’, 16 April. Voice of America (2009), ‘US reaffirms its rights to operate in South China Sea’, 16 July, accessed 31 March 2016 at http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13-2009-07-16voa4-68828782/365466.html. Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, ‘US/VIETNAM: China concern promotes security ties’. The Economist (2010), ‘Asia: testing the waters: strategic jousting between China and America’, 31 July, 32. Wong, E. (2010), ‘Chinese military seeks to extend its naval power’, The New York Times, 23 April, accessed 21 July 2015 at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/ world/asia/24navy.html. Storey, I. (2010), ‘China’s missteps in Southeast Asia: less charm, more offensive’, China Brief, 10 (25), 5. The Economist (2010), ‘The start of something big? Asian defence ministers meet in Hanoi’, 12 October. Ren, H.-F. and F.-K. Liu (2013), ‘Transitional security pattern in the South China Sea and the involvement of external parties’, Issues and Studies, 49 (2), 103–45. The Economist, ‘Asia: testing the waters’. Taipei Times (2012), ‘China rebuffs calls for talks on S. China Sea’, 13 July, A1. McClatchy – Tribune Business News (2011), ‘EDITORIAL: Armed conflict for control of South China Sea unlikely’, 24 June. Ren and Liu (2013), ‘Transitional security pattern in the South China Sea’. Ibid. Nye, J.S. (2011), ‘Obama’s Pacific pivot’, Daily News Egypt, 12 December. Colby and Ratner (2014), ‘Roiling the waters’. The Wall Street Journal (2012), ‘The bully of the South China Sea’, 14 August, 16. Webb, J. (2012), ‘The South China Sea’s gathering storm’, The Wall Street Journal, 20 August, A11. IIP Digital (2012), ‘Briefing by Clinton in Phnom Penh on trip to Asia’, 12 July, accessed 21 July 2015 at http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2012/07/ 201207128907.html. The Economist (2012), ‘Losing the limelight: Cambodia’s foreign relations’, 17 July. The Economist (2012), ‘Chinese checkers: Asian maritime diplomacy’, 21 July. Hutchins, A. (2012),‘America’s new BFF’, Maclean’s, 1 August, 28.

320 56. 57.

58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

63. 64. 65. 66. 67.

Handbook of US–China relations The Economist, ‘Tropical trouble: disputed waters’, 9 May. Thayer, C. (2013), ‘USS Cowpens incident reveals strategic mistrust between US and China’, The Diplomat, 17 December, accessed 21 July 2015 at http://the diplomat.com/2013/12/uss-cowpens-incident-reveals-strategic-mistrust-between-u-sand-china/. Auslin, M. (2014), ‘The new normal in Asia: Beijing will continue asserting itself in disputed territories: its neighbors will continue to do little to challenge it’, The Wall Street Journal, 12 August. Asia News Monitor (2014), ‘United States/China: US says China, not Washington, responsible for South China Sea tensions’, Bangkok, 14 August. Auslin, ‘The new normal in Asia’. The Economist (2014), ‘Your rules or mine? Maritime power’, 15 November, 10. Torbatti, Y. and T. Leong (2015), ‘ASEAN defense chiefs fail to agree on South China Sea statement’, 4 November, accessed 8 November 2015 at http://www. reuters.com/article/ 2015/11/ 04/us-asean-malaysia-statement-idUSKCN0ST07G2015 1104#bozhrl0WUS3wjRhw. Spetalnick, M. and M. Petty (2015), ‘Obama urges halt to artificial islands in South China Sea’, 21 November, accessed 22 November 2015 at http://www.reuters.com/ article/2015/11/21/us-asean-summit-idUSKCN0TA05S20151121. Womack, B. (2011), ‘The Spratlys: from dangerous ground to apple of discord’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 33 (3), 370–87. The Economist, ‘Your rules or mine?’. Teo, E. (2015), ‘3 Sino–US scenarios in South China Sea dispute’, Straits Times, 19 May, A13. Vassey, L.R. and P.J. Smith (1993), ‘US needs to focus on China’s growing strength in Asia’, Christian Science Monitor, 12 October, accessed 21 July 2015 at http://www.csmonitor.com/1993/1012/12192.html.

PART V SECURITY AND DEFENCE

17. Assessing the Sino–US power balance Yee-Kuang Heng

INTRODUCTION Understanding and evaluating how the power capabilities of major states stack up has long been one of the most fascinating, yet perplexing challenges in international relations (IR). While cognizant of the numerous and contested definitions of power in the discipline, this chapter sets out to examine and compare the methodologies, analytical models and intellectual frameworks being used by the United States and China to size each other up. In the process, it seeks to unearth and highlight the continuing diversity of methodological and conceptual approaches on both sides. This chapter first begins with how the Chinese perceive and conceptualize power balances, namely the notion of Comprehensive National Power (CNP) espoused by Beijing and the power rankings that have been developed on this basis. In particular, Chinese leaders have also demonstrated high-level political support for ‘soft power’ as part of CNP, far more than the US leadership has. Besides outlining the wide range of Chinese actors and institutions involved in assessing power balances, this section also discusses their disparate methodological tools and indicators for doing so. Despite perceptions of a monolithic topdown Chinese military and political system, in fact there exists a substantial range of actors and entities with different methodological approaches, assessments and views of the power balance. The chapter then examines US attempts to assess Chinese power. If the Chinese side emphasizes CNP, Washington on the other hand appears inclined towards reinventing and redeploying the Cold War era concept of net assessment and its core principles for understanding the twenty-firstcentury Sino–US power balance through a more dynamic interactive model. The much-discussed AirSea Battle doctrine is essentially an updated version of the Cold War era AirLand Battle doctrine. Even the name of the doctrine is suggestive of its roots. Despite the retirement of its founding father Andrew Marshall who served throughout the Cold War, the collapse of communism and through the rise of China, the Office of Net Assessment (ONA) continues to exist. The Carnegie Endowment has also conducted net assessments of the US–Japan alliance 323

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and the rise of China. But how far is the notion of net assessment relevant to the emerging power contention with China and what can it tell us about the current state of the US–China power balance? Beijing is not quite the full-fledged ideological all-spectrum foe that the USSR was and is infinitely far more economically interdependent with the United States. The Chinese also conceptualize power somewhat differently.

POWER IN THE EYES OF THE BEHOLDER In evaluating a Sino–US power balance, one should first of all begin with how both sides perceive power, particularly which aspect of power capabilities of the other side they are most concerned with measuring and hopefully surpassing. As China’s paramount leader Deng Xiaoping once said, ‘In measuring a country’s national power, one must look at it comprehensively and from all sides’.1 The notion of CNP has not been directly attributed to Deng himself but several Chinese strategists and authors who employ this phrase at least credit the intellectual premise in the modern era to Deng.2 Comprehensive National Power, as the name suggests, is a concept that stresses the sum total of the strengths of a country in several key domains, specifically the economy, military, science and technology, education, resources and soft power. As Glaser has pointed out, the current balance of power is evaluated ‘on the basis of sophisticated qualitative and quantitative measurements of Comprehensive National Power (CNP)’.3 Based on this concept of CNP, methodologies are used to rank different major countries in the world and these rankings are usually listed in documents such as the Yellow Book of International Politics and Yellow Book of World Economy, published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. The latest version of these reports includes the World Economy Analysis and Forecast (2015) and Annual Report on International Politics and Security (2015). Rankings of Chinese CNP relative to other major countries have therefore been compiled. For instance, the 2009 issue of the Yellow Book ranked China seventh in terms of its CNP, while the United States, Japan and Germany were ranked above it. The indicators in the book’s assessment of CNP includes territory and natural resources, population, economy, military and science, said Li Shaojun, director of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ World Economics and International Politics Institute. The various major nations were also evaluated on their social development, sustainability, security, domestic politics and international contribution.4 The book employs a ratings system, where individual countries’

Assessing the Sino–US power balance 325 strengths in specific fields are scored and assigned numerical points. There are also analysts at the Institute for International Studies at China’s Central Party School engaged in determining power shifts and balances between the United States and China, likewise at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, and not to mention leading academics at the prestigious Peking University. These analysts, Glaser reminds us, are important, for many of them work in institutions with official or semi-formal links to the Communist Party or State Council, providing policy advice and even influence official thinking on occasion.5 The government also publishes its own National Defence White Papers outlining China’s military strategy, while affiliated think-tanks such as the Centre for National Defence Policy (CNDP), a part of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Academy of Military Sciences also compiles its annual reports on China’s security and strategic issues. These papers, however, do not specifically focus on relative US–China military power balances in particular. Needless to say, amongst this bunch of analysts from the Central Party School to Peking University, there exist divergent assessments on whether US power is indeed in irreversible decline, particularly after the 2008 global financial crisis or whether its resilience will allow it to bounce back. Since 2009, Beijing has been probing the notion of the United States’ relative decline in power balances and has demonstrated greater assertiveness to protect what seem its core interests although it remained unclear in 2011 if a fundamental decision had been made that the power balance had indeed shifted in China’s favour to prompt such actions.6 By 2015, with Xi Jinping’s rise to power, Xi’s notion of a ‘new type of great power relationship’ with the United States could reflect a greater appreciation and confidence on the part of Chinese leaders that it is nearing some semblance of power parity with the United States. While Chinese leaders officially support its decades-old reliance on Deng Xiaoping’s mantra to lie low and bide time, the Pentagon’s 2015 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments on Chinese power notes that recent actions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and its ‘New Asian Security’ concept suggests that strict adherence to Deng might be loosening.7 Scholars such as Wang Jisi in 2008, however, felt inclined to adhere to Deng’s mantra and dismissed the notion that China and the United States could jointly manage international order because ‘this idea overestimates our power and position’.8 Furthermore, as China-watcher Kevin Rudd points out, Xi has by no means accepted that US decline is terminal and remains watchful for the US rebound. As Jeff Smith noted in May 2015, ‘Ask ten China scholars to define Chinese

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grand strategy and you will get ten answers’.9 This is the same predicament we face when assessing the current state of US–China power balances, discussed below. Another important dimension of China’s attempts to assess the power balance is its emphasis on and interest in the concept of ‘soft power’. Ironically, the concept is associated with US scholar Joseph Nye, but in contrast with the interest shown by China, the concept has not generated the same level of enthusiasm within US foreign policy circles. Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld once dismissed the notion, saying that he had no idea what it meant. While the Obama administration and especially the State Department under Hillary Clinton made repeated references to the related notion of ‘smart power’, it is the Chinese that appear to have paid more high-level attention to Nye’s concept. Former President Hu Jintao was perhaps the first high-ranking leader to use the phrase in 2007 in a widely noted speech to the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, where he described soft power as ‘a factor of growing significance in the competition in overall national strength’.10 This suggested that Chinese leaders considered soft power not only to be competitive in nature, but it was also central to its understanding of power balances. In 2012, Hu further argued that at least in the soft power balance, China was under threat from the West: ‘the international culture of the West is strong while we are weak’.11 In September 2014, China’s most prestigious institution, Peking University, launched a research centre dedicated to advancing Chinese national soft power and to help the government spread Chinese culture and values abroad. Culture Minister Cai Wu officiated at the Centre’s launch, declaring the government’s goal that ‘Cultural soft power is beginning to offer strong support for the rise of China. The country must enhance its cultural strength in order to dominate the global contest for soft power’.12 Under the Xi Jinping administration, soft power as a means to project Chinese influence remains important and receives high-level political attention. The Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued on 12 November 2013 made a point of stressing the need to improve Chinese cultural soft power. While soft power and CNP appear important to the Chinese leadership’s perception of power balances, how does one measure these elements of power? As analyst Yan Xuetong noted in 2006, methodological issues remain subject to a wide range of different measurements of Chinese power relative to others, ‘the differences in assessment of China’s power status still remain unresolved … more than ten evaluation and measurement methods have been in use in the field, with basically all using a different

Assessing the Sino–US power balance 327 type of index’.13 Besides the varied range of entities engaged in assessing Chinese power using greatly differing methodologies and indicators (from Tsinghua University to China Academy of Social Sciences and the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations), the methodological difficulties are further confounded by a tendency to either overestimate or underestimate Chinese power for political reasons, according to Yan.14 This is not to say that military power has become subsumed under the overarching framework of CNP or soft power. To the contrary, the much discussed Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) emphasis of recent Chinese weapons systems such as the ‘carrier killer’ anti-ship ballistic missile is precisely designed to negate US power projection capabilities in the event of crisis, although the Chinese themselves do not use the phrase A2/AD, which is of US origin. Indeed, many Chinese analysts have raised concerns over whether the US military is already or has acquired capabilities and associated doctrines like AirSea Battle (discussed below) that will negate China’s own15 nascent A2/AD capabilities. However, as Zhang and McClure point out, there are numerous methodological difficulties with Chinese sources evaluating the power balance in that ‘China continues to borrow heavily from the language and rhetoric in US concepts while continuing to struggle in developing its own strategies and concepts’.16 Complicating attempts to evaluate Chinese doctrine and developments, some Chinese analysts even suggest, informally, that the PLA should go beyond simply A2/AD and acquire capabilities for ‘far sea defence’ operating well beyond its territorial waters.17 Scholars such as Cheung also suggest that a new analytical framework based on the idea of Chinese military and defence innovation should also be included in any attempt to assess potential shifts in the US–China power balance: ‘examining the Chinese defense economy from a national innovation systems approach can help to shed light on critical processes that would otherwise be overlooked in more conventional assessments of defense industry and military modernization issues’.18 Indeed, with eye-catching technological developments such as its shooting down of an old satellite to the unveiling of a fifth-generation stealth fighter, it is easy to conclude that China’s hard military innovation capabilities have made huge leaps lately. Indicative of the interest shown in China towards such issues, in August 2014 President Xi Jinping presided over a meeting of Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, where he stressed the need for the Chinese military to catch up with more developed countries in military innovation, and China therefore also had to embrace innovation in military strategies, technologies, operational thinking, combat

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forces and military management.19 Related to this drive towards innovation has been a reported increase in Chinese military budgets dedicated towards cyberwarfare in 2015, although as one analyst put it, ‘even a ball park figure is unobtainable’.20 However, questions do remain over the ‘softer’ dimension of innovation such as organizational and doctrinal reforms to make these weapons game-changers in a potential conflict.21 Scholarly attempts to assess Chinese power with regard to the United States are usually broken down into several categories: (1) regional (Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia) (2) functional (e.g., air, naval, cyber and outer space capabilities) (3) normative (i.e., soft power).22 While these scholarly approaches appear systematic and comprehensive, a key obstacle remains access to reliable data and sources. Together with a mind-boggling array of official and semi-official publications and magazines on Chinese power that have varying levels of official backing and sometimes sensationalistic articles, Zhang and McClure remind analysts to be wary of the authenticity of these sources.23 Regardless of the difficulties faced by Chinese scholars themselves involved in ranking Chinese power, Yan does make one central conclusion about the importance of relativity in power balances that his US counterparts would also readily agree to: ‘The power status of a state can be understood only through a simultaneous comparative assessment of the power status of other nations’. As such, the power disparity between China and the United States, Yan concluded in 2006, is such that Beijing does not even belong in the same superpower class as the United States. China is a major power, unlike the United States as a superpower.24 To wrap up this section’s discussion on China’s perspectives on the power balance, several key points can be made. First, there exists a wide diversity of methods and indicators and indices employed by numerous entities (from universities to semi-official think-tanks affiliated with Chinese military or government bodies). This diversity, however, means consensus remains elusive on the methodologies and frameworks to be used, a point well made by leading scholar Yan Xuetong. Second, conceptually, China has been keen on attempts to rank and measure nations according to the notion of Comprehensive National Power. Within this conceptual framework, ironically, the US-derived theory of soft power has loomed far larger in the Chinese calculation than the United States’. Finally, where attempts at comparing CNP power capabilities across different countries are made, these appear to be for ranking purposes, rather than any systematic attempt to model dynamic strategic competition between states and how these competitions might evolve in the future.

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COLD WAR REDUX? THE RETURN OF NET ASSESSMENT The United States releases several of its own assessments of the power balance annually. Compared to Chinese assessments, US reports are more easily accessible as open-source material. The intellectual and methodological basis of such assessments, being more widely discussed in academia, will form the core of the remaining analysis undertaken in this chapter. One of the more well known is the annual report on Chinese military power submitted by the Pentagon. Since 2002, Congress has mandated the Pentagon to prepare an annual report containing both a public and a classified version of its latest estimates on the PLA’s current and likely future capabilities, doctrine, strategies, technologies, force structure, organization and operational concepts. The FY 2010 National Defense Authorization Act renamed what previously had been known as Military Power of the People’s Republic of China as Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China. A chronological assessment of these reports reveals that there was growing concern from 2006 onwards of how Chinese military strategy was premised on undercutting the US ability to project power into the Western Pacific, with the terms ‘anti-access’ and ‘area denial’ making frequent appearances from 2007 onwards.25 While these reports contain a very useful summary of trends and developments, these Department of Defense (DoD) reports are not without their shortcomings, as Zhang and McClure report, for they may be inadvertently shaped by political judgments, evaluations and intentions and may not be as comprehensive as they should be.26 Another interesting point to note is that such reports are themselves legacies of the Cold War, where alarming Soviet military advances spurred Congress to request such reports in the first place. There does not appear to be a Chinese equivalent at the official level. The latest 2015 iteration of the DoD report continues to note China’s long-term military modernization plans, doctrinal developments and reforms. These have the potential to undercut US technological superiority and Beijing’s investment in anti-access/area denial capabilities. Developments surveyed cover all the arms of the Chinese military and their improving capabilities, as well as China’s bilateral and multilateral military engagements such as joint exercises and peacekeeping operations and counter-piracy patrols. Notably, a Chinese submarine deployed to the Indian Ocean in 2014, ostensibly as part of anti-piracy patrols. This also reflects China’s capacity to project power into the region and protect its sea lines of communication. Apart from US government publications, the

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independent and bipartisan vibrant think-tank and academic community have conducted their own attempts to evaluate the power balance, What is most striking is the oft-cited use of Cold War era concepts and analytical tools, particularly net assessment that was pioneered and developed at the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment (ONA) from 1973 onwards. In 2013, The Carnegie Endowment published China’s Military and the U.S.–Japan Alliance in 2030: A Strategic Net Assessment. This report is notable for basing its analyses around what it calls the ‘intellectual approach’ known as net assessment, defined by the DoD as ‘the comparative analysis of military, technological, political, economic, and other factors governing the relative military capability of nations. Its purpose is to identify problems and opportunities that deserve the attention of senior defense officials’.27 This broad-based approach is important to understanding and identifying variables that might have significant effect on the strategic competition, security policies and military capabilities. The United States is not alone in attempting net assessments of Chinese power. Indian analysts too have conducted evaluations of how Chinese military doctrine and capabilities have evolved and how India must respond.28 It is, however, the US defence establishment that has institutionalized the concept of net assessment in its analyses of competitors’ power capabilities. Since the 1970s, the Pentagon has had an ONA led for several decades by the legendary Andrew Marshall until his retirement in 2014. When the DoD advertised for his replacement in early 2015, the job description was as follows: ‘develop assessments that compare the standings, trends, and future prospects of U.S. military capability and military potential with that of other countries’.29 The analytical focus should be dynamic and interactive, meaning that assessments should not exclusively be on one side or the other but rather on emerging factors, scenarios and trends that shape the interaction between the competitors. This framework eschews the commonly derided simplistic ‘bean counts’ of opposing numbers of enemy military hardware such as tanks, ships and planes, in order to attain some understanding of a military balance between two sides. In contrast, ‘A net assessment would demand more than a simple quantitative comparison; it would require an in-depth analysis of the so-called soft factors that are so critical to understanding the outcome of military interaction’.30 This is why during the Cold War, complex computer simulations and models were developed to calculate the impact of several factors such as training and morale in a potential conflict with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. While net assessment sounds relatively straightforward in its endeavour to compare how two competitors might interact, it is, however, not a ‘methodology’ in the strict theoretical sense that

Assessing the Sino–US power balance 331 there is a consensus about the shared body of practices, rules and policies employed by those engaged in the practice.31 If China had a multitude of methods and approaches to measuring CNP, likewise in the United States, there is no universal consensus on what net assessment is nor the methods entailed. As such, it might be more accurate to describe it as ‘an intellectual approach designed to pose and answer the most important strategic questions about the future security environment and to present plausible alternative versions of that environment, from a comprehensive and long-range perspective, taking into account all relevant factors, both military and nonmilitary’.32 Crucially, it is intended to comparatively assess two sides engaged in interacting or competing with each other and how the competition might evolve, the asymmetries between the two sides, as well as the opportunities and weaknesses. Academics such as Thomas Mahnken have also edited books attempting to evaluate the strategic competition between the United States and China, and one of the key sections in his book drew on competitive strategies during the Cold War, and attempts to determine the relevance for the current Sino–US power balance.33 The current ‘AirSea Battle’ doctrine is attributed by Peter Singer to the ONA.34 The document outlining the concept was published by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a think-tank with close links to the ONA. Its director Andrew Krepenivich is a former subordinate of Andrew Marshall. It is fair to state, as several naval strategists noted in the journal of the US Naval Institute, that AirSea Battle harks back to an earlier Cold War period, being as it is ‘modeled after the Army–Air Force Air Land Battle Doctrine of a previous generation … and is a return to historical precedent’.35 The theme of historical hangovers is best described by Jeffrey Lewis, that ‘AirSea Battle is, in many ways, a warmed-up serving of Cold War leftovers – the name deliberately evokes the AirLand Battle concept to defeat the Soviets in Europe’.36 The recent resurgence and rehabilitation of the net assessment concept with regard to the US–China power balance is all the more striking considering how the notion was once seen to be on the way out, after the events of 9/11. The US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003) declared that ‘classic net assessment of the enemy based on the number of tanks, airplanes or ships does not apply to these non-state actors’.37 China is a challenge that appears far more amenable to the deployment of these Cold War era concepts and responding in kind to Chinese strategic investments in its weapons systems is indicative of an emerging competition that can plausibly be modelled through net assessment frameworks. ‘The February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) made overcoming area-denial an essential part of US strategy. In

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August 2011, CNO Admiral Jonathan Greenert and Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton formed the AirSea Battle office at the DOD in order to develop the AirSea Battle (ASB) concept’.38 Net assessment as a concept has been defined variously as the ‘appraisal of military balances’, to ‘the analysis of the interaction of national security establishments in peacetime and war’.39 What is desired above all from net assessment is a long-term analysis of ‘a competitive political-military relationship including the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and fears of each competitor’.40 Conducting a net assessment, according to Skypek, requires focusing on four key areas: trend analysis, doctrine, asymmetries and scenarios. All four of these areas are present in current net assessments of the Sino–US balance. Net assessment then is predicated on a combination of ‘scenarios, war games, trend analysis, and considered judgment’.41 Indeed, as Coker has argued, in a previous century’s power transition, it was the British who first engaged in earliest exercises of trend analysis to conclude that conflict with the rising United States was no longer feasible. In the Carnegie Endowment’s net assessment of the US–Japan alliance and a rising China, it focused on several trends such as A2/AD capabilities, as well as the developing strategic outlooks of Japan, the United States and China. The benefits of focusing on trends is that it gives analysts a sense of momentum and extrapolating from these trends, and it is possible to attempt a view of how the future might look.42 This is why the DoD Annual Report to Congress also contains segments on China’s ‘Force Modernization Goals and Trends’ and notes that ‘Current trends in China’s weapons production will enable the PLA to conduct a range of military operations in Asia far from China’s traditional territorial claims’.43 As for scenarios, the Endowment’s report considered alternative futures for the Asian strategic environment, including an ‘eroding balance’, a full-blown Asian Cold War, and a Sinocentric Asia. It also plotted several possible ‘trajectories for Chinese strategy toward the US–Japan Alliance’ ranging from ‘cautious rise, cooperative weakness to aggressive ultra-nationalism’.44 The DoD Annual Report to Congress on China also included what is described as ‘factors shaping China’s leadership perceptions’ ranging from nationalism, economic concerns, regional security challenges, demographics and the environment. The ONA has conducted several reports on the evolving military balances as well as differences in strategic thinking between US and Chinese military officers and political leaders.45 In 2013, it was reported that ONA had commissioned reports from the Center for Budgetary and

Assessing the Sino–US power balance 333 Strategic Assessments on ‘Mining the Gaps in Chinese Strategic Discourse’.46 Another report delved into China’s use of non-kinetic unconventional psychological, media and legal operations as asymmetric means of conflict. While the US defence planning framework had previously focused on global ‘asymmetric’ and more generic ‘disruptive’ risks rather than a specific regional challenger, Stephan Frühling has observed more recently ‘the revival of net assessment analysis’ as Chinese military capabilities and doctrines developed amid growing Pentagon realization that Beijing’s strategy was intended to obstruct US projection of power into the Pacific.47 Since net assessment requires identifying a specific adversary with the intentions and capabilities to threaten your own interests, this carries a political downside in the form of exacerbating tensions with the identified potential foe.48 Likewise, Stephen Rosen notes that ‘competitive strategies’ as developed by the DoD since 1973 could be dangerous in peacetime as they could shift an adversary’s behaviour into more defensive approaches, increasing tension and likelihood of conflict.49 The retirement at the end of 2014 of Andrew Marshall as Director of Net Assessment at the Department of Defense after 42 years of service sparked renewed press and academic interest in the notion of net assessment and how it might help US defence planning as well as contested debates on Marshall’s legacy, and by extension the notion and utility of net assessment.50 Marshall’s replacement, retired Air Force Colonel Jim Baker, appointed in May 2015, was instructed by Defense Secretary Ash Carter to continue looking at future trends, but with an important caveat to ensure the work has ‘present relevance’ to him.51 A related but not altogether insignificant dimension of the complexities and intricacies of assessing the Sino–US power balance is the repeated bouts of so-called ‘declinism’ that the United States experiences. Even the Chinese side has weighed in on this issue, with leading scholar Wang Jisi pointing out that the United States in decline ‘is almost a form of political correctness in China’52 although he goes on to caution against this belief. As with all assessments of the power balance we have seen so far, Wang points out that ‘the problem lies in the question of what is the standard for measuring the decline of the United States?’53 Within US academia, this ‘declinism’ debate continues unresolved, with a spate of recent books by scholars arguing for both sides of the same coin: on the more negative side stands, writers such as Fareed Zakaria, Niall Ferguson and Edward Luce; more optimistic assessments about US power presented by the likes of Robert Kagan, Bruce Berkowitz, Josef Joffe and Joseph Nye. For his part, Nye’s latest 2015 book, Is the American Century Over?,54 makes the case for assessing the

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US–China power balance in three components: economic, military and soft power. In this conception, Nye’s framework comes closer to the Chinese notion of CNP than the Pentagon’s preferred approach of net assessment surveyed earlier. In a New Republic article that supposedly influenced President Barack Obama, Robert Kagan likewise makes the point that ‘measuring changes in a nation’s relative power is a tricky business, but there are some basic indicators such as economic strength, military capabilities and political influence in the global system. Kagan even suggests that these indicators are similar to ‘what the Chinese call “comprehensive national power”’, discussed in the previous section.55 Only in the economic field can China pose a plausible challenge to US dominance, and even so, Nye succinctly points out that the Chinese remain weak in innovation and science and technology: they can produce ‘iPhone jobs, but not Steve Jobs’. Others such as Sean Starrs have even disputed the measurements of US economic power as declining. Starrs argued that traditional national measurements of GDP and balance of payments are inaccurate indicators of a globalized economy like the United States. Instead, he suggests using measurements of profit shares of the top 2000 corporations globally, which reveals that US firms own 46 per cent of the top companies, and ‘by far the most dominant profit-shares across the most sectors than corporations from any other country’.56 If declinist accounts of US power appear too alarmist, similarly there have been calls from the Chinese side to adopt a less deterministic or exuberant approach to Chinese economic rise. As Pei Minxin points out, Chinese economic performance has been stalling, with massive bad loans stifling its banking system and poor investments from its stimulus package wasted on infrastructural assets. Added to these economic woes, China’s looming demographic collapse (which could prove even more calamitous than its rival, Japan’s) and assorted environmental degradation problems and social unrest and rifts amongst the ruling elites, Pei argues that Chinese power may have already ‘peaked’ with the implication that a downturn is on the cards if systemic reforms are not implemented.57

CONCLUSION In assessing the US–China power balance, it is instructive to consider one of the classic statements made in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War: the growth of the power of Athens and the alarm this caused in Sparta. Thucydides highlighted the problem that has been the focus of this chapter: how does a dominant power assess accurately the challenges

Assessing the Sino–US power balance 335 posed by a rising one when the relative power balance is a complex mix of material, political and moral capabilities?58 Furthermore, Nye has repeatedly warned of the pitfalls and uncertainties involved in predicting future trajectories of power balances. Witness the failure to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union or the bursting of Japan’s economic bubble in the 1980s. While the precise methodological tools and analytical frameworks for assessing Sino–US power balances will always remain somewhat of a hit-or-miss affair, the stakes are high for global stability in the twenty-first century. As Bonnie Glaser put it, ‘Beijing’s assessment of the global balance of power, especially American power and the position of China vis-a-vis the United States, is a critical factor in Chinese foreign policy decisionmaking’.59 Whether US dominance is perceived to be continuing and entrenched or ripe for challenge, could shape the extent to which Beijing opts for more restraint or confrontation. From the United States side, the Cold War framework of net assessment has figured prominently in attempts, notably by the ONA in the Pentagon but also the Carnegie Endowment, to assess how the Sino–US power balance might evolve in the twenty-first century. This should come as no surprise, for the notion of net assessment has already been redeployed in several ways in the post–Cold War era, by the Londonbased International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). For instance, the IISS has published several dossiers based on net assessments of North Korean and Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities.60 While these so-called rogue states constitute more of a strategic nuisance than a serious peer competitor, the rise of China presents a challenge of an altogether different magnitude. Yet, more than passing resemblances with the Cold War era attempts to assess strategic competition with the Soviet Union can be seen in the way the United States has conceptualized its emerging rivalry with China. There are also dangers in overreliance on net assessment and dynamic modelling of scenarios and trends: ‘The old joke about the Office of Net Assessment is that it should be called the Office of Threat Inflation’, said Barry Posen, director of the MIT Security Studies Program. ‘They go well beyond exploring the worst cases … They convince others to act as if the worst cases are inevitable’.61 Academics such as Joseph Nye or Robert Kagan involved in the related ‘declinism’ debate appear to favour measurements of power not explicitly based on net assessment, but on indicators of economic, military and soft power that seem more akin to China’s CNP framework. Yet, CNP is also not necessarily more amenable to precise measurements and indicators. If net assessment lacks consensus on its methodologies and tools, the same can equally be said for China’s preferred concept of CNP and its key component of soft power seems to have

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attracted far more Chinese political attention and resources than in US political circles. The United States might have a more vibrant and wide-ranging spectrum of views with its think-tanks and academic communities, but the Chinese have no lack of diversity either in their debates on the evolving power balance. From sensationalist journalism to semi-official analyses and academic reports, there have been an array of indicators and methodologies produced by research centres and thinktanks with varying levels of links with the Chinese government. A key methodological difficulty lies in not just making sense of the veracity of these indicators of power balances, but also the extent to which conclusions have been endorsed or accepted by policy-makers. Both China and the United States then, it seems, operate on somewhat different methodological, conceptual and intellectual grounds when assessing how their power capabilities stand relative to one another. The diversity of views in both countries and lack of consensus on precise indicators for assessing power reflect long-standing theoretical difficulties with the notion of power in political science and IR. However, there exists real-world policy implications, for how both sides evaluate and perceive the power balance at any one time, accurately or not, could determine the key policy choices they make in shaping the emerging global order.

NOTES 1.

2.

3.

4. 5. 6. 7.

Deng Xiaoping, quoted in People’s Daily, 26 February 1990, quoted in Huang, S. (1992), Zonghe guoli lun (On Comprehensive National Power), Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, p. 7. Zhu, L. and R. Meng (1995), ‘Deng Xiaoping zonghe guoli sixiang yanjiu’ (A study on Deng Xiaoping’s Comprehensive National Power thought), in L. Li and Q. Zhao (eds), Xin shiqi junshi jingji lilun yanjiu (Studies of New Period Military Economic Theory), Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, p. 42. Glaser, B. (2011), ‘A shifting balance: Chinese assessments of US power’, in C. Cohen (ed.), Capacity and Resolve: Foreign Assessments of US Power, Washington, DC: CSIS, p. 5, accessed 9 May 2015 at http://csis.org/publication/capacity-andresolve. Lei, X. (2009), ‘Yellow Book ranks China 7th in overall strength’, China Daily, 25 February, accessed 9 April 2015 at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2009-12/25/ content_9228213.htm. Glaser, ‘A shifting balance’. p. 4. Ibid., p. 14. Department of Defense (2015), Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Regarding the People’s Republic of China, pp. 22–3, accessed 28 March 2016 at http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2015_China_ Military_Power_Report.pdf.

Assessing the Sino–US power balance 337 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

Cited in Zhao, L. (2008), Interview with Wang Jisi, ‘US power/US decline and US–China relations’, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 16 November, accessed 30 May 2015 at http://www.japanfocus.org/-Wang-Jisi/2950/article.html. Smith, J.M. (2015), ‘Beware China’s grand strategy’, Foreign Affairs, 20 May, accessed 1 June 2015 at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-05-20/ beware-chinas-grand-strategy. Xinhua News Agency (2007), ‘Hu Jintao calls for enhancing soft power of Chinese culture’, 15 October, accessed 8 June 2015 at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/ 2007-10/15/content_6883748.htm. Simpson, P. (2012), ‘Chinese President Hu Jintao warns of cultural warfare from West’, The Telegraph, 2 January. Xinhua News Agency (2014), ‘New centre to strengthen China’s soft power’, 29 September, accessed 9 June 2015 at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/201409/29/c_133682761.htm. Yan, X. (2006), ‘The rise of China and its power status’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 1 (1), 5–33. Ibid. Swaine, M.D., M.M. Mochizuky and M.L. Brown et al. (2013), China’s Military and the US–Japan Alliance in 2030: A Strategic Net Assessment, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p. 44. Zhang, X. and S. McClure (2012), ‘Challenges in assessing China’s aerospace capabilities and intentions’, in A. Erickson and L. Goldstein (eds) (2012), Chinese Aerospace Power: Evolving Maritime Roles, Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute. Swaine et al., China’s Military and the US–Japan Alliance in 2030, p. 39. Cheung, T.-M., T. Mahnken and A. Ross (2014), ‘Frameworks for analyzing Chinese defense and military innovation’, in T.M. Cheung (ed.) (2014), Forging China’s Might: A New Framework for Assessing Innovation, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press. Xinhua News (2014), ‘Xi urges innovation in new military revolution’, 30 August, accessed 9 April 2015 at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-08/30/c_ 133608079.htm. Gertz, B. (2015), ‘Cheers to good frenemies! China investing in cyberwarfare superiority’, The Washington Times, 1 April, accessed 28 March 2016 at http:// www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/apr/1/china-invests-cyberwarfare-compete-usmilitary/?page=all. Cheung et al. (2014), ‘Frameworks for analyzing Chinese defense and military innovation’. See Chung, J.H. (ed.) (2015), Assessing China’s Power, New York: Palgrave. Zhang and McClure, ‘Challenges in assessing China’s aerospace capabilities and intentions’. Yan, ‘The rise of China and its power status’. Frühling, S. (2014), Defense Planning and Uncertainty: Preparing for the Next Asia-Pacific War, New York: Routledge, p. 151. Zhang and McClure, ‘Challenges in assessing China’s aerospace capabilities and intentions’. Cited in Swaine et al., China’s Military and the US–Japan Alliance in 2030, p. 7. Bakshi, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) G.D. (2014), China’s Military Power: A Net Assessment, Delhi: Knowledge World and Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi. See USAJobs, ‘Job title: Director of Net Assessment’, Job Announcement Number SES-1292546-RM, accessed 5 June 2015 at https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/View Details/390348800?share=facebook. Swaine, et al., China’s Military and the US–Japan Alliance in 2030, p. 16. Ibid., p. 8.

338 32. 33. 34.

35.

36. 37.

38.

39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

51.

52. 53. 54.

Handbook of US–China relations Ibid. [original emphasis]. Mahnken, T. (2012), Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History and Practice, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Singer, P.W. (2013), ‘Bad idea for the Pentagon’s idea shop’, War on the Rocks, 29 October, accessed 9 April 2015 at http://warontherocks.com/2013/10/bad-idea-forthe-pentagons-idea-shop/. Carreno, J., T. Culora, G. Galdoris and T. Hone (2010), ‘What’s new about the AirSea Battle concept?’, Proceedings: Journal of the US Naval Institute, 136 (8), accessed 9 April 2015 at http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2010-08/whatsnew-about-airsea-battle-concept. Lewis, J. (2014), ‘Yoda has left the building’, Foreign Policy, 24 October, accessed 23 April 2015 at http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/24/yoda-has-left-the-building/. CIA (2003), National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, p. 16, accessed 28 March 2016 at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/Counter_ Terrorism_Strategy.pdf. Blumenthal, D, and E. Linczer (2014), ‘Tale of the tape: comparing US and Chinese strategies in Asia’, The National Interest, 10 November, accessed 8 April 2015 at http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/balance-power-tale-the-tape-comparingchinese-american-11643?page=3. For a useful overview of definitions of net assessment, see Skypek, T. (2010), ‘Evaluating military balances through the lens of net assessment: history and application’, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 12 (2), 2. Ibid., p. 3. Bracken, P. (2006), ‘Net assessment: a practical guide’, Parameters, 36 (1), 90–100, accessed 28 March 2016 at http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/06bracken.pdf. Swaine et al., China’s Military and the US–Japan Alliance in 2030, p. 13. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Regarding the People’s Republic of China, p. 31. Swaine et al., China’s Military and the US–Japan Alliance in 2030, p. 89. See Pillsbury, M. (2000), China Debates the Future Security Environment, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press. Locker, R. (2013), ‘Pentagon analyzes potential China–India tensions’, USA Today, 30 August, accessed 18 Mary 2015 at http://www.usatoday.com/story/nation/2013/ 08/30/office-net-assessment-china-india-strategic-contest/2737017/. Frühling, Defence Planning and Uncertainty, p. 151. Ibid., pp. 27–8. Rosen, S. (2012), ‘Competitive strategies’. See, for instance, Desch, M.C. (2015), ‘Don’t worship at the altar of Andrew Marshall’, The National Interest, January–February, accessed 9 April 2015 at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-church-st-andy-11867. And for more sympathetic views of the Marshall legacy, see Krepinevich, A. and B. Watts (2015), The Last Warrior: Andrew Marshall and the Shaping of Modern American Defense Strategy, New York: Basic Books. Cited in Gibbons-Neff, T. (2015), ‘Pentagon chief issues new marching orders for Yoda office’, 10 June, accessed 11 June 2015 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ news/checkpoint/wp/2015/06/10/pentagon-chief-issues-new-marching-orders-for-yodaoffice/. Cited in Wittmeyer, A. (2013), ‘We’re all declinist pundits these days’, Foreign Policy, 2 January, accessed 13 April 2015 at http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/02/ were-all-declinist-pundits-these-days-recession-proof/. Cited in Zhao, interview with Wang Jisi. Nye, J.S. (2015), Is the American Century Over?, New York: Wiley.

Assessing the Sino–US power balance 339 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61.

Kagan, R. (2012), ‘Not fade away: the myth of American decline’, New Republic, 11 January, accessed 20 May 2015 at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/ magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism. Starrs, S. (2013), ‘American economic power hasn’t declined – it globalized! Summoning the data and taking globalization seriously’, International Studies Quarterly, 57 (4), 817–30. Pei, M. (2012), ‘Superpower denied? Why China’s rise may have already peaked’, The Diplomat, 9 August, accessed 17 June 2015 at http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/ superpower-denied-why-chinas-rise-may-have-already-peaked/. See Gilboy, G. and E. Heginbotham (2012), Chinese and Indian Strategic Behaviour: Growing Power and Alarm, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 2. Glaser, ‘A shifting balance’, p. 3. See Heng, Y.-K. (2007–08), ‘The return of net assessment’, Survival, 49 (4), 135–52. Cited in Jaffe, G. (2012), ‘US model for a future fans tension with China and inside Pentagon’, The Washington Post, 1 August, accessed 7 June 2015 at http://www. washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/US–model-for-a-future-war-fans-tensionswith-china-and-inside-pentagon/2012/08/01/gJQAC6F8PX_story.html.

18. China’s defense build-up: evaluating China’s military capabilities Yves-Heng Lim

Two decades after the last Taiwan crisis, the specter of a conflict continues to haunt US–China relations. Though Washington and Beijing have since recurrently stated that they do not – officially – consider each other as actual adversaries, areas of friction have been expanding. While, at the turn of the decade, the existence of a new assertive dimension to China’s foreign policy has been heatedly debated and flatly contested by some scholars,1 some Chinese initiatives – such as the unilateral declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone that encompasses the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 2013 or Beijing’s ‘polderization’ of some islands of the South China Sea for obvious military purposes over the last couple of years2 – have created some concerns about Beijing’s ulterior motives. Beyond occasional frictions, it is the whole dynamic of Sino–US relations, with the prospect of a ‘power transition’ that would put China at the top of the regional hierarchy in East Asia that raises questions about a potentially non-peaceful transition.3 A war between China and the United States would be, to quote Richard Bush and Michael O’Hanlon, ‘a war like no other’.4 This, of course, can be understood in many ways, but one obvious characteristic of a hypothetical Sino–US military conflict is that it would take place in the shadow of both nations’ nuclear arsenals, which makes large-scale ground operations impossible – though this does not mean that crucial infrastructures on land will be immune to attack.5 As a consequence, in a confrontation between the United States and China, it appears likely that both protagonists would try to limit the conflict to the four other domains that Chinese strategists consider as constitutive of contemporary warfare – that is, the sea, air, space and ‘electromagnetic’6 domains. This chapter proposes an overview of the evolution of Chinese capabilities by focusing on the three ‘traditional’ branches of its military forces that Beijing would have to mobilize in a confrontation with the United States7 – that is, naval, air and missile forces – and on two domains of the modern battlefield in which China has relatively new but rapidly progressing capabilities – space and cyberspace. 340

Evaluating China’s military capabilities 341

CHINA’S NAVAL POWER The last quarter century has witnessed the rapid rise of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). As of 2010, Bernard Cole concluded that the PLAN is ‘developing into a maritime force of twenty-first-century credibility in all areas – even if marginal in AAW, ASW [anti-air warfare, anti-submarine warfare], and force integration’.8 This tous azimuts (allround) modernization has radically transformed the structure of the PLAN and enhanced its ability to conduct sea denial, sea control and, to a certain extent, naval power projection missions. China’s sea denial capability has considerably grown over the last two-and-a-half decades. Chinese forces can already pose considerable challenges to the United States within the first chain of islands,9 and Beijing is currently trying to expand the maritime area in which it can efficiently deny command of the sea to its adversary deep into the Western Pacific. This development has been primarily supported by one of the most spectacular mutations of the PLA, which is the transformation of its submarine fleet.10 At the time of the 1995 Taiwan crisis, the fleet was composed of the obsolete Romeo – based on a Soviet model transferred in the 1950s – and slightly more advanced Ming SSK (diesel electric submarine) – which ran into technical problems, while its nuclear attack submarines – Han-class SSNs – were best known for their noisiness and their lack of reliability.11 Twenty years later, China boasts the largest diesel submarine fleet in the world, two-thirds of which are composed of Russian Kilo and indigenously-built Song and Yuan subs.12 With the purchase of 12 Kilo-class SSKs from Russia between 1993 and 2002, the PLAN acquired its first modern attack submarine, reportedly as quiet as the USS Los Angeles SSN when operating on batteries and equipped with the formidable Russian Klub-S ASM (anti-submarine missile).13 Contrary to what had occasionally been expected, the purchase of the Kilo did not sound the death knell for China’s indigenous Song SSK program. China now operates 13 Song, which is considered on a par with the ‘mid-1980s Western diesel submarine, which makes it … formidable, quiet submarine that will be very difficult to detect and locate, at least when the vessel operates on its batteries’.14 The Song has been succeeded by the Yuan-class SSK, the first of which was commissioned in 2006. The last Chinese Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) report mentions that the Yuan ‘has the added benefit of an air independent power (AIP) system and may have incorporated quieting technology from the Russian-designed KILO SS’.15 The presence of an AIP system onboard the Yuan allow it to stay

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submerged for extended periods of time and expand the geographic area the submarine can patrol,16 putting it in a possible position of ‘gatekeeper’17 at the chokepoints scattered around China near seas. The ONI report and the 2015 US Department of Defense (DoD) Report to Congress also indicate that the PLAN has finally developed a replacement for the short-range YJ-82 (22 NM), and that the brand-new YJ-18 – with a 290-NM range – should soon be installed on Song and Yuan submarines.18 China might finally have overcome the technical obstacles that made it suspend the production of Type-093 Shang-class SSNs in 2003 after only two units had been produced.19 In March 2015, Chinese media announced the launch of three Type-093G (Shang) SSNs,20 which are reportedly a much improved version of the earlier Shang that compare favorably with the Russian Oscar-class in terms of quietness and are probably equipped with the YJ-18.21 In parallel, recent developments in Chinese force structure indicate that China is now trying to reach beyond sea denial and build limited sea control and naval power projection capabilities. The most obvious sign of this evolution remains the commissioning, in September 2012, of the first ‘Chinese’ aircraft carrier – Liaoning (originally the Varyag) – after more than a decade of retrofitting – and denials about Chinese carrier ambitions.22 Three versions of the J-15 – trainer, multirole and EW (electronic warfare)23 – are in production, and media have reported J-15 training exercises at sea on multiple occasions.24 Beijing has been at the same time partially reorienting its acquisition of surface combatant towards platforms specialized in air defense such as the Luyang II-class – an Aegis-like destroyer25 – and the AAW Jiangkai II-class frigate, which have both been put into large-scale production.26 Moreover, Beijing seems to finally devote increased – though still modest – interest in ASW with the launch of ASW versions of the brand-new Jiangdao corvette and of the venerable Y-8 aircraft.27 Chinese progress in both AAW and ASW, together with the adjunction of additional SSN, clearly indicate that Beijing intends to field carrier battle groups in a very near future. This quest for new capabilities has not come to the detriment of the PLAN’s strength in anti-surface warfare. The 15 destroyers and 28 frigates that joined Chinese naval forces over the last 15 years carry high performance anti-ship missiles – the Chinese YJ-83, YJ-62 or the Russian Sunburn.28 Lighter platforms such as the Houbei FAC (fast-attack craft) or Jiangdao corvette – which could play a non-negligible role in the near seas29 – have also been equipped with such missiles. It is very unlikely that Chinese surface forces could hope to reach any measure of sea control in a confrontation with the US Navy – and it is therefore very unlikely that they will be used for such purposes30 – but when replaced in

Evaluating China’s military capabilities 343 a regional context, they currently largely overpower all their neighbors with the major exception of Japan.31 China has also made some progress in its capacity to project power from the sea onto the land, though the pattern of acquisition regarding amphibious platforms is arguably more difficult to interpret. Over the last ten years, China has acquired four 18 000-ton Yuzhao amphibious docks, which are each capable of transporting up to 800 troops and 20 tanks as well as four Z-8 helicopters.32 At the same time, however, since 2006 China has simply stopped building the type of medium and large amphibious ships that would be most useful in a Taiwan invasion scenario. This tends to suggest that the PLAN is expanding its views well beyond the island, as the Yuzhao is a perfect fit for ‘South China Sea island seizure and potentially even overseas expeditionary warfare’.33 Like China’s sea control forces, the PLAN’s power projection assets would be extremely vulnerable in any conflict involving the United States, but against China’s weaker neighbors they undoubtedly provide Beijing with a potent tool to impose its own views on territorial disputes in the near seas.

CHINA’S AIR POWER Over the last quarter of a century, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) has undergone a transformation on the same scale as the one experienced by the PLAN. The scope of the change can be easily grasped by the simple comparison made by David Shlapak: ‘Today [in 2010] almost a third of the PLAAF’s fighter-bombers are fourth-generation jets; yet as recently as 2000, they made up only 2 percent of the force’.34 Like the PLAN, the PLAAF has at the same time considerably reinforced its capacity to conduct its traditional mission – that is, defending China against airborne threats – and envisioned for itself new, more offensive-minded missions.35 China entered the post–Cold War and faced the 1995 Taiwan crisis with a very large but antiquated air force. The PLAAF then had more than 4000 combat aircrafts, but could only count on two dozen of fourth-generation fighters – that is, the Su-27 it had purchased from Russia in 1991.36 The bulk of PLAAF aircrafts were obsolete J-5, J-6/Q-5, J-7 – based respectively on the MiG-17, MiG-19 and MiG-21, which were all introduced in Soviet forces in the 1950s – with 100 of the more advanced J-8 completing the picture.37 The PLAAF was then clearly outclassed not only by Japanese and South Korean Air Forces, but also by its Taiwanese counterpart.38 Had a crisis occurred and escalated

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in the Taiwan Strait in the second half of the 1990s, China would not only have had little chance of successfully contesting US and Taiwanese air superiority in the Strait,39 but also faced significant problems in fulfilling its core mission of defending Chinese territory against potential air threats.40 Today’s PLAAF shares very little with this former version of itself. The number of combat aircrafts has been cut by two-thirds, and almost half of this force is composed of fourth-generation fighter jets. As of 2015, the PLAAF operates 650 fourth-generation fighter aircraft, which qualifies it as the second-largest modern air force in the world, ahead of Russia.41 A little more than one-third of this fleet is composed of Russian Su-27 (J-11 in Chinese nomenclature) and Su-30MK aircraft, which were purchased in the 1990s and early 2000s.42 The Chinese Air Force currently operates 170 air superiority Su-27/J-11 fighters – which are often put in the same class as the F-15C – and 73 multirole Su-30 – whose performances have been sometimes compared with those of the French Rafale.43 One intriguing development in Sino–Russian cooperation occurred in 2004 when production of the J-11 stopped after only 105 units had rolled off the assembly line. Beijing had signed a deal for the local assembly of 200 Su-27/J-11 in 1996 but Russia then unhappily discovered that Beijing had developed its own ‘indigenous’ multirole version of the fighter dubbed J-11B.44 Aside from the purchase – and vampirizing – of Russian fighters, and in spite of continuing deficiencies in some crucial sectors – such as the production of high-performance turbofan engines – Beijing has made considerable progress in the indigenous development and production of military aircrafts. After decades of development and delays, the JH-7 and the J-10 joined the PLAAF in 2003 and 2004. The fighter-bomber JH-7 – comparable to the European Tornado produced between 1979 and 1998, and still active in the German, Italian and British Air Forces45 – is rapidly replacing the remaining Q-5 and can notably be fitted with either YJ-83 ASM and the Kh-31P/YJ-91 anti-radiation missile.46 China’s most important achievement remains, to date, the completion of long-awaited multirole J-10 program, which reportedly ‘drew on Israel’s … [cancelled] Lavi advanced fighter … [which], in turn, drew heavily on US technology, including some associated with the … F-16 fighter’.47 Unsurprisingly, the J-10 has performances that have been recurrently compared with those of the F-16C,48 and can fulfill both air superiority – carrying Chinese PL-8, PL-11 and PL-12 AAM (air-to-air missiles) – and surface attack mission – carrying YJ-series or Kh-31/YJ-91 missiles.49 Pushing the PLAAF a little further into the ‘informationized’ age, China has also produced a very limited number of AWACS (airborne early warning and

Evaluating China’s military capabilities 345 control system aircraft), the KJ-2000, based on a Russian Il-76 airframe, and the lower-end KJ-200, based on the venerable Y-8.50 With more than 500 fourth-generation fighters, the PLAAF has today probably acquired the means to fulfill its primary mission of defending the Chinese territory against any conceivable air threat, but also to contest US air supremacy above and in the immediate vicinity of Chinese territory. Over this geographical area, the PLAAF could, moreover, leverage its increasingly thicker land-based air defense. China started purchasing 150-km-range S-300PMU1 SAM (surface-to-air) systems in 1992 and acquired two batches of the more advanced 200-km-range S-300PMU2 in the second half of the 2000s51 – which it has since reportedly been reverse-engineered and duplicated. Beijing launched its own indigenously-built 200-km-range HQ-9/FT-2000 at the end of the 1990s.52 China’s already robust air defense will also soon be supplemented by the brand-new Russian S-400 – with a 400-km range – as well as its Chinese equivalent the HQ-19.53 The rapid change of the PLAAF order of battle also makes China much more capable of conducting the kind of ‘offensive’ and strike missions that have been added to the PLAAF doctrine in recent years.54 While China’s explanation – that is, that the Russian fighter did not meet PLAAF needs anymore – of the abovementioned Su-27/J-11 incident might simply be post-hoc rationalization, it is nonetheless noticeable that China has since focused on multirole, as opposed to air superiority, fighters – that is, the J-10 and J-11B. The PLAAF capacity to conduct strike missions will be considerably enhanced by the introduction of the J-20 probably sometime before the end of the decade. According to Robert Haddick, China’s fifth-generation strike fighter could have a combat radius of 2000 km and ‘could be armed with a smart, precision air-to-surface missile with a range up to 1000 kilometers, similar to the US Air Force’s JASSM-ER missile’.55 One noticeable missing piece of the PLAAF puzzle, especially in a context in which China has recognized the ‘strategic’ role of the air power, is a long-range strategic bomber. The PLAAF only operates around 100 of the venerable medium-range H-6 – the largest part of which has been converted into cruise/anti-missile carriers.56 China was reportedly interested in the Russian Tu-22M Backfire at the turn of the millennium,57 but rumors about a deal have been recurrently denied by both parties. Artists’ impressions of possible Chinese stealth bombers – sometime dubbed H-20 – have also proliferated on the web and very low-quality pictures have raised doubts about a secret stealth bomber program,58 but Beijing, as of mid-2015, still had no – official – plans for such aircraft.

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CHINA’S MISSILE POWER One way to make a ballpark assessment of Chinese progresses regarding the – large – array of missiles operated by the Second Artillery Corps is to compare Chinese performance in the 1995 Taiwan crisis and its ambition with the fielding of the DF-21D ASBM (anti-ship ballistic missile) at the turn of the decade. In an angry reply to President Lee Teng-Hui’s visit to Cornell at the beginning of June 1995, China announced that missile tests would take place a few tens of miles north of the island. Of the six DF-15 SRBMs (short-range ballistic missiles) fired at the end of July, only half hit inside the target area, with one missile malfunctioning and being reportedly destroyed by ground controllers, and two others hitting outside the splash zone.59 These poor performances were, to a certain extent, reflected in the missile’s technical specifications: the SRBM had a reported Circular Error Probable (CEP) of 300 m for a 600-km range – against, for instance, a CEP of 5 m for a 500-km range for the French Hades that was retired in 1996.60 By contrast, one of China’s most spectacular achievements in the last few years has been the development and deployment of the first ASBM system. The DF-21D ASBM reached ‘initial operational capability’61 in 2010 and has since been progressively introduced in the Second Artillery Corps.62 Though doubts remain regarding China’s current capacity to manage the complex architecture that leads from detection to strike,63 the actual fielding of the DF-21D suggests that Beijing is confident that it is capable of overcoming such challenges and that it will be soon or is already in possession of a relatively reliable and sufficiently accurate64 1500-km-range anti-carrier ‘trump card’. As impressive as it is, the DF-21D might nonetheless only be a stepping stone as the new 3200-kmrange DF-25 is reported to have an ASBM version.65 ASBM progress has been matched by the development of long-range ASCMs (anti-ship cruise missiles).66 China is already in possession of at least two different long-range ASCM programs. The last ONI report suggests that though the maximum range of the YJ-62 in its export version is 650 NM, the domestic version of the missile probably ‘has much longer range, while Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems mentions a range “in excess of 2,000 km if required”’.67 Recent media reports have also shed light on an ASM version of the CJ-10, which might have ‘an effective range between 1,500 and 2,500 km’ and be capable of sinking ‘a 7,000 to 10,000-ton guided-missile cruiser with a single hit’.68 Individually, Chinese ASCMs and, above all, ASBMs69 would already be difficult to defeat, but in

Evaluating China’s military capabilities 347 saturation strikes70 involving different types of missiles possibly distributed in successive waves, it is very likely that the defenses of a carrier strike group would quickly be overwhelmed – especially as current shipborne missile defense systems cannot be rearmed at sea.71 Increased accuracy has not been the hallmark of anti-ship missiles only, and China’s conventional missile force as a whole has benefited from such improvements. This might be nowhere as visible as in the Taiwan Strait. Among the 1200 to 2000 SRBM that China currently aims at Taiwan72 are the DF-11A and the DF-15A whose CEPs have been reduced to 30 m and the DF-15B whose CEP is as low as 5 m.73 This evolution has obvious and dramatic consequences on the balance of force in the Strait. A detailed report published by the RAND in 2009 pointed out that the PLA could disable all Taiwanese runways with a salvo of 60 to 200 missiles – assuming a CEP of 30 m – putting a conclusion to the air battle even before Taiwanese fighters had a chance to take off.74 At the same time, the Second Artillery Corps has acquired the means to conduct conventional strikes well beyond Taiwan. The 2015 Department of Defense report to Congress points out that: China is increasing the lethality of its conventional missile force by fielding a new ballistic missile, the CSS-11 (DF-16), which possesses a range of 800–1,000 km. The CSS-11, coupled with the already deployed conventional variant of the CSS-5 (DF-21) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), will improve China’s ability to strike not only Taiwan, but other regional targets.75

In addition, the maturation of the DF-25, with a probable range superior to 3200 km and a CEP of 10 m76 will soon add Guam to the list of potential targets for the Chinese conventional ballistic missiles. China has a wide array of foreign and indigenously developed land-attack cruise missiles, most of them air-launched, with ranges up to 200 km.77 The introduction of the CJ/DH-1078 in the mid-2000s has provided the PLA with an LACM (land attack cruise missile) capable of attacking targets beyond 1500 km off the Chinese coasts, adding a layer of threat against regional targets. This again might only be a stepping-stone as longerrange versions of the missile are reportedly under development.79

CHINA’S SPACE POWER Like in the other ‘commons’,80 Chinese efforts and successes in space can be measured along two dimensions defined by its capability to deny space control to a potential adversary and to exert control over space for its own benefits. China’s space denial efforts were illustrated by the

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ASAT (anti-satellite weapons) test conducted on 11 January 2007, during which a kinetic kill vehicle carried by a DF-21 destroyed a Fengyun-1 weather satellite81 – incidentally establishing a new record with 2.317 trackable debris spread in Low Earth Orbit. China’s direct ascent ASAT test constituted a remarkable technical achievement. The targeted ‘satellite was destroyed by a unitary hit-to-kill payload – a bullet hitting a bullet’ with ‘no evidence that Chinese space managers manipulated the flight parameters of the target satellite before the mission’.82 Another ASAT test was conducted in May 2013 – though Beijing has not acknowledged the military nature of the test – this time at high-altitude. The test was probably conducted with a modified version of the DF-31 missile or of the Kuaizhou rocket, which reportedly delivered its payload approaching geostationary orbit83 on which are located a large number of US military communication satellites as well as other crucial military satellites such as some of the missile warning SBIRS (space-based infrared system) satellites.84 China has also conducted missile defense test that have obvious implications for Chinese ASAT capabilities,85 and an official missile defense test conducted in July 2014 has been depicted as a simple cover-up for another Low Earth Orbit ASAT test.86 China has also devoted significant efforts to the development of more exotic ASAT technologies. There are strong suspicions that China has developed co-orbital satellites ‘that come within a close distance to another satellite to interfere with, disable, or destroy the target satellite’ and are extremely difficult to identify as they can be integrated in satellites that ‘serve legitimate peacetime functions’.87 Other technologies such as the robotic arm that was first tested in 2013 could be used for disabling enemy satellites.88 Beijing has been reportedly developing directed-energy weapons for ASAT purposes.89 A ground-based laser was used in summer 2006 to illuminate a US satellite – though it is unclear whether the laser was used to test it as an ASAT weapon or a range-finder for another ASAT system.90 Other systems using microwaves that ‘temporarily or permanently disable electronic components through overheating or shortcircuiting’91 might also be under development. Beijing’s acquisition of a solid space denial capability has been mirrored by its efforts to build up a capacity to use space for military purposes – though China continues to adhere officially to a strict non-weaponization of space policy. As of early 2015, China had the second largest presence in space with 132 satellites, one-third of which were under direct military control.92 One of the most visible achievements of the Chinese space program has been the development of a competitor to the GPS, the BeiDou navigation system, which became operational in 2012 – though initial coverage was restricted to Asia and

Evaluating China’s military capabilities 349 Oceania.93 Around half of the planned 35 satellites have been launched as of 2015 and the system should offer global coverage by 2020. Kevin Pollpeter reports that ‘BeiDou is increasingly used by the Chinese military at the regiment level and above and is reportedly being integrated into weapon guidance systems’.94 Other successes include the launch of a set of all-weather remote-sensing and surveillance satellites, which benefit from increasingly higher resolution. A 2011 research note by the Project 2049 Institute reported the build-up of ‘a robust network of ELINT and imagery satellites in order to locate and track large warships, mobile air defense systems, and other critical defense systems’.95 Typifying this evolution, three of the Yaogan satellites launched after 2010 carry ELINT systems in addition to their usual high-resolution imaging capacity. In 2014, the Gaofen-2 ‘became China’s first satellite capable of sub-meter resolution imaging’,96 putting the Chinese satellite on an approximate par with Western systems. In a conflict, Chinese satellites would, however, be vulnerable to the same set of threats that Beijing has developed to counter US primacy in space. To palliate these vulnerabilities, Beijing seems to have opted for emergency replacement of destroyed assets – as hardening remains an extremely challenging task. According to Kevin Pollpeter: [the] development of the Kuaizhou and Long March-11 launch vehicles, both solid-fueled rockets, provide China with the capability to launch relatively small satellites rapidly if other satellites were to be destroyed or degraded. Although not as capable as larger satellites, these smaller satellites would be ‘good enough’ to meet the needs of the Chinese warfighter.97

From a more general perspective, ‘good enough’ or ‘sufficiency’ might – at least temporarily – be an adequate way to envision the PLA’s space requirements – though Beijing is ultimately aiming at ‘space supremacy’.98 China probably does not have to be on a par with the United States in terms of space power and assets to be able to achieve some of its limited objectives. A capacity to sufficiently degrade US space-based C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) so that power projection across the Pacific becomes unmanageable might be all that Beijing needs, even if the overall balance remains in favor of the United States.

CHINA’S CYBER POWER The publication of a new edition of the authoritative Science of Military Strategy99 by the Chinese Academy of Military Science at the end of

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2013 brought its lot of ‘unsurprising surprises’. One of them undoubtedly was the acknowledgment of what China observers had known for years, that the PLA had formed teams of cyber-warriors in charge of conducting defensive and offensive operations in the cyberspace – and, incidentally, that Beijing had been blatantly lying about it for years.100 The exact scope of Chinese efforts and capacities remains uncertain if only because ‘‘cyber-weapons’ are not publicly viewable and quantifiable in the same sense as submarines or aircraft’,101 but the list of cyberattacks attributed to state-sponsored Chinese hackers against foreign – and more particularly US – governmental structures and private organizations over the last decade or so is, to say the least, disquieting.102 To date, as pointed out by James Lewis, most of what has been qualified as Chinese cyberattacks have not been attacks in the traditional – war-causing – sense of the word, but rather sophisticated espionage.103 It remains, nonetheless, that the scale of some breaches by the PLA hackers has become staggering. Attacks conducted against the US Office of Personnel Management in 2014 and 2015 have allowed China to access potentially sensitive information about tens of thousands and then millions of government employees, leaving some of them possibly vulnerable to blackmail or extortion.104 Beijing’s proficiency in the domain of data theft has been exposed in the often-quoted Mandiant report, which concluded that ‘APT1 [that is, the largest ‘Advanced Persistent Threat’] is Unit 61398’, a constitutive part of the PLA that has been charged with the mission of ‘commit[ting] systematic cyber espionage and data theft against organizations around the world’.105 Part of the data stolen by this unit or possibly others with links to the PLA has direct military applications. Over the past decade, Chinese cyber-warriors have accessed confidential information about systems as sensitive as the PAC-3 missile system, the F-18 or the F-35.106 These ‘peacetime’ actives might, however, not be a reliable indicator of how Chinese cyber-warfare units would perform against a fully prepared adversary in an open conflict. Desmond Ball remarked, for instance, in 2011 that ‘there is no evidence that China’s cyber warriors can penetrate highly secure networks or covertly steal or falsify critical data’.107 This, however, might only be half good news as it leaves China with the – escalatory – option of targeting softer victims with the ultimate aim of paralyzing or crippling the adversary’s economic, social and political systems.108 On the defensive side, China itself remains vulnerable to cyber threats as illustrated, for instance, by ‘[r]ampant cybercrime [which] is a result, in part, of China’s below-average cyber defenses’109 or recurrent claims by the Chinese government that it is ‘one of the major victims of hacker attacks’.110 Well aware of these weaknesses, Beijing has taken steps to

Evaluating China’s military capabilities 351 render its own networks more secure against external threats. Desmond Ball reports that, at the turn of the decade, Beijing ‘has mandated the use of Kylin a highly secure, Unix-based operating system, apparently much more secure than Microsoft server software, which China’s University of Science and Technology for National Defense developed, and installation of which began on government and military systems in 2009’.111 In a hearing before the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, Kevin Coleman bluntly stated that this migration made US ‘offensive cyber capabilities ineffective against [Chinese systems] given the cyber weapons were designed to be used against Linux, UNIX and Windows’.112 A Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) report also points out that the Chinese government continues to hold a very tight grip on its domestic networks and might simply decide to pull the plug and ‘disconnect China’s Internet from all external portions of the Internet’.113 In peacetime, such decisions would cause insuperable damages to the Chinese economy, but in wartime, or after a Chinese first ‘cyberstrike’, such a move would ‘potentially reduce significantly its opponents’ ability to retaliate and inflict comparable damage on China in a cyber-counterstrike’.114 Though progresses made in securing Chinese networks can be seen as a purely defensive move, they might also be part of more destabilizing calculations as Beijing might come to consider that a confrontation in cyberspace would be more detrimental to US than Chinese forces, and even more so if China takes the initiative.

BY WAY OF CONCLUSION: CHINA’S NUCLEAR POWER ‘Thinking about the unthinkable’ with ‘Chinese characteristics’ would go well beyond the limits of this conclusion, but occasional – more or less veiled – nuclear threats by some high-ranking Chinese military officers115 and possible doubts regarding Beijing’s commitment to its historic ‘no first use’ pledge116 make it impossible to simply bypass the development of China’s nuclear arsenal. From a broad perspective, the modernization of Chinese nuclear forces has kept pace with the overall evolution of the PLA. Beijing has taken important steps to reduce the critical vulnerabilities of its nuclear deterrent. China began to deploy a new generation of ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) – DF-31 – at the turn of the millennium. Compared with its liquid-propellant predecessors – which required hours of preparation before launch117 – the solid-propellant DF-31 is road-mobile and has been tested with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles

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(MIRV).118 There are two known versions of the ICBM – DF-31 and DF-31A – with estimated range of 8000 and 10 000/14 000 km – depending on the carried payload. A new ICBM – DF-41 – probably capable of carrying up to ten 90kT warheads over 12 000 to 14 000 km is currently under development.119 China has also enhanced the survivability of its nuclear deterrent with the launch of four Jin-class SSBNs (ballistic missile submarines).120 Each Jin carries 12 JL-2 missiles that have a reported range of 8000 km and can be MIRVed.121 China’s sea-based deterrent continues, nonetheless, to suffer from undeniable weaknesses: the Jin’s relative noisiness makes it vulnerable to detection122 and if its patrols are confined to a near sea ‘bastion’, the limited range of the JL-2 leaves the continental United States out of reach – though Guam and Hawaii would still be within range. This, however, is likely to be only temporary as a new generation of SSBNs – dubbed Type-096 – and a longer-range JL-3 are reportedly already under development.123 In this sense, there is probably no fundamental difference in the way we should apprehend China’s nuclear modernization when put in the perspective of China’s overall military build-up: what counts is less the current state of affairs than the trajectory.

NOTES 1.

2.

3.

4. 5.

Jerden, B. (2014), ‘The assertive China narrative: why it is wrong and how so many still bought into it’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 7 (1), 47–88; Johnston, A.I. (2013), ‘How new and assertive is China’s new assertiveness?’, International Security, 37 (4), 7–48. Roy, D. (2015), ‘China is playing offense, not defense, in the South China Sea’, The Diplomat, 4 June, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/china-isplaying-offense-not-defense-in-the-south-china-sea/; Osawa, J. (2014), ‘China’s ADIZ over the East China Sea: a “great wall in the sky”?’, 17 December, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/12/17-china-airdefense-identification-zone-osawa. On power transition, see among others, Rapkin, D. and W. Thompson (2003), ‘Power transition, challenge and the (re)emergence of China’, International Interactions, 29 (4), 315–42; Lemke, D. (2002), Regions of War and Peace, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. For an optimistic view regarding US leadership, see Chan, S. (2007), China, the US and the Power-Transition Theory: A Critique, London: Routledge. O’Hanlon, M.E. and R.C. Bush (2007), A War Like No Other: The Truth About China’s Challenge to America, Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Both Chinese works on local war under high-tech/informationized conditions and the AirSea Battle concept explicitly envision such attacks. See Zhang, Y., S. Yu and X. Zhou (2006), Military Campaign Studies, Beijing: Guofang Daxue Chubanshe and

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6. 7. 8. 9.

10. 11. 12. 13.

14. 15. 16.

17.

18.

19. 20. 21. 22.

Xue, X. (2001), Campaign Theory Study Guide, Beijing: Guofang Daxue Chubanshe; and the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments report: Van Tol, J., M. Gunzinger, A. Krepinevich and J. Thomas (2010), AirSea Battle: A Point-ofDeparture Operational Concept, p. 40, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://www. csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/2010.05.18-AirSea-Battle.pdf. Zhang, Yu and Zhou, Military Campaign Studies, p. 48. For a comprehensive overview of Chinese ground forces, see Blasko, D.J. (2012), The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, London: Routledge. Cole, B.D. (2010), The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in the Twenty-First Century, 2nd edition, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, p. 113. The first chain depicted by Chinese authors runs from the Japanese Archipelago to the Philippines and basically encompasses the eastern limits of the South China Sea. See, for instance, Feng, L. and T. Zhuan (2007), ‘Characteristics of China’s sea geostrategic security and sea security strategy in the new century’, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, 20 (1), 23. The development of land-based long-range anti-ship missiles is discussed below. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (2015), The Military Balance 2015, London: IISS/Routledge, p. 239. Saunders, S. (2011), Jane’s Fighting Ships, Coulsdon, UK: Jane’s Group Information, p. 134; Murray, W.S. (2007), ‘An overview of the PLAN submarine force’, in A.S. Erickson, L.J. Goldstein, W.S. Murray and A.R. Wilson (eds), China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, pp. 59–77. Murray, ‘An overview’, p. 61. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) (2015), The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century, p. 16, accessed 28 March 2016 at https://fas.org/nuke/ guide/china/plan-2015.pdf. When running on battery at low speed (3 knots [kn]), AIP have a typical submerged endurance of 1500 nautical miles (NM) against 400 for the Kilo. See Psallidas, K., C.A. Whitcomb and J.C. Hootman (2010), ‘Design of conventional submarines with advanced air independent propulsion systems and determination of corresponding theater-level impacts’, Naval Engineers Journal, 122 (1), 111–23. Dutton, P. (2009), Scouting, Signaling, and Gatekeeping: Chinese Naval Operations in Japanese Waters and the International Law Implications, accessed 27 July 2015 at https://www.usnwc.edu/Research—Gaming/China-Maritime-Studies-Institute/ Publications/documents/CMS2_Dutton.aspx. ONI, The PLA Navy. See also Department of Defense (2015), Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf. The DoD report plainly states that ‘China’s newest indigenous submarine-launched ASCM, the YJ-18 and its variants, represents a dramatic improvement over the SS-N-27 [Klub]’ (p. 18). Saunders, Jane’s Fighting Ships, p. 131. People’s Daily (2015), ‘Commentary: the 093G could take on [JMSDF] Izumo in a real war’, 1 April, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://m2.people.cn/r/ MV80XzI1ODA2NTJfMTc4NF8xNDI3ODU1ODEw [in Chinese]. ONI, The PLA Navy, p. 19. Erickson, A.S., A.M. Denmark and G. Collins (2012), ‘Beijing’s “starter carrier” and future steps: alternative and implications’, Naval War College Review, 65 (1), 15–54. As a ‘short takeoff but arrested recovery’ carrier, the Liaoning is a tool fit for air/sea control rather than strike missions: see Li, N. and C. Weuve (2010), ‘China’s aircraft carrier ambitions: an update’, Naval War College Review, 63 (1), 20.

354 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

32.

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Handbook of US–China relations Errymath (2014), ‘Shenyang makes progress on J-15 fleet’ [blog], accessed 28 March 2016 at http://errymath.blogspot.com/2014/11/shenyang-makes-progress-on-j15-fleet.html#.VvqlsT9EKVQ. Huanqiu (2015), ‘Ten J-15 in production have initial combat capability’, 13 January, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2015-01/5392179.html. Bussert, J.C. and B.A. Elleman (2011), People’s Liberation Army Navy: Combat Systems Technology, 1949–2010, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. IISS, The Military Balance 2015. Panda, A. (2015), ‘With fourth “submarine-killer” Corvette, China makes ASW headway’, The Diplomat, 17 May, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://thediplomat.com/ 2015/05/with-fourth-submarine-killer-corvette-china-makes-asw-headway/. Wertheim, E. (2013), The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea. This very simple but often forgotten principle was first formulated more than a century ago by Julian Corbett. See Corbett, J.S. (2004), Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, p. 115. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces have, however, been depicted as ‘an unbalanced force’, which would face major problems in confronting the PLAN alone. See Holmes, J.R. (2012), ‘Japan’s Cold War Navy’, The Diplomat, 15 October, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://thediplomat.com/2012/10/japans-cold-warnavy/. Wertheim, The Naval Institute Guide. An even larger landing helicopter dock amphibious assault ship might be under development; see Fisher, R.D. (2015), ‘LHD model hints at potential Chinese requirements’, IHS Jane’s 360, 23 April, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://www.janes.com/article/50920/lhd-model-hints-at-potentialchinese-requirements. Erickson, A.S. (2015), ‘How U.S. Navy intel sees China’s maritime forces’, War on the Rocks, 10 April, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://warontherocks.com/2015/04/ how-u-s-navy-intel-sees-chinas-maritime-forces/. Shlapak, D. (2012), ‘Equipping the PLAAF: the long march to modernity’, in R.P. Hallion, R. Cliff and P.C. Saunders (eds), The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concept, Roles and Capabilities, Washington, DC: NDU Press, p. 193. Tanner, M.S. (2012), ‘The missions of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force’. IISS (1995), The Military Balance 1995, London: IISS/Routledge, p. 178. Jackson, P. (2001), Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, Coulsdon, UK: Jane’s Information Group. Scobell, A. (1999), Show of Force: The PLA and the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/10091/scobell.pdf. An in-depth study by RAND published in 2000 shows that the involvement of two carrier groups and US forces at Kadena would have had every chance to give Taiwanese and US forces complete command of the skies. See Shlapak, D.A., D.T. Orletsky and B.A. Wilson (2000), Dire Strait? Military Aspects of the China–Taiwan Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, p. 39. Shlapak, ‘Equipping the PLAAF’, p. 209. IISS, The Military Balance 2015. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (2015), ‘Arms transfer database’, accessed 27 July at http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers. The PLAAF also purchased 24 Su-30MKK2 (naval strike version). Haddick, R. (2015), ‘China’s offensive missile forces: implications for the United States; testimony before the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission’, 1 April, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/ Haddick%20USCC%20Testimony%201%20April%202015.pdf.

Evaluating China’s military capabilities 355 44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59.

60. 61.

62. 63. 64. 65. 66.

Jackson, Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft; Saunders, P.C. and J.K. Wiseman (2012), ‘China’s quest for advanced aviation technologies’, Hallion, Cliff and Saunders, The Chinese Air Force, pp. 302–4. Shen, P.-L. (2012), ‘China’s aviation industry: past, present and future’, in Hallion, Cliff and Saunders, The Chinese Air Force, p. 262. Jackson, Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, p. 157. Fisher, R.D. (2010), China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, p. 94. Cliff, R. (2010), ‘The development of China’s air force capabilities; testimony presented before the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission’, 20 May, accessed 28 March 2016 at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/ testimonies/2010/RAND_CT346.pdf. Jackson, Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, p. 113. IISS, The Military Balance 2015. SIPRI, ‘Arms transfer database’. Lennox, D. (2011), Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, Coulsdon, UK: Jane’s Information Group, pp. 14–15. Putz, C. (2015), ‘Sold: Russian S-400 missile defense systems to China’, The Diplomat, 14 April 2015, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/ sold-russian-s-400-missile-defense-systems-to-china/; Lennox, Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems. Tanner, ‘The missions of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force’. Haddick, ‘China’s offensive missile forces’. Jackson, Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft. Fisher, R.D. (1999), ‘Foreign arms acquisition and PLA modernization’, in J.R. Lilley and D. Shambaugh (eds), Chinas Military Faces the Future, Washington, DC: AEI/M.E. Sharpe, p. 147. Lamothe, D. (2013), ‘Is this China’s new stealth bomber?’, Foreign Policy, 30 December, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/30/is-thischinas-new-stealth-bomber/?wp_login_redirect=0. Copper, J.F. (2006), Playing with Fire: The Looming War with China over Taiwan, Westport, CT: Praeger, pp. 143–4; Fisher, R.D. (1997), ‘China’s missiles over the Taiwan Strait: a political and military assessment’, in J.R. Lilley and C. Downs (eds), Crisis in the Strait, Washington, DC: NDU Press, pp. 169–71. The second set of ‘missile tests’ in March 1996 would be much more satisfying as all fired missiles hit inside the target zones. CEP is the radius of the circle inside which a missile has a 50 percent chance of landing. Collins, G. and A.S. Erickson (2010), ‘China deploys world’s first long-range, land-based “carrier killer”: DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) reaches “initial operational capability” (IOC)’, China SignPost, 26 December, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://www.chinasignpost.com/2010/12/26/china-deploys-worlds-firstlong-range-land-based-carrier-killer-df-21d-anti-ship-ballistic-missile-asbm-reachesinitial-operational-capability-ioc/. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments. Hagt, E. and M. Durnin (2009), ‘China’s antiship ballistic missile: developments and missing links’, Naval War College Review, 62 (4), 87–115. At the time it reached IOC, Collins and Erickson mention that some Chinese sources suggested that the DF-21D had a CEP of ‘dozens of meters’ (Collins and Erickson, ‘China deploys world’s first long-range, land-based “carrier killer”’). Lennox, Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems. Gormley, D.M., A.S. Erickson and J. Yuan (2014), A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier: Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions, Washington, DC: NDU.

356 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72.

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Handbook of US–China relations ONI, The PLA Navy; Lennox, Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, p. 8. Xu, L. (2013), ‘So this is what the CJ-10 really looks like?’, Huanqiu, 18 March, accessed 26 March 2016 at http://mil.huanqiu.com/photo_china/2013-03/2686083. html [in Chinese]. See also Lennox, Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems. ONI (2009), A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics, p. 26, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://fas.org/irp/agency/oni/pla-navy.pdf. Erickson, A.S. and D.D. Yang (2009), ‘Using the land to control the sea: Chinese analysts consider the antiship ballistic missile’, Naval War College Review, 62 (4), 54–86. Van Tol, Gunzinger, Krepinevich and Thomas, AirSea Battle. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments, p. 47; Jennings, R. (2010), ‘China on track to aim 2,000 missiles at Taiwan: report’, Reuters, 19 July, accessed 28 March 2016 at http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCATRE66I 13F20100719. Lennox, Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems. Shlapak, D.A., D.T. Orletsky and T.I. Reid et al. (2009), A Question of Balance: Political Context and Military Aspects of the China–Taiwan Dispute, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, p. 43. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments, p. 16. Lennox, Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, p. 28. Gormley et al., A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier, pp. 25–6. There is some confusion around the denomination of the missile, which has also reportedly been named HN-2. See Easton, I. (2009), The Assassin Under the Radar: China’s DH-10 Cruise Missile Program, Futuregram, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://project2049.net/documents/assassin_under_radar_china_cruise_missile.pdf; Gormley et al., A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier. Lennox, Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems; Cole, J.M. (2012), ‘China’s growing long-range strike capability’, The Diplomat, 13 August, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/chinas-growing-long-range-strike-capability/. Posen, B. (2003), ‘Command of the commons: the military foundation of US hegemony’, International Security, 28 (1), 5–46. Easton, I. (2009), ‘The great game in space: China’s evolving ASAT weapons programs and their implications for future U.S. strategy’, 24 June, p. 2, accessed 27 July 2015 at https://project2049.net/documents/china_asat_weapons_the_great_ game_in_space.pdf. Tellis, A.J. (2007), ‘Punching the U.S. military’s “soft ribs”: China’s antisatellite weapon test in strategic perspective’, CEIP Policy Brief, No. 51, 1, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pb_51_tellis_final.pdf. Fisher, R.D. (2015), ‘Testimony of Richard D. Fisher Jr. – Senior Fellow, Asian Military Affairs, International Assessment and Strategy Center, before the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China Space and CounterSpace Issues’, 18 February, p. 142, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://origin.www.uscc. gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/February%2018%2C%202015_Transcript.pdf. Union of Concerned Scientists (2015), UCS Satellite Database, 31 January, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/ solutions/space-weapons/ucs-satellite-database.html. Pollpeter, K. (2015), in ‘Testimony before the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission for the Hearing on “China’s Space and Counterspace Programs”’, 18 February, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/ default/files/transcripts/February%2018%2C%202015_Transcript.pdf/. Rose, F.A. (2015), ‘Ballistic missile defense and strategic stability in East Asia’, 20 February, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2015/237746.htm. Pollpeter, ‘Testimony’, p. 17.

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105. 106.

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Ibid., p. 18. Easton, ‘The great game in space’; Department of Defense (2011), Military and Security Developments. Easton, ‘The great game in space’, p. 4. Pollpeter, ‘Testimony’, p. 17. Union of Concerned Scientists, UCS Satellite Database. Less one out of ten Chinese satellites on the list has been launched for purely commercial purposes. Zhao, S., Z. Yao, X. Zhuang and M. Lu (2014), ‘Analysis on coverage ability of BeiDou navigation satellite system for manned spacecraft’, Acta Astronautica, 105 (2), 487–94. Pollpeter, ‘Testimony’. Easton, I. and M. Stokes (2011), ‘China’s electronic intelligence (ELINT) satellite developments: implications for U.S. air and naval operations’, 23 February, p. 4, accessed 27 July 2015 at https://project2049.net/documents/china_electronic_ intelligence_elint_satellite_developments_easton_stokes.pdf. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments, p. 13. Pollpeter, ‘Testimony’, p. 13. Ibid., p. 15. Department of Military Strategy Studies, Academy of Military Science (2013), Science of Military Strategy, Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, pp. 194–6. McReynolds, J. (2015), ‘China’s evolving perspectives on network warfare: lessons from The Science of Military Strategy,’ China Brief, 15 (8), accessed 27 July 2015 at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5 D=43798&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=789&no_cache=1; Gady, F.-S. (2015), ‘Why the PLA revealed its secret plans for cyber war’, The Diplomat, 24 March, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/why-the-pla-revealed-itssecret-plans-for-cyber-war/. McReynolds, ‘China’s evolving perspectives on network warfare’. See the impressive list compiled in Ball, D. (2011), ‘China’s cyber warfare capabilities’, Security Challenges, 7 (2), 81–103; Mandiant Corporation (2013), APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, p. 23, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://intelreport.mandiant.com/. Lewis, J.A. (2013), ‘Five myths about Chinese hackers’, The Washington Post, 22 March, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fivemyths-about-chinese-hackers/2013/03/22/4aa07a7e-7f95-11e2-8074-b26a871b165a _story.html. Hirschfeld Davis, J. (2015), ‘Hacking of government computers exposed 21.5 million people’, The New York Times, 9 July, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://www. nytimes.com/2015/07/10/us/office-of-personnel-management-hackers-got-data-ofmillions.html; Schmidt, M.S., D.E. Sanger and N. Perlroth (2014), ‘Chinese hackers pursue key data on U.S. workers’, The New York Times, 9 July, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/10/world/asia/chinese-hackers-pursuekey-data-on-US-workers.html. Mandiant, APT1, pp. 6–7. Nakashima, E. (2013), ‘Confidential report lists U.S. weapons system designs compromised by Chinese cyberspies’, The Washington Post, 27 May, accessed 27 July 2015 at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/confidentialreport-lists-US–weapons-system-designs-compromised-by-chinese-cyberspies/2013/ 05/27/a42c3e1c-c2dd-11e2-8c3b-0b5e9247e8ca_story.html. Ball, ‘China’s cyber warfare capabilities’, p. 101.

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108.

Krepinevich, A.F. (2012), Cyber Warfare: A Nuclear Option?, p. 30, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://csbaonline.org/publications/2012/08/cyber-warfare-a-nuclearoption/. Lindsay, J.R. (2014–15), ‘The impact of China on cybersecurity: fiction and friction’, International Security, 39 (3), 17. The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China (2015), IV. Building and Development of China’s Armed Forces, 26 May, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2015-05/26/content_4586713. htm. Ball, ‘China’s cyber warfare capabilities’, p. 100. Coleman, K.G. (2009), ‘Opening statement, The US–China Economic and Security Review Commission’, 30 April, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://origin.www.uscc. gov/sites/default/files/4.30.09Coleman.pdf. Krepinevich, Cyber Warfare, p. 27. Ibid. Watts, J. (2005), ‘Chinese general warns of nuclear risk to US’, The Guardian, 16 July, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jul/16/ china.jonathanwatts; Tyler, P.E. (1996), ‘As China threatens Taiwan, it makes sure U.S. listens’, The New York Times, 24 January, accessed 30 March 2016 at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/24/world/as-china-threatens-taiwan-it-makes-sureus-listens.html?pagewanted=all. Acton, J.M. (2013), ‘Debating China’s no-first-use commitment: James Acton responds’, 22 April, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/ 04/22/debating-china-s-no-first-use-commitment-james-acton-responds. It should be noticed that the 2015 version of China’s Strategy White Paper reintroduced an explicit commitment after the 2013 omission. Lewis, J. (2007), The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China’s Search for Security in the Nuclear Age, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, p. 39. Lennox, Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, p. 29. At least some of the 20 DF-5 have also been MIRVed. It should also be noticed that the DF-15 and the DF-21 are nuclear-capable as will be the DF-16 and the DF-25. Lennox, Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, p. 31. The 2015 DoD report indicates that a total of five units is expected (Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments, p. 9). Lennox, Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, p. 40. Conroy, C. (2013), ‘China’s ballistic-missile submarines: how dangerous?’, The National Interest, 28 November, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://nationalinterest.org/ commentary/chinas-ballistic-missile-submarines-how-dangerous-9414. Fischer, R.D. (2014), ‘Potential indicators of China’s next generation nuclear submarines’, 30 June, accessed 27 July 2015 at http://www.strategycenter.net/ docLib/20140630_Fisher_ChinaSubs_063014.pdf; Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments.

109. 110.

111. 112. 113. 114. 115.

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117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123.

19. Facing the dragon: debating the US military response to China Benjamin Schreer

INTRODUCTION Preparing for the possibility of a military conflict with China has become of increasing concern for US strategic policy-makers and defence officials. The 2015 US National Military Strategy named China as one of those states that ‘are attempting to revise key aspects of the international order and are acting in a matter that threatens our national security interests’.1 Arguably, under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, China has intensified activities to challenge the US-led security order in the Asia-Pacific region to realize the government’s ‘China Dream’, that is, a regional order centred on Chinese pre-eminence.2 On the back of its economic growth, China is also gradually developing the military means to support this policy objective. For more than two decades, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has invested in military capabilities designed to undermine US military predominance in the Western Pacific. While the PLA still has a long way to go before it can seriously challenge the US military across all warfare domains (land, air, sea, space and cyberspace), it gradually minimizes the gap particularly in regard to operations close to China’s shoreline. In this context, the US Department of Defense (Pentagon) 2015 annual report on China’s evolving military power assessed that the PLA’s modernization had ‘the potential to reduce core U.S. military technological advantages’.3 As a response, the report announced that ‘[i]n concert with its allies and partners, the United States will continue adapting its forces, posture, and operational concepts to maintain a stable and secure Asia-Pacific security environment’.4 Indeed, the US military has readjusted its AsiaPacific posture for quite some time. In June 2011, then US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announced the development of a ‘more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable’ regional military posture.5 The new posture was to support the US ‘strategic rebalance’ (originally termed ‘the pivot’) towards Asia, a policy goal first announced by President Barack Obama during his visit to 359

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Australia in November 2011 in order to reassure regional allies and partners who worried about the strategic consequences of China’s rise.6 In 2012, Gates’s successor Leon Panetta announced that that by 2020, 60 per cent of the US Navy’s (USN) and US Air Force’s (USAF) fleets would be assigned to the Pacific Ocean, including six aircraft carriers, the majority of cruisers, destroyers, fast attack nuclear submarines and the new Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs).7 In May 2015 then US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel argued that the military ‘rebalance is not a goal, not a promise, or a vision, it’s a reality’.8 Over recent years the US military has undeniably moved more military hardware into the region, reinvigorated alliances, and fostered and/or intensified security partnerships.9 That said, the task confronting US strategic decision-makers and military planners to develop a credible military response to China’s evolving strategic challenge remains work in progress. The key question is how the US military could effectively fight and ‘win’ a military conflict with the PLA at acceptable political costs. The answer is critical for the future ability of the United States to deter unwanted Chinese strategic behaviour, to reassure allies and partners, and to protect its strategic interests in the region. Indeed, much is at stake in the debate about the ‘best’ US military strategy with regard to China given that the respective policy implications will have direct consequences for Washington’s regional leadership as well as for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific.10 Against this background, the chapter examines the current debate over US military response with regard to China, and analyses the advantages and shortfalls of each option. It proceeds in four broad steps. To set the scene, the chapter first discusses the key features of China’s military modernization and, second, the resulting strategic and militaryoperational challenges for the United States in the region. Third, it places the military response within the broader debate about choices for US grand strategy for China’s rise. This is important since the overarching grand strategy should guide US military strategy for a potential conflict with China. This part looks in detail at the different US military options. Moreover, it explores the evolution of official US military strategy and doctrine. The chapter concludes with some cautious predictions about how the US military will seek to maintain a credible deterrent and war-fighting posture against the PLA, and what this might imply for security and stability in the Asia-Pacific.

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CHINA’S EMERGING MILITARY CHALLENGE TO THE UNITED STATES The specific details of China’s military modernization are discussed elsewhere in this volume. Suffice to point out here that it is inherently difficult to assess the true nature of China’s military capability development, given the lack of transparency and access to PLA thinking.11 Consequently, current Western debate ranges from alarming assessments about the PLA rapidly closing the gap to the US military,12 to analyses arguing that despite China’s military modernization it is in no position to seriously challenge the US military.13 This chapter adopts a middle ground between the two poles, assuming that while at present the PLA is no match for the USN and USAF in the Western Pacific (particularly the further away the PLA operates from the shoreline), it has made progress in capability areas designed to complicate US operations in these waters and air spaces. The PLA’s comprehensive modernization is aimed at gradually building up the ability to project and sustain military power far from China’s coastline. While for many years, the primary focus was on improving PLA capabilities for a Taiwan scenario, ambitions have expanded beyond contingencies in the immediate maritime and air approaches. For instance, the intention to develop modern aircraft carriers and nuclear-powered submarines point to China’s blue-water ambitions for operations in the ‘far seas’, though it will remain a limited capability for the time being.14 At the same time, the PLA has emphasized the development of capabilities that would enable it to pose significant challenges to any adversary operating within the ‘first island chain’ – a geographical space enclosing the East Asian coastline, arcing southwards from the Japanese islands through Taiwan and the Philippine Archipelago. Key capabilities in this context include the DF-21D (also known as ‘carrier killer’) mobile, solid-fuel missile; dozens of modern, relatively quiet dieselelectric submarines; a formidable array of land-, air- and sea-based missiles; coastal artillery system; as well as new tactical fighter aircraft.15 In particular, the PLA’s significant arsenal of conventional cruise and ballistic missiles not only cover the whole of Taiwan but are increasingly capable of reaching US forward operating bases in Japan and Guam.16 It should also be noted that China’s 2015 defence White Paper announced a change in the country’s military strategy towards a greater emphasis on operations in the maritime domain.17 Importantly, through targeted investments in capabilities threatening forward deployed US forces and given China’s geographic location, the

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PLA does not necessarily have to level the US across all military domains in order to pose major problems for Washington’s strategic posture in the Asia-Pacific region.18 For instance, in a naval encounter in the South China Sea or the East China Sea, geographical proximity could be to China’s advantage, even if it lags behind the United States in technological military prowess. Indeed, if anything, the perception in current Western strategic discussion prevails that China is gradually shifting the strategic balance with the United States in its favour. However, there are different assessments within the Western strategic community about the PLA’s military strategy and operational concepts underlying its modernization process. The prevalent view, shared by US official defence thinking, is that the PLA is pursuing a ‘counterintervention strategy’ designed to prohibitively raise the costs of a third-party intervention for the United States.19 US official defence documents have used the term ‘Anti-Access/Area-Denial’ (A2/AD) to describe this approach. For example, the Pentagon’s 2015 report on China’s military assesses that ‘China is investing in military programs and weapons designed to improved extended-range power projection, anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD), and operations in emerging domains such as cyberspace, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum’.20 However, the report also points out that ‘China does not specifically refer to them [A2/AD capabilities] using this term’.21 Indeed, some scholars have argued that the ‘counterintervention strategy’ label assigned to China’s military strategy is misleading since PLA official documents rarely use the term. Moreover, a closer reading of official Chinese military doctrine seems to suggest that the PLA expects the United States to become involved in a core conflict, for example over Taiwan. That is, they are aware about the potential limitations of deterring a ‘third party intervention’ in the first place. These analysts also point out that Chinese naval ambitions go beyond ‘sea denial’ of the US Navy in its ‘near seas’, and instead also focus on exercising ‘sea control’ against middle powers and smaller regional states. Therefore, the US focus on A2/AD could unduly assume that China’s military is principally designed to counter the United States, possibly increasing the security dilemma between the two nations.22 Nevertheless, these critics also acknowledge that the PLA’s evolving military capabilities pose an ‘undeniable threat’ to US naval assets.23 And leaving the specific semantics of ‘counterintervention’ in Chinese military debate aside for a moment, it is obvious that China’s military modernization to a large extent focuses on the politico-strategic objective to undermine US leadership in the Asia-Pacific and on the related operational goal to erode the capacity of the US military to ‘rule the

Debating the US military response to China 363 waves’ in the Western Pacific.24 Therefore, China has evolved as a major military challenge for the United States. Strategically, Beijing appears on track to at least minimize the gap in the regional military balance with Washington over time, particularly in its ‘near seas’. For instance, a 2015 RAND Corporation study demonstrated that US ability to project military power to defend Taiwan against large-scale Chinese attacks could already be much more complicated and is likely to face future challenges in the years to come.25 Leaving aside critical qualitative factors of war-fighting (such as experience, training, sustainment, etc.) where the US military should enjoy a significant advantage, in quantitative terms the PLA appears to be already in a position to impose significant costs on the US military during a crisis. Moreover, a perceived Sino–US ‘imbalance of interests’ potentially compounds the credibility challenge for US military posture. In other words, even if the pure military balance still favours the United States, the perception in China as well as among United States’ regional allies and partners might well be that the ‘balance of interest’26 points the other way: The prospect of the United States prevailing in a protracted war may be sufficient to deter China … But deterrence is a function of perception, and much remains unknown about how China might view the balance of political and military forces in a crisis. Chinese leaders might overestimate their own military capacity. Alternatively, they might believe that the asymmetry of national interests at stake, combined with the likely costs of war, might dissuade the United States from entering a conflict, even if the PLA could not win outright.27

The perception about a weakened US resolve could thus not only make China more risk-taking in a crisis, but could also undermine Washington’s credibility with its allies and partners. As one analyst points out: If US allies conclude that Washington no longer has the ability or the will to defend themselves against coercion or attack, they may feel that they have little choice but to appease China. As it seeks to deter American intervention, Beijing is thus working simultaneously to decouple the US from its regional security partners.28

This challenge is compounded by the fundamental question for US political and military leaders of how to formulate, let alone execute a ‘theory of victory’ in a conflict with China. In a classical Clausewitzian sense, war is a mere continuation of politics29 and ‘victory at the highest level is correspondingly defined in political terms’.30 Conversely, if the war effort exceeds the value of the political objective, it should be stopped.31 Given the nature of China as an emerging major power, in

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possession of an increasingly secure nuclear second-strike capability, the United States would confront enormous strategic consequences in the case of a war. Thus, the question is how to end a war with China at acceptable political costs, for example, one that falls short of a major war that would impose massive costs on both sides, let alone the global economic system.32 As a result, China’s growing military power poses major challenges to the United States’ strategic position and has triggered an extensive debate about the adequate response.

US GRAND STRATEGIC OPTIONS WITH REGARD TO CHINA In principle, US military response should closely align with Washington’s grand strategy towards China. While the United States has not published an official grand strategy with regard to China, successive governments by and large have pursued a strategy that blended engagement and balancing – or what Robert Art has called ‘selective engagement’.33 The assumption behind this approach is that gradually China will integrate itself into the existing regional and international order. However, commensurate with its growing power, China has become more inclined to challenge the existing order and to alter it according to its preferences. For instance, a key tenet of current President Xi Jinping’s ‘China Dream’ is the concept of ‘Asia for Asians’, which entails a drastically reduced security role for the United States and other non-Asian powers in the region such as Australia.34 For the very same reasons, Xi’s advancement of a ‘new type of great power relationship’ with the United States is incompatible with the continued US leadership role in the Asia-Pacific.35 Therefore, the ongoing validity of ‘selective engagement’ has been increasingly questioned in US strategic debate.36 As Richard Betts has pointed out: American grand strategy so far has been hedging in both directions, but the development of Chinese power may force it to a fork in the road before long, choosing either the prong toward promoting cooperation at the price of accommodation, if not appeasement, or the prong toward facing conflict with containment and deterrence.37

Indeed, US strategic debate over China has shifted markedly. In the late 2000s, a lot of US scholars still assumed that intensifying efforts to integrate China in the existing, US-led Western order would be possible; the assumption being that it was in China’s best interest to profit from an open and rules-based order.38 Yet, increasingly they have come to

Debating the US military response to China 365 acknowledge that Beijing’s rapid military modernization and more assertive behaviour has intensified regional arms competition, with potentially destabilizing effects, thereby necessitating the United States and China to manage their growing security dilemma.39 According to other analysts, one option to manage the competitive nature of the Sino–US relationship is to exercise mutual restraint, and for the United States to provide China with certain reassurances. Militarily, this would include US restraint in regard to ‘modernization and deployment of long-range strike systems, especially precision conventional strike’.40 As will be discussed in more detail this approach also emphasizes a US military approach that forgoes large-scale attacks against the Chinese Mainland. While the later approach to some extent reflects the traditional combination of engagement and balancing, a grand strategy that would amount to accommodating China is imaginable in at least two ways. The first is to reach some kind of accommodation with China based on a ‘great bargain’ and/or recognizing Chinese ‘spheres of influence’, for instance in the South China Sea. The assumption is that because of the enormous costs of a military conflict with China, accommodation would be the preferable option for the US government. Such accommodation could come in some kind of ‘great bargain’ or ‘power-sharing arrangement’ between the two major powers.41 Other analysts have been more concrete in what such a deal might actually mean. Charles Glaser, for instance, argued that this might require the United States to ‘abandon’ Taiwan.42 Orville Schell called for the United States to acknowledge that China was ‘entitled to some kind of “sphere of influence” in the South China Sea … without completely yielding to all of its territorial claims’.43 The second strategy of accommodating China would be ‘offshore balancing’, which would require the United States to significantly cut back its regional military presence in Asia and detach itself from its former allies. For its advocates, this would eliminate the risk of becoming entangled in an unwanted conflict with China on behalf of allies and partners. If necessary, the United States could deploy significant military force from outside the region, thereby acting as a balancing force.44 In a similar vein, some scholars argue that policy-makers in Washington might be forced to adapt a grand strategy of ‘retrenchment’ because a sustained military presence in Asia-Pacific to face a more powerful China might simply be no longer fiscally affordable.45 A slightly different version is a grand strategy of ‘limited retrenchment’, which in regard to the Asia-Pacific mainly focuses on deterrence on the Korean Peninsula and not directly on the Chinese military challenge.46

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What these grand strategy designs have in common is an understanding that the era of US ‘primacy’ and military preponderance with regard to China is coming to an end, and that consequently Washington has to exercise more strategic restraint in its dealings with Beijing. However, some analysts also argue that the United States should seek to maintain primacy as long as possible. In their view, this amounts to a strategy of ‘balancing without containment’, which includes (among other things) increased investments in US military capabilities and building up allied and partner capacity to enable them to counter Chinese coercion.47 Finally, some US scholars make the case for a fully fledged Cold War–style grand strategy of ‘containment’ to deal with a rising China. This would include building a NATO-like alliance structure for the Asia-Pacific and even efforts designed to slow down Chinese economic growth.48

THE DEBATE ABOUT THE US MILITARY RESPONSE TO CHINA Principally, the debate oscillates between a military posture that focuses on maintaining (or restoring) ‘full spectrum dominance’ against the PLA, and one that puts limitations on operations against China. To assess those options it makes sense to identify a set of criteria, including (1) the potential impact of the military posture on deterrence and Sino–US crisis stability; (2) the prospect of achieving broader strategic goals (theory of victory); (3) long-term peacetime military competition; and (4) the ability to reassure allies and partners.49 Restoring Dominance: The ‘AirSea Battle’ Concept and its Critics The most prominent US military option has been the so-called ‘AirSea Battle’ (ASB) concept. The key assumption of US defence officials and analysts promoting ASB is that the United States needs to be in a position to defeat and disable China’s ‘A2/AD’ capabilities through a variety of offensive and defensive means, including deep, conventional strikes against targets on the Chinese Mainland in order to uphold deterrence stability. Arguably, ASB would reflect a US grand strategy designed to maintain US primacy in Asia. While US defence officials insist that the concept is not specifically aimed at China, the PLA is emerging as the United States’ ‘default adversary’50 and ASB is thus quite clearly also about maintaining Sino–US deterrence under such conditions. As one scholar observes: ‘Despite frequent protestations to

Debating the US military response to China 367 the contrary, Air-Sea Battle ideas are inevitably associated with rather traditional political assumptions which explicitly identify China … as a putative adversary that needs to be “offset” in order to preserve a “stable military balance” in the Western Pacific and more generally’.51 US official thinking about ASB dates back to 2009 when the USN and USAF signed a classified memorandum to develop a joint ASB concept to project power against an adversary’s sophisticated A2/AD capabilities. The February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) officially directed the development of ASB.52 In 2012, the Pentagon published the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), which assigned ASB a key role for operations in A2/AD environments.53 In addition, the Air-Sea Battle Office (ASBO) was created to facilitate implementation. In May 2013, the US Department of Defense published an unclassified ASB concept paper that stated that the ‘ASB Concept’s solution to the A2/AD challenge … is to develop networked, integrated forces capable of attack-in-depth to disrupt, destroy and defeat adversary forces’.54 The document also outlined three ‘lines of effort’ for US forces. Accordingly, the US and allied forces would seek to: + disrupt the adversary’s command, control, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities in order to deny it to track and locate targets and ‘ideally precluding attack on friendly forces’; + destroy the enemy’s A2/AD platforms and weapon system, reducing its ability to launch strikes while providing greater ‘freedom of action’; and + defeat the enemy’s weapons after they have been launched.55 These three lines of operations echo the JOAC’s focus on offensive operations, complemented by defensive measures. Notably, the JOAC also stressed the goal to ‘attack enemy anti-access/area-denial defense in depth rather than rolling back those defenses from the perimeter’.56 In other words, ASB was about a full-scale military campaign against an adversary’s most vulnerable systems, particularly C4ISR, including on the enemy’s territory. As mentioned already, US officials have denied that ASB was specifically designed to also deal with China’s A2/AD challenge. Yet, a 2010 report by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment (CSBA), a US think-tank with close ties to the Pentagon, developed concrete proposals on how ASB could be applied in a future Sino–US conflict:

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+ First, US forces would focus on ‘withstanding’ initial PLA attacks and limiting the damage to American and allied forces. + Second, they would then conduct a ‘blinding campaign’ against PLA C4ISR systems to deny the PLA situational awareness and the ability to launch weapon systems. + Third, a ‘missile suppression campaign’ would include strikes against China’s land-based missile launchers, surface-to-surface missiles and supporting infrastructure. Long-range strategic strike and submarine-launched weapons would also be employed to destroy or degrade China’s air defence assets and to establish US air superiority. + Fourth, in the event of a prolonged conflict, ‘follow-on operations’ by US and allied forces would be conducted, including ‘distant blockades’ against Chinese ships to threatened Beijing’s economic lifeline.57 Broken down into more concrete military operations, these four stages of an ASB campaign could include: + counter-space operations by the USAF to blind the PLA’s spacebased ocean surveillance systems and prevent it from targeting USN surface ships, giving the Navy operational freedom of manoeuvre; + long-range strike operations destroying PLA ground-based, longrange maritime surveillance systems and long-range ballistic missile launchers, thereby expanding the USN’s freedom of manoeuvre and reducing PLA strikes against the US and allied bases; + US carrier-based fighter aircraft ‘rolling back’ PLA manned and unmanned ISR and combat aircraft to secure forward operation of USAF tankers and other support aircraft; and + USAF supporting anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations through offensive mining to enable USN to conduct ‘distant blockade operations’.58 Finally, the CSBA report made the critical assumption that a Sino–US military conflict would be limited to the conventional level given that a nuclear escalation would not ‘appear to be in the parties’ interests’.59 In sum, the ASB concept, as discussed by CSBA and (without the explicit China focus) official US military documents, aims to strengthen deterrence by maintaining US military superiority and by signalling Washington’s willingness to impose significant costs on China in response to conventional aggression by the PLA, including deep strikes on the

Debating the US military response to China 369 Chinese Mainland. It also sought to reassure United States’ allies and partners in the region that the United States would retain a credible war-fighting posture against China. However, ASB became subject to significant criticism, including in US academic debate. First, the concept’s implicit ‘China dimension’ led to an image problem in terms of elevating the PLA to ‘peer competitor’ status. That is, ASB presupposes a future Sino–US relationship where US military containment is the underlying framework. This perception was exacerbated by the absence of a US grand strategy for dealing with a rising China.60 Critics also noted that ASB would fail to meet the criteria of a sensible ‘theory of victory’ for ‘winning’ a war with China. Assuming that the risk of nuclear escalation necessitates limited political aims on both sides, a ‘decisive military victory’ against China is difficult to foresee. Instead, the best outcome would be a ‘stalemate which leads to a cessation of conflict and return to some form of status quo’.61 Moreover, the assumption that nuclear escalation could be avoided might prove too optimistic. Nuclear stability in an ASB context would depend to a significant extent on Chinese assessments of whether its nuclear deterrent would remain unaffected by US deep strikes against its conventional forces. While the PLA has made some strides towards achieving a more secure nuclear second-strike capability, its nuclear posture remains seriously hampered by technological and bureaucratic shortfalls.62 Faced with sustained US strikes against most of the PLA’s land-based conventional long-range weapons and their C4ISR nodes, China’s leadership could perceive an existential threat against their nuclear deterrent, potentially increasing the risks of Chinese nuclear pre-emption. Critics, therefore, consider ASB as inherently risky because of its potential to trigger a nuclear escalation.63 Yet, other analysts point out that precisely because of the escalatory risks involved in ASB, Sino–US deterrence might be strengthened because Chinese leaders, calculating the devastating impact of US conventional counterattacks on its critical military infrastructure, might refrain from launching an A2/AD campaign against US forces in the first place.64 That said, even if a Sino–US nuclear escalation could be avoided in an ASB context, it is far from certain that the United States could achieve modest political objectives by striking targets in Mainland China. Because of China’s geography, deep strikes into its territory would require military operations that include intrusion into Chinese airspace with long-range strike capabilities. Such strikes would significantly increase domestic pressure on China’s leadership to respond. As a result, US military actions to coerce China into accepting limited political

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objectives (for instance, returning to the status quo ante) might be exceedingly difficult. ASB could therefore amount to a: […] 21st century equivalent of medieval siege warfare. Given China’s size and depth, its authoritarian culture and supporting institutions of internal security, American air and naval strike forces are likely to run out of precision-guided munitions long before they run out of targets to attack or achieve conditions for acceptable [conflict] termination.65

Finally, the impact of ASB in terms of reassuring US allies and partners was not entirely clear. One problem was confusion on their part over the concept’s secrecy as a classified military planning document, and the 2013 declassified version did little to provide greater clarity as to what exactly ASB was and what it would imply for their own respective forces and strategy. There was also suspicion that the concept might prepare the ground for a reduced US reliance on forward operating bases, potentially creating a ‘decoupling’ effect between the US and its allies. Moreover, most allies and partners were reluctant to officially sign up to a war-fighting concept that could increase tension with China. Yet, at the same time, increased strategic pressure from China meant that some allies were more susceptible to playing an active role within an ASB context. Of the major US allies in the region, Japan was the most supportive player, South Korea the least likely contributor, and Australia occupied a middle ground.66 Alternative Strategies Critics of the ASB concept have suggested alternative US military strategies to deal with China’s A2/AD challenge and to strengthen deterrence. They share the key assumption that the US should exercise (mostly) unilateral restraint and forego the military option of conventional deep strikes on the Chinese Mainland. But they also differ in some important aspects. Principally, two alternatives have been proposed: a ‘distant blockade’ and different versions of ‘maritime denial’ strategies. ‘Distant blockade’ A distant blockade focuses on China’s vulnerability to a major disruption of its seaborne trade and energy supply. The difficulty of protecting its sea lines of communications (SLOCS) far away from its territory, particularly around the maritime chokepoints in Southeast Asia, has been referred to as China’s ‘Malacca Dilemma’.67 The threat of a ‘distant blockade’ by US and allied air and naval forces operating in the Indian Ocean and around the exits of the South and East China Sea might deter

Debating the US military response to China 371 China from engaging in unacceptable military activities.68 US and allied forces would operate outside the range of the PLA’s conventional ballistic and cruise missiles, which might enable Washington to ‘dictate the pace, scope, and termination of a conflict. This strategy seeks to place China on the horns of a dilemma: either it must sortie its forces beyond the reach of its counter-intervention capabilities and fight a disadvantage, or accept painful economic dislocation during a conflict’.69 Moreover, the strategy’s advantage could be that it does not require direct attacks on China’s territory, that it could be quickly reversible, and that it might be less likely to provoke an escalatory Chinese response than the deep strikes envisioned under ASB. A ‘distant blockade’ could therefore be a ‘viable, lower cost strategy that capitalizes on America’s strengths and China’s weaknesses’.70 However, the ‘distant blockade’ strategy also suffers from shortfalls. The first is the challenge of implementation, with US and allied forces having to stop virtually hundreds of merchant ships bound for China, many of which would not even fly the Chinese flag. The disruption of maritime trade could also seriously infringe on Washington’s relations with neutral and even allied countries.71 In addition, the strategy carries the risk of creating a ‘decoupling effect’ between the United States and its allies. The United States would likely be seen by its allies as ceding control of the ‘first island chain’ to China and they would question the credibility of Washington’s defence commitments. If China for instance conquered Taiwan or sized disputed islands in the South China Sea, it is difficult to see how a ‘distant blockade’ would force Beijing to give up its gains. In short, if the United States was to limit its military options to a ‘distant blockade’, its ‘days as the preponderant regional power [would] surely be numbered’.72 Therefore, while it reduces some of the risks of ASB, as a stand-alone strategy, ‘distant blockade’ would probably be insufficient to meeting US goals and alliance commitments. ‘Maritime denial’ strategies Unlike a pure ‘distant blockade’, ‘maritime denial’ strategies entail operations within the ‘first island chain’ to shape Beijing’s behaviour whilst also refraining from direct strikes on Chinese territory. The first version has been called ‘offshore control’. Like a ‘distant blockade’, it aims to terminate a conflict with China on US terms through means of economic exhaustion. But it also entails defensive military operations closer to China’s shorelines. First, it focuses on denying China the use of the sea inside the ‘first island chain’, primarily using attack submarines, mines and limited air strikes – thereby playing to the technological and operational strengths of the USN. Second, US forces would seek to

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defend the air and sea space in the ‘first island chain’ to defend allies against Chinese direct attacks and coercive measures; this option seeks to exploit China’s geography by forcing the PLA to fight over longer distances. Finally, US forces would focus on ‘distant blockades’ of Chinese merchant and energy shipping in Southeast Asian maritime chokepoints. This approach would be most effectively tying military strategy to realistic US political objectives in a conflict with China.73 Nevertheless, ‘offshore control’ could face very similar challenges to the ‘distant blockade’ option. Most prominently, regional allies and partners could also perceive this as effectively abandoning them, which might lead them to either ‘bandwagon’ with China or to ‘balance’ against Beijing, including through the development of indigenous nuclear deterrent postures. Moreover, China might be tempted to seize the initiative during a crisis, hoping to present the United States with a fait accompli. That is, Chinese leaders might well speculate that the United States would rather negotiate and de-escalate during a crisis – particularly those not involving US ‘strategic interests’ – than fight in order to restore the status quo ante bellum.74 As a result, some analysts have promoted more offensive versions of ‘maritime denial’ strategies against China. For instance, the objective of a ‘war at sea’ strategy would be to create ‘a maritime no-man’s-land within the first island chain’ through: […] distant interception of Chinese shipping, widespread submarine attacks and mining inside the first island chain, offensive attacks by a flotilla composed of small missile-carrying combatants to fight in the China seas and patrol vessels for maritime interdiction at straits and chokepoints, and Marine expeditionary forces positioned to hold the South China Sea islands at risk, with no intention of putting ground forces on China’s mainland.75

Proponents argue that such a military strategy would provide US political leaders with ‘graduated options’ short of escalatory strikes on the Chinese Mainland, which would also be suitable for different types of grand strategies with regard to China, ranging from ‘co-operation, competition, confrontation, conflict short of war, or war’.76 Maritime denial strategies would contest China’s control of its ‘near seas’ by, at a minimum, creating zones of ‘mutual maritime denial’. They would also signal a willingness to operate in hostile A2/AD environments to prevent the PLA from seizing and holding islands in the Western Pacific. Moreover, they seek to adjust existing US regional force posture (rather than moving forces out of the region) and to make US allies and partners an integral part of the strategy. More recently, for instance, some analysts have proposed an ‘active denial strategy’ that

Debating the US military response to China 373 focuses on meeting ‘Chinese aggression directly, thereby making it more difficult for China to achieve a fait accompli’.77 This version of maritime denial would consist of three ‘mutually reinforcing’ elements: the creation of a more resilient US presence to survive Chinese pre-emptive attacks; the strengthening of military capabilities to attack PLA elements involved in offensive operations; and ‘bolstering and leveraging’ allied and partner capabilities. Its proponents argue that this military strategy would provide a US government with the greatest flexibility in both war and peacetime.78 Arguably, these variants of maritime denial strategies offer a credible alternative to the ASB concept. In particular, they play to the strengths of US forces in terms of their ability to achieve ‘sea control’ against the PLA in large parts of the Western Pacific for years to come. In waters and air spaces closer to China’s shores, US forces would have a high chance to achieve ‘sea denial’ against Chinese forces.79 These approaches also recognize that in the future, full spectrum military dominance against Chinese military forces might be unachievable. Yet, they are not risk-free, either. For instance, in contingencies such as the defence of Taiwan or Japanese islands, some strikes against targets in Mainland China to degrade the PLA’s anti-ship and anti-air systems deployed along the coastline would be almost unavoidable. As well, it is not entirely clear how these alternatives could minimize the risk of escalation, as even a distant interception of vessels as part of a ‘distant blockade’ would most likely be seen by Beijing as an act of war and could trigger a massive military response. Nevertheless, strategies that focus on denial might be a better alternative for conflicts short of major war over Taiwan or Japan, such as maritime disputes in the South China Sea and elsewhere.80

CONCLUSION There are no ‘good’ military options in a war with China, just ‘least bad’ ones.81 As a consequence, the debate about US military strategy with regard to China continues. At this point, it seems that the debate notwithstanding the US military continues to focus on implementing the ASB concept as part of the JOAC in order to be able to project power into sophisticated A2/AD environments. The 2015 US National Military Strategy stated that in ‘view of the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) challenges we increasingly face, our future force will have to operate in contested environments’ and that the US military would continue with ‘[i]mportant investments to counter A2/AD’.82 Moreover, while the

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Pentagon in January 2015 dropped the term ‘AirSea Battle’ and replaced it with ‘Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons’ (JAM-GC), the basic tenets of ASB appear to have been left in place.83 The conclusion by US defence planners seems that for deterrent purposes and in the event of conflict, strikes on Mainland China are necessary to achieve strategic and operational objectives. Moreover, this approach to US strategy also demonstrates that the United States will retain its forward military presence in the Asia-Pacific and enhance its capabilities to project power into zones contested by China. While Washington has not (yet) officially defined its grand strategy to deal with Beijing’s growing power, the military strategy at least suggests a grand strategic concept of ‘balancing without containment’. In other words, the United States is likely to push back against more assertive Chinese efforts to undermine its leadership credentials in the Western Pacific, including through show of military force. While this approach is likely to be welcomed by most US allies and partners in the region, it might also lead to a more contested Asia-Pacific strategic environment.

NOTES 1. 2.

3.

4. 5.

6. 7.

8.

US Joint Chiefs of Staff (2015), The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015, June, p. 2. International Institute for Strategic Studies (2015), ‘China’s regional grand strategy paves the way for realising the China Dream’, in Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2015, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, pp. 77–90. US Department of Defense (2015), Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, Annual Report to Congress, accessed 4 July 2015 at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf. Ibid. Remarks delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 4 June 2011, accessed 31 March 2016 at https://www.iiss.org/ en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2011-4eac/first-plenarysession-1fea/robert-gates-e986. Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament, Canberra, 17 November 2011, accessed 4 July 2015 at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/ 17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament. Remarks delivered by Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 2 June 2012, accessed 31 March 2016 at http://www.iiss.org/en/ events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/sld12-43d9/first-plenary-session-2749/leonpanetta-d67b. Remarks delivered by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 31 May 2014, accessed 31 March 2016 at http://www.iiss.org/ en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/2014-c20c/plenary-1-d1ba/chuck-hagela9cb.

Debating the US military response to China 375 9.

10.

11.

12. 13. 14.

15.

16.

17.

18. 19.

20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

26. 27. 28.

International Institute for Strategic Studies (2015), ‘The United States’ evolving regional military posture’, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2015, London: IISS, pp. 61–75. Friedberg, A.L. (2014), Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The Debate over US Military Strategy in Asia, London: Routledge for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 14. See Mattis, P. (2015), Analyzing the Chinese Military: A Review Essay and Resource Guide on the People’s Liberation Army, Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation. Montgomery, E.B. (2014), ‘Contested primacy in the Western Pacific: China’s rise and the future of U.S. power projection’, International Security, 38 (4), 115–49. Dibb, P. and J. Lee (2014), ‘Why China will not become the dominant power in Asia’, Security Challenges, 10 (3), 15–19. Erickson, A.S. and G. Collins (2012), ‘China’s real blue water navy’, The Diplomat, 30 August, accessed 7 July 2015 at http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/chinas-not-soscary-navy/1/. O’Rourke, R. (2015), China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1 June, accessed 15 June 2015 at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ RL33153.pdf. Gormley, D.M., A.S. Erickson and J. Yuan (2014), A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier: Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press; Chase, M.S. and A.S. Erickson (2012), ‘The conventional missile capabilities of China’s second artillery force: cornerstone of deterrence and warfighting’, Asian Security, 8 (2), 115–37. Fravel, M.T. (2015), ‘China’s new military strategy: “winning informationized local wars”’, China Brief, 15 (13), 23 June, accessed 25 June 2015 at http://www. jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=44072&tx_t tnews%5BbackPid%5D=789&no_cache=1#.VZ9LyvmqpBd. Christensen, T.J. (2001), ‘Posing problems without catching up: China’s rise and the challenges for U.S. security policy’, International Security, 25 (4), 5–40. See, for instance, Friedberg, Beyond Air-Sea Battle, pp. 24–5; Thomas, J. (2011), ‘China’s active defense strategy and its regional implications’, testimony before the U.S-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 27 January, accessed 7 July 2015 at http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/1.27.11Thomas.pdf. US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments, p. 31. Ibid., p. 33. Fravel, T.M. and C.P. Twomey (2015), ‘Projecting strategy: the myth of Chinese counter-intervention’, Washington Quarterly, 37 (4), 171–87. Ibid., p. 173. Heath, T. and A.S. Erickson (2015), ‘Is China pursuing counter-intervention?’, Washington Quarterly, 38 (3), 143–56. Heginbotham, E., F.E. Morgan and J.L. Helm et al. (2015), The U.S.–China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017, Santa Monica, CA: RAND. On the ‘balance of interest’ see Schweller, R. (1998), Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest, New York: Columbia Press. Heginbotham, E. and J.L. Heim (2015), ‘Deterring without dominance: discouraging Chinese adventurism under austerity’, Washington Quarterly, 38 (1), 188. Friedberg, Beyond Air-Sea Battle, p. 46.

376 29.

30. 31. 32. 33.

34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

Handbook of US–China relations The Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz famously wrote that ‘war is a continuation of politics by other means’. Von Clausewitz, C. (1984), in M. Howard and P. Paret (eds and trans.), On War, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 87. Bartholomees, B.J. (2008), ‘Theory of victory’, Parameters, 38 (2), 26. Von Clausewitz, On War, p. 92. Kaplan, R.D. (2005), ‘How we would fight China’, The Atlantic, June, accessed 10 July 2015 at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/06/how-we-wouldfight-china/303959/. Art, R.J. (2004), A Grand Strategy for America, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Art maintains that even under the changing geostrategic conditions selective engagement remains the right strategic approach. See Art, R.J. (2012), ‘Selective engagement in the era of austerity’, in R. Fortaine and K.M. Lord (eds), America’s Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Administration, Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, pp. 13–27. Pei, M. (2014), ‘China’s Asia?’, Project Syndicate, 3 December, accessed 15 July 2015 at https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/asia-for-asians-politicalrhetoric-by-minxin-pei-2014-12. Erickson, A.S. and A.P. Liff (2014), ‘Not-so-empty talk: the danger of China’s “new type of great-power relations” slogan’, Foreign Affairs, 9 October, accessed 15 July 2015 at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2014-10-09/not-so-empty-talk. Friedberg, A.L. (2015), ‘The debate over US China strategy’, Survival, 57 (3), 90–91. Betts, R.K. (2012), ‘American strategy: grand vs. grandiose’, in Fortaine and Lord, America’s Path, p. 40. Ikenberry, G.J. (2008), ‘The rise of China and the future of West’, Foreign Affairs, 87 (1), 23–37. Liff, A.P. and G.J. Ikenberry (2014), ‘Racing toward tragedy? China’s rise, military competition in the Asia Pacific, and the security dilemma’, International Security, 39 (2), 52–91. Steinberg, J. and M.E. O’Hanlon (2014), Reassurance and Resolve: U.S.–China Relations in the Twenty-First Century, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 209. White, H. (2013), The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power, Collingwood, VIC: Black Inc; Kissinger, H.A. (2011), On China, New York: Penguin Press. Glaser, C. (2011), ‘Will China’s rise lead to war? Why realism does not mean pessimism’, Foreign Affairs, 90 (2), 80–91; for a response see Bernkopf Tucker, N. and B. Glaser (2011), ‘Should the United States abandon Taiwan?’, Washington Quarterly, 34 (4), 23–37. Schell, O. (2015), ‘Can the U.S. and China get along?’, The New York Times, 10 July, A27. Layne, C. (2002), ‘Offshore balancing revisited’, Washington Quarterly, 25 (2), 233–48; Bandow, D. (2012), ‘Strategic restraint in the near seas’, Orbis, 56 (3), 486–502. Parent, J.M. and P.K. MacDonald (2011), ‘The wisdom of retrenchment: America must cut back to move forward’, Foreign Affairs, November/December. Betts, ‘American strategy’, pp. 36–9. Tellis, A.J. (2014), Balancing Without Containment: An American Strategy for Managing China, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment; see also Friedberg, ‘The debate over US China strategy’, pp. 101–7. Mearsheimer, J.J. (2014), ‘Can China rise peacefully?’, National Interest, 24 February, accessed 15 July 2015 at http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-chinarise-peacefully-10204.

Debating the US military response to China 377 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57.

58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78.

Friedberg, Beyond Air-Sea Battle, pp. 66–70. Dobbins, J. (2012), ‘War with China’, Survival, 54 (4), 7–24. Till, G. (2012), Asia’s Naval Expansion: An Arms Race in the Making?, London: Routledge for International Institute for Strategic Studies, pp. 83–4. US Department of Defense (2010), Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February, accessed 31 March 2016 at http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/1002QDR2010.pdf. US Department of Defense (2012), Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), Version 1.0, 17 January, accessed 31 March 2016 at http://www.defense.gov/Portals/ 1/Documents/pubs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf. Air-Sea Battle Office (2013), Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges, May, accessed 31 March 2016 at http:// archive.defense.gov/pubs/ASB-ConceptImplementation-Summary-May-2013.pdf. Ibid. US Department of Defense, Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC). Van Tol, J., M. Gunzinger, A.F. Krepinevich and J. Thomas (2010), AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 18 May, accessed 15 July 2015 at http://csbaonline.org/ publications/2010/05/airsea-battle-concept/. Ibid. Ibid., p. 50. Schreer, B. (2013), Planning the Unthinkable War: ‘AirSea Battle’ and its Implications for Australia, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, p. 18. Hammes, T.X. (2012), ‘Strategy for an unthinkable conflict’, The Diplomat, 27 July, accessed 20 July 2015 at http://thediplomat.com/2012/07/military-strategy-for-anunthinkable-conflict/. Lewis, J. (2014), ‘Paper tigers: China’s nuclear posture’, IISS Adelphi Series, accessed 31 March at http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/adelphi/by%20year/2014de9e/paper-tigers-chinas-nuclear-posture-371a. Etzioni, A. (2014), ‘The air-sea battle “concept”: a critique’, International Politics, 51 (5), 577–96. Friedberg, Beyond Air-Sea Battle, p. 90. MacGregor, D. and Y.J. Kim (2012), ‘Air-sea battle: something’s missing’, Armed Forces Journal, 1 April, accessed 17 July 2015 at http://www.armedforcesjournal. com/air-sea-battle-somethings-missing/. Schreer, Planning the Unthinkable War, Chapters 3 and 4. Storey, I. (2009), ‘China’s Malacca Dilemma’, China Brief, 6 (8), December, accessed 31 March 2016 at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/ ?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=31575&no_cache=1#.Vv0xVT9EKVQ. Mirski, S. (2013), ‘Stranglehold: the context, conduct and consequences of an American naval blockade of China’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 36 (3), 385–421. Heginbotham and Heim, ‘Deterring without dominance’, p. 190. Pfeifer, D.C. (2011), ‘China, the German analogy and the new AirSea operational concept’, Orbis, 55 (1), 114. Collins, G.B. and W.S. Murray (2008), ‘No oil for the lamps of China?’, Naval War College Review, 61 (2), 79–95. Friedberg, Beyond Air-Sea Battle, p. 115. Hammes, ‘Strategy for an unthinkable conflict’. Heginbotham and Heim (2015), ‘Deterring without dominance’, pp. 190–91. Kline, J.E. and W.P. Hughes (2012), ‘Between peace and the Air-Sea Battle: a war at sea strategy’, Naval War College Review, 65 (4), 35–6. Ibid., p. 35. Heginbotham and Heim, ‘Deterring without dominance’, p. 191. Ibid., pp. 191–6.

378 79. 80. 81. 82. 83.

Handbook of US–China relations On ‘sea control’ and challenges posed by A2/AD systems see Rubel, R.C. (2010), ‘Talking about sea control’, Naval War College Review, 63 (4), 38–47. Schreer, Planning the Unthinkable War, p. 20. Hammes, ‘Strategy for an unthinkable conflict’. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015, p. 16. Morris, T.S., M. VanDriel and B. Dries et al. (2015), ‘Securing operational access: evolving the Air-Sea Battle concept’, National Interest, 11 February, accessed 28 July 2015 at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/securing-operational-accessevolving-the-air-sea-battle-12219.

20. Against a superior foe: China’s evolving A2/AD strategy Jingdong Yuan

China’s defense modernization efforts over the past two decades have yielded significant results. Key features of these efforts include the restructuring of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in areas of doctrinal development, training and recruitment; procurement of major conventional weapons systems, mainly from the Russian Federation (although in recent years increasingly from enhancement of indigenous defense industrial capabilities); nuclear and missile modernization; and continuous double-digit increases of defense expenditure for the past quarter-century. While Chinese military strategy has evolved since the 1990s from fighting and winning local wars under modern, high-tech conditions, conditions of informationization, to winning informationized local wars in its latest rendition, including its ability to deter Taiwan independence and US intervention in that context, the extent of its programs and future direction have far more important implications. How would Beijing use its newly acquired military power in dealing with issues such as territorial disputes? Will a rising China challenge the United States and aspire to regional hegemony? Will China’s ever growing dependence on international trade and imports of raw materials and energy inform future defense modernization efforts toward power projection and far-sea maritime capacities? And, for the purpose of this chapter, how are China’s ongoing defense modernization programs informed by, and driving a military strategy – commonly known as Anti-Access and Area Denial, or A2/AD – that seeks to defeat a superior enemy? This chapter will seek to address and answer some of these questions. The next section provides a brief discussion of the doctrinal change in Chinese military modernization since the mid-1980s, with an emphasis on how the 1991 Gulf War influenced the Chinese military’s strategic thinking on active defense and procurement decisions. This is followed by an analysis of the developments in PLA A2/AD capabilities in the past two decades. It is argued that through major acquisition, integration and deployment of these capabilities, China now possesses the ability to place an opponent’s fixed – and increasingly mobile – assets in the Western Pacific theater at risk. These developments have significant geostrategic 379

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implications for the region as they could undermine confidence in US alliance commitments as much as they threaten security interests of its neighbors. The chapter also briefly addresses the US AirSea Battle Concept (ASBC) and alternative responses to the A2/AD challenges and explains the potential risks of miscalculation and escalation. It argues for greater US–China military dialogue and the development of crisis management mechanisms in order to prevent major military escalation and open confrontation between the region’s two great powers.

PREPARING FOR TOMORROW’S WARFARE The PLA’s military strategy has undergone drastic changes over the past three decades since the historical 1985 enlarged conference of the Central Military Commission (CMC). Long gone are the days when the military was guided by Chairman Mao Zedong’s romantic ‘People’s War’ dogma. A largely land-based infantry force of over four million strong as late as the mid-1980s, the PLA has undergone significant transformation of its force structure, facing and overcoming key challenges along the way. These have included but are not limited to its ability to adapt and adopt changes as necessitated by the revolution in military affairs (RMA); to integrate new weapons systems to elevate its overall combat capabilities; to implement reforms in organization, training and personnel; and to fulfill its new ‘historical missions’ and to become a ‘true maritime power’ as defined by the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership. As China’s defense White Papers in recent years have made clear, the military doctrine today is active defense with the ability to fight and win local warfare under high-tech and informationized conditions.1 The genesis of a major new thinking on military doctrine was first triggered by the PLA’s less than glamorous brief encounter with the Vietnamese military in 1979.2 This was followed by the Gulf War of 1990–91, which was a showcase of modern warfare fought with a synchronization of ever-exotic modern weapons, superior command, control, computers and intelligence (C3I), and the AirLand Battle (ALB) doctrine. The lessons of Desert Storm were not lost on the PLA leadership. A commentary of The PLA Daily at the time claimed that: [n]ew and developing science and technology are energetically giving impetus to revolution in weapons. This revolution has widened the gap between weapons and has extended the qualitative difference in military power. The technological gap of weapons and equipment between the opposite sides finds its expression in the battlefield in information gap, space gap, time gap and precision gap … The development of the war in the direction of high

China’s evolving A2/AD strategy 381 technology has become an irreversible trend … The future war will be characterized by the intensive use of high and new technology and will give increasing prominence to and find its expression in the contest in science and technology. The role of quality confrontation will be greatly raised in the process of war as well as its conclusion and the stress on quality buildup will be the only option for any army.3

Clearly, to the PLA, Desert Storm provided sobering lessons. To begin with, it was a totally different type of modern warfare. The demonstration of what could be regarded as a five-dimensional warfare – land, sea, air, space and electronic – drove home the reality that the PLA could hardly be considered even remotely prepared for such warfare. Second, Desert Storm was a showcase of modern weaponry at its best, with the US military for the first time deploying a reconnaissance-strikes complex, or RSC, ‘a ‘system-of-systems’ designed to locate an enemy’s forces, weapons and facilities, and to disable or destroy them using a mix of non-kinetic weapons (including electronic warfare and computer-network attacks) and precision-guided conventional munitions’.4 The conclusion? The country that failed to raise the level of defense science and technology and upgrade its defense capability would find itself vulnerable in future wars. Third, Desert Storm demonstrated the backwardness of Chinese, and for that matter, Soviet weaponry, with which the Iraqi armed forces were equipped. This raised the issue of the extent to which domestic defense industries were capable of providing the PLA with weaponry suited for modern warfare. Finally, the way the war had been executed posed a challenge to the doctrine of active defense as it was conceived and presented a moral dilemma of whether or not initiatives and preemptive strikes should be adopted. Indeed, as one observer noted: The Gulf War also showed that the highly lethal nature of a high-tech local war may render a more decisive edge to the side that launches a preemptive strike than in traditional wars. The side that strikes only after the enemy has struck may not win, but rather lose initiative and risk a decisive defeat simply because the chance for an effective second strike becomes slim due to debilitating and highly lethal raids.5

That the Chinese armed forces did not possess adequate capabilities was obvious: outdated equipment, low level of groundforce mobility, backward C3I, limited amphibious lift capability, poor logistics for sustained military operations, inadequate pilot training and limited anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Accordingly, a key element of China’s defense modernization programs since the early 1990s has been a concerted effort

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to improve the PLA’s weapons systems in a number of selected areas. These include major sea platforms such as submarines, new-generation destroyers, frigates and corvettes; fighter aircraft, airborne early warning (AEW) systems and in-flight refueling equipment and technology; and land weapon suites, including large-caliber artillery pieces and ballistic missile systems.6 Chinese analysts recognize that as much as future conflicts tend to be local and limited in scope, the nature of high-tech war has introduced important ‘non-local’ elements. The use of electronic warfare and space warfare and long-range weaponry will play an increasingly important role not just in the limited key arena of operations but can be extended to strike enemy locality and position; high-tech local warfare will test a country’s overall national might. This non-local phenomenon in local conflicts reflects the fact that the conducting of local, limited warfare increasingly involves the concentration of firepower and rapid mobilization of troops to quickly destroy the enemy and therefore change the balance of power, which in turn requires a capacity for long-range deployment in certain cases. Another is the use of electronic warfare to attack and paralyze the enemy’s reconnaissance, communications and command-and-control systems (called ‘soft’ combat), which can be, and on most occasions are, located away from the theater of operations.7 Indeed, the changing nature of modern warfare has both necessitated and informed significant changes in the PLA’s order of battle, and continues to provide guidance for future modernization efforts. As a result, army building over the past two decades has focused on making preparations for military struggle, which requires adjustments in army, navy, air force, and strategic artillery force doctrines, procurement priorities, command and control and training. Increasingly, emphasis has also been placed on developing and implementing joint war-fighting capabilities.8 The 2013 edition of The Science of Military Strategy published by the PLA Academy of Military Science Press summarizes the key characteristics of modern warfare, including medium- to longrange precision strike capabilities, system of systems, cyber/information dominance and identifies the likely military conflict/war scenarios China could be facing. Emphasizing the PLA’s unique military operational modes, the so-called three ‘nons’ – non-symmetrical (asymmetrical), non-linear and non-contact war-fighting, the book advocates continued adherence to the strategy of asymmetrical war-fighting but a greater emphasis on taking the initiative in its overall strategy of active defense. This recognition of the disparity of military capabilities between the PLA and its more powerful opponent, the United States, is also highlighted in China’s latest defense White Paper.9

China’s evolving A2/AD strategy 383 It is important to note that for an extensive period since the end of the Cold War, and likely for an equally long period into the future, China will remain inferior to the United States in overall military capabilities but can and will seek to compensate for its weaker position though asymmetrical warfare. In fact, while significant progress has been registered, analysts agree that many of the military reforms remain aspirational and incomplete.10 As Thomas Christensen points out, ‘China has long sought to affect the psychology of a militarily superior United States and its regional allies by posing potentially costly military challenges to forward-deployed US forces. What has changed in the interim is not so much China’s strategy but its capability to execute that strategy’.11

THE PLA A2/AD STRATEGY Western analysts of Chinese military options with regard to Taiwan generally include two schools: one holding that the Chinese military would undertake a measured approach, involving a deliberate build-up of overwhelming military force for the purpose of coercing Taiwan to submit to China’s pressure to stand down in a crisis. The other school of analytical opinion avers that China would employ surprise tactics to achieve rapid success against Taiwan before the United States had sufficient time to intervene. Chinese military strategists have devoted considerable space to the importance of seizing the initiative from the very beginning of a military campaign. As one Chinese military analyst has suggested, ‘in a high-tech local war, a belligerent which adopts a passive defensive strategy and launches no offensive against the enemy is bound to fold its hands and await destruction’.12 US military presence in East Asia poses a serious challenge to China’s strategic interests, especially where it pertains to Beijing’s mission of national unification and its ability in asserting maritime rights in the East China Sea and South China Sea. But the most critical issue involves potential US military intervention in a Taiwan Strait crisis, and as a consequence the PLA has to confront a much stronger opponent to protect China’s sovereignty over Taiwan. In the Taiwan Strait arena, it means that the PLA would (and will) likely face a much stronger enemy and engage in a military conflict that is intense, high-tech and asymmetrical even though it will remain localized. The challenge essentially comes down to how the Chinese military is going to fight a superior enemy and win the war. Indeed, ‘PLA planners had to devise means of offsetting and countering the United States’ advantages, enabling the “weak to defeat the strong”’.13 How to deter and prevent US military

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intervention becomes a critical issue for the PLA. Indeed, as one former US flag officer argues: Beijing’s primary military competitor – the United States – maintains a significant naval presence on ‘China’s doorstep.’ Should China elect to use force to resolve either reunification with Taiwan or outstanding maritime claims, the United States is the one country that could militarily deny success. Its air and naval presence in the region provides a counterbalance to the potential use of the PLA to settle these issues by force majeure.14

Most analysts would agree that China remains the weaker party in a likely military conflict with the United States. The PLA, despite the tremendous progress it has made and significant transformation it has undergone over the past three decades, still lags behind in many indicators of military power when compared to the world’s most advanced armed forces. These pertain to command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4IRS) systems, procurement and equipment, and personnel and training, among others, even though military spending has been growing at double-digit rates annually since the end of the Cold War. Clearly, for the PLA to confront a stronger opponent in local conflicts under modern, informationized conditions, the only pathway to victory – or at least avoidance of defeat – would be to disrupt and deny enemy access and exploit its points of weaknesses with the so-called ‘assassin’s mace’ if necessary.15 Indeed, given the asymmetrical capabilities of the two, direct engagement would incur significant costs and could also result in defeat. The PLA is clearly aware of the superiority of the US military and the implications for the outcomes of cross-Strait conflicts should US air, space and sea power be involved. The PLA’s inability (and reluctance) to compete directly with advanced US technologies may lead the Chinese military to focus on asymmetrical methods such as anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons in an effort to counter US military dominance.16 The desire to have some chance of success against a technologically superior opponent may well be the rationale behind China’s search for US military ‘soft ribs’ and here the so-called Anti-Access strategies come into the picture.17 According to the 2015 Pentagon report on China’s military, ‘China is investing in military programs and weapons designed to improve extended-range power projection, Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD), and operations in emerging domains such as cyberspace, space and the electromagnetic spectrum’.18 This should not be surprising. In fact, ‘[m]ost major military innovations came about due to the recognition of a pressing strategic or operational problem that cannot be handled through improvements to the

China’s evolving A2/AD strategy 385 existing force, but rather requires a new approach’.19 The RAND study on Chinese Anti-Access strategies has identified a number of ways and a multitude of possible targets that the Chinese military may contemplate employing and attacking to ensure that it can prevail over – or at least avoid defeat by – the United States in that theater of military operations. These include C4ISR systems, logistics and transportation, air bases, sea lanes and ports, and aircraft carriers, among others. The first and the last are of particular importance as the US military is highly dependent on both to operate effectively.20 The concept of ‘Anti-Access’ is the idea of disrupting, weakening, and denying US ability to deploy troops to overseas theaters of operations, given the US military’s dependence on assets such as forward basing, depots, information networks, and sea lines of communication (SLOCs), among others, to ensure operational effectiveness and successes.21 A 2007 RAND study defines an Anti-Access measure as ‘any action by an opponent that has the effect of slowing the deployment of friendly forces into a theater, preventing them from operating from certain locations within that theater, or causing them to operate from distances farther from the locus of conflict than they would normally prefer’.22 For Chinese military analysts, the lessons of the 1990–91 Gulf War, the 2001 Afghanistan invasion and 2003 invasion of Iraq clearly demonstrate that should the United States be allowed the build-up and projection of its overwhelming forces, no other military competitor can win in a contest.23 The Chinese military never uses the term A2/AD, although some concepts and alternative terms may capture or reflect the objectives: counter-intervention, ‘assassin’s mace’ (see below), trump weapons, system of systems, active strategic counterattacks on exterior lines, and three ‘nons’ – non-linear, non-contact, non-symmetric (asymmetric). Some analysts suggest that Active Strategic Counterattack against Exterior Lines (ASCEL), with its focus on the asymmetrical aspect of engaging a superior foe, may more approximate the A2/AD concept, which is by and large a Western term. They point out the similarities between A2/AD and ASCEL, where both emphasize taking the initiative in the early stage of a conflict, the role of naval, aerial, space and cyber strike forces, and home advantage. Indeed, ‘[t]he ASCEL doctrine calls for Chinese forces to strike first, strike deep and hit hard against an approaching enemy’.24 Counter-intervention is not used in the PLA lexicon, although, as two acute analysts suggest, the Chinese expressions ‘fan ganyu’, ‘fan ganshe’ and ‘fan jieru’ may be the conceptual equivalents. However, even some of these terms are borrowed from Western literature describing what is considered to be PLA strategy, rather than concepts developed by and

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used in authoritative Chinese writings.25 It is not entirely clear that any of these stand for the PLA’s accepted doctrine, even though some discussions can be identified in the Chinese literature. It is more likely, though, that in the development of PLA strategies, technologies can be determining factors.26 According to US Department of Defense reports on the Chinese military and other recent analyses, especially the series of RAND reports, the PLA has been developing and deploying a range of Anti-Access strategies through conventional and/or asymmetrical means. For instance, PLA writings suggest that given heavy US reliance on satellites and other space assets for military operations, jamming and destroying these space assets will become increasingly important in a future conflict. ASAT systems focus on disrupting enemy communications and intelligence systems, and are potentially powerful weapons against a technologically dominant adversary. This is the so-called ‘assassin’s mace’ (shashoujian).27 In addition, cyber and information warfare is another means – and a very effective one at that – in attaching and paralyzing the enemy’s information networks and nodes.28 The 2015 Pentagon report states that ‘Chinese offensive cyberspace operations could support A2/AD by targeting critical nodes to disrupt adversary networks throughout the region’.29 Chinese developments of A2/AD capabilities have largely been driven by the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, where the unhampered intervention by US aircraft carrier battle groups convinced the PLA that the only way to reverse the balance was to develop the capability to keep US forces at bay and inflict heavy tolls on them should Washington again intervene in future crises. However, Beijing perceives this as predominantly defensive in a strategic sense; its effectiveness and success are predicated on initiating offensive operations in striking fixed and mobile targets and engaging in cyber and space attacks to ensure its effectiveness and success. Likewise, US responses to A2/AD, out of determination to ensure its freedom of movements and power projection capabilities, also require offensive operations to achieve largely defensive purposes. In other words, US–China military conflicts and even potential escalation, could take place even though neither side is driven by offensive intent, nor does either deliberately seek military confrontation with the other. Nevertheless, both can still be heading for a train wreck.30 Cruise missiles in modern warfare are increasingly being recognized as decisive intermediate-range precision weapons. Clearly, their repeated use and effectiveness make them attractive weapons against both fixed and mobile targets, to avoid and/or reduce casualties, difficult to defend against given their low-altitude flight paths, and economical since they are only a fraction of the cost of regular ballistic missiles.31 Chinese

China’s evolving A2/AD strategy 387 military analysts note the use of Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) during the first and second Gulf Wars, and the Kosovo and Afghanistan operations. Thousands of them were launched, with 80–90 percent targeting success. Indeed, cruise missiles, together with ballistic missiles, will likely play a prominent role in what are described as the PLA’s missile-centric strategies, especially in the Taiwan Strait war theater, where the Chinese military could put US targets at risk in Guam, Okinawa, and at sea.32 Indeed, various reports suggest that the Chinese military is procuring and deploying anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) such HY-2 (Silkworm), LACMs, including YJ-63 (Eagle Strike), and DH-10 long-range LACMs, which can reach targets 2000 km away. These systems, together with the modified anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) based on a variant of the land-based DF-21/CSS-5, are becoming critical components of China’s strategy of A2/AD in the Western Pacific and could pose a serious challenge to the US Navy and its ability to operate in the region.33 Since the late 1990s, the Chinese military has increasingly moved toward a missile-centric strategy relying on conventional ballistic and ground-launched cruise missiles.34 The core components of this conventional capability include the medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) such as the DF-21 and more than 1000 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) like the DF-11 and DF-15, deployed across the Taiwan Strait as direct deterrence against the island’s independence, or, as one US analyst put it, to ‘perform military deterrence operations, including shows-offorce and “surgical strikes” against crucial enemy assets as a form of “strategic deterrence”’.35 Since the mid-1990s when the Second Artillery Corps (SAC) introduced its conventional missile arm, over the past two decades at least ten brigades of SRBMs, including cruise missile units, have now entered the PLA order of battle. This strategy is in line with A2/AD whereby the PLA aims at gaining decisive advantage in future conflicts around China’s periphery, including deterring US carrier groups in the West Pacific region.36 To achieve this objective, China in recent years has introduced and improved upon its anti-ship ballistic and cruise missile capability to secure its maritime periphery, increasingly up to and beyond the first island chain. Such capability could be what is described as a ‘game changer’ in the Western Pacific, where the Chinese military would be able to disrupt and deny the United States and its allies in conflicts over the Taiwan Strait and beyond.37 Chinese military leaders are confident that its strategic missile force has now acquired the capability to ‘[launch] precision strikes in all weathers and conditions’.38 According to Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins of the US Naval War College:

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China’s DF-21D ASBM is no longer aspirational. Beijing has successfully developed, tested, and deployed the world’s first weapons system capable of targeting a moving carrier strike group (CSG) from long-range, land-based mobile launchers. The Second Artillery, China’s strategic missile force, already has a capability to attempt to use the DF-21D against US CSGs in the event of conflict, and therefore likely expects to achieve a growing degree of deterrence with it.39

However, an effective A2/AD strategy requires that China acquires and deploys the ‘capacity to find US aircraft carrier roughly 1000 miles from the Mainland and to attack them with homing ASBMs (anti-ship ballistic missiles)’.40 A series of technical challenges need to be overcome, namely, detecting and identifying a carrier; feeding targeting-quality data to transporter-erector launchers (TELs) for prompt and precision launch; and defeating carrier missile defense.41 At the same time, China is reportedly deploying ocean-floor surveillance networks to enhance detection of enemy submarines and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft and subsequently strengthen its own ASW capability.42 China has been working to develop and deploy large numbers of ASCMs, and highly accurate air-launched anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles (ALCMs). These include the Yingji (Eagle Strike), or YJ-series, such as the YJ-63/KD-63, DH-10/CJ-10 and possibly YJ-100, YJ-91 (based on the Russian Kh-31P) and KD-88 (a variant of the YJ-88) ALCMs.43 The 2015 Pentagon report on China’s military lists the PLA precision strike capabilities, including land-attack cruise missiles (YJ-63, KD-88, CJ-20/CJ-10; under development: CM-802AKG); and anti-ship cruise missiles (YJ-62, SS-N-22/SUNBURN, YJ-18, YJ-; under development: YJ-12).44 Open-source reports suggest that China has in recent years rolled out new anti-ship missile systems that are longer in range and have improved precision. Analysts suggest that these could ‘re-define the naval combat arena’.45 The new system, the intermediate-range DF-26 (up to 4000 km), was rolled out during China’s military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of the victory against Japan in September 2015, and is reportedly nuclear-capable and puts Guam within range.46 The DH-10 ground-launched cruise missile/land attack cruise missile, for instance, has a range of 2000 km, and is deployed on a three-tube road mobile launcher. Approximately 100 LACMs enter into service each year.47 Other systems include the C-602 long-range ASCM and CJ-10 ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM); the illegal transfer of six Russian designed Kh-55 (AS-15 Kent) air-launched cruise missiles from Ukraine in 2000; and the Chang Jian (Long Sword) CJ-10 began trials in 2004, with 50–250 missiles of the latter already having been deployed. These systems have a range between 1500 and 2000 km.48

China’s evolving A2/AD strategy 389 The deployment of these systems, such as the CSS-5 intermediaterange ballistic missile (IRBM) and its ‘carrier killer’ ASBM variant (DF-21D and DF-26), and DH-10 ground-based land attack cruise missiles are now capable of hitting major US air bases in the Western Pacific, including Kadena on Okinawa and Kunsan in South Korea, and now possibly Guam. Together with fourth-generation fighter aircraft, ASAT, submarine and surface vessels armed with anti-ship missiles, China’s A2/AD developments pose a serious threat to US presence and undermine the credibility of its alliance commitments during times of crises and/or conflicts.49 The 2006 Chinese defense White Paper emphasizes the need for the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) to transition from its past mission of territorial air defense to both offensive as well as defensive operations. Indeed, over the past two decades, great efforts have been made to change the air force from the old subsidiary supporting role to one of a more active and offense-capable missions. This has involved both a more aggressive procurement program and renewed domestic defense industrial renovation to produce a new generation of fighter aircraft and refitting and modernization of the air force bomber fleet.50 These include fourth-generation Russian fighter aircraft and transporters such as Su-27, Su-30, Mig-29 and Il-76; air defense systems; and its domestically produced new fleet of fighter aircraft (J-10s). Production of the H-6/Badger bomber has been resumed, with the new variant capable of carrying ASCMs such as the YJ-62.51 The PLA Naval Air Force (PLANAF) uses an H-6 variant for anti-ship missile attack. The obsolescent H-6 bomber suffers from low payload and short range. However, it may have been given a new mission to destroy radars, command-and-control sites, and other fixed points on Taiwan by the reported addition of YJ/KD-63 LACMs in addition to the YJ-6/C-601, YJ-61/C-611 and YJ-81/C801L cruise missiles that it already carries.52 One Chinese source refers to it as ‘another strong platform for China’s cruise missiles’.53 LACMs and improved ability to launch them from aircraft may enable China to destroy Taiwan’s aircraft while they are on the ground or in hardened shelters. Though not yet introduced into force, at least two types of bomber-launched, 500-kg warhead LACMs are being developed with 1500-km ranges and 10-m accuracy.54 Such missiles could presumably threaten hardened aircraft revetments, including even the cave entrances to Taiwan’s underground fighter shelters inside the mountain at Cha Shan airbase on the east side of the island. Air-launched LACMs could be used to destroy Taiwan’s command-and-control nodes that

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would otherwise coordinate and direct the interception of PRC air attacks, and could be designated to destroy Taiwan’s aircraft and airfields.55 Conventional wisdom has it that the revolution in information technology easily enables the precision delivery of conventional payloads over great distances in the form of LACMs aided by advances in global positioning technologies. To be sure, the advent of global positioning technology has eased the process somewhat for states wishing to enter the LACM club. But the process of becoming truly proficient requires more than simple access to technology. What is truly novel about today’s Tomahawk LACM, even its latest Block IV version, is the extent to which its performance has depended on years of system diagnostics collected ever since the first Tomahawk was introduced in the 1970s. Virtually each and every Tomahawk, in peace and war, is analyzed to determine precisely what accounted for the missile’s performance, no matter whether the missile crashed after taking off or hit precisely where it was programmed to hit. To learn from their successes and errors requires the kind of sophisticated diagnostic equipment that provides information about system performance but also highly skilled systems integration specialists who possess specialized know-how accumulated over years of interaction with other skilled missile developers. Tomahawk’s ubiquitous appearance in multiple contingencies since the first Gulf War in 1991 has facilitated the creation of an enormously valuable store of knowledge that lends itself to steady improvement in LACM performance.56 While China will surely not need over three decades to develop high confidence in LACM performance, they will require time and dedicated effort before they can expect to have confidence that their LACMs will perform as desired, particularly in combined arms campaigns and the PLA’s Anti-Access strategies.

ASBC AND US REPONSES TO A2/AD Chinese military modernization of the past two decades is steadily changing the military balance across the Taiwan Strait in Beijing’s favor. Granted, not all of the weapons procurement and deployment have been driven by the Taiwan factor; China’s growing economic interactions with the outside world have expanded and exposed its interests, which require protection and hence power projection. However, the fact that the Mainland now has an ever growing inventory that it can draw upon in a future Taiwan scenario makes it imperative that Taiwan’s defense policy, including force structure and arms procurement, must be informed by the

China’s evolving A2/AD strategy 391 need to protect its political autonomy, resist Chinese coercion and defend against Chinese assault.57 While US commitment to Taiwan’s defense has never been explicitly spelled out and indeed Washington has regarded this policy of strategic ambiguity over the past three decades as a prudent and effective one that has served its interests well and contributed to cross-Strait peace and stability, the United States’ intervention in a potential Taiwan Strait military conflict has always remained a distinct possibility for a number of reasons. One is the impact on US strategic interests in East Asia. Washington needs to demonstrate its credibility in the region. Second is US respect for and support of Taiwan’s continuing democratization process. The third relates to how the United States should handle a rising power such as China.58 China’s A2/AD strategy and system deployment, although from Beijing’s perspective are principally defensive, can pose a serious threat to US power projection in the Western Pacific, its ability to intervene during crises either to protect its own interests or support and protect those of its allies and partners in the region, including defense of Taiwan in the event the island is threatened or attacked by China, and therefore undermine the credibility of its extended deterrence. With China deploying anti-ship and land attack ballistic and cruise missiles with extended range and improved precision, US forward-based troops, depots and naval forces at sea such as aircraft carrier battle groups are becoming vulnerable targets. US allies and partners, facing the specter of being attacked, may become reluctant to provide bases to the US military. Coupled with steep cuts in defense budgets in the coming years, the United States’ commitments to Asia have to undergo significant changes and adjustments to meet the new challenges.59 Washington is responding to China’s growing A2/AD capabilities with the development and deployment of theater missile defense systems and the AirSea Battle Concept (ASBC). US contribution to the region’s stability, and indeed its leadership role for well over six decades has depended critically on its ability to project power overseas at long distance. The forward military presence, made possible by access to and maintenance of overseas bases, constitutes the core of a defense posture that can shape and respond to regional contingencies. However, this ability is increasingly being eroded, undermined and even threatened by developments in Chinese A2/AD capabilities, leading many to believe, rightly or wrongly, that the era of US military dominance is coming to an end.60 What the Pentagon is particularly concerned about and feels threatened by in the Western Pacific are Chinese efforts to prevent US forces from operating from forward bases, disrupting and even destroying US military communications networks, and increasing threats to moving

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targets such as aircraft carrier groups by land-based ballistic missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles, effectively turning US military facilities and forces into ‘wasting assets’.61 These developments threaten to either neutralize US ability to come to the assistance of allies and friends in the region or raise the costs of such US intervention prohibitively. Such threats could also intimidate regional allies and partners to the extent that they are so concerned with impending conflict that they may become reluctant to host US forces and facilities. Some of the proposed responses, more defensive in nature, include hardening against missile attacks, beefing up submarine forces with conventional cruise missiles, and enhanced air and missile defenses, especially for carrier battle groups, in addition to the ability to protect IT networks against cyberwarfare as well as options to replace satellites should they be destroyed during the initial phase of military conflict.62 For many US defense analysts, defending against A2/AD could be costly and less effective than the development of ASBC offensiveoriented responses, such as blinding PLA space-based systems and therefore preventing them from being used for initiating attacks; longrange precision, penetrating strikes to destroy PLA ballistic and cruise missile launchers; and ground-based long-range maritime surveillance systems to reduce the Chinese military’s ability to target US and allied bases and facilities.63 Indeed, the ASBC is ‘designed to sustain America’s freedom of action in the face’ of A2/AD developments. It calls for the establishment of ‘networked and integrated forces’, which in turn would be expected to ‘disrupt, destroy and defeat’ the enemy at the start of any conflict.64 However, the more offensive aspects of ASBC raise the concern of uncontrolled escalation, with serious implications. Indeed, critics of the concept argue that it places too much emphasis on the operational aspects of attacks to eliminate key elements of Chinese A2/AD networks, and fails to consider the nature, the durability, and escalatory danger of potential future US–China military conflicts.65 What has been proposed instead is the concept of ‘offshore control’, which seeks to deny and disrupt China’s access to raw materials and energy supplies essential to China’s economy with the establishment of a set of rings away from the reach of its A2/AD capabilities. At the same time, the United States could develop advanced platforms that would force China to develop and acquire long-range assets to restore and guarantee offshore supplies. Another proposed concept, a war-at-sea strategy, follows the same logic by avoiding direct strikes against Chinese land assets but confines conflicts to the maritime arena out of reach of China’s A2/AD, where the United States enjoys significant undersea superiority.66

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CONCLUSION China’s military modernization has serious implications for the United States. While initially driven largely by the need to modernize a rather backward military with obsolete equipment, and to prepare for military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait, recent developments indicate that the PLA is on the march, motivated by ambitions such as regional influence and the ability to escort marine ships and protect critical SLOCs further away from China’s maritime boundary.67 China’s growing A2/AD capability is posing a significant threat to US ability to project power and protect its allies and partners in the region. US responses to such perceived threats, where the Pentagon adopts ASBC and develops greater interservice coordination, to disrupt, destroy and defeat Chinese capabilities, including options for deep strikes into Chinese territories, could lead to further escalation and even nuclear exchange, especially if Beijing perceives these strikes as aimed at taking out its nuclear retaliatory capabilities. Nor are the proposed alternatives, such as offshore control and war at sea, which require continued US operations in the region but out of range of Chinese missile strikes while actively engaging in economic warfare against China, specifically in disrupting and even cutting off Chinese oil supplies and imports of critical resources, guaranteed to keep any conflicts from escalating. Clearly, the two countries and especially the two militaries must engage in regular dialogue to better understand each other’s strategic goals, core national interests, and develop mechanisms to enhance confidence building and crisis management. In particular, neither side should seek to exploit unilateral advantage by engaging in disarming first strike capabilities in cyber and space, and prevent nuclear escalation in any conventional military conflict. It should be made clear that mutual vulnerability exists and neither could make any permanent gains without incurring debilitating damage to each other’s critical infrastructure in military but even more commercial spheres.68 While Beijing may not seek to challenge US presence in the region and indeed could value the latter’s continued engagement as a stabilizing force, over time it is likely to become more assertive in what it considers its sphere of influence and this may clash with Washington’s desire to remain the dominant power in the region. For this very reason, US administrations since the end of the Cold War have continued to emphasize the importance of alliances, the need for resolve in dealing with difficult cases, and role of missile defenses in deterring potential threats from rogue states and/or non-state actors. China’s military

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build-up will only reinforce Washington’s conviction that to retain US primacy in the region, stronger alliances, strengthened military presence and hedging should be pursued. This could in turn be seen by Beijing as the United States’ attempt to block and contain its rise and to deny its rightful place in Asia. Failing to address these issues could lead China and the United States on a collision course and in the process cause significant instability in the region.

NOTES 1.

2. 3.

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

10.

11. 12. 13. 14.

For a general discussion of Chinese military modernization, see Cliff, R. (2015), China’s Military Power: Assessing Current and Future Capabilities, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; Fisher, R. (2008), China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach, Westport, CT: Praeger Security International; Shambaugh, D. (2002), Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press; Ji, Y. (1999), The Armed Forces of China, London and New York: L.B. Tauris. Zhang, X. (2015), Deng Xiaoping’s Long War: The Military Conflict between China and Vietnam, 1979–1981, Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press. The commentary is cited in Chen, X. and X. Liu (1993), ‘Several questions concerning China’s national defense policy’, International Strategic Studies, No. 2. Also see Jencks, H.W. (2002), ‘Chinese evaluation of “Desert Storm”: implications for PRC security’, Journal of East Asian Affairs, 6 (2), 447–77. Friedberg, A.L. (2014), Beyond AirSea Battle: The Debate Over US Military Strategy in Asia, London: Routledge, p. 21. Li, N. (1996), ‘The PLA’s evolving warfighting doctrine, strategy and tactics, 1985–95: a Chinese perspective’, The China Quarterly, No. 146, 457. Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military; Pillsbury, M. (2000), China Debates the Future Security Environment, Washington, DC: National Defense University. Newmyer, J. (2010), ‘The revolution in military affairs with Chinese characteristics’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 33 (4), 483–504. Mulvenon, J. and D. Finkelstein (eds) (2005), China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation. The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China (2015), China’s Military Strategy, Beijing: The State Council Information Office; Shou, X. (ed.) (2013), The Strategy of Military Science, Beijing: PLA Academy of Military Science Press. For a recent assessment, see Chase, M.S. et al. (2014), China’s Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weakness of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Santa Monica, CA: RAND. See also, Kamphausen, R. and A. Scobell (eds) (2007), Right-Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. Christensen, T.J. (2015), The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, New York: W.W. Norton, p. 99. Mulvenon and Finkelstein, China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs. Friedberg, Beyond AirSea Battle, p. 17. McDevitt, M. (2011), ‘The PLA navy’s antiaccess role in a Taiwan contingency’, in P.C. Saunders and C.D. Yung, M. Swaine and A.N.-D. Yang (eds) (2011), The

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15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33.

Chinese Navy, Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, p. 199. Heginbotham, E. et al. (2015), The U.S.–China Military Scorecards: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017, Santa Monica, CA: RAND. Bao, S. (2007), ‘Deterrence revisited: outer space’, China Security, 3 (1), 2–11. Mulvenon, J.C., M.S. Tanner and M.S. Chase et al. (2006), Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Transformation and Implications for the Department of Defense, Santa Monica, CA: RAND. Office of the Secretary of Defense (2015), Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2015, p. 31. Mahnken, T.G. (2011), ‘China’s anti-access strategy in historical and theoretical perspective’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 34 (3), 303. Cliff, R. et al. (2007), Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Anti-Access Strategies and Their Implications for the United States, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, pp. 51–79. Krepinevich, A., B. Watts and R. Work (2003), Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Cliff, Entering the Dragon’s Lair, p. 11. Sun, L. (2002), Haiwan Zhanzheng Quanshi [The Complete History of the Gulf War], Beijing: Liberation Army Press [in Chinese]. Friedberg, Beyond AirSea Battle, p. 24. Fravel, M.T. and C.P. Twomey (2015), ‘Projecting strategy: the myth of Chinese counter-intervention’, The Washington Quarterly, 37 (4), 175. Twomey, C.P. (2014), ‘What’s in a name: building anti-access/area denial capabilities without anti-access/area denial doctrine’, in R. Kamphausen, D. Lai and T. Tanner (eds) (2014), Assessing the People’s Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, pp. 129–70; Wishik II, A.L. (2011), ‘An anti-access approximation: the PLA’s active strategic counterattacks on exterior lines’, China Security, No. 19, 37–48; Blasko, D.J. (2011), ‘“Technology determines tactics”: the relationship between technology and doctrine in Chinese military thinking’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 34 (3), 355–81. China–US Focus (2013), ‘Shashoujian: a strategic revelation or simply an idiom?’, 23 June, accessed 31 March 2016 at http://www.chinausfocus.com/culture-history/ shashoujian-a-strategic-revelation-or-simply-an-idiom/. For a good summary of these views, see Tellis, A.J. (2007), ‘China’s military space strategy’, Survival, 49 (3), 41–72. See also, Hagt, E. (2007), ‘China’s ASAT test: strategic response’, China Security, 3 (1), 31–51. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, p. 33. Goldstein, A. (2013), ‘First things first: the pressing danger of crisis instability in U.S.–China relations’, International Security, 37 (4), 49–89; Etzioni, A. (2014), ‘The AirSea Battle “concept”: a critique’, International Politics, 51 (5), 577–96. Gruselle, B. (2006), Cruise Missiles & Anti-Access Strategies, Paris: Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique. Zhou, Y. (2000), ‘Rixin yueyi de xunhang daodan’ [Ever changing new cruise missiles], Xiandai Junshi, May, 32–4; Wang, X (1999), ‘Kelindung yuanhe rezhong yu shiyong “zhanfu” xunhang daodan [Why is Clinton so keen on using ‘Tomahawk’ cruise missiles?], Xiandai Junshi, p. 47 [in Chinese]. Erickson, A.S. (2013), Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Development: Drivers, Trajectories, and Strategic Implications, Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation; Hoyler, M. (2010), ‘China’s “anti-access” ballistic missiles and U.S. active defense’, Naval War College Review, 63 (4), 84–105; Erickson, A.S. (2010), ‘China’s evolving anti-access approach: “Where’s the nearest (U.S.) carrier?”’, China Brief, 10 (18), 5–8; Erickson, A.S. and D.D. Yang (2009), ‘Using the land to control

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35. 36.

37. 38. 39.

40. 41. 42. 43.

44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

51.

52. 53.

Handbook of US–China relations the sea? Chinese analysts consider the antiship ballistic missile’, Naval War College Review, 62 (4), 53–86. Gill, B., J. Mulvenon and M. Stokes (2002), ‘The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: transition to credible deterrence’, in J. Mulvenon and A. Yang (eds), The People’s Liberation Army as Organization, Santa Monica, CA: RAND. Christman, R. (2011), ‘Conventional missions for China’s Second Artillery Corps’, Comparative Strategy, No. 30, 198. Stokes, M. and I. Easton (2010), Evolving Aerospace Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region: Implications for Stability in the Taiwan Strait and Beyond, 27 May, Project 2049 Institute, accessed 7 August 2015 at https://project2049.net/documents/ aerospace_trends_asia_pacific_region_stokes_easton.pdf. Erickson and Yang, ‘Using the land to control the sea?’; Erickson, ‘China’s evolving anti-access approach’. Quoted in Andrew, M. (2010, ‘China’s conventional cruise and ballistic missile force modernization and development’, China Brief, 10 (1), 5. Erickson, A.S. and G. Collins (2010), ‘China deploys world’s first long-range, land-based “carrier killer”: DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) reaches “initial operational capability” (IOC)’, ChinaSignPost, 26 December. Yuan, J. (2014), ‘The coming US–China military showdown’, in M. Li and K.M. Kemburi (eds), New Dynamics in US–China Relations, London: Routledge, p. 172. Hoyler, ‘China’s “anti-access” ballistic missiles and U.S. active defense’, p. 84. Goldstein, L. and S. Knight (2014), ‘Wired for sound in the “near seas”’, Proceedings Magazine, April, 56–61. Yuan, J. and A. Erickson (2011), ‘Antiaccess and China’s air-launched cruise missiles’, in A.S. Erickson and L.J. Goldstein (eds), Chinese Aerospace Power: Evolving Maritime Roles, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, pp. 275–86; Chase, M.S. (2011), ‘Strategic implications of Chinese land-attack cruise missile development’, in Erickson and Goldstein, Chinese Aerospace Power, pp. 275–86 and 287–303. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress. Hewson, R. (2013), ‘Storm force warning: China’s anti-ship missile range spreads its wings’, Jane’s International Defence Review, May, 46–51. Minnick, W. (2015), ‘China’s parade puts US Navy on notice’, Defense News, 3 September. Stokes and Easton, Evolving Aerospace Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region, p. 14. Andrew, ‘China’s conventional cruise and ballistic missile force modernization and development’. Kearn, D.W. (2014), ‘AirSea Battle and China’s anti-access and area denial challenge’, Orbis, 58 (1), 132–46. Lin-Greenberg, E. (2007), ‘Offensive airpower with Chinese characteristics: development, capabilities, and intentions’, Air & Space Power Journal, Fall, 67–77; Lewis, J.W. and L. Xue (1999), ‘China’s search for a modern air force’, International Security, 24 (1), 64–94. Saunders, P.C. and E. Quam (2007), ‘Future force structure of the Chinese air force’, in Kamphausen and Scobell, Right-Sizing the People’s Liberation Army, pp. 377– 436; Fisher, R. (2007), ‘China’s “new” bomber’, International Assessment and Strategy Center, 7 February, accessed 7 August 2015 at http://strategycenter.net/ research/pubID.146/pub_detail.asp. Mahnken, T.G. (2005), The Cruise Missile Challenge, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, p. 17. Wang, J. and Q. Fu (2008), ‘Pride and prejudice: an interpretation of Keating’s visit to China’, Bingqi Zhishi, March [in Chinese].

China’s evolving A2/AD strategy 397 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59.

60. 61. 62.

63. 64.

65. 66.

67. 68.

See, for example, Minnick, W. (2004), ‘China tests new land-attack cruise missile’, Jane’s Missiles & Rockets, 21 September. Murray, W. (2008), ‘Revisiting Taiwan’s defense strategy’, Naval War College Review, 61 (3), 13–38. See Gormley, D.M. (2008), Missile Contagion: Cruise Missile Proliferation and the Threat to International Security, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, especially Chapter 6. Hickey, D.V. (2013), ‘Imbalance in the Taiwan Strait’, Parameters, 43 (3), 43–53. Bergsten, C.F., C. Freeman, N.R. Lardy and D.J. Mitchell (2008), China’s Rise: Challenges and Opportunities, Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics and Center for Strategic and International Studies, pp. 169–90. Mahnken, T., D. Blumenthal and T. Donnelly et al. (2012), Asia in the Balance: Transforming US Strategy in Asia, Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute; Horowitz, M.C. (2012), ‘How defense austerity will test U.S. strategy in Asia’, The Diplomat, 9 August. Krepinevich, A.F. (2010), Why AirSea Battle?, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Krepinevich, A.F. (2009), ‘The Pentagon’s wasting assets: the eroding foundations of American power’, Foreign Affairs, 88 (4), 18–33. Montgomery, E.B. (2014), ‘Contested primacy in the Western Pacific: China’s rise and the future of U.S. power projection’, International Security, 38 (4), 115–49; Cheng, D. (2014), ‘The U.S. needs an integrated approach to counter China’s anti-access/area denial strategy’, Heritage Backgrounder, No. 2927. Van Tol, J., M. Gunzinger, A. Krepinevich and J. Thomas (2010), AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Schwartz, N.A. and J.W. Greenert (2012), ‘AirSea Battle: promoting stability in an era of uncertainty’, The American Interest, 20 February; International Institute for Strategic Studies (2012), ‘New US military concept marks pivot to sea and air’, Strategic Comments, 18 (20). Etzioni, A. (2014), ‘AirSea Battle: a case study of structural inattention and subterranean forces’, Armed Forces & Society, 14 September, accessed 31 March 2016 at http://afs.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/09/10/0095327X14548717. Hammes, T.X. (2012), ‘Offshore control: a proposed strategy for an unlikely conflict’, INSS Strategic Forum, June; Kline, J.E. and W.P. Hughes, Jr. (2012), ‘Between peace and the AirSea Battle: a war at sea strategy’, Naval War College Review, 65 (4), 35–41. Pomfret, J. (2010), ‘Economic powerhouse China focuses on its military might’, The Washington Post, 17 August, A06. Gomper, D.C. and P.C. Saunders (2011), The Paradox of Power: Sino–American Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability, Washington, DC: National University Press.

21. The PLA Navy and the US Navy in the Asia-Pacific: Anti-Access/Area Denial vs AirSea Battle Richard A. Bitzinger

As the US and Chinese rivalry in the Western Pacific continues to heat up, this competition is increasingly being played out in a game of military chicken: China is trying to gain the means to prevent US forces (and, by extension, its regional allies and partners) from entering or operating with impunity within the East and South China Seas, while the United States is endeavoring to counter such capabilities. China’s efforts have been dubbed ‘Anti-Access/Area Denial’ (A2/AD) capabilities. The US response has been AirSea Battle (ASB), or in its most recent incarnation, the ‘Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons’, or JAM-GC.1 However it is designated, the ASB concept is about overcoming the purportedly globally emerging ‘Anti-Access/Area Denial challenge’ that tests the operational freedom of US military forces.2 Advocates of ASB frequently emphasize the growing abilities of potential adversaries (China, Iran, North Korea) to deny US forces the ability to enter or operate in maritime territories adjacent to these countries. A2/AD is seen as especially crucial in deterring or countering third-party interventions – for example, efforts on the part of the US military to come to the aid of Taiwan in the case of a cross-Strait crisis, or Saudi Arabia and neighboring states in the case of attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf.3 According to the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Affairs (CSBA), ‘anti-access (A2) strategies aim to prevent US forces from operating from fixed land bases in a theater of operations’, while ‘area-denial (AD) operations aim to prevent the freedom of action of maritime forces operating in the theater’.4 The CSBA defines the ‘A2/AD’ threat as strikes by ballistic and cruise missiles (both land-attack and anti-ship), artillery and rocket barrages, submarine operations, and long-range air strikes. Cyberattacks, anti-satellite warfare, and even coastal mines are also usually characteristic of A2/AD.5

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Anti-Access/Area Denial vs AirSea Battle 399 While details surrounding ASB/JAM-GC are still sketchy, this operational concept has significant repercussions for security in the AsiaPacific, because it is an essential component of Washington’s response to the growth of Chinese military power. This is because China, above all other potential adversaries, is regarded as the most critical potential employer of an A2/AD strategy, and therefore the main object of an ASB-based response. The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) strategic priorities have shifted since the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996 toward adopting a diverse portfolio of A2/AD capabilities for air, sea and land operations designed to deter, delay and prevent external (i.e., US) entry into specific areas deemed vital to China’s ‘core interests’. To this end, the PLA has been gradually upgrading its existing weapons systems and platforms, while experimenting with the next generation of design concepts. This can be seen in the comprehensive modernization of China’s nuclear and conventional ballistic missiles; integrated air-, missile- and early-warning defense systems; electronic and cyberwarfare capabilities; submarines; surface combat vessels; and the introduction of the fourth and fifth generations of multi-role combat aircraft.6 Alongside the qualitative shifts in ‘hardware’, the PLA has also been revamping its ‘software’, including its military doctrine, organizational force structure and operational concepts, which are now conceptualized in the context of ‘Local Wars under Conditions of Informationization’. In particular, China’s military doctrine envisions future conflicts as being short in duration, limited to its coastal periphery or ‘near seas’ (the Yellow, East and South China Seas), and involving integrated or joint military operations across the air, sea, land, space and cyberspace domains. The shifting character of the future battlefield in turn alters the PLA’s operational requirements and compels the Chinese military to adopt innovative concepts and capabilities that would constrain the US’s strategic advantage and freedom of action in the region. These include A2/AD-oriented ‘attack and defense’ concepts that aim to offset the military effectiveness of US forward-deployed bases, mobile forces and their supporting infrastructure. Chinese A2/AD barriers can even be envisioned with regard to other regional crisis scenarios. On the Korean Peninsula, for example, China could take measures to disrupt the build-up of US combat power in terms of size, location and time frames. Specifically, the PLA could delineate clear air, sea and land buffer zones (conflict limit lines) beyond which US–South Korean forces could not operate. In such a case, the United States would need to construct alternative points of entry for its reinforcements, which could effectively delay its initial and follow-on responses. Similarly, in a scenario involving a Chinese attack on Taiwan,

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the use of anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles would impede the use of aircraft carriers around the island. Finally, depending on the modalities of China’s A2/AD strategies, the United States could potentially have to adjust the scope of its involvement in the region, limiting its operational conduct, particularly with regard to its naval deployments in the South China Sea.7

CHINESE MILITARY MODERNIZATION: BACKGROUND AND EFFECTS The modernization of the PLA and the subsequent expansion of Chinese military power is perhaps the single most significant security-related development affecting the Asia-Pacific region over the past decade. For nearly 20 years, the Chinese have put considerable resources and effort into reforming, recapitalizing and renovating its military. In conjunction, the PLA has been increasingly focused on the future military potential of the information technologies-led ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA). Beijing is attempting to transform the PLA from a force based on Mao Zedong’s principles of the ‘People’s War’ to one capable of fighting and winning ‘Limited Local Wars under High-Tech Conditions’, or, more recently, ‘Limited Local Wars Under Conditions of “Informatization”’. This new doctrine revolves around what some have termed ‘rapid war, rapid resolution’, which entails short-duration, high-intensity conflicts characterized by mobility, speed and long-range attack, employing joint operations fought simultaneously throughout the entire air, land, sea, space and electromagnetic battle space, and relying heavily on extremely lethal high-technology weapons. The PLA operational doctrine is also increasingly emphasizing pre-emption, surprise and shock value, given that the earliest stages of conflict may be crucial to the outcome of a war.8 Consequently, the PLA is currently engaged – as part of an ambitious ‘generation-leap’ strategy – in a ‘double construction’ transformational effort of simultaneously pursuing both the mechanization and informatization of its armed forces.9 Initially, the PLA is attempting to digitize and upgrade its current arsenal of conventional ‘industrial age’ weapons, that is, through improved communications systems, new sensors and seekers, greater precision, night-vision capabilities, and so on.10 Of particular apparent interest to the Chinese over the past decade and a half has been their pursuit of weapons for asymmetric warfare – sometimes referred to as ‘assassin’s mace’ or ‘trump card’ weapons.11 Some trump card weapons are intended to strike an enemy’s vulnerabilities, such as computer network attacks. Others are basically ‘old wine in

Anti-Access/Area Denial vs AirSea Battle 401 new bottles’, that is, already existing programs – such as fighter bombers, ballistic and anti-ship missiles, submarines, torpedoes, and mines to destroy enemy aircraft carriers – that nevertheless are regarded as the most effective weapons in the PLA’s arsenal and whose development or deployment has therefore been accelerated. Finally, this category of weapons also includes so-called ‘new concept’ arms, such as kinetic energy weapons (such as railguns), lasers, radio frequency and highpowered microwave weapons, and anti-satellite (ASAT) systems; most military systems in this last category are still in development, although China did successfully test an ASAT device in 2007.12 To pay for this ambitious and aggressive military build-up, Beijing has more than quintupled Chinese defence spending in real terms since the mid-1990s. The PRC’s official 2015 defence budget is 887 billion yuan, or US$141.5 billion – an increase of around 10 percent over the previous year, and continuing a nearly two-decades-long trend of near double-digit real (i.e., after taking inflation into account) increases in Chinese military spending. China, in fact, is now the second largest defense spender in the world, after the United States. The annual procurement budget alone has increased from US$3.1 billion in 1997 to an estimated US$47 billion in 2015, and defense R&D spending could total as much as US$10 billion to US$15 billion per annum. As a result of such arduous efforts, the military potential of China has expanded considerably over the past decade. China’s maritime forces – the PLA Navy (PLAN) – have particularly benefitted from transformation, as Beijing has de-emphasized ground forces in favor of acquiring the capabilities for force projection, long-range mobility, stealth and precision strikes. China’s 2006 defense White Paper states that the PLAN ‘aims at gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations and enhancing its capabilities in integrated maritime operations’.13 Some may interpret these efforts as an indicator of a more aggressive and expansionist China, or at least a PRC more likely to assert its role in the Asia-Pacific region and use its growing military might to back up its national interests and national security goals.14 While such an expanding military capability will mostly likely be used to attack and defeat Taiwan in the event that Taipei declares independence, while also deterring or denying US intervention on Taiwan’s behalf, these capacities can also be applied to other areas where the PRC has strong strategic interests, particularly Southeast Asia. This region is one of growing and increasingly diversified significance to Beijing, and China has several territorial, economic and political and diplomatic concerns that touch on Southeast Asia. These include (1) addressing long-standing disputes over sovereignty issues in the South China Sea,

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especially the Spratly Islands; (2) securing sea lines of communication to the Indian Ocean and the Middle East; (3) increasing economic ties with Southeast Asia (particularly trade and investment); and (4) legitimizing its own regional security role (and also limiting US influence) through a process of multilateral forums and negotiations.15 Consequently, Chinese military assertiveness has been felt as much in Southeast Asia as in other parts of the Asia Pacific. The Chinese have expanded their naval and air presence in the South China Sea and begun to extend naval patrols beyond, into the Indian Ocean. For example, the PLA has built a military airstrip on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, and it is reportedly constructing a new nuclear submarine base on Hainan Island.16 The PLAN is also building naval facilities in Myanmar and negotiating port access rights with Pakistan. More recently, China has been engaged in a massive effort, using dredging equipment and portable cement factories, to turn coral reefs in the Spratlys into functioning islands, complete with barracks, harbors and even aircraft runways. Overall, the PRC’s ‘creeping assertiveness’ or ‘creeping expansion’ in and around the East and South China Seas has been cause for considerable concern among the countries of Northeast and Southeast Asia.17 Regarding the South China Sea disputes, for example, Beijing’s competing territorial claims with several Southeast Asian countries over the ownership or control in the Spratly Islands has led China to be militarily engaged and active in this area for many decades, and this has often led to tension, if not outright clashes. The Spratlys, a chain of coral reefs that barely break the ocean’s surface, are adjacent both to major sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) and to potentially lucrative maritime natural resources (fisheries, oil and gas deposits). Consequently, several countries in addition to the PRC – including Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam – have laid claim to various parts of the Spratlys, and nearly all have attempted to enforce these claims by establishing garrisons and other structures on the islands. This has on occasion led to actual conflict, such as with China when it occupied and began building on the Philippines-claimed Mischief Reef in the mid-1990s, and when Chinese and Vietnamese naval vessels clashed in the Johnson Reef.

CHINA’S NAVAL BUILD-UP, 2000–2015 Armed with constantly expanding defense resources, the PLA has been engaged in a concerted effort to replace and upgrade its military hardware since at least the late 1990s. Initially, Beijing relied mostly on

Anti-Access/Area Denial vs AirSea Battle 403 foreign suppliers, particularly Russia, Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, Israel, to meet its immediate requirements for advanced armaments. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, for example, China became a major customer for Russian naval systems. The PLAN, for example, acquired four Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia, which are outfitted with the 3M-80E Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) ramjet-powered, supersonic anti-ship cruise missile (ASCMs); the original 3M-80E had a range of only 120 km, but later-model Sunburns have a reach in excess of 200 km. In addition, beginning in the mid-1990s, the Chinese Navy acquired 12 Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines from Russia, some of which are armed with the 3M-54E Klub (SS-N-27) ASCMs and the 53-65KE wake-homing torpedo. Since the turn of the century, however, the PLA has increasingly relied upon its own indigenous defense industry to supply it with modern weaponry. Since 2000, China has constructed as least 22 modern destroyers of the Type 51 and Type 052 classes. The most important of these are the Type 052C and Type 052D, which are outfitted with Aegis-type air-defense radar and fire-control systems, as well as HHQ-9 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), housed in vertical launch systems (VLSs). These destroyers are also equipped with the indigenous YJ-83 or YJ-62 ASCM and the HQ-2 land-attack cruise missile (a variant of the Russian Kh-55 missile). China has also added more than two dozen new frigates to its forces – particularly the Type 054A Jiangkai class, which features a stealthy design and is armed with ASCMs and VLS-deployed SAMs – as well as the new-generation Type 022 Houbei-class catamaranhulled missile fast attack craft (outfitted with YJ-83 ASCMs), of which at least 60 have been built. China has also greatly expanded its submarine fleet over the past 15 years. Since the late 1990s, the PLAN has acquired at least 26 Type 039 Song-class and Type 41 Yuan-class diesel-electric submarines. These classes are the first Chinese-built submarines to feature a modern ‘Albacore’ (teardrop) hull and a skewed propeller (for improved quieting), and to carry an encapsulated ASCM capable of being fired while submerged (through a regular torpedo tube), as well as an anti-submarine rocket. In addition, the Yuan class is thought to be equipped with an as yet unidentified engine for air-independent propulsion. Additionally, the PLAN has begun to replace its small and aging fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, that is, five Han-class nuclear-powered attack boats (SSNs) and one Xia-class nuclear-powered ballistic missilecarrying submarine (SSBN). The first in a new class of SSNs, the Type 093 Shang class, was launched in 2002 and commissioned in 2006; at least one additional Type 093 has also since entered service, and some

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sources estimate that up to eight boats in this class could be built. The PLAN has also launched at least four new SSBNs of the Type 094 Jin class, each carrying 12 JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with a range of 7000 km (three times greater than that of the JL-1 SLBM carried by the Xia).18 Follow-on classes of both new nuclear-powered submarines are expected over the next decade. China is also in the process of expanding its capacities for force projection and expeditionary warfare, in particular involving the acquisition of platforms capable of operating fixed-wing aircraft. China has launched four Type 071 17 000- to 20 000-ton landing platform dock (LPD) amphibious warfare ships, equipped with two helicopters and two air-cushioned landing craft (LCACs), and capable of carrying up to 800 troops; up to eight Type 071s could eventually be built. A larger LHD-type (landing helicopter dock) amphibious assault ship is also speculated.19 In perhaps its most dramatic development, the PLAN has recently taken delivery of China’s first aircraft carrier: the former, rebuilt Soviet carrier Varyag. A casualty of the post–Cold War, the Varyag was laid down in the early 1980s, but construction was halted in 1992 when the vessel was only 70 percent complete. Ukraine, which inherited it after the break-up of the Soviet Union, stripped the ship bare and left it exposed to the elements for several years. When the Varyag was finally sold and delivered to China in 2001 – ostensibly to be turned into a Macau casino – it was a rusted shell, without engines, rudder, weapons systems, or electronics. In addition, the process of removing sensitive equipment from the vessel had resulted in damage to its structure, so that even its seaworthiness was questioned. In mid-2005, however, the Chinese moved the Varyag to a drydock at the Dalian shipyard in northeast China, where it underwent substantial repairs and reconstruction, along with the installation of new engines, radars and electrical systems. The rebuilt ex-Varyag carrier underwent its first sea trials under PLAN colors in August 2011, and it was subsequently commissioned as the Liaoning and accepted into service with the PLAN in 2012. The Liaoning is equipped with the J-15 fixed-wing fighter jet (reportedly reversed-engineered from a Su-33 acquired surreptitiously from Ukraine), along with antisubmarine warfare and airborne early-warning helicopters. The ex-Varyag vessel will likely be used more as a research and training platform for future Chinese carrier designs and crews, rather than as a fully functioning carrier (although the ex-Varyag could be pressed into military service in a limited capacity). At the same time, China is expected to begin construction of several indigenous carriers. At one time, the authoritative Jane’s Information Group speculated that the

Anti-Access/Area Denial vs AirSea Battle 405 PLAN could build up to six aircraft carriers. If and when that happens, it would likely mean the reorientation of the PLAN around carrier battle groups (CVBGs), with the carrier at the heart of a constellation of supporting submarines, destroyers and frigates – an amalgamation of power projection at its foremost. Such CVBGs are among the most impressive instruments of military power, in terms of sustained, farreaching and expeditionary offensive force, and such a development would constitute a major shift in PLAN strategic direction. For its part, modernization of the PLA Naval Air Force (PLANAF) has focused mainly on the acquisition of modern fighter aircraft. In the mid-2000s, the PLANAF acquired 24 Sukhoi Su-30MK2 fighter bombers from Russia for use as maritime strike aircraft. Additionally, it is speculated that China’s J-20 ‘fifth-generation’ fighter could be optimized for maritime patrol and strike, due to its large size and emphasis on frontal stealth capabilities.20 Considerable attention has been paid of late to the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). The first of its kind in the world, the DF-21D ASBM combines a maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MARV) with a terminal guidance system, has a range of 1500 km, and is capable of hypersonic (Mach 5 and above) speeds.21 This makes the missile potentially effective against slow-moving carrier battle groups (and hence the DF-21D’s nickname as a ‘carrier killer’). According to the US Defense Department, the DF-21D is a ‘workable design’, deployed in small numbers and has already achieved ‘initial operating capability’.22 Finally, China has greatly expanded and modernized its paramilitary coastal security forces. Until recently, China operated five civil maritime forces: China Marine Surveillance (CMS), the Border Patrol, the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, Customs, and the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA). Many of these forces overlapped in their missions and competed with each other. In 2013, the first four services were combined into a single China Coast Guard (CCG), under the command of the State Oceanic Administration. The main missions of the CCG are patrolling territorial waters and disputed territories, anti-smuggling and anti-piracy, search and rescue, fisheries protection, and harbor and coastal security protection. The CCG is the maritime branch of the Public Security Border Troops, which in turn is under the authority of the Ministry of Public Security. The main missions of the CCG are patrolling territorial waters and disputed territories, anti-smuggling and anti-piracy, search and rescue, fisheries protection, and harbor and coastal security protection. The CCG operates over 100 patrol boats, in particular, the 41-m Type 218 offshore patrol vessels, armed with twin 14.5-mm machine guns. In 2007, the PLAN reportedly transferred two Jianghu-class frigates

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to the CCG, making them the largest ships in the Coast Guard. China’s other paramilitary coastal defense force is the MSA, which is run under the authority of the Ministry of Transportation. The MSA operates mainly along the Chinese coastline and the Yangtze, Pearl and Heilongjiang rivers, and is responsible for maritime and shipping safety, including the prevention of pollution from ships, inspection of ships and offshore facilities, navigational safety measures, search and rescue, port operations, and general maritime law enforcement. The MSA comprises a patrol force of 1300 vessels and watercraft of various types, including several large patrol boats and helicopters.

THE US RESPONSE: THE PIVOT TOWARD ASIA AND AIRSEA BATTLE At the beginning of 2012, the administration of US President Barack Obama formally promulgated its new ‘pivot’ to the Asia-Pacific region. Many hailed this move, later rechristened a ‘rebalancing’, as a significant, even consequential, realignment of US global power. After a decade-long preoccupation with fighting ground-based counterinsurgency wars in the Middle East, the US military now plans to emphasize air- and sea-based operations in an ‘arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia’.23 In particular, this rebalancing involves the redeployment of US forces from other parts of the world. The US Navy (USN) plans to position 60 percent of its fleet in the Pacific Ocean compared to a current 50:50 split between the Pacific and Atlantic. In addition, 2500 US Marines are to be based in Darwin, Australia, while Singapore has agreed to ‘host’ up to four of the new USN Littoral Combat Ships. Finally, the United States is seeking to expand its access to ports and other facilities in the Philippines (in this regard, Manila has decided to reopen the former US naval base at Subic Bay) and Vietnam. Of course, much of this supposed rebalancing is simple repurposing and repackaging. The United States never really decoupled that much from the Asia-Pacific – the region was simply eclipsed by the overriding campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and by the ‘Global War on Terror’. Already, six of the USN’s 11 aircraft carriers are based in the Pacific, as well as 31 of its 53 nuclear-powered attack submarines. And there are more than 60 000 US military personnel based just in the Western Pacific, along with 42 500 uniformed service members in Hawaii and 13 600 more afloat.

Anti-Access/Area Denial vs AirSea Battle 407 Yet, this rebalancing is significant because it symbolizes Washington’s renewed focus on China and its growing concern over the growth of Chinese military power in the Asia-Pacific. The strategic pivot is not merely a diplomatic re-engagement with Asia – it is a decidedly military effort by the United States to counterbalance Beijing’s growing strength and influence in the region. This has been particularly demonstrated by the US military’s (and especially the US Navy’s) recent activities in the South China Sea – deliberate actions intended to signal Beijing that Washington does not recognize China’s so-called ‘indisputable sovereignty’ over much of the South China Sea). These include flying US Navy P-8 maritime patrol aircraft over one of China’s new artificial islands in Fiery Cross Reef and Mischief Reef in the South China Sea, as well as sending warships to within the 12-nautical-mile limit of these artificial islands, claimed by China as territorial waters. In the case of the P-8, during one mission in May 2015, which included a CNN news crew onboard, a Chinese military radio operator repeatedly warned the aircraft that it was flying over ‘Chinese territory’, his tone increasingly exasperated. The P-8 crew’s response was that they were ‘conducting lawful military activities outside national airport’, and acting ‘with due regard in accordance with international law’. This point was later reinforced by Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter at the 2015 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore: ‘Turning an underwater rock into an airfield simply does not afford the rights of sovereignty or permit restrictions on international air or maritime transit’.24 The United States, therefore, is increasingly prone, in the name of ‘freedom of the seas’, to challenge Chinese assertions of ‘sovereignty’ over most of the East and South China Seas. The US pivot is increasingly taking on a military character, and therefore it should be viewed through the lens of the Pentagon’s nascent ASB concept. To put it simply, ASB is a novel and highly ambitious war-fighting model that anticipates massive counterstrikes against an enemy’s home territory, incapacitating the adversary by taking out its military surveillance and communications systems, while also targeting the enemy’s missile bases, airfields and naval facilities. In the Asia-Pacific, that perceived adversary is, increasingly, China. In September 2009, the US Navy and Air Force signed a classified memo to initiate an interservice effort to develop a new joint operational concept, dubbed AirSea Battle. Emulating intellectual transitions in military doctrine along the lines of the AirLand Battle (ALB) warfighting concept developed in the early 1980s to counter advances in Soviet operational art, ASB has been designed, at the strategic level, to preserve stability and to sustain US power projection and freedom of

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action, and, at the operational level, to offset current and anticipated asymmetric threats through a novel integration of US Air Force and Navy’s concepts, assets and capabilities. Although ASB was redesignated as the ‘Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons’ (JAM-GC) in January 2015, it remains, for all extent and purposes, the same. To counter a hypothetical crisis scenario or conflict in which an adversary employs an A2/AD strategy, ASB in turn envisions a preemptive, standoff, precision strike – or ‘Networked, Integrated Attack-inDepth’ – initiated and carried out by US forces alone, in three distinct phases: (1) by striking the enemy’s intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets from afar through a ‘blinding campaign’ in order to deny their situational awareness; by reducing the adversary’s ability to ‘see deep’, US aircraft carrier groups would thereby gain access to the battle space; (2) by carrying out a ‘missile suppression campaign’ to disrupt the enemy’s air-defense networks, using stealthy long-range platforms, and supported by submarine-launched weapons and sensors; through this destruction or degradation of the enemy’s critical air-defense assets and the consequent achievement of air superiority, US forces would be able to attack the adversary’s land-based missile launchers, surface-to-surface missiles, and their supporting infrastructure; (3) by conducting diverse follow-on operations, such as ‘distant blockades’ in order to seize the operational initiative and to ensure protracted US freedom of action in the region.25 Interestingly, while ASB appears to be inherently designed to limit China’s emerging A2/AD systems and capabilities, its proponents go out of their way to deny that ASB does not specifically target China. The CSBA, for example, has explicitly stated in a 2010 briefing that ‘ASB is NOT about war with China or containment of China’ but rather ‘part of a larger “offsetting strategy” aimed at preserving a stable military balance and maintaining crisis stability in East Asia’. Nevertheless, the briefing also describes the PLA’s acquisition of A2/AD capabilities as the ‘most stressful case’ for an ASB strategy. It then goes on to describe, in excruciating detail, how ASB would be employed to fight a war against China, including attacks on the Chinese Mainland.26 ASB was, almost from the onset, a highly controversial concept. Most argued that it was either too vague to sufficiently discuss as a conceivable war-fighting construct, or too apparently focused on being simply a ‘counter-China’ strategy so as to be credible. In general, ASB raised more questions than it answered. Is the United States really prepared to initiate deep strikes on Chinese territory, and, if so, under what conditions? How ‘scalable’ was ASB as a response, especially after

Anti-Access/Area Denial vs AirSea Battle 409 launching initial attacks on the Chinese Mainland? How believable might ASB be as a deterrent or response to lesser forms of Chinese aggression – for example, China’s use of limited military actions (gunboat battles, harassing ships) to press its claims in the South China Sea? In all these cases, the answers were either unclear or the inferred conclusions too frightening. AirSea Battle is so divisive that it is even propelling interservice debates within the US military. The US Army, in particular, was hostile to the whole ASB concept, given ASB’s neglect of US expeditionary and ground forces. Instead, the US Army pressed for expanding ASB to include amphibious, airborne and air-assault operations to gain and maintain inland access to the adversary’s territory, hence the eventual recalibration as JAM-GC. Still, including land forces into AirSea Battle does not make it any more coherent as an operational reality.

CONCLUSIONS China’s emergence as a military great power is inexorable. Beijing has, for at least a decade and a half, invested considerable resources, in terms of both money and human capital, into building up its armed forces – and it is paying off. The PLA is a much more capable force, relative to its neighbors, than it was 20 years ago. This is especially apparent in its Navy, and the PLAN is increasingly a force capable of projecting both considerable and sustainable power into the green waters of the Western Pacific, and perhaps, eventually, around the globe. This modernized and revitalized military force is being matched by (or perhaps this modernization process has even enabled) a new assertiveness, obstinacy, and obduracy in international affairs. When coupled with the country’s long-standing – and perhaps even growing – sense of ‘victimhood’ and the need to ‘reclaim lost status’, the result is a more militarily capable China that may be much less inclined to negotiation and compromise, and instead may be more prone to use force or the threat of force to achieve its goals.27 This combination of a more militarily competent and more intransigent China is an increasing cause for concern among the many countries in the Asia-Pacific. As a result, many of them wish to keep the United States engaged militarily in the Asia-Pacific, by offering new forward operating opportunities (e.g., Singapore’s hosting of USN Littoral Combat Ships) and new bases (e.g., Australia’s agreement to have US Marines in Darwin, the Philippines possibly reopening Subic Bay to the US Navy). Similar rationales can be used to justify the United States’ ‘pivot’

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back toward Asia and especially its embrace of AirSea Battle. There is, even in the absence of explicit referencing, an undeniable and direct link between Chinese ‘bad behavior’ in the East and South China Seas and such reactions as regional re-arming, the US pivot toward Asia, and AirSea Battle. In short, the United States is increasingly prepared to confront China, especially in international waters around China. This, in turn, raises natural fears that such a competition could lead to an armed clash, one that could inadvertently escalate geographically and in intensity. No one, perhaps, desires such an outcome. However, in the light of two mutually exclusive and intractable stances – one, on the part of Beijing, that asserts an ‘indisputable sovereignty’ within territories (and reserves the right to do as it pleases in those areas, and use force to get its way), versus others, led by the United States, who are equally determined to deny those claims and rights to China – it is difficult to see how compromise can be attained and conflict avoided.

NOTES 1. 2.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

McLeary, P. (2015), ‘New US concept melds air, sea and land’, Defense News, 24 January. Torsvoll, E. (2015), ‘Deterring conflict with China: a comparison of the Air-Sea Battle concept, offshore control, and deterrence by denial’, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 39 (1), 35–42; see also Bitzinger, R.A. and M. Raska (2013), The AirSea Battle Debate and the Future of Conflict in East Asia, Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, February, pp. 3–4. Office of the Secretary of Defense (2011), Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, p. 2. Krepinevich, A.F. (2010), Why AirSea Battle?, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Van Tol, J., M. Gunzinger, A. Krepinevich and J. Thomas (2010), AirSea Battle, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Bitzinger and Raska (2013), The AirSea Battle Debate, p. 5. Ibid., pp. 6–7. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report to Congress; see also Li, N. (2003), ‘Chinese views of the US war in Iraq: war-fighting lessons’, Chinese Military Update, July. Ji, Y. (2004), ‘China’s emerging national defence strategy’, China Brief, 24 November. Ji, Y. (2004), ‘Learning and catching up: China’s revolution in military affairs initiative’, in E.O. Goldman and T.G. Mahnken (eds), The Information Revolution in Military Affairs in Asia, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 97–123. Bruzdzinksi, J.E. (2004), ‘Demystifying shashoujian: China’s “assassin’s mace” concept’, in A. Scobell and L. Wortzel (eds), Civil-Military Change in China, Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, pp. 309–64.

Anti-Access/Area Denial vs AirSea Battle 411 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

Stokes, M.A. (1999), China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States, Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, pp. 195–213. Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China (2006), China’s National Defense in 2006, 29 December, accessed 16 August 2015 at http:// www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm. Griffin, C. and D. Blumenthal (2007), ‘China’s defense white paper: what it does (and doesn’t) tell us’, China Brief, 24 January. International Institute for Strategic Studies (2005), ‘China, America, and Southeast Asia: hedge and tack’, Strategic Comments, p. 1. Office of Naval Intelligence (2007), China’s Navy 2007, pp. 31–2, accessed 31 March 2016 at https://fas.org/irp/agency/oni/chinanavy2007.pdf. Schreer, B. (2013), Planning the Unthinkable War: AirSea Battle and its Implications for Australia, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, pp. 22–30. O’Rourke, R. (2007), ‘PLAN force structure: submarines, ships, and aircraft’, paper presented at the conference held by the Chinese Council on Advanced Policy Studies, RAND Corporation, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the National Defense University, on ‘The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles?’, Taipei, November–December, pp. 4–9, 13–18. Global Security (2015), ‘Type 094 Jin-class ballistic missile submarine’, accessed 16 August 2015 at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/china/type_94.htm. Defensetech.org (2010), ‘J-20 vs. F-35, one analyst’s perspective’, 31 December, accessed 16 August 2015 at http://defensetech.org/2010/12/31/j-20-vs-f-35-oneanalysts-perspective/. Minnick, W. (2008), ‘China developing anti-ship ballistic missiles’, Defense News, 14 January. Capaccio, T. (2011), ‘China has “workable” anti-ship missile design, Pentagon says’, Bloomberg, 26 August, accessed 16 August 2015 at http://www.bloomberg.com/ news/2011-08-25/china-has-workable-anti-ship-missile-design-pentagon-says.html. US Department of Defense (2012), Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century, Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, p. 2. Associated Press (2015), ‘South China Sea watch: US up pressure with overflights’, 6 June. Torsvoll, ‘Deterring conflict with China’. See also Bitzinger and Raska. The AirSea Battle Debate, pp. 3–4. Van Tol et al., AirSea Battle. Medeiros, E.S. (2009), China’s International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, pp. 10–11.

22. Cyberwar: China and the United States Nir Kshetri

In the post–Cold War security environment, cyberthreats have been a critical policy and defense issue.1 Some argue that cyberconflicts are the most serious security threats facing nations since the development of nuclear weapons in the 1940s.2 In recent years, cybersecurity has become a far more prominent and explicit element in national security and international relations. Cyberattacks, cybercrimes and cyberwarfare have generated much debate. Developing countries such as China are being increasingly affected by these phenomena.3 Moving to the focus of this chapter, allegations and counter-allegations have been persistent themes in dialogues and discourses in the US–China relationships involving cybercrime and cybersecurity.4 China’s alleged involvement in the thefts of Western intellectual property (IP) and trade secrets prompted the US Counterintelligence Executive to claim in a November 2011 report that ‘Chinese actors are the world’s most active and persistent perpetrators of economic espionage’.5 In June 2015, the US government revealed that hackers allegedly operating from China accessed confidential records of as many as 22 million current and former federal employees. The hackers gained ‘administrator privileges’, which allowed them to have full access to the computers and networks of the US Office of Personnel Management. Among the downloaded documents were confidential forms that listed ‘close or continuous contacts’, which included overseas workers.6 Quoting investigators, Reuters reported that the key suspect of the cyberattacks was a team that was tied to China’s Ministry of State Security. The investigators had relied on evidence such as the type of malicious software used and the use of a stolen digital certificate, which had been associated with the group in past attacks.7 It is thus argued that China is among the biggest threat to the US interest. Some estimates suggest that over 2000 companies, universities and government agencies in the United States experienced cyberattacks originated in China in the 2000s.8 It was reported that when some DuPont employees were on a business trip to China, they found that their laptops were infested with spyware although they were locked in the hotel safe.9 US intelligence officials have argued that China-originated 412

Cyberwar: China and the United States 413 cyberattacks such as IP and trade secret thefts would have long-term rather than immediate short-term effects with substantial economic damage. Kevin Mandia, CEO of security firm Mandiant has put it very strongly and bluntly: ‘My biggest fear is that in 10 years China will be making everything we [the US] were making – for half the price – because they’ve stolen all our innovations’.10 The Chinese government and China’s technology companies have complained about the US approach to cybersecurity. In September 2012, Huawei’s corporate senior vice-president, and ZTE’s senior vicepresident for North America and Europe testified at the US House Committee about the allegation that the two companies’ operations had posed cybersecurity threats to the United States. In an interview after the US House Committee hearing of September 2012, ZTE’s senior vicepresident for North America and Europe noted that ‘many Congress members still harbor a Cold War mentality and know little about China’s development’.11 Cybercrimes allegedly originated in China have brought domestic as well as international repercussions.12 The complexity of China-originated cyberattacks has discouraged foreign Internet firms to operate in the country. To take an example, in 2008, Google’s CEO said that his company would work with Chinese universities, starting with Tsinghua University, on cloud computing–related academic programs. The cybersecurity environment, however, led to Google’s withdrawal from China. There are also important international relations dimensions of cyberattacks originated in China. For instance, an FBI assistant director noted: ‘Cybercrime … is the fastest-growing problem faced by China–US cooperation’.13 Before proceeding, we offer some clarifying definitions. A cybercrime is defined as a criminal activity in which computers or computer networks are the principal means of committing an offense or violating laws, rules, or regulations.14 This definition of cybercrime is similar to that of Becker’s approach of defining a crime.15 Examples of cybercrimes include denial-of-service attacks, cybertheft, cybertrespass, cyberobscenity, critical infrastructure attacks, online fraud, online money laundering, criminal uses of Internet communications, ID fraud, use of computers to further traditional crimes, and cyberextortion.16 Cybersecurity involves technologies, concepts, policies, processes and practices used to protect assets (e.g., computers, infrastructure, applications, services, telecommunications systems and information) and the cyber environment from attack, damage and unauthorized access.17 Now let us define cyberwarfare for the purpose of this chapter. Analyzing a number of documents related to war ultimatum and motivations of war such as those of

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the World War I era (e.g., statements of British Foreign Minister Edward Grey and German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg) and the legendary Mongolian warrior and conqueror, Genghis Khan, Hirshleifer18 concluded that wars were fought for material ends as well as for intangible goals such as honor, dominance, reputation and prestige. Based on this, we define cyberwarfare as actions in the cyberspace carried out or initiated by a state actor against another state (an adversary state) for economic gains or with an intention to cause material losses or to destruct the glory, honor, prestige and reputation of the adversary. A number of cyberattacks that are widely believed to be carried out or initiated by nation states such as the 2007 cyberattacks against Estonia, the 2008 cyberattacks against Georgia, the Stuxnet worm that was designed to destroy Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities in 2010, and the 2012 cyberattacks against Saudi national oil company Aramco would fit this definition of cyberwarfare.19 The chapter is structured as follows. We proceed by first examining the US allegations regarding cyberattacks originated in China. Next, we look at the Chinese government’s response to the allegations. Then, we analyze the sources of cyberattacks targeting China. The section following this looks at the alleged modus operandi of Chinese hackers. A section follows on the broader institutional environment and China’s concerns. The final section provides concluding comments.

THE US ALLEGATIONS REGARDING CYBERATTACKS ORIGINATED IN CHINA The contemporary Western view is that China is among the biggest exporters of cybercrimes and that the country engages in various forms of cyberespionage activities. While Russia and Eastern Europe–based cybercriminals’ activities tend to revolve around monetizing from malicious applications, proportionately more China-connected cybercriminals are allegedly interested in gaining access to intellectual property (IP) and trade secrets. There are many instances of insider cybercrimes in the West that have been allegedly linked to China (Table 22.1). A 2011 report titled, Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets in Cyberspace, published by the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive,20 suggested that Chinese companies have been using ethnic Chinese ‘insiders’ to steal information from Western companies. Multiple cases of thefts of IP and trade secrets involving in companies such as Valeo, Dow AgroSciences,

Cyberwar: China and the United States 415 Cargill, Motorola, Valspar Corporation and Ford Motor Company are linked to ethnic Chinese. Table 22.1 Some notable examples of the engagement of ethnic Chinese in alleged cyberespionage activities against economic and industrial targets Organization

Description

Valeo

In 2005, a Chinese intern working in Valeo was detained in France for alleged database intrusion aimed at IP theft

Cargill and Dow AgroSciences

In December 2011, a Chinese-born scientist was convicted for stealing trade secrets from Cargill and engaging in economic espionage at Dow AgroSciences. Cargill estimated that the information stolen by the scientist was worth US$12 million in R&D

Motorola

An employee arrested by US Customs in Chicago allegedly possessed a one-way ticket to China and proprietary information that was worth US$600 million in about 1000 electronic documents

Valspar Corporation

An employee at Valspar Corporation was arrested in 2009, who allegedly downloaded 160 formulas for paints and coatings, which were estimated to cost the company about US$20 million in R&D or about one-eighth of the company’s annual profits

Ford Motor Company

A product manager at Ford Motor Company allegedly made unauthorized digital copies of about 4000 documents, which would help him to get a job with a Chinese automobile company

DuPont

A chemist downloaded data on organic light-emitting diodes, which he allegedly intended to transfer to Beijing University. It was also reported that China-based hackers attacked DuPont’s computer networks two or more times in 2009 and 201021

Due to China’s military might and political ambition in global affairs, its alleged engagement in cyberespionage activities against military and political targets has also been of concern (Table 22.2). Many US observers believe China has developed computer attack capabilities, trained hackers in Internet warfare, and is systematically probing US computer networks to find weaknesses. Although China, like most countries, is currently believed to be only testing cyberattack tools to determine the risks involved, experts argue that serious international cyberattacks may occur in the future. Some analysts observe that cyberattacks on the United States by China have been ‘frequent and aggressive’.22

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Table 22.2 Some notable examples of China’s alleged cyberespionage activities against military and political targets Time

Description

April 2010 (US- and Canada-based researchers tracked a sophisticated cyberespionage network, which they referred as the Shadow network)

The targets included the Indian Ministry of Defence, the United Nations, and the Office of the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala, India, and others

2004 (a hacking ring code named by the FBI as ‘Titan Rain’)

An analyst traced the ring to a team of government-sponsored researchers in China’s Guangdong Province. The team stole huge amounts of data from military labs, NASA, the World Bank and others

July 2006

An official of the US State Department in East Asia opened a malware-infected email message from China. The hackers broke into computers at US embassies in East Asia and subsequently the State Department headquarters in Washington, DC

October 2006

The US Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security: information about export of licenses for technology items to foreign countries was suspected to be stolen

Summer 2011

Japan’s parliament (diet) and largest defense contractor (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd): military data on warplanes and information on nuclear power plants were suspected to be stolen

For most cybercriminals it is more attractive to steal financial information, which can be converted into cash more easily compared to other data such as trade secrets and IP. A popular theory among some analysts is that if profit-motivated Chinese hackers break into foreign governments’ networks that lack monetization value, they can trade such networks with state-sponsored hackers, which is facilitated by information broker intermediaries.23 While online theft of financial credentials and bank accounts is the signature aspect of mainly cybercriminals from Russia and Eastern Europe, some of such frauds have been traced to China. This can be associated with China’s strong and significant position in the global cyberattack industry (Table 22.3).

Cyberwar: China and the United States 417 Table 22.3 Some representative studies on China’s position in the global cyberattack industry Time

China’s Position in the Global Attack Industry

First half of 2002 2006

China ranked fourth in total cyberattacks (6.9%)24 Symantec report: 5% of the world’s malware-infected computers were in Beijing. China overtook the United States in the number of malware hosts25 An annual survey by CyberSource ranked China as the world’s second riskiest country for online transactions, only behind Nigeria26 China was the top click-fraud–originating country outside North America (tied with France)27 China hosted more malware than any other countries (51.4%)28 China ranked second in the list of top infection program–creating countries (30%)29 China ranked second in the list of top countries hosting phishing websites (14%)30 China ranked fourth in the list of top countries generating spam (4%)31 China was the top click-fraud–originating country outside North America (4.3%)32 China had the world’s highest percentage of computers infected with malware (54.9%)33

2006

2006Q1 2007 2007 Second-half of 2007 Second-half of 2007 2008Q1 2012

According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), between March 2010 and April 2011 there were 20 incidents in which cybercriminals initiated the transfer of large sums from the accounts of US businesses to companies registered in cities near the China–Russia border. The criminals attempted to transfer about US$20 million but succeeded in transferring about US$11 million. The attacks mainly involved botnets that are often used in banking frauds such as Zeus botnet, Backdoor.Bot or Spybot. As soon as the transfers went through, the sums were withdrawn from or transferred out of the recipients’ accounts. A report from NetQin Mobile in August 2011 indicated that China accounted for 64 percent of mobile Android attacks. A significant proportion of versions of the premium rate ‘dialer’ Trojans are downloaded through app stores in China.34 A commonplace observation is that the state turns a blind eye and pretends not to notice any China-originated cyberattacks that target foreign consumers, businesses and government. That is, an unwritten

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rule, which is taking precedence to the law, is that hackers are not pursued as long as their attacks are limited to foreign websites. Indeed, a theory among Western analysts is that cyberattacks on foreign targets are tolerated and tacitly approved or even encouraged and openly promoted by the Chinese government.

THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO THE US ALLEGATIONS The Chinese government, on the other hand, commonly blames foreign hackers for cyberattacks targeting the country. For instance, Gu Jian of the Chinese Ministry of Public Security said that over 200 Chinese government websites experience cyberattacks on a daily basis and most attacks are foreign originated.35 According to the Information Office of the State Council, over one million IP addresses in China were controlled and 42 000 websites were hijacked by foreign hackers in 2009.36 In the first meeting of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts of the UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Program held in January 2011, the Chinese delegation, citing statistics of the China Ministry of Public Security, complained that the country was suffering from foreignoriginated cyberattacks. The delegation noted that in 2010, servers of over 90 percent of network sites that were used to commit cyberfrauds such as phishing, pornography and Internet gambling against Chinese targets were located outside China. The delegation also stated that over 70 percent of botnet control sites were in foreign countries.37 Chinese officials argue that they should be praised, not criticized, for taking measures to control cybercrimes at home and collaborate at the international level. In the early 2011, Chinese authorities and the US Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted joint operations to dismantle and shut down an illegal website dealing with child pornography. Dai Qingli, Spokesperson, Chinese Embassy in the UK, in a letter to the editor of the Financial Times noted that Chinese police helped 41 countries investigate 721 cases related to cybercrimes between 2004 and 2010. She also said that China had inter-police cooperation with more than 30 countries.38 China is also responding to the Western allegations by striking back with a strong denial and counter-allegation that US government agencies lack interest in fighting cybercrimes and do not cooperate with their Chinese counterparts. Gu Jian of the Chinese Ministry of Public Security noted that China had received no response in its request for cooperation from the United States on 13 cybercrime cases involving issues such as

Cyberwar: China and the United States 419 fake bank websites and child pornography.39 He further noted that in other cases it took up to six months to receive replies from the United States. China has warned against what it refers as a ‘blame game’. In the above-mentioned letter to the editor of the Financial Times, Dai Qingli, Spokesperson, Chinese Embassy in the UK noted: ‘The only solution is through enhanced co-operation based on equality, mutual respect and mutual benefit, rather than politicizing the issue or pointing fingers at others’.40 These allegations and counter-allegations are not new.41 More specifically, the Chinese government suspects that it is under cyberattack from the United States. There has been a deep-rooted perception among Chinese policy-makers that Microsoft and the US government spy on Chinese computer users through secret ‘back doors’ in Microsoft products. Computer hardware and software imported from the United States and its allies are subject to detailed inspection. Chinese technicians take control of such goods and either resist or closely monitor if Western experts install them.42 Chinese cryptographers reportedly found an ‘NSA’ key in Microsoft products, which was interpreted as the National Security Agency. The key allegedly provided the US government back-door access to Microsoft Windows 95, 98, NT 4.0, and 2000. Although Microsoft denied this allegation and even issued a patch to fix the problem, the Chinese government has not been convinced. Chinese military strategists have written openly about exploiting the vulnerabilities associated with the US military’s reliance on ICTs and traditional infrastructure used to conduct operations. Two senior colonels of the Chinese military Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui in their 1999 book, Unrestricted Warfare,43 have argued that since China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) lacks resources to compete with the United States in conventional weapons, it should focus on the ‘development of new information and cyber war technologies and viruses to neutralize or erode an enemy’s political, economic and military information and command and control infrastructures’. Note that the United States spends more than four times as much as China in the conventional military system. China’s PLA thus knows that catching up with the United States on this front is very difficult, if not impossible.44 The authors of Unrestricted Warfare have urged the development of a means of challenging the United States through asymmetry rather than matching in terms of all types of resources. The Chinese have viewed the US approach as ‘capitalistic hypocrisy’ and have expressed unhappiness and dissatisfaction with what they consider the system of rules that are designed by the United States as to

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what are ‘legal’ and illegal spying activities.45 Likewise, quoting to Chinese Internet insiders, a China Daily article on 5 June 2013 noted: ‘China has been the target of serious cyberattacks from the United States, but Beijing has never blamed Washington or the Pentagon because such accusations would be “technically irresponsible”’.46 China’s approach has shifted toward more offensive strategies following Edward Snowden’s revelation of the PRISM surveillance program.

THE SOURCES OF CYBERATTACKS TARGETING CHINA In light of China’s allegations that foreign hackers target Chinese computers, it would be interesting to see where cyberattacks targeting China come from. Based on various proxies and indicators, it can be argued that proportionately more cyberattacks targeting China originate internally compared to most other countries. A simple way to understand this argument is to look at indicators related to foreign and domestic origins of malware products infecting Chinese computers. One such indicator concerns the malware infection rate (MIR) per 1000 computers based on the Microsoft telemetry data that are collected from the users of Microsoft security products opting in for data collection. The telemetry data indicated that China was one of the countries with the lowest infection rates worldwide. Only Japan and Finland had lower infection rates than China among the countries considered in the Microsoft study. Another measure of cybercrime vulnerability is the threat exposure rate (TER) of the security company, Sophos. TER measures the percentage of PCs that have experienced a malware attack. According to Sophos’s TER, China was the second most malware infected country only behind Chile in the third quarter (Q3) of 2011 with a TER of 45.47 To put things in context, some of the cleanest countries in Sophos’s studies were Luxembourg (TER = 2), Norway (TER = 3) and Finland and Sweden (TER = 4), Japan and the UK (TER = 6), and the United States and Germany (TER = 7).48 Why is China then among the most malware-infected countries according to the Sophos’s TER data but among the cleanest countries according to Microsoft’s MIR data? The explanation for this puzzling pattern is that these two studies differ in terms of their ability to detect Chinese and foreign malware products. Note that while TER captures all types of malware attacks, Microsoft telemetry data can detect globally prevalent malware products but not necessarily threats that are in the Chinese language. The Microsoft report concluded that the low infection rate as

Cyberwar: China and the United States 421 detected by the telemetry data can be attributed to the unique characteristics of the Chinese malware ecosystem that tends to be dominated by Chinese-language threats that cannot be found in other countries.49

THE ALLEGED MODUS OPERANDI OF CHINESE HACKERS China-originated cybercrimes are believed to be more targeted, often tied to specific high-value targets, individualized and customized. Analysts have noted that a large proportion of the most sophisticated cyberattacks aimed at extracting high-value IP, also known as advanced persistent threats (APTs), originate from China. Note that APTs are characterized by a high degree of stealth. They employ sophisticated means to gain access into a network, stay hidden and undetected, and compromise data for an extended period of time. In order to escape observation and avoid notice, they act quietly, cautiously and secretly. Some argue that China heavily employs freelance hacking groups in international cyberattacks, providing ‘plausible deniability’ about the state’s involvement. Security analysts have maintained that although there is no definite proof, indirect and circumstantial evidence such as various digital fingerprints associated with the computer codes and the command-and-control computers and the malware products involved are too compelling, and say that most of the high-profile China-originated cybercrimes are most probably associated with the Chinese government or the PLA. The Chinese government has, however, strongly refuted these allegations. Cyberattacks originated in China are super-targeted and sophisticated. Modern information and communications technologies (ICTs) such as cloud computing and social media have been employed in high-profile cyberattacks originated in China. This capacity is powerfully illustrated in the Shadow case, in which, the cyberespionage network combined social networking and cloud computing platforms, including those of Google, Baidu, Yahoo, Twitter, Blogspot, and Blog.com, with traditional command-and-control servers.50 According to an October 2011 report of a group of 14 US intelligence agencies, Chinese hackers allegedly use malware that is very tough to trace. Chinese hackers’ modus operandi implies the existence of a de facto partnership between civilian hackers, their associations and the government. Some security experts think that the government sometimes asks hackers to carry out hacking tasks and monitors and controls their activities.51 The US government seems to be concerned that the state and

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the private sector in China have been working together to develop cyberattack capabilities. According to a US diplomatic cable released by Wikileaks, from June 2002 to March 2003, China’s largest infosec vendor, Topsec reportedly employed Lin Yong, the founder of Honker Union of China (also known as the Red Hackers), as a senior security service engineer to manage training.52 Topsec was partially funded by the Chinese government and reported to provide training and support services for the PLA.

THE BROADER INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND CHINA’S CONCERNS From the US perspective, in order to understand China’s point of view, it is important to look at the broader institutional environment. Prior research indicates that isomorphism measures that pay attention to how they are embedded in the ‘wider institutional field’53 or ‘networks of other already legitimate institutions’54 are more likely to be successful. China’s institutional environment has various idiosyncratic aspects.55 An article published in the China Economic Times on 12 June 200056 discussed three mechanisms that Xu Guanhua, then Chinese Vice Minister of the Science and Technology, thought high technology affects national security – military security, economic security and cultural security. Regarding military security, Guanhua forcefully argued that developed countries have put many hi-tech arms into actual battles and discussed the likelihood of ICT-exporting countries installing software for ‘coercing, attacking or sabotage’. Ironically, the truth or falsity of such claims is less relevant than the fear itself, which can significantly alter the equation of global security. Economic security concerns trade, production and finance.57 Developed and developing countries have different viewpoints regarding the economic security threats associated with cybersecurity. For instance, the United States is concerned about IP theft and other problems associated with economic espionage. China and other BRICS states (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), on the other hand, have argued that developing countries’ dependence on Western technologies as a threat to economic security. A commentary published in the People’s Liberation Army Daily on 8 February 2000, without directly referring to a specific country, noted that ‘some countries’ with highly developed ICT industries are ‘taking advantage of their monopolistic position’ to ‘control information technologies, infiltrate information resources’ and dump ICT products in underdeveloped countries. According to the article, the goal

Cyberwar: China and the United States 423 of these nations is ‘to attain political, economic and military objectives’. The article further noted that through the export of ICT products, the ‘information powers’ dominate information in underdeveloped nations and thereby threaten their economic security.58 Regarding cultural security, it is important to look at the issues of value and identity, which have been identified as a source of insecurity.59 The above-mentioned article in China’s People’s Liberation Army Daily warned that the ‘information colonialism’ is a real threat to national security, which ‘will be a major cause of future wars’.60 Due primarily to this concern, the Chinese government has been building systems based on open-source software (OSS). The views and positions of China are reflected in the approach of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which comprises China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as members. The 2008 SCO Agreement in the field of International Information Security expressed concerns about the ‘digital gap’ between the West and the East. The SCO economies are interested in controlling information that is likely to provoke what they call the three ‘evils’ (terrorism, extremism, separatism). They consider it important to prevent other nations from using their technologies to disrupt economic, social and political stability and national security. Western countries, on the other hand, maintain that too many government regulations and too much control may harm cyberspace security and emphasize the importance of the private sector in the formulation of international norms.61 In this way, the SCO economies’ approach is characterized by a relatively high emphasis on internal security compared to external security. A clear difference in priority was evident in the meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Barack Obama at the APEC Summit held in Beijing in November 2014. For instance, Xi ‘reaffirmed [China’s] firm opposition to terrorism of all forms’ including cyberterrorism. Obama, on the other hand, ‘stressed the importance of protecting IP as well as trade secrets, especially against cyber-threats’.62 It is also important to consider China’s hacking culture. Consider the US National Security Agency-backed hacking competition of June 2009. Four thousand, two hundred programmers from all over the world participated in algorithm coding and other contests. Of the finalists in the competitions, 20 were from China compared with ten from Russia, and only two from the United States.63 Chinese hacking groups consist of a mix of independent criminals, patriotic hackers who focus their attacks on political targets, the intelligence-oriented hackers inside the People’s Liberation Army, as well as other groups that are believed to work with the government.64 Quoting

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a Taiwanese information security official, Japan’s Mainichi Japan noted that China has about 900 000 hackers that have ‘close ties to the Chinese government or military’. Of these, about 70 000–80 000 are from the PLA or law enforcement agencies and 500 000–600 000 are civilians organized like military units and are rewarded for carrying out cyberattacks.65 Other estimates suggest that there were over 60 000–80 000 cyberwar fighters in the PLA. The ‘Red Hacker Alliance’ is arguably the largest and earliest hacking group. An estimate suggested that it had 20 000 hackers in 2005 and about 80 000 registered members at the peak. Monitoring a number of hacker websites, a US security analyst found that 380 000 hackers logged into Chinese hacking sites over a period of several days.66 China’s hacking culture helps us to distinguish Chinese ‘hackerism’ from the Western ‘hacktivism’. A significant proportion of the Chinese population tends to associate positive rather than negative stereotypes with hackers. Terms such as ‘hacker’ and ‘hacking’ lack the negative connotations that they have acquired in the West. Books and magazines on hacking appear to be more widespread and prevalent in China compared to elsewhere. For instance, magazines such as Hacker X Files and Hacker Defense provide step-by-step procedures and instructions for breaking into computers or writing malware. The Hacker’s Penetration Manual reportedly cost less than US$6.67 There are also hacker clubs, hacker online serials, hacker conferences and hacker training academic institutions.68 Also startling is the fact that young Chinese tend to treat hackers like rock stars. Research has indicated that Chinese students identify hackers as positive role models and wish to emulate them. According to a 2005 Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences survey about 43 percent of elementary school students said they ‘adore’ China’s hackers and about one-third said they would like to be one.69

CONCLUDING COMMENTS This chapter sheds light into the cyberspace dimension of China’s growing military and economic might. China’s position as a global center for industrial and economic espionage activities is attributed to the country’s hunger for intellectual property. The more analysts trace this connection of China-originated cyberattacks, the more popular becomes a theory among US intelligence officials and some security professionals that China prefers to rely more on stealing foreign technology and trade secrets rather than accelerating its own efforts to develop indigenous

Cyberwar: China and the United States 425 technology and ideas. At the same time, the United States and other Western powers lack the leverage and bargaining power to compel China to stop cyberattacks originating from the country. There are differences between Chinese and Western discourses about cybercrimes’ imports to and exports from China. Our analysis contradicts previous observations and arguments of Western analysts that the Chinese government is more serious about controlling cyberattacks targeting Chinese entities than foreign ones. The Chinese view of itself, in sharp contrast to the Western view, is of a victim in the cyberspace; the findings challenge, at least to some degree, the Chinese government’s portrayal of Chinese cyberspace as being the victim of foreign hackers. The above analysis challenges the views of some experts who argue that law enforcement officials in China, just like those in Russia, turn a blind eye to hackers attacking international websites and are more likely to pursue cybercriminals targeting domestic entities. In light of the above observations, perhaps it is an overstatement to say that the cybercrimes targeting domestic entities are controlled in China. Cybercrime laws are not strictly enforced and many Chinese hackers understandably disregard them. It is fair to say that China’s national cyber-policing strategy mainly involves monitoring and cracking down on cyberattacks that challenge the Chinese Communist Party’s dominance. Alleged cyberattacks from China have been among the major forces that are increasingly shaping institutions in the United States and other industrialized countries. Measures are being taken to make cyberattacks an integral part of risk assessment. In the 10-K reports filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), DuPont did not identify hacking as a risk and provided no indication that the company was an industrial espionage victim. As noted above, Google announced that China-originated attacks that infiltrated the company attacked at least 34 other major companies. While two, Intel and Adobe confessed to being attacked, albeit with few specifics, no other companies stepped forward.70 Given the perception of high-profile cyberattacks originating from China, investors may no longer tolerate organizations’ hesitant and secretive mentalities and unwillingness to report cyberattacks. Finally, unlike the case of globally isolated economies such as North Korea, the United States and other Western countries have a clearer understanding of China’s points of view despite occasional tensions and conflicts. China also maintains diplomatic and economic ties with most countries. Looking from this point of view, US–China relations involving the cyberspace is less complex than the challenges associated with cyberoffenses associated with North Korea.

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At a hearing of the US House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, James Andrew Lewis, Director and Senior Fellow, Technology and Public Policy Program and Director of the Technology Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies noted: ‘We need to persuade the Chinese to change their behavior; we can’t coerce them, they’re too big. There are factions within China that want to work with us. We need to encourage them’.71 One way would be to use a soft approach with China.

NOTES 1.

2. 3. 4. 5.

6.

7. 8.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

Eriksson, J. and G. Giacomello (2006), ‘The information revolution, security, and international relations: (IR) relevant theory?’, International Political Science Review, 27 (3), 221–44. Cobb, A. (1999), ‘Electronic Gallipoli?’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 53 (2), 133–49. Kshetri, N. (2010), ‘Diffusion and effects of cybercrime in developing economies’, Third World Quarterly, 31 (7), 1057–79. Kshetri, N. (2014), ‘Cyber-warfare: Western and Chinese allegations’, IEEE IT Professional, 16 (1), 16–19. Bremmer, I. (2015), ‘These 5 facts explain the threat of cyber warfare’, Time, 19 June, accessed 1 August 2015 at http://time.com/3928086/these-5-facts-explain-thethreat-of-cyber-warfare/. Crovitz, L.G. (2015), ‘We’re losing the cyber war’, The Wall Street Journal, 28 June accessed 1 August 2015 at http://www.wsj.com/articles/were-losing-the-cyber-war1435508565. Zengerle, P. and M. Cassella (2015), ‘Millions more of Americans hit by government personnel data hack’, Reuters, 9 July, accessed 1 August 2015 at http://www. reuters.com/article/2015/07/09/cybersecurity-usa-idUSKCN0PJ2MQ20150709. Riley, M. (2012), ‘SEC push may yield new disclosures of company cyber attacks’, Bloomberg Business, 10 January, accessed 1 August 2015 at http://www. bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-01-10/sec-push-may-yield-new-disclosures-of-cyberattacks-on-companies. Riley, M. and B. Stone (2011), ‘Hacker vs hacker’, Bloomberg Business, 14 March, accessed 1 April 2016 at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-03-10/ hacker-vs-dot-hacker. Easton, N. (2012), ‘Fortune’s guide to the future’, Fortune, 16 January, 165 (1), 44. Tan, Y. and L. Chen (2012), ‘Telecom giants hit back at allegations’, China Daily, 9 October, accessed 1 August 2015 at http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-10/09/ content_15802157.htm. Kshetri, N. (2013), ‘Cybercrime and cyber-security issues associated with China: some economic and institutional considerations’, Electronic Commerce Research, 13 (1), 41–69. Schafer, S. (2006), ‘A piracy culture: Beijing continues to defy US and European efforts to stop IP theft’, Newsweek, 16 January. Kshetri, N. (2009), ‘Positive externality, increasing returns and the rise in cybercrimes’, Communications of the ACM, 52 (12), 141–4. Becker, G. (1968), ‘Crime and punishment: an economic approach’, Journal of Political Economy, 76 (2), 169–217.

Cyberwar: China and the United States 427 16. 17.

18.

19. 20.

21. 22.

23.

24.

25.

26. 27. 28.

29. 30.

31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

Kshetri, N. (2006), ‘The simple economics of cybercrimes’, IEEE Security and Privacy, 4 (1), 33–9. International Telecommunication Union (2008), ‘Overview of cybersecurity, Recommendation ITU–T X.1205’, accessed 1 August 2015 at http://tinyurl.com/boys7dj. The ITU Plenipotentiary Conference 2010 held in Guadalajara, Mexico, approved the definition of cybersecurity. Hirshleifer, J. (1998), ‘The bioeconomic causes of war’, Working Paper No. 777, Department of Economics, University of California, accessed 1 April 2016 at http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp777.pdf. Kshetri, N. (2014), ‘Cyberwarfare in the Korean Peninsula: asymmetries and strategic responses’, East Asia, No. 31, 183–201. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (2011), Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets in Cyberspace, accessed 1 April 2016 at https://www.ncsc.gov/ publications/reports/fecie_all/Foreign_Economic_Collection_2011.pdf. Riley, ‘SEC push may yield new disclosures of company cyber attacks’. Reid, T. (2007), ‘China’s cyber army is preparing to march on America, says Pentagon’, The Times, 8 September, accessed 1 April 2016 at http://www. thetimes.co.uk/tto/technology/internet/article1860914.ece. Leyden, J. (2011), ‘Hidden dragon: the Chinese cyber menace’, The Register, 24 December, accessed 1 August 2015 at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/12/24/ china_cybercrime_underground_analysis/print.html. Riptech (2002), Riptech Internet Security Threat Report (Vol. II), July, accessed 1 April 2016 at http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/entwhitepaper_symantec_internet_security_threat_report_ii.pdf. Cited in Greenberg, A. (2007), ‘The top countries for cybercrime’, Forbes, 17 July, accessed 1 April 2016 at http://www.forbes.com/2007/07/13/cybercrime-worldregions-tech-cx_ag_0716cybercrime.html. Lindenmayer, I. (2006), ‘Online’, American Banker, 171 (18), 6. Kshetri, N. (2010), The Global Cybercrime Industry: Economic, Institutional and Strategic Perspectives, Springer, Chapter 10. Sophos.com (2007/08), Security Threat Report Update, 23 July, accessed 1 April 2016 at https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/Gated%20Assets/white%20 papers/sophossecurityreportjul08srna.pdf?la=en.pdf. Greenberg, ‘The top countries for cybercrime’. Symantec (2008), Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report accessed a April 2016 at http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_ internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf. Ibid. Kshetri, The Global Cybercrime Industry. PandaLabs, Annual Report 2012, accessed 1 April. Kshetri, N. (2013), Cybercrime and Cybersecurity in the Global South, Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. China Daily (2010), ‘2010 Internet policing hinges on transnational cybercrime’, 10 November, accessed 1 August 2015 at http://www.china.org.cn/business/2010-11/10/ content_21310523.htm. Kshetri, N. (2013), ‘Cyber-victimization and cybersecurity in China’, Communications of the ACM, 56 (4), 35–7. Pi, Y. (2011), ‘New China criminal legislations in the progress of harmonization of criminal legislation against cybercrime’, accessed 1 April 2016 at https://rm.coe.int/ CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001 6803042f0.

428 38. 39. 40. 41.

42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55.

56. 57. 58. 59.

Handbook of US–China relations Dai, Q. (2011), ‘China itself is facing growing cybercrime and attacks’, Financial Times, 11 November, accessed 1 August 2015 at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ 2a134f8c-f5be-11e0-bcc2-00144feab49a.html#axzz1dOy0Cfug. Kshetri, ‘Cyber-victimization and cybersecurity in China’. Dai, ‘China itself is facing growing cybercrime and attacks’. Kshetri, N. (2010), The Global Cyber-crime Industry: Economic, Institutional and Strategic Perspectives, New York: Springer-Verlag; Kshetri, N. (forthcoming), ‘Institutional and economic factors affecting the development of the Chinese cloud computing industry and market’, Telecommunications Policy 40 (2). Adams, J. (2001), ‘Virtual defense’, Foreign Affairs, May/June, 98–112. L. Qiao and X. Wang (1999), Unrestricted Warfare, Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House. Bremmer, ‘These 5 facts explain the threat of cyber warfare’. Sanger, D.E. (2014), ‘Fine line seen in US spying on companies’, New York Times, 21 May, accessed 1 August 2015 at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/business/ussnooping-on-companies-cited-by-china.html?_r=0. Li, X. (2012), ‘China is victim of hacking attacks’, China Daily, 5 June, accessed 1 August 2015 at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-06/05/content_16567174. htm. Sophos (2012), Security Threat Report 2012, accessed 1 April 2016 at https://www. sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/other/SophosSecurityThreatReport2012.pdf. Kshetri, ‘Cyber-victimization and cybersecurity in China’. Microsoft (2011), Microsoft Security Intelligence Report, accessed 1 April 2016 at https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=27605. Information Warfare Monitor/Shadowserver Foundation (2010), Shadows in the Cloud: Investigating Cyber Espionage 2.0, Joint Report: JR03-2010, 6 April, accessed 1 April 2016 http://www.nartv.org/mirror/shadows-in-the-cloud.pdf. Hvistendahl, M. (2009), ‘The China syndrome’, Popular Science, 274 (5), 60–65. Espiner, T. (2010), ‘Cable reveals US concerns over Chinese cyber-warfare’, ZDNet, 6 December, accessed 1 August 2015 at http://www.zdnet.com/article/cable-revealsus-concerns-over-chinese-cyber-warfare/. Lawrence, T.B., C. Hardy and N. Phillips, (2002), ‘Institutional effects of interorganizational collaboration: the emergence of proto-institutions’, Academy of Management Journal, 45 (1), 281. Suchman, M.C. (1995), ‘Managing legitimacy: strategic and institutional approaches’, Academy of Management Review, No. 20, 571–610. Kshetri, N. and L.L. Alcantara (2015), ‘Cyber-threats and cybersecurity challenges: a cross-cultural perspective’, in N. Holden, S. Michailova and S. Tietze (eds), The Routledge Companion to Cross-Cultural Management, London and New York: Routledge; Kshetri, N. (2009), ‘Institutionalization of intellectual property rights in China’, European Management Journal, 27 (3) 155–64; Kshetri, N. (2007), ‘The adoption of e-business by organizations in China: an institutional perspective’, Electronic Markets, 17 (2), 113–25. China Economic Times (2000), ‘High technology affects national security’, 12 June, accessed 1 April 2016 at http://www.china.org.cn/english/GS-e/668.htm. Albert, M. and B. Buzan (2011), ‘Securitization, sectors and functional differentiation’, Security Dialogue, 42 (4–5), 413–25. People’s Liberation Army Daily (2000), ‘Noting the phenomenon of information colonialism’, 8 February [in Chinese]. Azar, E.E. and C.-I. Moon (1998), ‘Legitimacy, integration and policy capacity: the “software” side of third world national security’, in National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats, College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland.

Cyberwar: China and the United States 429 60. 61.

62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71.

People’s Liberation Army Daily, ‘Noting the phenomenon of information colonialism’. Kizekova, A. (2012), ‘The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: challenges in cyberspace – analysis’, Eurasia Review, 27 February, accessed 1 August 2015 at http://www.eurasiareview.com/27022012-the-shanghai-cooperation-organisationchallenges-in-cyberspace-analysis/. Bennett, C. (2014), ‘US, China see little progress on cybersecurity’, The Hill, 12 November, accessed 1 August 2015 at http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/ 223865-us-china-see-little-progress-on-cybersecurity. Cetron, M.J., O. Davies, S.F. Steele and C.E. Ayers (2009), ‘Ten critical trends for cyber security’, Futurist, 43 (5), 40–49. Barboza, D. (2010), ‘Hacking for fun and profit in China’s underworld’, New York Times, 2 February, accessed 1 August 2015 at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/02/ business/global/02hacker.html?pagewanted=all. Mainichi Japan (2011), ‘Japan Not Alone as Victim of Chinese Cyber Attacks’, 31 October accessed 1 April 2016 at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/FOCUS% 3A+Japan+not+alone+as+victim+of+Chinese+cyber+attacks.-a0271247763. Hvistendahl, M. (2009), ‘Hackers: the China syndrome’, Popular Science, 23 April, accessed 1 April 2016 at http://www.popsci.com/scitech/article/2009-04/hackerschina-syndrome. Barboza, ‘Hacking for fun and profit in China’s underworld’. Hvistendahl, ‘Hackers: the China syndrome’. Ibid. Riley, ‘SEC push may yield new disclosures of company cyber attacks’. Freedberg, S.J. (2013), ‘Back off: how to curb Chinese cyber-theft’, Breaking Defense, 24 July, accessed 1 August 2015 at http://breakingdefense.com/2013/07/ theyre-already-afraid-us-can-scare-china-gently-into-stopping-cyber-theft/.

23. Future war: China and the United States Malcolm Davis

INTRODUCTION The prospect of future US–China war emerging from disputes in East Asia is very real. China’s rise is challenging to the established US strategic primacy in Asia, and more broadly, heralds the end of the US–led ‘unipolar moment’ and the prospect of an emerging competitive multipolar world. Commentators often refer to the notion of a ‘Thucydides Trap’ – the security dilemma generated by a rising power challenging an existing power. In commentating on this concept, Graham Allison suggests that: […] if leaders in China and the US perform no better than their predecessors in classical Greece, or Europe at the beginning of the 20th century, historians of the 21st century will cite Thucydides in explaining the catastrophe that follows. The fact that war would be devastating for both nations is relevant but not decisive.1

It is to be hoped that both China and the United States can manage their relationship to avoid such a trap, but hope is not a strategy, and the future of the US–China relationship is complex and uncertain. Therefore considering the prospect that a future crisis in East Asia, or the possibility of a conflict emerging somewhere else, could lead to a large-scale war between the United States and China must be thought about seriously. As Sun Tzu remarked: ‘Warfare is the greatest affair of state, the basis of life and death, the Way (Tao) to survival or extinction. It must be thoroughly pondered and analyzed’.2 How might such a war be fought and what would be the main military-technological features of potential future military conflict between China and the United States? There has been extensive analysis on Chinese development of ‘counter-intervention capabilities’ – referred to in Western literature as ‘Anti-Access and Area Denial’ (A2/AD) and a number of key implications emerge. China’s declared military strategy of ‘Active Defence’ is focused on protecting China’s vital interests, including those offshore in a manner that is strategically defensive but operationally and tactically offensive. Under Active Defence, China’s development of A2/AD-type capabilities is eroding US and allied 430

Future war: China and the United States 431 military-technological advantage and altering the balance of power in Asia. China’s approach to future war is based around the idea of fighting and winning informationized local war. The use of ‘network warfare’ – encompassing integrated network-enabled warfare in space, and across the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum, including cyberspace – to fight and win informationized local wars by denying a knowledge edge to an opponent like the United States is a key element of Chinese counterintervention operations alongside the PLA’s air, naval and long-range missile forces.3 However, the most recent Chinese defence White Paper, released in May 2015, makes clear that China is now beginning to move beyond a focus on counter-intervention operations in the near and middle seas, and is set to build new types of military capabilities to allow it to project power and presence into the far seas of the Indian Ocean (Figure 23.1). The key rationale for the PLA moving in this direction is to protect growing strategic interests aligned along the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’ as part of ‘open seas protection’. Therefore, future war between the United States and China may not necessarily be confined to Chinese A2/AD-type operations in East Asia and US efforts to counter such Chinese attacks, but may extend into regions such as the Indian Ocean. Future war between China and the United States will certainly occur in new operational domains such as space and across the EM spectrum.4 This chapter examines the character and conduct of such military operations, examines key military capability developments in China that support its ability to undertake such future military operations, and concludes with an analysis of likely US military options in the face of growing Chinese military power.

THE SHAPE OF WARS TO COME The starting point for analysis of future war between the United States and China is through examining strategic guidance in China’s biannual defence White Papers, the most recent of which was released in May 2015.5 The 2015 White Paper gives an insight into how Beijing perceives its strategic outlook, and where it focuses its military efforts in a geographic sense – what it refers to as the ‘strategic direction’. It is clear that China’s current perception of the main strategic direction remains focused on East Asia, in relation to existing disputes in the East China Sea (the Daioyu/Senkaku Islands dispute with Japan), the unresolved relationship with Taiwan, and the worsening South China Sea dispute, which notably focuses on active territorial disputes between China and Taiwan on one side, and the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei

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precise nature of its historical claims. The Near, Middle, and Far Seas, as well as the Far Oceans, are depicted notionally based on their location relative to China, as described by Admiral Liu Huaqing in his memoirs.

China claims a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) from its claimed baselines, as well as additional “historical claims” in the South China Sea.

Figure 23.1 Near seas vs far seas

Source: Erickson, A.S., A.M. Denmark and G. Collins (2012), ‘Beijing’s “starter carrier” and future steps’, US Naval War College Review, Winter.

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CHINESE CLAIMS AND MARITIME DYNAMICS China’s claimed straight baselines.

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Future war: China and the United States 433 on the other. Most recently, the South China Sea dispute has escalated as a result of large-scale Chinese land reclamation to build artificial islands on the disputed territory that it holds and US responses including ‘freedom of navigation operations’ (FONOPs) involving the deployment of naval vessels and aircraft to challenge China’s claim to disputed waters. As these three security disputes involve states that have direct and important security relations with Washington, they represent the most likely sources of a US–China conflict in the future.6 The potential for instability on the Korean Peninsula is also a factor in Chinese strategic thinking.7

Were a crisis to emerge in any of these disputes that led to a direct military conflict between the United States and China, how will the PLA will fight future wars? China’s 2015 defence White Paper makes clear the growing importance of PLA maritime, air and missile forces, as well as the ability to operate decisively in new operational domains such as space, and across the EM spectrum. Although modernization is also occurring within the land forces (the PLAA), with an increasing emphasis on building strategic mobility and responsiveness for joint and combined operations, it is modernization of the PLAN, PLAAF and PLASAF and China’s efforts to pursue a revolution in military affairs (RMA) with Chinese characteristics through building informationized forces that have the greatest prominence.8 A key development in the 2015 defence White Paper is that it strongly promotes China as a blue-water naval power. It refers to the 2004 ‘military strategic guidelines and the ‘preparation for military struggle’ (PMS), noting that the latter’s objective is to win ‘informationized local wars’, highlighting maritime military struggle and maritime PMS, which suggests a decisive shift from a continental to a maritime focus for the PLA and for China. This is reinforced by a key statement that cements the prominence of the PLAN for the future: ‘The seas and oceans bear on the enduring peace, lasting stability and sustainable development of China. The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests’.9 Under the new military strategic guidelines therefore, the PLAN will adopt a more expansive role that encompasses both offshore waters defence and ‘open seas protection’.10 This implies not only a more powerful Chinese naval capability, but also a PLAN presence further away from China than the recent focus on the ‘near seas’, and which could see PLAN forces regularly operating in areas such as the Indian Ocean and its approaches through the Southeast Asian straits (the Straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok–Makassar), as well as possibly deeper into the Pacific beyond the second island chain. This is a new strategic

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task for the PLA and reinforces a shift that began with Hu Jintao’s 2004 ‘new historic missions’.11 Dennis Blasko sums up the significance of this change, stating that: [t]he white paper has thereby acknowledged the need to shift the balance in PLA thinking from ground operations to joint naval and aerospace operations – something that has been signalled for years (going back officially at least to 2004) but will require change in all aspects of future military modernization. The impact of this admission on the PLA as an institution cannot be understated. It will have effects on everything from force size, structure and composition to personnel policies, doctrine, training, logistics and equipment acquisition.12

Given this much more significant focus on maritime operations, what implications does this have on how China would fight a future war, including a future war against the United States? Crucial in this regard are China’s military strategic guidelines, which are the basis for China’s national military strategy, officially referred to as ‘Active Defence’, which promotes a strategic defensive posture but an operationally and tactically offensive stance. Active Defence is ‘the highest-level operational guidance to all PLA services on how to fight and win wars. The warfighting principles embedded in Active Defense emphasize using precise and well-timed offensive operations, gaining and retaining the initiative, attacking only under favourable conditions, and exploiting an opponent’s most vulnerable weaknesses’.13 Although China consistently promotes Active Defence as being a defensive posture, Peng and Yao’s The Science of Military Strategy makes clear that first shots that could prompt Chinese military responses may not need to be military blows: ‘If a country invaded another country’s territorial land or waters, or hostile forces such as religious extremists, national separatists, and international terrorists challenged a country’s sovereignty, it could be considered as “firing the first shot” on the plane of politics and strategy’.14 Given China’s current maritime disputes with its neighbours, this interpretation of the nature of threat is broad, as defining an invasion of territorial waters could be taken to mean military activities by claimants to disputes in the South China Sea or East China Sea. China’s unwillingness to fully declare its claims in the South China Sea and the meaning of its declared ‘nine-dash line’ reinforce the risk of the actions of another state being used as a justification for pre-emptive military action by China. The military strategic guidelines therefore provide some clarity beyond the fuzziness of China’s declaratory Active Defence strategy. They first identify the strategic opponent based on China’s understanding of the international environment and its perception of threats to its

Future war: China and the United States 435 interests; they explain main strategic direction or ‘geographic focal points’ for conflict so that resources can be applied to meeting a threat in a particular region; and, determine preparations for military struggle (PMS), which explains Chinese perspectives on the character and conduct of wars that may involve China in the future. This then derives guidance for campaigns and operations – how the PLA will fight.15 The 2004 military strategic guidelines made clear that China is focused on fighting and winning local wars under informationized conditions, with a focus on China’s periphery within East Asia. This encompasses China’s current territorial and maritime security disputes within this region, and also demands that China counters the risk of US military intervention through effective counter-intervention capability (A2/AD). The 2015 defence White Paper indicates an update to the 2004 military strategic guidelines, driven by an observation that the development of information-led warfare continues to evolve even beyond that which was demonstrated during the 2003 Iraq War that prompted the 2004 guidelines.16 The 2015 defence White Paper states: The world revolution in military affairs (RMA) is proceeding to a new stage. Long-range, precise, smart, stealthy and unmanned weapons and equipment are becoming increasingly sophisticated. Outer space and cyber space have become new commanding heights in strategic competition among all parties. The form of war is accelerating its evolution to informationization.17

The 2015 White Paper highlights the growing role of unmanned systems, space capabilities and the more expansive role of the EM spectrum in modern warfare. As such the 2015 White Paper and China’s new military strategic guidelines imply that China recognizes that the RMA in information-led warfare, and the role of C4ISR18 demonstrated in the 1991 Persian Gulf War and again in the 2003 Iraq War, is the beginning of a process of military transformation – not the conclusion. Exploiting new approaches to battle through unmanned systems, through military capabilities in space and across the EM spectrum is where the future lies. Victory in information warfare – what the Chinese refer to as ‘network warfare’ – is the essential prerequisite for winning informationized war. Of key importance in waging network warfare is China’s view that space has become a new strategic centre of gravity and a new high ground. Space is seen by the PLA as being a commanding position from which control of the ground, oceans and the electromagnetic space delivers strategic initiative.19 China’s ability to undertake military operations in space includes using satellites for C4ISR to allow development of informationized forces within the PLA that can fight and win

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informationized local wars. Military space operations also include offensive counter-space attacks against an adversary’s critical space-based C4ISR systems. The most recent Chinese military power report highlights China’s move towards building a sophisticated counter-space capability, stating that: ‘PLA writings emphasize the necessity of “destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy’s reconnaissance and communications satellites” suggesting that such systems, as well as navigation and early warning satellites, could be among the targets of attacks designed to “blind and deafen the enemy”’. The same PLA analysis of US and coalition military operations also states that ‘destroying or capturing satellites and other sensors will deprive an opponent of initiative on the battlefield and [make it difficult] for them to bring their precision guided weapons into full play’.20 Chinese development of advanced anti-satellite weapons is proceeding apace. Testing has taken place of a direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) in January 2007 that destroyed a defunct Chinese weather satellite; a direct-ascent booster capable of delivering an ASAT to geostationary orbit (GEO) – the location of most US communication satellites – in 2010; co-orbital ASAT capabilities under the guise of civilian ‘small sats’; and ground-based jamming systems.21 By waging network warfare across the EM spectrum, as well as in outer space, the PLA seeks to quickly win an information advantage that is vital to the successful employment of other types of military power, including employing a more powerful blue-water naval capability as well as long-range air and missile capabilities to undertake counter-intervention operations. The 2013 volume of The Science of Military Strategy clearly states for the first time China’s growing ability for network warfare.22 Network operations are seen as part of Integrated Network Electronic Warfare (INEW) against an opponent’s military intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities through offensive electronic warfare attacks, as well as against an opponent’s EW systems.23 Pinning down a hard definition of INEW is challenging, with no clear answer coming from Chinese writers who suggest it means different things. In analysing the 2013 Science of Military Strategy’s perspective on INEW, John Costello states that: INEW means a lot of different things to a lot of different people. In some circles, it means using electronic warfare to transmit a cyber-attack, but to others it means fusing electronic warfare and cyber warfare commands together to execute a full-range of information operation capabilities. In Chinese strategic thought, both interpretations have been cited as correct.24

Future war: China and the United States 437 Costello argues that Chinese planners expect that in wartime the imposition of Internet blockades would shut down the Internet itself as an avenue for attack within a very short space of time, leaving the electromagnetic spectrum and INEW as the best path for China to win the information battle. This implies a ‘battle of the first salvo’ effect, with China rushing to launch pre-emptive network warfare attacks against an opponent and highlights the importance of seeing cyberwarfare and electronic warfare not as separate activities but as integrated as part of network warfare. According to Costello: The single greatest vector of attack is destroyed after the first salvos are fired, and digital soldiers, scouts, spies and saboteurs are exposed or rendered irrelevant. With physical or network access limited by geopolitical borders, Internet embargos and increased cyber security under threat or reality of cyber-attack, the most promising avenue, then is via the electromagnetic spectrum that connects these machines. Information operations planners have to plan for a contingency where the electromagnetic spectrum is the only viable option.25

PLA General Dai Qingmin explains INEW as being a ‘series of combat operations that use the integration of electronic warfare and computer network warfare measures to disrupt the normal operation of enemy battlefield information systems while protecting one’s own, with the objective of seizing information superiority’.26 INEW would see strategic offensive operations against rear-area command-and-control, intelligence gathering and logistics within an adversary’s homeland ‘so that combat losses cannot be restored and the deployed force cannot sustain battle’.27 This could include network warfare against non-secure semi-open information networks that manage critical infrastructure including power generation, telecommunications, water management, and even less secure commercial satellites being employed by US military forces in a crisis.28 The EW component of INEW is going to become more important in coming years, as EW is becoming more diverse in nature over time as new technologies emerge.29 Of key importance are high-powered microwave weapons that could make EW far more flexible in the future.30 The 2005 edition of The Science of Military Strategy makes clear the importance of winning the information battle as a key requirement for success in warfare. It states that: [i]nformation is the important resource to carry out direct attacks on the enemy’s information targets, and can play a major role in influencing the overall situation of the war. Information superiority will become an important factor in determining the victory or defeat of war. Hence, information operations will be a major operational pattern instead of a supplementary

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operational means as ever, and will be carried out in the whole process of war. The side that enjoys information superiority will also gain initiative in operations, while the other side will find itself to be trampled upon. Information warfare capability will become one of the core elements of the military fighting capacity, and the digitization level of the military will have a decisive bearing on its combat effectiveness.31

THE PLA GOES GLOBAL The need to successfully wage network warfare in space and across the EM spectrum to win an information advantage and deny it to an adversary is very clear in Chinese thinking. It is an enabler for all other aspects of modern warfare including that occurring in more traditional operational domains such as sea, air and land as well as missile capabilities. It is clear that China seeks to deter and deny access to an opponent like the United States in the event of a crisis in the near seas that could involve Taiwan, the South China Sea or the East China Sea.32 By striking at forward US bases in Guam and Okinawa, US land-based airpower operating from those bases would be threatened, whilst PLASAF anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), PLAN ships and submarines equipped with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and PLAAF airpower and coastal defence cruise missiles (CDCMs) would threaten forward-deployed US and allied naval forces.33 This is the essence of A2/AD. Geoffrey Till refers to Admiral Liu’s successor, Admiral Zhang Lianzhong, speaking in 1996, to explain exactly what China sought to achieve through its approach to A2/AD: The exterior perimeter is conceived as encompassing the seas out to the first chain of islands. This region will be defended by conventional and nuclear submarines (some of which will be armed with anti-ship missiles), by naval medium-range aircraft and by surface warships. The submarines will play a dynamic role to ensure defence in depth, including the laying of mines in the enemy’s sea lines of communication. The middle distance perimeter extends 150 miles from the coast and comes within range, but in most cases does not reach the first chain of islands. Anti-ship aircraft, destroyers and escort vessels will carry the main burden in this area. The interior defence perimeter extends to 60 miles from the coast. This will be the theatre of operations for the main naval air force, fast-attack boats and land-based anti-ship missile units.34

As noted above, the 2015 defence White Paper highlights a growing importance of China adopting a more ambitious and global role to defend growing interests further away from China under ‘open seas protection’

Future war: China and the United States 439 as a key role for the PLAN.35 The strategic rationale for China taking this step is very clear. China has growing strategic interests in the Indian Ocean along the route of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, specifically to ensure the security of maritime commerce and also protect the flow of energy resources. The life-blood of China’s economy is energy. Without access to energy resources, China’s economy will slow, it will become more vulnerable to internal social and political disorder and the CCP’s grip on power will be weakened.36 This dependency will grow, with China’s imported oil demand outstripping diminishing domestic and offshore production. Current projections suggest that by 2020, imported oil will make up 66 per cent of its total oil demand, and by 2040, it will make up 72 per cent.37 Recognizing the challenge of ensuring energy security, former Chinese President Hu Jintao highlighted the strategic significance of the Malacca Strait, and suggested a ‘Malacca Dilemma’ in November 2003, noting that ‘certain powers have all along encroached on and tried to control navigation through the [Malacca] strait’.38 The significance of the Malacca Strait is that 80 per cent of China’s energy as well as its trade moves through a waterway that at its most narrow point is only 1.7 miles across.39 The nearby Lombok–Makassar Straits are also strategically significant as most super-tankers are too large for the Malacca Strait to traverse this route.40 China must protect its energy security or see its economic survival and the survival of the CCP under threat in a crisis. In this sense, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road provides a natural framework along which PLA modernization can be aligned, and neatly allows PLA activities to directly support China’s diplomatic and political interests beyond the near seas including preserving its energy security. An increasing Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean will be essential according to National Defense University Professor Liang Fang, who suggests ‘that a military presence along the Maritime Silk Road must serve to deter any potential enemy, and that, ultimately, sea lane security can only be assured by carrier battle groups on station’.41 China’s strategic investment in the Silk Road initiatives must be protected, not only along the length of these routes, but also at their point of origin and final destination. It is important to recognize that the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road is not a one-way path for the flow of Chinese economic largesse to developing states. It is a two-way strategic conduit for growing Chinese power to reshape the regional security paradigm and drive the ‘China Dream’. What matters most is capital inflow and strategic benefit to China, and in this case, all roads lead to China via the South China Sea. Kaplan notes that ‘[t]he South China Sea functions as the throat of the Western Pacific and the Indian oceans – the

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mass of connective economic tissue where global sea routes coalesce’.42 For China to not control the South China Sea whilst claiming the mantle of twenty-first-century great power and a leader of an Asian community of common destiny is unthinkable, and it seems likely that the South China Sea will steadily assume greater prominence in Chinese strategic planning in coming years for these very reasons. This has significant implications for China’s military strategic guidelines, and for the future development of the PLA, most notably, the PLAN, due to the unresolved Malacca Dilemma, which even the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road does not fully address. The United States’ ability to interdict Chinese shipping through the Southeast Asian straits under a strategy of ‘Offshore Control’ represents China’s Malacca Dilemma made manifest and Beijing cannot afford to assume that the United States and its allies would not undertake a distant blockade in a future war.43 Therefore China will respond by seeking not only dominance of the South China Sea and its maritime and air approaches – something that would be only possible with military forces that are forward deployed on reclaimed islands – but eventually it will also require an expeditionary capability to counter potential US operations in the Indian Ocean because it is utterly pointless to control the South China Sea if China’s energy supplies can still be choked off at the Strait of Hormuz or at the Gulf of Aden and its maritime trade interdicted in the Bay of Bengal.44 Yoshihara and Holmes note that China is beginning down the path of developing naval forces for employment beyond scenarios in the Taiwan Straits: Present trends in China’s naval build-up, and in rhetoric issuing from Beijing, suggest that a benign outcome [a peaceful resolution of Taiwan] is neither inevitable nor probable. That China is already building up power projection capabilities for the post-Taiwan future is no longer a controversial statement. If so, systems under development for access denial are the precursor to a more capable, lasting Chinese presence in Asian waters.45

China’s introduction of the training aircraft carrier Liaoning in September 2012 is to be followed by up to four indigenous aircraft carriers by the mid-2020s. A PLAN aircraft carrier capability represents a significant step in the direction of blue-water power projection designed for distant naval deployments into the far seas.46 But the PLAN’s future aircraft carriers will need to be fully supported by naval surface combatants as part of a task force that can effectively defend it beyond the range of land-based air cover, as well as appropriate auxiliary vessels designed for at-sea combat sustainment tasks. In this regard, the PLAN is currently acquiring advanced multirole naval surface combatants including the

Future war: China and the United States 441 Type 052D Luyang-III-class guided missile destroyers (DDGs) and the Type 054A Jiangkai-II class guided missile frigates, and will soon launch the first of several Type 055-class guided missile cruiser (CGs), which will be one of the most heavily armed and powerful warships in Asia.47 All are equipped with long-range ASCMs and sophisticated Aegis-like air defence capabilities.48 Its conventional and nuclear submarine forces are increasingly potent with the Type 093 Improved Shang-class SSN and the future Type 095 guided missile nuclear submarine (SSGN) ideally suited to support blue-water operations in the Indian Ocean. Both will be armed with long-range supersonic ASCMs, and the Type 095 SSGN will also have land-attack cruise missile (LACM) systems that could threaten US base facilities on Diego Garcia. The significance of ASCMs is of key importance, and China is gaining a significant advantage in ASCM capability with its SS-N-27 and YJ-18 systems that enjoy longer range, high supersonic speed in a wave-hugging terminal phase, and an ability to be launched beyond the operational range of US Standard SM-2 and SM-6 area air defence missiles. Andrew Erickson notes the significance of the growing Chinese ASCM capability: [b]y 2020, China is on course to deploy greater quantities of missiles with greater ranges than those systems that could be employed by the US Navy against them. China is on track to have quantitative parity or better in surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and ASCMs, parity in missile launch cells, and quantitative inferiority only in multi-mission land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs). Land-based missiles with potential to threaten US ships and ports they deploy from include the world’s only anti-ship ballistic missile force deployed by China. Let me be clear: unless this gap can be filled credibly, China is poised to ‘outstick’ the US Navy by 2020 by deploying greater quantities of missiles with greater ranges than those of the US ship-based systems able to defend against them.49

Although serious risks to US advantages at sea are clear, it is important to recognize that the PLA does face significant challenges itself.50 A key vulnerability of the PLAN remains a gap in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability. China is moving rapidly to close this gap with the deployment of the Type 56A Jingdao ASW corvette that is equipped with towed sonar arrays and ASW helicopters, modern maritime patrol aircraft (MPAs) such as the Shaanxi Y-8Q, and development of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) and sea-bed sonar arrays. As Goldstein and Knight observed: [S]ince 2012 … China has deployed fixed ocean floor acoustic arrays off its coast, presumably with the intent to monitor foreign submarine activities in the near seas … The major undersea warfare gap that now exists between the

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United States and China may well diminish in coming decades. It is amply clear that China is committing significant research resources to try to detect submarines in nearby waters.51

China’s submarines are getting quieter, making them better ‘hunter killers’.52 In the longer term there is a growing likelihood that improvements in computing power and new types of sensors will make it easier for China to develop new approaches to undersea warfare and ASW that will erode the current invulnerability of US and allied submarines, making the ocean ‘more transparent’ to a range of systems and sensors.53 Developments in submarine quieting, the emerging revolution suggested by UUVs – as well as networked acoustic sensors – suggests that it will become easier for China to protect its maritime approaches from adversary submarines, and this will narrow the ASW gap between China and its neighbours. If the PLAN can perfect long-range submarine operations into far seas through the deployment of much more capable SSNs, such as the Type 095 SSGN, and with new diesel-electric submarines (SSKs) such as the Yuan-type boats with air independent propulsion (AIP), then China is no longer constrained by the two island chains. Other problems need to be resolved as the PLAN develops. There is an absence of operational experience by the PLAN in modern naval warfare, though realistic training exercises are seeking to address this challenge. Another serious gap is ensuring logistical support through underway replenishment ships. These types of vessels are only beginning to be acquired by the PLAN slowly, though the pace is likely to accelerate as China gets closer to launching its own indigenous aircraft carriers later this decade.54 China’s existing replenishment vessels are gaining valuable experience in supporting counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean, with 19 PLAN task forces having been deployed since 2008.55 However, whilst the PLAN is beginning to develop skills in operating naval task forces in more distant operations, such as those engaged on counterpiracy tasks off the Gulf of Aden, its logistic capabilities are insufficient to sustain a distant task force especially if engaged in high-intensity combat operations. Therefore the option of forward bases may emerge as a desirable alternative, with China having now gained a base in Djibouti at the entrance to the Red Sea near the Gulf of Aden, and another at Mahe in the Seychelles.56 China’s National Defence University has recently called for developing ‘strategic frontier islands’ and reefs by building airports and large floating platforms that could facilitate ‘remote strategic delivery’ and serve as supply depots – an idea very similar to China’s ongoing reclamation of reefs to create artificial islands in the South China Sea. An

Future war: China and the United States 443 article in the Xinhua New Agency’s International Herald Leader states that overseas bases could provide ship fuel and material supply, fixed supply bases for warship berthing, fixed wing reconnaissance aircraft, and finally a fully functional centre for replenishment, rest and large warship weapons maintenance.57 It nominates a total of 18 locations for overseas bases in the Indian Ocean, South Pacific and Africa. Most recently, there is growing concern in India that China may seek access to facilities in the Maldives. A recent constitutional amendment, rapidly passed through the local parliament, would allow foreign ownership of Maldives territory, providing that territory is reclaimed from the sea.58 Given the proximity of the Maldives to India and Sri Lanka, a Chinese military presence either in established ports, or through building reclaimed islands would certainly challenge India’s security interests and likely result in an increasing Sino–Indian naval rivalry, but such a presence, along with bases in the Seychelles and Djibouti would also strengthen China’s ability to counter US military forces in the Indian Ocean, including potentially at Diego Garcia. The importance of the Indian Ocean to China is very clear. Morgan Clemens notes that Chinese military authors have stressed the importance of the Maritime Silk Road, referring to it as ‘the crucial strategic direction of China’s rise’, but he argues that were China to seek to gain a ‘sea control’ capability for the Maritime Silk Road, ‘such an objective could only be achieved by a navy several times the size of the current People’s Liberation Army Navy – the development and construction of which would be itself a vastly expensive undertaking that would not come to pass for some decades (if ever)’.59 Therefore he discounts the prospect of the PLAN seeking a ‘sea control’ capability for the Indian Ocean, and promotes the idea that China will seek to ensure sea-lane security as a global commons, and focus on responding alongside other maritime partners to combat persistent low-intensity threats such as piracy – a challenge that the PLAN has been actively confronting since it began counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean in 2008. He discounts the types of bases suggested by proponents of the ‘string of pearls’ hypothesis.60 Rather than seeking actual bases, China would instead seek access to existing commercial facilities, perhaps built and run by Chinese state-owned enterprises. In this regard, China would establish a ‘dual-use’ facility – probably in Karachi, Pakistan – that would enable support for limited Chinese operations on cooperative maritime security missions.61 Turning to the role of the PLAAF and the PLASAF, their main focus remains in countering intervention by the United States in near seas contingencies. The development of new PLAAF capabilities under a

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switch to an ‘offensive air and space’ doctrine, would see advanced capabilities such as the J-20 fifth-generation fighter employed to exploit an opponent’s dependence on vulnerable airborne refuelling and airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft by launching long-range air interception against these platforms, and forcing them back beyond the operational radius of the very aircraft they are designed to support – carrier-based naval aviation.62 The PLAAF lacks long-range power projection capabilities, notably in terms of advanced long-range bombers and sufficient numbers of airborne refuelling aircraft to support expeditionary air operations into the Indian Ocean. As with other capability gaps, China looks set to address this with the development of a new long-range bomber that could contribute to supporting Indian Ocean operations and the introduction of the Y-20 strategic transport that is likely to be adapted to a variety of roles including airborne refuelling.63 The PLASAF’s conventional ballistic missile capabilities are becoming much more sophisticated. The DF-21D ASBM is well known and controversial in that a relatively low-cost missile may threaten the ability of US Navy aircraft carriers to approach China closely enough to employ its aircraft to strike targets. A longer ranged anti-ship-capable DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) is now in operational service, which can deliver a conventional (or nuclear) warhead out to 3000 km. This is sufficient to attack Guam, or if adapted to an ASBM role, force US naval forces even further beyond the second island chain.64 Finally, Chinese testing of a hypersonic glide vehicle (the Wu-15) may extend this lethal range even further.65 These systems could also be switched to supporting far seas operations in the Indian Ocean in the future. For example, a future 3000-km-range DF-26 ASBM capability, if deployed on Hainan Island, could cover all the maritime approaches in the Indian Ocean to the Straits of Malacca, Sunda and Makassar Straits as well as most of the Bay of Bengal, and as far south as Darwin, though not as far as Diego Garcia. Such a system deployed close to the Sino–Indian border could be employed to attack shipping in the Arabian Sea and throughout the Persian Gulf. Thus a PLAN ‘far seas’ operation in a future US–China conflict in the Indian Ocean may see US naval forces engaged not only by surface and submarine forces, or PLAAF forces based on any future bases in the Indian Ocean, but also from PLASAF missile forces or long-range PLAAF forces from China.

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THE US RIPOSTE The US response to China’s growing capability is focused around the ‘AirSea Battle Concept’ (ASBC), which has now been recently renamed with the rather clumsy title of ‘Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons’ (JAM-GC) – and the 2012 ‘Joint Operational Access Concept’ (JOAC).66 The United States is also beginning to debate a ‘third offset’ strategy for exploiting innovative military solutions to the problem of maintaining and extending US military-technological and operational advantage in Asia in the face of rapid Chinese advances in A2/AD capabilities.67 These could include much more substantial use of unmanned systems sent forward ‘into harm’s way’ whilst manned platforms stand back out of reach of Chinese A2/AD systems. The US Navy is also developing a concept of ‘distributed lethality’, which is designed to mitigate against risk posed by Chinese A2/AD capabilities by developing longer-range ASCM capabilities in the future to replace the ageing, slow and relatively short-range Harpoon anti-ship missile, thus addressing the warning noted earlier by Andrew Erickson about China being able to ‘outstick the US Navy’ through longer-range higher-speed missile systems.68 Although the US Department of Defense is regularly at pains to declare that ‘ASBC’, the ‘JOAC’, and ‘JAM-GC’ are ‘not necessarily being developed with any one country in mind’, it seems a stretch of credulity to suggest that China is not the principal subject of discussion in the Air-Sea Battle office at the Pentagon, given its growing A2/AD capabilities and the rapid development of the PLA’s ability to fight informationized local wars.69 A key challenge facing the United States and its allies is the military-strategic implications of Chinese investment in long-range missile capabilities for vulnerable forward bases and most significantly, naval surface forces. The question is now being asked as to whether Chinese investment into new and innovative capabilities like the ASBM heralds a ‘Maxim gun moment’ in military affairs that challenges the survivability and relevance of naval surface forces, which has implications for naval strategy and defence policy including long-term investment decisions for the future US Navy.70 Second, there is an important connection between space-based C4ISR capabilities and longrange missile systems like ASBM. Space systems are an essential element of the ASBM ‘kill chain’, and this fact redefines the future battle space, and means victory in space will determine victory on terrestrial battlefields. The United States cannot afford to ignore the direct challenge posed by Chinese anti-satellite systems because the loss of space

446 Handbook of US–China relations capabilities robs the United States of its information edge, and forces it back to fight a cruder and costlier form of war. The consequences of a successful Chinese counter-space offensive early in such a conflict are sobering. Without access to space systems, US military power would be emasculated. General William Shelton (USAF), Commander USAF Space Command states that: [i]n space, our sustained mission success integrating these satellite capabilities into our military operations has encouraged potential adversaries to further develop counter-space technologies and attempt to exploit our systems and information. We are so dependent on space these days. We plug into it like a utility. It is always there. Nobody worries about it … You do not even know sometimes that you are touching space. So, to lose US space capabilities it would be almost a reversion back to industrial-based warfare.71

Such a reversion would play to China’s advantage given that it could then exploit the favourable strategic geography of Asia to its benefit by massing its forces in time and geographic space to strike at exposed and vulnerable US forces. Such forces, cut off from space-support capabilities would be without the ‘knowledge edge’ that has been so valuable to the United States in the past. It is this space-enabled ‘knowledge edge’ that is a key foundation for the RMA in information-led warfare in the twenty-first century and that is the essential foundation for the modern US way of warfare that emphasizes rapid, decisive operations that exploit overwhelming military-technological advantage to minimize the risk of casualties and losses and to achieve strategic success quickly. Of course, the United States will not sit passively as its vital space capabilities are attacked and its ability to fight decisive information-led warfare eroded. As the PLA modernization leads to informationized forces, China too becomes dependent on space systems for force enhancement, and therefore more vulnerable to US counter-space operations. The United States so far is refraining from pursuing the development of anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities, and is focusing on building greater resilience into US space capabilities through satellite hardening, the use of ‘silent spares’, and ‘small satellites’ that can be launched in an operationally responsive manner.72 Emphasis on space situational awareness (SSA) to detect and monitor hostile space activities is also a priority. These measures seek to dissuade China from threatening warfare in space, by complicating the execution of such an attack. Arms control measures may also be a possibility through a Code of Conduct for space, designed to establish norms against destructive ASAT capability. These

Future war: China and the United States 447 are all worthy approaches, but they do not guarantee that China will not launch devastating counter-space attacks at the outset of a US–China conflict.

NOTES 1.

2. 3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9. 10.

Allison, G. (2012), ‘Avoiding Thucydides’s trap’, Financial Times, 22 August, accessed 10 September 2014 at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22265/ avoiding_thucydidess_trap.html. Sun, T. (1994), ‘Initial estimations’, in R.D. Sawyer (1994), Art of War, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, p. 167. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) includes the Army (PLAA), the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), the People’s Liberation Army Second Artillery Force (PLASAF), as well as the People’s Armed Police (PAP), Reserves, and People’s Militia. Chinese thinking on integrated network electronic warfare (INEW) perceives cyberspace and computer network operations, including cyberwar, as fully integrated with electronic warfare (EW) and cyberspace as part of the EM spectrum. State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China (2015), China’s Military Strategy, accessed 22 May 2015 at http://english.chinamil.com.cn/newschannels/2015-05/26/content_6507716.htm. Glaser, B. (2015), ‘Conflict in the South China Sea – Contingency Planning Memorandum update’, Council on Foreign Relations, accessed 15 May 2015 at http:// www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/conflict-south-china-sea/p36377; Panda, A. (2015), ‘Obama: Senkakus covered under the US–Japan security treaty’, The Diplomat, accessed 15 May 2015 at http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/obama-senkakus-coveredunder-us-japan-security-treaty/; Cronin, P.M. (2015), ‘America’s security role in the South China Sea’, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 23 July, accessed 28 July 2015 at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/ subcommittee-hearing-america-s-security-role-south-china-sea; Thayer, C. (2014), ‘Analysing the US–Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement’, The Diplomat, accessed 15 May 2015 at http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/analyzing-the-usphilippines-enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement/; Taiwan Relations Act, 1 January 1979, Section 3302, ‘Implementation of United States policy with regard to Taiwan’, accessed 15 May 2015 at http://www.taiwandocuments.org/tra01.htm#3302. Bush III, R.C. (2013), ‘China’s response to collapse in North Korea’, accessed 16 May 2015 at http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2013/11/14-china-northkorea-collapse-bush. Blasko, D.J. (2007), ‘PLA ground force modernization and mission diversification: underway in all military regions’, in R. Kamphausen and A. Scobell (eds), Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, pp. 281–2. State Council Information Office, China’s Military Strategy. Blasko, D.J. (2015), ‘The 2015 Chinese defense white paper on strategy in perspective – maritime missions require a change in the PLA mindset’, China Brief, 15 (12), accessed 2 June 2015 at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/ single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43974&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash =929d41649db48810d4e9257ba57d1744#.VcGC2k0w-Ul.

448 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

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Handbook of US–China relations Hartnett, D.M. (2009), ‘The PLA’s domestic and foreign activities and orientation’, testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 4 March, Washington, DC. Blasko, ‘The 2015 Chinese defense white paper on strategy in perspective’. US Office of Secretary of the Defense (2012), Annual Report to Congress – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2012, p. 3. Peng, G. and Y. Yao (2005), The Science of Military Strategy, 1st edition, Beijing: Military Science Press, p. 426. Fravel, T.M. (2015), ‘China’s new military strategy: “winning informationized local wars”’, China Brief, 15 (13), accessed 19 June 2015 at http://www.jamestown.org/ programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=44072&tx_ttnews%5Bback Pid%5D=789&no_cache=1#.Vasyzk0w-Uk. Lai, S.X. (2015), ‘From expediency to the strategic Chinese dream?’, Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) [blog], 5 August, accessed 7 August 2015 at http://cimsec.org/chinese-military-strategy-week-moving-expediency-towardchinese-dream/17714. State Council Information Office, China’s Military Strategy. C4ISR refers to command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Nurkin, T. (2015), ‘Catching up – briefing: China’s space programme’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 52 (31), 22–7. US Office of Secretary of the Defense (2014), ‘Counterspace’, in Annual Report to Congress – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, p. 40. Pollpeter, K., E. Anderson, J. Wilson and Y. Fan (2015), China Dream, Space Dream – China’s Progress in Space Technologies and Implications for the United States, Washington, DC: US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, pp. 11–16, 86. Peng, G. and Y. Yao (2013), The Science of Military Strategy, 3rd edition, Beijing: Military Science Press. See also McReynolds, J. (2015), ‘China’s evolving perspectives on network warfare: lessons from the Science of Military Strategy’, China Brief, 15 (8), 16 April. Fritz, J. (2013), ‘The semantics of cyber warfare’, East Asian Security Symposium and Conference Proceedings, Beijing, November, accessed 3 August 2015 at http://epublications.bond.edu.au/eassc_publications/42. Costello, J. (2015), ‘Chinese views on the information “center of gravity”: space, cyber and electronic warfare’, in 2015 Annual China Defense and Security Conference, Proceedings, Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, 12 March, p. 41. Ibid., p. 39. Quoted in Thomas, T.L. (2005), ‘Chinese and American network warfare’, Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 38, 77. Wortzel, L.M. (2013), The Dragon Extends its Reach – Chinese Military Power Goes Global, Washington, DC: Potomac Books, p. 142. Fritz, J. (2013) ‘Satellite hacking: a guide for the perplexed’, Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies, 10 (1), Article 3. Davis, M.T., D. Barno and N. Bensahel (2015), ‘The enduring need for electronic attack in air operations’, Policy Brief, Center for a New American Security, January, accessed 7 August 2015 at http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/ CNAS_ElectronicWarfare_DavisBarnoBensahel.pdf. Walling, E.M. (2001), ‘High power microwaves and modern warfare’, in W.C. Martel (ed.), The Technological Arsenal – Emerging Defense Capabilities, Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, pp. 90–103. Peng and Yao, The Science of Military Strategy, 1st edition, pp. 413–14.

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Friedberg, A.L. (2014), Beyond Air-Sea Battle – The Debate over US Military Strategy in Asia, London: International Institute of Strategic Studies. Gormley, D.M., A.S. Erickson and J. Yuan (2014) A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier – Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambition, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, pp. 15–23. In Till, G. (2013), Seapower – A Guide for the Twenty First Century, 3rd edition, London: Routledge, p. 153. Pillai, C.M. (2015), ‘Bear, dragon and eagle: Russian, Chinese and U.S. military strategies’, Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) [blog], 4 August, accessed 5 August 2015 at http://cimsec.org/chinese-military-strategy-weekcomparing-russian-chinese-u-s-military-strategies/17803. Ji, Y. (2007) ‘Dealing with the Malacca Dilemma: China’s effort to protect its energy supply’, Strategic Analysis, 31 (3), 467–89. US Energy Information Administration data on China, 4 February 2014, accessed 1 April 2016 at http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/China/china.pdf. In Lanteigne, M. (2008), ‘China’s maritime security and the “Malacca Dilemma”’, Asian Security, 4 (2), 143–61. US Energy Information Administration (2012), ‘World oil transit chokepoints’, 22 August, accessed 1 April 2016 at https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regionstopics.cfm?RegionTopicID=WOTC. See also Kaplan, R.D. (2014), Asia’s Cauldron – The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific, New York: Random House, pp. 9–10. Story, I. (2009), ‘China’s Malacca Dilemma’, China Brief, 6 (8). In Clemens, M. (2015), ‘The Maritime Silk Road and the PLA: Part One’, China Brief, 15 (6), 8. Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron, p. 9. Hammes, T.X. (2012), ‘Offshore control: a proposed strategy for an unlikely conflict’, Strategic Forum, pp. 1–14. Holmes, J.R. and T. Yoshihara (2008), ‘China’s naval ambitions in the Indian Ocean’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 31 (3), 367–94. Yoshihara, T. and J. Holmes (2010), Red Star Over the Pacific – China’s Rise and the Challenge of US Maritime Strategy, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, p. 7. O’Connor, S. (2014), ‘PLAN to get first homegrown carrier by 2017, claims local media’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 14 September; Erickson, A. (2014), ‘Asia get ready: is this China’s vision of future aircraft carrier designs?’, The National Interest, 8 December, accessed 7 August 2015 at http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/asiaget-ready-china%E2%80%99s-vision-future-aircraft-carrier-11812. Axe, D. (2014), ‘Here’s an even better look at China’s giant new cruiser – Type 055 details emerging’, War is Boring [blog], 4 May, accessed 7 August 2015 at https://medium.com/war-is-boring/heres-an-even-better-look-at-chinas-giant-newcruiser-d3a03bbbbdb9; Naval Open Source INTelligence (2015), ‘PLA could be developing two versions of Type 055 destroyer’, 6 April [blog], accessed 1 April 2016 at http://nosint.blogspot.co.uk/2015/04/pla-could-be-developing-two-versionsof.html; Axe, D. (2014), ‘Looks like China’s building a giant new warship – possible missile cruiser could outweigh rival surface combatants’, War is Boring [blog], 6 April, accessed 7 August 2015 at https://medium.com/war-is-boring/looks-likechinas-building-a-giant-new-warship-b88670ed99b. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, p. 10; Office of Naval Intelligence (2015), The PLA Navy – New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century, Washington, DC: US Department of Defence, pp. 15–17. Erickson, A.S. (2015), Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Hearing on America’s Security Role in

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2015 at http://aviationweek.com/defense/future-bombers-under-study-china-andrussia; Lamothe, D. (2013), ‘Is this China’s new stealth bomber?’ Foreign Policy, 30 December, accessed 7 August 2015 at http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/30/is-thischinas-new-stealth-bomber/; Fisher, R.D. (2014), ‘China’s NDU recommends 400 strong Y-20 fleet’, Defenceradar News, 28 July, accessed 1 April 2016 http:// defenceradar.com/chinas-ndu-recommends-400-strong-y-20-fleet/. Stokes, M.A. (2013) ‘The Second Artillery Force and the future of long-range precision strike’, in A.J. Tellis and T. Tanner (eds), Strategic Asia 2012–13 – China’s Military Challenge, Washington, DC: National Bureau of Research, p. 155. Schreer, B. (2014), ‘The strategic implications of China’s hypersonic missile test’, The Strategist, 8 January, accessed 7 August 2015 at http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ the-strategic-implications-of-chinas-hypersonic-missile-test/; Davies, A. (2014) ‘Hypersonic anti-ship missiles – incoming?’, The Strategist, 28 January, accessed 7 August 2015 at http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/hypersonic-anti-ship-missilesincoming/. US Department of Defense, Sustaining US Global Leadership, p. 10; see also Schreer, B. (2013), Planning the Unthinkable War – ‘Air-Sea Battle’ and its Implications for Australia, Strategy, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, p. 21; US Department of Defense (2012), Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), Version 1.0, 17 January; Van Tol, J., M. Gunzinger, A. Krepinevich and J. Thomas (2010), AirSea Battle – A Point of Departure Operational Concept, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, p. 14. Martinage, R. (2014), Toward a New Offset Strategy – Exploiting US Long-term Advantages to Restore US Global Power Projection Capability, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. In Friedman, N. (2015), ‘Sharpening the tactical picture’, US Naval Institute Proceedings Magazine, 141 (4), 90–91. Morris, T.S., M. van Driel and B. Dries et al. (2015), ‘Securing operational access: evolving the Air-Sea Battle Concept’, The National Interest, March–April, accessed 3 August 2015 at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/securing-operational-accessevolving-the-air-sea-battle-12219. Davies, A. and M. Thomson (2015), ‘Ships ahoy!’, The Strategist, 4 August, accessed 5 August 2015 at http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ships-ahoy/. US–China Economic and Security Review Commission (2015), ‘Hearing on China and the evolving security dynamics in East Asia’, p. 328. Krepon, M. (2014), ‘Responding to China’s counter-space capabilities’, Spotlight, 30 January, accessed 5 August 2015 at http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/respondingto-chinas-counter-space-capabilities/.

PART VI CONCLUSIONS

24. US–China outlook: pragmatism or confrontation Robert Sutter

The chapters of this book show an erratic pattern in US–China relations in the period after the Cold War featuring times of acute tension and acrimony and times of close engagement and cooperation. During the first half of this period, the United States appeared to hold the stronger hand in the relationship, with US policy initiatives often offensive to China, prompting Chinese reactions. In some instances, such as China’s militant behavior during the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1995–96 and its response to the US bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade in 1999, the Chinese reactions were strong and violent, compelling substantial adjustments in US policy. Later, the United States declined as it became bogged down in protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and it faced acute economic problems during the global economic crisis and recession beginning in 2008. By contrast, China avoided costly international obligations and sustained strong economic growth during the world recession. Against this background, China began a new phase in its foreign policy, which is featured prominently in the international activism of current Chinese President Xi Jinping. China took a series of bold initiatives designed to advance control of disputed territory in the East and South China Sea in coercive ways short of using military force. The moves came at the expense of several neighbors and at the expense of US interests and influence in regional affairs. In 2010, China pressed the US government harder than in the recent past in seeking concessions on issues ranging from Taiwan to Tibet. More recently, it launched prominent trade and investment mechanisms in Asia and more broadly that excluded the United States and competed with US-backed regional and international economic and financial institutions. President Xi Jinping and other top Chinese leaders ignored the complaints of the US president about Chinese practices. The complaints included China bullying its neighbors; engaging in cybertheft of economic property and other egregious violations of international economic norms; avoiding international responsibilities; and establishing rules and economic arrangements in Asia and the world at odds with the interests of the United 455

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States and other nations dependent on free trade and economic interchange. Lower-level officers and official Chinese media rebuked and dismissed the US complaints, and the offensive Chinese behavior continued.1 President Richard Nixon and Chairman Mao Zedong established a strategic understanding between the two powers, focused on dealing with the danger of an expanding Soviet Union. US–China relations were often troubled in this period, but the common concern with the USSR kept in check the wide range of Sino–US differences. The end of the Cold War coincided with the Tiananmen crackdown and the end of the Soviet Union. Collectively they shattered the foundation of Sino–US cooperation. Subsequently, officials and prominent experts in the United States and China at different times argued in favor of new overall frameworks for the US–China relationship that would allow the two powers to cooperate more closely and manage their differences more effectively. These frameworks failed to be developed. Examples included the Clinton administration’s effort to establish a strategic partnership with China that was abandoned by the incoming Bush administration; the Bush administration’s call on China to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in international affairs that met with an unfavorable response in China; and US calls for the Obama administration to establish a closer ‘G-2’ relationship with China as the key element in world politics, which met with unfavorable responses from China in particular. Most recently, a China-backed framework to establish a ‘new type of great power relationship’ with the United States seemed to be failing amid US suspicions that China was playing a double game in encouraging high-level bilateral discourse while pursing policies undermining US interests.2 The main reasons for these failures are strong and enduring Sino–US differences. As shown in the chapters of this book, these differences are often deeply rooted in both countries’ views of their history, interests and values. Adding to the negative mix is the state-fostered Chinese elite and public view of foreign affairs and particularly their negative view of the United States. China has a unique sense of self-righteous exceptionalism in foreign affairs that will not change easily. The United States is also known for exceptionalism in international affairs.3 And both countries are big – the world’s most powerful; their approaches to each other will not be easily changed by smaller powers or other outside forces. Under these circumstances, aspirations for major breakthrough in relations through close engagement and mutual reassurance often seemed unrealistic. Practice showed the wisdom of seeking more modest expectations of cooperation based on pragmatic decisions by leaders on both

US–China outlook: pragmatism or confrontation 457 sides dealing with their respective constraints and priorities. Such behavior emerged at the start of the twenty-first century after a decade of considerable turmoil and periodic dangerous confrontation. China at this time broadened efforts to reassure neighbors that China’s rise was not a threat. Chinese officials put aside strident criticism of the United States in favor of a focused effort to reassure the latter. They said that the alternative risked the United States and other concerned powers working together to resist China’s rise; they said such experience of rising powers in the twentieth century led to their destruction. On the US side, the initial toughness toward China of the George W. Bush administration subsided with 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States and later developments. As the United States became preoccupied with conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, constructive interaction with China became more important. There followed several years of generally cooperative relations. The two sides dealt with differences in a burgeoning array of official dialogues and worked together to address such sensitive issues as North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and efforts by Taiwan’s president to promote greater separation and independence of Taiwan from China. The Obama government strove to preserve the overall positive momentum in US–China relations seen in the latter Bush years.4 The pragmatic cooperation in US–China relations seen in this decade was based on particular circumstances: + Both administrations benefitted from positive engagement in various areas. Such engagement supported their mutual interests in stability in the Asia-Pacific, a peaceful Korean Peninsula, and a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue; US and Chinese leaders recognized the need to cooperate to foster global peace and prosperity, to advance world environmental conditions, and to deal with climate change and non-proliferation. + Both administrations saw that the two powers had become so interdependent that emphasizing the negatives in their relationship would hurt the other side but also would hurt themselves. Such interdependence was particularly strong in Sino–US economic relations. + Both leaderships were preoccupied with a long list of urgent domestic and foreign priorities; in this situation, one of the last things they sought was a serious confrontation in relations with one another.

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Relations deteriorated over trade and related economic policies during the prolonged US presidential primaries and election campaign in 2012. China became more assertive in support of its interests at odds with the United States, notably claims to disputed territory along its rim, especially in the East and South China Seas. The Obama government focused on a new approach known as the ‘pivot’ to Asia and later as the ‘rebalance’ in the broad Asia-Pacific region that had military, economic and diplomatic dimensions at odds with Chinese interests. US–China relations became overtly competitive. Given its many preoccupations at home and abroad, the Obama government seemed disinclined for the rest of its term to depart from the existing path of pragmatic engagement with China. Assessments were much less certain of the actions and intentions of the new Chinese leadership of Xi Jinping.5

XI JINPING’S FOREIGN POLICY: IMAGE AND REALITY Xi’s government undertook a major shift in Chinese foreign policy. The caution and low profile of the previous leaders were viewed with disfavor; Chinese policy and behavior became much more active, assertive and prominent. Chinese reassurance and restraint in dealing with the United States and others were played down; officials in China said they conveyed Chinese weakness to Asian rivals and the United States. The string of Chinese actions and initiatives were truly impressive: + With full support of senior leaders and nationalistic protesters, the government orchestrated the largest mass demonstration against a foreign target ever seen in Chinese history (against Japan over disputed islands in September 2012). It was followed by Chinese pressure on Japan unseen since World War II. + China used a range of coercive and intimidating means to extend control of disputed territory at neighbors’ expense. Chinese officials dismissed and rebuffed complaints that their actions upset regional stability and seriously undermined neighbors and the United States. + Despite escalating complaints, the new Chinese government also continued manipulative economic practices, cybertheft, and reluctance to contribute regional and global common goods. + China used its large foreign exchange reserves and trading capacity to develop international banks and to support often grandiose Chinese plans for Asian and global investments, loans and trade

US–China outlook: pragmatism or confrontation 459 areas that excluded the United States and countered US initiatives and support for existing international economic institutions. President Obama voiced unusual public complaints about China’s behavior that were ignored by President Xi. Xi Jinping tightened political control domestically as China pursued the new foreign policy. The Chinese advances were supported by ever-expanding Chinese capabilities backed by the impressive and growing economic and military power of China. Official Chinese media highlighted Xi’s consolidation of control of party and state leadership as he was depicted in glowing accounts directing multifaceted Chinese initiatives abroad with confidence and authority in pursuit of his broad vision of a unified, powerful and internationally respected China – what Xi and the Chinese publicists called the ‘China Dream’.6 In many respects, recent developments in Chinese foreign relations supported the common view among Chinese and international commentators that China had grown in power and confidence to the point that it could and would pursue a strategy of ever-expanding influence and leadership in Asian and world affairs. The tipping point in the Asian order that many forecast with the United States in decline and China in ascendance was seen to have arrived. The choices for the United States were often depicted in stark terms. The United States was called on by some to gird itself to prepare to resist in a ‘contest for supremacy’. Others saw the need for the United States to give way to China’s advance, making a choice that accepted China’s leading power and influence in Asia as the United States pulled away.7 These choices are unattractive. They seem to involve risk of great power war on the one hand or US appeasement on the other. Fortunately, a close look at the circumstances that influence Chinese foreign policy and behavior explained below offsets the predictions of a power shift, with US leadership being replaced by a confident China in the dominant position. Despite a nascent personality cult supported by the uniformly laudatory treatment of Xi Jinping and his actions in Chinese media and propaganda outlets over the past three years, the realities of power and influence continue to constrain Chinese policy actions. Existing circumstances support the argument here that despite its reputed resolve and frequent bluster, Xi Jinping’s government cannot risk a serious confrontation with the United States. For these reasons, Xi’s China is seen likely to complement the Obama government in avoiding mutually damaging confrontation in the period ahead.

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CONSTRAINING CHINA This discussion of constraints on the Chinese challenges to US leadership focuses on domestic preoccupations, strong Chinese interdependence with the United States, and China’s continued weak position relative to the United States in Asia and the world. The Asian countries on China’s periphery are historically where China has exerted greatest influence; they have long been the arenas of the majority share of Chinese foreign policy effort. This area is where China interacts most with the USA, the world’s remaining superpower. It encompasses sovereignty issues (e.g., Taiwan, other bordering territories and seas) and security issues (e.g., current US and past US or Soviet ‘encirclement’ or ‘containment’) that have been uppermost in modern Chinese foreign policy priorities. The Chinese military plays a major role in Asia, in contrast to other world areas where its role is minimal. Asian stability is essential for smooth Chinese economic development, the linchpin in sustaining the continued political legitimacy of the ruling Communist Party regime. Chinese involvement in other regions has focused in recent years on comparatively narrowly defined trade and related economic interests. Asia’s greater economic importance to China is underlined by the fact that even though China has become Africa’s largest trading partner, China’s trade with the Republic of Korea (South Korea) alone far surpasses its overall trade with Africa.8

DOMESTIC PREOCCUPATIONS9 There is a general consensus among specialists in China and abroad about some of the key objectives of Chinese leaders. They want to sustain one-party rule, and to do so they require continued economic growth that advances the material benefits of the Chinese people and assures general public support and legitimacy for the communist government. Such economic growth and continued one-party rule require stability at home and abroad, especially in nearby Asia where conflict and confrontation would have a serious negative impact on Chinese economic growth. At the same time, the need for vigilance in protecting Chinese security and sovereignty remains among the top leadership concerns as evidenced by the long and costly build-up of military forces to deal with a Taiwan contingency involving the United States and more recent use of various means of state power to advance territorial claims in nearby disputed seas. There is less clarity among specialists as to where Chinese international ambitions for regional and global leadership fit in

US–China outlook: pragmatism or confrontation 461 the current priorities of Beijing’s leaders, but there is little doubt that domestic concerns get overall priority. On this basis, analysts see a wide range of domestic concerns preoccupying the Xi Jinping leadership. They involve the following: + weak leadership legitimacy highly dependent on how the leaders’ performance is seen at any given time. + Pervasive corruption viewed as sapping public support and undermining administrative efficiency. + Widening income gaps posing challenges to the communist regime ostensibly dedicated to advancing the disadvantaged. + Widespread social turmoil reportedly involving 100 000–200 000 mass incidents annually that are usually directed at government officials or aspects of state policies. Managing such incidents and related domestic control measures involves budget outlays greater than China’s impressive national defense budget.10 + A highly resource-intensive economy (e.g., China uses four times the amount of oil to advance its economic growth to a certain level than does the United States, even though the United States is notoriously inefficient and arguably wasteful in how it uses oil).11 + Enormous and rapidly growing environmental damage is being done in China as a result of such intensive resource use. + The need for major reform of an economic model in use in China for over three decades that is widely seen to have reached a point of diminishing returns. The Chinese leadership set forth in November 2013 an ambitious and wide-ranging agenda of economic and related domestic reforms. These proposed actions will deal with the problems noted above, among other things. How the more than 60 clusters of a couple of hundred measures set forth for reform will in fact be implemented and how they will be made to interact effectively with one another are widely seen to require a strong and sustained effort of top Chinese leaders, probably for many years.12 Under these circumstances, those same leaders would seem unlikely to seek confrontation with the United States. Xi Jinping’s accommodation of President Obama in meeting in California in 2013 and his leadership’s continued public emphasis on the positive in US–China relations in seeking a new kind of major power relationship underlines this trend. Xi has also presided over China’s greater assertiveness on maritime territorial issues and other practices opposed by the United States, but thus far the Chinese probes and actions generally have been crafted to avoid direct confrontation with the superpower.

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Whether or not the many domestic priorities preoccupying Chinese leaders noted above can be equated with President Obama’s domestic preoccupations arguing for a continued pragmatic US approach to China remains to be seen. On balance, they incline Chinese leaders toward caution and pragmatism.

STRONG INTERDEPENDENCE The second set of constraints on tough Chinese measures against the United States involves strong and ever-growing interdependence in US–China relations. As reviewed in earlier chapters, growing economic interdependence has reinforced each government’s tendency to emphasize the positive and pursue constructive relations with one another. A pattern of dualism arose in twenty-first-century US–China relations. The pattern involved constructive and cooperative engagement on the one hand and contingency planning or hedging on the other. It reflected a mix of converging and competing interests and prevailing leadership suspicions and cooperation. This dualism showed as each government used engagement to build positive and cooperative ties while at the same time seeking to use these ties to build interdependence and webs of relationships that had the effect of constraining the other power from taking actions that opposed its interests. While the analogy is not precise, the policies of engagement pursued by the United States and China toward one another featured respective ‘Gulliver strategies’ that were designed to tie down the aggressive, assertive, and other negative policy tendencies of the other power through webs of interdependence in bilateral and multilateral relationships.13 The power of interdependence and dualism to constrain assertive and disruptive actions has limits. Changing international circumstances mix with patriotic and often strongly nationalistic sentiment among Chinese elite and public opinion and expanding Chinese military capabilities and coercive power to support stronger Chinese measures to protect and advance Chinese interests in the face of perceived outside intrusions and pressures. Chinese leaders adjust to such changing circumstances, weighing in each instance the costs and benefits of maintaining or altering policies.14 During the previous decade, Chinese leaders generally were seen as continuing to hedge their bets as they endeavored to persuade the United States and other important world powers of China’s avowed determination to pursue the road of peace and development. Such Chinese

US–China outlook: pragmatism or confrontation 463 international positivism not only fostered a beneficent image for China, it also served to foster norms and practices in regional and international organizations and circumstances that created a buffer against suspected US efforts to ‘contain’ China and to impede China’s rising power. Roughly consistent with the image of the ‘Gulliver strategy’ noted earlier, they fostered webs of interdependent relationships that tied down and hampered unilateral or other actions by the US superpower that could intrude on important Chinese interests in Asian and world affairs.15 In sum, the US approach to China sought engagement for its own sake, but it also sought to intertwine China in what the Council on Foreign Relations called a ‘web’ woven by the United States and its allies and associates to ensure that rising China conformed more to international norms backed by the United States as it rises in world prominence. For its part, China deliberately built interdependence with the United States and with regional and international organizations involving the United States as a means to buffer against and constrain possibly harsh US measures against China. As time passed, both sides became increasingly aware of how their respective interests were tied to the well-being and success of the other, thereby limiting the tendency of the past to apply pressure on one another. In effect, interdependence worked to constrain both sides against taking forceful action against each other.

CHINA’S INSECURE POSITION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC The third set of constraints on tough Chinese measures against the United States involves China’s insecure position in the Asia-Pacific region. This factor does not receive the attention it deserves. Major US government and non-government studies of China’s military challenge to the United States do not consider how China’s insecure position in Asia reduces the likelihood that Beijing would seek a military challenge and confrontation with the United States.16 Even after over two decades of repeated efforts, China’s rise in the region remains encumbered and has a long way to go to challenge US regional leadership. The Xi Jinping government’s assertive policies towards its neighbors have made the situation worse. The recent Chinese setbacks are not offset by Xi’s ambitious economic investment and financing plans, which have notable weaknesses of their own. Against this background, without a secure foundation in nearby Asia, China will be inclined to avoid serious confrontation with the United States.17 Among Chinese strengths in the Asia-Pacific region are the following:

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+ China’s position as the leading trading partner with most neighboring countries, the heavy investment many of those countries make in China, and recent growth of Chinese investment in nearby Asia; + China’s growing web of road, rail, river, electric power, pipeline, and other linkages promoting economic and other interchange with nearby countries; + China’s prominent leadership attention and active diplomacy in interaction with neighboring countries both bilaterally and multilaterally; and + China’s expanding military capabilities and related civilian security capabilities. Nevertheless, these strengths are offset by various weaknesses and limitations. First, some Chinese practices alienate nearby governments, which broadly favor key aspects of US regional leadership. Thus, leadership in the region involves often costly and risky efforts to support common goals involving regional security and development. In contrast, Chinese behavior shows a well-developed tendency to avoid risks, costs, or commitments to the common good unless there is adequate benefit for a narrow set of tangible Chinese interests. Although it has over US$3.5 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, China continues to run a substantial trade surplus and to accumulate large foreign exchange reserves supported by currency policies widely seen to disadvantage trading competitors in the Asia-Pacific and elsewhere. Despite its economic progress and role as an international creditor comparable to international financial institutions, China annually receives over US$6 billion a year in foreign assistance loans and lesser grants that presumably would otherwise be available for other deserving clients in the Asia-Pacific and the world. It carefully adheres to UN budget formulas that keep Chinese dues and other payments remarkably low. It tends to assure that its contributions to the broader good of the international order (e.g., extensive use of Chinese personnel in UN peacekeeping operations) are paid for by others. At bottom, the ‘win-win’ principle that undergirds recent Chinese foreign policy means that Chinese officials make sure that Chinese policies and practices provide a ‘win’ for generally narrowly defined national interests of China. They eschew the kinds of risky and costly commitments for the broader regional and global common good that Asian leaders have come to look to US leadership to provide. A major reason for China’s continued reluctance to undertake costs and commitments for the sake of the common good of the Asia-Pacific and broader international affairs is the long array of domestic challenges and preoccupations faced by Chinese leaders. The actual impact of these

US–China outlook: pragmatism or confrontation 465 domestic issues on the calculations of Chinese leaders is hard to measure with any precision, though their overall impact appears substantial. Second, recent episodes of Chinese assertiveness toward several neighbors and the United States have put nearby governments on guard and weakened Chinese regional influence. They have reminded China’s neighbors that the 60-year history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has much more often than not featured China acting in disruptive and domineering ways in the region.18 Notably, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping repeatedly conflicted with and invaded neighboring countries either with Chinese forces or with insurgents organized, armed and trained by China. Third, the record of China’s success in reassuring neighbors and advancing influence in the Asia-Pacific in the post–Cold War period – a period now extending 25 years – is mediocre. China faces major impediments, many homegrown. China’s long-standing practice of building an image of consistent and righteous behavior in foreign affairs blocks realistic appraisal of the wary view of China held by officials in most neighboring countries and the United States. The latter countries fear another in the long series of historical shifts in Chinese policy away from the current emphasis on reassurance and toward past practices of intimidation and aggression. Chinese elite and public opinion is well conditioned by China’s extensive education-propaganda apparatus; they know little about this negative Chinese legacy of past widespread intimidation and aggression. Absorbed in Chinese publicity regarding China’s allegedly exceptional position of consistent, moral and benign foreign behavior, Chinese elites and public opinion have a poor appreciation of regional and US concerns. Elite and public opinion restricts more realistic Chinese policies when dealing with disputes and differences with neighbors and the United States. Most notably, such opinion tends to support Chinese government’s exceptional position among major powers of having never acknowledged making a mistake in foreign policy. As a result, when China encounters a dispute with neighbors, the fault never lies with China. If Beijing chooses not to blame the neighbor, its default position is to blame larger forces, usually involving the United States.19

MEASURING CHINA’S RELATIONSHIPS20 The Xi government’s policies for two years drove relations with Japan to their lowest point since World War II. Japan’s effective firmness backed with stronger support from an increasingly concerned United States saw

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Xi change course – predictably without acknowledging any failure of past policy – in seeking better relations with Japan in 2015.21 Xi’s policies dealing with the conundrum in North Korea effectively drove relations with Pyongyang to their lowest point ever, underlining China’s inability in securing its interests in this critically important area for China. Most Southeast Asian nations didn’t challenge China publicly over the South China Sea, but Chinese expansion put the United States on alert; it prepared militarily with Japan, Australia and key Southeast Asian governments. The Xi government’s mix of economic and political overtures with military force demonstrations drove New Delhi to advance ties with the United States, Japan, and Australia to protect against China. Additionally, Taiwan and Hong Kong experienced unanticipated mass demonstrations and political developments sharply at odds with Chinese interests; in neither case did Xi’s China show a smooth path for advancing Chinese influence and control. The Xi Jinping government had an easier time improving relations with various Silk Road and other initiatives in Central Asia and in improving relations with Russia now isolated from the West. Overall it was clear that China’s position in nearby Asia declined markedly in large measure because of Xi’s overreaching assertiveness.

SHORTCOMINGS IN CHINA’S ECONOMIC INFLUENCE IN ASIA AND THE WORLD Viewing worsening relations along the rim of Asia and aware that flattening growth of Chinese foreign trade reduces Chinese international influence, the Xi Jinping government emphasizes to Asian and other developing countries massive plans for Chinese investment and financing abroad. The initiatives modify strong ‘going out’ policies of Chinese investment and financing during the previous decade. The latter saw Chinese-built infrastructure to access needed raw materials. The new investment and financing push enables construction abroad of Chinese supplied infrastructure by the enormous excess capacity of Chinese companies made idle inside China because of recent economic reforms.22 Chinese officials and lauding commentary portray enormous Chinese largess, unprecedented in the annals of world affairs. The results are multi-billion dollar commitments to various Chinese Silk Road funds, new development banks led by China and regional initiatives in Africa and Latin America. China pledged infrastructure in unstable Pakistan

US–China outlook: pragmatism or confrontation 467 valued at US$46 billion; a responsible Chinese official said Beijing’s overall plan for investment and financing in Africa over the next decade amounted to US$1 trillion; and Xi personally pledged investment in Latin America of US$250 billion over the next decade. Foreign commentary often echoed Chinese assessments in seeing Beijing as the dominant leader of international economic relations in Asia and much of the developing world.23 In contrast, a closer look shows the trade and economic influence of Xi Jinping’s China full of gaps and with less impact than might be expected. China’s trade is over 20 percent of the trade with South Korea and Australia, but neither country is subject to Chinese dominance. China’s important but lower percentage of trade in developing countries in Asia as well as in Africa and Latin America usually makes China just one among several important foreign actors in these countries. China’s role as an investor in all these regions is surprisingly small especially in view of all the attention Chinese leaders have given for over a decade to plans for multi-billion dollar investments. China accounts for about 10 percent of the foreign investment in Southeast Asia and about 5 percent in both Africa and Latin America.24 A major weakness of the Xi government’s pledges of large sums of investment and loans is that China often implements only a fraction of its very ambitious pledges. Promises of large Chinese investments and loans to Pakistan and Indonesia this year came with reports that China had actually implemented less than 10 percent of the multi-billion dollar pledges made to each country over the previous decade.25 The reasons for poor follow-through are not hard to find, especially in unstable or economically poorly endowed developing countries. Past practice showed multi-billion dollar Chinese projects stopped, put on hold or destroyed in numerous countries, notably Afghanistan, Brazil, Greece, Mexico, Myanmar, Nigeria, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and throughout the turbulent Middle East and North African region. A responsible Chinese official averred that 80 percent of proposed Chinese mining deals (an important feature of Chinese economic interaction in developing countries) fail to be implemented;26 another Chinese specialist advised that Chinese overseas investment ventures more often than not were losing money.27 Whatever influence China gains with economic initiatives are often diluted by negative reactions to corrupt practices and non-transparent agreements with unaccountable foreign governments. Foreign labor unions and other politically active constituencies resent imported Chinese labor crews, common Chinese violations of international labor standards when employing local workers, and egregious environmental impacts of Chinese development projects. Chinese influence also declines with those

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many developing countries facing demands for repayment of large Chinese loans from Chinese government creditors determined to be paid back.28

AROUSED UNITED STATES Xi Jinping’s dismissive and seemingly cavalier treatment of US complaints adds to his image in China as a decisive and forceful leader. But it reinforces US suspicion and strengthens resolve to counter Chinese advances. It is no coincidence that China’s influence in Japan, Taiwan, the South China Sea, Australia and India has declined as the United States has enhanced ties with countries along China’s rim concerned with Xi’s assertiveness. Overall, the Obama government’s rebalance policy and recent US practice mesh well with the interests of the majority of Asia-Pacific governments that seek development in an interdependent world economic order and an uncertain security environment caused notably by China assertiveness. By contrast, China’s mix of demands and self-serving and repeatedly unimplemented economic initiatives often have more negatives than positives for Asia-Pacific governments. A comparison of Chinese policies and practices in the Asia-Pacific with those of the United States underlines how far China has to go despite over two decades of efforts to secure its position in Asia if it intends to be successful in seriously confronting and challenging the United States. Without a secure periphery, and facing formidable US presence and influence, China almost certainly calculates that challenging the United States poses grave dangers for the PRC regime.29 US weaknesses in the Asia-Pacific included the foreign policies of the George W. Bush administration, which were very unpopular with regional elites and public opinion. As the Barack Obama government has refocused US attention positively on the Asia-Pacific region, regional concerns shifted to worry that US budget difficulties and political gridlock in Washington would undermine the ability of the United States to sustain support for regional responsibilities. As seen in the Obama government’s rebalance policy and in recent US practice, US priorities, behavior and power mesh well with the interests of the majority of Asia-Pacific governments that seek legitimacy through development and nation building in an uncertain security environment and an interdependent world economic order. The drivers of the United States undertaking leadership responsibilities in the Asia-Pacific region remain strong: (1) the region is an area of ever-greater strategic and economic importance for the United States and (2) the United States

US–China outlook: pragmatism or confrontation 469 remains strongly committed to long-standing US goals of supporting stability and balance of power, sustaining smooth economic access, and promoting US values and accepted international norms in this increasingly important world area. The basic determinants of US strength and influence in the AsiaPacific region involve the following factors:30 Security In most of Asia, governments are strong and viable and are able to make the decisions that determine the direction of foreign affairs. In general, officials see their governments’ legitimacy and success resting on nation building and economic development, which require a stable and secure international environment. Unfortunately, Asia is not particularly stable, and most regional governments are privately wary of and tend not to trust each other. As a result, they look to the United States to provide the security they need. They recognize that the US security role is very expensive and involves great risk, including large-scale casualties if necessary. They also recognize that neither China nor any other Asian power or coalition of powers is able or willing to undertake even a fraction of these risks, costs, and responsibilities. Economic The nation-building priority of most Asian governments depends importantly on export-oriented growth. Much of Chinese and Asian trade heavily depends on exports to developed countries, notably the United States. The United States has run a massive trade deficit with China, and a total annual trade deficit with Asia valued at over US$400 billion. Asian government officials recognize that China, which runs an overall trade surplus, and other trading partners of Asia are unwilling and unable to bear even a fraction of the cost of such large trade deficits, which nonetheless are very important for Asian governments. Government Engagement The Bush administration was generally effective in interaction with Asia’s powers. The Obama government has built on these strengths. The Obama government’s wide-ranging rebalancing with regional governments and multilateral organizations has a scope going from India to the Pacific Island states to Korea and Japan. Its emphasis on consultation and inclusion of international stakeholders before coming to policy decisions

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on issues of importance to Asia and the Pacific has also been broadly welcomed and stands in contrast with the previously perceived unilateralism of the Bush government. Meanwhile, the US Pacific Command and other US military commands and security and intelligence organizations have been at the edge of wide-ranging and growing US efforts to build and strengthen webs of military and related intelligence and security relationships throughout the region. Non-government Engagement and Immigration The United States for decades reaching back to past centuries has engaged the Asia-Pacific through business, religious, educational, media and other interchange. Such active non-government interaction puts the United States in a unique position and reinforces overall US influence.31 Meanwhile, 50 years of generally color-blind US immigration policy since the ending of discriminatory US restrictions on Asian immigration in 1965 has resulted in the influx of millions of Asia-Pacific migrants who call the United States home and who interact with their countries of origin in ways that undergird and reflect well on the US position in the region. Asia-Pacific Contingency Planning Part of the reason for the success of US efforts to build webs of security-related and other relationships with Asia-Pacific countries has to do with active contingency planning by many Asia-Pacific governments. As power relations change in the region, notably on account of China’s rise, regional governments generally seek to work positively and pragmatically with rising China on the one hand, but on the other hand they seek the reassurance of close security, intelligence and other ties with the United States in case rising China shifts from its current avowed benign approach to one of greater assertiveness or dominance. Given recent Chinese demands, coercion and intimidation, the AsiaPacific governments’ interest in closer ties with the United States meshed well with the Obama government’s engagement with regional governments and multilateral organizations. The US concern to maintain stability while fostering economic growth overlapped constructively with the priorities of the vast majority of regional governments as they pursued their respective nation-building agendas.

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CONCLUSION The circumstances discussed above underline the judgment of this chapter that China remains constrained in the Asia-Pacific region and for other important reasons; it is not in a position to confront the United States. The circumstances argue in favor of a forecast of China more likely to follow pragmatic practices complementing those of the Obama government, thereby avoiding serious confrontation in Sino–US relations. The foreign policy bluster of the Chinese government under Xi Jinping may continue, but so will the constraining power realities that will rein in Chinese international overreaching. The growing debate in the United States about how to deal with China will continue and may grow with more Chinese assertiveness. Most of the discussion calls on the United States to go further than existing Obama government policy in showing China that its behavior will not be without negative consequences for China.32 There are varying paths proposed.33 The strong US position in Asia and how it might be enhanced provides an important foundation to encourage China to curb assertiveness and return to a more cooperative policy with the United States, seen in the first decade of this century. The origins of that period of moderation over ten years ago came in the early part of the George W. Bush administration after a period of Chinese assertiveness and challenge of the United States in the latter 1990s regarding Taiwan, missile defense, the Middle East and other issues. It was prompted by assessments of US power and other circumstances causing China to review the negative consequences of China’s past confrontations with neighbors and the United States; China was better off in pursuing a more pragmatic policy to reassure the United States.34 The Xi Jinping government has publicly put aside such reassurance as it pursues national, regional and global ambitions in line with the ‘China Dream’. To get China to return to such a pragmatic approach of reassurance will require carefully crafted demonstrations of US influence and power. To repeat the point above, the existing US situation in Asia today provides a good foundation for such efforts to influence and shape China’s rise in directions compatible with US interests.35

NOTES 1.

Sutter, R. (2015), The United States and Asia, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 297–316; Johnson, C. (2014), Decoding China’s Emerging ‘Great Power’ Strategy in Asia, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

472 2.

3. 4. 5.

6.

7.

8. 9.

10. 11. 12.

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Handbook of US–China relations Blackwill, R. and A. Tellis (2015), Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China, Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations; Shambaugh, D. (ed.) (2012), Tangled Titans, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield; Economy, E. and A. Segal (2009), ‘The G-2 mirage’, Foreign Affairs, May–June, accessed 5 July 2015 at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64996/elizabeth-c-economy-and-adam-segal/ the-g-2-mirage; Zoellick, R. (2005) ‘Whither China: from membership to responsibility’, speech, 21 September, accessed 5 July 2015 at http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm. Sutter, R. (2013), Foreign Relations of the PRC, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 10–14. Bader, J. (2012), Obama and China’s Rise, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Assessments of US–China relations in this period include Christensen, T. (2015), The China Challenge, New York: W.W. Norton; Roy, D. (2013), Return of the Dragon, New York: Columbia University Press; Hachigian, N. (ed.) (2014), Debating China, New York: Oxford University Press; Bader, Obama and China’s Rise; Indyk, M., K. Lieberthal and M. O’Hanlon (2012), Bending History: Barack Obama’s Foreign Policy, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, pp. 24–69; Lieberthal, K. and J. Wang (2012), Addressing U.S.–China Strategic Distrust, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution; Nathan, A. and A. Scobell (2012), China’s Search for Security, New York: Columbia University Press; Friedberg, A. (2011), A Contest for Supremacy, New York: W.W. Norton. See also Shambaugh, Tangled Titans and Sutter, R. (2013), U.S.–Chinese Relations, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Deng, Y. (2015), ‘China: the post-responsible power’, Washington Quarterly, 37 (4), 117–32; Center for a New American Security (2015), More Willing and Able: Charting China’s International Security Activism, Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security; Johnson, C. (2014), ‘Xi Jinping unveils his foreign policy vision’, Thoughts from the Chairman, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies; Sun, Y. (2014), ‘China’s peaceful rise: peace through strength?’, PacNet Newsletter, No. 25, 31 March. Friedberg, Contest for Supremacy; Nathan, A. (2013), The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power by Hugh White, book review, Foreign Affairs, January– February, accessed 5 July 2015 at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138661/ hugh-white/the-china-choice-why-america-should-share-power. Sutter, Foreign Relations of the PRC, pp. 215–17. See the treatment of these preoccupations in, among others, Lampton, D.M. (2014), Following the Leader: Ruling China from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press; and Nathan and Scobell, China’s Search for Security. Blanchard, B. and J. Ruwitch (2013), ‘China hikes defense budget, to spend more on internal security’, Reuters, 5 March accessed 5 July 2015 at http://www.reuters.com/ article/2013/03/05/us-china-parliament-defence-idUSBRE92403620130305. Feng, Z. (2010), ‘China still a developing nation’, China Daily, 6 May, p. 12. Roach, S. (2013), ‘China’s policy disharmony’, Project Syndicate, 31 December, accessed 5 July 2015 at https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stephen-s– roach-says-that-china-needs-to-face-up-to-the-tradeoff-between-economic-rebalancingand-short-term-growth?barrier=true. This dualism and respective Gulliver strategies are discussed in Sutter, R. (2010), ‘China and U.S. security and economic interests: opportunities and challenges’, in R. Ross and O. Tunsjo (eds), U.S.–China–EU Relations: Managing the New World Order, London: Routledge; Shinn, J. (1996), Weaving the Net, New York: Council on Foreign Relations. Sutter, R. (2012), Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War, 3rd edition, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 3–13.

US–China outlook: pragmatism or confrontation 473 15. 16.

17.

18. 19. 20.

21. 22. 23.

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Saunders, P. (2006), ‘China’s global activism: strategy, drivers, and tools’, Occasional Paper, National Defense University Press Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, DC, 4 June, pp. 8–9. Such assessments of Chinese military capabilities include those by the Department of Defense, the Congressional Research Service (CRS), Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Carnegie Endowment, which portray growing challenges and sometimes dire implications for the United States. The Defense Department assessments are annual; see http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/ Documents/pubs/2013_China_Report_FINAL.pdf. The CRS report is updated regularly; see http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/207068.pdf. The CSIS report may be found at http://csis.org/publication/chinese-military-modernization-and-forcedevelopment-1; the Carnegie report at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/net_ assessment_full.pdf. All accessed 1 April 2016. Manyin, M.E., S. Daggett and B. Dolven et al. (2012), Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s ‘Rebalancing’ Toward Asia, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service; Saunders, P. (2012), The Rebalance to Asia: U.S.–China Relations and Regional Security, Washington, DC: National Defense University, Institute for National Security Studies. This section summarizes findings in Sutter, Foreign Relations of the PRC, pp. 1–26 and 311–27; and Sutter, The United States and Asia, pp. 109–34. For a more detailed explanation of these findings, see Sutter, Foreign Relations of the PRC, pp. 13–14. Rozman, G. (2013), East Asian National Identities: Common Roots and Chinese Exceptionalism, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Johnson, ‘Xi Jinping unveils his foreign policy vision’; Sun, ‘China’s peaceful rise’; Deng, ‘China: the post-responsible power’; Center for a New American Security (2015), More Willing and Able: Charting China’s International Security Activism, Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security. Zhao, S. (2015), ‘Xi and delegates signal “thaw”’, China Daily USA, 25 May, accessed 1 April 2016 at http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-05/25/content_ 20805992.htm. Sutter, R. and C.-H. Huang (2015), ‘China–Southeast Asia relations: ambitious economic initiatives amid boundary disputes’, Comparative Connections, 17 (1), 57–61. China Daily (2015), ‘Recent high-level visits showcase strengthening ties with Latin America’, 27 May, accessed 5 July 2015 at http://wo.chinadaily.com.cn/ view.php?mid=138660&cid=80&isid=1887; The Economist (2015), ‘China’s financial diplomacy: rich but rash’, 31 January, accessed 5 July 2015 at http://www. economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21641259-challenge-world-bank-andimf-china-will-have-imitate-them-rich; Rotbert, R. (2013), ‘China’s $1 trillion for Africa’, China–US Focus, 26 November, accessed 5 July at http://www.china usfocus.com/finance-economy/chinas-1-trillion-for-africa/. ASEAN Statistics (2015), ‘Top ten sources of foreign direct inflows in ASEAN’ (Table 27), accessed 1 April 2016 at http://www.asean.org/storage/2015/09/Table27.pdf; The Economist (2015), ‘China in Africa: one among many’, 17 January, accessed 5 July 2015 at http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/ 21639554-china-has-become-big-africa-now-backlash-one-among-many; Ray, R. and K.P. Gallagher (2014), 2013 China-Latin America Bulletin, p. 12, accessed 5 July 2015 at http://www.bu.edu/pardee/files/2014/01/Economic-Bulletin-2013.pdf. Yulisman, L. (2015), ‘Indonesia: Indonesia to push China to realize investment’, Jakarta Post, 4 April, accessed 5 July 2015 at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/ 2015/04/04/indonesia-push-china-realize-investment.html; Wisnu, D. (2015), ‘Indonesia: Jokowi’s visits to Japan and China: what’s in it for us?’ Jakarta Post, 7 April,

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27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

32. 33. 34. 35.

Handbook of US–China relations accessed 5 July 2015 at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/04/07/jokowi-svisits-japan-and-china-what-s-it-us.html; Brant, P. (2015), ‘China pledges $46 billion for Pakistan, but will Beijing deliver?’, The Interpreter, 21 April, accessed 5 July 2015 at http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/04/21/China-pledges-$46-billionfor-Pakistan-but-will-Beijing-deliver.aspx?COLLCC=866310007&. Toh, H.S. (2013), ‘Chinese investors warned about African mining risks’, South China Morning Post, 16 December, accessed 5 July 2015 at http://www.scmp.com/ business/commodities/article/1381796/chinese-investors-warned-about-african-miningrisks. Huang, Y. (2015), ‘Pragmatism can lead Silk Roads to success’, China Daily, 25 February, accessed 5 July 2015 at http://repubhub.icopyright.net/freePost.act?tag= 3.15484?icx_id=48971175. Field, M. (2015), ‘Uproar in Tonga: China’s “gift” troubles new prime minister’, NIKKEI Asian Review, 28 March, accessed 5 July 2015 at http://asia.nikkei.com/ Politics-Economy/International-Relations/tonga. Sutter, The United States and Asia, pp. 109–34, 297–316; Sutter, Foreign Relations of the PRC, pp. 321–6. Author’s findings based on interviews with over 200 officials from ten Asia-Pacific countries discussed most recently in Sutter, Foreign Relations of the PRC, pp. 321–6. During a speech in Manila in December 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry highlighted the millions of dollars of assistance to Philippine storm victims coming from such US business partners as Coca-Cola, Procter & Gamble, Dow Chemical, Fed-Ex, Cargill, and Citibank. See AA News (2013), ‘Kerry speaks in the Philippines’, 17 December, accessed 5 July 2015 at http://aapress.com/ethnicity/filipino/ kerry-speaks-in-the-philippines. Some specialists are more moderate, see Goldstein, L. (2015), Meeting China Halfway, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Sutter, The United States and Asia, pp. 297–316. Sutter, R. (2005), China’s Rise in Asia, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 266–7. For a recent discussion by prominent US China specialists on how the United States could go about shaping China’s rise, see Christensen, T. (2015), The China Challenge, New York: W.W. Norton.

25. The United States and China: why does their relationship matter to the rest of the world? Kerry Brown

INTRODUCTION The relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been called the most crucial of the twenty-first century. They are respectively the world’s largest and second-largest economies, with China already posited as larger than the United States in purchasing power parity terms by 2014. By most other measures, economic or military, geopolitical or diplomatic, they compete with each other, coming in as number one (the United States, for military spending) or number two (China). They are respectively the world’s largest and second-largest producers of carbon emissions, and the largest importers and exporters. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called the United States ‘the indispensable nation’.1 Its relationship with China is, on most accounts, also an indispensable one. Both powers, in different ways, see themselves as intrinsically global – the United States more through promotion of what it regards as universally valid political and social values, and China simply because of the vast importance of its economic and developmental reach. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the relationship between the two impacts on almost every other country, sometimes enforcing them to take sides, or creating problems in their allegiances (Australia is the classic example here – see below). From the view of many Chinese, the United States prosecutes daily containment on China, trying to hedge in its strategic space and force it into a box.2 For the United States, China is sometimes seen as a threat and sometimes as a core strategic partner.3 It is rarely, if ever, just a straightforward ally in any field. Whether it be naval issues, currency ones, or access to international markets, the US–China axis is a complex one. And it is also one that, by its very nature, encompasses the rest of the planet. In that sense, China and the United States are not only indispensable to each other. They are also indispensable to everyone else. 475

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GRAND NARRATIVES The simple fact is that US–China relations have never been easily constrained within a straightforward bilateral framework, but almost always located in a global context, where others figured and were affected by their links with each other. For the first two-and-half decades of the existence of the PRC, the two in fact did not formally talk to each other, and created a divided geopolitics where other countries were either for one (the United States) or the other (China). They ‘discovered’ each other through a bold, pragmatic accommodation in the Nixon presidency, largely through the need to work against a mutual enemy – the USSR.4 With the tidying up of policy over the Republic of China on Taiwan through the adoption of the ‘One China Policy’ in the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972, and the creation of formal diplomatic relations in 1979, the United States and China began their modern ‘love in’. The timing was good. In 1978, at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress in Beijing, a series of reforms were started, one of which was openness to the outside world. Deng Xiaoping visited the United States the same year, becoming, as paramount leader, the new face of Chinese power emerging from Maoist darkness.5 He proved, at least for a few years in the 1980s, a hit, the reformist face of a China starting to allow actors like Coca-Cola or Procter & Gamble to manufacture and sell to the Chinese. Kentucky Fried Chicken set up next to Tiananmen Square, and McDonald’s started its inexorable march across the country, conquering Chinese hearts and stomachs. The first great wave of overseas students started to go to US universities, amongst them Deng’s own grandson. Deng himself was accorded the final US accolade – a cover image on Time magazine. Where Americans went, others more often than not followed, with European, Japanese and other investment flowing in once the United States had breached the wall. The 1989 Tiananmen Square uprising abruptly stopped this. Blind eyes had been turned to Deng’s harder political image in the 1980s, with the idea that he, like Gorbachev in the USSR, would bring down the bamboo wall and herald in a new era of liberalism leading to full out democracy. But 1989 proved that underneath, as analysts who had watched him closely over the years realized, Deng was no Western-loving capitalist. He himself had said clearly he wanted to learn from the United States, but not copy. And he had mandated his officials to learn from a lot of other places too, not just the United States. Some have argued that the United States during the period after Tiananmen Square did much to stabilize things, ensuring that China did not become isolated and walk

The United States and China: why does their relationship matter? 477 away from economic reforms.6 There probably was a deep appreciation amongst US policy-makers that losing China twice in half a century was not a wise idea, and that they had to work with the more reform minded in the Chinese leadership. For that reason, after a rocky few years, US–China relations returned to their default narrative – allies publicly in terms of economic opening up, and promoting self-interest with each other, but aware of some core red lines that could not be crossed. In the Clinton era from 1992 this became encoded in the term ‘engagement’ rather than confrontation. Engagement was constructive, continued to talk about thorny issues like rights and values, and at least, for the US side, posited itself, as Clinton famously said standing next to President Jiang Zemin in a news conference in 1998, as standing on the right side of history. There were many, not just in the United States but elsewhere (including China) who sincerely believed that history was ending, liberal polities were the default for the future, and that China might struggle against this historic path, but could not avoid it. In the Clinton era, ambiguity towards China was best represented by the annual bickering over granting the country Most Favoured Nation trading status, something that demanded congressional input each time on China’s human rights issues. Human rights became one of the most trenchant sticking points, with the State Department report on China producing indignant anger each time it came out. Figures like dissident Wei Jingsheng and the Dalai Lama were accorded warm receptions in Washington. China started to formulate its own response, stating that in this era of engagement, it should be recognized as a developing country putting a priority on material collective rights, and finding its own path rather than slavishly following Western ones. Around this period, attacks on US-led Western universalism started to appear, either from Chinese politicians or academics. With the ‘accidental’ bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 things reached a shrill pitch, with many Chinese sincerely believing that the United States harboured animosity and resentment against China’s return to pre-eminence. Once more this spat did not just involve the United States and China, but the whole of NATO, with the United Kingdom in particular getting rough treatment because of its closeness to the United States. China’s entry to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 is a case in point of how US interests with China then aligned with those of many other international partners and were never solely bilateral. The WTO is governed in such a way that every member has to complete separate deals with the applicant nation for it to join. Some of these with China were straightforward. But for the EU and the United States in particular, there were long discussions, the most politically loaded of

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which was with the United States. It was only when these were concluded in late 2001 that China could formally join the organization. Over this period, there were often mutually exclusive and excluding narratives between the United States and China for each other that caused other partners to need to take sides. Chinese policy-makers often complained about the United States being a self-appointed global police officer, and stated that they were supporting a more equitable multipolar world. The sense from the Maoist era that the country was setting itself up as leader of the third (developing) world lingered, along with the implicit invitation for like-minded nations to stand beside it. But United States as the sole remaining superpower after the collapse of the USSR almost a decade earlier still dominated. Entry to the WTO, however, led to an explosion of productivity and economic success in China over the following decade, and dented the sense that the United States and the world it led were the sole option. From 2001, China rose quickly up most global tables, in terms of foreign currency reserves, economic size and volume of imports and exports. Suspicion grew in the United States that this concealed grander ambitions, especially with the period in the late Hu Jintao era from 2009 when, beset by the impact of the global financial crisis, the United States seemed to weaken and China was accused of entering an era of ‘assertiveness’. Around 2004–05, China had tried to pre-empt this by talking of its rise being ‘peaceful’. The mouthpiece for this was a retired but still highly active official who had gravitated to academia, Zheng Bijian.7 The very idea of a Chinese rise, peaceful or otherwise, was evidently disturbing to many in the US political establishment, with spats now more about Chinese plans to invest in US companies like Unocal than purely human rights ones.8 Chinese policy-makers changed ‘rise’ to ‘development’ to soften the tone of their statement, but this did little to assuage the fears of some Americans wary of what China finally intended. The notion that China harboured grander ambitions, particularly in the region, strengthened when Chinese–Japanese relations went into a tailspin from 2010. Even for some Chinese policy-makers, this was a surprising change. Former leader Jiang Zemin himself had talked of eras of strategic opportunity, during which China most wanted a constructive relationship with a more dominant, powerful United States as it continued to build up its own capacity and concentrate on domestic issues until 2020. Becoming so prominent, so quickly, seemed to mess this idea up. Even worse, from issues like the Middle East to Afghanistan and Africa, China was being dragged into areas it had tried to avoid on the basis of its ‘non-interference in the affairs of others’ stance. Things were made

The United States and China: why does their relationship matter? 479 even worse by the talk by at least some of the US establishment of China being a ‘stakeholder’ and needing to become more engaged in global affairs.9 One issue that the arguments and dialogue over the 2000s made clear was that the very fact that China posited an image of itself often in contradistinction primarily to the United States, and expended most diplomatic effort in this relationship in particular, meant that almost all other diplomatic partners had to work within this framework. Whatever China did, wherever it went, it seemed to be operating in terrain ‘granted’ it by the United States, and frustrated by this so that it sought new ways of conveying what its values were and what the basis of its diplomatic principles was. Hunting for a new grand narrative that was more indigenous and ‘belonged’ to China, Chinese thinkers looked at ideas based on classical sources. Academic Yan Xuetong constructed interesting links with pre–Qin dynasty philosophers like Confucius and Mencius, promoting a Chinese world view based on its values of harmony, equality between partners and the avoidance of unipolarity.10 Even non-Chinese supported this idea of a China offering an alternative to the United States in the way it behaved, which had its own validity rather than just being contrarian.11 This message had particular resonance after the damage to US moral leadership during its invasion of Iraq during the Bush presidency. In 2009, commentators started talking of the United States and China becoming a G2 in a bipolar world in recognition of China’s economic success. But it was something that Chinese leaders themselves resisted – arguing that it was way too early to start thinking this ambitiously. They perhaps also worried that it offered a target for nervous US hawks who were carefully watching for signs of Chinese overt competition to their interests. And it also cut against their desire to create a ‘a world away from the United States’, a place where they might be seen as themselves rather than being defined always against US standards and preoccupations. The United States for China has been both an indispensable power, as these issues of narratives within which to frame the relationship prove, but also an unavoidable one. Even with greater economic power and a United States beset by internal problems, it seemed China would not be easily given more strategic space in its own region. The articulation of the notion of ‘pivot’ to Asia, and in particular to Chinese interests, with Secretary of State Clinton and her Assistant Kurt Campbell taking the lead, marks this. President Obama insisted that the Pacific region was one that was neglected by the United States since World War II and that now the United States needed to see itself as predominantly a Pacific power, not an Atlantic one.12 From this moment, complaints about the pivot

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being an excuse to start meddling more in Chinese areas of strategic interest rose, with the word ‘containment’ appearing in unofficial, if not official, documents. Hu Jintao, as a spokesperson reassuring the outside world that a China with rampant growth, rising military spending and increasing confidence, did not particularly work, his stress on ‘win-win’ outcomes for the United States seeming to run against increasingly frequent clashes between China and its neighbours, most of whom (Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Taiwan) were either treaty allies of the United States, or, in the very unlikely case of Vietnam, sworn enemies in recent times who had converted to cordial partners. With Xi Jinping becoming party secretary in 2012, the tactics changed. Xi, after all, had visited the United States as early as 1985. As vice-president in 2011, and then as president from 2013, he undertook further visits to the United States. On one of these, to Sunnylands in mid-2013, he simply declared the ‘Pacific was big enough for the United States and China’ and articulated a notion of ‘a new model of great power relations’.13 This had the virtue of at least asserting what would once have been unsayable to Americans – that China was now economically at least large enough and important enough to demand, in some areas, parity with its largest trading partner and most important diplomatic partner. But as many commented, the challenge with China was that it was neither a friend nor an enemy. This made the statements that US politicians repeated when they welcomed a ‘strong China’ sometimes hard to understand, and tricky to interpret and act on for other countries. The easiest interpretation was that they recognized a strong China as being beneficial in some ways, in some areas. But a China with hard power to pursue its own interests in places as far away as Africa, Latin America and elsewhere was not so easy to take on board. And when China, as it did in 2014, established entities like an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the United States did not join, and put pressure on allies like Australia who might have been interested in such a bank to keep it at arm’s length.

THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA: A QUESTION OF ALLEGIANCES Amidst all of this is the issue of obligations, alliances and allegiances. As the main trading partner for over 120 countries in the world by 2014, good relations with China offered tangible benefits. Even an entity as large as the EU had members who increasingly seemed to avoid antagonizing China. The fallout of Prime Minister Cameron meeting the

The United States and China: why does their relationship matter? 481 Dalai Lama in the United Kingdom in June 2012 underlined this, with a year-long freeze in political relations. Leaders of other EU countries did not meet the Tibetan leader, in order to avoid Beijing’s wrath. Only the United States felt powerful enough for its president to continue the meetings. On the whole, publicly at least, leaders in the United States and China stated that they welcomed strong multilateral trading links. The United States, following its commitment to a strong China playing a role as a stakeholder in international issues, supported Australia and other countries expanding their trade and investment links with the People’s Republic. But there were plenty of cases where China was seen as covertly, and sometimes even explicitly, demanding things that antagonized the United States. These had a tangible impact on the foreign policy of external actors, even about matters that did not directly relate to the United States. The attempt, in 2004–05, to lift the EU arms embargo is an important example. Imposed after the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, following on from a similar one put in place by the United States, the EU–China arms embargo had been a target for Chinese officials for several years, arguing that it was against trade principles and was anti-competitive. It was particularly damaging because the EU had become since 1989 China’s main technology transfer partner, and an important supplier of intellectual property. Diplomatically, China waged a charm offensive, upgrading relations to the status of ‘strategic partnership’ ones and even producing a positive White Paper about the two in 2004. Despite this, the European moves to lift the embargo were knocked down by US interference. As of 2015, the embargo remains in place, despite arguments that other legislation manages to control exports of sensitive material, and such a symbolic piece of regulation is no longer necessary.14 The other example is the case of Australia. A treaty ally of the United States, and one that has been perhaps the most faithful in terms of support for US foreign policy (unlike even the United Kingdom, Australians fought, and died, in the Vietnam War), since 2009 China has become its largest trade partner. That has produced numerous complications, which have sometimes resulted in incoherence in Australian foreign policy. A defence White Paper issued in Canberra in 2009 was read in Beijing as being guided by ‘China Threat’ ideology, and painting China as an aggressor. A second produced in 2012 was slightly softer in tone. But with Chinese perceived assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific region with its most immediate neighbours, the statements by Prime Minister Tony Abbott from 2013 about Japan being Australia’s closest ally in the region, and of the utter necessity of maintaining alliance with the United States

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only seemed to indicate just how conflicted the country was becoming. During the state visit by President Xi Jinping to Australia in November 2014, he tactfully addressed this by asking for more ‘imagination and ambition’ bilaterally. That was interpreted as a call to Australia to make a better job of the somewhat Manichean division between its chief security partner, the United States, and its main economic one, China. This dilemma, however, is now no longer Australia’s alone. Many other countries in the Asia-Pacific region also have to balance their interests between the United States and China. Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Malaysia and New Zealand are all treaty partners of the United States, and carry mutual obligations. They belong to a zone clearly seen as falling within the US security blanket. This ‘Great Wall of US-Asia’ faces China as it looks out into the Pacific, inhibiting some of its ambitions. But it also represents the different philosophies of allegiance between the two major powers. For the United States, legally enshrined agreements give it what Kissinger called ‘strategic certainty’ but they also tie it down in obligations. When Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo in late 2013, drawing strong Chinese condemnation, he did so against US advice, and bringing the danger that they were being sucked into an increasingly dangerous potential conflict where they had no choice but to become involved. The same applies for Taiwan, where the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 creates obligations on the US side to get involved even when it might not wish to. This in particular made the Chen Shui-bian presidency of 2000 to 2008 difficult because of the way he was perceived in Washington as using the US security guarantee to protect himself from Chinese outfall when he was regarded as acting provocatively. China has taken a different tack. It has avoided directly challenging the United States by working largely in the economic realm, creating obligations and allegiances there that are more subtle, less easy to attack, and are presented as in accordance with the desire to support a prosperous, stable international environment. China has recently stayed aloof from anything that looks like security guarantees or allegiances. Since Xi Jinping has come to power in 2012–13 this policy of diplomatic diversification has grown more dominant. If the Deng idea of seeking economic influence and avoiding overt political and diplomatic involvement except on matters directly related to China (around diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, for instance) has paid good dividends since the late 1970s, building up China’s strength and capacity in areas where it also appeals to US interests, so too does the strategy of seeking out more diverse partners and opening up more options for China away from being over-dominated by the United States. Some commentators even interpret

The United States and China: why does their relationship matter? 483 the period from 2009 onwards, and particularly since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, as one in which it has been prosecuting a strategy where it is testing and pushing the allegiances of US allies in the region, trying to expand its strategic space by carefully making countries like the Philippines, South Korea and Malaysia question where their real interests lie.15 The day when a blank choice between the United States and China might come may well lie a long way in the future. But starting to place questions now seems at least to be one dimension of the current Chinese tactics in its region. Diversification to create a China sphere of influence away from US involvement started early. In the 2000s, China established forums with the Middle East, Africa and, through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, with Central Asian powers and Russia. Outlining this more Sinocentric sphere has largely been driven through economic interests, or securing resources. China has become a significant investor in the Middle East, and in Africa.16 In the late Hu Jintao period, China looked to be increasingly isolated, and bereft of true partners. Under Xi Jinping, however, an intense period of engagement regionally and across the world has led to new major trade deals with Russia, India and Australia, and the attempt to frame China’s global interests through the metanarrative of a ‘New Silk Road’. China has taken the lead in establishing an infrastructure bank and a BRICS bank, and has encouraged Central and Eastern European countries, some of them members of the European Union (EU), to form a loose grouping, for which it has created a secretariat in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Xi himself has been the spokesperson for China in this era, referring to a ‘China Dream’ that everyone can win from, with access to opportunities within China’s domestic market, and from a world where China’s stance of nonaggression is subtly positioned next to muscular US-led intervention. Critics call this posturing, staking out the moral high ground and refusing to take responsibility for affairs beyond its borders. But for Chinese leaders, their mantra is that they respect other countries’ autonomies, don’t seek to impose global values, and are pragmatic. Since the global economic crisis of 2008, many Chinese have lost some of their admiration for the US model of development, and become increasingly ambiguous about the sorts of benefits it was once thought to offer. Frustration has grown at a global economic and political decisionmaking infrastructure where China feels, as the world’s second-biggest economy, it is marginalized. Entities like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with its voting rights being disproportionate to China’s true influence have been a particular issue. There was an era when China viewed engagement internationally with United States or US-led norms,

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to be useful for its own internal reforms.17 But for the Xi leadership, things have become more complicated.

HOW TO VIEW CHINA’S RISE One issue that any country or region in the world now needs to consider when it thinks about the United States and China, is what position they take on how to view China’s rise, and US views on this. To look at the vast literature dealing with the US relationship with China, its history, development and current status, whether issued by Chinese, American, or other nationalities, and whether from official or non-official sources, there is often a sense that it is struggling with an underlying reluctance to state a number of unpalatable but striking facts. The United States and China have radically different political systems, with the United States driven more powerfully than, for instance, the EU or other major power entities, by a desire to see the world come closer to its values and its modes of governance. This proselytizing tone of many US official statements on China is particularly strong when rights issues are involved, but it comes through in a number of other areas. One of the constant accusations made against the United States by Chinese commentators is to have double standards – to declare it supports freedom, while at the same time assertively interfering in the affairs of others and trying to enforce outcomes on them. Chinese policy-makers in particular refer to two facts – their country’s resistance to armed conflict since 1979 (the PRC has, in that period, had two small clashes, both with Vietnam; the United States over that period has had major clashes with Iraq twice, and over a decade of fighting in Afghanistan, along with its various smaller battles in the former Yugoslavia and in parts of Africa). They also refer to the use of the veto at the UN. China and the United States are both permanent members of the UN Security Council. While the United States has used its vetoing powers over 100 times in the last 40 years, particularly on issues regarding Israel, China has yet to use its veto ten times. On this level, at least (military conflict and UN vetoes) China can argue that it contrasts with the United States through its respect for other’s autonomy, and its unwillingness to dictate to others. The other unstated fact that both the United States, China and others are having to grapple with is the simple one that a China that now has such a vast economy has, whether it likes it or not, the power to impact and influence the United States and the rest of the world simply through trade flows and currency. China holds over US$4 trillion of US treasury bonds, a third of them in US treasuries, and about the same amount in

The United States and China: why does their relationship matter? 485 Eurobonds. This vividly demonstrates the deep integration between the two, and the way the surrounding world is also intermixed. But it means that China speaking as though it was a small, unimportant regional player rather than a global force sounds ingenious. Few accept, too, that it seeks only economic power and is not also carrying a geopolitical ambition. How, the argument goes, can such a rich and economically powerful entity not also want to translate that into harder forms of political influence? China’s subtle annexation of spaces of strategic influence, from its claims over the South and East China Seas, to its cornering of global markets like those of rare metals are offered as evidence for this. China’s gradual encroachment of these less contentious spaces is regarded as ominous, prefiguring the day when it will finally stand up and show its true colours – a new kind of hegemonist. This in particular gives those tempted to get closer to China pause for thought, no matter what their traditional bias.

THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA: THE CHALLENGE OF WHO SAYS WHAT To the proposition that China had some template of what a great power is, how it might achieve this status itself, and what sort of domination it was nursing, there were more complicated issues of exactly who said what, and which statements to take seriously. The US–China relationship, with its massive scale, political importance and global profile, was one between which the airwaves were clouded by commentary, speculation and interference. There were multiple ways by which to see the relationship between the two, some benign, others less so. On climate change, Presidents Obama and Xi proved during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in November 2014 that they were close allies, signing a broad agreement on how they both intended to cap emissions and work with each other. In other areas, however, they were not so close. One of the abiding problems with the US–China relationship for those inside and outside of it is to work on not just what is being said between the two, but by whom, and what level of attention and credibility to give each. When a serving People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officer wrote a book, The China Dream, in 2009, in which he cast China as needing to take a more aggressive, assertive path, replacing a broken superpower that no longer had answers to the world’s problems, many overestimated the importance of what he wrote.18 Similarly, when another former PLA general made bellicose threats in the late 1990s about how China with its

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nuclear arsenal might be able to strike against the United States, these were also overinterpreted by worried analysts.19 In both cases though, the thinking of these two individuals needed to be backed up by real credible support within the decision-making elite in China. Some claimed that while not directly from the top-level decisionmakers, they reflected what they were thinking but didn’t dare say. But the inconvenient truth to the more hawkish was that Chinese leaders themselves remained relatively consistent across leadership generations on their stance towards the United States. They were critical sometimes, about specific things, from human rights to economic issues, reacted with brittle self-defence when accused of being currency manipulators, and stood their ground on issues like climate change at the Copenhagen Conference of late 2009. But on the broad issue of whether the two countries could walk away from each other and seek conflict, dragging in others, they never varied from the mantra that the United States and China had no choice but to get on with each other. Xi Jinping has been the latest to state this, loudly and publicly, in comments in late 2014 about the disastrous consequences of a fight between the United States, either in trade or military areas. The fact that the most influential voices in executive power in China never strayed from this framework is important. And the United States, despite its more open, less dictated political environment, was similar. Presidents from Clinton to Bush the younger famously ‘beat up’ on China when campaigning for election, but then spent their time in power defending themselves against claims they were soft on the People’s Republic. Bush in particular sought China out as an ally after 9/11 terrorist attacks. For Obama, the approach was a little different, with China figuring little in either of his two election campaigns. But he too spoke publicly only in one dimension – that the United States welcomes a strong China, a stakeholder and an ally who needed to play a larger role in global affairs. Wikileaks revelations from 2010 did not change this greatly. The most that they showed was that China holding so much US debt was an important consideration in seeking to avoid arguments with it.20 Harmonious coexistence sometimes creeping towards cooperation in public and at the most elite level on both sides therefore was the set default, with strategic disagreements about issues like cybersecurity or currency – and it was within this framework that most other countries also managed their relations with both powers. In these more marginal, emerging areas the more fractious side of US–China relations appeared, reaching its peak in 2014 when the FBI took the unprecedented step of naming five PLA officers as being engaged in direct attacks on US

The United States and China: why does their relationship matter? 487 commercial interests. Once more, however, this space was blurred by the concurrent revelations coming from the material issuing from Edward Snowden, the former CIA operative who showed that the US government agencies had been spying as assiduously on their own citizens as any outsiders. This also created blurred edges around the straightforward commitment of many countries within the EU or elsewhere seen as traditional security allies of the United States, meaning that they also sought a relationship with China where the United States was a less heavy, prescriptive presence.

RISKS TO THE RELATIONSHIP The Chinese and US political elite, joined by many other world leaders, talk as though the era of harmonious cooperation and necessary alliances between the two will be the set position for the foreseeable future. This is reassuring to the rest of the world. But the underlying anxiety in the relationship, which persists, is simply that the stakes if things go even partially wrong between the two are horribly high for them and everyone else. Speculation about coming conflicts between the two are mercifully few, but the risks of misunderstanding between them are high enough for them both to have institutionalized an economic and strategic dialogic at the highest level since the Bush presidency. No global leaders have more contact than those of the United States and China, and the two governments run over 80 different dialogues, across political, economic and social spheres. So much dialogue is meant to offset the chance that there might be misunderstandings. And yet, even with all this diplomatic talk, and greater person-to-person contact than ever before (from students and tourists to business travellers between both countries) over 2012 into 2014 there were multiple occasions when the relationship slipped into acrimony. Much of this was precipitated by wholly unexpected events. The fleeing of Wang Lijun, a former close associate of Politburo member Bo Xilai, to the US Consulate in February 2012 dragged the United States into one of the most troubled periods of recent times in Chinese domestic politics. Later in the year, the fleeing of dissident Chen Guangcheng to the US Embassy and then the delicate negotiations over his exile to the United States occurred just as Secretary of State Clinton was in Beijing for high-level talks. Conviction grew amongst some Chinese that as ever, the United States was stirring up trouble and trying to influence it. Subsequently the United States was using underhand means to interfere in Hong Kong and Taiwan during protests in both

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these places in 2014. It was also accused of standing too close to Japan and others around China’s territorial dispute with them over the maritime borders in the East and South China Seas. In this environment, a misstep by leaders of either side could have had serious consequences. In the US poplar television drama, House of Cards, screened across the United States in 2014, one of the plotlines was a looming military clash with China. And while discounting some of the extreme commentary on either side about the other was right most of the time, there was always the possibility that public opinion started to harden around postures and influence leaders in this way. Domestic sentiment in both countries about the other was, and remains, ambiguous. Americans like buying cheap Chinese goods until it is pointed out how these impact on labour in the United States. For the Chinese, being the sweatshop of the United States was demeaning.21 Figures in the United States and China appealed to the public to get tougher on the other. Most of the time, elite figures could either disregard this, or manipulate it. But the danger was that a more nationalistic polity, which China looked to be becoming under Xi Jinping, might let this get out of hand. The Communist Party of China (CPC) had one great source of legitimacy, as guardian of national unity and strength. A United States that seemed to be impeding this therefore was a major problem. And in this area, Chinese leaders might take the temptation to cave in to pressure and toughen their language, with responses from the other side. These complex bilateral dynamics might tempt other actors like the EU or even Australia to seek an occasional intermediation role. But so far it is pretty clear that the United States and China do not often welcome this. Nor have they proved interested in letting other parties join the table when they talk to each other. The EU might be the ultimate ally of the United States, and the ultimate trading partner of China, but any notion that it can partake in trilateral discussions has proved unsuccessful.22 Even with the Six Party Talks between the United States, Japan, China, Russia, South Korea and North Korea, it was clear when they were being run that North Korea most wanted to talk to the United States, and that this was immensely irritating to the Chinese. While China therefore often acted like it wanted to create spheres of influence away from the United States, it also jealously guarded its access and dialogues with the United States, even on multilateral issues like security, environment and the economy. The other issue for outside actors to contemplate was how to factor in the ‘known and unknown unknowns’, events that came out of the thin air and that compromised, or simply destroyed, the consensus view of a

The United States and China: why does their relationship matter? 489 US–China relationship where deep argument was too risky to contemplate. Scenarios at the moment range from 50 years or more before China might be in a position militarily and geopolitically to challenge the United States on any grounds of parity. This therefore makes it a safer option to continue siding as much as possible with US policy positions and US interests. While running the United States second in terms of gross spending on its military, China still spends less than a third of the US annual defence budget.23 It has one rudimentary aircraft carrier. The United States has 15. And in terms of combat experience, it last saw action over three decades ago. The United States is still active in the field. The final trump card the United States has is dominance of water and seaways globally, and particularly in the Asian region. A continuing US imperium, however, is predicated on its economy being stable and on there being no major domestic upheavals. On the whole, this assumption might be a sound one. Politically the United States has taken huge hits in the postwar period but remained stable, its economy growing. But in a world where the natural environment is acting increasingly unpredictably, and where small issues can end up having vast economic consequences, it is not impossible that the United States might hit either a crisis or a major economic downturn. As the power with most to lose in this situation, the impact might quickly be calamitous. Conversely, China has many more known problems. Leaders refer to these frequently. Its environment, its development path, its stability, are all more vulnerable to change than the United States’. It too is perfectly capable of hitting a problem where policy-makers and implementers run out of answers in the next decades, and its pathway to parity or superiority to the United States ends. For either US or Chinese decline, therefore, the outcomes will be scrappy. Complacently assuming a US–China relationship framework where mutual tolerance and cooperation are the best course of action and will continue to be so into the future is dangerous. The US–China relationship has plenty of scope for implosion, and while elites comfortingly talk of the impossibility of there ever being direct conflict or clashes today, there are many scenarios in the future where this position will be eroded or swept away. China might feel emboldened if faced by a weaker United States to claim more power and influence, and the United States might chose to pre-empt Chinese domination before it is too late. The problem with these messy possibilities is that unlike most other powers, a Chinese–US fall out would necessarily be a global one. And everyone would need to take sides.

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CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE The safest prediction to make about US–China relations is that they are not going to become any easier, and this makes life complicated for everyone else. Most effort will go into maintaining them at their current levels, with the occasional strategic argument, but too much vested interest, in both sides and elsewhere, in harmonious and constructive engagement to seriously derail them. There will be plenty of risks to this – internal issues, as mentioned above, or external ones, like the rise of a third power like a renascent Russia, which creates a triangulation dilemma again, as the USSR did in the past. It is more likely though that the greater danger is a United States overstretched and distracted, which forces a reluctant China to get involved before it is ready or really has the capacity to in complex terrains like the Middle East or Latin America. China has so far avoided being trapped in the complex political networks of the Middle East in particular, despite having large investment and resource interests there. But it is unlikely that it can easily continue this balancing act. Syria, with its enforcement on China of supporting a veto on UN intervention, was one of the few occasions when China had to stick its neck out and risk strong American wrath. On Russia and the Ukraine, the issue has also thrown up questions of how far China can maintain its neutrality without taking sides. This balancing act is becoming harder by the year. For the next decade, therefore, a US–China axis that gets more intertwined, more complex and that seeps beyond the simple framework of strategic partners working for mutual benefit looks inevitable. US–China policy-makers have probably exhausted the current parameters of their relationship, set in place in many ways by the Nixon opening up in the early 1970s, when the two could carve out clear areas of difference and similarity, agree to disagree on the contentious issues, and then simply get on with the non-contentious ones. Increasingly, the areas between contentious and non-contentious have become blurred. Even cyberespionage where China was painted the clear villain a few years ago is now, in the post-Snowden environment, not so straightforward. Neither Chinese nor US politicians like conveying complex messages, but it looks increasingly likely in the future that this is precisely what they will have to do, and the era of neat narratives and straightforward frameworks of friendship, engagement, and constructive relations are likely to be compromised by less clear-cut messages. For the rest of the world, factoring this complexity into their diplomatic thinking and scenario

The United States and China: why does their relationship matter? 491 planning will becoming increasingly necessary, with the era of comfortable boundaries and categorical allegiances increasingly a thing of the past.

NOTES 1. 2. 3.

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

17. 18.

Clinton, H. (2014), Hard Choices, New York: Simon and Schuster, p. 1. Wang, H. (2010), The End of the Revolution: China and the Limits of Modernity, London: Verso. See Kissinger, H. (2011), On China, London: Allen Lane, and Friedberg, A.L. (2011), A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, New York: W.M. Norton & Co for examples of both these kinds of thinking, the first describing China more as a strategic partner, the second as a strategic threat. MacMillan, M. (2006), Seize the Hour: When Nixon Met Mao, London: John Murray describes this period well. Vogel, E. (2011), Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, Cambridge: MA: Harvard University Press describes this period in great detail. Ross, R. (2009), China’s Security Policy: Structure, Power and Politics, London: Routledge is a good example of this. Zheng B. (2005), ‘China’s “peaceful rise” to great power status’, Foreign Affairs, 84 (5), 21. This is covered in Brown, K. (2008), The Rise of the Dragon: Chinese Inward and Outward Investment in the Reform Era 1978–2007, Oxford: Chandos Press. Zoellick, R. (2005), ‘Whither China: from membership to responsibility: remarks to National Committee on U.S.–China relations’, U.S. Department of State Archive, accessed 23 January 2015 at http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/ 53682.htm. Yan, X. (2011), Ancient Chinese Thought: Modern Chinese Power, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. See Jacques, M. (2009), When China Rules the Waves: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order, London: Penguin, and Ramo, J.C. (2004), The Beijing Consensus, London: Foreign Policy Centre. Cumings, B. (2010), Dominion from Sea to Sea: Pacific Ascendancy and American Power, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Xi, J. (2014), The Governance of China, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, pp. 306–9. Wacker, G. (2015), ‘Chinese internal views of the EU’, in K. Brown (ed.) (2015), The EU China Relationship: European Perspectives, London: Imperial College Press, p. 9. White, H. (2013), The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power, Melbourne: Black Inc. Brown, K. (2014), ‘Mixed signals: China in the Middle East’, Fride Policy Brief, accessed 23 January 2015 at http://fride.org/publication/1241/mixed-signals:-chinain-the-middle-east; French, H. (2014), China’s Second Continent: How a Million Migrants are Building a New Empire in Africa, New York: Vintage. See Foot, R. and A. Walter (2010), China, The United States and Global Order, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Liu, M. (2010), Zhongguo meng: hou meiguo shidai de daguo siwei zhanlue dingwei [China Dream: The Great Power Thinking and Strategic Positioning of China in the Post-American Age], Beijing: Zhongguo youyi chuban gongsi.

492 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

Handbook of US–China relations Kahn, J. (2005), ‘Chinese general threatens use of A-bombs if USA intrudes’, New York Times, 15 July accessed 3 April 2016 at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/15/ washington/world/chinese-general-threatens-use-of-abombs-if-us-intrudes.html. MacAskill, E. (2010), ‘Wikileaks: Hillary Clinton’s question: how can we stand up to Beijing?’, Guardian, 4 December, accessed 23 January 2015 at http://www. theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/04/wikileaks-cables-hillary-clinton-beijing. Wang X., S. Song, J. Huang and Q. Song (eds) (2009), Zhongguo Bu Gaoxing [China is Not Happy], Jiangsu: Phoenix Publishing and Jiangsu People’s Publishing Company. Gill, B. and A. Small (2014), ‘China, the US and the EU: hopes for multilateralism’, in K. Brown (ed.), China and the EU in Context: Insights for Business and Investors, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Data on military expenditure are contained in the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute material, accessed 23 January 2015 at http://www.sipri.org/ research/armaments/milex/milex_database.

Index

A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) as challenge to US 17, 164, 393 countering risk of US military intervention 435 as ‘counterintervention strategy’ label 362 as emphasis of Chinese weapons systems 327 focus on 332, 362 in future war scenario 430–31 likelihood of China using 369 as PLA strategy 383–90 potential power of 379–80 US alternatives to 370–73 US response to 15–16, 366–7, 390–94, 408–9, 445–7 what China seeks to achieve through 438 Acheson, Dean 47, 201 Active Defence 430–31, 434–5 ADIZ see Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) AIIB see Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) 15, 213, 233, 235, 278, 295, 302 air power (China) 343–4 AirSea Battle (ASB) concept attributed to ONA 331 China’s concern over 327 criticisms of 369–70 definition of 407 as emphasizing pre-emptive and deep strikes against China 230, 298–9 ‘lines of effort’ for US forces 367 proposals on use in future US–China conflict 367–9 as response to China’s A2/AD 16, 214, 327, 390–92, 398–400, 407–9, 445–7

as restoring dominance 366–7 as update of Cold War era AirLand Battle doctrine 323, 331–2 US embrace of 410 allegiances, global 480–84 anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons 211, 348, 384, 386, 389, 401, 436, 445–6 ARF see ASEAN Regional Forum ASEAN Plus Three (APT) 37–8 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) China’s behavior in South China Sea 226, 310–11 Hillary Clinton at meeting of 226, 258, 311–13 Japan’s promotion of 259 John Kerry at meeting of 314 underwhelming record of achievement 39 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 36–7, 69, 88, 105, 112, 150, 226, 258, 433, 485 Asia-Pacific region China’s insecure position in 463–5 determinants of US strength and influence in contingency planning 470 economic 469 government engagement 469–70 non-government engagement and immigration 470 security 469 drivers of US undertaking leadership responsibility 468–9 high stakes and substantial risks in 174 more assertive Chinese foreign policy 171–3 PLA Navy and US Navy in 398–400 US rebalancing strategy 169–70

493

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US weaknesses in 468 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 35, 37, 87, 127, 149, 167–68, 187, 275–6, 325, 480 Australia APEC initiated by 36 China countries protecting against 466 decline of influence in 468 as largest trading partner of 181, 481 new trade deals with 483 reaching free trade agreement with 141, 162 ‘hub and spokes’ alliance network 29 increasing regional security 246 as intermediate zone between superpowers 52 joining AIIB 35, 149 as not subject to Chinese dominance 467 Obama’s visits to 13–14, 173, 283 occupying middle ground 370 ‘security partnership’ with Japan 254, 259 US deployment of 2,500 Marines in 169, 296, 406 military forces in 188 stationing troops in 14 strategic ties with 37–8 strengthening alliance with 127, 150, 184, 201–2, 230 US–China relations and 481–2 Beijing Consensus 6–7, 17, 186–7 Beijing–Shanghai High-Speed Railway (HSR) 147 Berlin Wall 200, 207–8 Brzezinski, Zbigniew 74, 206 Bush, George H.W. accusation of coddling ‘Beijing Butcher’ 68 administration (1989–93) balancing act 64–5, 207 fluctuating relations 65–7

reaction to China’s copyright infringement 145 sale of aircraft to Taiwan 171, 289 sanctions against China 64, 68 Tiananmen Square crackdown 63–4 China’s preference for 63 remarkable China-related credentials 207 seeking to engage post-Tiananmen China 103 Bush, George W. administration (2001–09) abandoned frameworks 456 global ‘war on terror’ during 226–7, 229 origin of period of moderation 471 period of constructive interaction 457–8 policy to isolate DPRK 270–71 Sino–US relations 71–3 unilateralism to US actions 257–8 unpopularity of foreign policies 468 US–Japan relationship 257 welcoming China’s help after terrorist attacks 71–2, 293, 486 China as competitor assessment 71, 210 common counter-terrorism interests 210 relations with Taiwan 293–4 unpopular wars started by 225, 479 C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) 349, 367–9, 387, 435–6, 445 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 270, 323–4, 330, 332, 335 ‘carrier killer’ see DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) Carter, Ashton 82, 85–6, 89, 92, 199–200, 333, 407 Carter, Jimmy 56, 205–6, 287

Index 495 CCP see Communist Party of China (CCP) Centre for National Defence Policy (CNDP) 325 Chairman Mao see Mao Zedong Chen Guangcheng 105–6, 487–8 Chen Shui-bian era 72, 291–3, 482 China constraining 460, 460–61 domestic preoccupations 460–63 evaluating global leadership 182–7, 194 foreign policy 171–3, 231–3, 455, 458–9 global challenge to US 180–81, 194–5 global influence 167–8, 194–5 insecure position in Asia-Pacific 463–5 limitations of military power 287–91, 194–5 maritime disputes see Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands; South China Sea measuring relationships of 465–6 military modernization efforts background and effects 400–402 concern among Asia-Pacific countries 409–10 investment in 409 main features of 379, 381–2 military strategic guidelines 433–5, 440 perceptions of US as conspiratorial 118–20 defining conspiracy theory 120–22, 129 interpreting suspicions 122–6, 129 and US–China relations 126–30 preparing for future warfare 380–83 shortcomings in economic influence 466–8 soft power 165–7, 191–4, 323, 326, 328, 335–6 China Coast Guard (CCG) 405–6 ‘China Dream’ 92, 107–10, 232, 359, 364, 439, 459, 471, 483 China Dream (book) 12, 182, 485

‘China threat’ 10–11, 161, 238, 252, 290, 293, 481 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) see Communist Party of China (CCP) Chinese embassy bombing 11–12, 70, 118, 122–3, 209, 455, 477 Chinese Nationalism, rise of 11–12, 125 Chinese Nationalist Party see Kuomintang (KMT) Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (CPVA) 46 climate change as area for further cooperation 150, 457 China acquiring foreign technologies 146–7 China standing their ground on 486 China’s belief that it is making constructive contributions to 148 example of improved relations over 168, 485 media coverage 112 US hopes for China’s support on 13 Clinton, Hillary ARF meetings 311–13 China–Japan territorial dispute 306–7 description of China’s challenge 3 devotion of chapter of book to Chen Guangcheng case 105 hints of strategic readjustment 199 and notion of ‘pivot’ 479 on opportunities to work together 73, 211 questioning what happens ‘when an established power and a rising power meet’ xvii, 4 references to ‘smart power’ 326 on South China Sea 212, 226, 312–13 statements from America’s Pacific century article 225–6 US as ‘indispensable nation’ 475 US ‘not ceding the Pacific to anyone’ 13 visit to Asia-Pacific region 169 visit to Japan 258 Clinton, William Jefferson (Bill) administration (1993–2000) abandoned framework 456

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‘comprehensive engagement’/ ‘engagement plus’ strategy 208, 222, 477 imposition of military sanctions 104 involvement in Taiwan Strait crisis 289–90 Lee Teng-hui’s visit to US 289–90 Sino–US relations 67–70 agreement to re-establish communications 69 and China’s human rights record 68–9, 73, 104, 477 engagement ‘standing on right side of history’ 477 lack of experience in foreign affairs 67–8 as lacking clear grasp of US interests in Sino–US relations 67 re-emergence of mutual suspicion 70 refusal to ‘coddle dictators’ 68 supporting China’s entry into WTO 290–91 Cold War China’s relations with Korea following 268–9, 274–5 and division of Korea 267–8 impact of intensification of 28–9 of outbreak 183 of thaw in 31–2 origins of US alliance system in Asia 201–2 Taiwan Strait crisis following 288–90, 298 US–China relations after under Bush (G.H.W.) administration 63–7 under Bush (G.W.) administration 71–3 challenges facing both countries 62–3, 74–6 under Clinton administration 67–70 ‘engage but hedge’ policy 224 ‘grand bifurcation’ 208–10 under Obama administration 73–4

return of net assessment 329–35 and Tiananmen massacre 9–11 US Cold War mentality 413 US–China relations during Chinese perceptions of 44–5 early 1950s 46–51 early 1960s 51–4 period of normalization 54–8 rapprochement 45–6 Taiwan problem 285–6, 298 two phases 44 US perceptions of 45 and World War II 8–9 US entrenching divisions of 39 Communist Party of China (CCP) during Bush (G.H.W.) administration 63–7 and capitalist free-market economy 5 ‘China Dream’ as goal 108 Civil War victory 283 during Clinton administration 70 doubts about US intentions 75 in early 1950s 49–50 in early 1960s 51–2 establishment of National Security Commission 233 future military intentions 380 as guardian of national unity and strength 488 Mao as undisputed leader of 48 during Nixon administration 55–7 and Taiwan 284, 290–92 and Tiananmen incident 65 US perceptions of 83–6, 93 competition and cooperation 3–4, 224, 227, 234–5, 239 cyberwar 17 hacking 423–4 increasing 126, 162–3, 168, 173–4 in Japan–China relations 254 managing 232–3, 227, 235, 239 military 214 for regional leadership 112–13 security 200–201, 210, 214, 216, 365, 398, 410 strategic 330–31, 335, 435

Index 497 zero-sum 86 Comprehensive National Power (CNP) as Chinese attempt to assess US power 323 concept of 324 limitations of 328, 335–6 methodology of 324–5 conspiracy theory defining 120–22, 129 impact on US–China relations 126–40 interpreting suspicions of China 122–6, 129 US as conspiratorial 118–20 constructivism as prominent approach in international relations 101–2 cooperation advocacy of new model for long-term 148 bilateral 62–3, 65, 73–4, 174, 207 collapse of 225 and competition 3–4, 224, 227, 234–5, 239 cyber-crime 413, 418–19 economic 68, 88, 134, 261, 272, 276, 295 essential for global economic recovery 211 global China for 151 study of IPR as field for 142–3 on trans-border issues 134–5 Japan’s security 259–60 military 165, 169, 314 pragmatic 457–8 Sino–Russian 344 trilateral 273, 277 US–Japan 245–7, 258, 260–61 win-win 223, 234 wisdom of seeking more modest expectations of 256–7 counter-intervention capabilities see A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) cyberwar China’s cyber power 349–51, 382 competition 17

cyberattacks alleged modus operandi of Chinese hackers 421–2 broader institutional environment and China’s concerns 422–4, 426 China’s response to US allegations 413, 418–20 potential for, in future wars 436–7 sources of, targeting China 420–21 US allegations regarding China as origin of 412–18, 424–5 cybercrime 17, 350–51, 413, 418–20, 425 cyberespionage 17, 91, 162, 350, 490 cybersecurity 165, 412–13, 437, 486 cybertheft 148, 455, 458 definitions 413–14 declinism 333–5 Deng Xiaoping 5, 56, 58, 63–6, 103, 135, 144, 169, 223, 232, 268, 324–5, 465, 476, 482 Desert Storm 380–81 détente 55–8, 210–14 DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) 346, 361, 388–9, 405, 444, 446 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands China challenge to Japanese security 251–2 creating new status quo over 172 declaring ADIZ around 15, 213, 233, 340 erecting structures near 315 and Japan both claiming sovereignty over 303–4 US in Japan-China security dilemma 74, 254–5, 305–9 perceived to be at blame for 127 see also East China Sea distant blockade strategy 368, 370–73, 408, 440 domino theory 28–9 East Asia Summit (EAS) 36–8, 312

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East China Sea China aggressive actions in 166 arguments used to boost claims to 304 countries in dispute with 303 establishment of ADIZ 213, 233, 278, 295, 308 expanded sovereignty 184 increasing assertiveness in 13, 295, 383 locking fire-control radar on MSDF vessels in 252 refusal to back away from interests in 236 strategic importance for maritime strategy 232 Nanji Island 315 possible ‘distant blockade’ 370–71 US reasons for concern about China in 315–16 recommendations for preventing conflict 316–17 role in China’s disputes 304–9 see also Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands economic cooperation 68, 88, 134, 261, 272, 276, 295 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) 141, 295 economic rise of China and bilateral economic relationship 10, 17 as challenge to US 25–7, 10 economic indicators depicting 180 as economic opportunity for South Korea 265, 276 as fueling increases in China’s military 251 future scenario 133 as global economic power 181 growing military budget 181–2 leading to change in US perceptions 295 shortcomings in economic influence 466–8 as stalling 334 US perspectives on 86–9, 93

viewing 484–5 economic US–China relations China’s export trade 135–40, 149, 151–2 economic power, strategic rivalry over 161–3 intellectual property rights 142–7 interaction approaches 134–41, 150–51 overcoming geopolitics 147–50 US export trade 137–9, 147 EEZs (Exclusive Economic Zones) 13–14, 277–8, 295, 305–6, 310–11, 315 Eisenhower, Dwight 47, 49, 51, 57, 285–6 electromagnetic (EM) spectrum 340, 362, 384, 400, 431, 433, 435–7, 438 Fanell, James 82, 92, 303 financial crisis as catalyst for China’s increased participation in global governance 167 China’s economic rise amidst 295 effect on US–China economic relations 141 impact of China’s currency manipulations 89 impact on US 6, 181, 478 role of Wall Street traders’ secret discussions 122, 129 and spread of US conspiracy theories 118 US–China relations entering new era 75 and US resilience 325 Ford, Gerald 56, 205 free trade agreements 141, 163, 191, 295, 298 Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) 148 future war analysis of 431–8 China’s role in 438–44 prospect of 430–31 US response to China 445–7

Index 499 geopolitics 39, 147–50, 216, 476 global influence 162–3, 194–5 grand strategy 38, 360, 364–6, 374 Gulf of Aden 440, 442–3 hegemony China’s claim to never seek 7, 184, 213 Japan shattering Chinese 265 of Moscow, concerns over 45 paradoxes of 33–4, 38 regional, China as likely to establish 7, 10–11 US goal to maintain 119, 127 history of US–China relations 1969–89 45–6, 204–8, 286–8, 476 after Cold War 1989–93 63–7 1993–2000 67–70 2001–09 71–3 2009–present 73–4 and Tiananmen Massacre 9–11 during Cold War early 1950s 46–51 early 1960s 51–3 period of normalization 54–8 World War II and 8–9 rise of Chinese Nationalism 11–12 ‘hub and spokes’ alliance network 29, 285 human rights CCP ‘one of most egregious offenders of’ 85 showing little flexibility on 66 China’s crackdown on 166 during Clinton administration 67–70, 477 criticisms of China 118, 127, 149, 486 dominating agendas in US–China policy 10, 17 during Obama administration 73 trade benefits linked to 136 US advocacy 75 US–China relations 1989 Tiananmen Incident 102–3

2014 Hong Kong demonstrations 111–13 since 1989 104–11 spats less likely to concern 478 stable subset of 100 structure-transforming events 101–2 US seeking to impose its own conception of 66 India China’s new trade deals with 483 China’s newly established markets in 140 concern over China seeking access to Maldives 443 evaluating China’s military capabilities 330 US improving relations with 72, 127, 200 US strategic ties with 37–8 Indian Ocean 38, 188, 329, 330, 370–71, 402, 406, 431–3, 439–44 Integrated Network Electronic Warfare (INEW) 436–7 intellectual property rights (IPR) global evolution 142–4 normative obligations vs operative performance in China 122–5 interests see threats (security) IPR see intellectual property rights Jackson-Vanik Amendment 136 Japan APEC initiated by 36 China 1894–95 war between 265–6 challenges to security 251–2 declining influence of 468 devastated by war with 183, 284 Diaoyu/Senkaku Island dispute 15, 127, 232–3, 303, 305–9, 314–15 leading role in Japan’s expanding military posture 250–55 mass demonstrations 458 perspective of 124 PLAN 90, 92

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relations between 261, 465–6 security dilemma 254–5 and Taiwan 297 tensions reaching high level 295, 304 and cybercrime vulnerability 420 economy 5, 139 expansion of security role 248–50, 260 feeling need to acquire own nuclear weapons 273 as important bulwark against communist expansion 29 military capabilities 30, 246, 249–50 Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) 146–7 new regional security partnerships 259–60 Obama’s visits to 14 patent filings 145 rebalance 246–7 reduction in numbers studying language of 166 relations with North and South Korea 266, 269–71, 273, 275, 277 rising regional prosperity and relative decline of 247–50 US as ally of 370 defence relations 210 early relations with 27–8 efforts to rebuild economy 49 growing exposure 250–55 influence in 30–32 in Japan–China security dilemma 254–5 military exercise with 316 net assessment of alliance between 323–4, 330, 332 in partnership and on their own 255–60 rebalance to Asia 256–9 signing defense treaties with 201–2, 304 standing too close to 488

strengthening alliance with 127, 140, 200–201, 230 trade deficit with 208 as treaty partners 480, 482 troops in 188 in US–China relations integral role of 245–7, 261 as intermediate zone between 52 during World War II 8 Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC) see AirSea Battle (ASB) concept Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) 367, 373, 445 Kennedy, John F. 51–3, 57 Kerry, John 85–6, 88, 91, 118, 307, 314 Khrushchev, Nikita 52 Kissinger, Henry 17–18, 33, 55, 57, 64, 74, 103, 205, 207, 216, 386, 482 Korea civil war, division and Korean War 266–7 Cold War change, at end of 268–9 and Korea divided 267–8 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) calls to denuclearize 272 China and Russia 268–9 China’s ties with 272 concerns over 270 creating problems for China 273 negotiating end to nuclear program 270–71 as one of two regimes 266 potential impact of collapse of 273–4, 279 ramped up ship inspections 271 Kingdom of Korea, China and United States 265–6 Korean War 8, 46–8, 50, 201–2, 266–70, 285, 297 Republic of Korea (ROK) China’s trade with 460 defence spending 249, 256 economy 265, 268, 275–6

Index 501 foreign investment 275 illegal fishing in waters of 278 military response 273 as one of two regimes 266 security 265, 275, 280 US deep partnership with 201–2 in US–China relations 264–5, 279–80 see also North Korea; South Korea Kuomintang (KMT) 283–4, 294–5 land attack cruise missiles (LACMs) 387–90, 441 Lee Teng-hui fostering pro-independence movement 289 stressing Taiwan’s autonomy from Beijing 69 ‘two states’ theory 291 visit to US 10, 289–90, 346 MaYing-jeou 73, 294–7 Malacca Dilemma 370, 439–40 Mao Tse-tung see Mao Zedong Mao Zedong 28, 33, 44–57, 183, 266–68, 284, 286, 380, 400, 456, 465 maritime denial strategies 371–3 MFN see Most Favoured Nation (MFN) trade status military capabilities of China air power 343–5 cyber power 349–51 as difficult to assess 361 expansion 15–17, 38, 48, 75, 180, 225, 462, 464 hoping to boost, through Moscow ties 44 as inferior to those of US 383 against Korean Peninsula 47 limitations of 187–91, 194–5 missile power 346–7 naval power 341–3 nuclear power 351–2 PLA investing in 359 possible use against Taiwan 401 reduced 53 set to build new types of 431

space power 347–9, 435 as threat to US naval assets 362 US concerns over 208–9, 340, 359 US perceptions of 45, 47, 89–93 US response to 359–74 of Japan 30, 246, 249–50, 252–3 US building allies’ 49 need to strengthen 366, 373 US–China strategic rivalry 164–5, 174, 194–5 military competition and mutual hostility 214 military cooperation 165, 169, 314 missile power (China) 346–7 Most Favoured Nation (MFN) trade status 66, 68, 135–6, 290, 477 National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 146–7 National Security Commission (NSC) 172, 203, 233, 284 naval power (China) 341–3 net assessment aim/intention of 331 of China and Japan 260 and declinism 333–4 as ‘intellectual approach’ 330 as legacy from Cold War 329–30 limitations of 335 no consensus on methodology 330–31 revival of 331–3 as US attempt to assess Chinese power 223–4 network warfare 431, 435–8 ‘New Asian Security Concept’ 173, 325 ‘new model of major power relations’ changing logics of US–China relations 223–5 feasibility of 233–38 incompatible with continued US leadership role in Asia-Pacific 364 rebalance strategy China’s answer to 222–3, 239 China’s perception of 228–30

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reflecting China’s hopes of power parity with US 325 as strategic shift against China 225–8 reflecting confidence of power parity 225 slogan first raised 160 Xi Jinping’s foreign policy 231–3 Nixon Doctrine 29, 202–6 Nixon, Richard 33, 45–6, 54–7, 133, 135, 202, 286–7, 456, 476, 490 North Korea China concerns about relations with 268–9 as drain on security 255 as major trading partner of 181 outrage over China’s rapprochement with South 269 possible actions in case of collapse of North Korea 279 rescuing and supporting regime 267–8 Xi Jinping’s policies 466 cyberoffences associated with 425 ignoring UN resolution 266 invasion of South Korea 46, 267 military provocations 245–6 net assessments of 335 nuclear weapons ambitions 269–74, 276–7 requiring Soviet assistance 266–7 seen as place of ‘hostile communist power’ 203 US–China relations as catalyst to 280 collaboration on 72–3, 457 collapsing over nuclear crisis 225 goal of denuclearization 264 human rights issue 111 as irritant to 279, 488 US taking hard line with China over 14 nuclear strikes considered, against China 50, 285 Japan as only country experiencing 30

US attitudes towards possible Soviet Union attacks 205 nuclear weapons accusations of China’s theft of 209 China curtailing assistance to programmes 186 China’s ability to strike Japan with 250 China’s capabilities 15–17, 53, 214, 351–2, 363–4, 388, 402 in event of US–China conflict 340, 393 India’s access to 72 likelihood of use of 215, 368–9 and North Korea 72–3, 245–6, 264, 269–74, 276–7, 279–80, 457 state, China as 255 submarines of China 190, 341, 361, 403–4, 438, 441 of United States 188, 190, 360, 406 US aircraft carriers 189 Obama, Barack acknowledging integration with China 211–12 administration (2009–16) abandoned framework 456 challenges posed by China’s military developments 90–91 criticism for downplaying human rights issue 104–5, 109–10 cuts in defense spending 225 decision to decline Taiwan’s request to buy jets 171 engagement with regional governments and multilateral organizations 470 high expectations for cooperation 224 involvement in Japan’s territorial disputes 306–9 measured approach towards China 13 military action against Islamic State 185 refocusing US attention positively on Asia-Pacific region 468

Index 503 Sino–US relations 73–4, 126–7, 457–9, 462, 471 steps to enhance military presence 14 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 13 affirmation of US’s commitment to region 173 approach to China 486 calls to become tougher on China’s currency manipulation 89 China as ‘responsible stakeholder’ 88 and China’s involvement with ISIS 109 commenting on Xi’s acquisition of power 171 concerns over China’s military activity 91 declining meeting with Dalai Lama 13 as diplomatic and circumscribed in comments on governance in China 85 on economic interdependency 88 holding summit with African leaders 108–9 implying US as ‘indispensable nation’ 183–4, 195 Joint Vision Statement 274–5 MaYing-Jeou and Taiwan 294–7 meetings with Xi Jinping 112–13, 148, 212, 234, 258, 307–8, 423, 461, 485 mission to Beijing and Tokyo 306–7 promoting US students studying in China 128 and South China Sea 91, 309–15 taking hard line over trade issues and North Korea 14 visit to Japan 258 voicing complaints about China’s behavior 459 withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq and Afghanistan 225 see also ‘pivot’ to Asia; rebalancing strategy Office of Net Assessment (ONA) 323, 330–33, 335 offshore balancing 365

offshore control 371–2, 392–3, 440 One Belt, One Road initiative 87, 107–8, 149 ‘One China’ principle 9–10, 52, 55, 69, 206–7, 287, 291–2, 476 Open Door Policy 5, 9, 265, 288 open seas protection 431, 433–4, 438–9 Pacific power, making of 26–9, 479 Paracel Islands 303–4, 310, 312–14, 402 ‘Peaceful Rise’ 7, 212, 228, 232 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) A2/AD strategy 383–90, 393, 399–400 Air Force (PLAAF) 343–5, 389, 433, 438, 443–4 and AirSea Battle 16, 366–70 anti-corruption campaign in 308 Army (PLAA) 433 aware of superiority of US military 164, 419 capabilities 225, 327, 332, 359, 361 as challenge to US 360–64 clash with Vietnam 380 cooperative efforts between militaries 165 cyber power 350, 421–2, 424 Fanell’s comments on 92 fighting future wars 433–8 going global 438–44 missile force 347 naval fighter collision 165 Navy (PLAN) 2000–2015 build-up 402–6 acquisition of submarines 403 aircraft carriers 404–5 as customer of Russia 403 manoeuvres, US ignoring 310 potential future abilities 433–4, 438–44 power of 341–3 rapid development of 90 replacement of nuclear submarines 403–4 in South China Sea 212 transfer of frigates 405–6 transformation of 401–2, 409

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Handbook of US–China relations

pressure for more assertive action 317 regions for future presence 431 Second Artillery Force (PLASAF) 433, 438, 443–4 space-based systems 349, 392 in Tiananmen Square 64 transformation of 379–83, 400–402 US avoidance strategies 371–3 US communication channels with 92 People’s Republic of China (PRC) as acting in disruptive and domineering ways 465 clashes with Vietnam 310, 484 ‘creeping assertiveness’ 402 dangers for, in challenging US 468 as ‘darling of its Asian neighbours’ 303 establishment of 266, 283 intelligence 209 law on territorial waters 304 official 2015 defense budget 401 patent laws 144 and Taiwan 46, 50, 53, 52–3, 69, 71–4, 202–3, 207, 285–7, 390, 401 US documents on 85, 211, 329 US relations with, after Cold War under Bush (G.H.W.) administration 63–7 under Bush (G.W.) administration 71–3 challenges facing both countries 62–3, 74–6 under Clinton administration 67–70 under Obama administration 73–4 US relations with, during Cold War Chinese perceptions of 44–5 early 1950s 46–51 early 1960s 51–4 period of normalization 54–8 rapprochement 45–6, 204–8, 286–8, 476 two phases 44 US perceptions of 45

Philippines China claims overlapping with EEZs of 13, 295 fate of large investments in 467 heightening tensions between 170, 304 stand-off over Scarborough Shoal 14, 260, 295, 303, 312 tough stand on maritime and territorial disputes with 232 use of trade with 89 and Japan 254, 259–60, 316 Obama’s visits to 14 and Spratly Islands 303, 402 US expanding access to ports in 406, 409 expanding military cooperation with 127, 169 importance of bases in 203 introducing legislation to enable sales of weapons to 91 maintaining military forces in 188 military access agreement with 296 signing defense treaties with 201, 304 strengthening alliance with 127, 201, 230 uncertain strategic commitments to 310 US–China relations 312–14, 316–17, 482–3 ‘pivot’ to Asia change of direction blamed on China 224–5 Chinese answer to 222–3 Chinese perspective on 14, 222, 304 Chinese responses to 233, 304, 315 as conspiracy theory 119–20 dealing with Eurasian dilemma in relation to 149 impact on, and role in, politics of regionalism 35–40 Japan’s pivotally important role 29, 31 leading to reassessment of US role in Asia 228–9

Index 505 as military effort by US 359, 407 Obama, Barack launch of policy 359–60, 406 reconfirmation of strategy 228 speech on 13–14, 296 promise of increased business opportunities 140 rationales to justify 409–10 as response to China’s rise 119, 127 as strategic shift aimed at maintaining US primacy in Asia-Pacific region 222 as strategy designed to contain China 200, 296, 298, 479–80 Taiwan’s significance 283, 297–8 unveiling of strategy 226–7 US response, and Airsea battle 406–10 see also rebalancing strategy PLA see People’s Liberation Army (PLA) politics of China, US perceptions of 183–6, 93 power see US–China power balance power transition theory 4, 16 PRC see People’s Republic of China (PRC) preparation for military struggle (PMS) 433, 435 rapprochement, period of 33, 45–6, 204–8, 214, 216, 286–8, 476 Reagan, Ronald 56–7, 137, 206–7, 288 realism model of power transition 166 offensive 183–4 predicting conflict as inevitable 274 rebalancing strategy, US to Asia-Pacific region China’s perceptions of 199–200, 215, 223, 228–30 Chinese responses to 212–13, 222–3, 231–2, 239 Cold War origins of US alliance system 201–4 in context of strategic rivalry 169–70 disparate interpretations 199–200

as exacerbating ‘security dilemma’ dynamics 200–201 five pillars of 199–200 formerly ‘pivot’ to Asia 14, 227, 359, 406, 458 fundamental question of 201 grand bifurcation and protracted divorce 208–210 and Japan 246–7, 256–9 likely to lead to more resources devoted to 248 meshing well with majority of Asia-Pacific governments 468–9 military involvement 199–200, 215, 406–9 need for ‘geopolitical glue’ 216 Nixon Doctrine and US–China rapprochement 204–8 as strategic shift against China 225–8 terrorism detente and divorce delayed 210–14 threat to pre-existing security dilemma dynamics 215 see also ‘pivot’ to Asia Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 140 Republic of China (ROC) 8–9, 283, 285–6, 297–8 revolution in military affairs (RMA) 380, 400, 433, 435, 446 Roosevelt, F.D. 8, 206 Scarborough Shoal 14, 172, 260, 295, 303, 312–13 sea lines of communications (SLOCS) 189, 259, 329, 370, 385, 393, 402, 438 security threats see threats (security) Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands see Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands soft power 165–7, 191–4, 323, 326, 328, 335–6 South China Sea China actions of concern to South Korea 277 advantage of geographical proximity 362

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Handbook of US–China relations

arguments used to boost claims to 304 assertive moves in 13, 74, 85–6, 172 countries in dispute with 303, 431–2 creeping annexation of 14–15, 402 declining influence in 468 and economic ties with neighbours 231 expansion of naval and air presence in 402 harassing US Navy surveillance vessel in 295, 317 and Japan’s reliance on sea lanes 251, 259 land reclamation in 105, 109, 148, 172–3, 433, 442 military strategic guidelines 434–5, 439–40 no intention of backing away from interests in 236 ‘polderization’ of 340 spheres of influence in 365 standoff with Philippines 260 strategic importance for maritime strategy 232 ‘strategic space’ in 237 territorial claims 13, 15, 74, 172 use of economic tools as form of coercion in 89 use of law enforcement forces 233 as present day area of tension 13 US concern over China’s military activity in 91–2, 212, 235, 466 critical of China’s stance over 226 distant blockade strategy 371 effectiveness of ASB 409 maritime denial strategies 373 military’s recent activities in 407 potential adjustment of involvement 400 reasons for concern about China in 315–16 recommendations for preventing conflict 316–17 reconnaissance activities 165

role in China’s disputes 304–5, 309–15 as standing too close to Japan 487 surveillance aircraft intercepted 210 US–China relations 85–6, 91–2, 214 South Korea China establishing formal diplomatic relations 268 as major trading partner of 181 relations remaining locked in Cold War 267 trade comparison 467 trade ties increasing 268 economy 247–8 feeling need to acquire own nuclear weapons 273 ‘hub and spokes’ alliance network 29 military capabilities 249 and North Korea invasion by 46, 267 sinking of submarines 245–6 talks to negotiate end to nuclear program 270 Obama’s visits to 14 patent filings 145 reliance on South China Sea lanes 251 reunification under, as result of collapse of DPRK 273–4 as ‘tiger’ economy 29 US ensuring peace and stability on Peninsula 170 least likely contributor 370 major air base in 389 military commitment to 49 signing defense treaties with 202 stationing troops in 9, 188 strengthening alliance with 127, 200–201, 230, 258 strengthening military commitment to 49 treaty partners 482 US–China relations heavily dependent on evolution of 280

Index 507 role in 264–5 strategic dilemma in 274–9 Soviet Union challenge to leadership of communist movement 52 China and US 32–3, 44–5, 201–7, 287–8, 298, 456 rapid demise of 62, 215 Sino–Soviet split 9, 53, 57, 205, 268, 286–7, 298 space power (China) 347–9, 435 space systems 445–7 spheres of influence 159, 170, 173, 365, 393, 483, 488 Spratly Islands 303–4, 311–14, 317, 402 strategic rivalry see US–China strategic rivalry 21st Century Maritime Silk Road 431, 439–40, 443 Taiwan ceded to Japan 266 challenge for 299 China declining influence of 468 military options against 383–4, 387, 389–91, 393, 399–400 post-Taiwan future 440 reaching free trade agreement with 141 defense policy 390–91 importance of, to US strategy 202–3 mass demonstrations 466 president promoting greater independence from China 457 reunification, chances of 8, 283, 288, 291–2, 297–9, 384 reversal over 8 Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 253 Strait crisis (1954–55) 50, 202 Strait crisis (1962) 53 Strait crisis (1995–96) 209–10, 288–91, 298, 341, 343–4, 346–7, 386, 455 as ‘tiger’ economy 29

US ability to defend 298–9, 363, 373, 383–4 concerns about defense of 46 military commitment to 49, 391, 460 sacrifice of 9, 298–9 sales of aircraft to 10 support for 267 US–China relations 1996 quarrel 69 2008 attempt at closure 105 as arguably most significant issue between 283, 297 Chen Shui-bian era 291–3 Clinton’s response to PLA 104 collaborative approach on 72–3 emergence of problem 284–6 end of Cold War and Taiwan Strait crisis 288–91, 298, 455 Joint Communiqué 205–7 MaYing-jeou and Obama 294–7 Mutual Defense Treaty 8–9, 202–3, 285–7, 297 and Nixon, Ford and Carter 55–6 and Reagan 206–7 as significant source of tensions between 9, 44 Sino–Soviet split and US–China rapprochement 286–8 US arms sales 71, 73, 164–5, 171 US using underhand means of interfering in Taiwan’s protests 487–8 Taiwan Relations Act 9, 287–8, 393–4, 296, 299, 482 terrorist attacks of 9/11 13, 71–2, 185, 210–14, 293, 331, 457, 486 threats (security) airborne 343–4, 391–2 cyber 350–52, 412–13, 420–21, 423 exposure rate (TER) 420 low-intensity 443 nuclear 50, 270, 351 from rogue states 393–4 Thucydides Trap 160, 238, 430 Tiananmen Square incident China learning from 113

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Handbook of US–China relations

comparison with 2014 Hong Kong demonstrations 111–12 courting of Chinese students of 68 event marking 25th anniversary 85 fatalities 63–4 implications of EU arms embargo 481 human rights issues 17, 104 moral backlash 288–9 security relations 200 shattered cooperation 456 on Sino–US relations 9–11, 64–6, 102–4, 207, 290, 298, 476–7 as ‘long in the brewing’ 63 momentousness of occasion 102 trade in services 139 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement 143–4, 146 trade volume in goods 139 trading system, global 140 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 120, 122, 127, 140, 169, 230, 247, 296 Truman, Harry 46–9, 57, 202, 206, 284–5 United States (US) Air Force (USAF) 360–61, 367–8, 407–8, 446 alliance system, Cold War origins of 201–4 arousal of, in Asia-Pacific region 468–70 as conspiratorial 118–20 contested regions 35–9 and East Asia 25–6, 40 economic performance 6, 168 hegemony paradoxes of 33–5, 38 influence in Japan 30–32 making of Pacific power early history 26–7 early relations with Japan 27–8 post-war order 28–9 military response to China AirSea Battle (ASB) 366–70, 407–9 distant blockade strategy 370–71

to emerging military challenge 361–4 future predictions 373–4 grand strategic options 364–6, 374 maritime denial strategies 371–3 pivot toward Asia 406–7, 409–10 readjustment of Asia-Pacific posture 359–60 Navy (USN) 360–61, 367–8, 406–9 perspectives on China economics 86–9 as largely negative 93–4 military 89–92 politics 83–6 rhetoric becoming increasingly hostile 93–4 redefining region 28–9 as reluctant regionalist 36–7 role in Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute 305–9 role in South China Sea Islands dispute 309–15 see also People’s Republic of China (PRC), US relations with; US–China relations United States Trade Representative (USTR) 143, 145 US–China power balance how China perceives power 324–8 how US perceives power 329–30 limitations to assessing 334–6 methods of assessing each other’s power 323–4 US–China relations challenges in 16–17, 485–7 changing logics of 223–5 China as regional rival 32–5, 39–40 China’s perceptions of US 126–8 creating an axis for peace 315–17 economic China’s export trade 135–40, 149, 151–2 China’s rise 5–7, 10, 17, 133–4 intellectual property rights 142–7 interaction approaches 134–41, 150–51 overcoming geopolitics 147–50 US export trade 137–9, 147

Index 509 evolution of end of Cold War and Tiananmen Massacre 9–11 positive and negative accounts 7–8 present day tensions and US Pivot 13–16 rise of Chinese Nationalism 11–12 World War II and Cold War 8–9 future of 173–4 future prospects for 17–18, 490–91 human rights 1989 Tiananmen Incident 102–3 2014 Hong Kong demonstrations 111–13 during Clinton administration 67–70, 477 criticisms of China 118, 127, 149, 486 dominating agendas in policy 10, 17 since 1989 104–11 structure-transforming events 101–2 implications of US rebalance to Asia 199–216 importance of challenge of who says what 485–7 in future 490–91 grand narratives 476–80 as ‘most crucial of 21st century’ 475 question of allegiances 480–84 for regional stability in Asia 3–5 risks to relationship 487–9 viewing China’s rise 484–5 integral role of Japan in 245–7, 261 military capabilities 164–5, 174, 194 outlook for aroused United States 468–70 China’s domestic preoccupations 460–62 China’s insecure position in Asia-Pacific 463–5 constrained China 460, 470–71 erratic pattern in 455–58 measuring China’s relationships 465–6 recommendations for 470–71

shortcomings in China’s economic influence 466–8 strong interdependence 462–3 Xi Jinping’s foreign policy: image and reality 458–9 paradoxes of hegemony 33–5 and Taiwan Chen Shui-bian era 291–3 emergence of problem 284–6 end of Cold War and Taiwan Strait crisis 288–91, 298 future possibility of war 298–9 and MaYing-Jeou and Obama 394–7 Mutual Defense Treaty 8–9, 202–3, 285–7, 297 problem of 283–4 Sino–Soviet split and US–China rapprochement 286–8, 298 US–China strategic rivalry in Asia-Pacific region more assertive Chinese foreign policy 171–3 US rebalancing strategy 169–70 attempts to shape discourse 159–60 economic power 161–3 future of relations 195–6 global influence 167–8 military capabilities 164–5 models peaceful co-existence 159 realism, of power transition 159 tributary system 159 soft power 165–7 Vietnam China aid to communist insurgency in 48–9 disputed territories with 303, 402 incentive to ‘out-democratize’ 110 losing competitive edge to 162 Mao urging caution to North Vietnam 50 PLA’s clash with 380 PRC’s clash with 484 tough stand on disputes with 232, 304

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and Japan 259–60 US considering selling weapons to 91 improving relations with 127, 258, 480 seeking to expand access to ports in 406 US–China relations 1954 203 1970s and 1980s 309–10 present day 119, 230, 311–14, 316 Vietnam war US impact on 29, 287 ‘Vietnamizing’ war effort 204–5 US–China relations 9, 45, 52–3, 57, 205 Washington Consensus 7, 17, 186 White Papers (Chinese defense) 291, 325, 361, 380, 382, 389, 401, 431–5, 438–9 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 144 World Trade Organization (WTO) China’s accession to benefits of 137–8 highlighting paradoxes and contradictions of US–China relations 33–4 impact of 477–78 US supporting 70, 137, 161, 290–91 China’s perceived failure to adhere to regulations 89, 138 China’s use of 138 and laws on intellectual property 142–3 World War II 8–9 Xi Jinping attempts to expand strategic space 483 call for ‘New Asian Security Concept’ 173

‘China Dream’ 107–8, 359, 364, 459, 471, 483 Chinese comment on diplomatic efforts of 105 comments on common interest in South China Sea 214 daughter attended Harvard University 193 and Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute 306–8 diplomatic moves 148, 482 as dismissive of US complaints 468 domestic concerns of 461 efforts to root out deep corruption 194 foreign policy bluster 471 changes to 171–3 new phase in 455–6 tightening political control domestically 459 vision to strategy 231–3 as likely to avoid confrontation in period ahead 459, 461, 463, 486 meetings with Obama 112–13, 148, 212, 234, 258, 307–8, 423, 461, 485 and military innovation 327–8 as originator of ‘new model of major power relations’ slogan 182, 244–5 period of engagement leading to new trade deals 483 promoting China’s soft power 166, 326 and South Korea 275–7 state visit to UK 162 substantial global strategy under 149 summary of China’s relations 465–6 uncertainty about actions and intentions of 458 US comment on political system under 84–5, 88 weaknesses of economic investment and financing plans 463 weaknesses of investment and financing plans 466–8